GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) decoy monitoring method, equipment and medium

Abstract

The invention provides a GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) decoy monitoring method, GNSS decoy monitoring equipment and a medium. The method comprises the steps that a first monitoring signal, a second monitoring signal, first aircraft information corresponding to the first monitoring signal and second aircraft information corresponding to the second monitoring signal are received, the first monitoring signal and the second monitoring signal are air traffic monitoring signals, and the positioning modes of the first monitoring signal and the second monitoring signal are different; detecting whether the first aircraft information and the second aircraft information with the same flight identifier are updated normally or not; if yes, the aircraft distance is obtained according to the first aircraft information and the second aircraft information, and GNSS decoy is monitored based on the aircraft distance. According to the invention, the method can effectively achieve the recognition and monitoring of the GNSS decoy signal through the two air traffic monitoring signals with different positioning modes, does not need to depend on third-party equipment, is low in cost, is high in efficiency, can detect the region where the GNSS decoy occurs in the air in real time, facilitates the quick response to the decoy attack, and improves the operation safety and reliability of an aircraft.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of GNSS technology, and more specifically, to a GNSS spoofing monitoring method, device and medium. Background Art

[0002] GNSS stands for Global Navigation Satellite System, which refers to all satellite navigation systems in the world, such as the US GPS system, China's BeiDou system, Europe's GALILEO system, Russia's GLONASS system, etc. Its basic working principle is to deploy navigation satellite constellations to broadcast navigation ranging signals to users near the surface. Users receive signals from at least four satellites and calculate their own position and time based on the spherical return principle.

[0003] With the widespread application of satellite navigation technology, its security issues are becoming increasingly prominent. GNSS spoofing is a common attack method that simulates real GNSS signals to mislead the receiver and cause positioning errors. Existing GNSS spoofing monitoring methods have low monitoring effectiveness and efficiency. Especially when there is GNSS spoofing in the air, it is impossible to effectively monitor GNSS spoofing in the air. When GNSS spoofing occurs, it is easy for the aircraft to be lured to the wrong route, route or position due to the inability to identify and monitor GNSS spoofing signals, which seriously affects the operational safety of the aircraft. Summary of the invention

[0004] In view of the shortcomings of the existing methods, the present application proposes a GNSS spoofing monitoring method, device and medium, which can solve the problem that the existing technology is unable to effectively identify and monitor GNSS spoofing signals in the air.

[0005] In a first aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a GNSS spoofing monitoring method, the method comprising:

[0006] receiving a first surveillance signal and a second surveillance signal, and acquiring first aircraft information corresponding to the first surveillance signal and second aircraft information corresponding to the second surveillance signal, wherein the first surveillance signal and the second surveillance signal are air traffic surveillance signals, and the first surveillance signal and the second surveillance signal have different positioning modes;

[0007] Detecting whether the first aircraft information and the second aircraft information with the same flight identifier are updated normally, wherein the flight identifier includes at least one of a flight number, an address code, and a secondary code;

[0008] If so, the aircraft distance is obtained according to the first aircraft information and the second aircraft information, and GNSS spoofing is monitored based on the aircraft distance.

[0009] In a possible implementation, the positioning of the first monitoring signal depends on a satellite signal, and the positioning of the second monitoring signal depends on a radio round trip time and a radio angle.

[0010] In one possible implementation, the first surveillance signal includes an ADS-B signal, and the second surveillance signal includes at least one of a primary radar, a secondary radar, an S-mode radar, multilateration, and an integrated track.

[0011] In a possible implementation, obtaining first aircraft information corresponding to the first surveillance signal includes:

[0012] Parse the first monitoring signal according to the data format standard corresponding to the first monitoring signal to obtain the flight number, time tag, address code, quality identifier, aircraft latitude and longitude, altitude, and speed corresponding to the aircraft;

[0013] Acquiring second aircraft information corresponding to the second surveillance signal includes:

[0014] The second monitoring signal is parsed according to the data format standard corresponding to the first monitoring signal to obtain the flight number, time tag, address code, aircraft latitude and longitude, altitude, and speed corresponding to the aircraft.

[0015] In a possible implementation, the acquiring the first aircraft information corresponding to the first surveillance signal and the second aircraft information corresponding to the second surveillance signal further includes:

[0016] The first aircraft information and the second aircraft information are aligned according to the time tag to eliminate a monitoring signal time difference.

[0017] In a possible implementation, detecting whether the first aircraft information and the second aircraft information with the same flight identifier are updated normally includes:

[0018] Acquire first aircraft information and second aircraft information including the same flight identifier, acquire a first current update speed and a first historical update speed according to a time tag in the first aircraft information, and determine whether the first aircraft information is updated normally according to a comparison result between the first current update speed and the first historical update speed;

[0019] The current update frequency is obtained according to the time tag in the second aviation information, and whether the second aircraft information is updated normally is determined based on the update frequency.

[0020] In a possible implementation manner, acquiring the aircraft distance according to the first aircraft information and the second aircraft information includes:

[0021] Acquire the first aircraft information and the second aircraft information whose absolute value of timestamp difference is less than or equal to a preset value;

[0022] The aircraft distance is obtained according to the longitude and latitude of the aircraft corresponding to the first aircraft information and the second aircraft information.

[0023] In one possible implementation, monitoring GNSS spoofing based on the aircraft distance includes:

[0024] Get the aircraft distance corresponding to different timestamps;

[0025] If it is determined that the aircraft distance greater than the preset distance appears continuously for more than the preset number of times, it is determined that GNSS spoofing exists and the data corresponding to the GNSS spoofing is recorded.

[0026] In a second aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides an electronic device, comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory, wherein the processor executes the computer program to implement the steps of any of the methods described above.

[0027] In a third aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, wherein when the computer program is executed, the steps of any of the above methods are implemented.

[0028] The beneficial technical effects brought about by the technical solution provided by the embodiment of the present application include:

[0029] The present application provides a GNSS spoofing monitoring method, which has the beneficial effect of receiving the first monitoring signal and the second monitoring signal in the air traffic monitoring signal, obtaining the first aircraft information corresponding to the first monitoring signal and the second aircraft information corresponding to the second monitoring signal, wherein the first monitoring signal and the second monitoring signal have different positioning modes; detecting whether the first aircraft information and the second aircraft information with the same flight identification are updated normally, wherein the flight identification includes at least one of the flight number, the address code, and the secondary code; if it is determined that the first aircraft information and the second aircraft information are updated normally, the aircraft distance is obtained according to the first aircraft information and the second aircraft information, and GNSS spoofing is monitored based on the aircraft distance. The present application receives two air traffic monitoring signals at the same time, and the two air traffic monitoring signals use different positioning modes, thereby obtaining the aircraft distance using the two air traffic monitoring signals, and using the aircraft distance to monitor GNSS spoofing. The present application can effectively realize the identification and monitoring of GNSS spoofing signals using two air traffic monitoring signals with different positioning modes, without relying on third-party equipment, with low cost, high efficiency, and can detect the area where GNSS spoofing occurs in the air in real time, so as to facilitate rapid response to spoofing attacks and improve the safety and reliability of aircraft operations.

[0030] Additional aspects and advantages of the present application will be partially given in the following description, which will become apparent from the following description, or will be understood through the practice of the present application. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0031] The above and / or additional aspects and advantages of the present application will become apparent and easily understood from the following description of the embodiments in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, in which:

[0032] Figure 1 A flowchart of a GNSS spoofing monitoring method provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0033] Figure 2 A structural diagram of an electronic device provided in an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0034] The embodiments of the present application are described below in conjunction with the drawings in the present application. It should be understood that the implementation methods described below in conjunction with the drawings are exemplary descriptions for explaining the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application and do not constitute a limitation on the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application.

[0035] It will be understood by those skilled in the art that, unless specifically stated, the "said" and "the" used herein may also include plural forms. It should be further understood that the wording "including" used in the specification of the present application refers to the presence of the features, integers, steps, operations, elements and / or components, but does not exclude the implementation of other features, information, data, steps, operations, elements, components and / or combinations thereof supported by the present technical field. It should be understood that when we say that an element is "connected" or "coupled" to another element, the element may be directly connected or coupled to the other element, or it may refer to the connection relationship between the element and the other element through an intermediate element. In addition, the "connection" or "coupling" used herein may include wireless connection or wireless coupling. The term "and / or" used herein refers to at least one of the items defined by the term, for example, "A and / or B" may be implemented as "A", or as "B", or as "A and B".

[0036] In order to make the objectives, technical solutions and advantages of the present application clearer, the implementation methods of the present application will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0037] The embodiment of the present application provides a GNSS spoofing monitoring method, which can be used in a ground station, wherein the ground station is provided with ground equipment for receiving air traffic monitoring signals, and the GNSS spoofing signal can be identified and monitored through the ground station.

[0038] like Figure 1 As shown, the GNSS spoofing monitoring method of the present application includes:

[0039] S101: Receive a first monitoring signal and a second monitoring signal, and obtain first aircraft information corresponding to the first monitoring signal and second aircraft information corresponding to the second monitoring signal.

[0040] Optionally, the first monitoring signal and the second monitoring signal may be received by the same ground station or by different ground stations, and GNSS spoofing monitoring may be performed using the signals received by different ground stations.

[0041] Optionally, the first surveillance signal and the second surveillance signal are air traffic surveillance signals, and the first surveillance signal and the second surveillance signal are positioned in different ways.

[0042] Optionally, when receiving the first monitoring signal and the second monitoring signal, the received first monitoring signal and the second monitoring signal may be preprocessed. The preprocessing includes denoising, filtering, converting to digital signals and other preprocessing operations. The denoising and filtering operations include removing background noise, reducing multipath effects, eliminating other signal interference and other operations that can minimize the impact of interference signals.

[0043] Optionally, the positioning of the first monitoring signal depends on satellite signals, that is, the first monitoring signal depends on GPS or other satellite positioning systems for positioning, and the positioning of the second monitoring signal depends on radio round-trip time and radio angle.

[0044] Optionally, the first monitoring signal and the second monitoring signal may also rely on different satellites for positioning, such as the first monitoring signal relies on GPS positioning, and the second monitoring signal relies on Beidou satellites for positioning.

[0045] In one embodiment, the first monitoring signal includes ADS-B (Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast) and other signals that depend on GNSS positioning, and the second monitoring signal includes at least one of primary radar, secondary radar, S-mode radar, multi-lateration, integrated track and other signals that do not depend on GNSS positioning.

[0046] Optionally, obtaining the first aircraft information corresponding to the first monitoring signal includes: parsing the first monitoring signal according to the data format standard corresponding to the first monitoring signal, and obtaining the flight number, time tag, address code, quality mark, aircraft longitude and latitude, altitude, and speed corresponding to the aircraft; obtaining the second aircraft information corresponding to the second monitoring signal includes: parsing the second monitoring signal according to the data format standard corresponding to the first monitoring signal, and obtaining the flight number, time tag, address code, aircraft longitude and latitude, altitude, and speed corresponding to the aircraft. The flight identifications corresponding to different aircraft are different, and the flight identification includes at least one of the flight number, address code, and secondary code (SSR), and may also be other information that can be used to identify the aircraft. The number of digits of the address code may be 24. The altitude may include information indicating the altitude, such as flight altitude, geographical altitude, and elevation.

[0047] In one embodiment, the first monitoring signal is an ADS-B signal, and the received ADS-B signal is parsed according to the data format standard of the signal, and the flight number, time tag, address code, quality mark (navigation integrity data), aircraft latitude and longitude, altitude, speed and other information are extracted therefrom, and the information is written into the database. The second monitoring signal can be one of primary radar, secondary radar, S-mode radar, multi-point positioning, and integrated track, and the second monitoring signal is parsed according to the data format standard of the second monitoring signal, and the flight number, time tag, address code, aircraft latitude and longitude, altitude, speed and other information are extracted therefrom, and the information is written into the database. If the aircraft latitude and longitude, speed and other position information used to represent the position of the aircraft in the second monitoring signal uses XY rectangular coordinates, the coordinate system corresponding to the position information is converted into 84 coordinates, so that the coordinate systems corresponding to the information extracted from the first monitoring signal and the second monitoring signal are consistent.

[0048] Optionally, obtaining the first aircraft information corresponding to the first surveillance signal and the second aircraft information corresponding to the second surveillance signal further includes: aligning the first aircraft information and the second aircraft information according to the time tag to eliminate the surveillance signal time difference. The correspondence between the time tag of the first aircraft information and the time tag in the second aircraft information is obtained by aligning the time tags, thereby eliminating the surveillance signal time difference of the air traffic surveillance signals received by different ground stations.

[0049] S102: Check whether the first aircraft information and the second aircraft information with the same flight ID are updated normally.

[0050] Optionally, if it is determined that the first aircraft information and / or the second aircraft information is not updated normally, the abnormally updated information is discarded.

[0051] Optionally, detecting whether the first aircraft information and the second aircraft information with the same flight identification are updated normally includes: obtaining the first aircraft information and the second aircraft information with the same flight identification, obtaining a first current update speed and a first historical update speed according to a time tag in the first aircraft information, and determining whether the first aircraft information is updated normally according to a comparison result between the first current update speed and the first historical update speed; obtaining a current update frequency according to the time tag in the second aircraft information, and determining whether the second aircraft information is updated normally based on the update frequency. The first historical update speed may be a normal update speed of the first aircraft information with the same flight identification, and the normal update speed may be determined according to the historical information of the first aircraft information.

[0052] In one embodiment, the flight identifier may be an address code having 24 bits. The flight identifier is a unique label for each aircraft, which can accurately identify which aircraft the air traffic surveillance signal belongs to. After obtaining the first aircraft information, the first aircraft information corresponding to the same aircraft is obtained according to the flight identifier, and the first aircraft information currently corresponding to the aircraft is compared with its corresponding historical information to determine whether the first aircraft information is updated at a speed of 1-2 data per second (first historical update speed) within the current time period (e.g., within 30 seconds). If yes, it is determined that the update is normal. If not, it is determined that the update is abnormal.

[0053] In another embodiment, after obtaining the second aircraft information, the second aircraft information corresponding to the same aircraft is obtained according to the flight identifier. The update frequency of the second aircraft information in the current time period is obtained, and it is determined whether the update frequency is consistent with the predetermined update frequency of the second aircraft information (such as once every five seconds). If so, it is determined that the update is normal, and if not, it is determined that the update is abnormal.

[0054] S103: If yes, obtain the aircraft distance according to the first aircraft information and the second aircraft information, and monitor GNSS spoofing based on the aircraft distance.

[0055] Optionally, obtaining the aircraft distance according to the first aircraft information and the second aircraft information includes: obtaining the first aircraft information and the second aircraft information whose absolute value of the timestamp difference is less than or equal to a preset value; obtaining the aircraft distance according to the longitude and latitude of the aircraft corresponding to the first aircraft information and the second aircraft information. The timestamps of the first aircraft information and the second aircraft information can be determined according to the time tags after the time tags are aligned, each of the first aircraft information and the second aircraft information corresponds to a timestamp, and the timestamp difference between the first aircraft information and the second aircraft information can be obtained, and the aircraft distance can be calculated according to the first aircraft information and the second aircraft information whose absolute value of the timestamp difference is less than or equal to the preset value. For the convenience of description, the first aircraft information and the second aircraft information whose absolute value of the timestamp difference is less than or equal to the preset value can be recorded as the first aircraft information and the second aircraft information corresponding to the same time point.

[0056] In one embodiment, after obtaining the first aircraft information and the second aircraft information corresponding to the same flight identification, the first aircraft information and the second aircraft information whose absolute value of the timestamp difference is not greater than K seconds are obtained, where K may be less than or equal to 6 seconds, and the empirical value is less than or equal to 1 second. When the first aircraft information and the second aircraft information are normal, the aircraft longitudes and latitudes included in the first aircraft information and the second aircraft information whose absolute value of the timestamp difference is less than or equal to 6 seconds should be the same or the closest longitude and latitude values. If GNSS spoofing exists, the aircraft longitudes and latitudes included in the first aircraft information and the second aircraft information whose absolute value of the timestamp difference is less than or equal to 6 seconds are different and indicate different locations.

[0057] Optionally, monitoring GNSS spoofing based on aircraft distance includes: if it is determined that the number of consecutive occurrences of an aircraft distance greater than a preset distance is greater than a preset number of times, then it is determined that GNSS spoofing exists, and data corresponding to the GNSS spoofing is recorded.

[0058] Optionally, the preset distance may be 3 km, and the preset number of times may be 3. The preset distance and the preset number of times may also be other values, and the specific values ​​may be determined according to the type of aircraft, positioning accuracy, and actual environment.

[0059] Optionally, the preset distance may range from 2 to 10 km. When it is determined that the aircraft distance is greater than the preset distance, it is determined that GNSS spoofing is suspected, and the first aircraft information corresponding to the aircraft distance is recorded. The preset number of times may be N1 times. If it is determined that the aircraft distance is greater than the preset distance for N1 consecutive times, it is determined that GNSS spoofing exists, and the first aircraft signal corresponding to the aircraft distance greater than the preset distance may be determined as a GNSS spoofing signal, and the first aircraft information corresponding to the GNSS spoofing signal may be stored, and the aircraft longitude and latitude corresponding to the first aircraft information where GNSS spoofing occurs may be determined as the spoofing start point. The value of N1 may be 3.

[0060] In one embodiment, the first monitoring signal relies on GPS positioning. The second monitoring signal is located by round-trip time and angle of radio waves, and is completely independent of GPS positioning. The first aircraft information and the second aircraft information corresponding to the same aircraft are obtained using the first monitoring signal and the second monitoring signal. The aircraft longitude and latitude corresponding to the first aircraft information and the second aircraft information whose absolute value of the timestamp difference is not greater than a preset value are obtained, and the distance between the two aircraft longitudes and latitudes is determined as the aircraft distance. If the aircraft distance is greater than 3km, it is determined that there is suspected GNSS spoofing in the first monitoring signal. If this situation is detected for three consecutive times, it is determined that GNSS spoofing exists.

[0061] Optionally, after GNSS spoofing occurs, if it is determined that the value of the aircraft distance detected for N2 consecutive times is less than the preset distance, it can be determined that the GNSS spoofing disappears. The value of N2 can be 3 times. The position corresponding to the first aircraft information where the last GNSS spoofing occurs is determined as the end point of the spoofing. For the first aircraft information that is judged to have GNSS spoofing, the data when the spoofing occurs and the data for a period of time before and after the spoofing (the first aircraft information and the second aircraft information) are recorded for playback of the spoofing process. According to the above steps, the detection is repeated and the corresponding data is recorded. After recording the data, a heat map can also be generated based on the starting point or the end point of the GNSS spoofing, and the severity of the GNSS spoofing can be displayed by the heat map. And after receiving the aircraft selection instruction, the aircraft corresponding to the instruction and the data of the related GNSS spoofing can be obtained, and the data of the first monitoring signal and the second monitoring signal during the GNSS spoofing can be played back according to the data to display the occurrence process of GNSS spoofing.

[0062] The present application is further explained below through a specific embodiment of the GNSS spoofing monitoring method.

[0063] In one embodiment, the first monitoring signal is an ADS-B signal, the first monitoring signal is a comprehensive track, the first monitoring signal and the second monitoring signal are received, and all fields in the first monitoring signal are parsed, including but not limited to information of data items such as I021 / 073, I021 / 080, I021 / 090, I021 / 130, I021 / 140, I021 / 145, I021 / 150, I021 / 160, and I021 / 170. All fields in the second monitoring signal are parsed, including but not limited to data items such as I062 / 070, I062 / 105, I062 / 380, I062 / 390, I062 / 136, and I062 / 070. Thus, information such as flight number, time tag, 24-bit address code, secondary code, aircraft latitude and longitude, altitude, and speed are obtained. The update table of the first aircraft data corresponding to the first monitoring signal is shown in Table 1, and the update table of the second aircraft data corresponding to the second monitoring signal is shown in Table 2. Table 1 is the data of the aircraft with address code 78036E, and Table 2 is the data of the aircraft with address code 78036E.

[0064] Table 1

[0065]

[0066] Table 2

[0067]

[0068] According to the data in Table 1 and Table 2, check whether the first aircraft information and the second aircraft information are updated normally (such as checking whether the update speed is normal). Compare the first aircraft information and the second aircraft information with the address code of 78036E, obtain the first aircraft information and the second aircraft information whose absolute value of the timestamp difference is less than or equal to 1 second, and calculate the aircraft distance corresponding to the first aircraft information and the second aircraft information. If the aircraft distance is greater than 3 kilometers, it is judged that GNSS spoofing is suspected, and this data is recorded. As shown in Tables 3 and 4, Table 3 is the ADS-B data suspected of being deceived by GNSS, and Table 4 is the comprehensive track data corresponding to Table 3. According to the first row of data in Tables 3 and 4, the aircraft distance is 0.14 kilometers, and GNSS spoofing has not occurred. According to the third row of data, the aircraft distance is calculated to be 96.84 kilometers, and GNSS spoofing is suspected to have occurred.

[0069] Table 3

[0070]

[0071] Table 4

[0072]

[0073] If suspected GNSS spoofing is detected three times in a row, it is determined that GNSS spoofing exists. The first point where GNSS spoofing occurs (aircraft latitude and longitude) is recorded as the start point of spoofing. If the distance between the aircraft and the aircraft is less than 3 kilometers for three consecutive detections, it is determined that the GNSS spoofing disappears. The last point where GNSS spoofing occurs is recorded as the end point of spoofing. For data that is determined to have GNSS spoofing, the data when the spoofing occurs and the data before and after the spoofing occurs are recorded for playback of the spoofing process. Follow the above steps to loop the detection and record the corresponding data.

[0074] The GNSS spoofing monitoring method of the present application can perform GNSS spoofing analysis through air traffic monitoring signals, without relying on any third-party equipment or instruments, and realizes the identification of GNSS spoofing signals in the air. By real-time monitoring of the data of the first monitoring signal and the second monitoring signal, it is possible to detect in real time the area where GNSS spoofing occurs in the air, quickly respond to spoofing attacks, and improve the safety and reliability of aircraft operations. This method is suitable for GNSS spoofing monitoring in the entire airspace, all aircraft types, and all altitudes in the air, and has a wide range of applicability.

[0075] Based on the same inventive concept, the embodiment of the present application provides an electronic device, such as Figure 2 As shown, Figure 2 The electronic device 2000 shown includes: a processor 2001 and a memory 2003. The processor 2001 and the memory 2003 are connected in communication with each other, for example, via a bus 2002.

[0076] Processor 2001 may be a CPU (Central Processing Unit), a general-purpose processor, a DSP (Digital Signal Processor), an ASIC (Application Specific Integrated Circuit), an FPGA (Field-Programmable Gate Array) or other programmable logic devices, transistor logic devices, hardware components or any combination thereof. It may implement or execute various exemplary logic blocks, modules and circuits described in conjunction with the disclosure of this application. Processor 2001 may also be a combination that implements computing functions, such as a combination of one or more microprocessors, a combination of a DSP and a microprocessor, etc.

[0077] The bus 2002 may include a path to transmit information between the above components. The bus 2002 may be a PCI (Peripheral Component Interconnect) bus or an EISA (Extended Industry Standard Architecture) bus. The bus 2002 may be divided into an address bus, a data bus, a control bus, etc. For ease of representation, only one thick line is used in the figure, but it does not mean that there is only one bus or one type of bus.

[0078] The memory 2003 can be a ROM (Read-Only Memory) or other types of static storage devices that can store static information and instructions, a RAM (random access memory) or other types of dynamic storage devices that can store information and instructions, or an EEPROM (Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory), a CD-ROM (Compact Disc Read-Only Memory) or other optical disk storage, optical disk storage (including compressed optical disk, laser disk, optical disk, digital versatile disk, Blu-ray disk, etc.), a magnetic disk storage medium or other magnetic storage device, or any other medium that can be used to carry or store the desired program code in the form of instructions or data structures and can be accessed by a computer, but is not limited to this.

[0079] Optionally, the electronic device 2000 may further include a communication unit 2004. The communication unit 2004 may be used for receiving and sending signals. The communication unit 2004 may allow the electronic device 2000 to communicate with other devices wirelessly or by wire to exchange data. It should be noted that in actual applications, the communication unit 2004 is not limited to one.

[0080] Optionally, the electronic device 2000 may further include an input unit 2005. The input unit 2005 may be used to receive input digital, character, image and / or sound information, or generate key signal input related to user settings and function control of the electronic device 2000. The input unit 2005 may include, but is not limited to, one or more of a touch screen, a physical keyboard, a function key (such as a volume control key, a switch key, etc.), a trackball, a mouse, a joystick, a camera, a microphone, etc.

[0081] Optionally, the electronic device 2000 may further include an output unit 2006. The output unit 2006 may be used to output or display information processed by the processor 2001. The output unit 2006 may include but is not limited to one or more of a display device, a speaker, a vibration device, and the like.

[0082] Although the electronic device 2000 having various devices is shown in the figure, it should be understood that it is not required to implement or possess all the devices shown. More or fewer devices may be implemented or possessed instead.

[0083] Optionally, the memory 2003 is used to store a computer program for executing the solution of the present application, and the execution is controlled by the processor 2001. The processor 2001 is used to execute the computer program stored in the memory 2003 to implement the steps of any method provided in the embodiments of the present application.

[0084] Based on the same inventive concept, an embodiment of the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium, on which a computer program is stored. When the computer program is executed by an electronic device / processor, it implements the steps of any method provided in the present application / implements the steps of various optional implementation methods of the method provided in the present application.

[0085] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the various operations, methods, steps, measures, and schemes in the processes discussed in this application may be alternated, changed, combined, or deleted. Furthermore, other steps, measures, and schemes in the various operations, methods, and processes discussed in this application may also be alternated, changed, rearranged, decomposed, combined, or deleted. Furthermore, steps, measures, and schemes in the related art that are similar to those disclosed in this application may also be alternated, changed, rearranged, decomposed, combined, or deleted.

[0086] In the description of the present application, the directions or positional relationships indicated by words such as "center", "up", "down", "front", "back", "left", "right", "vertical", "horizontal", "top", "bottom", "inside" and "outside" are based on the exemplary directions or positional relationships shown in the accompanying drawings. They are for the convenience of describing or simplifying the description of the embodiments of the present application, and do not indicate or imply that the referred device or component must have a specific orientation, or be constructed and operated in a specific orientation. Therefore, they should not be understood as limitations on the present application.

[0087] The terms "first" and "second" are used for descriptive purposes only and should not be understood as indicating or implying relative importance or implicitly indicating the number of the indicated technical features. Thus, a feature defined as "first" or "second" may explicitly or implicitly include one or more of the features. In the description of this application, unless otherwise specified, "plurality" means two or more.

[0088] In the description of this application, it should be noted that, unless otherwise clearly specified and limited, the terms "installed", "connected", and "connected" should be understood in a broad sense, for example, it can be a fixed connection, a detachable connection, or an integral connection; it can be a direct connection, or an indirect connection through an intermediate medium, or it can be the internal communication of two components. For ordinary technicians in this field, the specific meanings of the above terms in this application can be understood according to specific circumstances.

[0089] In the description of this specification, specific features, structures, materials or characteristics may be combined in an appropriate manner in any one or more embodiments or examples.

[0090] The above is only a partial implementation method of the present application. It should be pointed out that for ordinary technicians in this technical field, without departing from the technical concept of the scheme of the present application, other similar implementation methods based on the technical ideas of the present application are also within the protection scope of the embodiments of the present application.

Claims

1. A GNSS spoofing monitoring method, characterized in that: The method comprises: receiving a first surveillance signal and a second surveillance signal, and acquiring first aircraft information corresponding to the first surveillance signal and second aircraft information corresponding to the second surveillance signal, wherein the first surveillance signal and the second surveillance signal are air traffic surveillance signals, and the first surveillance signal and the second surveillance signal have different positioning modes; Detecting whether the first aircraft information and the second aircraft information with the same flight identifier are updated normally, wherein the flight identifier includes at least one of a flight number, an address code, and a secondary code; If so, the aircraft distance is obtained according to the first aircraft information and the second aircraft information, and GNSS spoofing is monitored based on the aircraft distance.

2. The GNSS spoofing monitoring method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The positioning of the first monitoring signal depends on satellite signals, and the positioning of the second monitoring signal depends on radio round trip time and radio angle.

3. The GNSS spoofing monitoring method according to claim 2, characterized in that: The first surveillance signal includes an ADS-B signal, and the second surveillance signal includes at least one of a primary radar, a secondary radar, an S-mode radar, multilateration, and an integrated track.

4. The GNSS spoofing monitoring method according to claim 1, characterized in that: Acquiring first aircraft information corresponding to the first surveillance signal includes: Parse the first monitoring signal according to the data format standard corresponding to the first monitoring signal to obtain the flight number, time tag, address code, quality identifier, aircraft latitude and longitude, altitude, and speed corresponding to the aircraft; Acquiring second aircraft information corresponding to the second surveillance signal includes: The second monitoring signal is parsed according to the data format standard corresponding to the first monitoring signal to obtain the flight number, time tag, address code, aircraft latitude and longitude, altitude, and speed corresponding to the aircraft.

5. The GNSS spoofing monitoring method according to claim 4, characterized in that: The obtaining of first aircraft information corresponding to the first surveillance signal and second aircraft information corresponding to the second surveillance signal further includes: The first aircraft information and the second aircraft information are aligned according to the time tag to eliminate a monitoring signal time difference.

6. The GNSS spoofing monitoring method according to claim 4, characterized in that: The step of detecting whether the first aircraft information and the second aircraft information with the same flight identifier are updated normally includes: Acquire first aircraft information and second aircraft information including the same flight identifier, acquire a first current update speed and a first historical update speed according to a time tag in the first aircraft information, and determine whether the first aircraft information is updated normally according to a comparison result between the first current update speed and the first historical update speed; The current update frequency is obtained according to the time tag in the second aviation information, and whether the second aircraft information is updated normally is determined based on the update frequency.

7. The GNSS spoofing monitoring method according to claim 4, characterized in that: The acquiring the aircraft distance according to the first aircraft information and the second aircraft information includes: Acquire the first aircraft information and the second aircraft information whose absolute value of timestamp difference is less than or equal to a preset value; The aircraft distance is obtained according to the longitude and latitude of the aircraft corresponding to the first aircraft information and the second aircraft information.

8. The GNSS spoofing monitoring method according to claim 7, characterized in that: Monitoring GNSS spoofing based on the aircraft distance includes: If it is determined that the aircraft distance greater than the preset distance appears continuously for more than the preset number of times, it is determined that GNSS spoofing exists and the data corresponding to the GNSS spoofing is recorded.

9. An electronic device comprising a memory, a processor and a computer program stored in the memory, characterized in that: The processor executes the computer program to implement the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1-8.

10. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that: When the computer program is executed, the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 8 are implemented.

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