Unmanned aerial vehicle countering method and countering system thereof

Abstract

The invention discloses an unmanned aerial vehicle countering method and system, and the method comprises the steps: monitoring an unmanned aerial vehicle in an airspace in real time, judging whether the unmanned aerial vehicle is a to-be-countered unmanned aerial vehicle or not, and determining the to-be-countered unmanned aerial vehicle as a target unmanned aerial vehicle; and transmitting a countering signal to the direction of the target unmanned aerial vehicle, generating an identification code when the countering signal is transmitted, associating the identification code with the countering signal to form a countering signal associated with the identification code, and countering the target unmanned aerial vehicle. According to the unmanned aerial vehicle countering device, the unique identification code is associated with the countering signal, and the countering operation detailed information related to the unique identification code is recorded, so that the problem of management and tracing of the existing unmanned aerial vehicle countering device is solved, and subsequent precise management and responsibility tracing of the countering operation are facilitated.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) control, and particularly to an anti-UAV method and an anti-UAV system thereof. Background Art

[0002] In the current era of rapid technological development, UAVs, with their flexibility and versatility, have been widely used in many fields, from film and television aerial photography, logistics distribution, to agricultural plant protection, geographical mapping, etc. With the development of UAV technology, the application scope of UAVs is getting wider and wider. While bringing convenience, it also brings security risks and privacy issues such as breaking into no-fly zones, threatening public safety, privacy and important facilities. In order to deal with illegal or dangerous UAV activities, UAV anti-countermeasure technology has become one of the necessary measures. However, the existing anti-countermeasure devices have defects in management and tracking, and cannot effectively record and trace anti-countermeasure operations, which brings challenges to subsequent liability determination and management. Summary of the Invention

[0003] The purpose of the present invention is to provide an anti-UAV method and an anti-UAV system thereof to solve the problems raised in the above background art.

[0004] To achieve the above purpose, the present invention provides the following technical solution: An anti-UAV method, the method includes:

[0005] Monitor UAVs in the airspace in real time, determine whether they are UAVs to be countered, and determine the UAVs determined to be countered as target UAVs;

[0006] Send an anti-countermeasure signal in the direction of the target UAV. When sending the anti-countermeasure signal, generate an identification code, and associate the identification code with the anti-countermeasure signal to form an anti-countermeasure signal associated with the identification code, and counter the target UAV.

[0007] Further, the generation of the identification code includes:

[0008] Generate an original random number sequence by a random number generator, and perform encryption processing using a hash function to obtain a hash value;

[0009] Perform encryption processing on the transmission time, transmission location and / or serial number of the anti-countermeasure device of the anti-countermeasure signal, form a preliminary encrypted data set with the hash value, and encode the encrypted data set to form an identification code.

[0010] Further, the data fusion encryption of the transmission time, transmission location and / or serial number of the anti-countermeasure signal to form a preliminary encrypted data set with the hash value includes:

[0011] Take the start time of the acquisition countermeasure device as the transmission time, and use the time series encryption algorithm to segment and encrypt the transmission time at specific time intervals;

[0012] Take the location of the countermeasure device as the transmission location, and use the geographic information encryption algorithm to encrypt the transmission location;

[0013] Obtain the serial number of the countermeasure device, and combine it with the preset encryption key to encrypt the serial number through the asymmetric encryption algorithm;

[0014] According to the preset encryption fusion rule, converge the hash value and the encrypted transmission time, transmission location, and serial number into a preliminary encrypted data set.

[0015] Further, the step of converging the hash value, the encrypted transmission time, the transmission location, and the serial number into a preliminary encrypted data set according to the preset encryption fusion rule includes:

[0016] Generate a fixed-length associated hash value for the encrypted transmission time data using a lightweight hash function;

[0017] Perform hexadecimal encoding conversion on the encrypted serial number to generate a value similar to a hash value;

[0018] Encode the encrypted transmission location into a coordinate code adapted to the recognition code structure according to the preset coding rule;

[0019] Use the shared key generated by the key exchange protocol for the hash value, the associated hash value, and the value similar to the hash value as the shared key to perform block encryption on each data block to form a secondarily encrypted hash value, transmission time, and serial number;

[0020] Perform an exclusive OR operation on the secondarily encrypted transmission time and the coordinate code to generate a fused spatio-temporal feature data segment;

[0021] Integrate and converge the secondarily encrypted hash value, the spatio-temporal feature data segment, and the secondarily encrypted serial number in a preset order into a preliminary encrypted data set.

[0022] Further, encoding the encrypted data set to form a recognition code includes: encoding the secondarily encrypted hash value, the spatio-temporal feature data segment, and the secondarily encrypted serial number, and using the encoded hash value as the leading part, followed by the encoded spatio-temporal feature data segment and the encoded serial number in sequence to form the recognition code.

[0023] Further, the method further includes: recording the countermeasure operation.

[0024] Further, recording the countermeasure operation includes recording one or more of the countermeasure time, the countermeasure location, the characteristic information of the target UAV, the working parameters of the countermeasure device, and the countermeasure means.

[0025] An unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) countermeasure system, the system comprising a detection module, a control module, a countermeasure module and a generation module, wherein the detection module is used for monitoring UAVs in the airspace in real time and determining the UAVs to be countered as target UAVs; the countermeasure device is in signal connection with the control module and is used for generating corresponding countermeasure signals for the target UAVs according to the instructions of the control module; the generation module is in signal connection with the control module and is used for generating corresponding identification codes for the countermeasure signals according to the instructions of the control module; the control module is used for associating the identification codes with the countermeasure signals and controlling the countermeasure module to emit the countermeasure signals associated with the identification codes in the direction of the target UAVs to counter the target UAVs.

[0026] Furthermore, it further comprises a recording module, and the recording module is in signal connection with the control module.

[0027] Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of the present invention are as follows:

[0028] 1. By associating a unique identification code with the countermeasure signal and recording the detailed information of the relevant countermeasure operations, the present invention solves the problems in the management and traceability of existing UAV countermeasure devices, facilitating subsequent precise management of countermeasure operations and responsibility traceability.

[0029] 2. By deeply integrating a variety of key information, the generated identification code contains rich information and high security, and can comprehensively support the traceability of complex countermeasure operations and refined management. It has significant advantages in dealing with the increasingly complex chaos of unauthorized UAV flights and meeting strict regulatory requirements. By analyzing this identification code, the specific time, location of each countermeasure operation and which countermeasure device executed it can be clearly traced back, greatly improving the accuracy and convenience of information traceability. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0030] Figure 1 It is a structural block diagram of the UAV countermeasure processing system of the present invention;

[0031] Figure 2 It is a flowchart of the UAV countermeasure method of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE EMBODIMENTS

[0032] The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, rather than all the embodiments. All other embodiments obtained by those of ordinary skill in the art based on the embodiments of the present invention without creative efforts shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.

[0033] Such as Figure 1As shown, this embodiment provides an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) countermeasure system, which includes a detection module 1, a control module 2, a countermeasure device 3, an encoding module 4, and a recording module 5. In this embodiment, the control module 2 has a remote communication function and supports communication with the detection module 1, the countermeasure device 3, the encoding module 4, the recording module 5, and the remote command center through a 4G / 5G network or a satellite communication link to achieve real-time data interaction;

[0034] The detection module 1 is used to monitor UAVs in the airspace in real time. For example, a radar system is used to monitor UAVs in the airspace in real time. Through the transmission and reception of radio waves, information such as the position, speed, and direction of the UAV is detected. A camera or an infrared sensor is used to perform image recognition on UAVs in the airspace to identify the type and characteristics of the UAV. A radio frequency monitoring device is used to detect the communication frequency, communication protocol, and signal strength of the UAV. By analyzing the communication spectrum of the UAV, its signal characteristics are detected. By identifying the communication protocol used by the UAV, its type and identity are judged. By the change in signal strength, the activity state of the UAV is judged. The characteristics of the monitored UAV are matched with the characteristics of known legal UAVs. If the match fails or abnormal characteristics are found, it is judged as a UAV to be countered. The behavior pattern of the UAV, such as flight route, speed, and altitude, is analyzed to judge whether it is a suspicious or illegal UAV. The UAV determined to be countered is identified as the target UAV;

[0035] The countermeasure device 3 is signal-connected to the control module 2 and is used to generate corresponding countermeasure signals for the target UAV according to the instructions of the control module 2. For example, the countermeasure signal is an interference signal, which can block the remote control signal, video transmission signal or GPS signal of the UAV by transmitting a strong interference signal through a radio frequency interference transmitter, and can interfere with the UAV within a relatively long distance. For example, the countermeasure signal is a spoofing signal, which can transmit an interference signal through a GPS jammer to interfere with the GPS signal of the UAV, making it unable to obtain accurate position information, so that the UAV returns or lands due to the loss of positioning ability. A false GPS signal can be transmitted through a GPS spoofing transmitter to induce the UAV to fly to a wrong position, and spoofing can be achieved within a relatively long distance. An interference signal can be transmitted through an inertial navigation jammer to interfere with the inertial navigation system of the UAV (such as gyroscopes, accelerometers), making it unable to correctly judge the flight state. For example, the countermeasure signal is a capture signal, and a net bullet or net gun can be used to capture the UAV, forcing it to fall. The UAV can be directly controlled to avoid secondary interference. A laser beam can be used to irradiate the propeller or other key parts of the UAV to make it lose power, and the target can be accurately struck. For example, the countermeasure signal is a forced landing signal. For example, the remote control system of the UAV can be invaded through a remote control signal intrusion device to force it to execute a forced landing or return operation. The control signal of the UAV can be hijacked through a signal hijacking device to take over the control right of the UAV. For example, the countermeasure signal is a strike signal. The key parts of the UAV (such as the battery, circuit board, etc.) can be directly destroyed by using a high-energy laser beam through a laser strike system. High-energy electron pulses can be emitted through an electron pulse transmitter to burn out the electronic components of the UAV. The countermeasure signal can also be a combination of multiple signals, which is selected according to the type and behavior of the UAV.

[0036] The countermeasure device 3 also has a built-in high-precision clock module and is integrated with a high-precision positioning system. The clock module accurately captures the current time to the millisecond level at the moment when the countermeasure device 3 is started each time, and records it in accordance with the Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) standard, and the format is presented as "YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS.SSS". The positioning system such as GPS or Beidou locks the geographical location information of the countermeasure device 3 itself in real time, and accurately obtains the coordinates of the countermeasure location accurately represented by longitude and latitude through continuous communication with the positioning satellite.

[0037] The encoding module 4 is used to generate a corresponding identification code for the countermeasure signal according to the instructions of the control module 2, and includes a random number generator 41, a data acquisition unit 42 and an encoding unit 43.

[0038] The random number generator 41 works in cooperation with the hardware clock signal according to a specific mathematical algorithm. With the help of the pseudo-random number generation algorithm, the real-time clock pulse of the device hardware is used as the seed value, and a string of original random digital sequences with a length of [X] bits (such as 128 bits) is continuously generated by iteration.

[0039] The data acquisition unit 42 is connected to the countermeasure device 3 signal, obtains the start-up time of the countermeasure device captured by the clock module, obtains the coordinates of the countermeasure location obtained by the positioning system, and also obtains the serial number of the countermeasure device 3 stored in the read-only memory (ROM). In the equipment production process, each countermeasure device is assigned a unique serial number, which is stored in a specific area of ​​the equipment read-only memory (ROM). The serial number is carefully compiled by the equipment manufacturer in accordance with international general coding rules or enterprise-defined strict standards, covering core information such as equipment model, production batch, and production serial number, without duplication. The manufacturer relies on a strict quality management system to solidify a unique serial number for each device to eliminate the risk of tampering;

[0040] The encoding unit encrypts and encodes the collected original random number sequence, transmission time, transmission location, and serial number to form an identification code. Incorporating the transmission time of the countermeasure device into the identification code can accurately record the exact moment when each countermeasure operation is initiated, and integrate it into the identification code in the form of a timestamp (accurate to milliseconds or even higher precision). Subsequently, when querying and analyzing countermeasure records, whether it is tracing the specific moment when a particular drone is countered or counting the frequency and pattern of countermeasure operations within a specific time period, there is an accurate time basis. For example, in the security scenario of large-scale events, if there are multiple drone intrusion incidents, through the initiation time in the identification code, the sequence of each countermeasure can be clearly restored, providing a detailed timeline reference for security decision-making. Incorporating the countermeasure location into the identification code in the form of precise geographical coordinates enables clear positioning of each countermeasure operation in the geographical space. For example, in the urban security scenario, if an incident of a drone intruding into a sensitive area needs to be investigated, through the countermeasure location information in the identification code, it is possible to quickly lock down which street and which square in the city the countermeasure behavior specifically occurred near, facilitating security personnel to quickly restore the on-site situation and screen potential risk factors, providing crucial geographical clues for subsequent responsibility tracing and incident investigation. The combination of countermeasure time and countermeasure location can construct a complete spatio-temporal framework. By analyzing countermeasure data at different times and different locations, the activity patterns of "unauthorized" drone flights can be insightfully understood. For example, whether certain drones often appear in specific areas at night, or are frequently active around popular scenic spots during holidays, etc., providing comprehensive data support for formulating more targeted countermeasure strategies. Incorporating the serial number into the identification code enables more in-depth data correlation and analysis with other identification code information (such as transmission time, transmission location, etc.). By mining these correlated data, more valuable information can be obtained. For example, analyzing the countermeasure effects of countermeasure devices with the same serial number at different locations and different times helps summarize countermeasure experience and optimize countermeasure strategies; or by comparing the usage of devices with different serial numbers, the performance differences of the devices can be evaluated, providing data basis for equipment upgrading. This data correlation and analysis ability helps improve the overall management level and countermeasure effect of the countermeasure system.

[0041] The control module 2 is used to associate the identification code with the countermeasure signal. For example, an association mark is added to the identification code and the countermeasure signal, and the countermeasure module 3 is controlled to emit the countermeasure signal associated with the identification code in the direction of the target UAV to countermeasure the target UAV. The countermeasure device 3 has a transmitting module, which is built-in with an intelligent frequency band identification and switching system and a power dynamic regulation system. The frequency band identification and switching system monitors the signal frequency bands of UAVs in the surrounding airspace in real time. Once a target UAV is detected, the signal is immediately subjected to spectrum analysis to identify the specific frequency band to which it belongs. For example, if it is monitored that a certain target UAV uses the 2.4 GHz frequency band for communication, the intelligent frequency band identification and switching system quickly switches the operating frequency band of the signal transmitting module to the countermeasure frequency band effective for this frequency band, such as the corresponding interference frequency band, so as to ensure that the subsequent emitted countermeasure signal can accurately act on the target UAV, achieve efficient interference or block its communication link, and thus maximize the countermeasure success rate. The power dynamic regulation function acts according to the pre-set rules and the real-time obtained environmental information. By interacting with the positioning module and the surrounding environmental monitoring sensors (such as personnel density sensors, geographic information sensors, etc.), it judges the type of the current countermeasure scenario. For example, when in a densely populated urban area, the personnel density feedback by the sensor is high, and it is close to the no-fly zone around sensitive facilities such as hospitals and schools. At this time, the power dynamic regulation module automatically reduces the transmission power of the signal transmitting module according to the built-in algorithm, so that the intensity of the countermeasure signal is controlled within a reasonable range that can not only effectively countermeasure the illegal UAV but also will not cause electromagnetic interference to other electronic devices such as mobile phones, computers, and medical devices around, and at the same time ensure the health and safety of personnel. In an open and remote field operation area, if a long-distance and highly maneuverable illegal UAV is detected, the system will comprehensively consider factors such as the distance between the target UAV and the countermeasure device and the flight speed of the target, and quickly increase the transmission power through the power calculation formula and the power amplifier circuit to ensure that the countermeasure signal can cover the airspace where the target is located, achieve an effective countermeasure effect, and ensure the full coverage of the countermeasure operation.

[0042] The recording module 5 is signal-connected to the control module 2, and classifies and stores all the data generated during this countermeasure process, including the identification code, countermeasure time, countermeasure location, detailed feature information of the countered UAV, and the operating parameters of the countermeasure device, such as transmission direction, transmission power, transmission frequency, transmission bandwidth, etc., and can also be synchronously backed up to the cloud server.

[0043] As Figure 2 shown, this embodiment also provides a UAV countermeasure method, and the method includes the following steps:

[0044] S1: Monitor the UAVs in the airspace in real time, determine whether they are UAVs to be countered, and identify the UAVs determined to be countered as target UAVs;

[0045] S2: Transmit a countermeasure signal in the direction of the target UAV. When transmitting the countermeasure signal, generate an identification code, associate the identification code with the countermeasure signal to form a countermeasure signal associated with the identification code, and counter the target UAV;

[0046] S3: Record the countermeasure operation.

[0047] Specifically, use a radar system to monitor UAVs in the airspace in real time. Through radio wave transmission and reception, detect information such as the position, speed, and direction of the UAVs. Use a camera or infrared sensor to perform image recognition on the UAVs in the airspace to identify the type and characteristics of the UAVs. Use a radio frequency monitoring device to detect the communication frequency, communication protocol, and signal strength of the UAVs. Detect its signal characteristics by analyzing the communication spectrum of the UAVs. Judge its type and identity by identifying the communication protocol used by the UAVs. Judge the activity status of the UAVs by the change in signal strength. Match the monitored UAV characteristics with the known legal UAV characteristics. If the match fails or abnormal characteristics are found, judge it as a UAV to be countered. Analyze the behavior patterns of the UAVs, such as flight routes, speeds, and altitudes, to judge whether they are suspicious or illegal UAVs, and identify the UAVs determined to be countered as target UAVs;

[0048] Transmit a countermeasure signal in the direction of the target UAV. When transmitting the countermeasure signal, generate an identification code. In this embodiment, the random number generator works in cooperation with the hardware clock signal according to a specific mathematical algorithm. With the help of the pseudo-random number generation algorithm, use the real-time clock pulse of the device hardware as the seed value, and continuously iterate to generate a string of original random digital sequences with a length of [X] bits (such as 128 bits), for example, generate the random number "10110011..."; Obtain the time when the countermeasure device starts captured by the clock module through the data acquisition unit as the transmission time, such as the time when the countermeasure device starts captured is "2025-01-15 12:30:05.500", obtain the coordinates of the position of the countermeasure device obtained by the positioning system as the transmission location, such as the obtained transmission location coordinates are "30°15′20″N, 120°30′40″E", and at the same time, obtain the serial number of the countermeasure device 3 stored in the read-only memory (ROM), such as the obtained serial number of the countermeasure device 3 is "SN001-202501-ABC";

[0049] The encoding unit uses a hash function to encrypt the collected original random number sequence to obtain a hash value. For example, this embodiment uses SHA-256 for encryption conversion. The hash function uses a one-way characteristic to irreversibly map the original random number sequence to a fixed-length (256-bit) hash value through complex mathematical transformation. It has extremely high uniqueness and collision resistance. Slight changes in the input data will cause a dramatic change in the hash value, building a solid security line for data encryption. The random number "10110011..." is processed by multiple rounds of compression functions inside the SHA-256 function to output a hash value "a1b2c3d4e5f6..." with extremely high randomness, uniqueness and collision resistance; for the launch time "2025-01-15 12:30:05.500", an encryption algorithm based on time series is first used. This embodiment uses time differential encryption to encrypt the current time value by calculating the difference change law of adjacent launch times. Assuming that the previous launch time is "2025-01-15 12:29:55.000", calculate the time difference and encrypt it with a specific function to get the encrypted time data fragment "T123456...", which can not only retain the precise time scale, but also effectively prevent the time information from being tampered with, ensuring the security and accuracy of the launch time in the subsequent process; for the acquired countermeasure location coordinates "30°15′20″ North Latitude", firstly use the coordinate offset algorithm, combined with the random noise addition technology, to process the original coordinates, and then adjust them according to a certain random offset (such as latitude ±0.01°, longitude ±0.02°) on the basis of the original coordinates to get the fuzzy coordinate range "30°15′±0.01° North Latitude, 120°30′±0.02° East Longitude", which not only protects the precise privacy of the actual location, but also retains the approximate regional characteristics; for the acquired countermeasure device 3 serial number "SN001-202501-ABC", in the equipment production link, the manufacturer generates a pair of public key and private key. The private key is retained within the manufacturer for decryption and management, and the public key is implanted in the countermeasure device. The serial number is encrypted using the RSA asymmetric encryption algorithm using the public key preset by the manufacturer, and the plaintext serial number is converted into ciphertext. This process uses the characteristics of public key encryption and private key decryption to ensure the confidentiality of the serial number during transmission and fusion. Only the manufacturer with the corresponding private key can restore the serial number information, effectively preventing the serial number from being illegally obtained and tampered with. According to the preset encryption fusion rules, the hash value and the encrypted launch time, launch location and serial number are aggregated into a preliminary encrypted data set; specifically, the launch time data after time series encryption is sent to the SHA-1 hash function for processing. SHA-1, with its fast hashing characteristics, further compresses and confuses the time data to generate a 160-bit associated hash value. For example, the encrypted time data "T123456..." becomes "a1b2c3d4..." after SHA-1 operation.", making it unified with the random number hash value in terms of data format. The blurred coordinate range is encoded into a coordinate encoding form adapted to the recognition code structure and converted into "N3015A, E12030B" through specific encoding rules, enabling it to naturally integrate into the entire encrypted data system. As the key spatial pointing information for subsequent recognition code tracing, it also ensures coordination with other data formats during the encryption process. The serial number ciphertext is subjected to hexadecimal encoding conversion. After RSA encryption, the serial number becomes a string of binary data, which, after conversion through hexadecimal encoding rules, presents a character format similar to a hash value, such as "3f5a7b9c...". In this way, it can be fused with the random number hash value, encrypted data of the emission time and location according to the same rules;.

[0050] Using the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, the modules corresponding to the random number hash value, encrypted emission time, and encrypted serial number respectively act as participants. Based on their respective private keys and public parameters such as prime numbers and generators, a shared key is negotiated through mathematical algorithms in an insecure network environment. For example, a set of public parameters are jointly determined. These parameters include a large prime number (p) and a generator (g), which are the basis of the entire key exchange protocol. For example, (p = 23) (in actual applications, larger and more secure prime numbers will be used), (g = 5), and these values are publicly shared among the participants as the cornerstone for subsequent calculations. Each participant generates a private key respectively. For the random number hash value module, assume the generated private key is (a = 3); the emission time hash value module generates the private key (b = 7); the countermeasure device serial number encryption module generates the private key (c = 4). Based on the selected public parameters and their respective private keys, each participant calculates the corresponding public key. Taking the random number hash value module as an example, its public key (A = g a ÷ mod p), that is, (A = 5 3 ÷ mod 23 = 10). Similarly, the emission time hash value module calculates the public key (B = g b ÷ mod p = 5 7 ÷ mod 23 = 17), and the countermeasure device serial number encryption module calculates the public key (C = g c ÷ mod p = 5 4 ÷ mod 23 = 4). Then, each party publicly exchanges the public key it calculates, enabling each participant to obtain the public key information of other parties. Finally, each participant uses the public key of other parties received and its own private key to calculate the shared key. The random number hash value module calculates the shared key (k1 = B a ÷ mod p = 17 3 ÷ mod 23 = 11); the emission time hash value module calculates the shared key (k2 = A b ÷ mod p = 107 ÷ mod 23 = 11); The countermeasure device serial number encryption module calculates the shared key (k3 = A c ÷ mod p = 10 4 ÷ mod 23 = 11). It can be seen that through the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, all three parties finally obtain the same shared key (k = 11) (a longer key length can be used). This shared key will be used in the subsequent AES symmetric encryption algorithm to ensure that only the legitimate modules participating in the key exchange can use this key to encrypt data, protecting the confidentiality of the data fusion process. After obtaining the shared key, the random number hash value, the transmission time hash value, and the serial number encrypted data are respectively divided into fixed-length data blocks for the convenience of the AES symmetric encryption algorithm. The hash value of the random number is "a1b2c3d4e5f6...", which is divided into blocks of 128 bits (16 bytes), resulting in data blocks such as "a1b2c3d4e5f6g7h8" and "i9j10k11l12m13n14"; the transmission time hash value and the serial number encrypted data are divided in the same way to ensure that the formats of all data are unified during subsequent encryption processing. The appropriate encryption mode in the AES algorithm is selected. In this embodiment, CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) is adopted. In this mode, each data block will perform an exclusive OR operation with the encryption result of the previous data block before encryption, so that even the same plaintext data block will have different ciphertexts after encryption at different positions, greatly improving the encryption security. Taking the first random number hash value data block "a1b2c3d4e5f6g7h8" as an example, in the CBC mode, it performs an exclusive OR operation with a vector initialized to all zeros (Initialization Vector, IV), and then is encrypted with the shared key (k = 11) using AES to obtain the encrypted ciphertext data block. The subsequent data blocks are processed in the same way, performing an exclusive OR operation with the previous ciphertext data block and then being encrypted to ensure the encryption coherence and security of the entire data sequence. After being processed by the AES symmetric encryption algorithm, the random number hash value, the transmission time hash value, and the serial number encrypted data all become a string of ciphertext sequences, and due to the use of the same shared key and encryption mode, they are similar in binary structure. The encrypted random number hash value becomes the doubly encrypted hash value "m1n2o3p4q5r6...", the encrypted transmission time hash value becomes the doubly encrypted transmission time "s7t8u9v10w11x12...", and the encrypted serial number data becomes the doubly encrypted serial number "y13z14a15b16c17d18...". The three are consistent in data security and encryption structure. After encryption, the data blocks have the same length and the same encryption mode, which is convenient for subsequent direct sequential splicing or cross-combination to achieve deep fusion, effectively resisting external cracking risks, and ensuring the security and consistency of the fusion process;

[0051] Adopt a spatio-temporal correlation encryption algorithm to perform a cross-operation on the re-encrypted transmission time and the countermeasure location information after fuzzy coding. Taking the exclusive OR operation as an example, bitwise XOR the hash value of the transmission time (assuming it is "s7t8u9v10w11x12..." after re-encryption) with the ASCII code values of the corresponding characters of the location code "N3015A, E12030B". For the first character "s" of the transmission time hash value (ASCII code value is 115), XOR it with the first character "N" of the location code (ASCII code value is 78) to get the result 37. And so on, perform bitwise operations on the entire transmission time hash value and the location code to generate a fused spatio-temporal feature data segment, such as "37...". For the fused spatio-temporal feature data segment "37...", since it is obtained by the exclusive OR operation of the transmission time hash value and the location code, it has unique spatio-temporal correlation information. To make it easy to identify and interpret in the identification code, according to the preset coding rules, add a specific identification prefix and suffix to it. For example, add the prefix "ST_" and the suffix "_END", and it becomes "ST_37..._END". In this way, when parsing the subsequent identification code, this key spatio-temporal fusion information can be quickly located and extracted, and at the same time, it also follows the consistency requirements of the overall coding system. The re-encrypted serial number encrypted data "y13z14a15b16c17d18..." is fine-tuned again according to the device's own coding standard when integrating into the final identification code. Check whether its length and format fully meet the requirements of the identification code structure. If there are differences, perform appropriate padding or truncation processing. For example, if the identification code requires this part to be 20 bits in length and the current serial number encrypted data is 18 bits, then add two check characters generated according to the correlation algorithm of the encryption key and the serial number at the end, such as "y13z14a15b16c17d18XX", to ensure that the serial number can accurately identify the device in the identification code and is adapted to the overall coding style. Finally, combine the coding information of each segment in a strict and established order. Start with the random number hash value coding as the iconic beginning and core basis of the entire identification code, followed by the spatio-temporal fusion data coding to ensure the orderly presentation of key spatio-temporal dimension information, and then the optimized device unique serial number coding to clarify the identity of the countermeasure device, thus constructing the complete main structure of the identification code. During the splicing process, further refine the character connection rules. In addition to using a specific delimiter such as "-" to separate the coding of each segment, the usage frequency and position of the delimiter are also precisely defined.For example, it is stipulated that a "-" is used between the random number hash value encoding and the spatio-temporal fusion data encoding, and two "-" are used between the spatio-temporal fusion data encoding and the serial number encoding to form an identification code in the format of "a1b2c3d4...E5F6G7H8-ST_37..._END-y13z14a15b16c17d18XX". In this way, different information segments can be clearly distinguished, and the overall structure of the identification code is strengthened through a unique delimiter pattern. At the same time, ultra-fine verification is carried out throughout the splicing process. Not only are the length, format, checksum, etc. of each character and each segment of encoding checked in multiple aspects, but also a redundant verification algorithm is introduced. By performing additional mathematical transformations on the encoded data and comparing with the check values, any potential data errors or displacement risks are eliminated, ensuring the accurate and highly reliable generation of the identification code.

[0052] The control module 2 is used to associate the identification code with the countermeasure signal. For example, the identification code and the countermeasure signal are marked with an association mark, and the countermeasure module 3 is controlled to emit a countermeasure signal associated with the identification code in the direction of the target UAV to counter the target UAV.

[0053] For example, when it is detected that a UAV enters a restricted area without authorization, such as the airspace around sensitive places like airports, military bases, and government agencies, the countermeasure device emits a high-intensity radio frequency interference signal. Such signals usually cover the common communication frequency bands of UAVs, such as the 2.4GHz and 5.8GHz frequency bands. The modulation method of the signal can adopt sweep interference, that is, rapid scanning is carried out according to a certain frequency range and speed, continuously changing the frequency of the interference signal, making it difficult for the UAV's communication link to establish a stable connection. For example, within the 2.4GHz frequency band, sweep interference is carried out from 2.400GHz to 2.4835GHz at a speed of 100 times per second, making the signal received by the UAV chaotic and unable to normally receive and execute the operator's instructions. Also, according to the distance between the UAV and the countermeasure device, the countermeasure device will intelligently adjust the transmission power. When the UAV is relatively close, such as within 100 meters, the countermeasure device can appropriately reduce the transmission power to avoid excessive interference to other legal electronic devices in the vicinity; if the UAV is far away, reaching 1000 meters or even farther, the countermeasure device will increase the transmission power to ensure that the interference signal can effectively cover the UAV and block its communication;

[0054] For example, when the target drone is judged to have malicious behavior, such as carrying dangerous goods, taking secret photos and eavesdropping, the countermeasure device transmits a high-precision spoofing signal. The spoofing signal simulates the normal communication protocol between the drone and the remote control, and forges control instructions to make the drone fly or land along a preset safe path. For example, the countermeasure device sends a specific landing instruction to let the drone land in a safe area to prevent it from continuing to perform malicious tasks. The frequency and modulation method of the spoofing signal are highly matched with the normal communication signal of the drone, which is highly targeted and concealed. While transmitting the spoofing signal, the countermeasure device cooperates with a certain interference strategy to ensure that the spoofing signal can be successfully received by the drone. For example, at the moment when the drone receives the spoofing signal, a high-intensity interference pulse is briefly emitted to suppress the erroneous signal originally received by the drone, making the spoofing signal easier to identify and execute; for example, when the drone has an abnormal flight state, such as loss of control, abnormal flight trajectory, etc., the countermeasure device transmits an emergency countermeasure signal, which is usually transmitted in a wide-band, high-power manner to quickly cut off the power supply or communication link of the drone. For example, a strong interference signal covering the control frequency of the drone's power system is emitted to stop the drone's motor and force it to land safely. The waveform of the signal can be pulsed, which can interfere with the electronic equipment of the drone through instantaneous high-energy impact;

[0055] For example, when an abnormal flight of a target drone is detected, the countermeasure device will also form a linkage mechanism with other countermeasure devices or monitoring systems in the vicinity. Multiple countermeasure devices simultaneously transmit countermeasure signals to interfere with the drone from different directions and angles, increasing the success rate of the countermeasure. At the same time, the monitoring module tracks the location and status of the target drone in real time, providing accurate target information for the countermeasure device to ensure that the countermeasure signal can accurately hit the drone;

[0056] For example, in some temporarily designated no-fly zones, such as large-scale event sites and areas around important infrastructure, if a drone breaks in, the countermeasure device will emit a signal based on protocol blocking. It deeply analyzes the drone communication protocol and blocks and interferes with the key control command transmission part. For example, for the command frame structure responsible for controlling the flight direction and altitude in the common drone communication protocol, the countermeasure device sends specific interference data frames. The format of these data frames is similar to that of normal command frames, but the content is wrong or invalid. By sending a large number of such interference frames, the drone receiving end will make errors when parsing the command, so that the flight operation cannot be performed normally. At the same time, the countermeasure device adjusts the signal coverage strategy according to the scope and terrain characteristics of the no-fly zone. For open squares and other areas, omnidirectional transmitting antennas are used to evenly spread the countermeasure signal around; in mountainous areas with complex terrain or areas with many buildings, directional antennas may be combined to concentrate the signal to the direction where the drone may appear, and at the same time, the signal reflection and diffraction principles are used to expand the signal coverage as much as possible to ensure that the drone is effectively blocked from flying in the no-fly zone.

[0057] The recording module classifies and stores all the data generated during the counter-attack process, including the identification code, counter-attack time, counter-attack location, detailed feature information of the counter-attacked drone, and the working parameters of the counter-attack equipment, such as sending direction, sending power, sending frequency, sending bandwidth, etc., and can also be synchronized and backed up to the cloud server.

[0058] The present invention solves the problems of existing drone countermeasure equipment in management and tracing by associating a unique identification code with the countermeasure signal and recording the detailed information of the countermeasure operation related thereto, thereby facilitating the subsequent precise management and responsibility tracing of the countermeasure operation; the present invention deeply integrates a variety of key information, and the generated identification code contains rich information and has high security, and can fully support the tracing and refined management of complex countermeasure operations. It has significant advantages in coping with the increasingly complex chaos of "illegal flying" of drones and meeting strict regulatory requirements. By parsing this identification code, the specific time and place of each countermeasure operation and the details of which countermeasure device executed it can be clearly traced back, which greatly improves the accuracy and convenience of information tracing.

[0059] Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the aforementioned embodiments, it is still possible for those skilled in the art to modify the technical solutions described in the aforementioned embodiments, or to make equivalent substitutions for some of the technical features therein. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc. made within the spirit and principles of the present invention should be included in the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for countering a drone, characterized in that: The method comprises: Monitor drones in the airspace in real time to determine whether they are drones to be countered, and identify drones to be countered as target drones; A counter signal is transmitted in the direction of the target UAV. When the counter signal is transmitted, an identification code is generated, and the identification code is associated with the counter signal to form a counter signal associated with the identification code to counter the target UAV.

2. The method for countering a drone according to claim 1, characterized in that: The generation of the identification code includes: The random number generator generates the original random number sequence, which is encrypted using the hash function to obtain the hash value; The transmission time, transmission location and / or serial number of the countermeasure device of the countermeasure signal are encrypted and formed with the hash value to form a preliminary encrypted data set, and the encrypted data set is encoded to form an identification code.

3. The method for countering a drone according to claim 2, characterized in that: The transmission time, transmission location and / or serial number of the countermeasure device of the control signal are encrypted by data fusion, and the initial encrypted data set formed with the hash value includes: The time when the countermeasure device is started is collected as the launch time, and the launch time is encrypted in segments according to specific time intervals using a time series encryption algorithm; Obtain the location of the countermeasure device as the launch location, and encrypt the launch location using a geographic information encryption algorithm; Obtain the serial number of the countermeasure device, and encrypt the serial number using an asymmetric encryption algorithm in combination with a preset encryption key; According to the preset encryption fusion rules, the hash value and the encrypted launch time, launch location and serial number are aggregated into a preliminary encrypted data set.

4. The method for countering a drone according to claim 3, characterized in that: The step of aggregating the hash value, the encrypted transmission time, the transmission location, and the serial number into a preliminary encrypted data set according to the preset encryption fusion rule includes: The encrypted emission time data is used to generate an associated hash value of a fixed length using a lightweight hash function; Convert the encrypted serial number into hexadecimal code to generate a hash value; Encoding the encrypted launch location into a coordinate code that matches the identification code structure according to a preset encoding rule; Using the shared key generated by the key exchange protocol using the hash value, the associated hash value, and the similar hash value as the shared key, encrypt each data block in blocks to form a secondary encrypted hash value, a transmission time, and a serial number; Performing an XOR operation on the twice-encrypted emission time and the coordinate code to generate a fused spatiotemporal feature data segment; The secondary encrypted hash value, spatiotemporal characteristic data segment, and secondary encrypted serial number are integrated and aggregated into a preliminary encrypted data set in a preset order.

5. The method for countering a drone according to claim 4, characterized in that: Encoding the encrypted data set to form an identification code includes: encoding the twice-encrypted hash value, the spatiotemporal characteristic data segment, and the twice-encrypted serial number, starting with the encoded hash value, followed by the encoded spatiotemporal characteristic data segment and the encoded serial number to form the identification code.

6. The method for countering a drone according to claim 1, characterized in that: The method further includes: recording the countermeasure operation.

7. The method for countering a drone according to claim 6, characterized in that: Recording the countermeasure operation includes recording one or more of the countermeasure time, countermeasure location, characteristic information of the target UAV, working parameters of the countermeasure equipment, and countermeasure means.

8. A drone countermeasure system, characterized in that: The system includes a detection module, a control module, a countermeasure module and a generation module. The detection module is used to monitor the drones in the airspace in real time, and determine the drones to be countered as target drones; the countermeasure device is connected to the control module signal, and is used to generate a corresponding countermeasure signal to the target drone according to the command of the control module; the generation module is connected to the control module signal, and is used to generate a corresponding identification code for the countermeasure signal according to the command of the control module; the control module is used to associate the identification code with the countermeasure signal, and control the countermeasure module to transmit the countermeasure signal associated with the identification code in the direction of the target drone to counter the target drone.

9. The UAV countermeasure system according to claim 8, characterized in that: It also includes a recording module, which is connected to the control module by signal.

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