Equipment trusted startup method and device, electronic equipment and storage medium

Abstract

The invention provides an equipment trusted startup method and device, electronic equipment and a storage medium. The method relates to the technical field of trusted startup, and comprises the following steps: under the condition that first electronic equipment is in a power-on state, obtaining unique identification information of a first component included in the first electronic equipment; performing data encryption on the unique identification information to obtain first encrypted data; based on the first encrypted data, verifying a first component included in the first electronic equipment to obtain a verification result; the verification result represents a trusted measurement result of the first electronic equipment; based on the verification result, starting of the first electronic equipment is controlled; and in response to the fact that the first electronic equipment is not successfully started, determining a first component in an untrusted state based on the verification result. Through the method and the device, the reason of the trusted boot failure can be accurately determined.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of trusted boot technology, and in particular to a device trusted boot method, apparatus, electronic device and storage medium. Background Art

[0002] In the existing device trusted boot method, if a trusted measurement anomaly causes the device to fail to boot, the device will be prohibited from further booting. At this time, the trusted measurement log stored in the chip cannot be read separately, resulting in the inability to determine the cause of the trusted boot failure. The existing device trusted boot method has the problem of being unable to accurately determine the cause of the trusted boot failure. Summary of the invention

[0003] Embodiments of the present application provide a device trusted startup method, apparatus, electronic device, and storage medium.

[0004] According to a first aspect of the present application, a device trusted startup method is provided, the method comprising: The present application provides a device trusted startup method, the method comprising: when the first electronic device is in a powered-on state, obtaining unique identification information of a first component included in the first electronic device; encrypting the unique identification information to obtain first encrypted data; based on the first encrypted data, verifying the first component included in the first electronic device to obtain a verification result; the verification result represents a trusted measurement result of the first electronic device; based on the verification result, controlling the startup of the first electronic device; in response to the first electronic device not being successfully started, determining that the first component is in an untrusted state based on the verification result.

[0005] According to one embodiment of the present application, the first component includes: a processor, a memory, a PCIe peripheral component interconnect fast bus device, and the present application also provides one or more of the systems.

[0006] According to one embodiment of the present application, unique identification information of a first component included in a first electronic device is obtained, including at least one of the following: based on the chip version and socket identifier of the processor, unique identification information of the processor is calculated through an objective function; unique identification information of the memory is determined by traversing the serial presence detection data of the memory; unique identification information of the PCIe device is determined based on the register information of the PCIe device read; unique identification information of the system is determined based on the boot file information of the system read.

[0007] According to one embodiment of the present application, obtaining unique identification information of a first component included in a first electronic device includes: obtaining an initialization sequence of the first component; and obtaining the unique identification information of the first component in sequence based on the initialization sequence.

[0008] According to one embodiment of the present application, the method also includes: sending first encrypted data to a baseboard management controller of a first electronic device; the baseboard management controller performs a trust measurement based on reference component information and the first encrypted data through a preset trust measurement algorithm to obtain a verification result.

[0009] According to one embodiment of the present application, based on the reference component information and the first encrypted data, a trusted measurement is performed through a preset trusted measurement algorithm to obtain a verification result, including: the reference component information characterizes the trusted measurement standard of the first component; the first encrypted data is decrypted to obtain unique identification information of the first component; the unique identification information is matched with the reference component information according to the component type of the first component through a preset trusted measurement algorithm to obtain a sub-verification result corresponding to the same component type; and the verification result is determined based on the sub-verification result corresponding to each component type.

[0010] According to an embodiment of the present application, the method further includes: when the first electronic device is started for the first time, performing data processing on unique identification information of a first component included in the first electronic device to obtain reference component information.

[0011] According to one embodiment of the present application, based on the verification result, the startup of the first electronic device is controlled, including: in response to the verification result indicating that all first components included in the first electronic device are in a trusted state, starting the first electronic device; in response to the verification result indicating that there is a first component in the first electronic device that is in an untrusted state, pausing the startup of the first electronic device.

[0012] According to one embodiment of the present application, the method also includes: in response to the verification result indicating that the first component is in an untrusted state, parsing the sub-verification result corresponding to the first component in the untrusted state to obtain first data; the first data at least includes problem description information of the first component in the trust measurement process; and outputting the first data.

[0013] According to a second aspect of the present application, a device trusted startup apparatus is provided, the apparatus comprising: a basic input-output system, for obtaining unique identification information of a first component included in a first electronic device when the first electronic device is in a powered-on state; the basic input-output system is also used to encrypt the unique identification information to obtain first encrypted data; a baseboard management controller is used to verify the first component included in the first electronic device based on the first encrypted data to obtain a verification result; the verification result represents a trusted measurement result of the first electronic device; the basic input-output system is also used to control the startup of the first electronic device based on the verification result; the basic input-output system is also used to determine that the first component is in an untrusted state based on the verification result in response to the first electronic device not being successfully started.

[0014] According to one embodiment of the present application, the first component includes: a processor, a memory, a PCIe peripheral component interconnect fast bus device, and the present application also provides one or more of the systems.

[0015] According to one embodiment of the present application, the basic input and output system is used for at least one of the following: based on the chip version and socket identifier of the processor, calculating the unique identification information of the processor through the objective function; determining the unique identification information of the memory by traversing the serial presence detection data of the memory; determining the unique identification information of the PCIe device based on the register information of the PCIe device read; determining the unique identification information of the system based on the boot file information of the system read.

[0016] According to one embodiment of the present application, the basic input and output system is used to: obtain the initialization order of the first component; and obtain the unique identification information of the first component in sequence based on the initialization order.

[0017] According to one embodiment of the present application, the basic input and output system is used to: send first encrypted data to a baseboard management controller of a first electronic device; the baseboard management controller is used to perform trust measurement based on reference component information and the first encrypted data through a preset trust measurement algorithm to obtain a verification result.

[0018] According to one embodiment of the present application, reference component information represents a standard of a trust measurement of a first component; a baseboard management controller is used to: decrypt the first encrypted data to obtain unique identification information of the first component; match the unique identification information with the reference component information according to the component type of the first component through a preset trust measurement algorithm to obtain a sub-verification result corresponding to the same component type; and determine the verification result based on the sub-verification result corresponding to each component type.

[0019] According to an embodiment of the present application, the baseboard management controller is further used to: when the first electronic device is started for the first time, perform data processing on the unique identification information of the first component included in the first electronic device to obtain reference component information.

[0020] According to one embodiment of the present application, the basic input and output system is used to: in response to a verification result indicating that all first components included in the first electronic device are in a trusted state, start the first electronic device; in response to a verification result indicating that there is a first component in the first electronic device that is in an untrusted state, suspend the startup of the first electronic device.

[0021] According to one embodiment of the present application, the basic input-output system is also used for: in response to a verification result indicating that the first component is in an untrusted state, parsing the sub-verification result corresponding to the first component in the untrusted state to obtain first data; the first data at least includes problem description information of the first component in a trusted measurement process; and outputting the first data.

[0022] According to a third aspect of the present application, an electronic device is provided, including: at least one processor; and a memory communicatively connected to the at least one processor; wherein, The memory stores instructions that can be executed by the at least one processor, and the instructions are executed by the at least one processor to enable the at least one processor to perform the method described in the present application.

[0023] According to a fourth aspect of the present application, a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium storing computer instructions is provided, wherein the computer instructions are used to enable the computer to execute the method described in the present application.

[0024] The method of the embodiment of the present application, when the first electronic device is in a powered-on state, obtains the unique identification information of the first component included in the first electronic device; encrypts the unique identification information to obtain the first encrypted data; based on the first encrypted data, verifies the first component included in the first electronic device to obtain a verification result; the verification result represents the trust measurement result of the first electronic device; based on the verification result, controls the startup of the first electronic device; in response to the first electronic device not being successfully started, determines the first component in an untrusted state based on the verification result. In this way, the cause of the failure of the trusted startup can be accurately determined.

[0025] It should be understood that the teachings of the present application are not required to achieve all of the beneficial effects described above, but specific technical solutions can achieve specific technical effects, and other embodiments of the present application can also achieve beneficial effects not mentioned above. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0026] By reading the detailed description below with reference to the accompanying drawings, the above and other purposes, features and advantages of the exemplary embodiments of the present application will become easily understood. In the accompanying drawings, several embodiments of the present application are shown in an exemplary and non-limiting manner, wherein: In the drawings, the same or corresponding reference numerals represent the same or corresponding parts.

[0027] Figure 1 The schematic diagram shows the processing flow of the device trusted startup method provided by the embodiment of the present application. Figure 1 ; Figure 2 The schematic diagram shows the processing flow of the device trusted startup method provided by the embodiment of the present application. Figure 2 ; Figure 3 The schematic diagram shows the processing flow of the device trusted startup method provided by the embodiment of the present application. Figure 3 ; Figure 4 The schematic diagram shows the processing flow of the device trusted startup method provided by the embodiment of the present application. Figure 4 ; Figure 5 The schematic diagram shows the processing flow of the device trusted startup method provided by the embodiment of the present application. Figure 5 ; Figure 6 The schematic diagram shows the processing flow of the device trusted startup method provided by the embodiment of the present application. Figure 6 ; Figure 7 An application scenario diagram of the device trusted startup method provided by an embodiment of the present application is shown; Figure 8 Another application scenario diagram of the device trusted startup method provided in an embodiment of the present application is shown; Fig. 9 An optional schematic diagram of a device trusted startup apparatus provided in an embodiment of the present application is shown; Fig.10 An optional schematic diagram of an electronic device provided in an embodiment of the present application is shown. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0028] In order to make the purpose, features, and advantages of the present application more obvious and easy to understand, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present application. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present application, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present application.

[0029] In the following description, reference is made to “some embodiments”, which describe a subset of all possible embodiments, but it will be understood that “some embodiments” may be the same subset or different subsets of all possible embodiments and may be combined with each other without conflict.

[0030] In the following description, the terms "first\second" involved are merely used to distinguish similar objects and do not represent a specific ordering of the objects. It can be understood that "first\second" can be interchanged with a specific order or sequence where permitted, so that the embodiments of the present application described herein can be implemented in an order other than that illustrated or described herein.

[0031] Unless otherwise defined, all technical and scientific terms used herein have the same meaning as those commonly understood by those skilled in the art to which this application belongs. The terms used herein are only for the purpose of describing the embodiments of this application and are not intended to limit this application.

[0032] Before further describing the embodiments of the present application in detail, the nouns and terms involved in the embodiments of the present application are explained. The nouns and terms involved in the embodiments of the present application are subject to the following interpretations.

[0033] Trusted Boot: is a secure boot mechanism designed to ensure the integrity and trustworthiness of components loaded and used by the device during the boot process.

[0034] BIOS (Basic Input Output System): It is the starting point of computer system operation. It is used to perform self-test of hardware components when the device starts.

[0035] RAID (Redundant Array of Independent Disks): is a data storage technology that combines multiple independent physical hard disks in a specific way to form a logical storage unit, thereby increasing the data read and write speed of the storage system and enhancing data redundancy to improve fault tolerance. Different RAID levels can achieve different performance and security goals.

[0036] PCIe (Peripheral Component Interconnect Express): is a high-speed serial computer expansion bus standard that uses an efficient point-to-point connection protocol. It has high-speed, low-latency, high-bandwidth and other transmission characteristics, supports hot plugging, and is widely used in a variety of high-performance components and peripherals in modern computer systems. It has become the core technology for connecting modern high-performance hardware.

[0037] BMC (Baseboard Management Controller): used to remotely manage and monitor the hardware status of the device. BMC has its own processor and memory and is independent of the device's controller, memory, and operating system.

[0038] NVMe (Non-Volatile Memory Express): is a communication protocol based on the PCIe interface, designed specifically for SSDs (solid-state drives) to provide high-speed, low-latency storage access.

[0039] The processing flow of the device trusted startup method provided in the embodiment of the present application is described. Figure 1 , Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the processing flow of the device trusted startup method provided in the embodiment of the present application Figure 1 , will combine Figure 1 Steps S101-S104 are shown for explanation.

[0040] Step S101: when the first electronic device is powered on, unique identification information of a first component included in the first electronic device is obtained.

[0041] In some embodiments, the first electronic device may include a server. The server may include a BIOS and a BMC. The first electronic device may include other electronic devices, and the embodiments of the present application do not limit specific electronic devices. The power-on state may include: the first electronic device has been powered on, and the power supply begins to supply power to the various components inside the first electronic device, and the first electronic device is in an initial state with power for subsequent operations, but the first electronic device at this time has not yet been fully started to enter a normal operating state. The first component may include: one or more of a processor, a memory, a PCIe (Peripheral Component Interconnect Express bus) device, and a system. The unique identification information may include: unique and tamper-proof identity information of the first component. For example: identification information such as the serial number of the motherboard and the unique ID of the processor. When the first electronic device is in a powered-on state, the BIOS can obtain the unique identification information of the first component included in the first electronic device.

[0042] Step S102, encrypt the unique identification information to obtain first encrypted data.

[0043] In some embodiments, data encryption may include: using an encryption algorithm to convert the unique identification information into ciphertext. The encryption algorithm may include: an AES encryption algorithm, a SHA256 encryption algorithm, an MD5 encryption algorithm, and the like. The embodiments of the present application do not limit the specific encryption algorithm. The BIOS may perform data encryption on the unique identification information to obtain first encrypted data. The first encrypted data is data obtained after encrypting the unique identification information, and the first encrypted data may be used in a subsequent verification process.

[0044] Step S103: verifying a first component included in the first electronic device based on the first encrypted data to obtain a verification result; the verification result represents a trust measurement result of the first electronic device.

[0045] Step S104: based on the verification result, controlling the startup of the first electronic device.

[0046] In some embodiments, the verification result may include: information characterizing the trust measurement result of the first electronic device. If the verification result indicates that the verification is passed, the first electronic device is trustworthy and can continue to start normally. If the verification result indicates that the verification is not passed, the first electronic device is not trustworthy and cannot continue to start normally. The BIOS can send the first encrypted data to the BMC, and the BMC verifies the first component included in the first electronic device based on the first encrypted data to obtain a verification result. The BMC can send the verification result to the BIOS. The BIOS can control the startup of the first electronic device based on the verification result. The BIOS in this embodiment can be used as a computing component and an execution component, and the BMC can be used as a protection component. The resources of the BIOS and BMC are physically isolated and can only communicate through a secure channel.

[0047] Step S105 , in response to the first electronic device not being successfully started, determining the first component in an untrusted state based on the verification result.

[0048] In some embodiments, the untrusted state indicates that the first component is found to be abnormal or inconsistent with expected integrity information during the verification process, and it is impossible to determine whether the first component has been tampered with.

[0049] As an example, when the server is powered on, the BIOS obtains the serial number of the server's motherboard. The BIOS calls the SHA256 algorithm to encrypt the serial number of the motherboard, and generates the first encrypted data corresponding to the serial number of the motherboard, and the first encrypted data contains the encrypted representation of the unique identification information of the motherboard. The BIOS sends the first encrypted data to the BMC built into the server. The BMC stores the trusted reference component information, and the BMC performs a trust measurement on the reference component information and the received first encrypted data to obtain a verification result. The BMC can send the verification result to the BIOS. The BIOS can control the startup of the first electronic device based on the verification result. Specifically, if the verification result indicates that the verification is passed, the server is trusted, and the server is allowed to run normally. If the verification result indicates that the verification is not passed, the server is untrustworthy, and the server is prevented from starting and the alarm mechanism is triggered, prompting "Server startup abnormality, security risk!" and recording a log. When the server fails to start successfully, the BIOS will analyze the verification results to find out which components of the server have verification results that are in an untrustworthy state. By analyzing the abnormal information in the verification results, such as hash value mismatch, etc., a specific untrustworthy component, such as a damaged CPU, can be accurately located.

[0050] The method of the embodiment of the present application constructs a parallel system architecture of "computing" and "protection" through the BIOS and BMC in the electronic device, and realizes the trusted startup of the electronic device. The components included in the electronic device are measured for trustworthiness, and the cause of the trusted startup failure can be accurately determined based on the unique identification information of the components, which realizes the precision of the trusted measurement, effectively improves the security and reliability of the electronic device startup, ensures that the electronic device can resist potential security threats during the startup process, and ensures the normal operation of the electronic device and the security of data.

[0051] In some embodiments, the processing flow of the device trusted startup method is shown as follows: Figure 2 ,like Figure 2 As shown, the device trusted startup method may include: Step S201a, based on the chip version and socket identifier of the processor, the unique identification information of the processor is calculated through the objective function.

[0052] In this embodiment, the chip version of the processor may include: specific version information of the processor. The chip version of each processor is different. Specifically, the CPU_VERSION (chip version) function number of the x processor is 0xC0000000. The socket identifier (Socket ID) can be used to identify the physical location or socket number of the processor on the motherboard. Different processors can be installed on different sockets. The target function may include: a function for calculating unique identification information. In this embodiment, the target function can be used to calculate the chip version and socket identifier of the processor to obtain the unique identification information.

[0053] As an example, for obtaining the unique identification information of processor A, processor A uses CPU_VERSION to identify the chip version of the processor, and its function number is 0xC22222222. BIOS can input the function number of CPU_VERSION and the Socket ID of processor A into the target function for calculation to obtain the unique identification information.

[0054] Step S201b, determining the unique identification information of the memory by traversing the serial presence detection data of the memory.

[0055] In this embodiment, the serial presence detection (SPD) data may include: attribute information of DIMM (Dual In-line Memory Module). Each DIMM has an EEPROM (Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory) chip for storing SPD data. The attribute information of DIMM may specifically include: chip and module manufacturer, operating frequency, serial number, operating voltage, speed, capacity, voltage, and row and column address bandwidth and other information.

[0056] As an example, to obtain the unique identification information of the memory in the server, all the DIMMs in place on the server are traversed. Each DIMM has a corresponding SPD data, and the BIOS reads the SPD data by accessing the EEPROM chip on the DIMM. From the SPD data, the BIOS can extract the serial number of the DIMM as the unique identification information of the DIMM.

[0057] Step S201c: determining unique identification information of the PCIe device based on the read register information of the PCIe device.

[0058] In this embodiment, the register of the PCIe device can store information such as configuration information and status information of the PCIe device. During the PCIe device enumeration process, the BIOS reads the register of the PCIe configuration space, obtains the unique identifier included in the register information of each PCIe device, classifies all PCIe devices according to the device type register (Class Code), and then splices the unique identifier of each type of PCIe device together to obtain the unique identification information of the PCIe device. The PCIe architecture can be composed of PCIe devices of types such as root complex, switch and endpoint. The PCIe device enumeration can include: starting from the root complex, using a depth-first algorithm to scan the PCIe devices in the first electronic device. The scanning process will go deep into every possible branch path until it cannot go deeper, and each PCIe device node will only be accessed once. During the PCIe device enumeration process, the host can identify the attribute information such as the type and function of the PCIe device.

[0059] As an example, to obtain the unique identification information of the PCIe device in the server, the BIOS reads the register information of each network card to obtain the MAC address of each network port of each network card, and combines the MAC addresses of all network ports of all network cards to obtain the unique identification information of the network card.

[0060] Step S201d: determining the unique identification information of the system based on the read system startup file information.

[0061] In this embodiment, the startup file information may include Grub (GRand Unified Bootloader, Grand Unified Boot Loader) file information, Shim file information, kernel file information, and Initrd (Initial RAMDisk, Initial RAM Disk) file information and other information. The embodiment of the present application does not limit the specific system startup file information. Grub may include the GNU boot loader. Grub can be used to boot the operating system. Shim can be used to ensure that Grub can work normally in SecureBoot mode. Kernel is the most basic part of the operating system. Kernel can be used to implement functions such as hardware management, process management, memory management, file system management, and system calls. Initrd is a temporary root file system loaded into the memory when the system starts. Initrd may include various executable programs and drivers, which can be used to mount the root file system.

[0062] As an example, BIOS reads the boot file information of the system (OS), reads out the unique value in the boot file information, and combines the read unique values ​​to obtain the unique identification information of the system as a whole. The boot file information includes: Grub file information, Shim file information, Kernel file information and Initrd file information.

[0063] In the embodiment of the present application, a parallel system architecture of "computing" and "protection" is constructed through the BIOS and BMC in the electronic device, and the trusted startup of the electronic device is realized. The CPU, memory, PCIe device and system included in the electronic device are measured for trustworthiness. According to the unique identification information of each component, the cause of the trusted startup failure can be accurately determined, and the trustworthiness measurement is realized. The security and reliability of the startup of the electronic device are effectively improved, ensuring that the electronic device can resist potential security threats during the startup process, and ensuring the normal operation of the electronic device and the security of data.

[0064] Step S202: encrypt the unique identification information to obtain first encrypted data.

[0065] The specific description of step S202 is the same as that of step S102 and will not be repeated here.

[0066] As an example, data is encrypted on at least one of the obtained unique identification information of the processor, the unique identification information of the memory, the unique identification information of the PCIe device, and the unique identification information of the system to obtain first encrypted data. For example, data is encrypted on the obtained unique identification information of the processor to obtain first encrypted data. Alternatively, data is encrypted on the obtained unique identification information of the processor and the unique identification information of the memory to obtain first encrypted data. Alternatively, data is encrypted on the obtained unique identification information of the processor, the unique identification information of the memory, the unique identification information of the PCIe device, and the unique identification information of the system to obtain first encrypted data. The embodiments of the present application do not limit the specific unique identification information for data encryption.

[0067] In some embodiments, the processing flow of the device trusted startup method is shown as follows: Figure 3 ,like Figure 3 As shown, the obtaining of the unique identification information of the first component included in the first electronic device in step S101 may also include: Step S301, obtaining the initialization order of the first component.

[0068] Step S302: based on the initialization order, obtain the unique identification information of the first component in sequence.

[0069] In this embodiment, the initialization sequence may include: when the first electronic device is in a powered-on state, the BIOS initializes various components in a predetermined sequence.

[0070] As an example, when the server is powered on, the BIOS first initializes the processor, then the memory, then the PCIe device, and finally the system. The BIOS first calculates the unique identification information of the processor based on the chip version and socket identifier of the processor through the objective function; then, by traversing the serial presence detection data of the memory, the unique identification information of the memory is determined; then, based on the register information of the PCIe device read, the unique identification information of the PCIe device is determined; finally, based on the boot file information of the system read, the unique identification information of the system is determined.

[0071] After step S302, the device trusted boot method may further include: the BIOS calculates the HASH values ​​of the processor, memory, PCIe device and system in sequence through the SHA256 algorithm based on the initialization order.

[0072] In the embodiment of the present application, a parallel system architecture of "computing" and "protection" is constructed through the BIOS and BMC in the electronic device, and the trusted startup of the electronic device is realized. The CPU, memory, PCIe device and system included in the electronic device are measured in turn at different operation stages. According to the unique identification information of each component, the cause of the trusted startup failure can be accurately determined, and the precision of the trusted measurement is realized, which effectively improves the security and reliability of the electronic device startup, ensures that the electronic device can resist potential security threats during the startup process, and ensures the normal operation of the electronic device and the security of data.

[0073] In some embodiments, the processing flow of the device trusted startup method is shown as follows: Figure 4 ,like Figure 4 As shown, the device trusted startup method may also include: Step S401: sending first encrypted data to a baseboard management controller of a first electronic device.

[0074] Step S402: The baseboard management controller performs trust measurement based on the reference component information and the first encrypted data by using a preset trust measurement algorithm to obtain a verification result.

[0075] In this embodiment, the BIOS then sends the HASH values ​​of the processor, memory, PCIe device and system to the BMC in sequence according to the initialization order. The reference component information may include: encrypted component information pre-stored in the BMC. The reference component information may be used to compare with the first encrypted data through a trusted measurement algorithm to verify the credibility of the first component. The trusted measurement algorithm may include: an algorithm for evaluating the security and credibility of the component. The trusted measurement algorithm may be used to determine the verification result by comparing the encrypted data with the reference information. Through the trusted measurement algorithm in the TPCM (Trusted Platform Control Module) of the BMC, a trusted measurement is performed based on the reference component information and the first encrypted data to obtain a verification result. TPCM can be integrated in the BMC to realize its functions through the hardware resources and system architecture of the BMC. TPCM can be used to realize functions such as trusted measurement, secure storage, trusted reporting and cryptographic services.

[0076] In the embodiment of the present application, a parallel system architecture of "computing" and "protection" is constructed through the BIOS and BMC in the electronic device, and the trusted startup of the electronic device is realized. The CPU, memory, PCIe device and system included in the electronic device are measured in turn at different operation stages. According to the unique identification information of each component, the cause of the trusted startup failure can be accurately determined, and the precision of the trusted measurement is realized, which effectively improves the security and reliability of the electronic device startup, ensures that the electronic device can resist potential security threats during the startup process, and ensures the normal operation of the electronic device and the security of data.

[0077] In some embodiments, the processing flow of the device trusted startup method is shown as follows: Figure 5 ,like Figure 5 As shown, the device trusted startup method may include: Step S501, decrypt the first encrypted data to obtain unique identification information of the first component.

[0078] In this embodiment, the function structure code of the first encrypted data may specifically include: Typedef struct{ UINT8 firmware_type; UINT8 firmware_detail_type; UINT8 firmware_hash_len; UINT8 firmware_hash_content

[32] ; UINT8 firmware_version_len; UINT8 firmware_version[4]; }FIRMWARE_MEASURE_INFO Among them, firmware_type represents: the component type of the first component. For example, 0 represents the processor; 1 represents the memory; 2 represents the PCIe device; 3 represents the system; firmware_detail_type indicates: the component type distinguished by the detailed information of the first component. For example, for memory, different values ​​are used to represent different memory slots. For PCIe devices, 0 indicates RAID; 1 indicates network card; 2 indicates NVME; 3 indicates image processor. For the system, 0 indicates Grub file information; 1 indicates Shim file information; 2 indicates Kernel file information; 3 indicates initrd file information.

[0079] firmware_hash_len indicates: the length of the HASH value of the first encrypted data; firmware_hash_content means: the HASH value of the first encrypted data; firmware_version_len means: the firmware version length of the first component; firmware_version indicates: the firmware version of the first component.

[0080] Step S502: Match the unique identification information with the reference component information according to the component type of the first component through a preset trust measurement algorithm to obtain a sub-verification result corresponding to the same component type.

[0081] In this embodiment, the reference component information is used to characterize the standard of the trust measurement of the first component. The reference component information may include: unencrypted component information pre-stored in the BMC. The reference component information may be used to match the component type of the first component with the unique identification information through a trust measurement algorithm to verify the trustworthiness of the first component. The reference component information may be encrypted or unencrypted. For unencrypted reference component information, the BMC may directly use this information for matching when performing trust measurement. For encrypted reference component information, the BMC needs to decrypt the encrypted information first when performing trust measurement.

[0082] Step S503: Determine the verification result based on the sub-verification result corresponding to each component type.

[0083] In this embodiment, the function structure code of the verification result may specifically include: Typedef struct{ UINT8 firmware_type; UINT8 firmware_detail_type; UINT8 firmware_code; UINT8 firmware_result; }FIRMWARE_MEASURE_Result Among them, firmware_type represents: the component type of the first component; 0 represents the processor; 1 represents the memory; 2 represents the PCIe device; 3 represents the system.

[0084] firmware_detail_type indicates: the component type distinguished by the detailed information of the first component. For example, for memory, different values ​​are used to represent different memory slots. For PCIe devices, 0 indicates RAID; 1 indicates network card; 2 indicates NVME; 3 indicates image processor. For the system, 0 indicates Grub file information; 1 indicates Shim file information; 2 indicates Kernel file information; 3 indicates initrd file information.

[0085] firmware_code means: interface completion code. The interface completion code is used to confirm the result call status.

[0086] firmware_result indicates: a trust measurement result of the first electronic device.

[0087] As an example, the first encrypted data is decrypted, and the obtained unique identification information of the first component includes the unique identification information of the PCIe device and the unique identification information of the memory.

[0088] For PCIe devices, BMC compares the unique identification information of the PCIe device with the PCIe device information in the reference component information to obtain a sub-verification result of the PCIe device. The sub-verification result of the PCIe device may include: the result of the component type distinguished according to the detailed information of the first component. Specifically, the verification result of RAID, the verification result of the network card, the verification result of NVME and the verification result of the image processor. For memory, BMC compares the unique identification information of the memory with the memory information in the reference component information to obtain a sub-verification result of the memory. The sub-verification result of the memory may include: the verification result of the memory in slot 1 and the verification result of the memory in slot 2.

[0089] Finally, the BMC determines the overall verification result based on the sub-verification results corresponding to each component type. If all sub-verification results are credible, the overall verification result is credible; if there are untrustworthy sub-verification results, the overall verification result is untrustworthy.

[0090] In some embodiments, the device trusted startup method may further include: when the first electronic device is started for the first time, performing data processing on unique identification information of a first component included in the first electronic device to obtain reference component information.

[0091] As an example, for the first electronic device, if it is the first time to start up, the BIOS reads the unique identification information of the first component included in the first electronic device, and encrypts the unique identification information to obtain a hash value. Then, the hash value is stored in the trusted storage area of ​​the BMC. The specific steps are as follows: After the BIOS is powered on, scan all the first components in the first electronic device, read the unique identification information of the first component, and use algorithms such as SHA-256 to perform hash calculations on the unique identification information to obtain a hash value. The hash value is sent to the BMC, and the BMC stores the hash value in the trusted storage area of ​​the BMC as reference component information. When the first electronic device is started subsequently, the verification result can be obtained by comparing and verifying the unique identification information with the reference component information.

[0092] In the embodiment of the present application, a parallel system architecture of "computing" and "protection" is constructed through the BIOS and BMC in the electronic device, and the trusted startup of the electronic device is realized. The CPU, memory, PCIe device and system included in the electronic device are measured in turn at different operation stages. According to the unique identification information of each component, the cause of the trusted startup failure can be accurately determined, and the precision of the trusted measurement is realized, which effectively improves the security and reliability of the electronic device startup, ensures that the electronic device can resist potential security threats during the startup process, and ensures the normal operation of the electronic device and the security of data.

[0093] In some embodiments, the processing flow of the device trusted startup method is shown as follows: Figure 6 ,like Figure 6 As shown, the device trusted startup method may include: Step S601: verify a first component included in a first electronic device based on first encrypted data to obtain a verification result.

[0094] In this embodiment, the first encrypted data is trusted according to the component type of the first component through the trust measurement algorithm in the TPCM of the BMC, and the sub-verification results corresponding to the same component type are obtained. The BMC determines the verification result of the first electronic device based on the sub-verification results corresponding to each component type. For example, if all sub-verification results are trustworthy, the verification result of the first electronic device is trustworthy; if there are untrustworthy sub-verification results, the verification result of the first electronic device is untrustworthy.

[0095] Step S602a: in response to the verification result indicating that all first components included in the first electronic device are in a trusted state, starting the first electronic device.

[0096] Step S602b: in response to the verification result indicating that a first component in the first electronic device is in an untrusted state, suspending the startup of the first electronic device.

[0097] In this embodiment, if the verification result of the first electronic device is credible, it is determined that the verification result indicates that all first components included in the first electronic device are in a credible state, and the BIOS starts the first electronic device in response to the verification result to allow it to operate normally. If the verification result of the first electronic device is untrustworthy, it is determined that the verification result indicates that there is a first component in the first electronic device that is in an untrustworthy state, and the BIOS suspends starting the first electronic device in response to the verification result. In some embodiments, the device trusted startup method may also include: in response to the verification result indicating that the first component is in an untrusted state, parsing the sub-verification result corresponding to the first component in the untrusted state to obtain first data; the first data may include problem description information of the first component in the trusted measurement process; and outputting the first data.

[0098] As an example, the BMC verifies the first components such as the processor, memory, PCIe device, and system in the server based on the first encrypted data to obtain a verification result. The verification result indicates that the processor, memory, and system are in a trusted state, but the PCIe device is in an untrusted state. The BIOS parses the sub-verification result corresponding to the PCIe device in an untrusted state, determines that the network card in the PCIe device is in an untrusted state, and obtains the problem description information of the network card in the trusted measurement process. The BIOS displays the problem description information of the network card in the trusted measurement process in the management system of the server.

[0099] In the embodiment of the present application, a parallel system architecture of "computing" and "protection" is constructed through the BIOS and BMC in the electronic device, and the trusted startup of the electronic device is realized. The CPU, memory, PCIe device and system included in the electronic device are measured in turn at different operation stages. According to the unique identification information of each component, the cause of the trusted startup failure can be accurately determined, and the precision of the trusted measurement is realized, which effectively improves the security and reliability of the electronic device startup, ensures that the electronic device can resist potential security threats during the startup process, and ensures the normal operation of the electronic device and the security of data.

[0100] Figure 7 An application scenario diagram of the device trusted startup method provided in an embodiment of the present application is shown.

[0101] refer to Figure 7 An application scenario of the device trusted startup method provided in an embodiment of the present application is applied to the trusted startup of a server.

[0102] Step L1, power on the server. Specifically, first the server is in a powered-on state. The server includes BIOS and BMC. The server also includes a processor, memory, PCIe device and system.

[0103] Step L2, calculate HASH and send it. Specifically, BIOS obtains the unique identification information of the processor, the unique identification information of the memory, the unique identification information of the PCIe device, and the unique identification information of the system. BIOS encrypts the obtained unique identification information of the processor, the unique identification information of the memory, the unique identification information of the PCIe device, and the unique identification information of the system through the SHA256 algorithm to obtain HASH data. BIOS sends the HASH data to the BMC.

[0104] Step L3, BMC-TPCM trust measurement: BMC uses the trust measurement algorithm in TPCM to measure the HASH data to obtain the measurement result of the server.

[0105] Step L4, obtain the measurement results and execute. The BIOS obtains the measurement results in the BMC in real time during the operation phase, and controls the startup of the server according to the measurement results. In response to the verification result indicating that the processor, memory, PCIe device and system included in the server are in a trusted state, the server is started; in response to the verification result indicating that the processor, memory, PCIe device and system included in the server are in an untrusted state, the startup of the first electronic device is suspended.

[0106] Step L5, end.

[0107] Understandably, Figure 7 The application scenarios of the device trusted startup method are only some exemplary implementations in the embodiments of the present application. The application scenarios of the device trusted startup method in the embodiments of the present application are not limited to Figure 7 The application scenario of the device trusted boot method shown.

[0108] Figure 8 Another application scenario diagram of the device trusted startup method provided in an embodiment of the present application is shown.

[0109] refer to Figure 8 Another application scenario of the device trusted startup method provided in the embodiment of the present application is applied to locating components with abnormal trusted metrics in trusted startup.

[0110] Step S1, BIOS obtains Firmware_result from BMC. BIOS obtains verification result from BMC, and the verification result includes Firmware_result. Firmware_result indicates the trust measurement result of the server.

[0111] Step S2, determine whether Firmware_result is equal to 1. When the obtained Firmware_result is 1, it means that the trustworthiness of the server is normal, and then execute step S3 to continue booting. When the obtained Firmware_result is 0, it means that the trustworthiness of the server is abnormal, and then execute step S4 to query firmware_type to distinguish the component type. Step S3, continue starting.

[0112] Step S4, query firmware_type to distinguish component types. Among them, firmware_type represents: the component type of the first component in the server, 0 represents the processor; 1 represents the memory; 2 represents the PCIe device; 3 represents the system. Parse the value of the variable firmware_type in the verification result. According to the value of firmware_type, determine to query the firmware_detail_type of the corresponding component type. firmware_detail_type represents: the component type distinguished according to the detailed information of the first component. For example, for memory, different values ​​are used to represent different slots of memory. For PCIe devices, 0 represents RAID; 1 represents network card; 2 represents NVME; 3 represents image processor. For the system, 0 represents Grub file information; 1 represents Shim file information; 2 represents Kernel file information; 3 represents initrd file information.

[0113] Step S5, the CPU queries firmware_detail_type. Firmware_detail_type represents the CPU slot (0 represents Socket 0, 1 represents Socket 1). By querying the CPU's firmware_detail_type, the problem description information of the CPU slot with abnormal trustworthiness can be determined.

[0114] Step S6: query firmware_detail_type of the memory. The firmware_detail_type represents the slot of the memory (0 represents DIMM 0, 1 represents DIMM 1). By querying the firmware_detail_type of the CPU, the problem description information of the slot of the memory with abnormal trust metric can be determined.

[0115] Step S7, the PCIe device queries firmware_detail_type. Firmware_detail_type represents the device classification of the PCIe device (0 represents RAID, 1 represents network card, 2 represents NVME, and 3 represents image processor). By querying the firmware_detail_type of the PCIe device, the problem description information of the device classification of the PCIe device with abnormal trust metric can be determined.

[0116] Step S8, the system queries firmware_detail_type. Firmware_detail_type represents the system's boot file classification (0 represents Grub, 1 represents Shim, 2 represents Kernel, and 3 represents Initrd). By querying the system's firmware_detail_type, the problem description information of the boot file classification of the system with abnormal trustworthiness can be determined.

[0117] Step S9, a pop-up window prompts and asks the user whether to continue the startup. The pop-up dialog box informs the user which first components in the current server are in a trust measurement abnormality and the problem description information. If the user receives an instruction to continue the startup, the trust measurement abnormality is ignored and the server is started. For example: if the memory DIMM 0 trust measurement is abnormal, the pop-up window displays: "MemoryDIMM0 Verify Fail, Press'c'to Continue Verify or Press'Enter'to Shutdown!".

[0118] Understandably, Figure 8 The application scenarios of the device trusted startup method are only some exemplary implementations in the embodiments of the present application. The application scenarios of the device trusted startup method in the embodiments of the present application are not limited to Figure 8 The application scenario of the device trusted boot method shown.

[0119] The following is an exemplary structure of the software modules included in the device trusted startup device 90 provided in the embodiment of the present application. In some embodiments, for example Fig. 9As shown, the device trusted startup device 90 may include: a basic input-output system 901, which is used to obtain unique identification information of a first component included in the first electronic device when the first electronic device is in a powered-on state; the basic input-output system 901 is also used to encrypt the unique identification information to obtain first encrypted data; a baseboard management controller 902 is used to verify the first component included in the first electronic device based on the first encrypted data to obtain a verification result; the verification result represents a trust measurement result of the first electronic device; the basic input-output system 901 is also used to control the startup of the first electronic device based on the verification result; the basic input-output system 901 is also used to determine that the first component is in an untrusted state based on the verification result in response to the first electronic device not being successfully started.

[0120] In some embodiments, the first component includes: a processor, a memory, a PCIe peripheral component interconnect express bus device, and the system also provides one or more of the present application.

[0121] In some embodiments, the basic input and output system 901 is used for at least one of the following: based on the chip version and socket identifier of the processor, calculating the unique identification information of the processor through the objective function; determining the unique identification information of the memory by traversing the serial presence detection data of the memory; determining the unique identification information of the PCIe device based on the register information of the PCIe device read; determining the unique identification information of the system based on the boot file information of the system read.

[0122] In some embodiments, the basic input and output system 901 is used to: obtain the initialization order of the first component; and obtain the unique identification information of the first component in sequence based on the initialization order.

[0123] In some embodiments, the basic input / output system 901 is used to: send first encrypted data to a baseboard management controller 902 of a first electronic device; the baseboard management controller 902 is used to perform trust measurement based on reference component information and the first encrypted data through a preset trust measurement algorithm to obtain a verification result.

[0124] In some embodiments, the reference component information represents a standard of a trust measurement of a first component; the baseboard management controller 902 is used to: decrypt the first encrypted data to obtain unique identification information of the first component; match the unique identification information with the reference component information according to the component type of the first component through a preset trust measurement algorithm to obtain a sub-verification result corresponding to the same component type; and determine the verification result based on the sub-verification result corresponding to each component type.

[0125] In some embodiments, the baseboard management controller 902 is further used to: when the first electronic device is started for the first time, perform data processing on the unique identification information of the first component included in the first electronic device to obtain reference component information.

[0126] In some embodiments, the basic input and output system 901 is used to: in response to a verification result indicating that all first components included in the first electronic device are in a trusted state, start the first electronic device; in response to a verification result indicating that there is a first component in the first electronic device that is in an untrusted state, suspend starting the first electronic device.

[0127] In some embodiments, the basic input-output system 901 is also used for: in response to the verification result indicating that the first component is in an untrusted state, parsing the sub-verification result corresponding to the first component in the untrusted state to obtain first data; the first data at least includes problem description information of the first component in the trust measurement process; and outputting the first data. It should be noted that the description of the device in the embodiment of the present application is similar to the description of the method embodiment above, and has similar beneficial effects as the method embodiment, so it will not be repeated. Figures 1 to 8 The present invention can be understood by referring to the description of any one of the accompanying drawings.

[0128] According to an embodiment of the present application, the present application also provides an electronic device and a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium.

[0129] Fig.10 A schematic block diagram of an example electronic device 800 that can be used to implement an embodiment of the present application is shown. The electronic device is intended to represent various forms of digital computers, such as laptop computers, desktop computers, workbenches, personal digital assistants, servers, blade servers, mainframe computers, and other suitable computers. The electronic device can also represent various forms of mobile devices, such as personal digital processing, cellular phones, smart phones, wearable devices, and other similar computing devices. The components shown herein, their connections and relationships, and their functions are merely examples and are not intended to limit the implementation of the present application described and / or required herein.

[0130] like Fig.10As shown, the electronic device 800 includes a computing unit 801, which can perform various appropriate actions and processes according to a computer program stored in a ROM 802 or a computer program loaded from a storage unit 808 into a RAM 803. In the RAM 803, various programs and data required for the operation of the electronic device 800 can also be stored. The computing unit 801, the ROM 802, and the RAM 803 are connected to each other via a bus 804. An I / O interface 805 is also connected to the bus 804.

[0131] Multiple components in the electronic device 800 are connected to the I / O interface 805, including: an input unit 806, such as a keyboard, a mouse, etc.; an output unit 807, such as various types of displays, speakers, etc.; a storage unit 808, such as a disk, an optical disk, etc.; and a communication unit 809, such as a network card, a modem, a wireless communication transceiver, etc. The communication unit 809 allows the electronic device 800 to exchange information / data with other devices through a computer network such as the Internet and / or various telecommunication networks.

[0132] The computing unit 801 may be a variety of general and / or special processing components with processing and computing capabilities. Some examples of the computing unit 801 include, but are not limited to, a central processing unit (CPU), a graphics processing unit (GPU), various dedicated artificial intelligence (AI) computing chips, various computing units running machine learning model algorithms, digital signal processors (DSPs), and any appropriate processors, controllers, microcontrollers, etc. The computing unit 801 performs the various methods and processes described above, such as a device trusted boot method. For example, in some embodiments, the device trusted boot method may be implemented as a computer software program, which is tangibly contained in a machine-readable medium, such as a storage unit 808. In some embodiments, part or all of the computer program may be loaded and / or installed on the electronic device 800 via the ROM 802 and / or the communication unit 809. When the computer program is loaded into the RAM 803 and executed by the computing unit 801, one or more steps of the device trusted boot method described above may be performed. Alternatively, in other embodiments, the computing unit 801 may be configured to execute the device trusted boot method in any other appropriate manner (e.g., by means of firmware).

[0133] The above is only a specific implementation of the present application, but the protection scope of the present application is not limited thereto. Any person skilled in the art who is familiar with the present technical field can easily think of changes or substitutions within the technical scope disclosed in the present application, which should be included in the protection scope of the present application. Therefore, the protection scope of the present application should be based on the protection scope of the claims.

Claims

1. A device trusted startup method, characterized in that: The method comprises: When the first electronic device is in a powered-on state, acquiring unique identification information of a first component included in the first electronic device; Encrypting the unique identification information to obtain first encrypted data; Based on the first encrypted data, verifying a first component included in the first electronic device to obtain a verification result; the verification result represents a trust measurement result of the first electronic device; Based on the verification result, controlling the startup of the first electronic device; In response to the first electronic device not being successfully started, based on the verification result, determining that the first component is in an untrusted state.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The first component includes: one or more of a processor, a memory, a PCIe peripheral component interconnect fast bus device, and a system.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that The acquiring of unique identification information of a first component included in the first electronic device includes at least one of the following: Based on the chip version and socket identifier of the processor, unique identification information of the processor is calculated through an objective function; Determine unique identification information of the memory by traversing serial presence detection data of the memory; Determine unique identification information of the PCIe device based on the read register information of the PCIe device; Based on the read startup file information of the system, unique identification information of the system is determined.

4. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that: The acquiring of unique identification information of a first component included in the first electronic device includes: Obtaining the initialization order of the first components; Based on the initialization order, unique identification information of the first components is obtained in sequence.

5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The method further comprises: Sending the first encrypted data to a baseboard management controller of the first electronic device; The baseboard management controller performs trust measurement based on the reference component information and the first encrypted data by using a preset trust measurement algorithm to obtain the verification result.

6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that The step of performing trust measurement based on the reference component information and the first encrypted data by using a preset trust measurement algorithm to obtain the verification result includes: The reference component information represents a standard of a trustworthy measure of the first component; Decrypting the first encrypted data to obtain unique identification information of the first component; By using a preset trust measurement algorithm, the unique identification information is matched with the reference component information according to the component type of the first component to obtain a sub-verification result corresponding to the same component type; The verification result is determined based on the sub-verification results corresponding to each component type.

7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that The method further comprises: When the first electronic device is started for the first time, data processing is performed on the unique identification information of the first component included in the first electronic device to obtain the reference component information.

8. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The controlling the startup of the first electronic device based on the verification result includes: In response to the verification result indicating that all first components included in the first electronic device are in a trusted state, starting the first electronic device; In response to the verification result indicating that the first component in the first electronic device is in an untrusted state, suspending the startup of the first electronic device.

9. The method according to claim 8, characterized in that The method further comprises: In response to the verification result indicating that the first component is in an untrusted state, a sub-verification result corresponding to the first component in an untrusted state is parsed to obtain first data; the first data at least includes problem description information of the first component in a trust measurement process; The first data is output.

10. A device trusted startup apparatus, characterized in that: The device comprises: A basic input and output system, used to obtain unique identification information of a first component included in the first electronic device when the first electronic device is in a powered-on state; The basic input and output system is further used to encrypt the unique identification information to obtain first encrypted data; A baseboard management controller, configured to verify a first component included in the first electronic device based on the first encrypted data to obtain a verification result; the verification result represents a trustworthy measurement result of the first electronic device; The basic input and output system is further used to control the startup of the first electronic device based on the verification result; The basic input and output system is further used to determine, in response to the first electronic device failing to start successfully, a first component in an untrusted state based on the verification result.

11. The device according to claim 10, characterized in that The first component includes: one or more of a processor, a memory, a PCIe peripheral component interconnect fast bus device, and a system.

12. The device according to claim 11, characterized in that The basic input and output system is used for at least one of the following: Based on the chip version and socket identifier of the processor, unique identification information of the processor is calculated through an objective function; Determine unique identification information of the memory by traversing serial presence detection data of the memory; Determine unique identification information of the PCIe device based on the read register information of the PCIe device; Based on the read startup file information of the system, unique identification information of the system is determined.

13. The device according to claim 11, characterized in that The basic input and output system is used for: Obtaining the initialization order of the first components; Based on the initialization order, unique identification information of the first components is obtained in sequence.

14. The device according to claim 10, characterized in that The basic input and output system is used for: Sending the first encrypted data to a baseboard management controller of the first electronic device; The baseboard management controller is used to perform trust measurement based on the reference component information and the first encrypted data through a preset trust measurement algorithm to obtain the verification result.

15. The device according to claim 14, characterized in that The reference component information represents a standard of a trustworthy measure of the first component; and the baseboard management controller is used to: Decrypting the first encrypted data to obtain unique identification information of the first component; By using a preset trust measurement algorithm, the unique identification information is matched with the reference component information according to the component type of the first component to obtain a sub-verification result corresponding to the same component type; The verification result is determined based on the sub-verification results corresponding to each component type.

16. The device according to claim 15, characterized in that The baseboard management controller is also used for: When the first electronic device is started for the first time, data processing is performed on the unique identification information of the first component included in the first electronic device to obtain the reference component information.

17. The device according to claim 10, characterized in that The basic input and output system is used for: In response to the verification result indicating that all first components included in the first electronic device are in a trusted state, starting the first electronic device; In response to the verification result indicating that the first component in the first electronic device is in an untrusted state, suspending the startup of the first electronic device.

18. The device according to claim 17, characterized in that The basic input and output system is also used for: In response to the verification result indicating that the first component is in an untrusted state, a sub-verification result corresponding to the first component in an untrusted state is parsed to obtain first data; the first data at least includes problem description information of the first component in a trust measurement process; The first data is output.

19. An electronic device, characterized in that: include: at least one processor; as well as a memory communicatively connected to the at least one processor; wherein, The memory stores instructions that can be executed by the at least one processor, and the instructions are executed by the at least one processor to enable the at least one processor to perform the method according to any one of claims 1 to 9.

20. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium storing computer instructions, characterized in that: The computer instructions are used to make a computer execute the method according to any one of claims 1-9.

Images