A special operation management and control system for a chemical industrial park

Abstract

The application discloses a special operation management and control system for a chemical industrial park, and relates to the technical field of special operation management and control of a chemical industrial park.The system comprises a management and control server and a plurality of terminal devices corresponding to each operation subzone.The terminal devices are used for collecting state parameters of the operation subzones and sending data collection signals to the management and control server.The management and control server performs the following processing: receiving the data collection signals and accepting the first control mode setting of the operation subzone and the state parameter group; after the first control mode of the first operation subzone and the first group of state parameters is established, if the second group of state parameters of the first operation subzone is accepted, the management and control server calculates the difference between the second group of state parameters and the first group of state parameters; when the difference triggers a security threat under the first control mode, according to the preset management and control rule, one of the following operations is performed: changing the first control mode and establishing a second control mode; prohibiting the change of the first control mode and maintaining the original control mode.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of special operation control technology in chemical industrial parks, specifically a special operation control system for chemical industrial parks. Background Technology

[0002] Technical bottlenecks have long existed in the management and control of special operations in chemical industrial parks. Traditional systems, due to issues such as static threshold monitoring, reliance on manual decision-making, and the risk of uncontrolled extreme risks, are ill-suited to dynamic and complex environments. Existing solutions often use fixed thresholds (such as 10% LEL for combustible gas concentration) as safety warning lines, failing to predict parameter coupling risks (such as accelerated gas volatilization due to temperature increases) and trend evolution (such as a stepwise increase in concentration), resulting in delayed early warnings. In one instance, a certain industrial park failed to monitor the dynamic correlation between temperature and concentration, causing combustible gas to reach its explosive limit undetected.

[0003] The response delays and potential for misoperation are more pronounced when manually switching control modes. Operators must manually analyze data and execute commands; in one case, a 10-minute delay due to the ventilation system's activation allowed flammable gas concentrations to exceed the lower explosive limit. Furthermore, rigid access control leads to excessive restrictions on operational permissions in low-risk scenarios, while insufficient access in high-risk situations delays critical actions. In one red-risk incident, non-emergency commands consumed system resources, causing a delay in emergency response.

[0004] The lack of stringent risk management exacerbated safety hazards. Current technology lacks a mandatory locking mechanism for extremely high concentrations of flammable gases (such as hydrogen concentration >4% LEL), leading to an explosion in a certain industrial park due to the failure to terminate hot work operations. Regarding risk spread prevention, traditional systems are limited to monitoring single work zones and fail to achieve cross-regional joint prevention through GIS positioning and spatial risk modeling. In one incident, a sudden increase in flammable gas concentration in an adjacent area failed to trigger joint prevention mode, resulting in the fire spreading.

[0005] Traditional solutions rely on fixed rules (such as simple concentration threshold judgments) and cannot simulate parameter trends after switching modes. In one industrial park, the risk of ventilation system failure was not considered, resulting in concentration fluctuations exceeding 30% after mode switching, nearly triggering a secondary accident. These shortcomings expose the deficiencies of traditional systems in terms of dynamism, intelligence, and safety. There is an urgent need for breakthroughs in technologies such as real-time difference calculation, multi-parameter coupling analysis, and spatial linkage control to build an intelligent, dynamic, and safety-first management and control system for chemical industrial parks. Summary of the Invention

[0006] 1) Technical problems to be solved

[0007] The purpose of this invention is to overcome the shortcomings of the existing technology and provide a special operation control system for chemical industrial parks.

[0008] (ii) Technical Solution

[0009] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention provides the following technical solution:

[0010] A special operation control system for a chemical industrial park includes a control server and multiple terminal devices corresponding to each operation zone. The multiple terminal devices are used to collect status parameters of the operation zones and send data acquisition signals to the control server. The control server performs the following processing:

[0011] Receives data acquisition signals and accepts the first control mode settings for work zones and status parameter groups;

[0012] After establishing the first control mode for the first job partition and the first set of status parameters, if the second set of status parameters for that first job partition is received, the management server calculates the difference between the second set of status parameters and the first set of status parameters. When this difference triggers a security threat in the first control mode, one of the following operations is performed according to the preset management rules:

[0013] If the preset control rules allow it and changing the mode can reduce security risks, then change the first control mode and establish a second control mode;

[0014] If the preset control rules prohibit or change the mode, which would increase the security risk, then the change of the first control mode will be prohibited and the original control mode will be maintained.

[0015] Furthermore, the management server also receives operation instructions based on the first job partition. When the operation instruction involves switching control modes, the management server further determines:

[0016] If the analysis shows that the switching operation complies with the preset control rules and will not trigger a security threat, then the first control mode is changed and a second control mode is established.

[0017] If the control mode is not in compliance with the control rules or there is a security threat, the change of control mode shall be prohibited and the original control mode shall be maintained.

[0018] Furthermore, the control server compares the security threshold and difference between the first set of status parameters and the second set of status parameters. If:

[0019] If the difference triggers a security threat in the first control mode, and the preset control rules indicate that using the second set of state parameters to establish a second control mode can reduce the risk, then the first control mode is changed and a second control mode is established.

[0020] If the difference does not trigger a security threat, or if establishing a second control mode using the second set of state parameters fails to reduce the risk, then changing the control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

[0021] Furthermore, the control server determines the influence of the type of the second set of state parameters on the type and difference of the first set of state parameters. If:

[0022] If the types are different and the difference triggers a security threat in the first control mode, and the preset control rules recognize the necessity of the new mode, then the first control mode is changed and a second control mode is established.

[0023] If the same type or difference does not trigger a security threat, and the second set of state parameters does not bring significant monitoring advantages, then the change of control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

[0024] Furthermore, when the first set of status parameters includes a high-risk parameter, the control server determines the second set of status parameters and the difference between them. If:

[0025] The second set of status parameters does not include high-risk parameters and the difference triggers a high security risk in the first control mode. According to the preset control rules, the first control mode is changed and a second control mode is established.

[0026] If the second set of status parameters includes high-risk parameters, or if the difference does not trigger a high safety risk, then changes to the control mode are prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

[0027] Furthermore, the terminal device is equipped with a positioning module, which, when the control server receives the second set of status parameters:

[0028] The current position measured by the positioning module is obtained from the terminal device corresponding to the first work zone, and the current position measured by the positioning module is obtained from the sensor terminal corresponding to the second set of status parameters.

[0029] The influence of positional relationships and state parameter differences on the control mode is analyzed. If the positional relationships and differences trigger a security threat in the first control mode and meet the spatial layout requirements in the preset control rules, the first control mode is changed and a second control mode is established; otherwise, the change of control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

[0030] Furthermore, the control server locks the control mode related to the extreme risk parameter, and prohibits changes to the control mode during the locking period; after the lock is released, it determines whether to change the control mode based on the preset control rules and the difference in status parameters; wherein, the safety acceptance condition for the extreme risk parameter is that the gas concentration detection meets the standard and passes the acceptance.

[0031] Furthermore, the management server activates the corresponding management permissions according to the established job partition control mode, and dynamically adjusts the scope and priority of the management permissions based on the difference in status parameters and the level of security threats.

[0032] The present invention also provides a management server, which is embedded with the aforementioned management system. The management server includes a control unit, which performs the following processes:

[0033] Data acquisition signals are received from terminal devices based on the status parameters of the work zones.

[0034] The first control mode is set by the signal receiving and acceptance operation zone and status parameter group;

[0035] After the first control mode of the first work zone and the first set of status parameters is established, if the second set of status parameters is received, the control unit calculates the difference between the two sets of parameters. When the difference triggers a security threat in the first control mode, according to the preset control rules, it performs the operation of changing the first control mode and establishing the second control mode, or prohibiting the change of the control mode and maintaining the original control mode.

[0036] Furthermore, the control unit compares the safety thresholds and differences between the first group and the second group of state parameters. If the difference triggers a security threat in the first control mode, and the preset control rules indicate that using the second group of state parameters to establish a second control mode can reduce the risk, then the first control mode is changed and a second control mode is established. If the difference does not trigger a security threat, or using the second group of state parameters to establish a second control mode cannot reduce the risk, then the change of control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

[0037] Furthermore, the control unit determines the difference between the second set of state parameter types and the first set, as well as the impact of the difference. If the types are different and the difference triggers a security threat in the first control mode, and the preset control rules recognize the necessity of the new mode, then the first control mode is changed and a second control mode is established. If the types are the same or the difference does not trigger a security threat, and the second set of state parameters does not bring significant monitoring advantages, then the change of control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

[0038] Furthermore, when the first set of status parameters includes a high-risk parameter, the control unit determines the second set of status parameters and the difference between them. If the second set of status parameters does not include a high-risk parameter and the difference triggers a high security risk in the first control mode, the first control mode is changed and a second control mode is established according to the preset control rules. If the second set of status parameters includes a high-risk parameter, or the difference does not trigger a high security risk, the change of control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

[0039] Furthermore, when the control unit receives the second set of status parameters, it acquires the positioning data of the work zone terminal and the sensor terminal, analyzes the impact of the positional relationship and the difference in status parameters on the control mode, and if the positional relationship and the difference trigger a security threat in the first control mode and meet the requirements of the preset control rules regarding spatial layout, then the first control mode is changed and a second control mode is established; if not, the change of control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

[0040] Furthermore, the control unit locks the control modes related to the high-risk parameters until safety acceptance is passed. During the lockout period, changes to the control mode are prohibited. After the lockout is released, a determination is made, based on preset control rules and status parameter difference assessment, whether to allow changes to the control mode.

[0041] The present invention also provides a control method, which utilizes the aforementioned control server to implement the aforementioned control system, wherein the control server performs the following processes:

[0042] Data acquisition signals are collected from the receiving terminal device based on the status parameters of the work zone;

[0043] The first control mode is set by the signal receiving and acceptance operation zone and status parameter group;

[0044] Once the first control mode is established, if the second set of status parameters is received, the management server calculates the difference between the two sets of parameters. When the difference triggers a security threat in the first control mode, it performs the operation of changing the first control mode and establishing the second control mode according to the preset management rules, or prohibiting the change of the control mode and maintaining the original control mode.

[0045] Furthermore, when the first set of status parameters includes a high-risk parameter, the control server determines the second set of status parameters and the difference between them. If the second set of status parameters does not include a high-risk parameter and the difference triggers a high security risk in the first control mode, the first control mode is changed and a second control mode is established according to the preset control rules. If the second set of status parameters includes a high-risk parameter, or the difference does not trigger a high security risk, the change of control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

[0046] Furthermore, when the control server receives the second set of status parameters, it obtains the positioning data of the work zone terminal and the sensor terminal, analyzes the impact of the position relationship and the difference in status parameters on the control mode, and if the position relationship and the difference trigger a security threat in the first control mode and meet the requirements of the preset control rules regarding spatial layout, then the first control mode is changed and a second control mode is established; if not, the change of control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

[0047] Furthermore, the control server locks the control mode related to the high-risk parameters until the safety acceptance is qualified. During the locking period, changes to the control mode are prohibited. After the lock is released, the server determines whether to allow changes to the control mode based on the preset control rules and the difference in status parameters.

[0048] The beneficial effects of this application are as follows:

[0049] This application enables dynamic risk response capabilities, leaping from static thresholds to real-time trend prediction. Specifically, through real-time data difference analysis and dynamic rule matching, it upgrades from "static threshold monitoring" to "dynamic risk response." Traditional monitoring methods rely on fixed thresholds (e.g., 10% LEL for combustible gas concentration), triggering alarms once parameters exceed the limit, but failing to predict risk development trends. This system, however, calculates parameter differences (e.g., concentration change rate, temperature gradient) and combines them with multi-parameter coupling analysis to identify abnormal fluctuation patterns (e.g., a 400% increase in concentration within 10 minutes), thus predicting potential threats in advance. For example, it uses both absolute difference (Δconcentration = 25% - 5% LEL = 20% LEL) and relative difference (Δrate = 10℃ / minute) as dual indicators, combined with historical data to construct a risk prediction curve. By simulating parameter trends after switching control modes (e.g., concentration dropping to 8% LEL within 30 minutes after ventilation system startup), it assesses the probability of risk reduction, avoiding ineffective switching. By introducing combined thresholds (such as "temperature > 80℃ + combustible gas > 15% LEL" triggering an orange alert), the limitations of single-parameter monitoring are overcome. The system detects in real-time that the combustible gas concentration has risen from 5% LEL to 25% LEL, while the temperature rises by 10℃, immediately triggering a dual threat response of "high temperature + gas accumulation." System simulation verification shows that activating the enhanced ventilation system can reduce the concentration to a safe range, thereby dynamically switching to "enhanced ventilation mode" and shutting down non-explosion-proof equipment to prevent accidents.

[0050] 2. This application implements a precise decision-making mechanism, with rule-driven two-way verification ensuring effectiveness. Through a pre-set control rule base and real-time data simulation, it achieves two-way verification of "whether to switch" and "the effectiveness of the switch," avoiding secondary risks caused by blind adjustments. Traditional mode switching relies on manual experience, which may lead to misjudgment risks; while this system, through a rule engine and simulation model, ensures that each switch is based on scientific decision-making. Pre-set rules cover national standards and enterprise-customized strategies, using a weighted scoring mechanism (e.g., risk reduction accounts for 60%, operational compliance accounts for 40%) to determine the optimal path. An integrated machine learning model predicts parameter trends within 30 minutes after the switch; for example, a ventilation system malfunction may cause concentration fluctuations exceeding 30%. By shielding abnormal data (e.g., pressure sensors being artificially blocked, causing falsely lower displayed values), it rejects switch requests that appear safe but actually exacerbate risks. The system has received manual "switch to maintenance mode" commands triggered by operators. Through permission verification (operator has the necessary permissions) and risk simulation (risk of missing key parameters after switching <5%), the system allows the switch and activates the "mandatory check-in every 30 minutes" rule.

[0051] 3. This application implements a high-risk parameter locking mechanism. For high-risk parameters (such as combustible gas concentration > 4% LEL), the system employs a hard-coded locking mechanism to ensure that manual intervention in high-risk scenarios must be rigorously verified, preventing catastrophic consequences from misoperation. In specific implementation, a two-factor authentication unlocking and risk isolation strategy is adopted. Specifically, two-factor authentication unlocking requires both "gas concentration meeting the standard (< 1% LEL)" and "manual on-site acceptance signature" to unlock. The risk isolation strategy cuts off control linkage between high-risk and low-risk areas during the lockout period (e.g., prohibiting the ventilation system in area A from being affected by parameters in area B) to prevent risk spread. High-risk trigger conditions are written into the server firmware and cannot be modified through the rule base, ensuring absolute safety priority. For example, if the system detects a concentration of 4.5% LEL, it immediately locks the control mode, prohibiting any automatic switching. Although the ventilation system can theoretically reduce the concentration, due to the risk of electrical sparks, the system maintains the "high-risk lockout mode" and activates the emergency plan. After manual acceptance confirms that the concentration has dropped to 0.5% LEL and the temperature has stabilized, the system unlocks and switches to "degraded monitoring mode."

[0052] 4. This application achieves spatial risk linkage control, i.e., cross-regional collaborative defense. Through GIS positioning and spatial risk modeling, the system realizes "single-point anomaly, global response," effectively curbing the spread of risks. Traditional monitoring modes are limited to single operational zones, while this system can trigger cross-regional joint defense measures through location relationship analysis. Based on parameters such as wind speed and obstacle distribution, it predicts the risk spread path (e.g., combustible gas spreading to adjacent areas within 5 minutes under level 3 wind). It defines linkage rules (e.g., "triggering joint defense when concentration difference > 5% LEL and distance < 50 meters") to automatically coordinate multi-regional response measures. Through 5G networks, it achieves millisecond-level data interaction across multiple terminals, ensuring the immediate issuance of joint defense commands.

[0053] 5. This system implements dynamic access control, enabling real-time adaptation between risk levels and control intensity. The system dynamically adjusts user permissions based on risk levels, restricting low-priority operations in high-risk scenarios to ensure the timeliness and authority of security control. Permissions are bound to roles (operator, safety officer, administrator), supporting fine-grained configuration (e.g., safety officers can switch modes, operators can only view data). Permission status is updated every minute, freezing low-priority permissions in high-risk situations (e.g., requiring equipment maintenance requests to be queued). All instructions record the operator, timestamp, and rehearsal results; in case of conflict between manual and automated controls, security rules take the highest priority. Attached Figure Description

[0054] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the framework principle of the present invention.

[0055] Figure 2 This is a flowchart of the method of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0056] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0057] Example 1

[0058] like Figure 1-2As shown, this invention provides a technical solution: a special operation control system for a chemical industrial park, including a control server and multiple terminal devices corresponding to each operation zone. The multiple terminal devices are used to collect status parameters of the operation zones and send data acquisition signals to the control server. The control server performs the following processing: receiving data acquisition signals and accepting the setting of a first control mode for the operation zone and a group of status parameters; after establishing the first control mode for the first operation zone and the first group of status parameters, if a second group of status parameters for the first operation zone is received, the control server calculates the difference between the second group of status parameters and the first group of status parameters. When the difference triggers a safety threat under the first control mode, according to preset control rules, one of the following operations is performed: if the preset control rules allow it and changing the mode can reduce the safety risk, then the first control mode is changed and a second control mode is established; if the preset control rules prohibit it or changing the mode will increase the safety risk, then the change of the first control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

[0059] In the above, the management server is equipped with a processor, and the processor is connected to an actuator. In the above, the multiple terminal devices are used to collect the status parameters of the work partition and send data acquisition signals to the management server. The processor processes the data acquisition signals and then performs corresponding operations through the actuator. In this application, the impact of the difference on security threats is judged based on multi-parameter coupling analysis.

[0060] In the above embodiments, terminal devices are distributed across various work zones, responsible for collecting status parameters (such as temperature, pressure, gas concentration, etc.) and sending data acquisition signals to the server. Upon receiving the signal, the server establishes a corresponding control mode for the first work zone and the first set of status parameters. This mode defines initial safety control rules and risk thresholds. When a second set of status parameters from the same work zone is received, the server calculates the difference between the two sets of parameters. If the difference triggers a safety threat in the first control mode (e.g., exceeding the risk threshold), one of the following operations is performed according to the preset control rules: Allow switching: If the rules allow it and changing the mode can reduce the risk (e.g., adjusting the ventilation frequency to reduce gas concentration), then a second control mode is established; Prohibit switching: If the rules prohibit it or switching would increase the risk (e.g., blindly adjusting leading to increased parameter fluctuations), then the original mode is maintained.

[0061] In the above embodiments, this control system constructs a two-layer architecture of "terminal perception - server decision-making": terminal devices (such as sensors and cameras) distributed in each work zone continuously collect status parameters such as temperature, pressure, and gas concentration, and transmit them to the control server in real time through data acquisition signals. The server first completes the initialization of the first control mode, that is, establishes the mapping relationship between the first work zone and the first set of status parameters, forming a baseline control model that includes safety thresholds, risk levels, and response rules (for example, setting the combustible gas concentration threshold of the hot work area to 10% LEL, corresponding to the "normal monitoring mode").

[0062] The triggering and decision-making of dynamic control refers to the following: When the second set of state parameters for the same work zone is input, the server performs differential quantification analysis: calculating the absolute difference (e.g., a 20% difference when the concentration rises from 5% LEL to 25% LEL) and the relative difference (e.g., a 400% increase in concentration within 10 minutes) between the two sets of parameters, and comparing them with the risk threshold of the first control mode. If the difference triggers a safety threat (e.g., exceeding the lower explosive limit by 20%), then the preset rule decision chain is entered: Allowing scenario switching: If the rule base contains a strategy of "activating enhanced ventilation when the concentration exceeds 15% LEL", and simulation verification shows that switching to "enhanced ventilation mode" can reduce the concentration to a safe range, then the control mode is updated; Prohibiting scenario switching: If the rule prohibits adjusting ventilation in high-temperature environments (which may cause electrical sparks), or if the parameter fluctuation exceeds 30% after switching, then the original mode is maintained and an audible and visual alarm is triggered. Taking hot work operations in a chemical industrial park as an example: the initial control mode is set to "routine monitoring" based on an ambient temperature of 25℃, an oxygen concentration of 20%, and a combustible gas concentration of 5% LEL. When the second set of parameters showed a temperature of 35℃ and a combustible gas concentration of 25% LEL, the difference triggered a dual threat of "high temperature + gas accumulation." System checks revealed that the ventilation system could reduce the concentration to below 10% LEL within 10 minutes, so the system switched to "enhanced ventilation mode," simultaneously shutting down non-explosion-proof electrical equipment within 50 meters of the work area. If a ventilation system malfunction causes the risk assessment value to increase after the switch, the original mode will be maintained and the emergency evacuation plan will be activated.

[0063] Therefore, this application enables data-driven decision-making through the upgrade from "status monitoring" to "trend prediction" via difference calculation, such as early identification of abnormal fluctuations in concentration with an increase rate exceeding 5% / minute; the core rules pre-set rules integrate national security standards (such as GB30871-2022) with enterprise-customized strategies to form an automated closed loop of "risk identification - rule matching - action execution"; and it achieves two-way verification of mode switching, not only determining "whether switching is needed" but also verifying "whether switching is effective" through simulation calculation, avoiding system disturbances caused by invalid operations.

[0064] Therefore, through real-time data difference analysis, the system can automatically respond to changes in the working environment, avoiding the lag of static control. Relying on preset control rules (such as industry standards and historical accident experience), it ensures that mode switching conforms to safety logic, reducing human error. Through a "switch / maintain" binary decision, it achieves flexible adjustment to low-risk changes and strict restriction of high-risk changes, balancing efficiency and safety.

[0065] In some embodiments, the management server also receives operation instructions based on the first job partition. When the operation instructions involve switching control modes, the management server further determines: if the analysis shows that the switching operation conforms to the preset management rules and will not trigger a security threat, then the first control mode is changed and a second control mode is established; if it does not conform to the management rules or there is a security threat, then the change of control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

[0066] In the above embodiment, when the server receives an operation instruction (such as a manually initiated mode switch request) for the first job partition, it needs to perform compliance verification on the control mode switch involved in the instruction. This is done using the following dual judgment criteria: First, rule compliance judgment: analyzing whether the switch operation complies with preset control rules (e.g., whether the user has the necessary permissions, or whether it is within a permitted switch period); second, security threat assessment judgment: determining whether the switch will trigger a security threat (e.g., switching to a low-monitoring mode may lead to missed risks). If the rules are met and there is no threat, the switch is executed; if the rules are violated or a threat exists (e.g., unauthorized personnel attempting to switch to a dangerous mode), the switch is prohibited and the original mode is maintained.

[0067] In the above embodiments, operators can send mode switching commands through the system interface or a handheld terminal. After receiving the command, the server performs dual verification: it calls the role permission table to verify whether the operator has the necessary permissions to switch modes; and it simulates the parameter change trajectory after the switch based on historical data to assess whether it will lead to a breach of the security threshold.

[0068] Therefore, this application achieves refined decision-making logic. For example, when an operator sends a "switch to maintenance mode" command, the system checks and finds that: ① the operator has the necessary permissions; ② the monitoring frequency decreases after the switch but manual inspections increase (simulation shows a risk of missing key parameters <5%). At this point, the switch is executed, simultaneously activating the "maintenance mode" exclusive rules (such as mandatory check-in every 30 minutes to confirm safety status). If a "switch to automatic operation mode" command is mistakenly sent, the system recognizes insufficient permissions and directly rejects it. If a senior engineer sends a command but the switch causes a 20% increase in the risk of reactor temperature runaway, operation is prohibited and a risk warning report is pushed to management.

[0069] Therefore, this application achieves dynamic binding of permissions, with a strong correlation between permission configuration and control mode. For example, the "emergency control mode" is only open to security personnel when the threat level reaches red, avoiding the risk of accidental activation under normal circumstances; operation traceability: all instructions record the operator, timestamp, and parameter simulation results; when manual instructions conflict with automatic control, the system automatically prioritizes security rules and rejects unauthorized operations.

[0070] In some embodiments, the management server compares the security thresholds and differences between the first set of status parameters and the second set of status parameters. If the difference triggers a security threat in the first control mode, and the preset management rules indicate that establishing a second control mode using the second set of status parameters can reduce the risk, then the first control mode is changed and a second control mode is established; if the difference does not trigger a security threat, or establishing a second control mode using the second set of status parameters cannot reduce the risk, then the change of the control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

[0071] In the above embodiment, the control server compares the safety thresholds (such as upper limit, lower limit, and rate of change thresholds) and differences between the first and second sets of state parameters to determine whether a threat has been triggered. If the difference triggers a threat, but the risk can be reduced by establishing a new mode using the second set of parameters (e.g., by adjusting the parameter range to move the system away from the danger zone), then a switch is executed; if the difference does not trigger a threat (e.g., parameter fluctuations are within a safe range), or the risk cannot be reduced after switching (e.g., the second set of parameters themselves are more dangerous), then the original mode is maintained. The parameters are set as follows: Absolute threshold: the physical safety boundary of the parameter; Relative threshold: the parameter change rate limit (e.g., temperature rise rate ≤ 5℃ / minute); Combined threshold: multi-parameter coupled risk value (e.g., "temperature > 80℃ and combustible gas concentration > 15% LEL" is defined as an orange warning).

[0072] When the difference between the second set of parameters and the first set exceeds any threshold, the system initiates a risk reduction assessment: using a Bayesian network algorithm to predict the parameter trend within 30 minutes after the mode switch, and to determine whether the risk value has decreased (e.g., from "orange" to "yellow").

[0073] This application overcomes the limitations of single-parameter monitoring through multi-parameter coupling analysis, such as simultaneously identifying potential safety risks of "abnormal temperature + increased concentration"; it constructs a real-time risk surface based on historical data to intuitively display the mapping relationship between parameter differences and risk levels, assisting in rule optimization and counterintuitive operation blocking: it rejects switching where "parameters seem optimized but actually hide risks" (such as reducing the displayed value by shielding the pressure sensor signal), ensuring that control measures are real and effective.

[0074] In some embodiments, the control server determines the impact of the type of the second set of status parameters on the type and difference of the first set of status parameters. If: the types are different and the difference triggers a security threat in the first control mode, and the preset control rules recognize the necessity of the new mode, then the first control mode is changed and a second control mode is established; if the types are the same or the difference does not trigger a security threat, and the second set of status parameters does not bring significant monitoring advantages, then the change of control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

[0075] In some embodiments, when the first set of status parameters includes a high-risk parameter, the control server determines the second set of status parameters and the difference between them. If the second set of status parameters does not include a high-risk parameter and the difference triggers a high safety risk in the first control mode, the first control mode is changed and a second control mode is established according to the preset control rules. If the second set of status parameters includes a high-risk parameter, or the difference does not trigger a high safety risk, the change of control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained. For example, if the first set of parameters includes a high-risk parameter (such as concentration > 4% LEL, extremely high explosion risk), and the second set of parameters shows that the gas concentration drops to 2% LEL (not a high-risk parameter), but the temperature difference triggers a high risk (increase of 15°C / minute).

[0076] In this situation, the control server prioritizes determining whether the extremely high-risk parameters have been eliminated: if the second group does not contain extremely high-risk parameters (gas concentration meets the standard), and the temperature difference triggers a high risk (potentially causing other combustible substances to volatilize), then it switches to "high-temperature warning mode" and activates the cooling spray system; if the second group still contains extremely high-risk parameters (such as gas concentration not decreasing), or the temperature difference does not reach the high-risk threshold (<5℃ / minute), then switching is prohibited, and the "extreme-risk lockout mode" is maintained, requiring mandatory manual intervention. The key rule is that extremely high-risk parameters (such as critical concentrations of combustible gases and highly hazardous chemical reactants) must be cleared to zero first; otherwise, mode adjustment is prohibited to ensure that high-risk scenarios are absolutely controllable.

[0077] In some embodiments, the terminal device is equipped with a positioning module. When the management server receives the second set of status parameters, it obtains the current position measured by the positioning module from the terminal device corresponding to the first work zone and obtains the current position measured by the positioning module from the sensor terminal corresponding to the second set of status parameters.

[0078] The influence of positional relationships and state parameter differences on the control mode is analyzed. If the positional relationships and differences trigger a security threat in the first control mode and meet the spatial layout requirements in the preset control rules, the first control mode is changed and a second control mode is established; otherwise, the change of control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

[0079] For example, if the terminal equipment in the hot work area is located in zone A, and the second set of parameters comes from a sensor in the adjacent zone B (30 meters away from zone A), it detects a sudden increase in the flammable gas concentration in zone B to 18% LEL. The control server analyzes the location relationship (zones A and B are adjacent) and the parameter difference (concentration exceeding the threshold of 8%), determining that the risk may spread to zone A, triggering the "cross-regional risk linkage" rule: if the preset rule requires "when the concentration in adjacent areas exceeds 15% LEL, the main work area needs to upgrade its monitoring level," then it switches to "regional joint defense mode," simultaneously activating the ventilation systems in zones A and B, and prohibiting hot work in zone A; if the location relationship is unrelated (e.g., parameters come from an unrelated area more than 200 meters away) or the rule has no linkage requirement, then it maintains the original mode, only alarming zone B separately. Through GIS positioning and spatial risk modeling, "single-point anomaly, global response" is achieved, preventing the risk from spreading and causing chain accidents.

[0080] In some embodiments, the control server locks the control mode related to the extreme risk parameter, and prohibits changes to the control mode during the locking period; after the lock is released, it determines whether to change the control mode based on the preset control rules and the difference in status parameters; wherein, the safety acceptance condition for the extreme risk parameter is that the gas concentration detection meets the standard and passes the acceptance.

[0081] For example, if a hot work operation triggers a critical risk due to hydrogen leakage, the control server locks the current control mode (prohibiting any automatic switching) and initiates a safety acceptance process. During the lockout period, operators are prohibited from changing the mode until the gas concentration detection meets the standard (hydrogen concentration < 1% LEL) and manual acceptance is passed. After unlocking, the server reassesses the status parameter differences (e.g., concentration stabilizes at 0.5% LEL, temperature is normal). If it meets preset rules (e.g., no critical risk parameters for 30 consecutive minutes), switching to "normal monitoring mode" is allowed; if residual risk still exists (e.g., temperature fluctuation > 8℃ / minute), the "degraded monitoring mode" is maintained, and the inspection frequency is increased. The lockout mechanism prevents accidental operation in high-risk scenarios, and the acceptance process ensures that mode changes are only allowed after the risk has been completely eliminated.

[0082] In some embodiments, the management server activates corresponding management permissions based on the established work zone control mode, and dynamically adjusts the scope and priority of management permissions according to the difference in status parameters and the level of security threats. For example, when a hot work operation switches from "routine monitoring" to "enhanced ventilation mode," the management server simultaneously activates the following permission adjustments: granting ventilation system control permissions to on-site operators and disabling the start / stop permissions for non-explosion-proof equipment; Priority: when the risk level rises from yellow to orange, the priority of inspection check-in permissions is increased (mandatory check-in every 15 minutes), and non-emergency instructions (such as equipment maintenance requests) are temporarily frozen. The dynamic binding rules for permissions are adjusted in real time based on the risk level. For example: low risk (blue): basic data viewing and routine inspection records are allowed; high risk (red): only safety officers can perform mode switching, and all operations require double verification. Through granular control of permissions, the system ensures that "risk level matches management intensity," avoiding security vulnerabilities caused by permission abuse.

[0083] Example 2

[0084] In some embodiments, a management server includes a control unit that performs the following processes: receiving data acquisition signals from a terminal device based on the status parameters of a work partition; accepting the setting of a first control mode for the work partition and a set of status parameters through the signal reception; after establishing the first control mode for the first work partition and the first set of status parameters, if a second set of status parameters is received, the control unit calculates the difference between the two sets of parameters; when the difference triggers a security threat under the first control mode, it performs operations such as changing the first control mode and establishing a second control mode, or prohibiting the change of control mode and maintaining the original control mode, according to preset management rules.

[0085] In the above embodiments, in the hot work operation scenario, the control server first receives a first set of status parameters (ambient temperature 25°C, oxygen concentration 20%, combustible gas concentration 5% LEL) through terminal devices (gas sensor, temperature sensor). The server establishes a "normal monitoring mode" as the first control mode based on a preset safety threshold (combustible gas concentration threshold 10% LEL). When a material leak occurs, the terminal devices collect a second set of parameters (temperature 35°C, combustible gas concentration 25% LEL) and send the data signal to the server. The server's control unit performs the following steps: 1) Difference calculation: Combustible gas concentration difference = 25% LEL - 5% LEL = 20% LEL (exceeding the threshold 10% LEL); Temperature difference = 35°C - 25°C = 10°C (exceeding the preset temperature change rate threshold).

[0086] The control server determines that the difference between two sets of parameters triggers a dual safety threat of "high temperature + gas accumulation." Then, it performs the following operations: Rule matching and decision-making: The server retrieves the preset control rule base and analyzes whether switching control modes is allowed. If the rule allows switching and the risk can be reduced after switching (e.g., starting an enhanced ventilation system can reduce the concentration of combustible gas to below 10% LEL within 10 minutes), then the mode switch is executed, establishing the "enhanced ventilation mode" (second control mode). If the rule prohibits switching (e.g., a ventilation system malfunction may cause electrical sparks), or the risk increases after switching (e.g., the simulated concentration fluctuation exceeds 30%), then the original mode is maintained and an audible and visual alarm is triggered.

[0087] In the above embodiment, the server employs a real-time difference calculation model to generate dynamic difference quantification analysis, distinguishing between absolute differences (such as the amount of concentration change) and relative differences (such as the rate of change), and comprehensively assessing the threat level by combining multi-parameter coupled risks (such as the synergistic effect of temperature and concentration). A preset rule base integrates national security standards and enterprise-defined strategies, determining the optimal decision-making path through a weighted scoring mechanism. For example, rules may assign a higher weight to "risk reduction magnitude" to ensure the effectiveness of decision-making.

[0088] In some embodiments, the control unit compares the safety thresholds and differences between the first group and the second group of state parameters. If the difference triggers a security threat in the first control mode, and the preset control rules indicate that using the second group of state parameters to establish a second control mode can reduce the risk, then the first control mode is changed and a second control mode is established. If the difference does not trigger a security threat, or using the second group of state parameters to establish a second control mode cannot reduce the risk, then the change of the control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

[0089] In the above embodiment, the control unit of the management server performs the following comparative analysis: First, a safety threshold comparison is performed: the combustible gas concentration threshold of 10% LEL is exceeded (actual value 25% LEL); the temperature change rate threshold (e.g., 5℃ / minute) is exceeded (actual value 10℃ / minute). Second, the management server determines that the difference triggers a safety threat and conducts a risk reduction feasibility assessment, including predicting the parameter trends after switching to "enhanced ventilation mode" through a Bayesian network algorithm: after the ventilation system is started, the combustible gas concentration is expected to drop to 8% LEL within 10 minutes; the temperature may drop to 30℃ within 15 minutes due to ventilation heat dissipation. If the simulation results show that the risk level drops from "red" to "yellow", it is determined that switching modes can reduce the risk, and the switch is executed; if the simulation shows that the ventilation system malfunctions after the switch (e.g., short circuit risk), the original mode is maintained and an alarm is triggered.

[0090] In some embodiments, the control unit determines the difference between the second set of state parameter types and the first set and the impact of the difference. If the types are different and the difference triggers a security threat in the first control mode, and the preset control rules recognize the necessity of the new mode, then the first control mode is changed and a second control mode is established. If the types are the same or the difference does not trigger a security threat, and the second set of state parameters does not bring significant monitoring advantages, then the change of control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

[0091] In the above embodiments, if the type of the second set of parameters changes (e.g., the detection of toxic gases is added), the processing logic of the control server is as follows: Type difference judgment: The first set of parameters consists of temperature, oxygen concentration, and combustible gas concentration; the second set of parameters adds hydrogen sulfide concentration (different type). The control server identifies the parameter type difference and assesses its impact on safety. This includes difference impact analysis: If the hydrogen sulfide concentration exceeds the standard (e.g., 10 ppm) and triggers a safety threat, and the preset rules recognize the necessity of the added monitoring (e.g., regulations require monitoring of toxic gases during hot work), then it switches to "Comprehensive Emergency Mode"; if the type difference only involves redundant parameters (e.g., repeatedly deployed temperature sensors), and the difference does not trigger a threat, then the original mode is maintained.

[0092] In the above implementation process, a parameter type whitelist mechanism can be added: the server maintains a list of allowed parameter types and only accepts switching requests for parameters within the list. Additionally, a mode compatibility check can be implemented: before switching to a new mode, the server verifies the compatibility of the old and new parameter types (e.g., whether a ventilation system can simultaneously handle combustible and toxic gases).

[0093] In some embodiments, when the first set of status parameters includes a high-risk parameter, the control unit determines the second set of status parameters and the difference between them. If the second set of status parameters does not include a high-risk parameter and the difference triggers a high security risk in the first control mode, the first control mode is changed and a second control mode is established according to the preset control rules. If the second set of status parameters includes a high-risk parameter, or the difference does not trigger a high security risk, the change of control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

[0094] In the above embodiment, assuming a hydrogen leak triggers a Class A risk (combustible gas concentration > 4% LEL) in the hot work area: Lockdown Trigger: The control server immediately locks the current control mode ("Class A Risk Lockdown Mode"), prohibiting any automatic switching; a safety acceptance process is initiated, requiring manual verification to confirm that the hydrogen concentration has dropped below 1% LEL. Unlocking and Mode Reassessment: After successful acceptance, the server unlocks and recalculates the parameter differences; if remaining risks (such as temperature fluctuations > 8°C / minute) still require downgraded monitoring, the "Downgraded Monitoring Mode" is maintained; if the risk is eliminated, it switches back to the "Regular Monitoring Mode".

[0095] The above technology employs a two-factor authentication mechanism and a risk isolation strategy. Specifically, the two-factor authentication mechanism requires both concentration compliance (gas sensor data) and manual acceptance (on-site signature confirmation) to unlock. The risk isolation strategy involves the server severing control linkages between high-risk and low-risk areas during the lockout period to prevent risk spread.

[0096] In some embodiments, when the control unit receives the second set of status parameters, it acquires the positioning data of the work zone terminal and the sensor terminal, analyzes the impact of the positional relationship and the difference in status parameters on the control mode, and if the positional relationship and the difference trigger a security threat in the first control mode and meet the requirements of the preset control rules regarding spatial layout, then the first control mode is changed and a second control mode is established; if not, the change of control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

[0097] In the above embodiment, if the flammable gas concentration in adjacent work area B suddenly increases (25% LEL) and is adjacent to hot work area A (30 meters away), the control server, upon receiving the data change, performs the following operations: location relationship analysis and linkage control. Location relationship analysis refers to the control server using the GIS system to determine the spatial correlation between area A and area B (e.g., sharing a ventilation system). If a preset rule requires "triggering joint defense when the concentration in adjacent areas exceeds 15% LEL," then the system switches to "area joint defense mode." Linkage control: Simultaneously activate the ventilation systems in areas A and B; prohibit hot work in area A until the concentration in area B drops to a safe level.

[0098] In the above embodiments, the following technologies were employed: Risk diffusion model: The server has a built-in risk diffusion algorithm that predicts the risk spread path based on factors such as wind speed and obstacle distribution. Spatial permission matrix: Defines linkage rules between different areas (e.g., "trigger joint defense when concentration difference > 5% LEL and distance < 50 meters").

[0099] In some embodiments, the control unit locks the control mode related to the highest-risk parameters until safety acceptance is passed. During the lockout period, changes to the control mode are prohibited. After the lockout is lifted, a determination is made, based on preset control rules and status parameter difference assessment, whether to allow changes to the control mode.

[0100] In the above embodiments, for example in a hydrogen leak incident, if the acceptance test fails (e.g., the concentration is still 2% LEL), based on the above data, the control server performs the following operations for continuous monitoring: the server maintains "degraded monitoring mode" and increases the frequency of inspections (e.g., manual inspection every 15 minutes); priority adjustment: lock the safety officer's permissions, allowing them only to perform mode switching operations.

[0101] In the above embodiments, a tiered acceptance standard and dynamic permission binding technology are adopted. Specifically, the tiered acceptance standard sets differentiated acceptance conditions based on risk level (e.g., extremely high risk requires dual verification). Dynamic permission binding: in high-risk scenarios, permissions are strongly correlated with risk level (e.g., red risk is only accessible to the security director).

[0102] Example 3

[0103] This invention also provides a control method, which utilizes the control server to implement the control system, comprising: the control server performing the following processing: acquiring data acquisition signals from receiving terminal devices based on the status parameters of the work partition; accepting the setting of a first control mode for the work partition and the status parameter group through signal reception; after the first control mode is established, if a second set of status parameters is received, the control server calculates the difference between the two sets of parameters; when the difference triggers a security threat in the first control mode, according to preset control rules, the control server performs operations to either change the first control mode and establish a second control mode, or prohibit the change of control mode and maintain the original control mode.

[0104] In the above embodiments, the execution flow of the control method in a hot work scenario is as follows: Data acquisition and signal reception: Terminal devices (sensors, cameras) collect data such as temperature and combustible gas concentration in real time; the data is transmitted to the control server via a wireless network (such as 4G / 5G). First control mode setting: The server sets the "normal monitoring mode" according to the initial parameters (temperature 25℃, combustible gas 5% LEL) and defines the safety threshold (concentration 10% LEL). Second set of parameter processing: When a leak occurs, the server receives the second set of parameters (temperature 35℃, concentration 25% LEL); calculates the difference and triggers a safety threat, entering the rule matching stage.

[0105] In the above embodiments, decision-making and execution include: if the rules allow and switching can reduce risk, then switching to "enhanced ventilation mode"; if switching is not feasible, then maintaining the original mode and triggering an alarm. The control server in this application performs time synchronization and fusion analysis on multi-source heterogeneous data (temperature, gas, video).

[0106] In some embodiments, when the first set of status parameters includes a high-risk parameter, the control server determines the second set of status parameters and the difference between them. If the second set of status parameters does not include a high-risk parameter and the difference triggers a high security risk in the first control mode, the first control mode is changed and a second control mode is established according to the preset control rules. If the second set of status parameters includes a high-risk parameter, or the difference does not trigger a high security risk, the change of control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

[0107] In the above embodiments, if the second set of parameters includes extremely high risk (such as hydrogen concentration of 4.5% LEL), a lockout is triggered: the server immediately locks the control mode, prohibiting any automatic switching; a manual acceptance process is initiated, requiring on-site testing to confirm that the concentration has dropped below 1% LEL.

[0108] Post-unlock assessment: After successful acceptance, the server recalculates parameter differences (such as temperature fluctuations); if remaining risks still require downgraded monitoring, the "downgraded mode" is maintained.

[0109] In the above embodiments, hard-coded security rules and emergency response plans are employed. Hard-coded security rules: Triggering conditions for extremely high risks are written into the server's underlying logic and cannot be modified through the rule base. Emergency response plans: Emergency plans (such as evacuation broadcasts and fire suppression system standby) are automatically activated during the lockdown period.

[0110] In some embodiments, when the control server receives the second set of status parameters, it obtains the positioning data of the work zone terminal and the sensor terminal, analyzes the impact of the position relationship and the difference of status parameters on the control mode, and if the position relationship and the difference trigger a security threat in the first control mode and meet the requirements of the preset control rules regarding spatial layout, then the first control mode is changed and a second control mode is established; if not, the change of control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

[0111] In the above embodiment, if the flammable gas concentration in adjacent work area B suddenly increases (25% LEL) and is adjacent to hot work area A (30 meters away), the control server, upon receiving the data change, performs the following operations: location relationship analysis and linkage control. Location relationship analysis refers to the control server using the GIS system to determine the spatial correlation between area A and area B (e.g., sharing a ventilation system). If a preset rule requires "triggering joint defense when the concentration in adjacent areas exceeds 15% LEL," then the system switches to "area joint defense mode." Linkage control: Simultaneously activate the ventilation systems in areas A and B; prohibit hot work in area A until the concentration in area B drops to a safe level.

[0112] In the above embodiments, the following technologies were employed: Risk diffusion model: The server has a built-in risk diffusion algorithm that predicts the risk spread path based on factors such as wind speed and obstacle distribution. Spatial permission matrix: Defines linkage rules between different areas (e.g., "trigger joint defense when concentration difference > 5% LEL and distance < 50 meters").

[0113] In some embodiments, the control unit locks the control mode related to the highest-risk parameters until safety acceptance is passed. During the lockout period, changes to the control mode are prohibited. After the lockout is lifted, a determination is made, based on preset control rules and status parameter difference assessment, whether to allow changes to the control mode.

[0114] In the above embodiments, the control server locks the control mode related to the special risk parameters until the safety acceptance is qualified. During the locking period, the control mode is prohibited from being changed. After the lock is released, the server determines whether to allow the change of the control mode based on the preset control rules and the difference of the status parameters.

[0115] In the above embodiments, for example in a hydrogen leak incident, if the acceptance test fails (e.g., the concentration is still 2% LEL), based on the above data, the control server performs the following operations for continuous monitoring: the server maintains "degraded monitoring mode" and increases the frequency of inspections (e.g., manual inspection every 15 minutes); priority adjustment: lock the safety officer's permissions, allowing them only to perform mode switching operations.

[0116] In the above embodiments, a tiered acceptance standard and dynamic permission binding technology are adopted. Specifically, the tiered acceptance standard sets differentiated acceptance conditions based on risk level (e.g., extremely high risk requires dual verification). Dynamic permission binding: in high-risk scenarios, permissions are strongly correlated with risk level (e.g., red risk is only accessible to the security director).

Claims

1. A special operation management and control system for a chemical industrial park, characterized in that, The system comprises a control server and a plurality of terminal devices corresponding to each work partition, the terminal devices are used to collect state parameters of the work partition and send data collection signals to the control server, and the control server performs the following processes: Receiving the data collection signals and receiving the first control mode setting of the work partition and the state parameter group; After establishing the first control mode of the first work partition and the first group of state parameters, if a second group of state parameters of the first work partition is received, the control server calculates the difference between the second group of state parameters and the first group of state parameters, and when the difference triggers a security threat under the first control mode, the following operations are performed according to the preset control rule: If the preset control rule allows and the change mode can reduce the security risk, the first control mode is changed and the second control mode is established; If the preset control rule prohibits or the change mode increases the security risk, the change of the first control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained; When the control server receives the second group of state parameters, the terminal device is equipped with a positioning module: The current position measured by the positioning module is obtained from the terminal device corresponding to the first work partition, and the current position measured by the positioning module is obtained from the sensor terminal corresponding to the second group of state parameters; The influence of the position relationship and the difference of the state parameters on the control mode is analyzed, if the position relationship and the difference trigger a security threat under the first control mode, and meet the requirements of the preset control rule about the spatial layout, the first control mode is changed and the second control mode is established; if not, the change of the control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

2. The management system according to claim 1, wherein The control server also receives operation instructions based on the first work partition, when the operation instruction involves control mode switching, the control server further judges: If the switching operation meets the preset control rule and does not trigger a security threat, the first control mode is changed and the second control mode is established; If it does not meet the control rule or there is a security threat, the change of the control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

3. The management system according to claim 1, wherein The control server compares the security threshold and the difference between the first group of state parameters and the second group of state parameters, if: The difference triggers a security threat under the first control mode, and the preset control rule indicates that establishing the second control mode with the second group of state parameters can reduce the risk, the first control mode is changed and the second control mode is established; The difference does not trigger a security threat, or establishing the second control mode with the second group of state parameters cannot reduce the risk, the change of the control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

4. The management system according to claim 1, wherein The control server judges the type of the second group of state parameters and the type of the first group of state parameters and the influence of the difference, if: The types are different and the difference triggers a security threat under the first control mode, and the preset control rule recognizes the necessity of the new mode, the first control mode is changed and the second control mode is established; The types are the same or the difference does not trigger a security threat, and the second group of state parameters does not bring significant monitoring advantages, the change of the control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

5. The management system according to claim 1, wherein When the first group of state parameters includes a special risk parameter, the control server judges the second group of state parameters and the difference between them, if: The second group of state parameters does not contain a special risk parameter, and the difference triggers a high safety risk in the first control mode. According to the preset management and control rules, the first control mode is changed and a second control mode is established. The second group of state parameters contains a special risk parameter, or the difference does not trigger a high safety risk. The change of the control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

6. The management system of claim 1, wherein, The management and control server locks the control mode related to the special risk parameter. During the locking period, the change of the control mode is prohibited. After the lock is released, whether to change the control mode is judged according to the preset management and control rules and the state parameter difference evaluation. The safety acceptance condition of the special risk parameter is that the gas concentration detection meets the standard and is accepted.

7. The management system of claim 1, wherein, The management and control server activates the corresponding management and control authority according to the established operation partition control mode, and dynamically adjusts the range and priority of the management and control authority according to the state parameter difference and the safety threat level.

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