Substation remote operation and maintenance method and system based on national secret communication

Abstract

The invention discloses a substation remote operation and maintenance method and system based on national secret communication, and relates to the technical field of power system safety operation and maintenance, and the method comprises the steps: generating a national secret authentication identifier according to the safety level of a substation operation and maintenance instruction through employing a national secret algorithm, and carrying out the encryption transmission; verifying the validity of the national secret authentication identifier by using the security gateway; performing equipment operation sequence context relevance checking on the substation operation and maintenance instruction; and executing the substation operation and maintenance instruction passing validity verification and equipment operation sequence context relevance check, monitoring an equipment operation state, and performing association analysis on an execution result of the substation operation and maintenance instruction and the equipment operation state to generate an operation and maintenance safety record. According to the method, the technical problems of insufficient communication security protection and difficult operation risk identification in the remote operation and maintenance of the transformer substation are solved, the security and reliability of the remote operation and maintenance of the transformer substation are improved through cryptographic algorithm encryption and operation sequence relevance check, and potential safety hazards of a power system caused by remote operation errors are effectively prevented.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of power system safety operation and maintenance, and particularly to a substation remote operation and maintenance method and system based on national cryptographic communication. Background Technique

[0002] The remote operation and maintenance of substation equipment in the power system is an important part of the construction of the smart grid, and its security and reliability are directly related to the stable operation of the power grid. With the deep integration of the power communication network and information technology, the secure transmission and execution mechanism of substation remote operation and maintenance instructions has become a core part of the smart grid security protection system. The substation remote operation and maintenance technology has developed from the traditional one-way instruction transmission mode to a full-process security control mechanism including identity authentication, permission control, instruction verification, execution monitoring, and security auditing. Especially in the context of the construction of the new power system, the power system security protection standard GB / T 36323-2018 puts forward security requirements such as hierarchical authorization and multi-factor authentication for substation remote operations, promoting the development of substation remote operation and maintenance technology to a higher security level.

[0003] However, there are still many deficiencies in the existing substation remote operation and maintenance technology. First, most of the existing authentication mechanisms use fixed keys and single authentication methods, lacking the ability to dynamically adjust the authentication intensity according to the security level of instructions, resulting in redundant verification of low-risk instructions or insufficient protection of high-risk instructions. Second, the instruction verification and execution links are separated. The verification only focuses on the legality of the instruction itself, ignoring the context relevance of the instruction in the operation sequence, and cannot effectively prevent legal but unreasonable operation sequences. Third, the instruction execution monitoring mechanism is simple, only recording the execution result and lacking the correlation analysis of the execution process and device response, making it difficult to support post-event security auditing and responsibility tracing. Finally, the integrated application of national cryptographic algorithms in the existing substation operation and maintenance system is still in its infancy, lacking a systematic national cryptographic authentication and encrypted transmission solution. Summary of the Invention

[0004] In view of the above problems, the present invention is proposed.

[0005] Therefore, the present invention provides a substation remote operation and maintenance method and system based on national cryptographic communication, which can solve the problems mentioned in the background technique.

[0006] To solve the above technical problems, the present invention provides the following technical solution: A substation remote operation and maintenance method based on national cryptographic communication, including: generating a national cryptographic authentication identifier by applying a national cryptographic algorithm according to the security level of the substation operation and maintenance instruction, and encrypting and transmitting the substation operation and maintenance instruction; using a security gateway to verify the validity of the national cryptographic authentication identifier; performing a context relevance check on the device operation sequence of the substation operation and maintenance instruction based on the national cryptographic authentication identifier; executing the substation operation and maintenance instruction that passes the validity verification and the context relevance check of the device operation sequence, monitoring the device operation status, and associatively analyzing the execution result of the substation operation and maintenance instruction with the device operation status to generate an operation and maintenance security record.

[0007] As a preferred solution of the substation remote operation and maintenance method based on national cryptographic communication according to the present invention, wherein: applying a national cryptographic algorithm according to the security level of the substation operation and maintenance instruction includes the following steps: receiving a substation operation and maintenance instruction, extracting the instruction type, operation object, and operation parameters of the substation operation and maintenance instruction, and determining the security level of the substation operation and maintenance instruction according to the instruction type, the operation object, and the operation parameters; the security level includes a query level, a configuration level, and a control level; selecting an encryption mode of the national cryptographic algorithm based on the security level, and adopting different encryption modes for substation operation and maintenance instructions with different security levels; constructing an instruction security attribute tag containing security level information, and selecting an encryption key based on the instruction security attribute tag; using the selected encryption mode of the national cryptographic algorithm and the encryption key to encrypt the substation operation and maintenance instruction to obtain the encrypted substation operation and maintenance instruction.

[0008] As a preferred solution of the substation remote operation and maintenance method based on national cryptographic communication according to the present invention, wherein: the generation of the national cryptographic authentication identifier is specifically to perform a digital signature process on the encrypted substation operation and maintenance instruction to generate a national cryptographic authentication identifier including the substation operation and maintenance instruction digest information, signature information, and the instruction security attribute tag.

[0009] As a preferred solution of the substation remote operation and maintenance method based on national cryptographic communication according to the present invention, wherein: the using a security gateway to verify the validity of the national cryptographic authentication identifier includes: receiving a security message containing the substation operation and maintenance instruction and the national cryptographic authentication identifier; extracting the digital signature and digest information in the national cryptographic authentication identifier; selecting a corresponding verification key and verification algorithm according to the security level to verify the digital signature; calculating the digest value of the substation operation and maintenance instruction and comparing it with the digest information; wherein, the query level instruction adopts single-factor verification, the configuration level instruction adopts two-factor verification, and the control level instruction adopts three-factor verification.

[0010] As a preferred solution of the substation remote operation and maintenance method based on national cryptographic communication according to the present invention, wherein: the context relevance check of the device operation sequence for the substation operation and maintenance instruction based on the national cryptographic authentication identifier includes: extracting an instruction sequence number from the national cryptographic authentication identifier; querying the associated instruction history record according to the instruction sequence number; judging whether the precondition of the substation operation and maintenance instruction is satisfied; and matching the substation operation and maintenance instruction with a preset substation device operation rule to confirm the operation compliance.

[0011] As a preferred solution of the substation remote operation and maintenance method based on national cryptographic communication according to the present invention, wherein: the preconditions of the substation operation and maintenance instruction include: the current operation state of the device satisfies the instruction execution condition; the previous instruction related to the substation operation and maintenance instruction has been successfully executed; the time for executing the substation operation and maintenance instruction meets the preset substation operation timing requirement; and the execution of the substation operation and maintenance instruction will not cause a state conflict between mutually coupled devices.

[0012] As a preferred solution of the substation remote operation and maintenance method based on national cryptographic communication according to the present invention, wherein: the associated analysis of the execution result of the substation operation and maintenance instruction and the device operation state to generate an operation and maintenance safety record includes: converting the substation operation and maintenance instruction into a control command recognizable by the device, establishing a mapping relation table between the substation operation and maintenance instruction and the control command, and collecting device operation state parameters according to the mapping relation table; the device operation state parameters include pre-operation state parameters and post-operation state parameters, and the state change amount is calculated by comparing the pre-operation state parameters and the post-operation state parameters; executing the control command, recording the execution timing information, execution response time and execution result code, and constructing an execution feature vector; constructing an operation and maintenance execution association model based on the state change amount and the execution feature vector, and the operation and maintenance execution association model performs feature fusion on the state change amount and the execution feature vector to generate the operation and maintenance safety record including the execution process of the substation operation and maintenance instruction and the device response situation.

[0013] To further solve the above technical problems, the present invention provides the following technical solutions: A substation remote operation and maintenance system based on national cryptographic communication, including: An encryption transmission module, configured to generate a national cryptographic authentication identifier by applying a national cryptographic algorithm according to the security level of a substation operation and maintenance instruction, and encrypt and transmit the substation operation and maintenance instruction; A verification module, configured to verify the validity of the national cryptographic authentication identifier by using a security gateway; An inspection module, configured to perform a context relevance check on the device operation sequence of the substation operation and maintenance instruction based on the national cryptographic authentication identifier; An execution monitoring module, configured to execute the substation operation and maintenance instruction that passes the validity verification and the context relevance check of the device operation sequence, monitor the device operation status, and perform an associated analysis on the execution result of the substation operation and maintenance instruction and the device operation status to generate an operation and maintenance security record.

[0014] A computer device includes a memory and a processor, and the memory stores a computer program. Wherein, when the processor executes the computer program, the steps of the above-mentioned substation remote operation and maintenance method based on national cryptographic communication are implemented.

[0015] A computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program thereon. When the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the above-mentioned substation remote operation and maintenance method based on national cryptographic communication are implemented.

[0016] The beneficial effects of the present invention: The present invention realizes a differential authentication mechanism based on the security level of instructions, ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of the operation and maintenance instruction transmission process; establishes a context relevance check mechanism for operation and maintenance instructions to prevent legal but unreasonable operation sequences; constructs an associated analysis model of the execution process and device response, forming a complete instruction execution security closed-loop proof, providing comprehensive security protection for substation remote operation and maintenance. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0017] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, the following will briefly introduce the drawings required for the description of the embodiments. Obviously, the following drawings are only some embodiments of the present invention. For those of ordinary skill in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative efforts.

[0018] Figure 1 It is a schematic diagram of the overall process of a substation remote operation and maintenance method based on national cryptographic communication proposed by the present invention; Figure 2 It is a flowchart of generating an operation and maintenance security record in a substation remote operation and maintenance method based on national cryptographic communication proposed by the present invention; Figure 3 It is a schematic diagram of the overall structure of a substation remote operation and maintenance system based on national cryptographic communication proposed by the present invention. Detailed Implementation Modes

[0019] To make the above objects, features, and advantages of the present invention more obvious and understandable, the following will describe the detailed implementation modes of the present invention in conjunction with the accompanying drawings of the specification. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present invention, rather than all embodiments. Based on the embodiments in the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those of ordinary skill in the art without creative efforts shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.

[0020] In the following description, many specific details are set forth to facilitate a full understanding of the present invention. However, the present invention can also be implemented in other ways different from those described herein. Those skilled in the art can make similar extensions without departing from the connotation of the present invention. Therefore, the present invention is not limited by the specific embodiments disclosed below.

[0021] Example 1, referring to Figure 1 and Figure 2 , which is an embodiment of the present invention, and provides a substation remote operation and maintenance method based on national secret communication.

[0022] Figure 1 Fig. shows the overall process schematic diagram of a substation remote operation and maintenance method based on national secret communication, including the following steps: S1: Apply the national secret algorithm according to the security level of the substation operation and maintenance instruction to generate a national secret authentication identifier, and encrypt and transmit the substation operation and maintenance instruction.

[0023] Specifically, the national secret algorithms in this embodiment include SM2 and SM4 algorithms.

[0024] S1.1: Apply the national secret algorithm according to the security level of the substation operation and maintenance instruction, including the following steps: Receive the substation operation and maintenance instruction, extract the instruction type, operation object, and operation parameters of the substation operation and maintenance instruction, and determine the security level of the substation operation and maintenance instruction according to the instruction type, operation object, and operation parameters; where the security level includes query level, configuration level, and control level.

[0025] In this embodiment, the instruction type includes data query type, parameter configuration type, and equipment control type; the operation object includes protection device, monitoring unit, and auxiliary system; the operation parameters include set value and execution condition. The determination of the security level is calculated using a risk assessment model: ; Wherein, represents the comprehensive risk value of the instruction , represents the risk value of the instruction type, represents the risk value of the operation object, Represents the risk value of the operation parameter, , and are the weights of the three factors respectively, and . According to the calculated risk value, the instructions are divided into three security levels: query level, configuration level, and control level by setting thresholds. Through the design of this risk assessment model, the security risks of different instructions can be accurately quantified, the security level division can be realized, and different-intensity security protection measures can be implemented for instructions with different risk levels.

[0026] Select the encryption mode of the national secret algorithm based on the security level, and adopt different encryption modes for substation operation and maintenance instructions with different security levels.

[0027] In this embodiment, the query-level instructions are encrypted in the ECB mode of the SM4 algorithm; the configuration-level instructions are encrypted in the CBC mode of the SM4 algorithm; the control-level instructions adopt the encryption method combining SM2 and SM4. First, the session key is encrypted by SM2, and then the instruction content is encrypted by the GCM mode of SM4 with this session key. This differential encryption strategy can balance the security and performance requirements, adopt lightweight encryption methods for low-risk instructions to improve processing efficiency, and adopt strong cryptographic suites for high-risk instructions to ensure security, effectively solving the problem that the traditional single encryption mode cannot balance efficiency and security.

[0028] Construct an instruction security attribute label containing security level information, and select an encryption key based on the instruction security attribute label.

[0029] The instruction security attribute label is encapsulated in a structured format, and the corresponding key is selected from the key management system according to the security level: ; Among them, represents the selected encryption key, represents the security level, represents the instruction initiator identifier, represents the instruction recipient identifier. The function KeySelect selects the appropriate key from the key library according to these parameters. This key selection mechanism based on the security attribute label realizes the automation and refinement of key management, avoids the security risks brought by traditional fixed keys, and reduces the complexity of key distribution and management at the same time.

[0030] Use the selected encryption mode and encryption key of the national secret algorithm to encrypt the substation operation and maintenance instructions to obtain the encrypted substation operation and maintenance instructions.

[0031] For the SM4-ECB mode, the encryption process is: ; Among them, represents the th ciphertext block, represents the th plaintext block, represents the SM4 encryption algorithm, represents the encryption key.

[0032] For the SM4-CBC mode, the encryption process is as follows: ; where, when i = 0, is the initialization vector, represents the exclusive OR operation.

[0033] The encryption process is carried out using the national cryptographic algorithm, ensuring the security and efficiency of the encryption process. Compared with the traditional AES algorithm, the SM4 algorithm has better performance on domestic hardware platforms and can meet the low-latency requirements of substation real-time operation and maintenance.

[0034] S1.2: Generate the national cryptographic authentication identifier, specifically by performing digital signature processing on the encrypted substation operation and maintenance instructions to generate a national cryptographic authentication identifier containing the summary information, signature information, and instruction security attribute label of the substation operation and maintenance instructions.

[0035] First, calculate the digest of the encrypted instructions using the SM3 hash algorithm: ; where, represents the digest value, represents the encrypted instruction data, SM3 represents the SM3 hash algorithm, and the output is a 256-bit hash value.

[0036] Then, sign the digest using the SM2 signature algorithm: ; where, is the signature value, is the private key of the signer, represents the SM2 signature algorithm.

[0037] Finally, combine the summary information, signature information, and instruction security attribute label to form the national cryptographic authentication identifier: ; where, AUTH represents the national cryptographic authentication identifier, TAG represents the instruction security attribute label.

[0038] Through the generation process of the national secret authentication identifier, the authenticity of the instruction source and the protection of data integrity are realized, effectively preventing instruction tampering and forgery attacks. Compared with the traditional MAC authentication method, the SM2 digital signature also provides non-repudiation, ensuring the traceability and clear responsibility of operation and maintenance operations, and significantly improving the security control level of substation remote operation and maintenance.

[0039] S1.3: Encrypt and transmit the substation operation and maintenance instructions. Specifically, assemble the encrypted substation operation and maintenance instructions and the national secret authentication identifier to form a security message and transmit it.

[0040] The security message is assembled in the following format: ; where, MSG represents the security message, Header represents the message header, containing information such as version number and length, represents the encrypted instruction content, AUTH represents the national secret authentication identifier, represents the connection operation.

[0041] The message is transmitted through a secure channel. After receiving the message, the receiving party first verifies the validity of the authentication identifier, then decrypts the instruction content, and finally performs a permission check according to the instruction security attribute label.

[0042] The design of this security message realizes the integrated protection of data transmission confidentiality, integrity, and identity authentication. Compared with the traditional separate security mechanism, it greatly reduces the number of protocol interactions and processing delays, improves the transmission efficiency, simplifies the implementation complexity, and reduces the maintenance cost.

[0043] Among them, the instruction security attribute label includes the identity information of the instruction initiator, the identity information of the instruction recipient, the security level identifier, the instruction valid time window, and the instruction sequence number. The instruction sequence number is used to identify the position of the substation operation and maintenance instruction in the operation sequence.

[0044] The instruction sequence number is generated in a monotonically increasing manner: ; where, represents the sequence number of the current instruction, represents the sequence number of the previous instruction. By verifying the continuity of the sequence number, the receiving party can prevent replay attacks and ensure that the instructions are executed in the correct order.

[0045] The introduction of the instruction security attribute label solves the problem of the separation of identity authentication and instruction control in traditional substation operation and maintenance systems, realizes fine-grained access control based on instruction content and context, and effectively prevents unauthorized operations and replay attacks. In particular, the design of the instruction valid time window limits the effective execution period of the instruction. Even if the key is leaked, expired instructions cannot be executed, reducing the scope of influence of security incidents.

[0046] Through the implementation of the above S1 step, the present invention constructs a complete set of substation operation and maintenance instruction security processing mechanisms based on national cryptographic algorithms, taking into account both security and processing efficiency.

[0047] S2: Use the security gateway to verify the validity of the national cryptographic authentication identifier.

[0048] Specifically, receive the security message containing the substation operation and maintenance instruction and the national cryptographic authentication identifier; extract the digital signature and digest information in the national cryptographic authentication identifier; select the corresponding verification key and verification algorithm according to the security level to verify the digital signature; calculate the digest value of the substation operation and maintenance instruction and compare it with the digest information; among them, query-level instructions use single-factor verification, configuration-level instructions use two-factor verification, and control-level instructions use three-factor verification.

[0049] First, the substation security gateway receives the security message transmitted through the network. The security message contains the encrypted substation operation and maintenance instruction and the national cryptographic authentication identifier. As the security barrier between the substation and the external network, the security gateway is responsible for the security verification of all operation and maintenance instructions entering the substation. The receiving process of the security message adopts a redundant channel design to ensure that when the main channel fails, the standby channel can take over in time to ensure the reliability of instruction reception.

[0050] After receiving the security message, the security gateway parses the national cryptographic authentication identifier from the security message and extracts the digital signature and digest information therein. The parsing of the national cryptographic authentication identifier is consistent with the structure described in the S1 part. The security gateway accurately extracts the three parts of information, namely the digest information, the signature value, and the instruction security attribute label, through a preset data structure parsing algorithm, preparing for the subsequent verification process. Through this structured parsing method, the problems of mixed security metadata and difficult extraction in traditional systems are solved, and the efficiency of verification processing is improved.

[0051] Next, the security gateway selects the corresponding verification key and verification algorithm from the key management system according to the security level information in the instruction security attribute label. For the SM2 algorithm, the verification key is the public key of the sender. This adaptive key selection mechanism based on the security level effectively solves the security risks in the traditional fixed key mode and realizes the refined management and control of key use.

[0052] Subsequently, the security gateway verifies the digital signature using the selected verification key. The verification process for SM2 signature is as follows: ; where, result represents the verification result (Boolean value), is the public key of the signer, is the digest value, is the signature value, represents the SM2 signature verification algorithm. Only when the verification result is true does it indicate that the signature is valid, thereby confirming the legitimacy of the instruction source. Compared with traditional password verification methods, SM2 digital signature verification provides a higher level of identity authentication guarantee and effectively resists the risk of forgery attacks.

[0053] Meanwhile, the security gateway recalculates the digest value of the substation operation and maintenance instruction and compares it with the digest information in the national cryptography authentication identifier. The security gateway verifies whether the instruction has been tampered with during transmission by comparing whether the recalculated digest value is equal to the received digest value. The collision resistance performance of the SM3 algorithm is superior to traditional MD5 and SHA-1 algorithms, which can effectively prevent hash collision attacks and improve the reliability of instruction integrity verification.

[0054] In this embodiment, different verification mechanisms with different strengths are adopted for instructions with different security levels: 1. For query-level instructions, single-factor verification is adopted: only the validity of the digital signature is verified. This lightweight verification is applicable to low-risk query operations. While ensuring basic security, it minimizes the verification overhead and improves the system response speed. For frequently executed query operations, the single-factor verification mechanism can reduce the verification latency and improve the processing efficiency.

[0055] 2. For configuration-level instructions, two-factor verification is adopted: in addition to verifying the digital signature, the validity of the instruction time window also needs to be verified. The instruction time window verification adopts the following conditions: ; where, represents the current time, and represent the effective start time and end time of the instruction respectively. This dual guarantee mechanism effectively prevents replay attacks and delay attacks, ensuring that the configuration instruction is executed within the specified validity period.

[0056] 3. For control-level instructions, three-factor verification is adopted: in addition to the above two verifications, serial number continuity verification is added. The serial number verification conditions are: ; where, represents the serial number of the current instruction, Indicates the sequence number of the last successfully executed instruction. The three-factor verification mechanism provides the strictest security guarantee for high-risk control instructions, ensuring that instructions are executed in the correct order, preventing instruction replay, out-of-order execution, and missed execution, and significantly improving the security of substation operation control.

[0057] Through this design of multi-level security verification, the present invention realizes the precise matching of the verification intensity and the instruction risk level. While ensuring the security of high-risk instructions, it avoids the performance loss caused by over-verification of low-risk instructions. This differential verification mechanism solves the problem of low efficiency caused by the "one-size-fits-all" approach in traditional verification methods, ensures the security of critical instructions, and improves the overall response efficiency of the system, providing a solid technical guarantee for the safe operation and maintenance of substations.

[0058] S3: Check the context relevance of the device operation sequence of substation operation and maintenance instructions based on the national cryptography authentication identifier.

[0059] S3.1: Extract the instruction sequence number from the national cryptography authentication identifier.

[0060] The security gateway obtains the instruction sequence number information by extracting the instruction security attribute label in the national cryptography authentication identifier. The instruction sequence number is the position identifier of the substation operation and maintenance instruction in the operation sequence, which is crucial for ensuring the correctness of the instruction execution order.

[0061] The extraction process of the instruction sequence number is realized by parsing the instruction security attribute label, and the serial number field is included in the label structure. Structured parsing technology is used to accurately extract the serial number information to avoid parsing errors caused by chaotic data formats in traditional methods. This precise extraction mechanism lays a solid foundation for subsequent context relevance checks.

[0062] S3.2: Query the associated instruction history record according to the instruction sequence number.

[0063] According to the extracted instruction sequence number, query the historical instruction record associated with the current instruction from the instruction history database. The query of associated instructions adopts the context correlation analysis algorithm, which not only considers the continuity of the instruction sequence but also the functional relevance between instructions.

[0064] By constructing an instruction association graph structure to quickly locate the previous instructions directly related to the current instruction and extract their execution status and result information. This graph-based association analysis method solves the problem that traditional linear checks cannot effectively handle complex instruction dependency relationships, and is especially suitable for the multi-device collaborative operation scenario of substations.

[0065] The historical record query results include key information such as the execution status, execution time, operation object, and operation result of the previous instruction, providing data support for subsequent precondition judgment. This comprehensive historical information acquisition mechanism effectively solves the problem of unclear instruction execution context in traditional operation and maintenance systems.

[0066] S3.3: Determine whether the preconditions of the substation operation and maintenance instruction are met.

[0067] Based on the queried associated instruction historical records, comprehensively judge the preconditions of the substation operation and maintenance instruction to ensure the safety and effectiveness of instruction execution. The judgment of preconditions uses rule engine technology, and through preset condition judgment rules, parallel evaluation of multi-dimensional preconditions is carried out.

[0068] The precondition judgment not only focuses on the legality of the instruction itself, but also pays more attention to the context adaptability of the instruction in the entire operation sequence. This context-aware condition judgment method effectively prevents potential safety hazards caused by isolated instruction judgment.

[0069] S3.4: Match the substation operation and maintenance instruction with the preset substation equipment operation rules to confirm the compliance of the operation.

[0070] Match the substation operation and maintenance instruction that has passed the precondition judgment with the preset substation equipment operation rule library to confirm the compliance of the operation. The operation rule matching uses semantic analysis technology. By extracting the operation intention and operation object of the instruction, pattern matching is carried out with the standard operation process in the rule library.

[0071] The matching process of operation rules is not only a simple rule search, but also includes rule reasoning and conflict detection. It can intelligently identify the deviation between the instruction operation and the preset rules and give specific non-compliance reasons. This deep semantic analysis rule matching mechanism solves the problem that traditional keyword matching methods are difficult to accurately identify complex operation semantics.

[0072] Through the implementation of the above four steps, the present invention realizes a comprehensive context relevance check of substation operation and maintenance instructions, ensuring the safety, orderliness, and compliance of instruction execution. This context association check mechanism based on the national secret authentication identifier not only improves the safety of substation remote operation and maintenance, but also optimizes the rationality of the operation process, providing technical support for substation intelligent operation and maintenance.

[0073] Furthermore, the preconditions of the substation operation and maintenance instruction include: the current operation state of the equipment meets the instruction execution conditions; the previous instructions related to the substation operation and maintenance instruction have been successfully executed; the time for executing the substation operation and maintenance instruction meets the preset substation operation timing requirements; the execution of the substation operation and maintenance instruction will not cause state conflicts between mutually coupled devices.

[0074] The current operating state of the device meets the instruction execution conditions: By means of the real-time device status monitoring interface, the current operating state of the instruction operation object is obtained and compared with the prerequisite state required for instruction execution. This state adaptability check mechanism avoids the risk of forced execution of instructions when the device does not have the execution conditions. For example, for the circuit breaker closing instruction, check whether the current state of the circuit breaker is in the open state, whether the mechanical energy storage is completed, whether the operating mechanism is normal, etc. This dynamic check mechanism based on the actual state of the device solves the limitation of traditional static rule checks that cannot cope with changes in device status.

[0075] The previous instructions related to the substation operation and maintenance instructions have been successfully executed: Based on the associated instruction history records queried above, verify whether the previous instructions directly related to the current instruction have been successfully executed. The successful execution of the previous instructions is an important prerequisite for ensuring the safe and effective execution of the current instruction.

[0076] It should be noted that the verification of previous instructions not only checks the execution status of the instructions, but also analyzes whether the execution results meet the execution requirements of the current instruction. For example, before executing the fixed value modification instruction of a certain protection device, verify whether the exit instruction of the protection device has been successfully executed. This relevance check considering the execution results of instructions effectively prevents logical breaks in the operation sequence and improves the integrity of the operation process.

[0077] The time for executing the substation operation and maintenance instructions meets the preset substation operation timing requirements: Check the rationality of the instruction execution time to ensure that it meets the timing requirements of substation operations. The timing requirements include the minimum time interval between instructions, the time window limit for specific operations, etc.

[0078] In an optional embodiment, the timing check can adopt a time correlation model, which not only considers the absolute time requirements, but also pays attention to the relative time constraints between operations. For example, after the transformer tap is switched, it is necessary to wait for a certain time before adjusting the load. According to this timing requirement, judge whether the execution timing of the current load adjustment instruction is appropriate. This timing constraint check mechanism solves the problems of equipment damage and system instability caused by improper operation timing in traditional operation and maintenance systems.

[0079] The execution of substation operation and maintenance instructions will not cause state conflicts between mutually coupled devices: Through the analysis of the device topology relationship, evaluate whether the execution of the current instruction will conflict with the states of mutually coupled devices. The coupling relationship between devices is an important constraint condition for the safe operation of the substation, and state conflicts may lead to system instability or even failures.

[0080] It should be noted that the coupling conflict detection is based on the device state transition model. By simulating the device state changes after the instruction execution, it predicts the possible state conflicts between devices. For example, it checks whether the closing operation of the bus sectionalizing circuit breaker will cause voltage or phase conflicts between the two sections of the bus. This prediction-based conflict detection method effectively prevents system anomalies caused by the interaction between devices and improves the stability of substation operation.

[0081] Furthermore, the preset operation rules for substation equipment include: performing power equipment operations in the order of "isolate first, then close"; the operation order of high-voltage side equipment and low-voltage side equipment follows the principle of "high first, then low"; the operation of the protection device follows the order of "energize the differential protection first, then the backup protection"; the operation order of the transformer follows the rule of "adjust the tap changer first, then load"; the circuit breaker reclosing operation must be performed after the fault is eliminated.

[0082] Perform power equipment operations in the order of "isolate first, then close": This rule requires that when performing power equipment operations, the isolation operation must be performed first to ensure that the equipment is in a safe isolated state, and then the closing operation can be performed. This rule is the basic safety principle for power equipment operations and is of great significance for preventing misoperations and ensuring personal safety.

[0083] It should be noted that by analyzing the logical order of the instruction operations, it is ensured that the isolation operations are performed before the closing operations. For example, when operating the circuit breaker, it is checked whether the relevant isolating switches have been operated and whether these operations meet the requirements of safe isolation. This forced constraint mechanism for the operation order effectively prevents equipment damage and safety accidents caused by incorrect operation order.

[0084] The operation order of high-voltage side equipment and low-voltage side equipment follows the principle of "high first, then low": This rule stipulates that when operating a device combination (such as a transformer) that includes a high-voltage side and a low-voltage side, the high-voltage side equipment should be operated first, and then the low-voltage side equipment. This principle is formulated based on the energy flow direction and safety considerations of the power system.

[0085] It should be noted that by identifying the voltage level attribute of the device, it is judged whether the operation order conforms to the principle of "high first, then low". For example, in the transformer outage operation, it is checked whether the opening operation of the high-voltage side circuit breaker is performed before the low-voltage side circuit breaker. This operation order constraint considering the voltage level avoids the risk of equipment overload and damage caused by energy backflow.

[0086] The operation of the protection device follows the sequence of "energize the differential protection first, and then the backup protection": This rule requires that when energizing the protection device, the main protection (such as differential protection) should be energized first, and then the backup protection (such as distance protection, overcurrent protection, etc.). This sequence is formulated based on the coordination relationship and selectivity principle of the protection device.

[0087] It should be noted that by analyzing the function type and protection scope of the protection device, it is judged whether the energizing sequence meets the rule requirements. For example, during the energizing operation of the line protection, it is checked whether the energizing of the line differential protection is prior to the distance protection. This intelligent judgment mechanism for the energizing sequence of the protection device ensures the correct coordination of the protection system and improves the reliability and selectivity of fault handling.

[0088] The operation sequence of the transformer follows the rule of "adjust the tap changer first, and then load": This rule stipulates that before adjusting the transformer load, the tap changer should be adjusted first to ensure that the transformer operates at an appropriate turns ratio. This rule is based on the considerations of the safe operation and efficiency optimization of the transformer.

[0089] It should be noted that by identifying the type and purpose of the transformer operation instruction, it is judged whether the operation sequence conforms to the rule of "adjust the tap changer first, and then load". For example, during the commissioning process of the transformer, the system checks whether the tap changer has been adjusted to the appropriate position before allowing the load to be added. This constraint mechanism for the operation sequence of the transformer avoids the problems of reduced efficiency and equipment overload caused by operation at an unreasonable turns ratio.

[0090] The circuit breaker reclosing operation must be performed after the fault is eliminated: This rule requires that the circuit breaker reclosing operation can only be performed after it is confirmed that the fault has been eliminated, to prevent system shock and equipment damage caused by reclosing with a fault.

[0091] It should be noted that by analyzing the fault information and the circuit breaker status, the safety of the reclosing operation is judged. Before executing the reclosing instruction, it is checked whether the fault flag of the relevant line or equipment has been cleared and whether the protection device has been reset. This operation constraint based on the fault status effectively prevents the risk of secondary fault expansion and equipment damage caused by blind reclosing.

[0092] Through the matching check of the above device operation rules, the present invention realizes a comprehensive evaluation of the compliance of substation operation and maintenance instructions, ensuring the safety and standardization of instruction execution. This compliance check mechanism based on refined rules effectively solves the safety risks and equipment damage problems caused by non-standard operations in traditional operation and maintenance systems, providing technical guarantee for the safe and stable operation of substations.

[0093] S4: Execute the substation operation and maintenance instruction that has passed the validity verification and the relevance check of the device operation sequence context, monitor the device operation status, and perform an associated analysis on the execution result of the substation operation and maintenance instruction and the device operation status to generate an operation and maintenance safety record.

[0094] As Figure 2 shown, it is a schematic diagram of the execution process of step S4, including: S4.1: Convert the substation operation and maintenance instruction into a control command recognizable by the device, establish a mapping relationship table between the substation operation and maintenance instruction and the control command, and collect device operation status parameters according to the mapping relationship table.

[0095] This link is a process of converting the verified high-level operation and maintenance instruction into a control command that can be directly executed by a specific device, which solves the adaptation problem between high-level semantic instructions and low-level device control.

[0096] Substation operation and maintenance instructions are usually high-level semantic instructions for the business layer, while substation devices need to receive low-level control commands in a specific format. To solve the semantic difference between the two, the present invention designs an instruction-to-command mapping and conversion mechanism. This mechanism is based on instruction semantic parsing technology, extracts the operation intention, operation object, and operation parameters of the instruction, and then converts them into control commands recognizable by the device through preset mapping rules.

[0097] The mapping relationship table is a structured set of conversion rules, which contains the mapping rules between instruction types, operation objects, parameter conditions, and corresponding control commands. This table not only realizes static mapping but also supports dynamic parameter filling, and can generate parameterized control commands according to the specific parameter values in the instruction. This flexible mapping mechanism solves the problem that traditional fixed mapping methods are difficult to adapt to complex parameter combinations.

[0098] Based on the established mapping relationship table, the present invention can specifically determine the device operation status parameters to be collected. This targeted parameter collection mechanism solves the problems of heavy system burden and data redundancy caused by traditional full-scale collection, and improves the accuracy and efficiency of status monitoring. Through this precise collection method guided by the mapping relationship, the present invention can obtain the status parameters most relevant to the current operation and provide precise data support for subsequent associated analysis.

[0099] Specifically, the device operation status parameters include pre-operation status parameters and post-operation status parameters. The pre-operation status parameters are collected before executing the control command, and the post-operation status parameters are collected after executing the control command. The status change amount is calculated by comparing the pre-operation status parameters and the post-operation status parameters.

[0100] The collection of pre - operation status parameters is a comprehensive record of the current status of the device before executing the control command. According to the list of key parameters determined by the mapping relation table, the real - time status data of the device is collected through the device communication interface. These parameters usually include information such as the switch status, operating parameters, and alarm status of the device, providing reference data for subsequent analysis of status changes.

[0101] The collection of post - operation status parameters is the record of the new status of the device after the control command is executed. The same type of status parameters as before the operation are collected to ensure data comparability. An appropriate delay is usually set for post - operation collection to ensure that the device status is completely stable before collection. This delay collection mechanism considering the device response characteristics solves the problem that traditional immediate collection may capture intermediate states.

[0102] The calculation of the status change amount uses the parameter difference analysis method. The status parameters before and after the operation are compared one by one to calculate the change amount of each parameter. The calculation process not only considers simple numerical differences but also the type characteristics of the parameters. Corresponding change amount calculation methods are used for different types of parameters such as digital quantities, analog quantities, and status quantities. This type - aware change amount calculation mechanism solves the problem that traditional simple difference calculations cannot accurately express complex status changes.

[0103] The status change amount, as an objective reflection of the device's response to the instruction, provides an important basis for subsequent evaluation of the execution effect. By analyzing the status change amount, the present invention judges the actual effect of the instruction execution and identifies potential execution anomalies or device failures.

[0104] S4.2: Execute the control command, record the execution timing information, execution response time, and execution result code of the control command, and construct an execution feature vector containing the execution timing information, execution response time, and execution result code.

[0105] This link comprehensively monitors and records the execution process of the control command, solving the problems of opaque execution process and difficult fault location caused by the simplification of traditional execution records.

[0106] The execution of the control command adopts a secure sequential execution mechanism. According to the predefined execution process, the control command is sent to the target device. During the execution process, the transmission status of the command, the response status of the device, and the execution feedback information are monitored in real - time to ensure the reliable execution of the command. For complex combined commands, a transaction processing mechanism can be adopted to ensure that the combined command is executed completely or rolled back completely as a whole, avoiding inconsistent system states caused by partial execution.

[0107] The recording of execution timing information adopts a multi-level timestamp mechanism, which not only records the start time and completion time of command execution, but also records the timestamp of key nodes during the execution process. These timestamps form the time track of command execution, providing a timing basis for subsequent execution anomaly analysis. This fine-grained timing recording mechanism solves the problem that it is difficult to locate the execution bottleneck by only recording the start and end times in the traditional method.

[0108] The measurement of execution response time adopts an end-to-end timing method, and the time interval from the command being sent to receiving the device response is used as the execution response time. The response time is monitored in real time and compared with the preset normal response time range to detect response anomalies in a timely manner. This response time monitoring mechanism solves the problem of lack of timeliness evaluation in traditional execution monitoring and improves the sensitivity to execution anomalies.

[0109] The generation of execution result codes is based on the comprehensive analysis of device feedback and status detection. The execution results are divided into three basic types: success, failure, and partial completion, and the specific result status is represented by a refined code system. This structured result code system solves the problem that traditional simple success / failure marks cannot express complex execution results and provides rich result information for subsequent execution analysis.

[0110] The construction of execution feature vectors structures the execution timing information, execution response time, and execution result codes to form a multi-dimensional vector representing the characteristics of command execution. This vector representation method converts discrete execution information into a data structure that can be quantitatively analyzed, providing a data basis for subsequent pattern recognition and anomaly detection.

[0111] Specifically, the execution timing information includes the execution start time, execution completion time, and intermediate key node timestamps. The execution response time is the time required for the device to respond to the control command. The execution result codes include success codes, failure codes, and partial completion codes.

[0112] The execution start time is the time point when the control command starts to be issued. A high-precision clock is used to record this time point as the starting mark of the execution process.

[0113] The execution completion time is the time point when all executions of the control command end. For multi-step commands, the completion time is the time point when the last step is executed and completed.

[0114] The intermediate key node timestamps are the time records of important stages during the execution process, including command issuance time, command reception confirmation time, execution start time, intermediate state change time, and execution end time, etc. These timestamps constitute a complete execution timeline, providing detailed timing information for execution process analysis.

[0115] The calculation of the execution response time adopts a multi-point measurement method, records the time interval from the command issuance to the device response, and differentiates between communication delay and device processing time. This refined measurement of the response time helps to identify the specific reasons for response delays and provides a basis for system optimization.

[0116] The execution result code adopts a hierarchical coding structure. The main code represents the basic result type of the execution (success, failure, partially completed), and the secondary code represents the specific result status or reason for failure. For example, the failure code not only indicates that the execution has failed but also includes specific reason codes such as communication failure, device rejection, timeout, parameter error, etc. This detailed result code system improves the information content of the execution result and facilitates subsequent fault diagnosis and problem-solving.

[0117] S4.3: Construct an operation and maintenance execution association model based on the state change amount and the execution feature vector. The operation and maintenance execution association model performs feature fusion on the state change amount and the execution feature vector to generate an operation and maintenance safety record that includes the execution process of substation operation and maintenance instructions and the device response situation.

[0118] This link is the core step of correlative analysis between the instruction execution process and the device response result, which solves the problem of the disconnection between the execution process and the execution effect in traditional operation and maintenance records.

[0119] The operation and maintenance execution association model is a data model that correlates state changes with execution features. Through this model, a correspondence relationship is established between the instruction execution process and the device response result. The association model adopts a bidirectional mapping structure, which can not only infer the expected state changes based on execution features but also evaluate the rationality of the execution process based on state changes. This bidirectional association mechanism solves the problem that traditional one-way judgment cannot comprehensively evaluate the execution quality.

[0120] The feature fusion process adopts multi-dimensional feature alignment technology to perform time synchronization and semantic alignment on each dimension of the state change amount and the execution feature vector, and identify the causal relationships and related patterns between them. The fusion process not only focuses on numerical matching but also considers temporal logic and functional relevance to form a fusion feature set that comprehensively represents the execution process and the response result. This multi-dimensional feature fusion method solves the problem that traditional simple association cannot capture complex execution patterns.

[0121] The generation of the operation and maintenance safety record is based on the comprehensive analysis of the fusion features. The execution process information and the device response situation are organized into a structured safety record, which includes the basic information of the instruction, the details of the execution process, the state change result, and the safety assessment conclusion, etc. This safety record containing rich information provides comprehensive data support for subsequent operation and maintenance analysis, fault diagnosis, and safety auditing.

[0122] Specifically, feature fusion includes calculating the deviation value between the state change amount and the expected response of the device; if the execution result code is a success code and the deviation value is zero, mark the normal execution identifier in the operation and maintenance security record; if the execution result code is a success code but the deviation value is not zero, calculate the ratio of the deviation value to the execution response time as the security risk index, and mark the potential risk identifier in the operation and maintenance security record; if the execution result code is a failure code, analyze the corresponding relationship between the intermediate key node timestamps in the execution timing information and the state change amount, identify the failure link, and mark the failed execution identifier in the operation and maintenance security record; if the execution result code is a partially completed code, compare the execution feature vector with the historical execution feature vector to determine the reason for partial completion, and mark the partial completion identifier in the operation and maintenance security record.

[0123] The deviation value calculation adopts a multi-parameter weighted method. According to the importance and sensitivity of different parameters, the deviations of each parameter are weighted and calculated to obtain the comprehensive deviation value. This deviation calculation method considering the parameter importance solves the problem that the traditional simple mean calculation cannot reflect the importance of key parameters and improves the accuracy of deviation evaluation.

[0124] The generation of the normal execution identifier is based on strict consistency judgment. It is required that when the execution result code shows success and the state change is completely consistent with the expectation (the deviation value is zero), it is marked as normal execution. This strict normal standard ensures that the execution marked as normal truly achieves the expected effect and improves the reliability of operation and maintenance quality control.

[0125] The generation of the potential risk identifier adopts a risk quantification method. By calculating the ratio of the deviation value to the execution response time as the security risk index, the potential risk is quantitatively evaluated. This risk quantification mechanism solves the problem of the traditional risk assessment being vague and provides a data basis for risk management. The higher the security risk index, the greater the state deviation per unit time and the higher the risk level. Based on this, the risk level is divided and marked.

[0126] The generation of the failed execution identifier is based on the analysis of the failure cause location. By correlating the corresponding relationship between the intermediate node timestamps and the state change, the failure link in the execution process is identified. This fault location method based on timing analysis solves the problem that the traditional fault record lacks location information and provides an accurate guide for fault diagnosis and problem solving.

[0127] The generation of the partial completion identifier adopts a pattern comparison technology. The current execution feature vector is compared with the historical execution feature vector, and the specific reason for partial completion is identified through similarity analysis. This reason analysis method based on historical data solves the problem that the traditional record has an unclear description of the partial completion situation and improves the pertinence of problem solving.

[0128] Specifically, the operation and maintenance security record simultaneously records the instruction security attribute label, instruction serial number of the substation operation and maintenance instruction, and the inspection result of the context relevance of the device operation sequence, forming a complete proof of the security closed-loop of instruction execution.

[0129] The integrity design of the operation and maintenance security record adopts the idea of full-link tracing, and the record contains the whole process information from instruction verification to execution completion. The instruction security attribute label in the record provides the security characteristic information of the instruction, the instruction serial number ensures the traceability of the execution order, the context relevance inspection result proves the rationality of the instruction execution, and the execution process and response result record the actual execution effect. This comprehensive recording mechanism forms a complete proof of the security closed-loop of instruction execution, providing a reliable basis for post-event auditing and responsibility tracing.

[0130] The design of the security closed-loop proof adopts anti-tampering technology, digitally signs and timestamp encapsulates the generated operation and maintenance security record to ensure the authenticity and non-tamperability of the record. This legally valid security record solves the problem that traditional operation and maintenance records are easy to be modified and difficult to be used as evidence, providing a reliable responsibility guarantee mechanism for the safe operation and maintenance of the substation.

[0131] Through the implementation of the above S4 step, the present invention realizes the whole-process monitoring and recording of the substation operation and maintenance instruction from verification to execution and then to effect evaluation, and constructs a complete operation and maintenance security closed-loop system. This operation and maintenance method based on national cryptography authentication and context association not only improves the security and reliability of substation operation and maintenance, but also provides a solid data basis for operation and maintenance quality evaluation and security auditing, realizing the safe control and traceability of substation remote operation and maintenance, and having important practical value and popularization significance.

[0132] Example 2, referring to Figure 3 , which is an embodiment of the present invention, provides a substation remote operation and maintenance system based on national cryptography communication.

[0133] As Figure 3 shown, it is the overall structure schematic diagram of the system, including: An encryption transmission module, which is used to generate a national cryptography authentication identifier by applying the national cryptography algorithm according to the security level of the substation operation and maintenance instruction, and encrypt and transmit the substation operation and maintenance instruction; A verification module, which is used to verify the validity of the national cryptography authentication identifier by using a security gateway; An inspection module, which is used to perform context relevance inspection of the device operation sequence of the substation operation and maintenance instruction based on the national cryptography authentication identifier; An execution monitoring module, which is used to execute the substation operation and maintenance instruction that has passed the validity verification and the context relevance inspection of the device operation sequence, monitor the device operation status, and associate and analyze the execution result of the substation operation and maintenance instruction with the device operation status to generate an operation and maintenance security record.

[0134] Embodiment 3 is an embodiment of the present invention. The difference from the previous embodiment is that when the function is implemented in the form of a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on such an understanding, the technical solution of the present invention, in essence, or the part that contributes to the prior art, or a part of this technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions for causing a computer device (which may be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the methods described in various embodiments of the present invention. The aforementioned storage medium includes: various media such as USB flash drives, mobile hard disks, read-only memories (ROM, Read-Only Memory), random access memories (RAM, Random Access Memory), magnetic disks, or optical discs that can store program codes.

[0135] The logic and / or steps represented in the flowchart or described in other ways herein, for example, can be considered as a definite sequence list of executable instructions for implementing logical functions, and can be specifically implemented in any computer-readable medium for use by an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device (such as a computer-based system, a system including a processor, or other systems that can fetch and execute instructions from the instruction execution system, apparatus, or device), or in combination with these instruction execution systems, apparatus, or devices. For the purposes of this specification, a "computer-readable medium" can be any device that can contain, store, communicate, propagate, or transport a program for use by or in connection with an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device.

[0136] More specific examples (non-exhaustive list) of computer-readable media include the following: an electrical connection part with one or more wirings (electronic device), a portable computer disk cartridge (magnetic device), random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), optical fiber device, and portable compact disc read-only memory (CDROM). Additionally, the computer-readable medium can even be paper or other suitable media on which the program can be printed, because the program can be obtained electronically, for example, by optically scanning the paper or other media, then editing, interpreting, or processing it in other suitable ways if necessary, and then storing it in a computer memory.

[0137] It should be understood that each part of the present invention can be implemented by hardware, software, firmware or a combination thereof. In the above embodiments, multiple steps or methods can be implemented by software or firmware stored in a memory and executed by a suitable instruction execution system. For example, if implemented by hardware, as in another embodiment, any one of the following techniques known in the art or a combination thereof can be used: discrete logic circuits having logic gate circuits for implementing logical functions on data signals, application specific integrated circuits having appropriate combinational logic gate circuits, programmable gate arrays (PGAs), field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), etc.

[0138] It should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention and not to limit them. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the preferred embodiments, those of ordinary skill in the art should understand that the technical solutions of the present invention can be modified or equivalently replaced without departing from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the present invention, and they should all be covered by the scope of the claims of the present invention.

Claims

1. A remote operation and maintenance method for a substation based on national secret communication, characterized in that: include: According to the security level of the substation operation and maintenance instruction, a national secret algorithm is applied to generate a national secret authentication mark, and the substation operation and maintenance instruction is encrypted for transmission; Using a security gateway to verify the validity of the national secret authentication mark; Performing a context relevance check of the equipment operation sequence on the substation operation and maintenance instruction based on the national secret authentication identifier; Execute the substation operation and maintenance instructions that have passed the validity verification and the equipment operation sequence context relevance check, monitor the equipment operation status, and associate the substation operation and maintenance instruction execution results with the equipment operation status to generate an operation and maintenance safety record.

2. The remote operation and maintenance method of a substation based on national secret communication according to claim 1, characterized in that: Apply the national encryption algorithm according to the security level of the substation operation and maintenance instructions, including the following steps: receiving a substation operation and maintenance instruction, extracting an instruction type, an operation object, and an operation parameter of the substation operation and maintenance instruction, and determining a security level of the substation operation and maintenance instruction according to the instruction type, the operation object, and the operation parameter; the security level includes a query level, a configuration level, and a control level; Selecting an encryption mode of the national secret algorithm based on the security level, and using different encryption modes for the substation operation and maintenance instructions of different security levels; constructing an instruction security attribute tag containing security level information, and selecting an encryption key based on the instruction security attribute tag; The substation operation and maintenance instruction is encrypted using the selected encryption mode of the national secret algorithm and the encryption key to obtain the encrypted substation operation and maintenance instruction.

3. The remote operation and maintenance method of a substation based on national secret communication according to claim 2 is characterized in that: The generation of the national secret authentication mark is specifically to digitally sign the encrypted substation operation and maintenance instruction to generate a national secret authentication mark including the substation operation and maintenance instruction summary information, signature information and the instruction security attribute label.

4. The remote operation and maintenance method of a substation based on national secret communication as claimed in claim 3 is characterized in that: The use of a security gateway to verify the validity of the national secret authentication identifier includes: Receiving a security message including the substation operation and maintenance instruction and the national secret authentication mark; Extract the digital signature and summary information from the national secret authentication mark; Selecting a corresponding verification key and verification algorithm according to the security level to verify the digital signature; Calculating a summary value of the substation operation and maintenance instruction, and comparing it with the summary information; Among them, query-level instructions use single-factor authentication, configuration-level instructions use two-factor authentication, and control-level instructions use three-factor authentication.

5. The remote operation and maintenance method of a substation based on national secret communication according to claim 4 is characterized in that: The checking of the context relevance of the equipment operation sequence of the substation operation and maintenance instruction based on the national secret authentication identifier includes: Extracting the instruction serial number from the national secret authentication mark; Query the associated instruction history records according to the instruction serial number; Determining whether the preconditions of the substation operation and maintenance instruction are met; The substation operation and maintenance instructions are matched with preset substation equipment operation rules to confirm the operation compliance.

6. The remote operation and maintenance method of a substation based on national secret communication according to claim 5 is characterized in that: The preconditions for the substation operation and maintenance instructions include: The current operating status of the device meets the command execution conditions; The preceding instructions related to the substation operation and maintenance instructions have been successfully executed; The time for executing the substation operation and maintenance instruction meets the preset substation operation timing requirements; The execution of the substation operation and maintenance instructions will not cause status conflicts between mutually coupled devices.

7. The remote operation and maintenance method of a substation based on national secret communication according to claim 6 is characterized in that: The substation operation and maintenance instruction execution result is associated with the equipment operation status and analyzed to generate an operation and maintenance safety record, including: Convert the substation operation and maintenance instructions into control commands recognizable by the equipment, establish a mapping relationship table between the substation operation and maintenance instructions and the control commands, and collect equipment operation status parameters according to the mapping relationship table; the equipment operation status parameters include pre-operation status parameters and post-operation status parameters, and calculate the state change by comparing the pre-operation status parameters and the post-operation status parameters; Execute the control command, record execution timing information, execution response time, and execution result code, and construct an execution feature vector; An operation and maintenance execution association model is constructed based on the state change amount and the execution feature vector. The operation and maintenance execution association model performs feature fusion on the state change amount and the execution feature vector to generate the operation and maintenance safety record including the substation operation and maintenance instruction execution process and equipment response status.

8. A substation remote operation and maintenance system based on national secret communication, based on the substation remote operation and maintenance method based on national secret communication according to any one of claims 1 to 7, characterized in that: include, An encryption transmission module, used to generate a national encryption authentication mark by applying a national encryption algorithm according to the security level of the substation operation and maintenance instruction, and encrypt and transmit the substation operation and maintenance instruction; A verification module, used to verify the validity of the national secret authentication identifier using a security gateway; A checking module, used for checking the context relevance of the equipment operation sequence of the substation operation and maintenance instruction based on the national secret authentication identifier; The execution monitoring module is used to execute the substation operation and maintenance instructions that have passed the validity verification and the equipment operation sequence context relevance check, and monitor the equipment operation status, and associate the substation operation and maintenance instruction execution results with the equipment operation status to generate an operation and maintenance safety record.

9. A computer device comprising a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, wherein: When the processor executes the computer program, the steps of the substation remote operation and maintenance method based on national secret communication described in any one of claims 1 to 7 are implemented.

10. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that: When the computer program is executed by the processor, the steps of the substation remote operation and maintenance method based on national secret communication described in any one of claims 1 to 7 are implemented.

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