Train control method and train control system for entering check based on trusted interval

Abstract

The invention discloses a train control method and a train control system based on credible interval entry check. The train control method comprises the following steps: starting a backup command; the temporary speed limit server starts a sending module used for sending authorization to a train self-protection system; performing interval credible entry check; determining the existence condition of the train in the interval; the temporary speed limit server updates a train existence condition list in the interval; the train obtains a front driving permission; the train runs according to the running permission. According to the train control method and the train control system based on the credible interval entry check, the axle counting equipment is arranged at the interval entrance, software of the temporary speed limit server only needs to adjust individual modules, and the software of the temporary speed limit server can be only used for recording the train condition in the interval and is not used for authorized calculation, so that the train control method and the train control system are convenient to use. The deployment cost of the temporary speed limit server is reduced, the transportation efficiency under the condition of a CTCS-2 system fault is improved, and the toughness of the CTCS-2 system is improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of train operation control, and particularly to a train control method and a train control system based on credible section entry inspection. Background Art

[0002] At present, the widely used CTCS-2 (Communication Based Train Control System Level 2) train control system relies on manual driving operations and manual recovery mechanisms when the track circuit in the section fails. In the operation scenarios of urban high-density lines and other application scenarios with strict requirements for operation and maintenance timeliness and efficiency, once the system degrades due to track circuit failures, the overall system operation efficiency will be significantly reduced. This not only increases the operation and management difficulty but also makes it difficult to meet the needs of the operator for high-frequency and high-efficiency transportation services.

[0003] To improve the availability of the train control system, the industry often considers superimposing other train control systems such as CTCS-3 (Communication Based Train Control System Level 3). However, systems such as CTCS-3 also largely rely on the track circuit to achieve signal transmission and train control. This means that even with a multi-system redundancy design, the risk of system failure caused by track circuit failures cannot be fundamentally solved. In addition, superimposing multiple train control systems will significantly increase the system construction and operation and maintenance costs, which is a heavy economic burden for many operation entities and faces great obstacles in actual popularization and application. Summary of the Invention

[0004] The object of the present invention is to provide a train control method and a train control system based on credible section entry inspection, which have the advantage of good system reliability.

[0005] To achieve the above object, the present invention provides a train control method based on credible section entry inspection, which includes:

[0006] S10. Enable the backup command;

[0007] S20. The temporary speed limit server enables a sending module for sending authorization to the train's own protection system;

[0008] S30. Conduct credible entry inspection of the section;

[0009] S40. Confirm the presence of trains in the section;

[0010] S50. The temporary speed limit server updates the list of train presence in the section;

[0011] S60. The train obtains the proceeding movement authority ahead.

[0012] S70. The train travels in accordance with the proceeding movement authority.

[0013] Optionally, confirming the train presence in the section in step S40 includes:

[0014] Step S401. The temporary speed restriction server attempts to communicate with the train.

[0015] If the temporary speed restriction server successfully establishes communication with the train, then proceed to S402. The temporary speed restriction server determines the position of the train according to the communication result with the train; the temporary speed restriction server records the train as a communicated train and adds it to the communicated train list.

[0016] If the temporary speed restriction server fails to establish communication with the train, then proceed to S403. The temporary speed restriction server records that a non-communicated train enters the section, and extends the blocked area of the non-communicated train forward in the driving direction to the blocking point.

[0017] Optionally, the situation of the front blocking point includes: the communicated train ahead, the section train confirmation equipment ahead, and the home signal ahead.

[0018] Optionally, the section train confirmation equipment includes axle counter equipment and train sensing equipment.

[0019] Optionally, the specific process of performing the section reliable entry check in step S30 includes:

[0020] S301. Perform the section reliable entry check through the axle counter equipment installed in the entrance section of the section.

[0021] Optionally, the specific process of performing the section reliable entry check in step S30 includes:

[0022] S302. Perform the section reliable entry check through the train sensing equipment installed in the entrance section of the section.

[0023] Optionally, the specific process of performing the section reliable entry check in step S30 includes:

[0024] S303. Judge whether the train control departure route has ever been in use, and perform the section reliable entry check.

[0025] Optionally, step S60 specifically includes step S601: The temporary speed limit server sends the identity and IP information of the train ahead of the current train to the current train according to the train presence list. The current train establishes vehicle-to-vehicle communication with the train ahead, obtains the position of the train ahead through vehicle-to-vehicle communication, and calculates the driving curve. When the point ahead of the current train is a non-train blocking point such as a signal or a protected area, the position offset information of the non-train blocking point based on the balise at the section entrance is sent to the current train.

[0026] Optionally, after step S601, step S60 further includes step S602: The temporary speed limit server maps the position autonomously reported by the train to the track section, generates track circuit low-frequency code data according to the track section, and sends the track circuit low-frequency code data to the train through the sending module by wireless communication. The train's own protection system on the train processes the track circuit low-frequency code data.

[0027] Optionally, after step S601, step S60 further includes step S602': The temporary speed limit server calculates a movement authority for each communicating train and sends the calculated movement authority to the communicating train through the sending module.

[0028] Optionally, after step S70, there is further step S80: After the train exits the section, the temporary speed limit server clears the information of the train from the train presence list.

[0029] The present invention also provides a train control system based on trusted section entry check. The train control system is used for the train control method as described above. The train control system includes:

[0030] A trackside section monitoring component for monitoring the train presence in the section;

[0031] A temporary speed limit server and a train's own protection system. The temporary speed limit server has a sending module for sending authorization to the train's own protection system, and the train's own protection system has a receiving module capable of receiving wireless block from the temporary speed limit server.

[0032] Optionally, the trackside section monitoring component includes two sets of axle counter devices, and the two sets of axle counter devices are respectively arranged at both ends of the section.

[0033] Optionally, the trackside section monitoring component includes a radio frequency tag reading device, and a radio frequency identification tag is correspondingly provided on the train.

[0034] In summary, compared with the prior art, the train control method and train control system based on reliable interval entry check provided by the present invention have the following beneficial effects:

[0035] The train control method and train control system based on reliable interval entry check provided by the present invention set axle counters at the interval entrance. The software of the temporary speed limit server only needs to make individual module adjustments, and the software of the temporary speed limit server can be only used to record the situation of trains in the interval and not for authorization calculation, reducing the deployment cost of the temporary speed limit server, improving the transportation efficiency in the case of CTCS-2 system failures, and enhancing the resilience of the CTCS-2 system. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0036] Figure 1 It is a flowchart of the train control method based on reliable interval entry check of the present invention.

[0037] Figure 2 It is a schematic diagram of the train control method of the present invention when trains in the interval can all communicate normally.

[0038] Figure 3 It is a schematic diagram of the train control method of the present invention when trains in the interval cannot communicate normally. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE EMBODIMENTS

[0039] The following will combine the attached drawings in the embodiments of the present invention Figure 1 ~attached drawings Figure 3 to elaborate in detail on the technical solutions, structural features, achieved objectives and effects in the embodiments of the present invention.

[0040] It should be noted that the attached drawings adopt a very simplified form and all use non-precise scales, only for conveniently and clearly assisting in explaining the objectives of the embodiments of the present invention, not for limiting the limiting conditions of the embodiments of the present invention. Therefore, they do not have technical substance significance. Any modification of the structure, change of the proportional relationship or adjustment of the size, without affecting the effects that the present invention can produce and the objectives that can be achieved, should still fall within the scope covered by the technical content disclosed by the present invention.

[0041] It should be noted that in the present invention, relational terms such as first and second are only used to distinguish one entity or operation from another entity or operation, and do not necessarily require or imply any such actual relationship or order between these entities or operations. Moreover, the term "comprising", "including" or any other variant thereof is intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, so that a process, method, article or device including a series of elements not only includes those elements clearly listed, but also includes other elements not clearly listed, or elements inherent to such process, method, article or device.

[0042] As Figure 1 shown, the present invention provides a train control method based on a credible interval entry check. When there is a track circuit failure in the interval, it is impossible to complete the occupancy inspection and coding functions through the track circuit, the authorization of the train control center cannot be sent to the train through the track circuit, and the presence of the train cannot be sensed through the track circuit. In this case, the CTCS-2 system can still operate efficiently.

[0043] The train control method includes:

[0044] S10. Enable the backup instruction command. After a track circuit failure occurs in the interval, the backup instruction command is manually enabled.

[0045] After receiving the manually enabled backup instruction command, enter step S20. The temporary speed restriction server enables the sending module for sending authorization to the train's own protection system. The TSRS (Temporary Speed Restriction Server) in this solution is upgraded to have the ability to send authorization. At the same time, the CTCS-2 on-board ATP (Automatic Train Protection) device is added with the function of receiving wireless block information from the TSRS. In this embodiment, after receiving the instruction, the TSRS enables the function of the built-in "C2 authorization processing" module (hereinafter referred to as the TSRS_S_C2 module). After the function of the TSRS_S_C2 module is enabled, the TSRS can send relevant information to the on-board ATP device, otherwise it does not send.

[0046] In this embodiment, only individual module adjustments need to be added to the software built in the TSRS, and this module can only record the presence of trains in the interval and can not authorize the calculation of the modules in the TSRS, which has the advantages of low cost and high feasibility. It can effectively improve the transportation efficiency in the case of CTCS-2 system failures and improve the resilience of the CTCS-2 train control system.

[0047] S30. Conduct a credible interval entry check; in one embodiment, step S30 for conducting a credible interval entry check specifically includes: S301. Conduct a credible interval entry check through the axle counter device set in the entrance section of the interval. The axle counter device can, as needed, set axle counter devices in the departure sections of the departure routes such as 1 departure and 2 departures (in CTCS-2, it must be the route blocking mode).

[0048] In other embodiments, step S30 for conducting a credible interval entry check specifically includes: S302. Conduct a credible interval entry check through the train sensing device set in the entrance section of the interval.

[0049] In another embodiment, step S30 of the trusted entry check of the section specifically includes: S303, judging whether the train control departure route has been in use, and performing a trusted entry check of the section. In this embodiment, the axle counting device or other equipment is not set at the entrance of the section, but the train control departure route is detected to have been in use (locked and occupied), and the last section of the route or 1 departure is occupied or the departure route is unlocked (from the in-use state to the unlocked state), then the TSRS_S_C2 module believes that a train has entered the section, and further determines whether it is a communication train or a non-communication train based on the train report. In this solution, the axle counting device may not be arranged, and other methods may be used to confirm whether a train has entered the section, thereby reducing the arrangement of axle counting devices and reducing equipment costs.

[0050] S40, confirming the existence of trains in the section;

[0051] The existence of trains in the section is confirmed in step S40, including:

[0052] Step S401, the temporary speed limit server attempts to communicate with the train. When there is a train in the section, it can be divided into two cases: one is a communication train that can establish communication with the temporary speed limit server; the other is a non-communication train that cannot establish communication with the temporary speed limit server.

[0053] If the temporary speed limit server successfully establishes communication with the train, then enter S402, the temporary speed limit server determines the position of the train according to the communication result with the train; if the on-board position report shows that the train has entered the section, the occupation of the section is caused by a certain communication train, and the temporary speed limit server records the train as a communication train and adds it to the communication train list. Specifically, the TSRS_S_C2 module records the addition of the train to the communication train list stored in the temporary speed limit server. In addition, since the train has been running in the section, considering the availability of the site, the tolerance can be appropriately set. In the actual railway operation scenario, considering various factors such as the transmission delay of wireless communication, the clock synchronization error of the on-board equipment and the ground equipment, the time difference of signal processing, etc., a certain time difference is allowed between the on-board position report and the actual occupation of the section, rather than requiring the two to be completely synchronized. This setting of tolerance is to improve the availability and stability of the system in a complex field environment, that is, a certain time difference is allowed between the on-board position report and the section occupation, and the time difference difference can be configured. The time difference is caused by the train uploading through wireless transmission and collecting through hard-electric circuits, so the specific time difference value can be determined based on these factors.

[0054] If the communication between the temporary speed limit server and the train fails, it enters S403. The temporary speed limit server records a non - communicating train entering the section and extends the blocked area of the non - communicating train forward in the driving direction to the blocking point. In this embodiment, when the train communication is lost or autonomous positioning cannot be completed, the starting point of the blocked area is set at the position where the communication is lost and extended to the forward blocking point. The situations of the forward blocking point include: the forward communicating train, the forward section train confirmation equipment, and the forward signal at the station entrance. For the forward communicating train, since there is an actual position report of the communicating train, the blocked area is extended to the tail of the forward communicating train; for the forward section train confirmation equipment, such as the axle counter equipment in the forward section, it can be extended to the tail of the forward blocked area to form a larger blocked area.

[0055] In this embodiment, the section train confirmation equipment includes axle counter equipment and train induction equipment. Specifically, the trackside section monitoring component includes two sets of axle counter equipment, which are respectively arranged at both ends of the section and are used to detect with high safety and reliability whether a train enters the section. The axle counter equipment arranged at both ends of the section is used to record the vehicle information entering and leaving the section respectively. The axle counter equipment detects the electromagnetic changes generated when the train wheels pass through by sensors installed at both ends of the track. When the train enters the track section, the sensor records the number of axles of the wheels and transmits this information to the upper computer for processing. It is also possible to set train induction equipment instead of axle counter equipment at the ends of the section. The train induction equipment includes an RFID (Radio Frequency Identification Tag) reader installed at the end of the section, and an RFID identity card is correspondingly installed on the train. When the train passes by the RFID reader, the train information can be read. Moreover, since the information stored in the RFID readers on each train is different, it is also possible to know which specific train has entered the section. In addition, to improve the safety factor, multiple different RFID readers can be set at the entrance of the section, and RFID identity cards corresponding to the readers are arranged on the vehicle body. As long as any one of the RFID identity cards is recognized by the RFID reader, it is considered that a train has entered.

[0056] S50. The temporary speed limit server updates the train presence list in the section. The train presence list is used to reflect the real-time status in the section. Specifically, the information recorded in the train presence list includes: the station approach signal ahead, train 1, train 2...train N. When there is a blocked protection area in the section, it is recorded as: the station approach signal ahead, train 1, train 2 protection area...train N. For the subsequent release of the protection area, the protection area can be cleared manually, that is, the section fault protection area release command is manually issued to the TSRS equipment to release the fault protection area; in addition, when the section of the train that has lost communication is restored, the train can realize autonomous positioning and can report the location of the train. In addition, it is necessary to determine whether the train length is the same as the original train length to avoid the loss of train integrity. If all conditions are met, the relevant protection area is automatically cleared.

[0057] S60, the train obtains driving permission from the front; step S60 specifically includes step S601, the temporary speed limit server sends the identity and IP information of the train ahead of the current train to the current train according to the train existence list, the current train establishes vehicle-to-vehicle communication with the train ahead, obtains the position of the train ahead through vehicle-to-vehicle communication, and calculates the driving curve; when the front of the current train is a non-train blocking point such as a signal light or a protection area, the position offset information of the transponder based on the section entrance of the non-train blocking point is sent to the current train, that is, the distance of the blocking point relative to the transponder is reported.

[0058] In one embodiment, after step S601, step S60 also includes step S602, the temporary speed limit server maps the position reported autonomously by the train to the track section, and generates track circuit low-frequency code data according to the track section, such as L5, L4, L4, L2, where L5 indicates that the 7 block sections ahead are idle, L4 indicates that the 6 block sections ahead are idle, L3 indicates that the 5 block sections ahead are idle, and L2 indicates that the 4 block sections ahead are idle. The track circuit low-frequency code data is sent to the train by the sending module through wireless communication, and the train's own protection system on the train processes the track circuit low-frequency code data. For the train's ATP, the track circuit code sending logic is still used for processing, but the channel for obtaining information is changed from the original track circuit to wireless communication. It is only necessary to modify the ATP so that it can obtain the track circuit low-frequency code data through wireless communication.

[0059] In another embodiment, after step S601, step S60 further includes step S602'. The temporary speed limit server calculates the movement authority for each communicating train and sends the calculated movement authority to the communicating train through the sending module. The range of the movement authority is the forward blocking point, and there are three cases for the forward blocking point, namely: 1. The starting point of the track section where the forward communicating train is located; 2. The forward section train confirmation device; 3. The forward approach signal. Among them, the specific direction of the forward blocking point is determined according to the current section direction, and the section direction is sent by the train control system to the TSRS device. The TSRS_S_C2 module sends the line map within the authorized movement authority range to the on-vehicle device, and the line data reuses the message formats of the existing TCC (Train Control Center) and active balises, such as E21, E27 packets, etc.

[0060] The E21 packet is a specific format data unit in the messages sent by the Train Control Center (TCC) and active balises. The E21 packet is mainly used to transmit important information related to train operation control, such as basic line data like line gradient, track circuit length, train speed limit, etc. These information are crucial for the safe operation and precise control of the train. By receiving and parsing message information such as the E21 packet, the train can understand the condition of the forward line in real time, so as to adjust its operation state and ensure safe and efficient train operation.

[0061] The E27 packet is one of the message formats in the train control system, carrying specific control information, such as temporary speed limit, route information, etc., to achieve dynamic control and management of train operation.

[0062] After step S60 is completed, it enters S70, and the train travels according to the movement authority.

[0063] After step S70, it further includes step S80. After the train exits the section, the temporary speed limit server clears the information of the train from the train presence list.

[0064] In addition, in this embodiment, for the integrity judgment of the train, it can be detected manually or automatically by the train. In the case of manual confirmation of the train integrity, when the train maintenance personnel find that the rear of the train is missing, they immediately report the missing end-of-train information to the dispatcher. The dispatcher promptly closes the "radio block authorization" function of the TSRS_S_C2 module. The train fails to obtain authorization and starts braking to stop. At this time, the TSRS no longer sends authorization information to the on-board equipment and actively disconnects the connection with the train. In another case, for trains with the ability of self-detection of integrity, they can automatically report the integrity loss information to the TSRS device. The TSRS sets a blocked area forward from the position where the train loses integrity until the blocking point. As a preferred embodiment, it can also be that the dispatcher temporarily does not allow trains without the ability of automatic detection of train integrity to enter the fault section. That is, in this case, all trains entering the section have the ability of self-detection of integrity to improve the safety of train operation in the section.

[0065] After the track circuit fault is repaired, the dispatcher should promptly close the backup instruction command. After receiving the close instruction, the TSRS_S_C2 module performs corresponding initialization processing on relevant states, specifically including: clearing the train information stored internally; clearing the section block information stored internally.

[0066] When the train receives both the authorization information from the track circuit and the line data of the active balise while running, it ignores the information of the line data of the active balise and takes the information of the TSRS_S_C2 module as the standard.

[0067] When the track circuit is working normally, the TSRS does not send authorization information to the train. Only when it receives the enabling backup authorization dispatching command from the CTC (Centralized Traffic Control) or the authorization request from the TCC, it sends authorization information to the trains within the direction jurisdiction. Among them, the enabling backup authorization dispatching command of the CTC is that when the dispatcher finds that devices such as the track circuit fail and the TCC can no longer undertake the normal authorization function, it issues a start backup authorization dispatching command to the TSRS. When the fault is repaired, the TCC can issue a dispatching command to revoke the start backup authorization dispatching command. When the TCC detects a track circuit fault, it sends an authorization transfer request to the TSRS; when it detects that the track circuit returns to normal, it sends a revocation authorization transfer request to the TSRS. In addition, the train control equipment needs to send the section direction information and axle counter occupancy information to the TSRS device.

[0068] Reference Figure 2 and Figure 3 For further explanation of the train control method of the present invention.

[0069] Such as Figure 2As shown, Train 2 enters the section, and the axle counting device located in the departure section reports occupancy. One second later, Train 2 reports its own position to TSRS based on wireless communication. TSRS simultaneously receives the axle counting occupancy from the train control or TIS (Train Control and Interlocking System, train control and interlocking integrated equipment), and the train autonomous report information, confirming that Train 2 has entered the current section. The functional module TSRS_S_C2 in TSRS begins to add Train 2 to the train list. And notify Train 2 that its preceding vehicle is Train 1. After Train 1 passes the station approach signal in front, the TSRS_S_C2 module excludes Train 1 from the list of trains processed in this section, and at the same time, changes the blocking point type in front of Train 2 to a signal and sends it to Train 2. The movement authorization calculated by Train 2 itself ends at the station approach signal in front. When Train 2 receives the code data (non-fault area) from the track circuit during the forward movement, it continues to move forward according to the code authorization.

[0070] As a preferred implementation, if Train 1 cannot establish communication with TSRS before entering the section, and the axle counter shows occupied when entering the section, but there is no position report of Train 1, the TSRS_S_C2 module will set up a blockade area in the section. At this time, if Train 2 enters the section again, because a blockade has been formed at the entrance of the section, the TSRS_S_C2 module can only send an authorization of length 0 to Train 2.

[0071] like Figure 3 As shown in the figure, if train 1 loses communication in the section, TSRS sets a blockade area forward along the direction of section operation from the position where the train loses communication. For train 2 behind train 1, TSRS sends LU code bits to the train based on wireless communication according to the idleness of the track section in front of it (two track sections are idle). Based on this code bit data, the ATP equipment of train 2 can still use the existing track circuit code sending logic to control the train forward. If train 1 restores communication with TSRS before crossing the station entrance signal in front, and can provide train positioning information in time in combination with transponder positioning, TSRS will automatically release the protection area. Otherwise, a manual command to release the protection area is required. After the section fault is repaired, a manual command is issued to the TSRS device, and TSRS turns off the TSRS_S_C2 module. Considering that there is a transition period in the middle, the train may receive the code sending authorization information of the track circuit and the information of the TSRS_S_C2 module at the same time, and the train commands the train according to the track circuit authorization information.

[0072] The present invention also provides a train control system based on trusted interval entry check. The train control system is used for the train control method as described above. The train control system includes a trackside interval monitoring component, a temporary speed restriction server, and a train self-protection system. The trackside interval monitoring component is used to monitor the presence of trains in the interval. The temporary speed restriction server has a sending module for sending authorizations to the train self-protection system, and the train self-protection system has a receiving module capable of receiving wireless block from the temporary speed restriction server.

[0073] The trackside interval monitoring component includes a radio frequency tag reading device, and a radio frequency identification tag is correspondingly provided on the train.

[0074] Although the content of the present invention has been described in detail through the above preferred embodiments, it should be recognized that the above description should not be considered as a limitation of the present invention. After those skilled in the art have read the above content, various modifications and alternatives to the present invention will be obvious. Therefore, the protection scope of the present invention should be defined by the appended claims.

Claims

1. A train control method based on trusted interval entry check, characterized in that: The train control method comprises: S10, enable the backup instruction command; S20, the temporary speed limit server activates a sending module for sending authorization to the train's own protection system; S30, performing interval trusted entry check; S40, confirming the existence of trains in the section; S50, the temporary speed limit server updates the train existence list in the section; S60, the train obtains the forward driving permission; S70: The train travels according to the driving permit.

2. The train control method according to claim 1, characterized in that: Confirming the existence of a train in the section in step S40 includes: Step S401, the temporary speed limit server attempts to communicate with the train; If the temporary speed limit server successfully establishes communication with the train, the process proceeds to S402, where the temporary speed limit server determines the location of the train according to the communication result with the train; the temporary speed limit server records the train as a communication train and adds it to a communication train list; If the temporary speed limit server fails to establish communication with the train, the process proceeds to S403, where the temporary speed limit server records that a non-communication train has entered the section, and extends the blocked area of ​​the non-communication train forward in the travel direction to the blocking point.

3. The train control method according to claim 2, characterized in that: The conditions at the blocking point ahead include: the communication train ahead, the section train confirmation equipment ahead, and the station entry signal ahead.

4. The train control method according to claim 3, characterized in that: The section train confirmation equipment includes an axle counting device and a train sensing device.

5. The train control method according to claim 1, characterized in that: Step S30 of performing interval trusted entry check specifically includes: S301, performing a reliable entry check of the section by using an axle counting device arranged at the entrance section of the section.

6. The train control method according to claim 1, characterized in that: Step S30 of performing interval trusted entry check specifically includes: S302, performing a trusted entry check on the section by means of a train sensing device arranged at the entrance section of the section.

7. The train control method according to claim 1, characterized in that: Step S30 of performing interval trusted entry check specifically includes: S303. Determine whether the train control departure route has ever been in use, so as to conduct a reliable entry check of the section.

8. The train control method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The step S60 specifically includes step S601, the temporary speed limit server sends the identity and IP information of the train ahead of the current train to the current train according to the train existence list, the current train establishes vehicle-to-vehicle communication with the train ahead, obtains the position of the train ahead through vehicle-to-vehicle communication, and calculates the driving curve; when the front of the current train is a non-train blocking point such as a signal or a protection area, the position offset information of the transponder based on the section entrance of the non-train blocking point is sent to the current train.

9. The train control method according to claim 8, characterized in that: After step S601, the step S60 also includes step S602, the temporary speed limit server maps the position of the train autonomously reported to the track section, and according to the track circuit low-frequency code data generated by the track section, sends the track circuit low-frequency code data to the train through wireless communication through the sending module, and the train's own protection system on the train processes the track circuit low-frequency code data.

10. The train control method according to claim 8, characterized in that: After step S601, step S60 further includes step S602', the temporary speed limit server calculates a driving permit for each of the communication trains, and sends the calculated driving permit to the communication train through the sending module.

11. The train control method according to claim 1, characterized in that: After step S70, the method further includes step S80: after the train leaves the section, the temporary speed limit server clears the information of the train from the train existence list.

12. A train control system based on trusted interval entry check, characterized in that: The train control system is used for the train control method according to any one of claims 1 to 11, and the train control system comprises: Trackside section monitoring component, used to monitor the presence of trains in the section; A temporary speed limit server and a train protection system, wherein the temporary speed limit server has a sending module for sending authorization to the train protection system, and the train protection system has a receiving module capable of receiving wireless blocking from the temporary speed limit server.

13. The train control system according to claim 12, characterized in that: The trackside section monitoring component includes two groups of axle counting devices, and the two groups of axle counting devices are respectively arranged at two ends of the section.

14. The train control system according to claim 12, characterized in that: The trackside section monitoring component includes a radio frequency tag reading device, and a radio frequency identification tag is correspondingly provided on the train.

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