Fault response safety circuit of section integrated monitoring system

Abstract

A fault response safety circuit of an interval comprehensive monitoring system comprises a logic control module, a safety verification module, a first relay and a second relay, the control end of the first relay is connected with the safety verification module, a first contact of the first relay is connected to a first control loop in series, one end of the first control loop is connected to control voltage, and the other end of the first control loop is connected to a second control loop. The other end of the first control loop is connected to the control end of the second relay, a first contact of the second relay is connected to the first driving loop in series, one end of the first driving loop is connected to driving voltage, and the other end of the first driving loop is connected with a driven device. According to the invention, the universality of parts of the system is improved, the overall hardware cost of equipment is reduced, the product efficiency is improved, the safety of the interval comprehensive monitoring system is improved, the time for cutting off the output after the system fails is shortened, and the upgrading circuit has expandability.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of railway signals, and in particular to a fault response safety circuit of an integrated section monitoring system. Background Art

[0002] With the continuous development of my country's social economy, the demand for railway transportation is also increasing. Signaling equipment plays a key role in the operational efficiency and safety of railway transportation. The hardware design of signaling equipment should comply with standard specifications in terms of anti-interference design, environmental adaptability design, safety protection design, maintainability design, etc. to meet different operating environments.

[0003] The section integrated monitoring system was developed in accordance with the "Interim Technical Conditions for Integrated Monitoring of Railway Signal Sections". It has the functions of effectively protecting the section track section from "loss of occupancy", secure information transmission between stations and section direction control. It is a ground equipment used to meet the application requirements of railway lines using relay coding, and plays an important role in the safe operation of trains.

[0004] Currently, the fault response safety circuit of the section integrated monitoring system has high cost, high maintenance cost and weak substitutability.

[0005] The statements herein merely provide background information related to the present invention and do not necessarily constitute prior art. Summary of the Invention

[0006] The purpose of the present invention is to provide a fault response safety circuit for an interval integrated monitoring system, which improves the versatility of the system's components, reduces the overall hardware cost of the equipment, improves product performance, improves the safety of the interval integrated monitoring system, speeds up the time to cut off the output after a system failure, and makes the upgraded circuit scalable.

[0007] In order to achieve the above-mentioned object, the present invention provides a fault response safety circuit of a zone integrated monitoring system, comprising:

[0008] Logic control module, used for performing logic operations;

[0009] a safety verification module, connected to the logic control module via a bus, and configured to check the calculation results of the logic control module;

[0010] a first relay, wherein a control end of the first relay is connected to the safety verification module, a first contact of the first relay is connected in series to a first control loop, one end of the first control loop is connected to a control voltage, and the other end of the first control loop is connected to the control end of the second relay;

[0011] The second relay has a first contact connected in series with the first driving circuit, one end of the first driving circuit is connected to the driving voltage, and the other end of the first driving circuit is connected to the driven device.

[0012] The logic control module adopts a VLE logic control board, the safety verification module adopts a VPS-3 safety verification board, the first relay adopts a JWXC-1700 relay, and the second relay adopts a JWJXC-480 relay.

[0013] The first relay further includes a second contact, which is connected in series to a second control loop, one end of the second control loop is connected to the control voltage, and the other end of the second control loop is connected to the control end of the second relay, and the second contact of the first relay and the first contact of the first relay operate simultaneously.

[0014] The second relay further includes a second contact, which is connected in series to a second drive circuit. One end of the second drive circuit is connected to a drive voltage, and the other end of the second drive circuit is connected to a driven device. The second contact of the second relay and the first contact of the second relay operate simultaneously.

[0015] The first relay further includes a third contact, which is connected to a state acquisition circuit. The third contact of the first relay and the first contact of the first relay operate simultaneously.

[0016] The present invention proposes a fault-oriented safety protection design for interval integrated monitoring equipment. It combines existing circuits for improvement, enhances its maintainability and component substitutability, upgrades customized components to universal components, and the system no longer relies on specific relays, thereby improving the versatility of system components, reducing the overall hardware cost of the equipment, improving product performance, and improving the safety of the interval integrated monitoring system. It speeds up the time to cut off the output after a system failure, and the upgraded circuit is scalable and can also be used in other systems to achieve fault response safety. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0017] Figure 1 It is a circuit diagram of a fault response safety circuit of a section integrated monitoring system in the background technology.

[0018] Figure 2 This is the circuit diagram of the start-enabling relay (YFJ).

[0019] Figure 3 This is the circuit diagram of the section protection relay (QJFHJ).

[0020] Figure 4The present invention provides a circuit diagram of a fault response safety circuit of a zone integrated monitoring system. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0021] The present invention is further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments. The advantages and features of the present invention will become clearer according to the following description. It should be noted that the drawings are in a very simplified form and are not in precise proportions, which are only used to conveniently and clearly assist in explaining the purpose of the embodiments of the present invention. In order to make the purposes, features and advantages of the present invention more obvious and easy to understand, please refer to the accompanying drawings. It should be noted that the structures, proportions, sizes, etc. illustrated in the drawings of this specification are only used to match the contents disclosed in the specification for people familiar with this technology to understand and read, and are not used to limit the limiting conditions for the implementation of the present invention, so they have no technical significance. Any modification of the structure, change in the proportional relationship or adjustment of the size should still fall within the scope of the technical content disclosed in the present invention without affecting the efficacy and purpose that can be achieved by the present invention.

[0022] The section integrated monitoring system is a key device used in railway signal systems. Its main function is to perform section occupancy logic checks to ensure the safety of train operations. Figure 1 As shown, the fault response safety circuit of the currently used interval integrated monitoring system includes a logic control module 1 and a safety verification module 2 connected via a bus, and further includes a relay 3, one end of the contact of the relay 3 is connected to the drive voltage 4, and the other end is connected to the system drive board 5, and the control end of the relay 3 is connected to the safety verification module 2. The logic control module 1 adopts a VLE logic control board card, which is responsible for the software logic operation of the interval integrated monitoring system. The safety verification module 2 adopts a VPS safety verification board card, which is used to independently check the operation results of the logic control module 1. When the check is correct, the safety verification module 2 generates an output control voltage to control the contact of the relay 3 to be attracted, connects the output circuit of the drive voltage 4 to the outside, and enables the system drive board 5 to output the drive voltage normally. When the check is incorrect, the safety verification module 2 stops outputting the control voltage, the contact of the relay 3 falls, and the output power of the drive voltage 4 is cut off.

[0023] Figure 1 In the diagram, VIIB16 is the system acquisition board, responsible for collecting data from external relays. VOOB8 is the system driver board, responsible for driving external relays. I / OBUS2 is the differential bus board, and I / OBE2 is the bus expansion board. The fault response safety circuit of the integrated monitoring system employs the principle of fault-driven safety. When a system fault occurs, safety check module 2 de-energizes relay 3, which in turn cuts off the output of the external driver, causing the system-driven external relay to drop and be guided to a safe location.

[0024] Relay 3 uses a VRD relay. Its electrical specifications are: drop current: 0.0116A; excitation current: 0.0177A; operating current: 0.0181A; contact resistance: average 0.02Ω; and two coil resistances: 50Ω. The VRD relay provides a 24V power switch for the system driver during normal operation. This type of relay is a specialized model, expensive, has a long procurement cycle, and is limited by foreign design and production. Therefore, the study aimed to replace it with an AX series signal safety relay to achieve the same functionality. This ensures that, in the event of a system failure, the system can be guided to safety by gravity, disconnecting external outputs. Furthermore, the limitations of the VPS board's drive capability were investigated. The VPS board cannot directly drive the existing AX series relays, necessitating the design of a new combination circuit to achieve fault response safety.

[0025] According to the "Interim Technical Conditions for Integrated Railway Signal Section Monitoring," CRCE

[2018] No. 155, a single station can manage a maximum of 40 block sections and 8 section openings. Each block section has a section protection relay QJFHJ that requires actuation. Each section opening includes the departure permission relay YFJ, the forward direction change relay ZGFJ, the reverse direction change relay FGFJ, the small track relay XGJ, the supervised section flashing light relay JQDS, the supervised section light relay JQD, the receiving light relay JD, the departure light relay FD, the auxiliary light relay FZD, and the departure relay CZJ, for a total of 10 actuation code positions, with five scattered actuation code positions at each boundary. Based on this calculation, the number of single-system actuation relays in the section integrated monitoring system is 40 + 10 × 8 + 5 × 8 = 160. In normal idle mode, block section QJFHJ actuation is activated, section openings ZGFJ / FGFJ, JD / FD, CZJ, and JQD actuation are activated, YFJ actuation is activated for forward departure, and scattered actuation code positions at the boundary are activated. Under normal circumstances, the pickup is 40+4×8+4+5×8=116. The external drive uses a 1700 relay (single coil), and the current it passes is (24V / 850Ω)*116=3.28A.

[0026] Based on the above analysis, according to the requirements of the railway standard, the maximum current calculated by the section integrated monitoring system is 3.28A. Taking into account the 10% floating error, when upgrading the circuit, the maximum current that can be tolerated is greater than 3.7A, which can ensure that there will be no overcurrent problem.

[0027] The external drive output relays of the section integrated monitoring system include:

[0028]

[0029]

[0030] Among the aforementioned drive relays, non-safety relays will not pose a safety hazard due to faulty outputs. Therefore, a focus is placed on analyzing the safety relays and the impact of their fault response time. Combined with the safety function analysis, the following three relays are identified as safety-related and quantitatively analyzed:

[0031] Departure Relay (YFJ): When YFJ is energized by mistake, if the departure route is not processed, there will be no safety impact; if the departure route is processed, it may lead to erroneous opening when the exit signal conditions are not met, which will pose a safety risk. After YFJ is energized, the signal opening relay KXJ can be energized. The interlocking collects the KXJ status as one of the conditions for opening the exit signal, such as Figure 2 shown.

[0032] In order to prevent YFJ from affecting the external system, the time from YFJ error drive to cut-off should be less than T YFJ =TYFJ 励磁时间 +TKXJ 励磁时间 -TYFJ 释放时间 .

[0033] YFJ uses JWXC-1700 relay, T YFJ =113ms+113ms-34ms=192ms. According to the principle of reaction failure safety, the safety reaction time of the interval comprehensive monitoring for the YFJ relay should be less than 192ms in the worst case.

[0034] Section protection relay (QJFHJ): In order to realize the logic inspection of the track section of the automatic block section, one QJFHJ is added to each block section on the basis of the existing GJ circuit. It is normally in the attracted state. When it is detected that the block section has lost occupancy, faulty occupancy and normal occupancy, the system controls the QJFHJ relay to fall for safety protection. When the section occupancy logic check is turned on, the QJFHJ is mistakenly energized. If the block section is in the normal occupancy or faulty occupancy state at this time, the QGJ relay is in the fallen state, so the GJ relay is in the fallen state and there is no safety impact. If the block section is lost occupancy at this time, the QGJ relay is also in the attracted state. The GJ relay is mistakenly attracted, and the block section state is still idle. There is no signal and code protection for the block section with lost occupancy, which poses a safety risk.

[0035] QJFHJ circuit such as Figure 3 As shown in the figure, due to the parallel circuit of capacitor and resistor in series in the GJ excitation circuit, the GJ has a slow absorption characteristic, which will delay absorption by 2.3s to 2.8s (TGJ 励磁时间 ).

[0036] The block section state is one of the conditions for the section track circuit to send codes. In order to prevent QJFHJ from affecting the track circuit code, the time from QJFHJ error driving to disconnection should be less than T QJFHJ-轨道电路发码 =T QJFHJ励磁时间 +T GJ励磁时间 -T QJFHJ释放时间 .

[0037] If QJFHJ adopts JWXC-1700,

[0038] T QJFHJ-轨道电路发码 =113ms+2300ms-34ms=2379ms. According to the principle of reaction failure safety, the safety reaction time of the interval integrated monitoring system for QJFHJ in the worst case should be less than 2379ms.

[0039] Outbound relay (CZJ): When the logic check function is turned on, CZJ is driven normally. When the departure route is arranged and the train occupies the last section of the departure route, CZJ falls. When the train clears the last section of the departure route, but the 1LQ device status is idle, QJK determines that the 1LQ logic state is occupied and lost, and the QJFHJ of 1LQ falls, causing the GJ of 1LQ to fall. At this time, if CZJ is driven incorrectly, the last section of the departure route will be unlocked incorrectly, posing a safety risk. CZJ incorrect driving may cause the interlocking to incorrectly unlock the departure route. Since the interlocking needs to delay 3s after collecting the GJ to unlock the route, in order to prevent CZJ from affecting the interlocking unlocking route, the time from CZJ incorrect driving to cutting off should be less than TCZJ = TCZJ excitation time + 3s - TCZJ release time. CZJ uses JWXC-1700 relay,

[0040] T CZJ =113ms+3000ms-34ms=3079ms. According to the principle of reaction failure safety, the safety reaction time of the interval integrated monitoring system to the CZJ relay should be less than 3079ms in the worst case.

[0041] In summary, the maximum safety response time for the integrated monitoring system should be no more than 192ms. Based on this conclusion, the safety circuit upgrade was performed. Safety relay upgrades should be selected based on universality and interchangeability, with a maximum load of no less than 3.7A and a safety circuit fault response time no more than 192ms.

[0042] There are two resistors R in the VPS board drive VRD circuit. VPS , a single resistor R VPS The resistance of the two coils of the VRD relay is 499Ω. The total resistance R VRD The resistance of the VPS+VRD drive circuit is 100Ω, and the total resistance of the VPS+VRD drive circuit is R=2×R VPS+R VRD =1098Ω.

[0043] In order to ensure that the energy consumption of the entire circuit remains unchanged, the total resistance of the circuit must be kept constant. VPS Modify to 100Ω, and upgrade the VPS board to VPS-3 board, which requires the selected relay coil resistance R VRD ≈900Ω, through the general AX series relays used in existing railways, JWXC-1700 (single coil resistance is 850Ω) is selected as the safety relay to replace VRD.

[0044] The JWXC-1700 relay was selected as the safety card control output due to its versatility and high interchangeability. Further analysis of the circuit revealed that the JWXC-1700 relay itself has eight nodes: two for internal system use and six for controlling the driver board power supply, three for positive and three for negative. The JWXC-1700 relay has a current carrying capacity of 1A, with a maximum current carrying capacity of 3A for each of the three positive and negative nodes. The design took into account the differences in contact resistance, which can lead to uneven current distribution across the contact points. This could lead to overcurrent conditions (contact overcurrent exceeding 1A) during operation, as the JWXC-1700 relay alone could not meet the full load. Therefore, a repeater relay, KZKFJ, was added to the safety relay to control the output power of the integrated zone monitoring system. The KZKFJ was selected from the JWJXC-480 relay, a reinforced relay with a maximum current carrying capacity of 5A, meeting the maximum load of the integrated zone monitoring system.

[0045] like Figure 4 As shown, the present invention provides a fault response safety circuit for an interval integrated monitoring system, which comprises: a logic control module 101 and a safety verification module 102 connected via a bus, wherein the logic control module 101 adopts a VLE logic control board, which is responsible for the software logic operation of the interval integrated monitoring system, and the safety verification module 102 adopts a VPS-3 safety verification board, which is used to independently check the operation results of the logic control module 1.

[0046] The fault response safety circuit also includes a first relay 103 and a second relay 104, the control end of the first relay 103 is connected to the safety verification module 102, the first contact 103-1 of the first relay 103 is connected in series to the first control circuit 11, one end of the first control circuit 11 is connected to the control voltage 22, the other end of the first control circuit 11 is connected to the control end of the second relay 104, the first contact 104-1 of the second relay 104 is connected in series to the first drive circuit 31, one end of the first drive circuit 31 is connected to the drive voltage 33, and the other end of the first drive circuit 31 is connected to the driven device (not shown in the figure). The safety verification module 102 independently checks the calculation results of the logic control module 1. If the check is correct, the safety verification module 102 generates an output control voltage to control the first contact 103-1 of the first relay 103 to attract and close, connecting the first control circuit 11 connected to the control voltage 22. The control voltage 22 outputs a control voltage to control the first contact 104-1 of the second relay 104 to attract and close, connecting the first drive circuit 31 connected to the drive voltage 33. The drive voltage 33 can normally output the drive voltage to the external driven device. If the check is incorrect, the safety verification module 102 stops outputting the control voltage. The first contact 103-1 of the first relay 103 drops and opens, the first control circuit 11 is disconnected, and the output of the control voltage 22 is cut off. The first contact 104-1 of the second relay 104 drops and opens, and the first drive circuit 31 is disconnected, cutting off the output of the drive voltage 33.

[0047] The first relay 103 further includes a second contact 103-2, which is connected in series to the second control loop 12. One end of the second control loop 12 is connected to the control voltage 22, and the other end of the second control loop 12 is connected to the control terminal of the second relay 104. By providing two control loops in parallel and controlling them separately through two contacts, the circuit's usability is enhanced, and stable operation can be achieved even if one contact is poor.

[0048] Similarly, the second relay 104 also includes a second contact 104-2, which is connected in series with the second drive circuit 32. One end of the second drive circuit 32 is connected to the drive voltage 33, and the other end of the second drive circuit 32 is connected to the driven device. By providing two drive circuits in parallel and controlling them separately through two contacts, the circuit's usability is enhanced, and stable operation can be achieved even if one contact is poor.

[0049] The first relay 103 further includes a third contact 103-3, which is connected to the status acquisition circuit 33. Since the first contact 103-1, the second contact 103-2 and the third contact 103-3 are all normally open contacts and the three contacts operate simultaneously, the working status of the first relay 103 can be collected by the status acquisition circuit 44, and the first contact 103-1 and the second contact 103-2 can be detected in time to ensure that the second relay 104 is driven correctly, thereby avoiding unexpected output of the first relay 103.

[0050] The first relay 103 is a JWXC-1700 relay, known as the "Railway Signal Safety Relay," a relay designed specifically for railway signaling systems. The primary function of this relay is to play an important control and protection role in signaling circuits, ensuring the stable transmission and safe operation of railway signals. The JWXC-1700 relay operates on the principle of electromagnetic induction. When the current in the circuit changes, the coil inside the relay generates a magnetic field, which in turn attracts or repels the contacts, thereby controlling the on / off state of the circuit. This operating principle enables the JWXC-1700 relay to respond quickly and accurately to current changes in railway signaling systems, ensuring the stability and reliability of signal transmission.

[0051] The second relay 104 adopts a JWJXC-480 relay. The first contact 104-1 and the second contact 104-2 of the JWJXC-480 relay can withstand a large current, which can make up for the weakness of the JWXC-1700 relay's small current flow capacity and meet the maximum load condition of the interval integrated monitoring system.

[0052] The cost of a JWXC-1700 relay plus a JWJXC-480 relay is less than that of a VRD relay. After the circuit upgrade, the VPS board plus VRD relay was upgraded to a VPS-3 board plus a JWXC-1700 relay plus a JWJXC-480 relay. Research, analysis, and testing revealed that the time from signal cessation after the VPS-3 board detects an error to the JWXC-1700 relay node dropping, and then to the JWJXC-480 relay dropping, is 180ms, meeting the maximum safety response time requirement of a section integrated monitoring system of no more than 192ms.

[0053] The present invention proposes a fault-oriented safety protection design for interval integrated monitoring equipment. It combines existing circuits for improvement, enhances its maintainability and component substitutability, upgrades customized components to universal components, and the system no longer relies on specific relays, thereby improving the versatility of system components, reducing the overall hardware cost of the equipment, improving product performance, and improving the safety of the interval integrated monitoring system. It speeds up the time to cut off the output after a system failure, and the upgraded circuit is scalable and can also be used in other systems to achieve fault response safety.

[0054] It should be noted that, in this document, the terms "comprises," "includes," or any other variations thereof are intended to encompass non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or apparatus comprising a series of elements includes not only those elements but also other elements not explicitly listed, or elements inherent to such process, method, article, or apparatus. In the absence of further limitations, an element defined by the phrase "comprising a ..." does not exclude the presence of other identical elements in the process, method, article, or apparatus comprising the element.

[0055] In the description of the present invention, it should be understood that the terms "center," "height," "thickness," "up," "down," "vertical," "horizontal," "top," "bottom," "inside," "outside," "axial," "radial," "circumferential," and the like, indicating positions or location relationships, are based on the positions or location relationships shown in the accompanying drawings and are intended only to facilitate the description of the present invention and simplify the description. They do not indicate or imply that the devices or elements referred to must have a specific orientation, be constructed, or operate in a specific orientation. Therefore, they should not be construed as limiting the present invention. In the description of the present invention, unless otherwise specified, "plurality" means two or more.

[0056] In the description of the present invention, unless otherwise expressly specified or limited, the terms "mounted," "connected," "connected," and "fixed" should be understood in a broad sense. For example, they may refer to fixed or detachable connections, or integration; mechanical or electrical connections; direct or indirect connections through an intermediate medium; and internal communication between two components or interaction between two components. Those skilled in the art will understand the specific meanings of the above terms in the present invention based on specific circumstances.

[0057] In the present invention, unless otherwise expressly specified or limited, a first feature being "above" or "below" a second feature may include the first and second features being in direct contact, or may include the first and second features being in contact not directly but through another feature between them. Furthermore, a first feature being "above," "above," and "above" a second feature may include the first feature being directly above or obliquely above the second feature, or may simply mean that the first feature is higher in level than the second feature. A first feature being "below," "below," and "below" a second feature may include the first feature being directly below or obliquely below the second feature, or may simply mean that the first feature is lower in level than the second feature.

[0058] Although the present invention has been described in detail through the above preferred embodiments, it should be understood that the above description is not intended to limit the present invention. After reading the above description, various modifications and substitutions of the present invention will become apparent to those skilled in the art. Therefore, the scope of protection of the present invention should be defined by the appended claims.

Claims

1. A fault response safety circuit of an integrated monitoring system for an area, characterized in that: Include: Logic control module, used for performing logic operations; a safety verification module, connected to the logic control module via a bus, and configured to check the calculation results of the logic control module; a first relay, wherein a control end of the first relay is connected to the safety verification module, a first contact of the first relay is connected in series to a first control loop, one end of the first control loop is connected to a control voltage, and the other end of the first control loop is connected to the control end of the second relay; The second relay has a first contact connected in series with the first driving circuit, one end of the first driving circuit is connected to the driving voltage, and the other end of the first driving circuit is connected to the driven device.

2. The fault response safety circuit of the section integrated monitoring system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The logic control module adopts a VLE logic control board, the safety verification module adopts a VPS-3 safety verification board, the first relay adopts a JWXC-1700 relay, and the second relay adopts a JWJXC-480 relay.

3. The fault response safety circuit of the section integrated monitoring system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The first relay further includes a second contact, which is connected in series to a second control loop, one end of the second control loop is connected to the control voltage, and the other end of the second control loop is connected to the control end of the second relay, and the second contact of the first relay and the first contact of the first relay operate simultaneously.

4. The fault response safety circuit of the section integrated monitoring system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The second relay further includes a second contact, which is connected in series to a second drive circuit. One end of the second drive circuit is connected to a drive voltage, and the other end of the second drive circuit is connected to a driven device. The second contact of the second relay and the first contact of the second relay operate simultaneously.

5. The fault response safety circuit of the section integrated monitoring system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The first relay further includes a third contact, which is connected to a state acquisition circuit. The third contact of the first relay and the first contact of the first relay operate simultaneously.

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