Verifiable and editable block chain method and system supporting lightweight storage and authority supervision

Abstract

The invention belongs to the technical field of block chains, discloses a verifiable and editable block chain method supporting lightweight storage and authority supervision, and aims to solve the supervision problems that in an existing verifiable and editable block chain scheme, the verification cost is high, the storage overhead is too large, and data modification is not fully considered in design. According to the scheme, in the aspect of lightweight storage, all the data on the chain are effectively aggregated into a single global authentication tag with a fixed size, so that the continuous increase of the block chain storage cost is remarkably controlled. Meanwhile, according to the scheme, an efficient data query method is designed particularly for a verifier, the calculation complexity in the query process is greatly reduced, efficient query of the block chain data is achieved, and then the overall operation efficiency of the system is improved. More importantly, the proposed double-layer permission supervision mechanism adopts a hierarchical management mode, not only supports flexible editing of block contents, but also can effectively correct malicious rewriting behaviors, and has the ability to cancel administrator permissions with malicious modification behaviors, so that the overall security and credibility of the system are comprehensively improved. In general, according to the scheme, a double-layer authentication tag structure and a double-layer authority management mechanism are innovatively combined.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of blockchain technology, and in particular relates to a verifiable and editable blockchain method and system that supports lightweight storage and permission supervision. Background Technology

[0002] In recent years, with the continuous development of blockchain technology, its core characteristic of "immutability" has become a key means to solve various trust issues. Based on the design of encryption algorithms and data structures, data on the blockchain cannot be arbitrarily changed or deleted once written, thus achieving trusted storage and verification of information without relying on a central institution. This characteristic has enabled blockchain technology to be widely used in multiple application areas such as digital currency, supply chain, insurance, and energy.

[0003] However, with the continuous implementation of blockchain applications, more and more cases show that while immutability protects blockchain security, it also limits its development. On the one hand, malicious users upload illegal or malicious information, which other users find difficult to identify, thus unintentionally spreading illegal content and polluting the blockchain environment; on the other hand, this characteristic contradicts the "right to be forgotten" requirement in regulations such as GDPRS. (Schwerin Blockchain and Privacy Protection in the Case of the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): A Delphi Study[J].The Journal of British Blockchain Association,2018,1(1):1-77), making it difficult to delete personal data, thereby creating compliance risks and resource waste.

[0004] Therefore, to address the aforementioned issues, Ateniese (G. Ateniese, B. Magri, D. Venturi, et al. Redactable Blockchain - or Rewriting History in Bitcoin and Friends[C]. 2017 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2017: 111-126.) and others proposed the concept of editable blockchains. They used the Chameleon hash function (H. Krawczyk and T. Rabin, Chameleon Hashing and Signatures. IACR Cryptol. ePrint archive: report 1998 / 101 [Online]. Available: https: / / eprint.iacr.org / 1998 / 010, Mar 17, 1998.) to replace the original hash function of the blockchain. This allows modification of blockchain data while ensuring the hash value remains unchanged. Furthermore, they employed complex cryptographic techniques such as secure multi-party computation and secret sharing. Subsequently, research in this field has been further expanded to various aspects such as fine-grained control (D. Derler, S. Kai, D. Slamanig, et al. Fine-Grained and Controlled Rewriting in Blockchains: Chameleon-Hashing Gone AttributeBased[C]. The 26th Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, 2019: 24-27.) and permissionless settings (D. Deuber, B. Magri, S. Thyagarajan. Redactable Blockchain in the Permissionless Setting[C]. 2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2019: 124-138.).

[0005] However, in editable blockchain technology, editing operations lead to the problem of multiple versions coexisting (G.Tian, ​​J.Wei, M.). W. Susilo, X. Huang and X. Chen, "VRBC: A Verifiable Redactable Blockchain With Efficient Query and Integrity Auditing," in IEEE Transactions on Computers, vol. 72, no. 7, 2023: 1928-1942., In real-world network scenarios, if a malicious full node exists, resource-constrained light nodes may obtain older versions of data from the malicious full node, making effective verification impossible. Furthermore, when a new node synchronizes the entire network ledger, all edit records need to be stored on-chain to effectively verify the ledger's correctness and integrity, leading to wasted storage resources. Simultaneously, users cannot be certain whether the received blocks are the latest version, causing data that should be discarded to continue propagating because different versions have the same hash value.

[0006] Tian et al. proposed the concept of verifiable and editable blockchain (G. Tian, ​​J. Wei, M. W. Susilo, X. Huang and X. Chen, "VRBC: A Verifiable Redactable Blockchain With Efficient Query and Integrity Auditing," in IEEE Transactions on Computers, vol. 72, no. 7, 2023: 1928-1942., implemented efficient on-chain data validity verification and designed a data structure for authentication based on vector commitments—the Blockchain Authentication Tree (BAT). Based on this, an efficient VRBC scheme supporting integrity auditing was proposed, effectively solving the resource waste and security risks caused by invalid queries and ledger consistency issues. Shen et al. (J. Shen, X. Chen, Z. Liu and W. Susilo, "Verifiable and Redactable Blockchains With Fully Editing Operations," in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 18, 2023: 3787-3802.) proposed a verifiable and editable blockchain with fully editable operations by combining cryptographic primitives such as accumulators and double trapdoor hash functions. This scheme supports editing operations such as appending, inserting, modifying, and deleting blocks, and uses incentives to revise block editing operations in a timely manner. By verifying the blockchain state, historical versions are invalidated, achieving full editability of block objects and verifiability of the blockchain state. However, the additional cost of verifying the blockchain state is not negligible. In the same year, Xu (Z.Xu, X.Luo, K.Xue, D.Wei and R.Li, "SEREDACT: Secure and Efficient Redactable Blockchain with VerifiableModification," 2023 IEEE 43rd International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS), 2023, pp.818-828.) et al. proposed an efficient dynamic update verification mechanism based on Merkle, which supports fast version checking and forced modification updates.Subsequently, Yang et al. (Yang Y, Chen Y, Liu Z, et al. Verifiable and redactable blockchain for internet of vehicles datasharing[J]. IEEE Internet of Things Journal, 2024.) proposed a secure and efficient decentralized Chameleon Hash Scheme (CHSTs) based on Schnorr threshold signatures, which can modify and delete block data without breaking the hash links between blocks. Meanwhile, to ensure the consistency and correctness of the blockchain during modification, this scheme introduces a modification verification mechanism based on vector commitments, effectively supporting data consistency verification and state updates in editable blockchains. In the same year, Wang (Wang W, Peng H, Duan J, et al. Resilient and Redactable Blockchain With Two-Level Rewriting and Version Detection[J]. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 2025, 20: 1163-1175.) and others proposed a resilient and editable blockchain (RRB) with two-level rewriting and transaction version detection. It supports on-chain data modification at both the transaction level and the block level and adopts an accumulator-based on-chain data version detection mechanism to achieve effective revocation of old version data.

[0007] In summary, existing verifiable and editable blockchain solutions address the issue of multiple versions coexisting by introducing certified data structures. This causes storage costs to rise sharply with the increase in data volume, while verification also faces high computational costs, thus adversely affecting the overall efficiency and performance of the system.

[0008] Based on the above analysis, the problems and shortcomings of the existing technology are as follows:

[0009] (1) Excessive storage cost: Current verifiable and editable blockchains generally achieve system security and verifiability by introducing certified data structures. However, in the model of multiple parties maintaining the ledger, additional storage space is consumed, which inevitably increases the scale of the blockchain.

[0010] (2) High computational burden: The unlimited growth of blockchain will lead to increasingly higher verification costs. When users perform a large number of verifications, they will face high computational costs, resulting in a large amount of computational overhead, which will have an adverse effect on the overall efficiency and performance of the system.

[0011] (3) There are defects in the data modification supervision mechanism: On the one hand, some existing verifiable and editable blockchain solutions have not fully considered the supervision of data modification in their design and lack effective constraints; on the other hand, even if some solutions introduce supervision measures, such as supervising data modification by selecting a semi-trusted third party or committee, or selecting a new block to replace the original block by voting, although these solutions improve the security of the system, they either have the problem of low modification efficiency or the risk of semi-trusted entities abusing their power. Summary of the Invention

[0012] To address the problems existing in the prior art, this invention provides a verifiable and editable blockchain method that supports lightweight storage and permission supervision.

[0013] This invention is implemented as follows: A verifiable and editable blockchain method supporting lightweight storage and permission supervision includes:

[0014] Step 1, Initialization;

[0015] Step 2, add data;

[0016] Step 3, data update;

[0017] Step 4: Revoke permissions;

[0018] Step 5, data query.

[0019] Furthermore, the initialization:

[0020] During the initialization phase, a security parameter of 1 is given. λ The authoritative center runs KeyGen(1) λ Generate two RSA moduli N = pq and N = p1q1, and select two prime numbers e > 1 and e1 > 1, such that e1d1 ≡ 1 (mod φ(N1)) and ed ≡ 1 (mod φ(N)), and the parameter g. d =g d (modN), then it selects one. The unique cyclic subgroup QR N The generator g is defined, and three hash functions are defined. H1:{0,1} * →{0,1} λ and prime number hash function H Prime :{0,1} * →Prime(λ); then, it randomly selects two elements. Then initialize two counters cnt1←1 and cnt2←1, and two aggregation labels σ. * ←1, δ * ←1;

[0021] At the same time, the authoritative center groups all blocks on the entire blockchain into groups of 10 blocks each (this number can be changed for different blockchain environments), and each group is assigned an elected administrator to manage the block information within its group.

[0022] Finally, it outputs pk = (N, e, g, g) d ,name1,name2,H,H1,H Prime ), sk=(p,q,d,cnt1,cnt2), mpk=(N), msk=(d), spk1=(N1), msk1=(d1); where, the tag private key sk is given to the authority center to perform tag-related operations, the master private key msk is also given to the authority center to calculate the outer hash function collision and supervise the administrator's behavior, and the subordinate private key ssk1 is given to the first group of selected administrators R1 to manage the block information within the first group; at the same time, (pk,mpk,spk1) are made public;

[0023] The authoritative center calculated the genesis block hash value h0 = H(pp||ctr0), where pp contains all the public information; finally, the authoritative center published the information B0 = (h0,ctr0,pp,σ) on the blockchain. * ,δ * ).

[0024] Furthermore, the data is added as follows:

[0025] To add a block to the blockchain, the blockchain packages some transactions together and calculates their MHT root value m. i Then run the Bind algorithm to generate a new block B. i ;

[0026] Hash Binding: First, the blockchain miner randomly selects a random number. And calculate block B i inner hash value h 2,i Then, the blockchain miner outputs the inner hash h. 2,i The public key of the group administrator. The hash value h of the previous block i-1 As input to the outer hash, another random number is randomly selected. Compute block B i outer hash value h 1,i Finally, the miner will block B. i Add to the blockchain;

[0027] Tag binding: The authority center first generates message m i The label σ iThen the authoritative center will aggregate the tags into the aggregated tags of this group. superior When group I has a total of 10 aggregated tags, the authority center will assign aggregated tags to this group. Generate outer label δ I Finally, the authoritative center will δ I Aggregate to global tag δ * superior;

[0028] Finally, the authoritative center published a new block B on the blockchain. i inner aggregation tag and global label δ * .

[0029] Furthermore, the data is updated as follows:

[0030] When the s-th block needs to be edited (e.g., message m...), s Replace with m' s The following steps need to be performed:

[0031] Content update: First, find the I-th group containing the s-th block. At this point, there are two scenarios: one is handled by the group's administrator, R. I He is searching for collisions and possesses the subordinate key ssk. I This can ensure the inner hash value h 2,s Calculate the new random number r' in the inner layer while keeping the values ​​unchanged. 2,s Another scenario is that the authoritative center possessing the master private key msk guarantees the outer hash value h. 1s If the hashes of the outer layer remain unchanged, it will then select a new inner random number. And use this new inner random number to calculate the new inner hash value h' 2,s Then the authoritative center can obtain a new outer random number r' 1,s In this way, the system generates a new collision block B'. s =(h i-1 ,h 1,i ,m' s ,r' 2,s ,r' 1,s ,h' 2,s ,spk I Replace the original block B s =(h s-1 ,h 1,s ,m s ,r 2,s ,r 1,s ,h 2,s ,spk I );

[0032] Tag update: When you want to send message m s Replace with m' s At that time, the authoritative center will update its tag information; first, the authoritative center will assign a new message m' s Generate new label σ' s And update the aggregate tags for this group. Next, a new outer tag δ' is generated for this new aggregation tag. I And update the global tag δ * ;

[0033] Finally, the authoritative center publishes a new block B' on the blockchain. s and the updated tags

[0034] Furthermore, the permission is revoked:

[0035] When the authority center detected administrator R I Malicious behavior exists; it runs KGenCH2(pp) to generate the I-th new slave key pair (ssk'). I ,spk' I He generates a new N' I and the new d' I ,and Finally, the authoritative center will... (spk') I =N' I ,ssk' I =d' I Granted the new elected administrator R' I ;

[0036] At this time, the new administrator R' I The hash values ​​of all messages in his group need to be recalculated. For ease of understanding, only the calculation process for one message is described here; first, an inner random number is randomly selected. And use this new inner random number to calculate the new inner hash value h' 2,s Then, the new administrator R' I The output h' of the inner hash 2,s The public key spk' of the new administrator in this group I The hash value h of the previous block i-1 As input, a new outer random number r' is calculated. 1,s The final output is r' = (r' 1,s ,r' 2,s ,h' 2,s This process combines the hash value with the subordinate public key spk' representing the new administrator's identity. IBinding allows for the revocation of permissions for the old administrator.

[0037] Furthermore, the data query:

[0038] During the data query phase, in order to query the data m of the s-th block... s The verifier must execute the following query protocol:

[0039] The validator first runs the TagAux algorithm to calculate the data m. s Corresponding auxiliary information Then the TagRet algorithm is run using the Shamir function to retrieve the global label δ. * The outer original label δ was retrieved from the middle. I The verifier verifies the correctness of the retrieved tags by calling the TagVerify algorithm; if the verification algorithm returns 1, it means that the calculated outer original tag δ is correct. I correct;

[0040] Next, the validator runs the TagRet algorithm to aggregate tags from the inner layer. The original label σ was retrieved from the middle. s Then, the TagVerify algorithm is called to verify its correctness; if the verification algorithm returns 0, it means that the data m is correct. s If invalid, the verifier will discard it; otherwise, it will further check the correctness by verifying the chameleon hash value of the query block. If the hash verification is successful, the verifier will then store block B. s He will leave it unchanged; otherwise, he will discard the block.

[0041] Another object of the present invention is to provide a verifiable and editable blockchain system that supports lightweight storage and permission supervision, comprising:

[0042] The initialization module is used for data initialization.

[0043] The data addition module is used for adding data.

[0044] The data update module is used for data updates.

[0045] The permission revocation module is used to revoke permissions.

[0046] The data query module is used for data querying.

[0047] Another object of the present invention is to provide a computer device including a memory and a processor, the memory storing a computer program that, when executed by the processor, causes the processor to perform the steps of the verifiable and editable blockchain method supporting lightweight storage and permission supervision.

[0048] Another object of the present invention is to provide a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program that, when executed by a processor, causes the processor to perform the steps of the verifiable and editable blockchain method that supports lightweight storage and access control.

[0049] Another objective of this invention is to provide an information data processing terminal for implementing the verifiable and editable blockchain system that supports lightweight storage and permission monitoring.

[0050] Based on the above technical solutions and the technical problems solved, the advantages and positive effects of the technical solution to be protected by this invention are as follows:

[0051] This invention aims to address the problems of high verification costs and excessive storage overhead in existing verifiable and editable blockchain schemes, as well as the regulatory issues arising from insufficient consideration of data modification in their design. Specific technical problems include:

[0052] 1. How to reduce the storage overhead caused by authentication data structures: Existing verifiable and editable blockchains generally rely on complex authentication data structures (such as Merkle trees and their variants) to ensure data verifiability and security. However, these structures lead to increased storage costs in environments with multiple maintenance parties and continuous data growth. This invention can bind continuously growing data to a fixed-size tag, achieving lightweight storage while ensuring data verifiability and effectively controlling the growth of the blockchain size.

[0053] 2. How to achieve efficient querying of on-chain blocks: As the length of the blockchain increases and on-chain data accumulates, the process of querying blocks becomes increasingly complex and time-consuming. This not only increases the computational burden but also adversely affects the throughput and response speed of the entire blockchain system. This invention provides a mechanism that can significantly reduce the computational complexity of the query process, achieve efficient querying of blockchain data, and thus improve the overall operating efficiency of the system.

[0054] 3. How to construct a secure and controllable data modification and access control mechanism: In scenarios where data is frequently modified, existing regulatory measures often suffer from problems such as low modification efficiency, cumbersome processes, or the risk of abuse. Therefore, this invention provides a two-layer access control mechanism that can achieve both efficient data modification and support access supervision, thereby overcoming the shortcomings of existing verifiable and editable blockchain regulatory mechanisms and improving the overall security of the system.

[0055] In summary, this invention achieves a balance between storage cost and computational efficiency through an innovative technical solution, improving the practicality of verifiable and editable blockchains, while realizing more efficient data modification and access control, thus solving the main problems in existing technologies.

[0056] The purpose of this invention is:

[0057] 1. Support for lightweight storage: A new two-layer authentication tag structure is designed to effectively control the growth of blockchain storage costs by aggregating all data into a single, fixed-size global authentication tag.

[0058] 2. Support for efficient queries: For validators, an efficient data query method is proposed, which significantly reduces the computational complexity of the query process, enables efficient querying of blockchain data, and thus improves the overall operating efficiency of the system.

[0059] 3. Efficient data modification and permission management mechanism: By proposing a two-layer permission supervision mechanism, using a hierarchical management approach, not only can block content be edited efficiently, but malicious rewriting behavior can also be effectively corrected and the permissions of administrators who have engaged in malicious modification can be revoked, thereby improving the overall security and credibility of the system.

[0060] In summary, this invention aims to address the high verification costs, excessive storage overhead, and insufficient consideration of data modification oversight issues in existing verifiable and editable blockchain solutions. Regarding lightweight storage, this solution effectively aggregates all on-chain data into a single, fixed-size global authentication tag, significantly controlling the continuous increase in blockchain storage costs. Simultaneously, this solution specifically designs an efficient data query method for validators, greatly reducing the computational complexity of the query process and achieving efficient querying of blockchain data, thereby improving the overall system efficiency. More importantly, the proposed two-layer permission oversight mechanism adopts a hierarchical management approach, not only supporting flexible editing of block content but also effectively correcting malicious rewriting behavior and having the ability to revoke administrator privileges for malicious modifications, thus comprehensively enhancing the overall security and trustworthiness of the system. Overall, this solution innovatively combines a two-layer authentication tag structure and a two-layer permission management mechanism, achieving a key trade-off between storage costs and computational efficiency, and enabling more efficient data modification and permission management. It significantly improves the practicality, security, and reliability of verifiable and editable blockchains, making it particularly suitable for application scenarios with high requirements for resource efficiency, data controllability, and refined management.

[0061] This invention challenges and overcomes a core technical bias in the field of verifiable and editable blockchain design: that achieving full data verifiability, flexible editability, and effective data modification regulation must come at the cost of sacrificing core system performance (significantly increasing storage and computational overhead) or introducing regulatory mechanisms with inherent flaws (such as centralization risk and inefficiency).

[0062] Traditional viewpoints and most existing solutions often follow this path when pursuing verifiable and editable features:

[0063] 1. Compromise between storage and computation: A common approach to ensure data verifiability is to directly introduce complex authentication data structures (such as building a complete Merkle tree or its variants for every data modification). While this approach is straightforward, it comes at the cost of increased storage space overhead and a sharp rise in the computational complexity of verification.

[0064] 2. The Dilemma of Regulatory Mechanisms: At the level of regulating data modification, one must either introduce centralized or semi-centralized arbitration mechanisms (such as trusted third parties or committee approvals) to achieve effective regulation, but this contradicts the decentralized spirit of blockchain and may lead to inefficiency and abuse of power; or choose to maintain decentralization, but this makes it difficult to achieve timely and effective constraints and efficient handling of malicious modification, rendering regulation ineffective or slow to respond. This often leads designers to believe that there is an insurmountable gap between strong regulation and system security.

[0065] This invention refutes this prejudice through its core "two-layer authentication tag structure" and "two-layer access control mechanism":

[0066] Dual-layer authentication tag structure: This invention aggregates dynamically growing data into a fixed-size global tag and supplements it with an efficient data query mechanism. Under the premise of ensuring verifiability, it achieves lightweight storage and efficient verification, thereby improving the system's practicality and efficiency while ensuring functionality.

[0067] Two-tiered access control mechanism: This mechanism, through its layered design, constructs a regulatory model that combines efficiency and security while supporting fine-grained access control. This effectively refutes the technical prejudice that "efficient and secure modification regulation inevitably sacrifices system efficiency or introduces centralized risks," demonstrating the possibility of achieving efficient, secure, controllable, and well-managed access control in editable blockchains.

[0068] In summary, the technical solution of this invention not only solves specific storage, computing, and regulatory challenges, but more importantly, it demonstrates that in the design of verifiable and editable blockchains, the core functional attributes (verifiability, editability, and regulatory capability) of the system can be synergistically optimized with high performance (low overhead, high efficiency) and strong security, rather than necessarily being at odds with each other. This provides a new design paradigm and optimization path for the technological evolution in this field. Attached Figure Description

[0069] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of a verifiable and editable blockchain method that supports lightweight storage and permission supervision, provided by an embodiment of the present invention.

[0070] Figure 2 This is a block diagram of a verifiable and editable blockchain system structure that supports lightweight storage and permission supervision, as provided in an embodiment of the present invention.

[0071] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of a verifiable and editable blockchain solution that supports supervision and efficient querying, provided by an embodiment of the present invention.

[0072] Figure 4 This is the addition process provided in the embodiments of the present invention;

[0073] Figure 5 This is the update process provided in the embodiments of the present invention;

[0074] Figure 6 This is the query process provided in the embodiments of the present invention;

[0075] Figure 7 This is the cancellation process provided in the embodiments of the present invention; Detailed Implementation

[0076] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of this invention clearer, the invention will be further described in detail below with reference to embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative and not intended to limit the invention.

[0077] Table 1 Basic Symbols

[0078]

[0079]

[0080] In traditional verifiable and editable blockchain architectures, the permanent storage of the complete ledger by full nodes and the purely append-only write strategy often leads to a continuous increase in storage pressure and ledger consistency maintenance costs. This solution leverages a two-layer chameleon hash function and an aggregatable tag system to cluster on-chain data into fixed block groups and introduces an election-based administrator mechanism, fundamentally resolving the contradiction between "verifiable and editable" and "system performance." By binding the MHT root value to the two-layer hash output, and supplementing it with immutable aggregation of group-level and global tags, it not only compresses the local storage size of lightweight nodes but also reserves a secure anchor point for subsequent dynamic editing.

[0081] When a block is first written, miners calculate the Merkle root for the new block and select a random value to generate the inner hash. The outer hash then embeds the inner hash, the administrator's public key, and the pointers to the preceding blockchain, naturally coupling the block's identity and permission structure. The authority center simultaneously generates RHVTs tags for the block messages and aggregates them in real time. Once the tags within a group reach a preset threshold, outer tags are generated all at once, accumulating globally. This "hierarchical aggregation—batch issuance" process significantly reduces the computational complexity of the query process and creates a traceable minimum modification domain for subsequent modifications.

[0082] If on-chain information needs modification, the system does not rely on hard forks or complete chain rewriting. Instead, it first precisely locates the block to be modified using an index. Group administrators with subordinate private keys can search for collisions within the inner layer while maintaining the stability of the inner hash. If an administrator is deprived or becomes unreachable, the authoritative center holding the master private key reconstructs the two-layer random number pair by searching for collisions in the outer layer, replacing the internal message while keeping the outer hash unchanged. This ensures the continuity of the chain structure while enabling two-layer on-chain editing.

[0083] The authorization framework minimizes the trust assumptions about a single administrator. When the monitoring module detects signs of malicious activity, the authority center immediately generates a new RSA modulus and decryption index, and issues a new subordinate key to the succeeding administrator. This administrator then recalculates the hash bindings of all blocks within the group and writes their public key into the outer hash input. The old administrator then loses the ability to generate collisions, and any validator on the chain can verify whether the revocation process complies with legal algorithmic constraints by comparing the mapping relationship between the old and new hash chains and the tag evolution path.

[0084] During the data query phase, the verifier first generates auxiliary information based on locally stored public parameters and the query transaction using TagAux, and then utilizes the Shamir partitioning principle to obtain global delta data. * The process involves reverse retrieval of the corresponding outer tag, followed by indexing down to the individual σ tag. *After the tag double verification is passed, the verifier only needs to recalculate the chameleon hash and compare it with the on-chain record to complete the global consistency check of the transaction validity in lightweight storage, avoiding redundant off-chain evidence collection processes.

[0085] This method, centered on verifiable editability, addresses multiple pain points of current verifiable and editable blockchains in terms of lightweight storage, dynamic data governance, and access control through the collaboration of two-layer chameleon hashing, group aggregation tags, and group administrators. While ensuring cryptographic integrity, its working mechanism introduces a flexible role migration mechanism that more closely resembles real-world governance models, laying the technological foundation for next-generation verifiable and editable blockchains that prioritize regulatory compliance and lightweight design.

[0086] like Figure 3 A verifiable and editable blockchain solution that supports oversight and efficient querying includes the following participants: a central authority, blockchain miners, validators, and administrators. The specific interaction process is as follows:

[0087] 1. Certificate Authority:

[0088] The authoritative center is responsible for the system initialization.

[0089] Each block on the blockchain can be bound to a global tag of a fixed size.

[0090] On-chain data can be modified according to legal obligations or user requests.

[0091] Malicious behavior can be monitored by stripping the relevant administrators of their power to modify transactions.

[0092] 2. Blockchain Miner:

[0093] It is a full node that owns the entire blockchain ledger.

[0094] Responsible for adding new blocks to the blockchain.

[0095] 3. Verifier:

[0096] A lightweight node, such as for users with limited resources.

[0097] It can query and verify on-chain data and check the integrity of the blockchain ledger.

[0098] Submit a modification request if necessary.

[0099] 4. Administrators (Racdactors):

[0100] Selected administrators can edit on-chain data within their assigned group based on user requests.

[0101] If an administrator engages in malicious behavior, the Authority Center will revoke their modification privileges and grant those privileges to the next elected administrator.

[0102] like Figure 1 As shown, an embodiment of the present invention provides a verifiable and editable blockchain method supporting lightweight storage and permission supervision, comprising the following steps:

[0103] S101, Initialization;

[0104] S102, Data Addition;

[0105] S103, Data Update;

[0106] S104, Permission revoked;

[0107] S105, Data Query.

[0108] Initialization provided in this embodiment of the invention:

[0109] During the initialization phase, a security parameter of 1 is given. λ The authoritative center runs KeyGen(1) λ Generate two RSA moduli N = pq and N = p1q1, and select two prime numbers e > 1 and e1 > 1, such that e1d1 ≡ 1 (mod φ(N1)) and ed ≡ 1 (mod φ(N)), and the parameter g. d =g d (modN), then it selects one. The unique cyclic subgroup QR N The generator g is defined, and three hash functions are defined. H1:{0,1} * →{0,1} λ and prime number hash function H Prime :{0,1} * →Prime(λ); then, it randomly selects two elements. Then initialize two counters cnt1←1 and cnt2←1, and two aggregation labels σ. * ←1, δ * ←1;

[0110] At the same time, the authoritative center groups all blocks on the entire blockchain into groups of 10 blocks each (this number can be changed for different blockchain environments), and each group is assigned an elected administrator to manage the block information within its group.

[0111] Finally, it outputs pk = (N, e, g, g)d ,name1,name2,H,H1,H Prime ), sk=(p,q,d,cnt1,cnt2), mpk=(N), msk=(d), spk1=(N1), msk1=(d1); where, the tag private key sk is given to the authority center to perform tag-related operations, the master private key msk is also given to the authority center to calculate the outer hash function collision and supervise the administrator's behavior, and the subordinate private key ssk1 is given to the first group of selected administrators R1 to manage the block information within the first group; at the same time, (pk,mpk,spk1) are made public;

[0112] The authoritative center calculated the genesis block hash value h0 = H(pp||ctr0), where pp contains all the public information; finally, the authoritative center published the information B0 = (h0,ctr0,pp,σ) on the blockchain. * ,δ * ).

[0113] Data addition provided in this embodiment of the invention:

[0114] To add a block to the blockchain, the blockchain packages some transactions together and calculates their MHT root value m. i Then run the Bind algorithm to generate a new block B. i ;

[0115] Hash Binding: First, the blockchain miner randomly selects a random number. And calculate block B i inner hash value h 2,i Then, the blockchain miner outputs the inner hash h. 2,i The public key of the group administrator. The hash value h of the previous block i-1 As input to the outer hash, another random number is randomly selected. Compute block B i outer hash value h 1,i Finally, the miner will block B. i Add to the blockchain;

[0116] Tag binding: The authority center first generates message m i The label σ i Then the authoritative center will aggregate the tags into the aggregated tags of this group. superior When group I has a total of 10 aggregated tags, the authority center will assign aggregated tags to this group. Generate outer label δ I Finally, the authoritative center will δ I Aggregate to global tag δ* superior;

[0117] Finally, the authoritative center published a new block B on the blockchain. i inner aggregation tag and global label δ * .

[0118] Data updates provided by embodiments of the present invention:

[0119] When the s-th block needs to be edited (e.g., message m...), s Replace with m' s The following steps need to be performed:

[0120] Content update: First, find the I-th group containing the s-th block. At this point, there are two scenarios: one is handled by the group's administrator, R. I He is searching for collisions and possesses the subordinate key ssk. I This can ensure the inner hash value h 2,s Calculate the new random number r' in the inner layer while keeping the values ​​unchanged. 2,s Another scenario is that the authoritative center possessing the master private key msk guarantees the outer hash value h. 1s If the hashes of the outer layer remain unchanged, it will then select a new inner random number. And use this new inner random number to calculate the new inner hash value h' 2,s Then the authoritative center can obtain a new outer random number r' 1,s In this way, the system generates a new collision block B'. s =(h i-1 ,h 1,i ,m' s ,r' 2,s ,r' 1,s ,h' 2,s ,spk I Replace the original block B s =(h s-1 ,h 1,s ,m s ,r 2,s ,r 1,s ,h 2,s ,spk I );

[0121] Tag update: When you want to send message m s Replace with m' s At that time, the authoritative center will update its tag information; first, the authoritative center will assign a new message m' s Generate new label σ' s And update the aggregate tags for this group. Next, a new outer tag δ' is generated for this new aggregation tag. I And update the global tag δ * ;

[0122] Finally, the authoritative center publishes a new block B' on the blockchain. s and the updated tags

[0123] The permission revocation provided in this embodiment of the invention:

[0124] When the authority center detected administrator R I Malicious behavior exists; it runs KGenCH2(pp) to generate the I-th new slave key pair (ssk'). I ,spk' I He generates a new N' I and the new d' I ,and Finally, the authoritative center will... (spk') I =N' I ,ssk' I =d' I Granted the new elected administrator R' I ;

[0125] At this time, the new administrator R' I The hash values ​​of all messages in his group need to be recalculated. For ease of understanding, only the calculation process for one message is described here; first, an inner random number is randomly selected. And use this new inner random number to calculate the new inner hash value h' 2,s Then, the new administrator R' I The output h' of the inner hash 2,s The public key spk' of the new administrator in this group I The hash value h of the previous block i-1 As input, a new outer random number r' is calculated. 1,s The final output is r' = (r' 1,s ,r' 2,s ,h' 2,s This process combines the hash value with the subordinate public key spk' representing the new administrator's identity. I Binding allows for the revocation of permissions for the old administrator.

[0126] Data query provided in this embodiment of the invention:

[0127] During the data query phase, in order to query the data m of the s-th block... s The verifier must execute the following query protocol:

[0128] The validator first runs the TagAux algorithm to calculate the data m. s Corresponding auxiliary information Then the TagRet algorithm is run using the Shamir function to retrieve the global label δ. * The outer original label δ was retrieved from the middle. I The verifier verifies the correctness of the retrieved tags by calling the TagVerify algorithm; if the verification algorithm returns 1, it means that the calculated outer original tag δ is correct. I correct;

[0129] Next, the validator runs the TagRet algorithm to aggregate tags from the inner layer. The original label σ was retrieved from the middle. s Then, the TagVerify algorithm is called to verify its correctness; if the verification algorithm returns 0, it means that the data m is correct. s If invalid, the verifier will discard it; otherwise, it will further check the correctness by verifying the chameleon hash value of the query block. If the hash verification is successful, the verifier will then store block B. s He will leave it unchanged; otherwise, he will discard the block.

[0130] like Figure 2 As shown, an embodiment of the present invention provides a verifiable and editable blockchain system that supports lightweight storage and permission supervision, comprising:

[0131] The initialization module is used for data initialization.

[0132] The data addition module is used for adding data.

[0133] The data update module is used for data updates.

[0134] The permission revocation module is used to revoke permissions.

[0135] The data query module is used for data querying.

[0136] Another object of the present invention is to provide a computer device including a memory and a processor, the memory storing a computer program that, when executed by the processor, causes the processor to perform the steps of the verifiable and editable blockchain method supporting lightweight storage and permission supervision.

[0137] Another object of the present invention is to provide a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program that, when executed by a processor, causes the processor to perform the steps of the verifiable and editable blockchain method that supports lightweight storage and access control.

[0138] Another objective of this invention is to provide an information data processing terminal for implementing the verifiable and editable blockchain system that supports lightweight storage and permission monitoring.

[0139] Example 1

[0140] In an enterprise-level supply chain contract management system, this invention proposes a verifiable and editable blockchain method that supports lightweight storage and permission supervision for managing and maintaining contract terms, performance records, and revision history among partner companies. Initialization Phase: Initialize this verifiable and editable blockchain and deploy core smart contracts. Establish a two-layer authentication tag structure and configure a two-layer permission supervision mechanism to clearly define the permissions of each party. Each time new contract or performance data is added, relevant information is efficiently aggregated and updated on the chain through the two-layer authentication tag structure. When users (such as partners or auditors) query contracts, the system uses an efficient query mechanism to quickly return data, allowing users to quickly verify the integrity and authenticity of the data based on the tags. Any revisions to contract terms are made by the administrator of each group; this mechanism also actively supervises editing behavior, effectively correcting malicious tampering and revoking the permissions of violators, thereby ensuring the security and trustworthiness of contract data.

[0141] Example 2

[0142] In a digital copyright and content traceability platform, this invention proposes a verifiable and editable blockchain method that supports lightweight storage and permission supervision. This method is used to manage and track the copyright ownership, authorization records, and dissemination history of original digital content (such as articles, images, audio, and video). The system first initializes each key pair, establishes a two-layer authentication tag structure, and configures a two-layer permission supervision mechanism, clearly defining the permissions of creators, platforms, and authorized users. When new original content is registered or authorization changes are recorded, the relevant copyright information and metadata are recorded on the blockchain and bound to tags. When users (such as content creators, copyright buyers, and regulatory agencies) query copyright information, the system uses an efficient query mechanism to quickly return data, allowing users to quickly verify the data's integrity and authenticity based on the tags. Any revisions to copyright information, authorization scope, or infringement handling are made by the administrator of each group. This mechanism also proactively supervises editing behavior, effectively correcting malicious false copyright claims or unauthorized modifications, and revoking the permissions of violators, thereby ensuring the accuracy and credibility of digital copyright data.

[0143] Figure 4The curves shown reveal the convergence characteristics of the performance during the addition phase as the number of transactions in the block changes. In the experiment, we used two aggregation thresholds, k=10 and k=20, respectively. For the corresponding schemes, as the number of transactions increased from 100 to 600, the total time for inner and outer hash and tag aggregation operations remained in the millisecond range. Specifically, when k=10, the overall time consumption fluctuated slightly with the increase in the number of transactions in the block, but hovered around 0.024 seconds; while when k=20, the time consumption was further reduced to approximately [missing value]. Within seconds. This relatively smooth trend indicates that our two-layer chameleon hashing plus batch tag aggregation design suppresses the cost caused by the expansion of transaction size within a single block to a very small fluctuation range, thereby ensuring a nearly constant addition overhead under different transaction densities.

[0144] Figure 5 This experiment demonstrates a comparison of the time consumed during the block expansion path for two scenarios: the "R" model (administrator modification) and the "CA" model (authority center modification). The number of transactions was increased from 100 to 600 in the experiment to examine the performance fluctuations of the overall update operation (including inner and outer layer collision location and tag re-aggregation). It can be seen that whether the administrator searches for inner layer collisions or the authority center searches for outer layer collisions, the time consumed remains stable at a certain level. The two curves highly overlap within a second interval, and the collision operation and tag update operation in the update process are highly consistent under different transaction volumes. Their complexity is independent of the transaction size within a single block, thus ensuring that the update overhead can be nearly constant under different transaction densities.

[0145] Figure 6 The corresponding query process focuses on examining the additional overhead required to perform query operations on already-on-chain blocks as the blockchain size changes. The horizontal axis expands from 100 blocks to 2000 blocks, and the vertical axis represents the total time consumed by the query operation. Compared to the low latency of the modification phase when the number of transactions is fixed, it is clear that the average latency of the query phase increases linearly with the chain length. Taking k=10 as an example, when the number of blocks increases from 100 to 2000, the time required increases from approximately 0.061 seconds to 0.118 seconds; while when k=20, the corresponding latency increases from approximately 0.050 seconds to 0.076 seconds. This phenomenon reflects that the complexity of the tag-assisted reconstruction algorithm in the query process depends on the total number of existing blocks on the chain, and the larger the value of k, the wider the range of a single aggregation, thus making the query cost more considerable on longer chains.

[0146] Figure 7This reveals the time cost curves for revoke and update-based revoke operations as the aggregation parameter k changes. As k increases from 10 to 50, the complexity of reconstructing group-level hashes and re-aggregating upstream and downstream tags in a single revoke operation exhibits a quasi-linear expansion: the time for a simple branch revoke increases from approximately 0.24 seconds to 1.03 seconds, while the time for revoke with an update increases from approximately 0.27 seconds to 1.06 seconds. The two curves almost resonate in tandem, indicating that the cost of inner and outer layer hash collisions and tag re-aggregation dominates in revoke operations. The additional overhead from the "update" phase is not negligible when k is small, but its relative contribution gradually weakens as k increases. This experimental result emphasizes that when the system needs to frequently or on a large scale rotate administrators, the aggregation threshold setting has a direct impact on the overall revoke efficiency, requiring a trade-off between security requirements and performance costs.

[0147] Experimental results show that the computational cost of the data addition process is independent of the block size and depends only on the group size. The more blocks in a group, the lower the computational cost of the addition process. This is because the more blocks in a group, the fewer groups are needed for the same total number of blocks, and the fewer times the outer tag is calculated. Therefore, the addition time decreases as the group size k increases.

[0148] In the data update process, the collision algorithm plays a crucial role as the core algorithm. Experimental observations show that the computational cost of the update is independent of the block size and the group size. This is because each update only requires finding collisions with the hash values ​​of the corresponding blocks, calculating the label of the new block, and overwriting the original label. This process does not involve the block size or the group size.

[0149] The computational overhead of the data query process increases exponentially with the number of blocks. Furthermore, for different group sizes k, the larger k is, the slower the growth rate. This is because the query process requires all information from the outer layer when calculating auxiliary information. With the same total number of blocks, the larger k is, the smaller the number of groups, the less data is used for computation, and the higher the computational efficiency.

[0150] The time required for data revocation depends on the number of groups, k, and increases linearly. This is because revoking an administrator requires recalculating the hash values ​​of all data within that administrator's group; therefore, as the number of groups increases, the time required to revoke an administrator R also increases. Furthermore, we observed another scenario: when a group of committees is revoked, some data within that group is simultaneously modified. This involves a label update process, thus increasing the time cost due to label updates.

[0151] It should be noted that embodiments of the present invention can be implemented in hardware, software, or a combination of both. The hardware portion can be implemented using dedicated logic; the software portion can be stored in memory and executed by a suitable instruction execution system, such as a microprocessor or dedicated-design hardware. Those skilled in the art will understand that the above-described devices and methods can be implemented using computer-executable instructions and / or included in processor control code, for example, such code provided on a carrier medium such as a disk, CD, or DVD-ROM, a programmable memory such as read-only memory (firmware), or a data carrier such as an optical or electronic signal carrier. The devices and modules of the present invention can be implemented by hardware circuitry such as very large-scale integrated circuits or gate arrays, semiconductors such as logic chips, transistors, or programmable hardware devices such as field-programmable gate arrays, programmable logic devices, etc., or by software executed by various types of processors, or by a combination of the above-described hardware circuitry and software, such as firmware.

[0152] The above description is merely a specific embodiment of the present invention, but the scope of protection of the present invention is not limited thereto. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, and improvements made by those skilled in the art within the scope of the technology disclosed in the present invention, and within the spirit and principles of the present invention, should be covered within the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A verifiable and editable blockchain method supporting lightweight storage and permission supervision, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: S1 initialization generates a two-layer chameleon hash public and private key, the first and second RSA moduli, the public and private key exponents, the initial value of the aggregation tag and public parameters, and divides the blocks into groups according to the predetermined number of blocks and elects an administrator for each block group. S2 data is added, transactions are packaged and the corresponding Merkle root value is calculated, the first random number is selected to calculate the inner chameleon hash, the inner hash output, the public key of the block group administrator, the hash of the previous block and the second random number are used as inputs to calculate the outer chameleon hash, and tags are generated, aggregated and written to the blockchain. S3 data update: After locating the target block, the block content is replaced with a random number while keeping the inner or outer hash value constant, and the group-level and global aggregation tags are updated simultaneously. When S4 permissions are revoked, the Authority Center generates a new subordinate key pair and recalculates the entire hash of the block group when it detects malicious behavior by the administrator. This allows the new administrator's public key to be rebound to the block hash in order to strip the old administrator of their permissions. In S5 data query, the validator retrieves the target tag through the aggregation tag reconstruction algorithm and combines it with the recalculated chameleon hash to verify the validity of the block data, thereby completing the consistency verification in the light node environment.

2. The method as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The initialization step S1 includes: A. Generate the first RSA modulus N, the corresponding private key d, and the public key exponent e based on the security parameters; B. Generate a second RSA modulus N1 and the corresponding private key d1 and public key exponent e1, which will be used for administrator privilege monitoring; C. Construct the first and second layer chameleon hash public keys through the generator of cyclic subgroups, and set three types of hash functions to support tag generation, outer layer hash evaluation and prime number mapping.

3. The method as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The data addition step S2 includes: A. The miner calculates the inner chameleon hash based on the Merkle root value and the first random number; B. Input the inner hash output, the block group administrator's public key, the previous block hash, and the second random number into the outer chameleon hash function to obtain the outer hash; C. The authority center generates tags for transaction messages and aggregates them sequentially at the group and global levels before publishing them along with the blocks.

4. The method as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The data update step S3 includes: A. When the administrator holds the subordinate private key, the first random number is reselected and the block content is replaced while keeping the inner hash unchanged; B. When only the authoritative center holds the master private key, reselect the first and second random numbers and replace the block content while keeping the outer hash unchanged; C. After the replacement is complete, new tags are generated and group-level and global aggregate tags are synchronized.

5. The method as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The permission revocation step S4 includes: A. The authoritative center uses the second RSA public key index and the private key index to generate a new subordinate key pair; B. Write the new administrator's public key into the outer hash input of all blocks in the block group, so that the old administrator can no longer generate collisions; C. The validator confirms the validity of the revocation action by comparing the old and new hash chain mappings and the tag evolution path.

6. A verifiable and editable blockchain system supporting lightweight storage and permission monitoring, characterized in that, include: An authority center is used to perform initialization, tag aggregation, and permission monitoring in the method described in any one of claims 1 to 5; Miner nodes are used to perform data addition and block writing; Administrator node, used for data updates and permission handover within the block group; Verification nodes are used to perform data queries and consistency verification.

7. The system as described in claim 6, characterized in that, The authoritative centers include: The key generation module is used to generate two-layer chameleon hashes and multi-level RSA public and private keys; The tag aggregation module is used to cumulatively issue block group tags and global tags; The behavior monitoring module is used to detect the behavior of administrator nodes and trigger permission revocation.

8. A blockchain node device, characterized in that, It includes a processor, a memory, and a communication interface, wherein the instructions stored in the memory enable the processor to execute all the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 5.

9. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, which, when executed by a processor, implements the method of any one of claims 1 to 5.

10. The computer-readable storage medium as claimed in claim 9, characterized in that, The program is also used to execute the following verification protocols: P1 extracts the target outer label from the global label using the aggregated label reconstruction algorithm; P2 further extracts the target inner layer labels and verifies their correctness; P3 recalculates the chameleon hash and compares it with on-chain records to confirm the legitimacy of the target block.

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