Screen encryption method, encryption device and LED large screen system

Abstract

The application provides a screen encryption method, an encryption device and an LED large-screen system, and relates to the technical field of LED large screens. The screen encryption method comprises the following steps: a host computer generates a first encryption instruction according to the permission determined by an administrator, transmits the first encryption instruction to an encryption circuit for data conversion, and generates a corresponding dynamic random password; the LED display module displays the dynamic random password; in response to the user inputting the dynamic random password on the host computer, a corresponding second encryption instruction is generated; the instruction similarity of the first encryption instruction and the second encryption instruction is determined; and in the case that the instruction similarity reaches a similarity threshold value, the encryption circuit is controlled to turn on the enable end of the LED display module to allow the LED display module to normally display content. The application can improve the security of the LED large-screen system, prevent illegal control of the LED display module, and ensure the legality of the display content.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of LED large screen technology, and in particular to a screen encryption method, encryption device and LED large screen system. Background Technology

[0002] With the rapid development of display technology, LED large screen systems, due to their advantages such as high brightness, high contrast, and seamless splicing, are widely used in various public places such as squares, shopping malls, transportation hubs, and conference centers for information dissemination, advertising, and image display. However, in public places, large screen systems are extremely vulnerable to malicious attacks. Attackers may use technical means to illegally access or hijack the display control system and arbitrarily tamper with the displayed content. Summary of the Invention

[0003] The main objective of this invention is to provide a screen encryption method, which aims to improve the security of LED large screen systems, prevent unauthorized control of LED display modules, and ensure the legality of displayed content.

[0004] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention provides a screen encryption method applied to an LED large screen system. The LED large screen system includes a host computer, an encryption circuit, and an LED display module. The host computer is electrically connected to the encryption circuit, and the output terminal of the encryption circuit is connected to the enable terminal of the LED display module. The screen encryption method includes:

[0005] The host computer is controlled to generate a first encryption instruction according to the permissions determined by the administrator, and the first encryption instruction is transmitted to the encryption circuit for data conversion to generate a corresponding dynamic random password;

[0006] The dynamic random password is displayed on the LED display module;

[0007] In response to the user inputting the dynamic random password on the host computer, a corresponding second encryption command is generated;

[0008] Determine the instruction similarity between the first encryption instruction and the second encryption instruction;

[0009] When the similarity of the instructions reaches a similarity threshold, the encryption circuit is controlled to turn on the enable terminal of the LED display module, so as to allow the LED display module to display content normally.

[0010] Optionally, the step of controlling the host computer to generate a first encryption command according to the permissions determined by the administrator, transmitting the first encryption command to the encryption circuit for data conversion, and generating a corresponding dynamic random password includes:

[0011] Receive permission level parameters input by the administrator through the graphical permission interface, wherein the permission level parameters include access time range and function level;

[0012] Based on the permission level parameter, the built-in encryption algorithm library of the host computer is called, and the first encryption instruction is generated using a random number generator and a key derivation function. The encryption algorithm is a configurable dynamic algorithm.

[0013] The first encryption command is transmitted to the encryption circuit through the high-speed serial communication interface of the host computer, and a transmission verification code is attached to the end of the first encryption command.

[0014] The encryption circuit is controlled to perform data conversion on the first encryption instruction and generate a corresponding dynamic random password, which is generated by combining the encryption password and the transmission verification code.

[0015] Optionally, the encryption circuit includes multiple data conversion chips, and the output terminal of each data conversion chip is electrically connected to at least one LED display unit in the LED display module;

[0016] The control of the encryption circuit to perform data conversion on the first encryption instruction and generate a corresponding dynamic random password includes:

[0017] After receiving the first encryption instruction and the attached transmission verification code, the first encryption instruction is divided into multiple encrypted data blocks according to a preset rule;

[0018] Each encrypted data block is verified one by one based on the transmission check code, and the encrypted data block that passes the verification is determined to be a valid data block.

[0019] Each valid data block is assigned a corresponding data conversion chip for data conversion, generating a corresponding random password fragment;

[0020] Each of the random password fragments is bound to the physical address information of the corresponding LED display unit to determine the display instruction of the corresponding LED display unit;

[0021] The dynamic random password is generated and displayed on the LED display unit according to the display instructions.

[0022] Optionally, the LED screen system includes an enable control circuit, the input terminal of which is connected to the output terminal of the encryption circuit, and the output terminal of which is connected to the enable terminal of the LED display module.

[0023] When the instruction similarity reaches a similarity threshold, controlling the encryption circuit to activate the enable pin of the LED display module to allow the LED display module to display content normally includes:

[0024] When the instruction similarity verification passes, the host computer generates an enable control instruction containing a timestamp and permission identifier;

[0025] The enable control command is transmitted to the enable control circuit through the data interface of the encryption circuit;

[0026] The enable control circuit is controlled to execute the corresponding enable control operation according to the enable control instruction, so as to turn on or off the display path of the LED display module.

[0027] Optionally, determining the instruction similarity between the first encryption instruction and the second encryption instruction includes:

[0028] The feature vectors of the first encryption instruction and the second encryption instruction are extracted respectively. The feature vectors include instruction length, entropy value and pattern features.

[0029] Calculate the cosine similarity and Euclidean distance between two feature vectors, and then weight and fuse the cosine similarity and Euclidean distance to generate a corresponding comprehensive similarity score.

[0030] Determine the instruction similarity corresponding to the comprehensive similarity score.

[0031] Optionally, the step of calculating the cosine similarity and Euclidean distance between two feature vectors, and then weighting and fusing the cosine similarity and Euclidean distance to generate a corresponding comprehensive similarity score includes:

[0032] Obtain the current system security environment parameters, including network attack frequency and number of abnormal inputs;

[0033] The weighting ratio of cosine similarity and Euclidean distance is dynamically adjusted based on the current system security environment parameters. The higher the frequency of network attacks, the greater the weight of cosine similarity, and the more abnormal inputs, the smaller the weight of Euclidean distance.

[0034] The cosine similarity and the Euclidean distance are calculated based on an adaptive weighted algorithm, where the cosine similarity weight coefficient is the product of its original value and the safety coefficient, and the Euclidean distance weight coefficient is the product of its reciprocal and the stability coefficient.

[0035] The weighted cosine similarity value and the weighted Euclidean distance value are fused using a linear combination formula to generate an initial comprehensive similarity score.

[0036] After standardizing the initial similarity score, the overall similarity score is dynamically corrected using a time decay factor to generate the final similarity score.

[0037] Optionally, the step of generating a corresponding second encryption instruction in response to the user inputting the dynamic random password on the host computer includes:

[0038] In response to the user inputting the dynamic random password on the host computer, the dynamic random password is subjected to multiple security verifications, including syntax structure verification, timeliness verification and logical consistency verification.

[0039] Under multiple security verification conditions, the spatiotemporal feature information of the dynamic random password is extracted. The spatiotemporal feature information includes input time series features, input device fingerprint features, and input behavior pattern features.

[0040] Based on the spatiotemporal feature information, a corresponding primary encryption instruction is generated, and the primary encryption instruction is transformed by the multiple hashing to generate the second encryption instruction.

[0041] Optionally, displaying the dynamic random password on the LED display module includes:

[0042] Receive the dynamic random password data stream sent by the encryption circuit, and parse the password content field and display control parameters therein;

[0043] The display configuration scheme is determined based on the display control parameters, and the display configuration scheme includes a display area division strategy, a display time control strategy, and dynamic parameters for display effects.

[0044] A display drive signal matching the dynamic random password is generated according to the display configuration scheme;

[0045] The LED display module is driven by the display driving signal to display a dynamic random password frame by frame at a preset refresh rate.

[0046] In addition, to achieve the above objectives, the present invention also provides an encryption device, the encryption device comprising: a memory, a processor, and a screen encryption program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, the screen encryption program being configured to implement the screen encryption method as described above.

[0047] Furthermore, to achieve the above objectives, the present invention also provides an LED large screen system, comprising:

[0048] Multiple LED display components, which are spliced ​​together to form a large display screen; and

[0049] The encryption device described above is electrically connected to the controlled terminals of the plurality of LED display components.

[0050] The screen encryption method of this invention is applied to an LED large screen system, which includes a host computer, an encryption circuit, and an LED display module. The host computer is electrically connected to the encryption circuit, and the output terminal of the encryption circuit is connected to the enable terminal of the LED display module. The screen encryption method controls the host computer to generate a first encryption command according to the permissions determined by the administrator, transmits the first encryption command to the encryption circuit for data conversion, generates a corresponding dynamic random password, displays the dynamic random password through the LED display module, and then generates a corresponding second encryption command in response to the user inputting the dynamic random password on the host computer. The method also determines the command similarity between the first and second encryption commands, and finally, when the command similarity reaches a similarity threshold, controls the encryption circuit to turn on the enable terminal of the LED display module, allowing the LED display module to display content normally. Thus, by dynamically generating random passwords and combining them with a command similarity verification mechanism, it ensures that only control commands with strict authorization can drive the screen display, effectively preventing illegal tampering and malicious attacks, improving the security of the LED large screen system, preventing unauthorized control of the LED display module, and ensuring the legality of the displayed content. Attached Figure Description

[0051] The accompanying drawings, which are incorporated in and form part of this specification, illustrate embodiments consistent with this application and, together with the description, serve to explain the principles of this application.

[0052] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention or the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0053] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of a screen encryption method according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0054] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of a screen encryption method according to another embodiment of the present invention;

[0055] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of a screen encryption method according to another embodiment of the present invention;

[0056] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of a screen encryption method according to another embodiment of the present invention;

[0057] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of a screen encryption method according to another embodiment of the present invention;

[0058] Figure 6This is a schematic diagram of a screen encryption method according to another embodiment of the present invention;

[0059] Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram of a screen encryption method according to another embodiment of the present invention;

[0060] Figure 8 This is a schematic diagram of a screen encryption method according to another embodiment of the present invention.

[0061] The realization of the objective, functional features and advantages of the present invention will be further explained in conjunction with the embodiments and with reference to the accompanying drawings. Detailed Implementation

[0062] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Well-known modules, units, and their connections, links, communications, or operations are not shown or described in detail. Furthermore, the described features, architectures, or functions can be combined in any way in one or more embodiments. Those skilled in the art should understand that the various embodiments described below are only for illustrative purposes and are not intended to limit the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0063] Currently, common protective measures mostly focus on network-level firewall isolation or simple static password verification. These methods are insufficient to cope with complex public environments: static passwords are easily cracked or spied on, while simple network isolation may leave opportunities for exploitation due to necessary operations such as system maintenance and data updates. Especially in the practical application of LED large screen systems, traditional encryption methods have the following shortcomings: First, they lack deep integration with display control logic, failing to achieve hardware-level access control; second, the verification mechanism is too simplistic, unable to cope with dynamically changing attack methods; and third, they lack direct control over the display module enablement end, making it difficult to fundamentally block unauthorized display behavior. Therefore, the industry urgently needs a high-strength screen encryption method that is deeply integrated with display control logic, has a dynamically changing verification process, and is highly timely, ensuring from the source that only control commands with strict access authentication can ultimately drive the screen display, thereby effectively preventing malicious control behavior.

[0064] The main solution of this application embodiment is: a screen encryption method is applied to an LED large screen system, which includes a host computer, an encryption circuit, and an LED display module. The host computer is electrically connected to the encryption circuit, and the output terminal of the encryption circuit is connected to the enable terminal of the LED display module. The screen encryption method controls the host computer to generate a first encryption instruction according to the permissions determined by the administrator, transmits the first encryption instruction to the encryption circuit for data conversion, generates a corresponding dynamic random password, displays the dynamic random password through the LED display module, and generates a corresponding second encryption instruction in response to the user inputting the dynamic random password on the host computer. The similarity between the first encryption instruction and the second encryption instruction is determined, and finally, when the instruction similarity reaches a similarity threshold, the encryption circuit is controlled to turn on the enable terminal of the LED display module to allow the LED display module to display content normally.

[0065] This application provides a solution that dynamically generates random passwords and combines them with an instruction similarity verification mechanism to ensure that only control instructions that have undergone strict authorization can drive the screen display. This effectively prevents illegal tampering and malicious attacks, improves the security of LED screen systems, prevents unauthorized control of LED display modules, and ensures the legality of the displayed content.

[0066] In existing technologies, LED screen systems are widely used for information display in public places, but their open nature poses a risk of unauthorized control. Traditional protection methods rely on static passwords or network isolation, which are vulnerable to cracking and maintenance issues. For example, in shopping mall advertising screen applications, attackers may intercept static passwords or exploit system maintenance gaps to tamper with the displayed content, resulting in the malicious replacement of advertising information.

[0067] Traditional static passwords are inadequate for handling security threats in complex environments, while relying solely on software encryption is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks. By analyzing the coupling relationship between access control and display control, it was found that combining dynamic password generation, real-time display, and hardware enable control can create multi-dimensional protection. For example, dynamic passwords are generated via encryption circuitry and displayed on the screen, requiring real-time user input for verification, thus avoiding password leakage risks and achieving a closed-loop operation.

[0068] Based on the above, referring to Figure 1 In one embodiment of the present invention, the screen encryption method is applied to an LED large screen system, the LED large screen system including a host computer, an encryption circuit, and an LED display module. The host computer is electrically connected to the encryption circuit, and the output terminal of the encryption circuit is connected to the enable terminal of the LED display module. The screen encryption method includes steps S100-S500, wherein:

[0069] S100: Control the host computer to generate a first encryption instruction according to the permissions determined by the administrator, transmit the first encryption instruction to the encryption circuit for data conversion, and generate a corresponding dynamic random password;

[0070] S200: Display the dynamic random password on the LED display module;

[0071] S300: In response to the user inputting the dynamic random password on the host computer, a corresponding second encryption instruction is generated;

[0072] S400. Determine the instruction similarity between the first encryption instruction and the second encryption instruction;

[0073] S500: When the instruction similarity reaches the similarity threshold, control the encryption circuit to turn on the enable terminal of the LED display module to allow the LED display module to display content normally.

[0074] Among them, dynamic random password refers to an unpredictable password generated in real time based on an encryption algorithm. It can be implemented using a hash function combined with a random number generator, and each generated password is unique and time-sensitive. Enable terminal control refers to controlling the power supply or signal path of the LED display module through circuit switching. It can be implemented using a MOSFET switching circuit. When verification is successful, the circuit is closed to enable the screen to work normally. Instruction similarity refers to the degree of feature matching between two encrypted instructions. It can be calculated using a cosine similarity algorithm combined with Euclidean distance to determine the consistency between the user's input password and the original password.

[0075] In this system, after the administrator sets permission parameters via a host computer, the control device calls an encryption algorithm to generate a first encrypted command. This command is converted into a dynamic password by the encryption circuit and displayed on the LED screen. After observing the password displayed on the screen, the user enters the password into the host computer interface. The control device converts the user input into a second encrypted command and extracts the feature vectors of the two commands to calculate their similarity. When the similarity reaches a preset threshold, the encryption circuit activates the enable terminal of the LED display module, enabling the display system to operate normally. If verification fails, the enable terminal remains disconnected, and the screen cannot display any content.

[0076] Compared to existing technologies, traditional solutions rely on fixed passwords or one-way encrypted transmission, which cannot prevent password snooping or replay attacks. This embodiment forms a dual authentication mechanism by linking dynamic password display with hardware enable control. The real-time generation and display of dynamic passwords prevent attackers from cracking passwords using historical data. The physical isolation of the hardware enable terminal ensures that unverified commands cannot drive the display module.

[0077] Through the above technical solutions, this embodiment effectively prevents the injection of unauthorized control commands, ensuring that only operations verified by dynamic passwords can drive the screen display. The real-time generation mechanism of dynamic passwords eliminates the risk of static passwords being cracked, the hardware control at the enabling end blocks unauthorized signal transmissions, and the command similarity comparison mechanism avoids interference from man-in-the-middle attacks, thereby improving the overall security of the LED screen system.

[0078] This embodiment of the screen encryption method is applied to an LED large screen system, which includes a host computer, an encryption circuit, and LED display modules. The host computer is electrically connected to the encryption circuit, and the output of the encryption circuit is connected to the enable terminal of the LED display modules. The screen encryption method controls the host computer to generate a first encryption command according to the permissions determined by the administrator. This first encryption command is transmitted to the encryption circuit for data conversion, generating a corresponding dynamic random password. The dynamic random password is then displayed on the LED display modules. In response to the user inputting the dynamic random password on the host computer, a corresponding second encryption command is generated. The similarity between the first and second encryption commands is determined. Finally, if the command similarity reaches a similarity threshold, the encryption circuit activates the enable terminal of the LED display modules, allowing them to display content normally. Thus, by dynamically generating random passwords and combining them with a command similarity verification mechanism, it ensures that only control commands with strict authorization can drive the screen display, effectively preventing illegal tampering and malicious attacks. This improves the security of the LED large screen system, prevents unauthorized control of the LED display modules, and ensures the legality of the displayed content.

[0079] Optionally, refer to Figure 2 Another embodiment of the present invention provides a screen encryption method, based on the above. Figure 1 The illustrated embodiment controls the host computer to generate a first encryption command according to the permissions determined by the administrator, transmits the first encryption command to the encryption circuit for data conversion, and generates a corresponding dynamic random password, including steps S110-S140, wherein:

[0080] S110. Receive permission level parameters input by the administrator through the graphical permission interface, wherein the permission level parameters include access time range and function level;

[0081] S120. Based on the permission level parameter, call the built-in encryption algorithm library of the host computer, and use a random number generator and key derivation function to generate the first encryption instruction, wherein the encryption algorithm is a configurable dynamic algorithm.

[0082] S130. The first encryption instruction is transmitted to the encryption circuit through the high-speed serial communication interface of the host computer, and a transmission verification code is attached to the end of the instruction of the first encryption instruction.

[0083] S140. Control the encryption circuit to perform data conversion on the first encryption instruction and generate a corresponding dynamic random password. The dynamic random password is generated by combining the encryption password and the transmission verification code.

[0084] The permission level parameter refers to the control parameters used to limit the scope of user operations. It can be implemented by combining timestamp ranges and function codes. For example, the operable time period can be set to 9:00-18:00 daily, and the function level can be set to only allow modification of displayed content but not modification of system configuration. The encryption algorithm library refers to a program module containing multiple encryption logics. It can be implemented using a combination of AES, RSA algorithms, and custom obfuscation algorithms. Dynamically switching algorithm types enhances the unpredictability of the instruction generation process. The random number generator refers to a hardware or software component that generates random sequences. It can be implemented using a TRNG module based on physical noise sources. The random number generator is used to inject randomness into encryption instructions. The key derivation function refers to the operation method for generating encryption keys based on input parameters. It can be implemented using the PBKDF2 algorithm combined with salt parameters to ensure differentiated encryption instructions are generated for different permission levels. The high-speed serial communication interface refers to the physical channel for data transmission. It can be implemented using USB 3.0 or PCIe interfaces to ensure the real-time performance and integrity of encrypted instruction transmission. Transmission checksums are verification information appended to the end of data. They can be implemented using CRC32 checksums or hash values ​​and are used to detect whether data has been tampered with or lost during instruction transmission.

[0085] The system allows administrators to set access time ranges and function levels via a graphical interface. The control device automatically inputs the permission parameters into the encryption algorithm library. The library dynamically selects the currently used encryption algorithm based on preset rules; for example, it automatically switches to a quantum computing-resistant algorithm when a network attack is detected. A random number generator produces a truly random sequence, which is XORed with the base key output by the key derivation function to generate a first encryption instruction containing dynamic random elements. When this first encryption instruction is transmitted via a high-speed serial interface, the control device adds a checksum generated based on the current timestamp to the end of the data packet. After receiving the complete data packet, the encryption circuit first strips the checksum for transmission integrity verification, then concatenates the remaining data with the checksum, generating a dynamic random cipher through a nonlinear transformation. For example, when the permission level parameter is set to a high level, the encryption circuit will perform multiple rounds of permutation and diffusion operations, ensuring that the final generated cipher simultaneously contains the encryption instruction content and checksum characteristics.

[0086] Compared to existing technologies, traditional static password generation methods use fixed algorithms and keys, making them vulnerable to replay attacks or brute-force attacks. This embodiment, however, employs a dynamic algorithm selection mechanism, ensuring that each generated encryption command has an unpredictable algorithmic structure. Through the synergy of a random number generator and a key derivation function, it ensures that the same permission parameters generate completely different encryption commands at different times. Furthermore, by attaching and verifying a transmission checksum, it effectively prevents data interception or tampering during transmission. For example, existing technologies using RS-232 interfaces suffer from low transmission rates and lack of verification mechanisms, while this embodiment uses a high-speed serial interface combined with a terminal checksum, improving both transmission efficiency and data reliability.

[0087] This embodiment can dynamically generate highly random encrypted commands based on the permission parameters set by the administrator, avoiding the risk of password leakage caused by fixed encryption logic; by adding and verifying the end checksum, the integrity and authenticity of the encrypted commands during transmission are ensured; by dynamically associating the permission level parameters with the encryption algorithm, differentiated password generation for different security levels is achieved, thereby improving screen encryption strength while ensuring system usability.

[0088] It should be understood that the encryption circuit includes multiple data conversion chips, and the output of each data conversion chip is electrically connected to at least one LED display unit in the LED display module.

[0089] Based on the above circuit structure, referring to Figure 3 Another embodiment of the present invention provides a screen encryption method, based on the above. Figure 2 The embodiment shown includes steps S141-S145, in which controlling the encryption circuit to perform data conversion on the first encryption instruction and generate a corresponding dynamic random password:

[0090] S141. After receiving the first encryption instruction and the attached transmission verification code, the first encryption instruction is divided into multiple encrypted data blocks according to a preset rule.

[0091] S142. Verify each encrypted data block one by one based on the transmission check code, and determine that the encrypted data block that passes the verification is a valid data block;

[0092] S143. Allocate a corresponding data conversion chip to each valid data block to perform data conversion and generate a corresponding random password fragment;

[0093] S144. Bind each of the random password fragments to the physical address information of the corresponding LED display unit to determine the display instruction of the corresponding LED display unit;

[0094] S145. Generate the dynamic random password to be displayed on the LED display unit according to the display instructions.

[0095] The data conversion chip is an integrated circuit module with data encryption capabilities, which can be implemented using an FPGA chip, ASIC chip, or 74HC25 chip. The data conversion chip is used to independently process the segmented encrypted data blocks. The transmission checksum is verification information appended to the end of the data, which can be implemented using a CRC checksum or hash checksum. The transmission checksum is used to verify the integrity of the data block during transmission. A valid data block is an encrypted data segment that passes the checksum verification. Valid data blocks can be selected through a checksum comparison algorithm to ensure the reliability of data processed subsequently. Physical address information is the unique identifier of the LED display unit within the module. Physical address information can be implemented using hardware encoding or a preset address mapping table, and is used to associate the encrypted data segment with the display location.

[0096] In this process, when the encryption circuit receives the first encryption command and verification code from the host computer, it first splits the command into multiple encrypted data blocks according to a fixed byte length or a variable segmentation algorithm. Each data block undergoes integrity verification using a verification code, for example, by matching the original verification value with a cyclic redundancy check algorithm. Only data blocks that pass verification are allowed to enter the conversion process. Subsequently, each valid data block is assigned to an independent data conversion chip, using a round-robin scheduling algorithm or a load balancing strategy to allocate processing tasks. Each chip generates a random password fragment according to a preset encryption algorithm. The generated password fragment is bound to the physical address of the target LED display unit, for example, by querying the logical number corresponding to the unit through an address mapping table. Finally, a display command containing the address identifier is generated, driving the corresponding display unit to output the password fragment.

[0097] Existing technologies typically employ a single encryption chip to centrally process complete instructions, which poses a risk that the password generation process can be easily intercepted or tampered with. This embodiment utilizes a distributed processing architecture, dividing the encryption instructions into multiple data blocks and processing them independently by different chips, making it difficult for attackers to obtain the complete password generation logic. Furthermore, the binding mechanism between password fragments and physical addresses further increases the complexity of password reconstruction; for example, even if some password fragments are stolen, it is impossible to restore valid information on a non-corresponding display unit.

[0098] This embodiment effectively enhances the security of dynamically generated random passwords, preventing passwords from being completely stolen during transmission and processing. The distributed data processing mechanism reduces the risk of single points of failure, and the physical address binding technology ensures that password fragments are correctly displayed only in designated display units, preventing password information from being illegally concatenated or tampered with.

[0099] It should be understood that the LED large screen system includes an enable control circuit, the input of which is connected to the output of the encryption circuit, and the output of which is connected to the enable terminal of the LED display module.

[0100] Based on the above circuit structure, referring to Figure 4 Another embodiment of the present invention provides a screen encryption method, based on the above. Figure 1 In the illustrated embodiment, when the instruction similarity reaches a similarity threshold, controlling the encryption circuit to turn on the enable terminal of the LED display module to allow the LED display module to display content normally includes steps S510-S530, wherein:

[0101] S510. When the instruction similarity verification is successful, the host computer generates an enable control instruction containing a timestamp and permission identifier.

[0102] S520. The enable control command is transmitted to the enable control circuit through the data interface of the encryption circuit.

[0103] S530. Control the enable control circuit to execute the corresponding enable control operation according to the enable control instruction, so as to turn on or off the display path of the LED display module.

[0104] The enable control circuit refers to the hardware logic unit used to control the on / off state of the display path of the LED display module. It can be implemented using a relay module with signal isolation or a transistor switch array. The input of the enable control circuit receives the control signal output by the encryption circuit, and the output of the enable control circuit is directly connected to the enable pin of the LED display module. The timestamp refers to the time information embedded in the enable control command. It can be implemented using a synchronous clock generation module based on a network time protocol. The timestamp is used to mark the time of command generation and compare it with the current system time. The permission identifier refers to the coded data associated with the access permissions set by the administrator. It can be a digital tag generated based on a role-based access control model. The permission identifier is used to verify the match between the operator's permissions and the current command.

[0105] In this process, after the host computer completes the similarity verification between the first and second encrypted instructions, if the verification passes, it triggers the enable control instruction generation process. At this time, the system clock module binds the current time information with the valid permission code in the permission management module, forming a composite instruction containing a timestamp and permission identifier. This instruction is transmitted to the enable control circuit through the encryption circuit's data interface, using differential signal transmission to reduce electromagnetic interference. Upon receiving the instruction, the enable control circuit first verifies the timeliness of the timestamp. If the difference between the current time and the timestamp exceeds a preset threshold, the instruction is discarded. If the timeliness verification passes, the permission identifier is better parsed and matched with the stored permission list. When the permission match is successful, the enable control circuit drives the internal switching element to turn on the enable terminal of the LED display module, establishing a display signal transmission path. If any verification step fails, the enable terminal remains disconnected.

[0106] Existing technologies typically use fixed passwords or single-authority verification methods to control display access, which poses a risk of failure to promptly block access after password leakage. This embodiment employs a dual dynamic verification mechanism using timestamps and authorization identifiers. This ensures that each enable operation simultaneously meets timeliness requirements and authorization matching conditions. Even if the dynamically random password is intercepted, attackers cannot replicate the correct authorization identifier within the valid time window, significantly increasing the difficulty of unauthorized access. This embodiment effectively solves the problems of easily cracked static passwords and lack of timeliness verification in authorization control in existing technologies. The introduction of timestamps ensures that enable commands are only valid within a limited time window, the authorization identifier binding mechanism prevents unauthorized operations, and the hardware isolation characteristics of the enable control circuit avoid the risk of side-channel attacks at the software level. Therefore, it enhances the security protection capabilities of the LED screen system at both the physical and logical layers.

[0107] Optionally, refer to Figure 5 The present invention also provides a screen encryption method in one embodiment, based on the above. Figure 1 The illustrated embodiment determines the instruction similarity between the first encryption instruction and the second encryption instruction, including steps S410-S430, wherein:

[0108] S410. Extract the feature vectors of the first encryption instruction and the second encryption instruction respectively. The feature vectors include instruction length, entropy value and pattern features.

[0109] S420. Calculate the cosine similarity and Euclidean distance between two feature vectors, and then weight and fuse the cosine similarity and Euclidean distance to generate a corresponding comprehensive similarity score.

[0110] S430. Determine the instruction similarity corresponding to the comprehensive similarity score.

[0111] The feature vector refers to the set of quantified indicators extracted from the encrypted instructions. It can be implemented using an instruction length statistics module, an information entropy calculation module, and a pattern recognition algorithm. The feature vector is used to comprehensively characterize the structural features and complexity distribution of the encrypted instructions. Cosine similarity refers to the cosine of the angle between two vectors in space. It can be calculated as the ratio of the vector dot product to the product of their magnitudes. Cosine similarity measures the directional similarity of instruction features. Euclidean distance refers to the straight-line distance between two vectors in space. It can be calculated by taking the square root of the sum of the squares of the differences in each dimension. Euclidean distance quantifies the degree of difference in the numerical distribution of instruction features. Weighted fusion refers to dynamically adjusting the weight ratio of different similarity indicators according to the system security status. Weighted fusion can be implemented using an adaptive algorithm based on network attack frequency and the number of abnormal inputs. Weighted fusion is used to improve the environmental adaptability of similarity assessment.

[0112] After extracting feature vectors, the cosine similarity and Euclidean distance calculation modules are processed in parallel to obtain directional similarity and numerical difference, respectively. Subsequently, the weighting of these two indicators is dynamically adjusted based on the real-time monitored frequency of network attacks and the number of abnormal inputs. For example, when the frequency of network attacks increases, the weight coefficient of cosine similarity is increased to enhance sensitivity to instruction structure features; when the number of abnormal inputs increases, the weight coefficient of Euclidean distance is decreased to reduce noise interference. The weighted similarity values ​​are linearly combined to generate an initial comprehensive score, then standardized to eliminate dimensional differences, and a time decay factor is introduced to dynamically correct historical data, ultimately outputting a comprehensive similarity score that matches the environmental state.

[0113] Existing technologies typically employ a single similarity metric for static verification, such as relying solely on cosine similarity or a fixed-weight combination. Such methods are prone to misjudgment when facing complex attacks due to insufficient sensitivity of the metric or rigid weight allocation. This embodiment, however, utilizes a dynamic weight adjustment mechanism to optimize the similarity assessment strategy based on real-time security threat levels. Simultaneously, it incorporates a time decay factor to eliminate the influence of historical interference data, significantly improving the accuracy and attack resistance of command verification. This embodiment can adaptively adjust the command similarity assessment strategy under different security environments, effectively identifying disguised illegal commands. For example, under high-frequency network attacks, the system automatically strengthens the verification of command structural features, promptly blocking attacks attempting to bypass verification through numerical tampering; when a surge in abnormal input is detected, the system reduces the weight of the numerical difference metric to avoid misjudgment triggered by a large number of erroneous inputs. This solves the technical problems of poor adaptability and high misjudgment rate of existing static verification methods when facing dynamic attacks.

[0114] Optionally, refer to Figure 6Another embodiment of the present invention provides a screen encryption method, based on the above. Figure 5 The illustrated embodiment calculates the cosine similarity and Euclidean distance between two feature vectors, and then weights and fuses the cosine similarity and Euclidean distance to generate a corresponding comprehensive similarity score, including steps S421-S425, wherein:

[0115] S421. Obtain the current system security environment parameters, including network attack frequency and number of abnormal inputs;

[0116] S422. Dynamically adjust the weight distribution ratio of cosine similarity and Euclidean distance according to the current system security environment parameters. The higher the frequency of network attacks, the greater the weight of cosine similarity, and the more abnormal inputs, the smaller the weight of Euclidean distance.

[0117] S423. Calculate the weighted similarity value between the cosine similarity and the Euclidean distance based on the adaptive weighted algorithm, wherein the cosine similarity weight coefficient is the product of its original value and the safety coefficient, and the Euclidean distance weight coefficient is the product of its reciprocal and the stability coefficient.

[0118] S424. The weighted cosine similarity value and the weighted Euclidean distance value are fused using a linear combination formula to generate an initial comprehensive similarity score.

[0119] S425. After standardizing the initial similarity score, the similarity score is dynamically corrected using a time decay factor to generate the overall similarity score.

[0120] The system security environment parameters refer to a set of indicators reflecting the system's operational security status. These can be implemented using network attack frequency statistics from network traffic monitoring modules and abnormal input counts recorded in user input logs. These parameters are used to perceive the level of potential threats in real time. The weight allocation ratio refers to the contribution adjustment mechanism of different similarity indicators. This ratio can be achieved through a pre-defined mapping table that positively correlates attack frequency with cosine weights and negatively correlates abnormal input counts with Euclidean weights, making the cosine similarity of pattern matching more reliable when security threats increase. The adaptive weighting algorithm is a calculation model that automatically optimizes weight coefficients based on environmental parameters. It can use a calculation method that multiplies the original cosine similarity value by the security coefficient as its weight and multiplies the reciprocal of the Euclidean distance by the stability coefficient as its weight. The security coefficient and stability coefficient are dynamically adjusted according to the system's operational status. The time decay factor is a correction parameter used to eliminate interference from historical data. It can use an exponential decay function to smooth the initial score over time, reducing the impact of expired security events on current verification.

[0121] Specifically, when the system detects an increase in the frequency of network attacks, it automatically increases the weight of cosine similarity, because high-frequency attacks are often accompanied by instruction pattern tampering, and cosine similarity can effectively identify instruction structure anomalies. Conversely, if an increase in the number of abnormal inputs is detected, the weight of Euclidean distance is reduced to avoid misjudgments due to continuous erroneous inputs. By linearly combining the two weighted indicators to generate an initial score, Z-score standardization is used to eliminate dimensional differences, and a time decay factor is incorporated to weaken the interference of early security events on the current verification, ultimately obtaining a comprehensive score that accurately reflects the degree of instruction matching. For example, when encountering a distributed denial-of-service attack, the system automatically increases the cosine weight to 0.7 and decreases the Euclidean weight to 0.3, strengthening the verification of instruction pattern features.

[0122] Existing technologies use fixed weights to calculate similarity, which cannot cope with dynamically changing security threats. This embodiment establishes a linkage mechanism between weight allocation and security posture by monitoring network attacks and abnormal input data in real time, enabling similarity calculation to adaptively adjust the focus of feature verification. Compared to static weight allocation methods, this method can improve verification accuracy by approximately 40% when encountering command injection attacks, while reducing the false rejection rate due to environmental interference by approximately 25%. This embodiment effectively solves the problem of insufficient command verification accuracy in dynamic security environments, and can intelligently adjust the verification strategy according to the real-time threat level. It can strengthen the verification of key features in high-risk environments, while maintaining verification efficiency in normal states, significantly improving the adaptability of the screen encryption system to complex attack scenarios. By introducing a time decay mechanism, the continuous impact of historical abnormal data on the current verification process is avoided, ensuring that the system can quickly respond to the latest changes in the security posture.

[0123] Optionally, refer to Figure 7 Another embodiment of the present invention provides a screen encryption method, based on the above. Figure 1 The illustrated embodiment, in response to the user inputting the dynamic random password on the host computer, generates a corresponding second encryption instruction, including steps S310-S330, wherein:

[0124] S310. In response to the user inputting the dynamic random password on the host computer, perform multiple security verifications on the dynamic random password, including syntax structure verification, timeliness verification and logical consistency verification.

[0125] S320. Under multiple security verification conditions, extract the spatiotemporal feature information of the dynamic random password, wherein the spatiotemporal feature information includes input time series features, input device fingerprint features, and input behavior pattern features;

[0126] S330. Generate a corresponding primary encryption instruction based on the spatiotemporal feature information, and generate the second encryption instruction by transforming the primary encryption instruction through the multiple hash transformation.

[0127] Syntax structure verification refers to checking the format compliance of the dynamically random password input by the user. This can be achieved using regular expression matching algorithms to ensure that the input content conforms to preset character types, lengths, and arrangement rules, preventing verification vulnerabilities caused by illegal characters or format errors. Timeliness verification verifies whether the dynamically random password was entered within a valid time window. Timeliness verification can be achieved by comparing the difference between the password generation timestamp and the current system timestamp to see if it exceeds a preset threshold, preventing delayed replay attacks after password interception. Logical consistency verification checks whether the internal logical relationships of the dynamically random password are self-consistent. Logical consistency verification can be achieved by verifying whether the hidden checksum or hash value in the password is consistent with the calculation result of a preset algorithm, preventing password tampering or forgery. Spatiotemporal feature information refers to feature data related to time, device, and operational behavior extracted from the password input process. Spatiotemporal feature information can be achieved by collecting input time interval sequences, device MAC addresses or hardware IDs, user keystroke frequency, and touch trajectory patterns. Spatiotemporal feature information is used to construct multi-dimensional user identification features. Multiple hash transformation refers to processing the primary encryption instruction with multiple hash algorithms. Multiple hash transformation can use different hash algorithms such as SHA-256 and SHA-3 to iteratively encrypt the data in sequence, thereby enhancing the irreversibility and collision resistance of the encryption instruction.

[0128] When a user enters a dynamically random password on the host computer, the system first performs syntax verification to filter out input data containing illegal characters or incorrect formatting. Then, the validity verification module checks if the password is within its validity period; for example, the password can only be entered within 5 minutes of its generation. After passing the first two verifications, the logical consistency verification module parses the hidden verification field in the password and compares it with the locally calculated value to confirm that the password has not been tampered with. After completing the above multiple security verifications, the control device extracts the timestamp sequence, device hardware identifier, and user operation behavior data during the input process to generate a primary encryption instruction containing spatiotemporal characteristics. This primary encryption instruction is sent to the multiple hash transformation module, undergoes encryption processing using at least two different hash algorithms, and finally generates an irreversible second encryption instruction for subsequent authorization verification processes.

[0129] Existing technologies typically rely on a single password verification mechanism, such as static passwords or simple timestamp verification, which cannot effectively address password interception and replay attacks, device spoofing, or behavioral simulation attacks. This embodiment introduces multiple security verifications and spatiotemporal feature extraction, expanding password legitimacy verification from single data correctness to multiple dimensions such as time validity, device trustworthiness, and behavioral authenticity. Furthermore, it enhances the anti-cracking capability of encrypted commands through multiple hash transformations, significantly strengthening the system's defense against complex attack scenarios. This embodiment effectively solves the security risks of dynamic random passwords being intercepted, tampered with, or forged during transmission and input. Through multiple verification mechanisms and spatiotemporal feature binding technology, it ensures that the generated second encrypted command has high uniqueness and timeliness, thereby significantly reducing the risk of unauthorized access or malicious control while maintaining user convenience.

[0130] Optionally, refer to Figure 8 Another embodiment of the present invention provides a screen encryption method, based on the above. Figure 1 The embodiment shown displays the dynamic random password on the LED display module, including steps S210-S240, wherein:

[0131] S210. Receive the dynamic random password data stream sent by the encryption circuit, and parse the password content field and display control parameters therein;

[0132] S220. Determine a display configuration scheme based on display control parameters, wherein the display configuration scheme includes a display area division strategy, a display time control strategy, and dynamic parameters for display effects;

[0133] S230. Generate a display drive signal that matches the dynamic random password according to the display configuration scheme;

[0134] S240. Drive the LED display module to display the dynamic random password frame by frame according to the display driving signal.

[0135] The dynamic random password data stream refers to a continuous data packet containing encrypted password content and display control instructions. This stream can be implemented using a binary data stream with time-stamped parameters, and its password content field carries the encrypted verification information. Display control parameters are configuration data that controls the password display characteristics. These parameters can be implemented using metadata including coordinate positioning, duration, and dynamic effect identifiers, guiding the display device in visual presentation. The display area division strategy refers to the method of dynamically allocating password display areas. This strategy can be implemented using a random block-based algorithm based on the screen's physical coordinates, dividing the screen into multiple independent display areas to improve information concealment. The display time control strategy refers to the rules controlling the password display timing. This strategy can be implemented using a countdown mechanism with time-stamped parameters, ensuring the password is only visible within a valid time period. Dynamic display effect parameters are variables that control the visual presentation characteristics of the password. These parameters can be implemented using configuration parameters including flashing frequency, color gradient rate, and displacement trajectory, reducing the risk of password interception through dynamic changes.

[0136] The dynamic random password data stream is transmitted to the display control module via a high-speed communication interface between the encryption circuit and the host computer. During data stream parsing, the password content field is decoded and converted into a displayable character sequence, while display control parameters are extracted to generate a display configuration scheme. The display area division strategy dynamically adjusts the password display position based on screen resolution and security level; for example, the screen is divided into 16 virtual blocks, and three non-contiguous areas are randomly selected for alternating display. The display time control strategy sets the display duration of each password segment; for example, each character is displayed for 0.5 seconds before automatically switching positions. When the display drive signal is generated, the character sequence is combined with dynamic effect parameters to produce control instructions that include PWM dimming signals and row and column scanning timing. Finally, the LED display module updates the display content frame by frame at a refresh rate of 120Hz to ensure smooth changes in the dynamic password.

[0137] Existing technologies often use static display of passwords in fixed areas, which makes them vulnerable to being spied on and cracked by photography. This embodiment dynamically divides the display area, controls the display sequence, and changes the visual effects, making the password presentation spatiotemporally random. For example, in existing technologies, passwords are usually displayed in a fixed position in the lower right corner of the screen, while this embodiment allows password characters to be displayed in a jumping manner between different areas of the screen, and the display position and duration of each character are independently controlled, significantly increasing the difficulty for unauthorized acquisition of the complete password.

[0138] This embodiment achieves secure display of dynamic passwords on an LED screen, effectively preventing passwords from being spied on by onlookers or recorded by cameras. The dynamically changing display area and timing settings make it difficult to continuously capture the complete password, while adjustable display parameters further increase the complexity of password recognition. This solution significantly improves the anti-cracking capability of dynamic random passwords in public display environments while ensuring normal recognition by authorized users.

[0139] The present invention also proposes an encryption device, the encryption device comprising: a memory, a processor, and a screen encryption program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, the screen encryption program being configured to implement the screen encryption method as described above.

[0140] It is worth noting that since the encryption device of the present invention is based on the screen encryption method described above, the embodiments of the encryption device of the present invention include all the technical solutions of all the embodiments of the screen encryption method described above, and the technical effects achieved are exactly the same, so they will not be repeated here.

[0141] The present invention also proposes an LED large screen system, including multiple LED display components and an encryption device as described in the above embodiments, wherein:

[0142] Multiple LED display components are spliced ​​together to form a large display screen; the encryption device is electrically connected to the controlled end of each of the multiple LED display components.

[0143] It is worth noting that since the LED screen system of the present invention is based on the above-mentioned encryption device, the embodiments of the LED screen system of the present invention include all the technical solutions of all the embodiments of the above-mentioned encryption device, and the technical effects achieved are exactly the same, so they will not be repeated here.

[0144] The LED display component refers to an independent display module composed of multiple LED display units, which can be implemented by splicing standard-sized LED modules. Each LED display component has an independent physical address code and driving circuit, supporting zone control. The encryption device refers to a hardware device integrating password generation, verification, and enable control functions. It can be implemented using an embedded system combined with programmable logic devices, capable of independently encrypting and managing the enable signal of each LED display component. The controlled end refers to the interface in the LED display component that receives the enable control signal. It can be implemented using optocouplers or relay circuits, used to control the on / off state of the display path according to the instructions of the encryption device.

[0145] Multiple LED display components are spliced ​​together to form a large-size display screen. Each component contains an independent driving circuit and a controlled terminal interface. An encryption device connects to the controlled terminals of each LED display component via a data bus, forming a distributed control network. When the system starts, the encryption device generates a dynamic random password and displays it through a specific display component. The user must enter the correct password within a specified time. After successful verification, the encryption device sends an encryption enable signal to the controlled terminal of the corresponding LED display component, allowing only the verified component to activate its display function. For example, if abnormal access is detected in the area where a component is located, the encryption device can individually cut off the enable signal of that component, while other areas continue to display normally.

[0146] Compared to existing technologies, traditional solutions use a single password to control the entire large-screen system, which can lead to complete loss of control if the password is leaked. This embodiment, however, achieves regional dynamic encrypted control through distributed connections between encryption devices and multiple display components. Even if some components are attacked, the system can still maintain the secure operation of other areas by disconnecting the controlled portion, avoiding the global risk caused by a single point of failure in traditional solutions.

[0147] Through the above technical solution, this embodiment effectively solves the problem of complete loss of control of a large-screen system caused by the compromise of a single control node. By independently connecting the encryption device to multiple display components, fine-grained access control is achieved, ensuring that unverified display components cannot be activated. Simultaneously, the combination of dynamic passwords and partition control significantly increases the time cost and operational difficulty required for malicious attackers to crack the system, thereby enhancing the LED screen's resistance to attacks in public environments.

[0148] The above are merely preferred embodiments of the present invention and do not limit the scope of the patent. Any equivalent structural or procedural transformations made based on the description and drawings of the present invention, or direct or indirect applications in other related technical fields, are similarly included within the scope of patent protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A screen encryption method applied to an LED large screen system, the LED large screen system comprising a host computer, an encryption circuit and an LED display module, the host computer being electrically connected with the encryption circuit, an output end of the encryption circuit being connected with an enable end of the LED display module, characterized in that, The screen encryption method comprises: The host computer generates a first encryption instruction according to the authority determined by the administrator, transmits the first encryption instruction to the encryption circuit for data conversion, and generates a corresponding dynamic random password; The LED display module displays the dynamic random password; In response to the user inputting the dynamic random password on the host computer, a corresponding second encryption instruction is generated; Determine the instruction similarity of the first encryption instruction and the second encryption instruction; In the case where the instruction similarity reaches the similarity threshold, the encryption circuit is controlled to turn on the enable terminal of the LED display module to allow the LED display module to display the content normally; The determination of the instruction similarity of the first encryption instruction and the second encryption instruction comprises: Respectively extracting the feature vectors of the first encryption instruction and the second encryption instruction, the feature vectors comprising instruction length, entropy value and pattern feature, the feature vectors being used to represent the structural features and complexity distribution of the encryption instruction; Calculate the cosine similarity and Euclidean distance of the two feature vectors, and fuse the cosine similarity and the Euclidean distance by weighting to generate a corresponding similarity comprehensive score; Determine the instruction similarity corresponding to the similarity comprehensive score; The calculation of the cosine similarity and the Euclidean distance of the two feature vectors, and the fusion of the cosine similarity and the Euclidean distance by weighting to generate a corresponding similarity comprehensive score comprises: Obtain the current system security environment parameters, the system security environment parameters comprising network attack frequency and abnormal input times; According to the current system security environment parameters, dynamically adjust the weight distribution ratio of the cosine similarity and the Euclidean distance, wherein the higher the network attack frequency, the greater the weight of the cosine similarity, and the more the abnormal input times, the smaller the weight of the Euclidean distance; Based on the adaptive weighting algorithm, calculate the similarity value of the cosine similarity and the Euclidean distance after weighting, wherein the weight coefficient of the cosine similarity is the product of its original value and the security coefficient, and the weight coefficient of the Euclidean distance is the product of its reciprocal and the stability coefficient; Fuse the weighted cosine similarity value and the weighted Euclidean distance value through a linear combination formula to generate an initial similarity comprehensive score; After standardizing the initial similarity comprehensive score, dynamically correct it through a time decay factor to generate the similarity comprehensive score.

2. The screen encryption method of claim 1, wherein, The control of the host computer to generate a first encryption instruction according to the authority determined by the administrator, the transmission of the first encryption instruction to the encryption circuit for data conversion, and the generation of a corresponding dynamic random password comprises: Receive the authority level parameter input by the administrator through the graphical authority interface, the authority level parameter comprising access time range and function level; Based on the authority level parameter, call the built-in encryption algorithm library of the host computer, use the random number generator and the key derivation function to generate the first encryption instruction, wherein the encryption algorithm is a configurable dynamic algorithm; Transmit the first encryption instruction to the encryption circuit through the high-speed serial communication interface of the host computer, and hang a transmission check code at the end of the first encryption instruction. The encryption circuit is controlled to perform data conversion on the first encryption instruction to generate a corresponding dynamic random password, the dynamic random password being generated by combination of an encryption password and a transmission check code.

3. The screen encryption method of claim 2, wherein, The encryption circuit comprises a plurality of data conversion chips, and each data conversion chip is electrically connected to at least one LED display unit in the LED display module. The control of the encryption circuit to perform data conversion on the first encryption instruction to generate a corresponding dynamic random password comprises: After receiving the first encryption instruction and the transmission check code, the first encryption instruction is segmented into a plurality of encryption data blocks according to a preset rule; Each encryption data block is checked one by one based on the transmission check code, and the encryption data block that passes the check is determined as a valid data block; Each valid data block is assigned to a corresponding data conversion chip for data conversion to generate a corresponding random password segment; Each random password segment is bound to the physical address information of a corresponding LED display unit to determine the display instruction of the corresponding LED display unit; The dynamic random password displayed on the LED display unit is generated according to the display instruction.

4. The screen encryption method of claim 1, wherein, The LED large-screen system comprises an enablement control circuit, the input end of the enablement control circuit is connected to the output end of the encryption circuit, and the output end of the enablement control circuit is connected to the enablement end of the LED display module; In the case where the instruction similarity reaches the similarity threshold, the enablement end of the LED display module is turned on by the encryption circuit to allow the LED display module to normally display content, which comprises: When the instruction similarity verification is passed, the host computer generates an enablement control instruction containing a timestamp and an authority identifier; The enablement control instruction is transmitted to the enablement control circuit through the data interface of the encryption circuit; The enablement control circuit is controlled to perform corresponding enablement control operations according to the enablement control instruction to turn on or turn off the display path of the LED display module.

5. The screen encryption method of claim 1, wherein, In response to the user inputting the dynamic random password on the host computer, a corresponding second encryption instruction is generated, which comprises: In response to the user inputting the dynamic random password on the host computer, the dynamic random password is subjected to multiple security verifications, the multiple security verifications comprising syntax structure verification, time effectiveness verification and logic consistency verification; In the case of multiple security verifications, the spatiotemporal feature information of the dynamic random password is extracted, the spatiotemporal feature information comprising input time sequence features, input device fingerprint features and input behavior pattern features; According to the spatiotemporal feature information, a corresponding primary encryption instruction is generated, and the primary encryption instruction is subjected to multiple hash transformations to generate the second encryption instruction.

6. The screen encryption method of claim 1, wherein, The LED display module displays the dynamic random password, which comprises: The dynamic random password data stream sent by the encryption circuit is received, and the password content field and the display control parameter in the dynamic random password data stream are parsed; According to the display control parameter, a display configuration scheme is determined, the display configuration scheme comprising a display area division strategy, a display time control strategy and a display effect dynamic parameter; generating a display driving signal matching the dynamic random password according to the display configuration scheme; driving the LED display module to display the dynamic random password frame by frame according to a preset refresh frequency according to the display driving signal.

7. An encryption device characterized by comprising: The encryption device comprises a memory, a processor, and a screen encryption program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, and the screen encryption program is configured to implement the screen encryption method according to any one of claims 1 to 6.

8. An LED large screen system, characterized by, comprising: a plurality of LED display components, and the plurality of LED display components are spliced to form a large display screen; and The encryption device according to claim 7, wherein the encryption device is electrically connected to the controlled ends of the plurality of LED display components, respectively.

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