Emergency shutdown control method and device for plant flooded with water

Abstract

The invention discloses an emergency shutdown control method and device for a flooded plant. According to the method, three types of water level monitoring sensors are arranged according to risk levels of key areas of the plant; fault self-diagnosis is carried out based on the combination relation of sensor action signals, and when any connecting rod floating ball liquid level switch or electrode type liquid level switch acts and the other connecting rod floating ball liquid level switch does not act, it is judged that a water level measuring point has a fault, and a fault alarm is triggered; a shutdown instruction is generated through physical and signal dual redundancy design; and performing secondary verification on the shutdown instruction by adopting a hard strap interlocking mechanism, and when the two paths of shutdown signals are received and the hard strap is in an input state, starting an emergency shutdown process and synchronously triggering a broadcast alarm system. According to the invention, the reliability and response speed of plant flooding accident monitoring can be effectively improved, the risks of maloperation and refusal operation are reduced through multi-sensor redundancy configuration and fault self-diagnosis logic, dual-path emergency shutdown control is realized, and the safety protection capability of a hydropower station is remarkably enhanced.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application relates to the technical field of water-flooding protection control of hydropower stations, and particularly relates to a water-flooding power house emergency shutdown control method and device. BACKGROUND

[0002] Water-flooding power house is a major safety production accident of a hydropower station. Once a water-flooding power house accident occurs, it will cause significant economic losses to the enterprise, and even cause casualties. Therefore, preventing water-flooding power house accidents is one of the most important work of safety management of hydropower stations. Generally, when a hydropower station power house is threatened by water-flooding, the following defects exist: 1. The shutdown point arrangement lacks scientificity: the existing point is mostly concentrated in the surface area of the power house, and is not arranged differently according to the water-flooding risk level of different areas (such as high-risk areas such as water conveying corridors, unit foundation pits, cable layers, etc.), and is not arranged according to the risk level of key areas, resulting in that some equipment monitoring blind areas, such as water conveying systems and metal structures, are easily ignored, thereby delaying the response opportunity of the accident.

[0003] 2. The control logic reliability is insufficient: the water level monitoring element is of a single type, and double redundancy in the physical and signal levels is not realized, which is easy to cause misoperation or refusal to operate due to single-point failure of the sensor, such as missing the shutdown opportunity due to single sensor failure.

[0004] 3. The linkage response efficiency is low: the existing system mostly relies on manual confirmation to start the shutdown process, and does not realize automatic linkage of water level monitoring and shutdown instruction, or the complex logic process causes shutdown delay (such as needing to forward signals through multiple PLCs), which cannot meet the protection needs of the scene of rapid rise of high water level. SUMMARY

[0005] In view of the problems of unscientific shutdown point arrangement, insufficient control logic reliability, and low linkage response efficiency in the existing water-flooding power house protection system of a hydropower station, the present application provides a water-flooding power house emergency shutdown control method, which is based on multi-level risk zoning theory, proposes a redundant point arrangement scheme covering key areas, and combines multi-sensor combination judgment logic and automatic linkage process to realize rapid identification, reliable alarm, and emergency shutdown control of water-flooding power house accidents, thereby significantly improving the ability of the hydropower station to resist water-flooding accidents and reducing the risk of equipment damage and casualties.

[0006] Another object of the present application is to provide a water-flooding power house emergency shutdown control device.

[0007] To achieve the above object, the first aspect of the present application provides a water-flooding power house emergency shutdown control method, comprising: S1, arranging three types of water level monitoring sensors according to the risk level of the key area of the factory building, the three types of water level monitoring sensors comprising two connecting rod floating ball liquid level switches and one electrode type liquid level switch, and setting different action thresholds to realize sensor signal level correlation; S2, performing fault self-diagnosis based on the combination relationship of the sensor action signals, when any connecting rod floating ball liquid level switch or electrode type liquid level switch acts and the other connecting rod floating ball liquid level switch does not act, determining that the water level measuring point is faulty and triggering a fault alarm; S3, generating a shutdown instruction through physical and signal dual redundancy design, the physical redundancy comprising independent support installation and separate power supply circuit, and the signal redundancy comprising two independent shutdown signals output by a PLC controller to a monitoring system; S4, adopting a hard pressure plate interlocking mechanism to perform secondary verification on the shutdown instruction, when both of the two shutdown signals are received and the hard pressure plate is in the put-in state, starting an emergency shutdown process and synchronously triggering a broadcast alarm system.

[0008] In an embodiment of the present application, the three types of water level monitoring sensors arranged according to the risk level of the key area of the factory building further comprise: S11, setting a water level monitoring threshold of ≥300mm for the sensors for the tail water inlet door, the volute inlet door and the technical water supply layer; S12, setting a water level monitoring threshold of ≥100mm for the sensors for the water machine room.

[0009] In an embodiment of the present application, the fault self-diagnosis based on the combination relationship of the sensor action signals further comprises: S21, when floating ball 1 or the electrode type liquid level switch acts and floating ball 2 does not act, determining that the water level measuring point is faulty; S22, triggering a fault alarm signal by comparing the action state difference between floating ball 2 and floating ball 1 / electrode.

[0010] In an embodiment of the present application, the shutdown instruction generated through physical and signal dual redundancy design further comprises: S31, adopting independent support installation of the three types of water level monitoring sensors to avoid signal failure caused by support loosening; S32, through the double signal output circuit design of the PLC controller, sending two independent shutdown signals to the monitoring system and the water machine protection system respectively.

[0011] In an embodiment of the present application, further comprising: S5, setting a 5-second delay trigger for the broadcast alarm signal and a 2-second delay trigger for the shutdown signal to filter out transient interference signals.

[0012] In one embodiment of the present application, the secondary verification of the shutdown instruction by the hard press plate interlocking mechanism further comprises: S41, verifying the legality of the shutdown instruction by logical AND operation of the physical hard press plate state and the two-way shutdown signal; S42, when the hard press plate is in the put-in state and the two-way shutdown signal is received, starting the emergency shutdown process and synchronously triggering the broadcast alarm system.

[0013] To achieve the above purpose, the second aspect embodiment of the present application provides a water-flooded plant emergency shutdown control device, comprising: A sensor arrangement module is arranged to arrange three types of water level monitoring sensors according to the risk level of the key area of the plant, the three types of water level monitoring sensors including two connecting rod floating ball liquid level switches and one electrode type liquid level switch, and different action thresholds are set to realize sensor signal hierarchical correlation; A fault self-diagnosis module is arranged to perform fault self-diagnosis based on the combination relationship of the sensor action signals, and when any connecting rod floating ball liquid level switch or electrode type liquid level switch acts and the other connecting rod floating ball liquid level switch does not act, it is determined that the water level measuring point is faulty and a fault alarm is triggered; A double redundancy design module is arranged to generate a shutdown instruction through physical and signal double redundancy design, the physical redundancy includes independent support installation and separate power supply circuit, and the signal redundancy includes outputting two-way independent shutdown signals to the monitoring system by the PLC controller; A hard press plate interlocking verification module is arranged to perform secondary verification of the shutdown instruction by the hard press plate interlocking mechanism, and when the two-way shutdown signal is received and the hard press plate is in the put-in state, the emergency shutdown process is started and the broadcast alarm system is synchronously triggered.

[0014] The water-flooded plant emergency shutdown control method and device of the embodiment of the present application effectively improve the reliability and response speed of water-flooded accident monitoring, reduce the risk of misoperation and refusal to operate, and realize rapid identification and emergency shutdown control of the water level anomaly in the key area through physical and signal double redundancy design and multi-sensor combination judgment logic. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0015] The above and / or additional aspects and advantages of the present application will become apparent and more readily appreciated from the following description of the embodiments, taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, in which: Figure 1 A flowchart of a water-flooded plant emergency shutdown control method provided by the embodiment of the present application; Figure 2 A water-flooded plant alarm logic diagram for the water machine room provided by the embodiment of the present application; Figure 3 A water level over-high broadcast alarm logic diagram provided by the embodiment of the present application; Figure 4This is a logic diagram for shutting down units with excessively high water levels in the plant, provided in an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 5 This is a structural diagram of an emergency shutdown control device for a flooded factory provided in an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0016] It should be noted that, unless otherwise specified, the embodiments and features described in the present invention can be combined with each other. The present invention will now be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments.

[0017] To enable those skilled in the art to better understand the present invention, the technical solutions of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings of the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort should fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0018] The following description, with reference to the accompanying drawings, describes an emergency shutdown control method and apparatus for a flooded factory building according to an embodiment of the present invention.

[0019] This embodiment provides a method for emergency shutdown control in a flooded factory building. For example... Figure 1 As shown, the method includes the following steps: S1. Three types of water level monitoring sensors are arranged according to the risk level of key areas of the plant. The three types of water level monitoring sensors include two linkage float level switches and one electrode level switch, and different action thresholds are set to realize the hierarchical correlation of sensor signals.

[0020] Specifically, in some implementations, deploying three types of water level monitoring sensors according to the risk level of key areas in the powerhouse is one of the core steps in this invention for achieving rapid identification and reliable shutdown control of flooding accidents. This step is based on the multi-level risk zoning theory and combines the requirements for redundant configuration of water level monitoring elements in "DL / T 2447-2021 Technical Specification for Safety Inspection of Flood-Proof Powerhouse of Hydropower Station" and "NB / T35004-2013" to differentiate sensor configurations for areas with different risk levels within the powerhouse, thereby improving the overall monitoring accuracy and reliability of the system.

[0021] In a specific technical implementation, each shutdown point position includes two connecting rod floating ball liquid level switches and one electrode type liquid level switch. The connecting rod floating ball liquid level switch triggers the switch action through the mechanical displacement of the floating ball with the change of the water level, and has the characteristics of simple structure and rapid response; while the electrode type liquid level switch judges the water level height through the conduction state between the water level and the electrode, and is suitable for scenes with high precision requirements. The three types of sensors are set with different action thresholds to realize signal level association. For example, in the water machine room area, the action setting value of floating ball 1 and electrode is , and the action setting value of floating ball 2 is Through this hierarchical setting, the system can respond at different water level stages, thereby realizing progressive control from primary alarm to emergency shutdown.

[0022] The action threshold of the sensor needs to be accurately set according to the risk level of the area. For example, the shutdown water level of the tail water access door, the volute access door and other high-risk areas is set to , and the water machine room is . In addition, the power supply circuit of each sensor is independent, and the installation bracket is also separated from each other, so as to avoid the failure of all sensors due to a single fault point. In terms of signal transmission, each shutdown point position outputs two independent water level over-high shutdown signals through the PLC controller, ensuring the redundancy of the signal path.

[0023] This arrangement is widely applicable to key areas in the hydropower station plant, such as the water machine room, the technical water supply layer, the tail water access door, etc., and can realize rapid response and reliable shutdown, especially in the case of rapid water level rise. Through the multi-sensor combination judgment logic, the system can effectively filter out false alarms caused by environmental factors such as water vapor condensation and water flow impact, and improve the accuracy of water level over-high identification.

[0024] Through differentiated arrangement and signal level association design, the redundancy and fault tolerance of the water flooding monitoring system are significantly enhanced, providing a reliable basis for the triggering of subsequent emergency shutdown logic, thereby effectively reducing the equipment damage and personal safety risk caused by water flooding accidents, and improving the overall disaster prevention ability of the hydropower station.

[0025] Further, S1 includes: S11, setting the water level monitoring threshold of the sensor to ≥300mm for the tail water access door, the volute access door, and the technical water supply layer.

[0026] Specifically, in some implementations, setting a water level monitoring threshold of ≥ 300mm for the tail water inlet door, volute inlet door, and technical water supply layer is one of the key steps in the present application to achieve rapid identification and reliable shutdown control of the flooded plant accident. This step is based on the risk level division of the key areas of the hydropower plant, combined with the requirements of "DL / T 2447-2021 Hydropower Plant Flooded Plant Safety Inspection Technical Regulations" and "NB / T35004-2013" on the redundant configuration of water level monitoring elements, to ensure that the shutdown logic can be triggered in time when the water level is abnormally high to prevent the accident from expanding.

[0027] This step uses three types of water level monitoring elements for combined configuration, including two connecting rod floating ball liquid level switches and one electrode type liquid level switch. Among them, the trigger water level of the floating ball 1 and the electrode type liquid level switch is set to ≥ 300mm, which is used as a shutdown threshold to determine whether to enter an emergency shutdown state. When any sensor detects that the water level reaches or exceeds this threshold, an action signal will be output to the PLC controller. The PLC controller processes the signal according to the pre-set logic and outputs two independent water level over-high shutdown signals to the monitoring system through hardwiring, achieving double redundancy design in physical and signal levels.

[0028] The water level monitoring threshold is set to ≥ 300mm, which is determined based on the actual operation experience and risk assessment model of the hydropower station, and can effectively identify abnormal water accumulation in areas such as the tail water inlet door, volute inlet door, and technical water supply layer. In addition, the installation position of the sensor needs to meet the requirements of "Technical Measures to Prevent Misoperation" in "Q / HN-1-6300.08.001-2019" to ensure the accuracy and stability of signal acquisition. Each sensor power supply loop is independent and the installation brackets do not interfere with each other to improve the overall anti-interference ability and reliability of the system.

[0029] This step is suitable for water level monitoring and emergency shutdown control in high-risk areas of the hydropower plant. For example, in the tail water inlet door area, if the water level rises rapidly due to drainage system failure or sudden leakage, the ≥ 300mm monitoring threshold can capture the abnormality in time and trigger the shutdown process to prevent further water level rise and cause equipment damage or personnel injury. This logic is linked with the water disaster accident shutdown hard pressure plate in the monitoring system to ensure that the shutdown process is started 2 seconds after the system authorization, effectively filtering out transient interference signals and improving the accuracy of the response.

[0030] By scientifically setting the water level monitoring threshold and using multiple sensor redundancy configuration, the reliability and response speed of water level abnormality identification are significantly improved. When the water level is ≥ 300mm, the system can quickly judge and start the emergency shutdown process, effectively preventing the further deterioration of the flooding accident and ensuring the safe operation of the hydropower station.

[0031] S12, set the water level monitoring threshold for the water machine room to ≥100mm.

[0032] Specifically, this step is based on the water submergence risk level of different areas in the hydropower plant building. For the high-risk area of the water machine room, a scientific and reasonable water level monitoring threshold is set to ensure that the shutdown logic can be triggered in time when the water level abnormally rises, preventing the accident from expanding.

[0033] The water level monitoring system of the water machine room consists of three independent sensors, including two connecting rod float ball liquid level switches and one electrode type liquid level switch. Among them, the action setting value of the float ball 1 and the electrode type liquid level switch is set to 10 cm (i.e. 100 mm), which is used as the basis for determining water level overheight. When the water level reaches or exceeds this threshold, the sensor will output an action signal to the PLC controller, and then send two independent water level overheight shutdown signals to the monitoring system through hardwiring, realizing double redundancy design in physical and signal layers. In addition, each sensor uses independent power supply circuit and bracket installation to avoid failure of the entire monitoring system due to a single fault point.

[0034] The setting of the water level monitoring threshold strictly follows the requirements of "DL / T 2447-2021 Hydropower Station Flooded Plant Safety Inspection Technical Regulations" and "NB / T35004-2013" on the redundancy configuration of water level monitoring elements. The triggering condition of the water level overheight shutdown signal is water level ≥100mm, and the shutdown process is started after a signal delay of 2 seconds to filter out transient interference signals and improve system stability. At the same time, the action setting value of the float ball 2 is 5 cm, which is used to assist in determining whether the sensor is stuck or malfunctioning, thereby improving the system's ability to identify abnormal conditions.

[0035] This step is widely applicable to the water machine room area of the hydropower plant building, especially in emergency situations where the drainage system is limited or the water inflow rate is fast. By setting a reasonable water level monitoring threshold, the system can start the shutdown process at an early stage of abnormal water level rise, effectively preventing irreversible damage to the unit equipment caused by flooding accidents.

[0036] By scientifically setting the water level monitoring threshold and combining multiple sensor redundancy configuration, the accuracy and reliability of water level monitoring in the water machine room are significantly improved, providing a solid data foundation for subsequent emergency shutdown logic, thereby achieving rapid response and double protection of flooding accidents, ensuring the safe operation of the hydropower station.

[0037] S2, based on the combination of sensor action signals, when any connecting rod float ball liquid level switch or electrode type liquid level switch acts and the other connecting rod float ball liquid level switch does not act, it is determined that the water level measurement point is faulty and a fault alarm is triggered.

[0038] Specifically, in some implementations, each shutdown point is configured with two connecting rod float ball liquid level switches (float ball 1 and float ball 2) and one electrode type liquid level switch, each having different action thresholds and response mechanisms. Among them, the action thresholds of float ball 1 and the electrode type liquid level switch are both water level ≥ 10 cm, and the action threshold of float ball 2 is water level ≥ 5 cm, which mainly serves as a primary alarm signal and does not participate in the shutdown logic.

[0039] The specific implementation is that when any connecting rod float ball liquid level switch (float ball 1 or float ball 2) or electrode type liquid level switch acts, the system will collect the signal and compare it with the signals of the remaining sensors. If float ball 1 or the electrode type liquid level switch acts, but float ball 2 does not act, the system determines that the water level measurement point is faulty and triggers a fault alarm. This logic, based on the low threshold characteristics of float ball 2, can identify abnormal sensor states such as mechanical jamming, signal drift or false triggering in advance when the water level has not yet reached the shutdown threshold, thereby avoiding false shutdown or missed shutdown caused by a single sensor failure.

[0040] The action thresholds of float ball 1 and the electrode type liquid level switch are 10 cm, and the action threshold of float ball 2 is 5 cm, which meets the requirements of the technical measures in Q / HN-1-6300.08.001-2019 for preventing false action. At the same time, this logic is applicable to key areas such as the water machine room, technical water supply layer, tail water inlet door, and volute inlet door, especially in emergency scenarios where the water level rises rapidly, which can effectively improve the system's ability to judge the true water level state.

[0041] Through the combination of sensor signals, automatic identification and isolation of measurement point faults are achieved, improving the fault tolerance and self-diagnosis level of the water level monitoring system, providing a reliable prerequisite for subsequent emergency shutdown logic, thereby significantly enhancing the safety protection capability of the hydropower station in the event of flooding.

[0042] Further, S2 includes: S21, when float ball 1 or the electrode type liquid level switch acts and float ball 2 does not act, determining that the water level measurement point is faulty.

[0043] Specifically, when float ball 1 or the electrode type liquid level switch acts and float ball 2 does not act, it is determined that the water level measurement point is faulty, which is the core component of the sensor fault identification logic in the present application, aiming to improve the reliability and fault tolerance of the water level monitoring system. In some implementations, this logic cross-verifies based on the action threshold differences of different sensors, thereby achieving rapid identification and isolation of abnormal signals.

[0044] The set action water level of float ball 1 and the electrode type liquid level switch is 10 cm (i.e. ), and the action threshold of float ball 2 is 5 cm (i.e. ). Under normal conditions, when the water level reaches 10 cm, the float ball 1 and the electrode type liquid level switch should act simultaneously, and the float ball 2 should also be in the action state due to the lower setting. If the float ball 1 or the electrode acts but the float ball 2 does not act, it indicates that the float ball 1 or the electrode has abnormal conditions such as misoperation, jamming or signal drift, and the system will automatically determine that the measuring point is in a fault state, thereby avoiding false shutdown or false alarm caused by false report of a single sensor.

[0045] The logic relies on the consistency of the precise water level setting value and the sensor response. The action setting values of the float ball 1 and the electrode are consistent, both being 10 cm, and the action setting value of the float ball 2 is 5 cm, forming a stepped response mechanism. In addition, the system ensures that the sensors do not interfere with each other in the physical layer through independent power supply circuits and bracket mounting methods, thereby improving the independence and reliability of the signals.

[0046] The logic is widely used in key areas of hydropower station plants, such as the water machine room, the technical water supply layer, the tail water inlet door, etc. In these areas, water level abnormalities can quickly cause equipment damage or personal safety risks, therefore, automatic identification of measuring point faults is of great significance to ensure stable operation of the system. The logic realizes online monitoring and fault isolation of the water level measuring point state by collecting sensor signals in real time through the PLC controller and combining with the hard pressure plate state.

[0047] S22, triggering a fault alarm signal by comparing the action state difference between the float ball 2 and the float ball 1 / electrode.

[0048] Specifically, in some implementations, triggering a fault alarm signal by comparing the action state difference between the float ball 2 and the float ball 1 / electrode is a key logic step for realizing automatic identification of measuring point faults in the waterproof plant protection system of the present application. Based on the design of multi-sensor redundant configuration and differentiated action threshold, this step aims to improve the system's ability to identify abnormal states and avoid false alarms or false shutdowns caused by a single sensor failure.

[0049] The set action water level of the float ball 2 (such as 5 cm) is lower than that of the float ball 1 and the electrode (such as 10 cm), and this differentiated setting enables the float ball 2 to respond to water level changes earlier as a preliminary warning signal. When the water level reaches the set value of the float ball 2, the system only triggers a "water level too high" alarm without starting the shutdown logic. However, if the float ball 1 or the electrode signal acts (i.e. the water level reaches or exceeds 10 cm) but the float ball 2 does not act, the system determines that the water level measuring point is faulty. This logic is realized through Boolean operation inside the PLC controller, that is, when "float ball 1 or electrode action" and "float ball 2 inaction" are both true, a fault alarm signal is output to the monitoring system.

[0050] The shutdown threshold of the floating ball 1 and the electrode is uniformly set as the water level ≥ 10 cm, and the alarm threshold of the floating ball 2 is 5 cm, which meets the requirements of the technical measures for preventing misoperation in Q / HN-1-6300.08.001-2019. Through this hierarchical threshold design, the system can make differentiated responses at different water level stages, thereby improving the accuracy and reliability of the overall judgment.

[0051] In application scenarios, this step is widely used in key areas of hydropower plant houses, such as water machine rooms, technical water supply layers, tail water access doors, etc. In actual operation, when floating ball 1 or electrode misoperation occurs at a certain measuring point, the system can cross-verify through the state of floating ball 2 to quickly identify sensor abnormalities and prevent non-planned shutdowns caused by misjudgment.

[0052] By introducing floating ball 2 as an auxiliary judgment basis, the misoperation or jamming state of floating ball 1 or electrode is effectively identified, and the response accuracy of the system to real water level overheight events is improved. At the same time, this logic avoids false shutdowns caused by sensor failures, enhances the robustness and safety of the water flooding protection system, and provides a strong guarantee for the stable operation of the hydropower station.

[0053] S3, a shutdown instruction is generated through physical and signal dual redundancy design, the physical redundancy includes independent support installation and separate power supply circuit, and the signal redundancy includes two independent shutdown signals output by the PLC controller to the monitoring system.

[0054] Specifically, in some implementations, a shutdown instruction is generated through physical and signal dual redundancy design, which is a key technical step in the present application to improve the reliability of the water flooded plant accident protection system. The core of this step is to ensure that the shutdown instruction can be quickly and accurately received and executed by the monitoring system when the water level abnormally rises through the redundancy configuration of hardware structure and signal transmission path, thereby effectively preventing equipment damage and personnel injury.

[0055] Physical redundancy mainly reflects in two aspects: first, the water level monitoring elements of each shutdown point are installed with independent supports to avoid simultaneous failure of multiple sensors due to loose, corrosion or structural deformation of the supports; second, the power supply circuits of each sensor are independent of each other to ensure that other sensors can still work normally when a short circuit, power failure or interference occurs in a certain circuit. Signal redundancy outputs two independent shutdown signals from the PLC controller to the monitoring system, and these two signals use different transmission channels in physics, such as different relay circuits or different communication modules, to realize signal level redundancy verification. Only when both signals are correctly received and meet the logical conditions, the monitoring system will start the emergency shutdown process.

[0056] The key parameters involved in this step include: water level overheight setting value, signal delay time, hard pressure plate state, etc. For example, the shutdown water level of the water chamber is set to , and the shutdown water level of the tail water inlet door, the volute inlet door and other high-risk areas is set to . The signal delay is set to 2 seconds to filter out transient interference signals and prevent false operation. The hard pressure plate, as a secondary safety interlock device, is one of the necessary conditions for triggering the shutdown logic.

[0057] This step is widely applicable to multiple key areas of the hydropower station plant, such as the water chamber, technical water supply layer, tail water inlet door, volute inlet door, etc. In actual operation, when the water level in any area reaches the set threshold, the PLC controller will output two signals to the monitoring system according to the redundancy logic, and at the same time, the hard pressure plate state is judged to ensure the accuracy and timeliness of the shutdown command.

[0058] This step significantly improves the fault tolerance and response reliability of the system in the event of a flood accident through physical and signal dual redundancy design. It meets the requirements of NB / T35004-2013 for redundancy configuration of water level monitoring elements, and also meets the technical measures for preventing false operation in Q / HN-1-6300.08.001-2019. This design effectively avoids false operation or refusal caused by single sensor or signal channel failure, providing a solid guarantee for the safety production of hydropower stations.

[0059] Further, S3 includes: S31, installing three types of water level monitoring sensors with independent brackets to avoid signal failure caused by bracket loosening.

[0060] Specifically, in some implementations, to improve the reliability and stability of the water level monitoring system, the present application installs three types of water level monitoring sensors with independent brackets to avoid signal failure caused by bracket loosening. The technical implementation of this step is based on the redundancy configuration principle of mechanical and electrical sensors, combined with the optimization design of physical installation structure, to ensure that water level information can be continuously and accurately obtained in the event of a flood accident, thereby providing reliable input for the emergency shutdown logic.

[0061] The three types of sensors include two connecting rod float ball liquid level switches and one electrode type liquid level switch. Each type of sensor is fixed to the monitoring point by an independent mounting bracket. The bracket is made of high-strength stainless steel, which has good corrosion resistance and structural stability. During installation, the bracket and the sensor are connected by threads or a buckle type fixing structure, and a lock washer or lock nut is provided at the connection part to prevent loosening caused by water impact, vibration or long-term operation. In addition, the power supply circuits of each sensor are independent of each other to avoid simultaneous failure of multiple sensors caused by common power supply or line failure.

[0062] The action setting value of the floating ball 1 and the electrode type liquid level switch is water level ≥ 10 cm, and the action setting value of the floating ball 2 is water level ≥ 5 cm. The design meets the technical measure requirements for preventing misoperation in Q / HN-1-6300.08.001-2019. By setting different action thresholds, the system can realize hierarchical identification and fault self-checking of the water level abnormal state. For example, when the floating ball 1 or the electrode acts but the floating ball 2 does not act, the system can determine that the sensor is faulty, thereby avoiding false alarms or false shutdowns.

[0063] This step is suitable for high-risk areas in the hydropower station plant, such as the water turbine room, the technical water supply layer, the tail water inlet door, etc. In these areas, water level abnormalities may directly threaten equipment safety and personnel life, so the installation of sensors must have high reliability. The installation mode of independent supports is especially suitable for environments with frequent vibrations or water flow impacts, ensuring that the sensors can still work stably under complex working conditions.

[0064] Through the redundant design of the physical structure, the collective failure of the sensors caused by the loosening of the supports is effectively prevented, thereby ensuring the continuity and accuracy of the water level monitoring signals. Combined with the subsequent multi-sensor combination judgment logic, the identification ability of the system for the water level overhigh state is further improved, providing double protection for the emergency shutdown process, and significantly enhancing the response speed and control reliability of the hydropower station in the water flooding accident.

[0065] S32, through the double signal output circuit design of the PLC controller, two independent shutdown signals are sent to the monitoring system and the water turbine protection system respectively.

[0066] Specifically, based on the high-risk characteristics of the water flooding accident of the hydropower station, a dual redundancy mechanism at the physical and signal levels is adopted to improve the reliability and fault tolerance of the system in emergency situations.

[0067] The PLC controller judges the water level signals from different sensors in real time through its internal logic operation module. When the water level overhigh signal of any critical area (such as the tail water inlet door, the spiral case inlet door, the water turbine room, etc.) is triggered, the PLC controller will send independent shutdown signals to the monitoring system and the water turbine protection system through its double signal output circuit. The output circuit uses a hardwired way to ensure the physical isolation of the signal transmission path and avoid signal loss due to single channel failure. Each signal output path is configured with an independent relay to realize electrical isolation and signal independence.

[0068] The triggering of the water level over-height signal is based on the setting value of the sensor. For example, in the water chamber, the shutdown threshold of the float ball 1 and the electrode is set to water level ≥ 10 cm, and the action setting value of the float ball 2 is 5 cm, which is used to assist in judging the sensor state. After receiving the signal meeting the “float ball 1 or electrode and float ball 2” logical condition, the PLC controller will output a shutdown signal with a delay of 2 seconds to filter out transient interference and ensure the accuracy and stability of the shutdown instruction. The delay setting meets the technical specification of NB / T35004-2013 on the redundant configuration of water level monitoring elements.

[0069] This step is widely used in high-risk areas such as the leakage drainage system of the hydropower plant house, the technical water supply layer, and the tail water inlet door. When the water level abnormally rises, the PLC controller ensures that the monitoring system and the water machine protection system can receive the shutdown instruction synchronously through the double signal output mechanism, thereby starting the emergency shutdown process, including closing the electromagnetic valve, the guide vane, the water inlet accident door, the cylinder valve, and tripping the GCB, to realize the rapid protection of the unit.

[0070] This step significantly improves the reliability and fault tolerance of the water flooding accident response through the double signal output design. Even if one of the signal transmission paths fails, the other can still independently complete the transmission of the shutdown instruction, thereby avoiding shutdown failure due to signal loss. In addition, this design also meets the technical measure requirements of Q / HN-1-6300.08.001-2019 for preventing misoperation, providing a strong guarantee for the safety production of the hydropower station.

[0071] S4, a hard pressure plate interlocking mechanism is used to verify the shutdown instruction twice, and when both shutdown signals are received and the hard pressure plate is in the put-in state, the emergency shutdown process is started and the broadcast alarm system is triggered synchronously.

[0072] Specifically, in some implementations, the present application uses a hard pressure plate interlocking mechanism to verify the shutdown instruction twice to ensure the reliable triggering of the shutdown process in the water flooding plant accident. The technical implementation of this step is based on the dual redundancy design of physical signals and logical control, and the specific operation mode is as follows: when the water level of any high-risk area (such as the tail water inlet door, the spiral case inlet door, the water chamber, or the technical water supply layer) reaches or exceeds the set shutdown threshold (such as the water chamber shutdown water level ≥ 100 mm), the corresponding water level monitoring element (including float ball 1 and electrode) will output a water level over-height signal. After processing by the PLC controller, two independent shutdown signals are generated and transmitted to the monitoring system through hardwiring. At the same time, a “water disaster shutdown hard pressure plate” is provided in the monitoring system, which is a physical interlocking device used to authorize the execution of the shutdown process to prevent unauthorized or mis-triggered non-scheduled shutdown.

[0073] The triggering of the stop signal in the application needs to meet two conditions: one is that both of the two stop signals are received, and the other is that the hard pressure plate is in the put-in state. The signal delay is set to 2 seconds, which is used to filter out transient interference signals and ensure the stability and accuracy of the stop command. In addition, the set value of the float ball 1 and the electrode is 10 cm, and the set value of the float ball 2 is 5 cm, which is used to assist in judging whether the sensor state is normal, thereby improving the overall fault self-checking ability of the system.

[0074] This step is widely applicable to the water level monitoring and emergency stop control system of the hydropower station plant, especially in emergency situations such as rapid water level rise and drainage system failure, it can quickly and reliably start the stop process and trigger the broadcast alarm system at the same time, achieving timely protection of personnel and equipment.

[0075] Further, S4 comprises: S41, verifying the legality of the stop command through logical AND operation of the physical hard pressure plate state and the two stop signals.

[0076] Specifically, in some implementations, verifying the legality of the stop command through logical AND operation of the physical hard pressure plate state and the two stop signals is a key link in the emergency stop logic of the application, aiming to improve the reliability and safety of the response to the flooded plant accident. The technical implementation of this step is based on the cooperative judgment of double redundant signals and physical interlocking mechanism, ensuring that the triggering of the stop command is both fast and accurate when the water level is abnormally high, avoiding false stop or refusal to stop caused by a single signal source or misoperation.

[0077] When the water level of any critical area (such as the tail water inlet door, the spiral case inlet door, the water machine room, and the technical water supply layer) reaches or exceeds the set stop threshold (such as water machine room water level ≥ 100 mm, tail water inlet door, and spiral case inlet door water level ≥ 300 mm), the flood alarm PLC cabinet will output two independent water level over-high stop signals through hardwiring. These two signals are triggered by different sensors (such as float ball 1 and electrode) and transmitted through independent power supply circuits and physical paths to achieve redundant verification at the signal level. At the same time, a "flood accident stop hard pressure plate" is provided in the monitoring system, which is a physical safety interlocking device used to authorize the execution of the stop logic. Only when the hard pressure plate is in the put-in state, the monitoring system will respond to the stop signal.

[0078] The logical judgment condition involved in this step is that both of the two stop signals act simultaneously (logical "AND"), and the hard pressure plate is in the put-in state. After the signal is triggered, the system sets a 2-second delay ( ) to filter out transient interference signals and prevent false actions. In addition, the stop action setting of float ball 1 and electrode is 10 cm, and the action setting of float ball 2 is 5 cm, which is used for primary alarm and fault identification.

[0079] This logic is widely used in multiple high-risk areas of hydropower plant, such as water turbine room, technical water supply layer, tail water inlet door, etc. When the water level abnormally rises, the system outputs two signals to the monitoring system through the PLC cabinet, and makes logical judgment combined with the state of the hard pressure plate, to ensure the legality and effectiveness of the shutdown instruction. This mechanism can effectively deal with environmental disturbances such as water vapor condensation and water flow impact, and improve the stability of the system under complex working conditions.

[0080] Through logical AND operation of physical hard pressure plate and two shutdown signals, double verification of shutdown instruction is realized, which significantly improves the reliability and safety of flood accident shutdown control, and meets the technical specifications of NB / T35004-2013 on redundant configuration of water level monitoring elements.

[0081] S42, when the hard pressure plate is in the input state and the two shutdown signals are received, the emergency shutdown process is started and the broadcast alarm system is triggered synchronously.

[0082] Specifically, this step relies on the hard pressure plate configured in the flood alarm PLC control cabinet as a physical interlocking device. The input state of the hard pressure plate indicates that the system has entered a running mode that can respond to water level overhigh signals, preventing false triggering of the shutdown process in non-emergency states. When the float ball 1 or the electrode type liquid level switch in any key area (such as the tail water inlet door, the spiral case inlet door, the water turbine room or the technical water supply layer) acts, the PLC cabinet will output two independent water level overhigh shutdown signals. These two signals are transmitted to the monitoring system through hardwiring, realizing redundant verification at the signal level. Only when both signals are received by the monitoring system and the hard pressure plate is in the input state, the system will start the emergency shutdown process after a delay of 2 seconds.

[0083] The key parameters involved in this step include the input state of the hard pressure plate, the synchronous reception of the two shutdown signals, and the 2-second delay time. Among them, the 2-second delay design is used to filter out transient interference signals such as water flow fluctuations or sensor transient false actions, thereby improving the accuracy of system judgment. In addition, the action setting value of float ball 1 and electrode is 10 cm, and the action setting value of float ball 2 is 5 cm, which can effectively identify the water level overhigh state through the combination of sensors with different setting values.

[0084] This logic is widely used in key areas of hydropower plant, such as water turbine room, technical water supply layer, tail water inlet door, etc. When the water level rises rapidly to a dangerous threshold, the system can complete the generation of shutdown instruction and the triggering of broadcast alarm in the shortest time, which can save valuable time for personnel evacuation and equipment protection.

[0085] Through double signal verification and hard interlocking mechanism, the reliability and safety of the flood accident response are significantly improved, and the system malfunction caused by single signal failure or false alarm is avoided, thereby effectively reducing the risk of equipment damage and personnel injury.

[0086] Also includes: S5, set 5 seconds delay trigger for broadcast alarm signal, set 2 seconds delay trigger for shutdown signal, to filter out transient interference signal.

[0087] Specifically, this step involves setting a delay trigger mechanism for broadcast alarm signal and shutdown signal respectively, to filter out transient interference signal, improve the judgment accuracy and control reliability of the system in the flood accident. In some implementations, the delay mechanism is realized by the timer module inside the programmable logic controller (PLC), and the specific delay time is 5 seconds for broadcast alarm signal and 2 seconds for shutdown signal. Based on the characteristics of sensors in the water level monitoring system of hydropower station plant, which are easily affected by environmental disturbances such as transient water flow impact and water vapor condensation, the design introduces a reasonable delay logic, effectively avoiding false alarm or false shutdown caused by short-term abnormal signal.

[0088] When the water level high signal is triggered by the float ball 1 or the electrode and the float ball 2 at the same time, the PLC controller receives the combined signal and starts the timer module for delay processing. The delay time of the broadcast alarm signal is 5 seconds, that is, after the signal exists for 5 seconds, the PLC sends the signal to the broadcast system through the opened relay, triggering the voice alarm of "flood plant, leave quickly". The delay time of the shutdown signal is 2 seconds, if the water level high signal exists for 2 seconds, the PLC outputs two independent shutdown signals to the monitoring system to realize double redundancy in physical and signal level. This delay mechanism meets the technical specifications of NB / T35004-2013 on redundancy configuration of water level monitoring elements.

[0089] The broadcast alarm delay is set to 5 seconds, and the shutdown signal delay is set to 2 seconds, both based on the statistical analysis of the duration of transient interference signal in actual working conditions. The 5-second broadcast delay can ensure the identification of real water level anomaly and avoid false alarm due to short-term fluctuation; the 2-second shutdown delay can effectively filter out transient interference while ensuring response speed, ensuring the reliability of the shutdown instruction. In addition, each shutdown point is equipped with 2 link ball float level switches and 1 electrode type level switch, with action setting values of 10 cm (float ball 1 and electrode) and 5 cm (float ball 2) respectively, to distinguish between "water level high" and "water level high" states.

[0090] The delay trigger mechanism is widely used in key areas of the hydropower station plant, such as the water machine room, the technical water supply layer, the tail water inlet door, etc. When the water level is abnormal, the system determines whether to start the broadcast alarm or execute the shutdown process through the persistence of the delay judgment signal. The mechanism can significantly improve the response ability of the system to real flooding accidents in actual operation, and reduce the operation risk caused by false action. This step effectively improves the anti-interference ability and judgment accuracy of the water level monitoring system by introducing delay logic. When the water level signal fluctuates instantaneously, the system will not respond immediately, thereby avoiding unnecessary shutdown or alarm and ensuring the stable operation of the hydropower station. At the same time, the delay mechanism is combined with the redundant sensor configuration to further enhance the reliability of the system, which meets the technical requirements of preventing false action in Q / HN-1-6300.08.001-2019.

[0091] The flooding plant emergency shutdown control method of the embodiment of the present application can realize rapid identification and reliable shutdown control of flooding plant accidents, improve system monitoring accuracy and response efficiency, and reduce the risk of equipment damage and personnel injury caused by abnormal water level.

[0092] Embodiment 2 The specific control logic of the flooding plant emergency shutdown control method proposed by the present application is as follows: It can be understood that the flooding plant is defined as: a large amount of water in the hydropower plant, and the drainage pump cannot work normally; or although it works normally, the maximum drainage capacity of the drainage pump per unit time is lower than the water inflow, and the water level rises to cause unit power failure, equipment damage and personal injury.

[0093] It can be understood that the plant emergency shutdown point arrangement is as follows: 1. Key area coverage principle: According to DL / T 2447-2021 Hydropower Station Flooded Plant Safety Inspection Technical Regulations, the shutdown point setting needs to cover the key areas of the plant and the plant area, the water supply system, the metal structure, the unit and the auxiliary equipment, etc. The point arrangement of the flooding plant of the present application covers the plant foundation corridor, the tail water inlet door, the volute inlet door, the water machine room, the technical water supply layer, the intermediate layer, the plant leakage drainage, the dam leakage drainage, the volute disc valve, etc. Each area of the whole plant, and different water level shutdown points are set according to different key areas, among which the tail water inlet door, the volute inlet door, the technical water supply room shutdown water level is ≥300mm, and the water machine room shutdown water level is ≥100mm.

[0094] 2. Redundancy principle: Each point water level monitoring element includes two connecting rod float ball liquid level switches and one electrode type liquid level switch to improve the reliability of water level monitoring; each sensor power supply circuit is separate and installed with independent support to avoid all failures caused by single support loosening. Each shutdown point sends two high water level shutdown signals to the monitoring system through the PLC controller to start the emergency shutdown process, achieving double redundancy in physical and signal layers.

[0095] It can be understood that the sensor alarm logic is as follows: Each point water level monitoring element includes two connecting rod float ball liquid level switches and one electrode type liquid level switch, when the water level reaches or exceeds the sensor set value, the sensor will send an action signal. Float ball 2 acts as a high water level signal, which is used for monitoring system alarm when the water level is too high (primary alarm), this signal does not participate in the shutdown logic; float ball 1 and electrode act as high water level signal, which starts the plant broadcast emergency function when action (shutdown threshold), these two signals belong to the shutdown measuring point. Table 1 is the water machine room waterproof plant setting value table of No. 2 unit, the float ball 1 and electrode action setting value is 10 cm, and the float ball 2 action setting value is 5 cm.

[0096] Table 1 Setting value table of water machine room waterproof plant of No. 2 unit

[0097] Specifically, the sensor alarm logic takes Figure 2 for example: (1) Realize the automatic identification of measuring point failure, avoid misjudgment risk: Using the characteristics that the float ball 2 action setting value is lower than that of float ball 1 and electrode, a simple and effective fault judgment rule is established: when float ball 1 or electrode signal acts but float ball 2 does not act, it is directly judged as water level measuring point failure. This design can quickly identify abnormal states such as sensor jamming and signal drift, such as false triggering caused by mechanical jamming of float ball 1, to avoid false alarm or false shutdown caused by false signal output of single measuring point failure, which meets the requirements of "technical measures to prevent false operation" in 《Q / HN-1-6300.08.001-2019》.

[0098] (2) Multi-sensor combination judgment, improve the accuracy of high water level identification: Adopting the combination judgment logic of "float ball 1 or electrode and float ball 2": when float ball 1 or electrode and float ball 2 act at the same time, it is judged as water machine room water level high, and the alarm voice "water flooded plant, leave quickly" will be played through the relay sent to the broadcast system after 5S delay, see Figure 3 .

[0099] When the measuring point is normal, float ball 1 and electrode act at the same time, which is judged as water level high shutdown (shutdown threshold).

[0100] Through the signal cross verification of different types of sensors (mechanical trigger for floating ball type, circuit on-off sensing for electrode), the false alarm caused by environmental interference such as water vapor condensation and water flow impact is reduced, the determination of the "water level over high" state is more accurate, the specification requirement of "redundant configuration of water level monitoring element" in NB / T35004-2013 is met, and the monitoring reliability of the waterproof plant system is significantly improved.

[0101] Further, when the water level of the plant is over high, the unit shutdown logic diagram takes Figure 4 as an example.

[0102] (1) Water level over high alarm trigger condition: when the floating ball 2 signal of any measuring point of water machine room, technical water supply layer, tail water inlet door and volute inlet door acts, and the water level over high alarm hard press plate of the water disaster alarm PLC cabinet is put in, the monitoring system reports that the water level of the unit is over high. The hard press plate of this logic is a physical safety interlocking device, which is used to authorize the alarm function to prevent false alarm.

[0103] (2) Emergency shutdown instruction generation and transmission: when the water level over high signal of any measuring point of tail water inlet door, volute inlet door, water machine room and technical water supply layer acts, two water level over high shutdown signals are sent out through the hard press plate of the water disaster alarm PLC cabinet, if both of the two shutdown signals are sent to the monitoring system, and the monitoring water disaster accident shutdown hard press plate is put in, the signal is delayed for 2 seconds, then the water disaster accident shutdown process and the plant broadcast alarm system are started through the monitoring system. The advantages of this logic are: the water disaster alarm PLC cabinet outputs two independent water level over high shutdown signals through hard wiring, which is a redundant design, can be used for signal verification, and avoids single point transmission failure; the "shutdown signal hard press plate" in the PLC cabinet is a secondary safety interlock; the signal is triggered after 2 seconds of delay, which is used to filter out transient interference signals and avoid false action.

[0104] (3) Double protection mechanism of shutdown process: the water level over high shutdown signal is also sent to the water machine protection, and the water machine protection water disaster accident shutdown process is started through the monitoring system. The advantages of this logic are: the water level over high shutdown signal triggers double path shutdown control synchronously, which ensures the reliability of shutdown. The unit emergency accident shutdown process: close electromagnetic valve, close guide vane, drop inlet accident door, drop cylinder valve, trip GCB, and start normal shutdown process. The water machine protection emergency accident shutdown process: close electromagnetic valve, close guide vane, drop inlet accident door, drop cylinder valve, trip GCB, and start mechanical accident shutdown process.

[0105] In summary, the emergency shutdown logic of the application takes "fast response, double redundancy and safety interlocking" as the core, and realizes reliable shutdown control under water flooding accident based on the linkage judgment of monitoring point signal and system hard press plate state.

[0106] The above emergency shutdown logic is converted into non-electric quantity protection logic of the unit as shown in Table 2, and the non-electric quantity protection logic of the water turbine protection is the same, which is not listed here.

[0107] Table 2 Non-electric quantity protection logic of unit water-flooding plant

[0108] Embodiment 3 The embodiment of the present application also provides a water-flooding plant emergency shutdown control device 10, as shown in the figure, the device 10 comprises: Figure 5 a sensor arrangement module 100, used for arranging three types of water level monitoring sensors according to the risk level of the key area of the plant, the three types of water level monitoring sensors comprising two connecting rod floating ball liquid level switches and one electrode type liquid level switch, and different action thresholds are set to realize sensor signal hierarchical correlation; a fault self-diagnosis module 200, used for performing fault self-diagnosis based on the combination relationship of the sensor action signals, when any connecting rod floating ball liquid level switch or electrode type liquid level switch acts and the other connecting rod floating ball liquid level switch does not act, determining that the water level measuring point is faulty and triggering a fault alarm; a double redundancy design module 300, used for generating a shutdown instruction through physical and signal double redundancy design, the physical redundancy comprising independent support installation and separate power supply circuit, and the signal redundancy comprising two independent shutdown signals output by a PLC controller to a monitoring system; a hard pressure plate interlocking verification module 400, used for performing secondary verification on the shutdown instruction by using a hard pressure plate interlocking mechanism, when the two shutdown signals are both received and the hard pressure plate is in the put-in state, starting an emergency shutdown process and synchronously triggering a broadcast alarm system.

[0109] Further, the sensor arrangement module is also used for: setting a water level monitoring threshold of ≥300mm for the tail water inlet door, the volute inlet door and the technical water supply layer; setting a water level monitoring threshold of ≥100mm for the water turbine room.

[0110] Further, the fault self-diagnosis module is also used for: when the floating ball 1 or the electrode type liquid level switch acts and the floating ball 2 does not act, determining that the water level measuring point is faulty; triggering a fault alarm signal by comparing the action state difference between the floating ball 2 and the floating ball 1 / electrode.

[0111] Further, the double redundancy design module is also used for: arranging the three types of water level monitoring sensors through independent support installation to avoid signal failure caused by support loosening; ​Through the double signal output circuit design of the PLC controller, two independent shutdown signals are sent to the monitoring system and the water machine protection system respectively.

[0112] Further, it also comprises: The delay control module is used for setting 5-second delay trigger for the broadcast alarm signal and 2-second delay trigger for the shutdown signal to filter out transient interference signals.

[0113] Further, the hard pressboard interlocking verification module is also used for: The legality of the shutdown instruction is verified through logical AND operation of the physical hard pressboard state and the two shutdown signals; When the hard pressboard is in the put-in state and the two shutdown signals are both received, the emergency shutdown process is started and the broadcast alarm system is triggered synchronously.

[0114] The water-flooded plant emergency shutdown control device of the embodiment of the application can realize fast identification and reliable shutdown control of water-flooded plant accidents, improve system monitoring accuracy and response efficiency, and reduce the risk of equipment damage and personnel casualty caused by abnormal water level.

[0115] The above only describes the preferred embodiments of the application and is not used to limit the application, and the application can have various changes and variations for those skilled in the art. Any modification, equivalent replacement, improvement, etc. made within the spirit and principle of the application shall be included in the protection scope of the application.

[0116] In the description of the present specification, the description of the terms "one embodiment", "some embodiments", "example", "specific example", or "some examples" means that the specific features, structures, materials or characteristics described in connection with the embodiment or example are included in at least one embodiment or example of the application. In the present specification, the illustrative description of the above terms does not necessarily refer to the same embodiment or example. Moreover, the specific features, structures, materials or characteristics described can be combined in any appropriate manner in any one or more embodiments or examples. In addition, the skilled in the art can combine and combine the different embodiments or examples described in the present specification and the features of the different embodiments or examples without contradiction.

[0117] In addition, the terms "first", "second" are only used for description purposes, and cannot be understood as indicating or implying relative importance or implicitly indicating the number of indicated technical features. Therefore, the features limited by "first", "second" can explicitly or implicitly include at least one of the features. In the description of the application, the meaning of "multiple" is at least two, for example, two, three, etc., unless otherwise specifically limited.

Claims

1. A method for controlling emergency shutdown of a flooded plant, characterized by, Comprising: S1, arranging three types of water level monitoring sensors according to the risk level of the key area of the factory building, the three types of water level monitoring sensors including two connecting rod float ball liquid level switches and one electrode type liquid level switch, and setting different action thresholds to realize sensor signal hierarchical correlation; S2, performing fault self-diagnosis based on the combination relationship of the sensor action signals, when any one of the connecting rod float ball liquid level switches or the electrode type liquid level switch acts and the other connecting rod float ball liquid level switch does not act, determining that the water level measuring point is faulty and triggering a fault alarm; S3, generating a shutdown instruction through physical and signal dual redundancy design, the physical redundancy including independent support installation and separate power supply circuit, and the signal redundancy including two independent shutdown signals output by the PLC controller to the monitoring system; S4, adopting a hard pressure plate interlocking mechanism to perform secondary verification on the shutdown instruction, when both of the two shutdown signals are received and the hard pressure plate is in the put-in state, starting an emergency shutdown process and synchronously triggering a broadcast alarm system.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein, The three types of water level monitoring sensors arranged according to the risk level of the key area of the factory building further comprise: S11, setting the water level monitoring threshold of the sensors to be greater than or equal to 300mm for the tail water inlet door, the volute inlet door and the technical water supply layer; S12, setting the water level monitoring threshold of the sensors to be greater than or equal to 100mm for the water machine room.

3. The method of claim 1, wherein, The fault self-diagnosis based on the combination relationship of the sensor action signals further comprises: S21, when the float ball 1 or the electrode type liquid level switch acts and the float ball 2 does not act, determining that the water level measuring point is faulty; S22, triggering a fault alarm signal by comparing the action state difference between the float ball 2 and the float ball 1 / electrode.

4. The method of claim 1, wherein, The shutdown instruction generated through physical and signal dual redundancy design further comprises: S31, adopting independent support installation of the three types of water level monitoring sensors to avoid signal failure caused by support loosening; S32, through the double signal output circuit design of the PLC controller, sending two independent shutdown signals to the monitoring system and the water machine protection system respectively.

5. The method of claim 1, wherein, Further comprising: S5, setting a 5-second delay trigger for the broadcast alarm signal and a 2-second delay trigger for the shutdown signal to filter out transient interference signals.

6. The method of claim 1, wherein, The secondary verification of the shutdown instruction by the hard pressure plate interlocking mechanism further comprises: S41, verifying the legality of the shutdown instruction through logical AND operation of the physical hard pressure plate state and the two shutdown signals; S42, when the hard pressure plate is in the put-in state and both of the two shutdown signals are received, starting an emergency shutdown process and synchronously triggering a broadcast alarm system.

7. A waterflooded plant emergency shutdown control device, characterized by, Comprising: a sensor arrangement module, configured to arrange three types of water level monitoring sensors according to the risk level of the key area of the factory building, the three types of water level monitoring sensors including two connecting rod float ball liquid level switches and one electrode type liquid level switch, and setting different action thresholds to realize sensor signal hierarchical correlation; a fault self-diagnosis module, configured to perform fault self-diagnosis based on the combination relationship of the sensor action signals, when any one of the connecting rod float ball liquid level switches or the electrode type liquid level switch acts and the other connecting rod float ball liquid level switch does not act, determining that the water level measuring point is faulty and triggering a fault alarm; A dual redundancy design module is configured to generate a shutdown instruction through physical and signal dual redundancy design, the physical redundancy includes independent support installation and separate power supply circuit, and the signal redundancy includes two independent shutdown signals output by a PLC controller to a monitoring system; A hard pressure plate interlocking verification module is configured to perform secondary verification on the shutdown instruction by using a hard pressure plate interlocking mechanism, and when both of the two shutdown signals are received and the hard pressure plate is in an input state, an emergency shutdown process is started and a broadcast alarm system is triggered synchronously.

8. The apparatus of claim 7, wherein, The sensor arrangement module is further configured to: For the tail water inlet door, the spiral case inlet door and the technical water supply layer, a sensor with a water level monitoring threshold of ≥300mm is arranged; For the water machine room, a sensor with a water level monitoring threshold of ≥100mm is arranged.

9. The apparatus of claim 7, wherein, The fault self-diagnosis module is further configured to: When the float ball 1 or the electrode type liquid level switch is actuated and the float ball 2 is not actuated, it is determined that the water level measuring point is faulty; By comparing the difference between the actuation states of the float ball 2 and the float ball 1 / electrode, a fault alarm signal is triggered.

10. The apparatus of claim 7, wherein, The dual redundancy design module is further configured to: Three types of water level monitoring sensors are installed in independent supports to avoid signal failure caused by support loosening; Through a double signal output circuit design of the PLC controller, two independent shutdown signals are sent to the monitoring system and the water machine protection system respectively.

11. The apparatus of claim 7, wherein, Further comprising: A delay control module is configured to set a 5-second delay trigger for the broadcast alarm signal and a 2-second delay trigger for the shutdown signal, so as to filter out transient interference signals.

12. The apparatus of claim 7, wherein, The hard pressure plate interlocking verification module is further configured to: Through logical AND operation of the physical hard pressure plate state and the two shutdown signals, the legality of the shutdown instruction is verified; When the hard pressure plate is in the input state and both of the two shutdown signals are received, the emergency shutdown process is started and the broadcast alarm system is triggered synchronously.

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