Methods, devices, storage media and electronic equipment for switching train operation permits in faulty sections

Abstract

This application discloses a method, device, storage medium, and electronic device for switching train operation permits in faulty sections. The method includes: adjusting a first train operation permit when a faulty section exists within a track circuit section; when the faulty section has not been safely confirmed and the first train approaching the faulty section is within a preset approach range, sending a fault confirmation request to the first train and receiving a fault confirmation receipt sent by the first train after passing through the faulty section; based on the fault confirmation receipt, and combined with the confirmation status of the faulty section, the status of the axle counting section, and the status of abnormal events within the axle counting section, determining whether it is safe to pass through the faulty section; if so, generating a second train operation permit. This application, through the control logic of first train exploration confirmation and subsequent normal passage, minimizes the impact of faults on train operation efficiency while ensuring safe passage through faulty sections.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of railway technology, and in particular to a method, device, storage medium and electronic equipment for switching train operation permits in fault sections. Background Technology

[0002] The CTCS-2 level train control system consists of trackside station equipment and onboard equipment. Its core functionality involves obtaining the occupancy status of track sections through the trackside station equipment, which transmits train operation permits to the train via track circuits. When a track circuit malfunctions and generates a red light, the trackside station equipment activates a safety protection mechanism based on the fault status: the train is not allowed to pass through the faulty section at its original speed. In this case, the trackside station equipment adjusts the train's operation permit endpoint to the starting point of the faulty section. Upon receiving the adjusted operation permit, the onboard equipment controls the train to stop as it approaches the faulty section to prevent the train from entering the faulty section with an unknown safety status.

[0003] According to relevant train operation regulations, in this situation, the basic safety conditions of the faulty section must first be manually confirmed before subsequent train operations can be organized. After manual confirmation, the onboard equipment is downgraded to visual operation mode, which grants the driver manual control authority. The driver must manually observe and confirm the safety of the track before driving the train through the faulty section at a fixed low speed. In this scenario, all trains approaching the faulty section must follow the same procedure of stopping, manual confirmation, equipment downgrading, and passing through at low speed to complete safety confirmation and passage. However, if frequent train stops or prolonged low-speed operation are caused solely by a fault in the track circuit equipment, it will severely disrupt the established train scheduling plan, significantly reduce the efficiency of line transportation, and consequently lead to train delays and other problems. Summary of the Invention

[0004] In view of the above problems, this application provides a method, apparatus, storage medium and electronic device for switching traffic permits in faulty sections.

[0005] To solve the above-mentioned technical problems, this application proposes the following solution:

[0006] In a first aspect, this application provides a method for switching train operation permits for faulty sections. The method includes: when a faulty section exists within a track circuit section, adjusting a first train operation permit, wherein the adjusted first train operation permit is used to instruct a train to stop running at a first speed when it reaches the starting point of the faulty section, the first speed being the speed at which the train runs in a normal track circuit section; when the faulty section has not been safely confirmed and the first train approaching the faulty section is within a preset approach range, sending a fault confirmation request to the first train to instruct the first train to pass through the faulty section at a second speed, and receiving a fault confirmation receipt sent by the first train after passing through the faulty section, wherein the second speed is a preset low speed less than the first speed; based on the fault confirmation receipt, and in conjunction with the confirmation status of the faulty section, the status of the axle counting section, and the status of abnormal events within the axle counting section, determining whether it is safe to pass through the faulty section; if so, generating a second train operation permit, wherein the second train operation permit is used to enable trains approaching the faulty section within a preset time period after the first train to pass through the faulty section at the first speed.

[0007] Secondly, this application provides a fault section traffic permit switching device, which includes:

[0008] The first train operation permission module is used to adjust the first train operation permission when there is a fault section in the track circuit section. The adjusted first train operation permission is used to instruct the train to stop when it runs to the starting point of the fault section at a first speed. The first speed is the speed at which the train runs in the normal track circuit section.

[0009] The fault confirmation module is used to send a fault confirmation request to the first train when the fault section has not been safely confirmed and the first train approaching the fault section is within a preset approach range, so as to instruct the first train to pass through the fault section at a second speed, and to receive the fault confirmation receipt sent by the first train after passing through the fault section. The second speed is a preset low speed that is less than the first speed.

[0010] The safety confirmation module is used to determine whether it is safe to pass through the fault section based on the fault confirmation receipt, the confirmation status of the fault section, the status of the axle counting section, and the status of abnormal events within the axle counting section.

[0011] The second train operation permission module is used to generate a second train operation permission if the condition is met. The second train operation permission is used to enable trains that approach the fault section within a preset time period after the first train to pass through the fault section at a first speed.

[0012] To achieve the above objectives, according to a third aspect of this application, a storage medium is provided, the storage medium including a stored program, wherein, when the program is executed, the device where the storage medium is located is controlled to perform the fault section traffic permit switching method of the first aspect described above.

[0013] To achieve the above objectives, according to a fourth aspect of this application, an electronic device is provided, the device including at least one processor, and at least one memory and bus connected to the processor; wherein the processor and memory communicate with each other through the bus; the processor is used to call program instructions in the memory to execute the fault section traffic permit switching method of the first aspect described above.

[0014] By employing the above-described technical solution, the technical solution provided in this application has at least the following advantages:

[0015] This application sends a fault confirmation request to the first train, instructing it to pass through the faulty section at a second speed (lower than the first speed) and provide feedback. This replaces the traditional process where all trains must stop and wait for manual confirmation by having the first train scout the area at low speed, ensuring safety while reducing waiting time for subsequent trains. Subsequently, based on the fault confirmation feedback from the first train and information such as the faulty section's confirmation status, after determining that the faulty section is safe to pass, a second travel permit is generated for the destination to cross the faulty section, clearly indicating that subsequent trains can directly pass through the faulty section at the first speed. This completely eliminates the restriction that all trains must pass through at low speed in the traditional scenario, fundamentally solving the problem of long-term low-speed operation caused by track circuit faults. The entire process, through the control logic of first train scout confirmation and subsequent normal passage, minimizes the impact of faults on train operation efficiency while ensuring safe passage through the faulty section, avoiding scheduling disruptions and train delays, effectively balancing safety and transportation efficiency in fault scenarios.

[0016] The above description is only an overview of the technical solution of this application. In order to better understand the technical means of this application and to implement it in accordance with the contents of the specification, and to make the above and other objects, features and advantages of this application more obvious and understandable, the following are specific embodiments of this application. Attached Figure Description

[0017] Various other advantages and benefits will become apparent to those skilled in the art upon reading the following detailed description of preferred embodiments. The accompanying drawings are for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to limit the scope of this application. Furthermore, the same reference numerals denote the same parts throughout the drawings. In the drawings:

[0018] Figure 1 A flowchart illustrating a method for switching traffic permits in a faulty section, as provided in an embodiment of this application, is shown.

[0019] Figure 2 This illustration shows an example of a method for switching traffic permits in a fault section according to an embodiment of this application;

[0020] Figure 3This illustration shows a schematic diagram of another example of a fault section traffic permit switching method provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0021] Figure 4 This illustration shows a structural schematic diagram of a fault section traffic permit switching device provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0022] Figure 5 A schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided in an embodiment of this application is shown. Detailed Implementation

[0023] Exemplary embodiments of the present application will now be described in more detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. While exemplary embodiments of the present application are shown in the drawings, it should be understood that the present application may be implemented in various forms and should not be limited to the embodiments set forth herein. Rather, these embodiments are provided so that this application will be thorough and complete, and will fully convey the scope of the present application to those skilled in the art.

[0024] In the embodiments of this application, the terms "first," "second," etc., do not have a logical or temporal dependency, nor do they limit the quantity or execution order. It should also be understood that although the following description uses the terms "first," "second," etc., to describe various elements, these elements should not be limited by the terms. These terms are merely used to distinguish one element from another.

[0025] In this application, the term "at least one" means one or more, and the term "multiple" means two or more.

[0026] It should also be understood that the term “if” can be interpreted as “when” or “upon”, or “in response to determination” or “in response to detection”. Similarly, depending on the context, the phrase “if determination…” or “if detection [the stated condition or event]” can be interpreted as “when determination…” or “in response to determination…” or “when detection [the stated condition or event]” or “in response to detection [the stated condition or event]”.

[0027] In the architecture of the CTCS-2 level train control system, trackside station equipment and onboard equipment are the two core components, working together to achieve train operation control. The trackside station equipment plays a crucial role: on the one hand, it collects and obtains the occupancy status of track sections; on the other hand, it uses the track circuit as a transmission medium to issue train departure permits, providing a basis for normal train operation. Once a track circuit malfunctions in a section, indicated by the characteristic red light band, the trackside station equipment will immediately trigger safety protection procedures based on the fault signal. For safety reasons, trains will be prohibited from passing through the faulty section at their original speed. Simultaneously, the trackside station equipment will adjust the train departure permit, precisely setting the endpoint of the permit at the beginning of the faulty section. Upon receiving the adjusted departure permit, the onboard equipment will automatically trigger speed control logic, guiding the train to decelerate as it gradually approaches the faulty section, ultimately stopping smoothly before the starting point of the faulty section, thus preventing the train from mistakenly entering a faulty area with an unclear safety status.

[0028] According to relevant railway operation regulations, the basic safety conditions of the faulty section must first be manually confirmed before subsequent trains can continue operating. Specifically, after the manual confirmation, the onboard equipment must switch to visual operation mode, in which the driver gains manual control of the train. During operation, the driver must continuously observe the track conditions manually, and only after confirming there are no safety hazards should the train be driven through the faulty section at a fixed low speed. It is worth noting that in this fault scenario, all trains approaching the faulty section must strictly follow the unified process of stopping and waiting, manually confirming safety, degrading onboard equipment, and passing through at low speed, completing safety confirmation one by one before proceeding. However, in actual operation, if all trains frequently stop and wait, or travel at low speed for extended periods, simply due to a fault in the track circuit equipment, it will have a significant negative impact on railway transportation. This will not only severely disrupt pre-established train scheduling plans, leading to a significant decrease in the overall transportation efficiency of the line, but may also trigger a chain reaction, causing widespread train delays and operational disruptions, affecting the stability and reliability of railway transportation services.

[0029] Based on this, this application provides a method for switching traffic permits in faulty sections. The method for switching traffic permits in faulty sections will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating a method for switching traffic permits in a faulty section, as provided in this application. It specifically includes the following steps:

[0030] Step 110: When there is a faulty section in the track circuit section, adjust the first train operation permit.

[0031] In the CTCS-2 level train control system operation scenario of urban railway, the trackside station equipment continuously collects data such as the status information of the track circuit section of the ground section, the axle counting section status information, and the train position report sent by the train on-board equipment. Based on this data, it generates the first track circuit original train operation permission required for normal train operation. This train operation permission is transmitted to the train on-board equipment through the track circuit. The train on-board equipment controls the train to continue to travel at the first speed of normal track circuit section operation based on this first track circuit original train operation permission.

[0032] When the first train is running within a section of the track circuit, and a fault occurs in a section of the track circuit along its running path, forming the first fault section, the trackside station equipment uses the track circuit fault detection module to capture the fault status of the first fault section in real time. At this time, the trackside station equipment immediately adjusts the original train operation permission for the first track circuit. The adjusted first train operation permission no longer extends beyond the fault section according to the extension logic of the normal section, but instead sets the end point of the train operation permission as the starting point of the first fault section, thereby achieving initial safety protection for trains entering the fault section.

[0033] After receiving the adjusted first travel permit, the onboard equipment of the first train, combined with real-time data such as train speed, position, and distance to the starting point of the first fault section, calculates a reasonable deceleration curve using onboard control algorithms. As the train approaches the first fault section at the initial speed, the onboard equipment, according to a preset safety control strategy, gradually controls the train's speed according to the calculated deceleration curve, ensuring that the train can stop accurately when it reaches the starting point of the first fault section, avoiding the train entering the fault section in an unknown state, and ensuring the initial operational safety of the train in the fault scenario.

[0034] After the first train stops at the starting point of the first fault section, the trackside station equipment immediately initiates the auxiliary judgment process under the fault scenario. It begins to comprehensively verify the various conditions for sending the confirmation request for the first fault section, including confirming whether the logical state of the first fault section is fault-occupied, whether the first fault section is a new fault section that has not been confirmed, whether there is any foreign object encroachment within the first fault section, and whether any special events affecting train operation safety, such as earthquakes, have occurred. At the same time, it also checks whether the first most recent related transponder based on the position report previously sent by the first train is a transponder associated with the first fault section.

[0035] Only when all the above conditions are met will the trackside station equipment generate an acknowledgment request for the first fault section and send the request to the onboard equipment of the first train through a pre-established first wireless transmission channel. If any condition is not met, the trackside station equipment will continuously monitor changes in relevant status data and wait for all conditions to be met before executing the subsequent acknowledgment request sending operation. During this process, the first train will remain stopped at the starting point of the first fault section until it receives further instructions from the trackside station equipment.

[0036] Step 120: When the fault section has not been safely confirmed and the first train approaching the fault section is within the preset approach range, send a fault confirmation request to the first train to instruct the first train to pass through the fault section at the second speed, and receive the fault confirmation receipt sent by the first train after passing through the fault section.

[0037] After the initial train operation permit adjustment, if the faulty section still hasn't been safely confirmed, the trackside station equipment initiates a position monitoring process for approaching trains. This involves the trackside station equipment receiving periodically sent train position reports from the train's onboard equipment and extracting the train's real-time position coordinates generated based on the nearest associated transponder. Simultaneously, it retrieves pre-stored faulty section position information (including the faulty section's start / end coordinates and its axle counting zone) and preset approach range parameters. This preset approach range is set based on the distribution rules of associated transponders behind the faulty section, typically using the track area covered by five associated transponders behind the faulty section as its boundary. This serves as the core basis for determining whether a train has entered the approach range.

[0038] The trackside station equipment dynamically compares the train's real-time position coordinates with the boundary coordinates of a preset approach range. If the nearest associated transponder in the train's position report belongs to the list of associated transponders for the faulty section, and the train's current position falls within the area covered by five associated transponders, then the train is determined to have entered the preset approach range. At this time, the trackside station equipment performs a comprehensive check on the preconditions for sending a fault confirmation request. The check includes confirming whether the logical state of the faulty section is fault-occupied, whether the faulty section is a newly confirmed faulty section, whether there are foreign objects encroaching on the boundary within the faulty section, and whether any abnormal events affecting train operation safety, such as earthquakes, have occurred. Only when all check conditions are met will the trackside station equipment generate the corresponding fault confirmation request.

[0039] Subsequently, the trackside station equipment sends the generated fault confirmation request to the onboard equipment of the first train via a pre-established wireless transmission channel with the train's onboard equipment. Upon receiving the request, the onboard equipment of the first train displays a prompt on the human-machine interface. After seeing the prompt, the driver, following existing train operation procedures, requests confirmation from the dispatching and command system. Once verified and approved by the dispatching and command system, the onboard equipment of the first train is downgraded to visual driving mode. At this point, the onboard equipment grants the driver manual control authority. The driver confirms track safety by manually observing the area and then controls the first train to slowly proceed towards the fault section at a second speed. This second speed is a fixed low speed, typically set at 20 km / h, which meets the safety requirements for low-speed passage through fault sections in existing train operation regulations.

[0040] As the first train passed through the faulty section at a second speed, the driver continuously monitored the track conditions to ensure the train encountered no additional safety risks. Once the first train had completely left the faulty section and entered the normal section behind it, the driver activated the fault confirmation function on the onboard equipment's human-machine interface, triggering the generation of a fault confirmation receipt. This receipt contained key information such as the faulty section's identifier, the time the train passed through the faulty section, and the train's operating status at the time of passage. The onboard equipment of the first train wirelessly transmitted this fault confirmation receipt to the trackside station equipment.

[0041] Step 130: Based on the fault confirmation receipt, combined with the confirmation status of the fault section, the status of the axle counting zone, and the status of abnormal events within the axle counting zone, determine whether it is safe to pass through the fault section.

[0042] When the trackside station equipment receives a fault confirmation receipt sent after the first train has passed through the faulty section, it first initiates the parsing process for that receipt. During parsing, the trackside station equipment extracts key operating parameters from the fault confirmation receipt when the first train passed through the faulty section. These parameters include, but are not limited to, the train's speed, travel time, position change data within the faulty section, and track status feedback information recorded by the onboard equipment. Subsequently, the trackside station equipment retrieves pre-stored historical operating parameters of the first train in the corresponding normal track circuit section (i.e., when the section was fault-free before the fault occurred) and compares the extracted faulty section operating parameters with the historical normal operating parameters for the same section item by item. During the comparison, attention is paid to whether the train's passing speed meets the preset low-speed passing standard (i.e., 20 km / h), whether the travel time is within a reasonable range, and whether the position change matches the actual length of the faulty section. If the comparison results of all parameters are within the preset allowable deviation range and there is no abnormal parameter feedback, the faulty section confirmation status corresponding to the fault confirmation receipt is determined to be valid. If any parameters exceed the deviation range or abnormal feedback occurs, the confirmation status is deemed invalid, and it is necessary to wait for the first train to resend a valid fault confirmation receipt or to further investigate the cause of the parameter abnormality.

[0043] After confirming the status of the faulty section, the trackside station equipment begins acquiring axle counting data for each sub-section within the axle counting zone where the faulty section is located. This axle counting data is collected in real-time by axle counters distributed across each sub-section and transmitted to the trackside station equipment. This data includes the real-time pulse counts of the axle counters for each sub-section and the pulse count changes over a preset time period. The trackside station equipment compares the real-time pulse counts of each sub-section with a preset no-load pulse reference value. This reference value is a standard value calibrated based on the pulse output characteristics of the axle counters under conditions of no train occupancy and no foreign object interference. If the deviation between the real-time pulse count of a sub-section and the no-load pulse reference value is within a preset no-load deviation range, it is preliminarily determined that the sub-section is in an idle state; if the deviation exceeds the no-load deviation range, it is preliminarily determined that the sub-section may be in an occupied state.

[0044] For sub-sections initially determined to be occupied, the trackside station equipment calculates the duration of the occupancy based on changes in pulse counts. The specific calculation method is as follows: starting from the moment the pulse count is first detected to exceed the no-load deviation range, pulse count changes are continuously monitored until the pulse count returns to within the no-load deviation range. The time difference between these two moments is the duration of the occupancy for that sub-section. After calculation, the trackside station equipment checks the duration of the occupancy for the faulty section and its adjacent sub-sections, and reconfirms the deviation between the real-time pulse count and the no-load pulse reference value for both types of sections. If the duration of the occupancy for both the faulty section and adjacent sections is zero, and the deviation between the real-time pulse count and the no-load pulse reference value is within the allowable range, then the occupancy of the faulty section and adjacent sections is confirmed to meet safety requirements. If the duration of the occupancy is greater than zero, or the pulse count deviation exceeds the allowable range, then the occupancy is determined to be non-safe, and subsequent procedures must be suspended while investigating the cause of the abnormal occupancy.

[0045] Simultaneously, the trackside station equipment initiates a monitoring process for abnormal events within the axle counting zone. The monitored abnormal events include at least foreign object intrusion and earthquakes. The trackside station equipment acquires real-time monitoring data for various abnormal events through data transmission links established with foreign object intrusion monitoring devices (such as infrared beam sensors and lidar) and earthquake monitoring instruments deployed within the axle counting zone. For foreign object intrusion monitoring, it checks whether the monitoring device outputs a foreign object intrusion trigger signal. If no trigger signal is output, the foreign object intrusion monitoring data is determined to be within a preset safety threshold; if a trigger signal is output, a foreign object intrusion risk is identified, and safety requirements are not met. For earthquake monitoring, it reads data such as seismic wave intensity and vibration frequency recorded by the earthquake monitoring instrument and compares it with a preset earthquake safety threshold (this threshold is set based on the line's seismic design standards). If the monitoring data is all below the safety threshold, the earthquake monitoring data is determined to meet safety requirements; if it is above the safety threshold, an earthquake risk is identified, and safety requirements are not met.

[0046] When the confirmed status of the faulty section is determined to be valid, the occupancy status assessment results of the faulty section and adjacent sections within the axle counting zone meet the safety requirements, and the monitoring results of abnormal events such as foreign object intrusion and earthquakes within the axle counting zone all meet the preset safety standards, the trackside station equipment generates a determination result that the faulty section can be safely passed.

[0047] Step 140: Generate the second driving permit.

[0048] Once the trackside station equipment determines that the faulty section is safe to pass through, it initiates the process of acquiring the associated data from the positioning devices (i.e., transponders) linked to the faulty section. This associated data is generated in real time by the associated transponders distributed behind the faulty section and transmitted to the trackside station equipment. Specifically, it includes information such as the transponder's device identifier, installation location coordinates, last data update time, positioning signal strength, and historical positioning error records. After acquiring this associated data, the trackside station equipment verifies the associated data of the transponders one by one, combining it with the previously confirmed faulty section status (which must be valid), the axle counting zone status (the faulty section within the axle counting zone has been confirmed and other sub-segments are idle), and the abnormal event status within the axle counting zone (no foreign object intrusion, no earthquakes, or other anomalies). During the verification process, the device identifier of the associated transponder is checked to see if it matches the preset list of associated transponders for the fault section, whether the installation location coordinates are within the preset range of 5 transponders behind the fault section, whether the positioning signal strength meets the minimum threshold requirement for data transmission, and whether the historical positioning error is within the allowable deviation range. After verification, all transponders that meet the above conditions are selected as valid associated positioning devices.

[0049] For each valid associated positioning device, the trackside station equipment retrieves its historical positioning deviation data from the past 30 days based on its real-time location information and calculates the average positioning deviation of the device using a weighted average algorithm. Subsequently, the real-time location information of the valid associated positioning device is compensated and calibrated against the average positioning deviation to obtain a precise second train operation permission starting point reference. This ensures that the starting point reference accurately reflects the actual position of the train when passing the associated transponder, avoiding deviations in the train operation permission range due to positioning errors.

[0050] While determining the starting point reference, the trackside station equipment analyzes the physical boundary coordinates of the faulty section based on the track circuit topology diagram. These coordinates are determined by the positions of the track circuit insulation joints at both ends of the faulty section. Simultaneously, combined with the actual length data of the faulty section, the specific locations of the starting and ending points of the faulty section on the actual track are clarified. Next, the trackside station equipment obtains the signal coverage range of the subsequent normal track circuit section (i.e., the distance from which the track circuit signal can be stably transmitted within the normal section), axle counting zone division information (confirming the axle counting zone to which the subsequent normal section belongs and the distribution of sub-segments within that zone), and sets a preset safety protection distance according to train operation safety regulations. Combining this information, the safe boundary of the subsequent normal track circuit section is determined, i.e., the farthest normal section that the train can safely enter after passing the faulty section.

[0051] Subsequently, the trackside station equipment calculates the relative distance between the starting reference of the effective associated positioning device after calibration and the physical boundary of the fault section. This is combined with the train's travel time through the fault section at the first speed (normal operating speed) (derived by dividing the fault section length by the first speed), and a preset safety redundancy coefficient (usually set to 1.2-1.5 to handle sudden situations such as speed fluctuations during train operation). The minimum safe distance required for the train to pass through the fault section is calculated using the formula: Minimum safe distance = (Relative distance + First speed × Travel time) × Safety redundancy coefficient. Based on this minimum safe distance and the previously determined safe section boundary of the subsequent normal track circuit section, the total distance that the second travel permit needs to cover is further calculated, and the final endpoint of the second travel permit is set. During the setting process, it is ensured that the endpoint not only completely crosses the physical endpoint of the fault section but also forms a connection with the effective monitoring range of the subsequent normal track circuit section with an overlap length of no less than the preset length, avoiding a gap in travel permit coverage when the train enters the normal section from the fault section.

[0052] After determining the starting and ending points of the second train operation permit, the trackside station equipment embeds a unique identifier (such as a transponder ID) of the corresponding valid associated positioning device into the data packet of the second train operation permit. This identifier is used by the train's onboard equipment to quickly match the associated transponder corresponding to its current location when receiving the train operation permit, ensuring the accurate application of the train operation permit. At the same time, the trackside station equipment will also associate the confirmed status information of the faulty section (including confirmation time and confirmed train number) and the idle status information of the axle counting section (including the idle duration of each sub-section within the axle counting section and the axle counting data verification result) into the second train operation permit to form complete train operation permit data.

[0053] The generated second train operation permit is sent wirelessly to the train approaching the fault section after the first train. Upon receiving the second operation permit, the train's onboard equipment matches the unique identifier of the valid associated positioning device embedded in the permit with the associated transponder corresponding to its current location to confirm the applicability of the operation permit. Subsequently, based on the destination location indicated in the second operation permit and the safe passage information of the fault section, the onboard equipment controls the train to continue traveling at the first speed (normal operating speed), safely passing through the fault section without stopping or slowing down, until entering the subsequent normal track circuit section, effectively ensuring the transportation efficiency of the line in fault scenarios.

[0054] After generating a second train pass permitting the destination to pass through the faulty section based on the location information of the positioning device associated with the faulty section, to further ensure the operational safety of subsequent trains passing through the faulty section at the first speed, it is necessary to conduct targeted safety verification based on the train's own characteristics and the track conditions of the faulty section. Therefore, the trackside station equipment first obtains the type information (including factory-calibrated parameters such as train model, number of axles, and traction power) and load information (including real-time data such as the current number of passengers in the carriages and the weight of goods, etc. if it is a passenger train, it is fed back through the on-board weighing system; if it is a freight train, it is determined by combining the loading list and real-time weight monitoring data) of the subsequent trains approaching the faulty section. At the same time, the trackside station equipment retrieves the pre-stored track parameters of the faulty section. These parameters include the track gradient, curve radius, track gauge, track material wear degree, and the maximum allowable wheel-rail force limit of the faulty section, all of which come from the periodic inspection records and updated data of the track maintenance system.

[0055] Based on the acquired train type and load information, as well as the track parameters of the faulty section, the trackside station equipment invokes its built-in dynamic operation model algorithm module to construct a dedicated dynamic operation model for the train passing through the faulty section. This model, based on train dynamics principles, uses the traction characteristic curve and braking characteristic parameters corresponding to the train type, the axle load distribution data corresponding to the load information, and parameters such as gradient resistance and curve resistance of the faulty section as input variables to establish the force-motion relationship equations of the train within the faulty section, thus achieving a digital simulation of the train's operation.

[0056] After the model is built, the trackside station equipment initiates a simulation operation, setting the simulation scenario as a train entering the fault section at its initial speed (normal operating speed) and continuously passing through. During the simulation, the dynamic operation model calculates the wheel-rail interaction forces (including vertical and lateral forces, reflecting the impact of the train on the track), braking distance (the shortest distance required for emergency braking calculated based on the current speed and the track resistance of the fault section, used to verify safety redundancy in emergency situations), and derailment coefficient (a key indicator measuring the risk of derailment when the train is running on curves or slopes) at different locations within the fault section, at a frequency of 100ms / time. Each set of calculation results is transmitted in real time to the safety verification module of the trackside station equipment for comparison with preset safety limits.

[0057] If the simulation results show that all calculated parameters are within the preset safety limits, the endpoint position of the second train operation permit is deemed to meet the safety operation requirements and no adjustment is needed. However, if any parameter exceeds the preset safety limit—for example, in the simulation of a curve section in the fault zone, the derailment coefficient exceeds the limit of 0.8, or the wheel-rail lateral force exceeds the limit of 120kN—the trackside station equipment initiates the endpoint position adjustment process. During the adjustment, the adjustment direction and amount are determined based on the magnitude of the parameter exceedance: if the braking distance exceeds the limit, it indicates insufficient safety redundancy provided by the current endpoint position; the endpoint position is extended to the normal section behind the fault zone by a length equal to the excess distance × 1.5 (1.5 is the safety compensation coefficient); if the wheel-rail force or derailment coefficient exceeds the limit, the endpoint position is adjusted based on the line parameters of the excess position (such as curve radius and gradient) to ensure that when the train passes through the fault zone at the first speed, the distance between the most severely stressed position and the endpoint position meets the required running distance for force return to the limit + a 20-meter safety buffer distance. After adjustments, restart the dynamic running model for a second simulation until all parameters meet the safety limits.

[0058] Once the endpoint of the second train operation permit is determined, the trackside station equipment will embed the final adjusted endpoint and the verification results of the dynamic operation model (including the simulated maximum values ​​of each key parameter, the deviation rate from the safety limit, and the verification pass status indicator) as additional parameters into the data packet of the second train operation permit. These additional parameters are stored in an encrypted format and, together with the previously embedded unique identifier of the valid associated positioning device and the fault section confirmation status information, form a complete train operation permit data chain. This ensures that after receiving the second train operation permit, the onboard equipment can not only obtain the operating range instructions but also access the safety verification basis, further improving the safety and reliability of passage through the fault section.

[0059] After the second train operation permit is generated and sent, and subsequent trains are allowed to enter the faulty section at the first speed according to this permit, the trackside station equipment initiates a real-time position tracking process for subsequent trains to promptly grasp their traffic status, ensure their safe departure from the faulty section, and smoothly switch to normal operation mode. Specifically, when a subsequent train approaching the faulty section after the first train enters the faulty section at the first speed according to the second train operation permit and continues to travel, the trackside station equipment tracks the position status of the subsequent train in real time through a dual monitoring mechanism. On one hand, the trackside station equipment continuously receives position reports sent by the onboard equipment of the subsequent trains via a wireless transmission channel. These reports contain information such as real-time position coordinates generated by the effective positioning device associated with the faulty section, train speed, and direction of travel. On the other hand, the trackside station equipment retrieves track circuit status data from the normal track circuit section behind the faulty section. This data is collected in real time by the track circuit equipment in the normal section and reflects whether the section is occupied by a train and the approximate range of the occupied position.

[0060] The trackside station equipment compares the real-time position coordinates of subsequent trains with the pre-stored physical end coordinates of the fault section and the physical start coordinates of the normal track circuit section behind the fault section. It also performs cross-validation using track circuit occupancy data from the normal track circuit section. When the position report shows that the head position coordinates of the subsequent train have crossed the physical end coordinates of the fault section, and the track circuit equipment in the normal track circuit section reports that a train occupancy signal has been detected in that section (indicating that at least one carriage of the train has entered the normal section), the trackside station equipment determines that the subsequent train has passed the fault section and entered the normal track circuit section following the fault section.

[0061] At this point, the trackside station equipment initiates the second train operation permit transmission stop procedure. First, the internal train operation permit management module marks the second train operation permit status of the subsequent train as terminated and records the time of cessation, the train identifier, and the normal section number where the train is currently located. Subsequently, the train operation permit management module sends a stop transmission command to the wireless transmission channel control unit. This command contains the unique identifier of the train whose second train operation permit transmission needs to be stopped and the corresponding second train operation permit number, ensuring accurate location of the target train's train operation permit transmission link.

[0062] Upon receiving the stop transmission command, the wireless transmission channel control unit immediately terminates the transmission of the second train operation permit data packet to the subsequent train's onboard equipment. Simultaneously, it sends a transmission stop confirmation signal to the status feedback module of the trackside station equipment, indicating that the transmission of the second train operation permit has been successfully stopped. During this process, to prevent operational anomalies caused by the sudden cessation of receiving the second train operation permit, the trackside station equipment embeds a notification message indicating an impending switch to normal operation permits in the last second train operation permit data packet before the transmission ceases. This notification message is displayed on the human-machine interface of the subsequent train's onboard equipment, informing the driver that they have entered a normal section and will subsequently operate according to the original operation permit transmitted by the track circuit.

[0063] When subsequent trains have completely left the axle counting section corresponding to the faulty section, and the track circuit equipment in the normal track circuit section is able to stably transmit the normal track circuit original train operation permit (i.e., the second track circuit original train operation permit) to the train's onboard equipment, the trackside station equipment further cleans up the second train operation permit-related data of the subsequent trains, including deleting the data packet, additional parameters, and verification results of the second train operation permit from the train operation permit storage module, releasing equipment storage resources, reserving space for other possible second train operation permits, ensuring that the train control system's management of train operation permits for other trains approaching the faulty section is not affected, and maintaining the continuity and efficiency of the entire faulty section's traffic scheduling.

[0064] To better understand the practical application process of switching traffic permits for faulty sections, the following explanation uses specific scenario examples. Figure 2 and Figure 3 As shown, in the actual scenario of switching train operation permits in a fault section, the train initially travels normally according to the original train operation permit transmitted by the track circuit. The position report sent by train 1 is generated based on the nearest associated transponder B2 to its current position; the position report sent by train 2 is generated based on its nearest associated transponder DW. As the train travels from station A towards the section, section 3G within the axle counting zone becomes a fault section, while the remaining sections LQG, 1G, 2G, 4G, and 5G remain normal. At this time, train 1, as the first train approaching the fault section, has its original train operation permit endpoint adjusted to the starting point of 3G and must stop on 2G, which precedes 3G. If train 1 fails to pass through the fault section quickly, the subsequent train 2 will slow down due to track occupancy and stop within 1G behind train 1. According to the design rules, the associated transponders corresponding to fault section 3G are B3, B2, B1, and DW, a total of four. The station equipment at station A first verifies the conditions for sending a fault confirmation request. It confirms that the logical state of 3G is fault-occupied, 3G has not been confirmed, there are no foreign objects or earthquake events within 3G, and the transponder B2 on which the train 1 position report is based belongs to the 3G associated transponder. After all conditions are met, it sends a 3G fault confirmation request to the onboard equipment of train 1.

[0065] After receiving the request, the onboard equipment of Train 1 displays it on the human-machine interface. Following existing train operation procedures and confirmation from dispatch, the driver downgrades the onboard equipment to visual driving mode. The driver then manually controls the train to travel at a fixed speed of 20 km / h past 3G, completing the safety confirmation of 3G and leaving the faulty section. Subsequently, the onboard equipment of Train 1 sends a 3G fault confirmation receipt to the trackside station equipment at Station A via the wireless transmission channel. Upon receiving the receipt, the trackside station equipment at Station A verifies that the receipt information matches the previously sent confirmation request. It then assesses the conditions for activating redundant train operation permits. It confirms that the only faulty section 3G within axle counting zone 2 has been effectively confirmed, all other sections within axle counting zone 2 (4G, 5G, etc.) are idle, axle counting zone 2 as a whole is idle, and there are no foreign objects or earthquake events within the zone. Once all conditions are met, the redundant train operation permit generation function for the wireless transmission channel of axle counting zone 2 is activated.

[0066] For axle counting zone 2, the trackside equipment at station A generates four redundant train operation permits (M1, M2, M3, and M4) based on the associated transponders B3, B2, B1, and DW, respectively. The endpoint of each redundant train operation permit extends beyond the faulty section 3G, and at most two sections, ultimately reaching the end of 5G. At this time, train 2, located in the normal section LQG, reports its position based on the nearest associated transponder DW, matching it with the redundant train operation permit M1. The trackside equipment at station A sends M1 to train 2 via the wireless transmission channel. Train 2's onboard equipment determines that the endpoint distance of M1 is not within the speed reduction range and maintains normal travel speed. When train 2 travels from the normal section 1LQ to 1G, its position report switches to being based on the nearest associated transponder B1, matching it with the redundant train operation permit M2. After the trackside equipment at station A sends M2, train 2 still does not need to reduce speed. When train 2 continues to travel to 2G, its position report, based on the nearest relevant transponder B2, matches with redundant travel permission M3. After receiving M3, train 2 does not need to stop at 2G as it would under the original travel permission, but instead directly enters the faulty section 3G. After entering 3G, train 2's position report, based on the nearest relevant transponder B3, matches with redundant travel permission M4. After receiving M4, it maintains normal speed until it leaves 3G and enters the normal section 4G. Once train 2 is in the normal section 4G, there are no faulty sections ahead of it, and the original travel permission of the track circuit extends further away. The trackside station equipment at station A no longer sends redundant travel permission to train 2, and train 2 continues to operate normally relying on the original travel permission transmitted by the track circuit.

[0067] In summary, this application sets the first travel permit endpoint as the starting point of the fault section, and specifies that the train will stop after reaching this starting point at a normal first speed. This operation not only continues the initial safety protection in the fault scenario, preventing the train from blindly entering the unknown fault area, but also reduces unnecessary premature deceleration by setting the train to travel at a normal speed before the fault, thus reducing the initial impact on train operation efficiency. Next, for situations where the fault section has not been safely confirmed and the first train enters the preset approach range, this application sends a fault confirmation request to the first train, instructing it to pass through the fault section at a second speed lower than the first speed and provide feedback. This approach, using the first train to explore the path at low speed, replaces the traditional process where all trains must stop and wait for manual confirmation, ensuring safety while shortening the waiting time for subsequent trains. Subsequently, based on the fault confirmation receipt from the first train and information such as the confirmed status of the faulty section, after determining that the faulty section can be safely traversed, a second travel permit is generated to allow the final train to pass through the faulty section. This clarifies that subsequent trains can directly pass through the faulty section at the highest speed, completely eliminating the restriction that all trains must pass through at low speed in traditional scenarios. This fundamentally solves the problem of long-term low-speed operation caused by track circuit faults. The entire process, through differentiated control logic of first train exploratory confirmation and subsequent normal passage, minimizes the impact of faults on train operation efficiency while ensuring safe passage through the faulty section. It avoids scheduling disruptions and train delays, effectively balancing safety and transportation efficiency in fault scenarios.

[0068] It is understood that, in order to achieve the functions in the above embodiments, the computer device includes hardware structures and / or software modules corresponding to the execution of each function. Those skilled in the art should readily recognize that, based on the units and method steps described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed in this application, this application can be implemented in hardware or a combination of hardware and computer software. Whether a function is executed by hardware or by computer software driving hardware depends on the specific application scenario and design constraints of the technical solution.

[0069] Furthermore, as a response to the above Figure 1 The implementation of the method embodiment shown in this application provides a fault section traffic permit switching device. The embodiment of this device corresponds to the foregoing method embodiment. For ease of reading, this embodiment will not repeat the details of the foregoing method embodiment, but it should be understood that the device in this embodiment can correspondingly implement all the contents of the foregoing method embodiment. Specifically, as shown... Figure 4 As shown, the fault section traffic permit switching device 400 includes:

[0070] The first train operation permission module 410 is used to adjust the first train operation permission when there is a fault section in the track circuit section. The adjusted first train operation permission is used to instruct the train to stop running when it reaches the starting point of the fault section at a first speed. The first speed is the speed at which the train runs in a normal track circuit section.

[0071] The fault confirmation module 420 is used to send a fault confirmation request to the first train when the fault section has not been safely confirmed and the first train approaching the fault section is within a preset approach range, so as to instruct the first train to pass through the fault section at a second speed, and to receive the fault confirmation receipt sent by the first train after passing through the fault section. The second speed is a preset low speed that is less than the first speed.

[0072] The safety confirmation module 430 is used to determine whether it is safe to pass through the fault section based on the fault confirmation receipt, combined with the confirmation status of the fault section, the status of the axle counting section, and the status of abnormal events within the axle counting section.

[0073] The second train operation permission module 440 is used to generate a second train operation permission if the condition is met. The second train operation permission is used to enable trains that approach the fault section within a preset time period after the first train to pass through the fault section at a first speed.

[0074] Furthermore, such as Figure 4 As shown, the safety confirmation module 430 is specifically used to parse the fault confirmation receipt to extract the operating parameters of the first train when it passed through the fault section. The operating parameters are compared with the historical normal operating parameters of the first train in the same section to determine whether the fault section confirmation status corresponding to the fault confirmation receipt is valid. It also acquires axle counting data for each sub-section within the axle counting zone, assesses the occupancy status of each sub-section based on the axle counting data, and confirms whether the occupancy status of the fault section and adjacent sections meets safety requirements. Furthermore, it monitors the status of abnormal events within the axle counting zone to confirm that the monitoring data for various abnormal events affecting train operation safety are all within preset safety thresholds. When the confirmation status of the fault section is determined to be valid, the axle counting zone status assessment result meets safety requirements, and the abnormal event monitoring result meets preset safety standards, it indicates that the fault section can be safely passed.

[0075] Furthermore, such as Figure 4As shown, the safety confirmation module 430 is specifically used to acquire axle counting data for each sub-segment within the axle counting zone. The axle counting data includes the real-time pulse count of the axle counter corresponding to each sub-segment and the change in pulse count within a preset time period. The real-time pulse count is compared with a preset no-load pulse reference value to assess whether each sub-segment is in an occupied state. If so, the occupancy duration of each sub-segment is calculated based on the change in pulse count of each sub-segment. The occupancy duration of the faulty section and adjacent sections is checked to see if it is zero and if the deviation between the real-time pulse count and the preset no-load pulse reference value is within the allowable range, thereby confirming whether the occupancy status of the faulty section and adjacent sections meets the safety requirements.

[0076] Furthermore, such as Figure 4 As shown, the second train operation permit module 440 is specifically used to acquire the associated data of the positioning devices associated with the faulty section; to filter out valid associated positioning devices based on the confirmed status of the faulty section, the status of the axle counting zone, the status of abnormal events within the axle counting zone, and the associated data; for each valid associated positioning device, to determine the starting point reference of the second train operation permit based on the location information of the valid associated positioning device, and to set the ending position of the second train operation permit in combination with the length of the faulty section and the distribution of subsequent normal track circuit sections; to embed the unique identifier of the valid associated positioning device in the second train operation permit, and to associate the confirmed status information of the faulty section and the idle status information of the axle counting zone.

[0077] Furthermore, such as Figure 4 As shown, the second train operation permit module 440 is specifically used to calibrate the starting point benchmark of the second train operation permit based on the real-time position information of the effective associated positioning device and combined with the historical positioning deviation data of the effective associated positioning device; analyze the physical boundary coordinates of the fault section based on the length of the fault section and the track circuit topology; determine the safe section boundary that can be extended by the subsequent normal track circuit section according to the signal coverage range of the subsequent normal track circuit section, the axle counting zoning information and the preset safety protection distance; calculate the relative distance between the starting point benchmark after calibration of the effective associated positioning device and the physical boundary of the fault section, and obtain the minimum safe distance required for the train to pass through the fault section by combining the running time of the train passing through the fault section at the first speed and the preset safety redundancy coefficient; calculate the total distance that the second train operation permit needs to cover based on the minimum safe distance and the safe section boundary of the subsequent normal track circuit section, set the endpoint position, and ensure that the endpoint position crosses the physical endpoint of the fault section and forms a connection with the effective monitoring range of the subsequent normal track circuit section with a length not less than the preset overlap length.

[0078] Furthermore, such as Figure 4As shown, the second train operation permit module 440 is specifically used to obtain the train type and load information corresponding to the second train operation permit, and construct a dynamic operation model of the train passing through the faulty section by combining the line parameters of the faulty section; simulate the operation process of the train passing through the faulty section at a first speed through the dynamic operation model, calculate the wheel-rail interaction force, braking distance and derailment coefficient of the train in the faulty section in real time, and compare them with the preset safety limits; if there are parameters in the simulation results that exceed the preset safety limits, adjust the end position of the second train operation permit according to the extent of the exceedance; embed the adjusted end position and the verification result of the dynamic operation model as additional parameters into the second train operation permit.

[0079] Furthermore, such as Figure 4 As shown, when a train following the first train approaches the faulty section, passes through the faulty section and enters the normal track circuit section after the faulty section, the second train travel permission is stopped from being sent to the train following the first train approaching the faulty section.

[0080] Optionally, the fault section traffic permission switching device may be an electronic device with data processing capabilities, or a functional module in the electronic device, without limitation.

[0081] For example, the electronic device can be a server, which can be a single server or a server cluster consisting of multiple servers. As another example, the electronic device can be a mobile phone, tablet computer, desktop computer, laptop computer, handheld computer, notebook computer, ultra-mobile personal computer (UMPC), netbook, as well as cellular phone, personal digital assistant (PDA), augmented reality (AR), virtual reality (VR) device, and other terminal devices. Furthermore, the electronic device can also be a recording device, video surveillance device, etc. This application does not impose any special limitations on the specific form of the electronic device.

[0082] The following example uses an electronic device as the switching device for train operation permits in the faulty section. Figure 5 As shown, Figure 5 The hardware structure of an electronic device 500 provided in this application.

[0083] like Figure 5 As shown, the electronic device 500 includes a processor 510, a communication line 520, and a communication interface 530.

[0084] Optionally, the electronic device 500 may also include a memory 540. The processor 510, memory 540, and communication interface 530 can be connected via a communication line 520.

[0085] The processor 510 can be a central processing unit (CPU), a general-purpose processor, a network processor (NP), a digital signal processor (DSP), a microprocessor, a microcontroller, a programmable logic device (PLD), or any combination thereof. The processor 510 can also be any other device with processing capabilities, such as a circuit, device, or software module, without limitation.

[0086] In one example, processor 510 may include one or more CPUs, for example Figure 5 CPU0 and CPU1 in the CPU.

[0087] As an optional implementation, the electronic device 500 may include multiple processors; for example, in addition to processor 510, it may also include processor 570. A communication line 520 is used to transmit information between the components included in the electronic device 500.

[0088] Communication interface 530 is used for communication with other devices or other communication networks. This other communication network can be Ethernet, Radio Access Network (RAN), Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN), etc. Communication interface 530 can be a module, circuit, transceiver, or any device capable of enabling communication.

[0089] Memory 540 is used to store instructions. These instructions can be computer programs.

[0090] The memory 540 may be a read-only memory (ROM) or other type of static storage device capable of storing static information and / or instructions; it may also be a random access memory (RAM) or other type of dynamic storage device capable of storing information and / or instructions; it may also be an electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), a compact disc read-only memory (CD-ROM) or other optical disc storage, optical disc storage (including compressed optical discs, laser discs, optical discs, digital universal optical discs, Blu-ray discs, etc.), disk storage media, or other magnetic storage devices, etc., without limitation.

[0091] It should be noted that the memory 540 can exist independently of the processor 510, or it can be integrated with the processor 510. The memory 540 can be used to store instructions, program code, or some data, etc. The memory 540 can be located inside or outside the electronic device 500, without restriction.

[0092] The processor 510 is configured to execute instructions stored in the memory 540 to implement the communication method provided in the following embodiments of this application. For example, when the electronic device 500 is a terminal or a chip in a terminal, the processor 510 can execute instructions stored in the memory 540 to implement the steps performed by the sending end in the following embodiments of this application.

[0093] As an optional implementation, the electronic device 500 also includes an output device 550 and an input device 560. The output device 550 can be a display screen, speaker, or other device capable of outputting data from the electronic device 500 to the user. The input device 560 can be a keyboard, mouse, microphone, joystick, or other device capable of inputting data into the electronic device 500.

[0094] It should be pointed out that, Figure 5 The structure shown does not constitute a limitation on the electronic device, except... Figure 5 In addition to the components shown, the electronic device may include more or fewer components than illustrated, or combine certain components, or have different component arrangements.

[0095] The fault section traffic permit switching device and application scenarios described in this application are for the purpose of more clearly illustrating the technical solutions of this application, and do not constitute a limitation on the technical solutions provided in this application. As those skilled in the art will know, with the evolution of fault section traffic permit switching devices and the emergence of new business scenarios, the technical solutions provided in this application are also applicable to similar technical problems.

[0096] This application provides a storage medium storing a program that, when executed by a processor, implements the fault section traffic permit switching method.

[0097] This application is described with reference to flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams of methods, apparatus (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of this application. It will be understood that each block of the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, and combinations of blocks in the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, special-purpose computer, embedded processor, or other programmable data processing apparatus to produce a machine, such that the instructions, which execute via the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing apparatus, generate instructions for implementing the flowchart... Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A device that provides the functions specified in one or more boxes.

[0098] In a typical configuration, the device includes one or more processors (CPUs), memory, and a bus. The device may also include input / output interfaces, network interfaces, etc.

[0099] Memory may include non-persistent memory in computer-readable media, such as random access memory (RAM) and / or non-volatile memory, like read-only memory (ROM) or flash RAM, and memory includes at least one memory chip. Memory is an example of computer-readable media.

[0100] Computer-readable media includes both permanent and non-permanent, removable and non-removable media that can store information using any method or technology. Information can be computer-readable instructions, data structures, modules of programs, or other data. Examples of computer storage media include, but are not limited to, phase-change memory (PRAM), static random access memory (SRAM), dynamic random access memory (DRAM), other types of random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), flash memory or other memory technologies, CD-ROM, digital versatile optical disc (DVD) or other optical storage, magnetic tape, magnetic magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices, or any other non-transferable medium that can be used to store information accessible by a computing device. As defined herein, computer-readable media does not include transient computer-readable media, such as modulated data signals and carrier waves.

[0101] It should also be noted that the terms "comprising," "including," or any other variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises a list of elements includes not only those elements but also other elements not expressly listed, or elements inherent to such process, method, article, or apparatus. Unless otherwise specified, an element defined by the phrase "comprising one..." does not exclude the presence of other identical elements in the process, method, article, or apparatus that includes that element.

[0102] Those skilled in the art will understand that embodiments of this application can be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Therefore, this application can take the form of a completely hardware embodiment, a completely software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Furthermore, this application can take the form of a computer program product embodied on one or more computer-usable storage media (including, but not limited to, disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program code.

[0103] The above are merely embodiments of this application and are not intended to limit the scope of this application. Various modifications and variations can be made to this application by those skilled in the art. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc., made within the spirit and principles of this application should be included within the scope of the claims of this application.

Claims

1. A method for switching traffic permits in a faulty section, characterized in that, The method comprises: adjusting a first train operation permit when a fault section exists in the section track circuit section, the adjusted first train operation permit being used to indicate that a train stops running at the starting point of the fault section at a first speed, the first speed being the speed at which the train runs in a normal track circuit section; when the fault section is not confirmed to be safe and the first train approaching the fault section is in a preset approaching range, sending a fault confirmation request to the first train to indicate that the first train passes through the fault section at a second speed, the second speed being a preset low speed less than the first speed, and receiving a fault confirmation reply sent by the first train after passing through the fault section; based on the fault confirmation reply, judging whether it is safe to pass through the fault section in combination with the confirmation state of the fault section, the state of the axle counting section and the abnormal event state in the axle counting section; if yes, generating a second train operation permit, the second train operation permit being used to make the train approaching the fault section within a preset time period after the first train to pass through the fault section at the first speed.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein, based on the fault confirmation reply, judging whether it is safe to pass through the fault section in combination with the confirmation state of the fault section, the state of the axle counting section and the abnormal event state in the axle counting section, comprising: analyzing the fault confirmation reply to extract the running parameters of the first train when passing through the fault section, comparing the running parameters with the historical normal running parameters of the same section of the first train to determine whether the fault section confirmation state corresponding to the fault confirmation reply is valid confirmation; obtaining the axle counting data of each sub-section in the axle counting section, and evaluating the occupancy state of each sub-section according to the axle counting data to confirm whether the occupancy states of the fault section and the adjacent sections of the fault section meet the safety requirements; monitoring the abnormal event state in the axle counting section to confirm that all kinds of abnormal event monitoring data affecting train operation safety are within a preset safety threshold; when the confirmation state of the fault section is determined to be valid, the state evaluation result of the axle counting section meets the safety requirements, and the abnormal event monitoring result meets the preset safety standard, it is indicated that the fault section can be safely passed through.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein, obtaining the axle counting data of each sub-section in the axle counting section, and evaluating the occupancy state of each sub-section according to the axle counting data to confirm whether the occupancy states of the fault section and the adjacent sections of the fault section meet the safety requirements, comprising: obtaining the axle counting data of each sub-section in the axle counting section, the axle counting data comprising the real-time pulse count of each sub-section corresponding to the axle counter and the pulse count change amount in a preset time period; comparing the real-time pulse count with a preset empty load pulse reference value to evaluate whether each sub-section is in an occupancy state; if yes, calculating the occupancy state duration of each sub-section based on the pulse count change amount of each sub-section; verifying whether the occupancy state duration of the fault section and the adjacent sections is zero and the deviation of the real-time pulse count from the preset empty load pulse reference value is within an allowable range, to confirm whether the occupancy states of the fault section and the adjacent sections meet the safety requirements.

4. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that, Generating a second train operation permit crossing the fault section based on position information of the positioning device associated with the fault section, comprising: Obtaining associated data of the positioning device associated with the fault section; Screening out effective associated positioning devices according to the confirmed state of the fault section, the state of the axle counting section, the abnormal event state in the axle counting section and the associated data; For each effective associated positioning device, determining the starting reference of the second train operation permit according to the position information of the effective associated positioning device, setting the end position of the second train operation permit in combination with the length of the fault section and the distribution of the subsequent normal track circuit section; Embedding the unique identifier of the effective associated positioning device in the second train operation permit, while associating the confirmed state information of the fault section and the idle state information of the axle counting section.

5. The method of claim 4, wherein, For each effective associated positioning device, determining the starting reference of the second train operation permit according to the position information of the effective associated positioning device, setting the end position of the second train operation permit in combination with the length of the fault section and the distribution of the subsequent normal track circuit section, comprising: Calibrating the starting reference of the second train operation permit based on the real-time position information of the effective associated positioning device in combination with the historical positioning deviation data of the effective associated positioning device; Analyzing the physical boundary coordinates of the fault section based on the length of the fault section and the track circuit topology structure; Determining the safe section boundary that the subsequent normal track circuit section can extend according to the signal coverage range of the subsequent normal track circuit section, the axle counting section division information and the preset safety protection distance; Calculating the relative distance between the calibrated starting reference of the effective associated positioning device and the physical boundary of the fault section, combining the running time of the train through the fault section at the first speed and the preset safety redundancy coefficient to obtain the minimum safety distance required for the train to pass through the fault section; Based on the minimum safety distance and the safe section boundary of the subsequent normal track circuit section, calculating the total distance covered by the second train operation permit, setting the end position to ensure that the end position crosses the physical end of the fault section and forms a connection with the effective monitoring range of the subsequent normal track circuit section that is not less than the preset overlap length.

6. The method of claim 5, wherein, The method further comprises: Obtaining the train type and load information corresponding to the second train operation permit, combining the line parameters of the fault section to construct a dynamic running model of the train passing through the fault section; Simulating the running process of the train through the fault section at the first speed through the dynamic running model, and calculating the wheel-rail force, braking distance and derailment coefficient of the train in the fault section in real time, and comparing with the preset safety limit value; If there is a parameter exceeding the preset safety limit value in the simulation result, adjusting the end position of the second train operation permit according to the exceeding amplitude; Embedding the adjusted end position and the verification result of the dynamic running model as additional parameters into the second train operation permit.

7. The method of claim 1, wherein, The method further comprises: When the train approaching the fault section after the first train passes through the fault section and enters the normal track circuit section after the fault section, stop sending the second train operation permit to the train approaching the fault section after the first train.

8. A fault section reclosing device, characterized in that The device comprises: The first train operation permission module is configured to adjust the first train operation permission when there is a fault section in the section track circuit section, and the adjusted first train operation permission is used to instruct a train to stop running at the starting point of the fault section when running at a first speed, and the first speed is the speed of the train running in a normal track circuit section; The fault confirmation module is configured to send a fault confirmation request to the first train when the fault section is not completed with safety confirmation and the first train approaching the fault section is in a preset approaching range, to instruct the first train to pass through the fault section at a second speed, and the second speed is a preset low speed less than the first speed, and receive a fault confirmation reply sent by the first train after passing through the fault section; The safety confirmation module is configured to judge whether it is safe to pass through the fault section based on the fault confirmation reply, in combination with the confirmation state of the fault section, the state of the axle counting section, and the abnormal event state in the axle counting section; The second train operation permission module is configured to generate a second train operation permission if it is safe to pass through the fault section, and the second train operation permission is used to make the train approaching the fault section within a preset time period after the first train run at the first speed to pass through the fault section.

9. A storage medium, characterized by The storage medium comprises a stored program, wherein the program controls the device where the storage medium is located to execute the fault section train operation permission switching method according to any one of claims 1-7 when the program is running.

10. An electronic device, comprising: The device comprises at least one processor, at least one memory connected with the processor, and a bus; wherein the processor, the memory and the bus complete mutual communication through the bus; the processor is used to call the program instruction in the memory to execute the fault section train operation permission switching method according to any one of claims 1-7.

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