Authentication and key agreement method and system for unmanned aerial vehicle dynamic group

Abstract

The invention belongs to the technical field of unmanned aerial vehicle Internet security, particularly relates to an unmanned aerial vehicle Internet identity authentication and key negotiation method, system and terminal, and designs an authentication and key negotiation method for an unmanned aerial vehicle dynamic group in order to solve the problem of secure communication between an unmanned aerial vehicle and each physical node in the unmanned aerial vehicle Internet. In the designed method, anonymity and privacy protection of UAV identity information are realized based on a symmetric encryption algorithm by introducing a trusted third-party mechanism; lightweight unmanned aerial vehicle identity authentication and group session key distribution are realized by using uniqueness and unclonability of the PUF, a message authentication code and secret sharing; when the UAV needs to join or exit the group, the join or exit of the UAV is realized based on a secret sharing scheme.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application belongs to the technical field of unmanned aerial vehicle Internet security, and particularly relates to an authentication and key agreement method and system for unmanned aerial vehicle dynamic groups. BACKGROUND

[0002] In recent years, the unmanned aerial vehicle industry has developed rapidly. With the advantages of low energy consumption and strong maneuverability, unmanned aerial vehicles have been applied to smart cities, logistics transportation, emergency rescue, military applications and other fields. With the complexity and scale of unmanned aerial vehicle application scenarios, a single unmanned aerial vehicle cannot meet the actual demand, so unmanned aerial vehicles begin to work collaboratively in the form of clusters and communicate and exchange data in real time through ground control centers (GCS), cloud platforms, other Internet of Things devices and users. This comprehensive network ecosystem formed by a large number of unmanned aerial vehicles through networking, similar to the Internet of Things, is called unmanned aerial vehicle Internet, aiming to realize the collaborative control, task allocation and data exchange of unmanned aerial vehicle groups.

[0003] However, in the unmanned aerial vehicle Internet, there are still some security problems. First, the computing resources of unmanned aerial vehicles are limited and cannot perform high-consumption cryptographic operations such as public key encryption and digital signature. Second, unmanned aerial vehicles have the advantage of high maneuverability, but they are also vulnerable to capture attacks by attackers, physical cutting of unmanned aerial vehicles, reading of data and subsequent leakage of unmanned aerial vehicle data. Unmanned aerial vehicles and ground base stations (GCS) communicate in a wireless network environment and are vulnerable to malicious attacks by attackers, such as replay attacks and impersonation attacks. Therefore, it is necessary to authenticate the nodes in the unmanned aerial vehicle Internet. Only nodes that pass the authentication can access the network and communicate. Authentication aims to prevent malicious nodes from impersonating or tampering with information and to negotiate group session keys between legitimate nodes.

[0004] For the security problem of UAV Internet, implementing data encryption and message authentication technology is an effective means to solve this problem. At present, the research on the security problem of UAV Internet is still in its infancy. Although many schemes have been proposed for UAV Internet authentication and key agreement, there are still some problems, for example, the designed group authentication scheme ignores the flexibility of UAVs and does not realize the dynamic joining and exiting of UAVs. Secondly, in the current research scheme, for the anonymity of UAV ID, the ID is usually hashed to hide the real identity information of the UAV, but this also makes it impossible for government agencies to identify the real identity information of UAVs with malicious behavior and to manage them. In addition, UAVs of the same commercial company have the same commercial company ID, and attackers can easily identify which commercial company the UAV belongs to, thus judging the commercial purpose of the company and failing to protect the privacy of the commercial company's information. So far, there is no perfect scheme for UAV Internet authentication and key agreement. It is an important and urgent task to study the security protection mechanism of UAV Internet. An efficient and reliable authentication and key agreement mechanism suitable for UAV Internet environment will provide protection for the safe operation of UAVs and promote the construction of smart cities.

[0005] Through the above analysis, the problems and defects of the prior art are that malicious attackers can impersonate legitimate UAV nodes to transmit malicious information and listen to data information in the UAV Internet. In the existing UAV Internet authentication and key agreement protocol, the identity of the UAV is hashed to be anonymous, but this method has vulnerabilities, and attackers can hide their identity information and cannot be supervised, thus implementing attack operations. In addition, it is impossible to implement privacy protection for UAVs of the same commercial company, so that attackers can determine that the UAV belongs to a certain company or unit. At the same time, the designed group authentication scheme ignores the flexibility of UAVs and does not realize the dynamic joining and exiting of UAVs SUMMARY

[0006] In view of the problems existing in the prior art, the present application provides an authentication and key agreement method for a dynamic group of UAVs.

[0007] The present application is implemented as follows: an authentication and key agreement method for a dynamic group of UAVs, which comprises:

[0008] S1, UAV identity information registration: first, the UAV (UAV) initiates a registration request, and then the ground control center (GCS) and the trusted third-party institution (Cust) process the identity information of the UAV and the identity information of the commercial company to which it belongs, respectively, and distribute the UAV pseudonym identity (EUID) and the company pseudonym identity (ECID) with privacy protection function and the secret share to the UAV.

[0009] S2, UAV identity authentication and key agreement: first, the UAV in the group sends an authentication message, then the leader UAV (LU) collects and aggregates the message authentication code, while the LU forwards the aggregated message authentication code to the GCS, then the GCS authenticates the aggregated message authentication code, verifies the UAV identity, and recovers the initial key based on secret sharing, then calculates the group session key and distributes it to each UAV in the group;

[0010] S3, dynamic joining and leaving of UAVs: when a UAV in the group needs to join or leave, first, the UAV that needs to join or leave initiates a request, then the GCS processes the request and authenticates the identity information of the UAV, after authentication, the GCS updates the group session key and the secret share of the UAVs in the group.

[0011] Further, the S1 specifically comprises:

[0012] (1) first, the UAV sends the UID i to the GCS;

[0013] (2) after the GCS receives the UID i , generates a random value Seed G , then the GCS calculates and (i is the session identifier, T is the task identifier), finally the GCS sends the EUID i , GID i to the UAV;

[0014] (3) after the UAV receives the message sent by the GCS, first generates a random value r i , then the GCS sends the EUID i , CID i and r i to the trusted third party Cust;

[0015] (4) after the Cust receives the message sent by the UAV, generates a random value Seed C , then the Cust calculates then the Cust generates i random number seeds Seed i , the Cust calculates the generation matrix M i according to Seed i×t , then calculates gk=KDF(r1||r2…||r i ||Seed C ) and H(gk), then the Cust encodes gk into a column vector gk t×1 , then calculates M i×t ·gk t×1 =yi×1 ,Cust took out y i×1 Each column vector element in the sequence obtains a secret share y. i Finally, Cust will use ECID i Seed i y i And H(gk) are sent to the UAV;

[0016] (5) After receiving the message sent by Cust, the UAV calculates R. i =PUF(ECID) i ||EUID i ), then R i H(gk) is sent to GCS.

[0017] Furthermore, S2 specifically includes:

[0018] (1) First, the drones in the group are selected with a random number r. i Then calculate The secret share is then encoded to obtain S. i =encode(seed) i ||y i ), then calculate Finally, the drone within the group calculates the message authentication code. splicing message M i =R i '||H i ||EUID i ECID i Message authentication code And message M i Send to the group's leader drone LU;

[0019] (2) After receiving messages from UAVs within the group, the LU aggregates the authentication codes of messages sent by each UAV within the group to obtain... Then, concatenate the received messages to obtain message M = M1||M2…||M i ||UID L Finally, the aggregated message authentication code And message M is sent to GCS;

[0020] (3) After receiving the message from LU, GCS first restores the temporary authentication key. Subsequently, based on the recovered temporary authentication key PUF(r) i Recover the secret share of the UAV Then decode to obtain the actual share information. i ')=seed i||y i ;

[0021] (4) After GCS successfully recovers the temporary authentication key PUF(r i ), GCS calculates each UAV message authentication code Finally, aggregate all the message authentication codes to get Compare the received aggregated message authentication code with the aggregated message authentication code generated by GCS itself. If correct, the GCS completes the authentication of the identity of the UAV in the group;

[0022] (5) After GCS completes the authentication of the UAV, GCS recovers the respective row vector I i of each UAV in the group using the seed i of each UAV in the group, combines all the row vectors to obtain the generation matrix M i×t , combines all the y i of the UAVs to obtain the column vector y i×1 , and finally solves the matrix equation M i×t ·x t×1 =y i×1 to obtain the initial key x t×1 , converts it to hexadecimal characters x, and then calculates H(x) and compares it with the stored H(gk) to determine whether the recovered key hash value is correct. If the hash values are the same, the key is successfully recovered;

[0023] (6) GCS calculates as part of the generation of the group session key, and XORs with x to obtain the group session key Finally, GCS calculates and message authentication code for each UAV in the group. GCS sends L i , and the concatenated message N=L i ||G r ||SID to each UAV in the group;

[0024] (7) After each UAV in the group receives the message sent by GCS, it first recovers the group session key Then calculate Compare the received with the generated . If correct, the identity of GCS is authenticated and the correctness of the session key GK is verified.

[0025] Further, the S3 specifically includes:

[0026] (1) First, the UAV that needs to join or exit selects a random number r i , and then calculates and encode the secret share, obtaining S i ' = encode(seed i || y i ), then calculate Finally, the UAV calculates the message authentication code Splice M i = R i || H i || EUID i || ECID i || Tag, and the UAV sends the message authentication code and the message M i to the GCS;

[0027] (2) After receiving the message sent by the UAV, the GCS first restores the temporary authentication key then calculates If the message authentication code is correct, the identity of the UAV is authenticated;

[0028] (3) Then, the GCS restores the secret share of the UAV i according to the restored temporary authentication key PUF(r and decodes to obtain the real share information Decode(S i ') = seed i || y i , then restores the row vector I i using the seed 1×t of the UAV, and verifies whether I 1×t · x t×1 is equal to y i , if correct, the correctness of the secret share of the UAV is verified;

[0029] (4) The GCS generates a random number seed Seed and a random number Gr, then calculates a new session key and calculates and for the UAVs in the group, then calculates the message authentication code Finally, the GCS sends the message authentication code and the message to the UAVs in the group;

[0030] (5) After receiving the message sent by the GCS, the UAVs in the group first calculate according to the received message, then calculate and calculate the message authentication code Finally, check whether the received is equal to the generated If equal, the identity of the GCS is authenticated and the correctness of the session key is verified, and finally the saved secret share y i is updated.

[0031] Another object of the present application is to provide a dynamic group authentication and key agreement system for unmanned aerial vehicles, which comprises:

[0032] An unmanned aerial vehicle identity registration module: initiated by the UAV, the GCS and the Cust generate EUID and ECID with privacy protection for the UAV, and distribute secret shares and related authentication information for the UAVs in the group;

[0033] An unmanned aerial vehicle identity authentication and key agreement module: based on secret sharing, the identity authentication of the unmanned aerial vehicles in the group is completed, after the authentication is passed, the GCS restores the initial key according to the secret share, and then the GCS distributes the group session key to the UAV;

[0034] A dynamic joining and exiting module of the unmanned aerial vehicle: when the unmanned aerial vehicle in the group needs to join or exit, first, the identity authentication is completed according to the message authentication code and the secret share, and then the GCS completes the negotiation and update of the group session key and the update of the secret share of the unmanned aerial vehicle.

[0035] Another object of the present application is to provide a computer device, which comprises a memory and a processor, the memory stores a computer program, and the computer program is executed by the processor to make the processor execute the steps of the dynamic group authentication and key agreement method for unmanned aerial vehicles.

[0036] Another object of the present application is to provide a computer readable storage medium, which stores a computer program, and the computer program is executed by the processor to make the processor execute the steps of the dynamic group authentication and key agreement method for unmanned aerial vehicles.

[0037] Another object of the present application is to provide an information data processing terminal for realizing the dynamic group authentication and key agreement system for unmanned aerial vehicles.

[0038] In combination with the above technical solutions and the technical problems solved, the technical solution to be protected by the present application has the following advantages and positive effects:

[0039] The application aims to solve the privacy protection problem of UAV identity information, in the registration stage, the GCS performs encryption operation on the real identity information UID of the UAV to obtain EUID, the Cust performs encryption operation on the commercial company information CID and EUID to obtain ECID, the UID and CID are respectively encrypted and protected for processing, which can effectively guarantee the security and anonymity of the real identity information of the UAV, meanwhile, the EUID and ECID also guarantee the privacy of the identity information of the UAV, and when the relevant identity information of the UAV needs to be known, only the GCS and the Cust cooperate to restore the relevant identity information of the UAV.

[0040] The application aims to solve the authentication and key negotiation problem in the communication process between the group UAV and the GCS, the UAV uses the temporary authentication key PUF(r i ), which can guarantee the randomness of the transmitted message and effectively prevent replay attacks; the XOR operation is adopted, which can reduce the resource consumption of the UAV; the EUID and ECID with privacy protection function are used, which can effectively protect the privacy of the real identity information of the UAV; in addition, the aggregated message authentication code is used for authentication, which can effectively reduce the signaling blocking problem of the GCS and also guarantee the integrity of the authentication message.

[0041] The application aims to solve the problem of dynamically joining and exiting the group of the group UAV, when the UAV needs to join or exit the group, the double verification mode is adopted, the message authentication code and the secret share are verified at the same time, which can effectively verify the identity; the group session key is updated in time, the new session key and the new secret share are distributed to the UAV in the new group, which can effectively guarantee the security of the group session key and realize the joining and exiting of the UAV.

[0042] Whether the technical solutions of the present application solve the technical problems that people have been eager to solve but have always failed to succeed: first, in the UAV Internet, the UAV collects the messages from the ground, then transmits the collected messages to the GCS through the base station, the GCS processes the received messages and makes relevant feedback actions, and if necessary, the collected messages can be cloud stored. In the whole process, it is necessary to authenticate the identity of the UAV and negotiate the session key among the UAVs, and due to the limited computing resources of the UAV, lightweight cryptographic operations must be used. Second, in the existing work, when the UAV is authenticated, the UID is hashed to ensure the anonymity of the UID, but after the UID is hashed, the government agency cannot identify the real identity information of the malicious UAV, cannot supervise the behavior of the UAV, and the UAVs of the same commercial company have the same commercial company CID, so the attacker can easily identify which commercial company the UAV belongs to, thereby judging the commercial purpose of the company, and cannot protect the privacy of the commercial company information. Third, after the existing research groups the UAVs, the groups are in a fixed grouping state, and the UAVs that need to join or exit the group cannot perform join or exit operations.

[0043] This identity authentication and key negotiation method will have an important impact on the security protection technology of the UAV Internet, and is expected to improve the security of the UAV Internet. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0044] Figure 1 is the flow chart of the UAV Internet identity authentication and key negotiation method provided by the embodiment of the present application;

[0045] Figure 2 is the schematic diagram of the system structure of the UAV Internet identity authentication and key negotiation system provided by the embodiment of the present application;

[0046] Figure 3 is the flow chart of the UAV identity information registration provided by the embodiment of the present application;

[0047] Figure 4 is the flow chart of the UAV identity authentication and key negotiation provided by the embodiment of the present application;

[0048] Figure 5 is the flow chart of the dynamic joining and exiting of the UAV provided by the embodiment of the present application;

[0049] Figure 6 is the security analysis result diagram of the UAV Internet identity authentication and key negotiation of the present application;

[0050] Figure 7 is the security analysis result diagram of the dynamic joining and exiting of the UAV of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0051] In order to make the objectives, technical solutions and advantages of the present application clearer, the present application will be further described in detail below with reference to the embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are only used to explain the present application and should not be used to limit the present application.

[0052] As shown in Figure 1 The UAV dynamic group-oriented authentication and key agreement method provided by the embodiment of the present application comprises:

[0053] S1, UAV identity information registration: the identity of the UAV is registered, and the UAV is distributed with EUID and ECID having a privacy protection function and secret shares and related authentication information;

[0054] S2, UAV identity authentication and key agreement: two-way authentication is completed between the GCS and the UAV, the GCS restores the initial key according to the secret share of the UAV and distributes a group session key to the UAV;

[0055] S3, dynamic joining and exiting of the UAV: when the UAV needs to join or exit the group, the GCS authenticates the UAV, then the GCS distributes a new group session key and a new secret share to each UAV in the new group, realizing the update of the group session key and the secret share;

[0056] As shown in Figure 2 The UAV dynamic group-oriented authentication and key agreement method provided by the embodiment of the present application comprises:

[0057] The UAV identity information registration module: the UAV initiates a registration request, and the GCS and the Cust register the identity information of the UAV, and the registered identity information can guarantee the privacy of the identity information of the UAV and the company to which the UAV belongs;

[0058] The UAV identity authentication and key agreement module: the UAV and the GCS complete authentication based on the aggregated message authentication code, the GCS restores the initial key according to the secret share of each UAV, then calculates a group session key and distributes it to the UAV;

[0059] The dynamic joining and exiting of the UAV module: when the UAV needs to join or exit the group, the GCS verifies the identity of the UAV according to the secret share and the message authentication code, then the GCS distributes a new session key to each UAV in the new group and completes the update of the secret share of the UAV;

[0060] The technical solutions of the present application will be further described below with reference to specific embodiments.

[0061] The application consists of: a UAV (UAV), a leader UAV (LU), a ground control center (GCS), and a trusted third-party agency (Cust). The Cust belongs to a trusted third-party agency and participates in completing the identity registration of the UAV. The GCS is a ground control center with high performance and high storage characteristics, responsible for the identity registration, authentication, and distribution of group session keys of the UAV, and completes the joining and exiting of the UAV, and realizes the group session key update. The LU has better computing resources than the UAV and is responsible for aggregating and forwarding the authentication messages of the UAV.

[0062] First, the UAV identity information registration stage, the UAV, GCS and Cust complete the registration of the identity information of the UAV.

[0063] Second, the UAV identity authentication and key negotiation stage, the GCS and the UAV complete mutual authentication, and the GCS distributes the group session key to the UAV.

[0064] Finally, the dynamic joining and exiting of the UAV stage, when the UAV needs to join or exit the group, the GCS realizes the joining or exiting of the UAV.

[0065] The symbols used in the protocol are shown in Table 1:

[0066] Table 1 Protocol symbol definition

[0067]

[0068] I. UAV identity information registration stage

[0069] The registration stage completes the establishment of the UAV identity information EUID on the GCS and the establishment of the commercial company information ECID on the Cust on the secure channel. The GCS and the Cust respectively use their own secret keys to complete the establishment of the UAV related identity information. Without revealing the secret key, the attacker cannot obtain the real identity information of the UAV, ensuring the anonymity of the UAV. At the same time, an attacker, GCS and Cust alone cannot obtain UID and CID according to EUID and ECID at the same time, and associate UID and CID, which forms effective privacy protection for the UAV. The specific process is as follows:

[0070] (1) First, the UAV sends UID i to the GCS;

[0071] (2) After receiving UID i , the GCS generates a random value Seed G , then the GCS calculates EUID i = E KG (i||SeedG ||UID i ), and (i is session identity, T is task identity), finally GCS sends EUID i , GID i to UAV;

[0072] (3) After receiving the message sent by GCS, UAV first generates a random value r i , then GCS sends EUID i , CID i and r i to the trusted third party Cust;

[0073] (4) After receiving the message sent by UAV, Cust generates a random value Seed C , then Cust calculates Subsequently, Cust generates i random seeds Seed i , Cust calculates the generation matrix M i according to Seed i×t , then calculates gk=KDF(r1||r2…||r i ||Seed C ) and H(gk), then Cust encodes gkinto column vector gk t×1 , then calculates M i×t ·gk t×1 =y i×1 , Cust takes each column vector element in y i×1 to get the secret share y i , finally Cust sends ECID i , Seed i , y i and H(gk) to UAV;

[0074] (5) After receiving the message sent by Cust, UAV calculates R i =PUF(ECID i ||EUID i ), then sends R i and H(gk) to GCS.

[0075] II. UAV identity authentication and key agreement phase

[0076] After the identity information registration of UAV is performed, the identity authentication and key agreement of UAV will be carried out. In this phase, LU aggregates the authentication message of UAV and forwards it to GCS, GCS first verifies the aggregated message authentication code, and distributes the session key to UAV after verification, the specific process is as follows:

[0077] (1) First, the UAV in the group selects a random number r i , then calculates and encodes the secret share to get S i ' = encode (seed i || y i ), then calculates Finally, the UAV in the group calculates the message authentication code Splice the message M i = R' i || H i || EUID i || ECID i , send the message authentication code and the message M i to the leader UAV LU in the group;

[0078] (2) After receiving the message sent by the UAV in the group, the LU aggregates the message authentication code sent by each UAV in the group to get Then splice the received message to get the message M = M1||M2…||M i || UID L , finally send the aggregated message authentication code and the message M to the GCS;

[0079] (3) After receiving the message sent by the LU, the GCS first restores the temporary authentication key Then restore the secret share of the UAV according to the restored temporary authentication key PUF (r i ) to get Then decode to get the real share information Decode (S i ') = seed i || y i ;

[0080] (4) After the GCS successfully restores the temporary authentication key PUF (r i ), the GCS calculates the message authentication code of each UAV Finally, aggregate all the message authentication codes to get Compare the received aggregated message authentication code with the aggregated message authentication code generated by the GCS itself, if correct, the GCS completes the authentication of the identity of the UAV in the group;

[0081] (5) After the GCS completes the authentication of the UAV, the GCS restores the respective row vector I i of each UAV in the group with the seed i of each UAV in the group, and combines all the row vectors to get the generation matrix M i×tand combine all the y of the UAVs i , to get the column vector y i×1 , and finally solve the matrix equation M i×t ·x t×1 =y i×1 , to get the initial key x t×1 , convert it into hexadecimal characters x, and then calculate H(x) and compare it with the stored H(gk) to determine whether the recovered key's hash value is correct, and if the hash values are the same, the key is successfully recovered;

[0082] (6) GCS calculation As part of the group session key generation, XOR with x to get the group session key Finally, the GCS calculates for each UAV in the group and the message authentication code The GCS sends L i , and the spliced message N=L i ||G r ||SID to each UAV in the group;

[0083] (7) After each UAV in the group receives the message sent by the GCS, first recover the group session key Then calculate Compare the received with the generated , and if correct, authenticate the identity of the GCS and verify the correctness of the session key GK.

[0084] III. Dynamic joining and exiting phase of UAV

[0085] When a UAV needs to join or exit the group, this phase will authenticate the identity of the UAV, then complete the joining or exiting of the UAV, and implement the update of the session key in the group and the update of the secret share stored by the UAV. The specific process is as follows:

[0086] (1) First, select a random number r i by the UAV that needs to join or exit, then calculate and encode the secret share to get S i '=encode(seed i ||y i ), then calculate Finally, the UAV calculates the message authentication code Splice M i =R i '||H i ||EUID i ||ECID i||Tag, the last UAV will message authentication code and message M i send to GCS;

[0087] (2) GCS after receiving the message sent by the UAV, first restore temporary authentication key Then calculate If the message authentication code is correct, the identity of the UAV is authenticated;

[0088] (3) then GCS according to the restored temporary authentication key PUF(r i ) restore the secret share of UAV And decode to get the real share information Decode(S i ') = seed i ||y i , then use the seed of the unmanned plane I i Restoration vector 1×t , verify I 1×t ·x t×1 Whether equal to y i , if correct, the correctness of the secret share of UAV is verified;

[0089] (4) GCS generates random number seed Seed and random number Gr, then calculates the new session key And calculate And Then calculate the message authentication code Finally, GCS will send the message authentication code And message Send to the UAV in the group;

[0090] (5) after receiving the message sent by the GCS, the UAV in the group first calculates Then calculate And calculate the message authentication code Finally check whether the received Equal to the generated If equal, the identity of the GCS is authenticated and the correctness of the session key is verified, and finally the saved secret share y i ' is updated.

[0091] The application embodiment of the present application provides a kind of computer equipment, computer equipment includes memory and processor, memory has computer program, computer program is executed by processor, to make processor execute the step of the authentication and key negotiation method for unmanned plane dynamic group.

[0092] The embodiment of the present application provides an information data processing terminal, which is used for realizing the authentication and key negotiation system for a dynamic group of unmanned aerial vehicles.

[0093] The embodiment of the present application is divided into three parts, which are an unmanned aerial vehicle identity information registration stage, an unmanned aerial vehicle identity authentication and key negotiation stage and a dynamic joining and exiting stage of the unmanned aerial vehicle.

[0094] I. Unmanned aerial vehicle identity information registration stage: on a secure channel, a UAV initiates a request UID for registration of identity, after the GCS receives the request UID of the UAV, the GCS uses its own secret key K G encrypts the UID to obtain EUID, then the EUID is sent by the GCS and forwarded to the Cust by the UAV. After the Cust receives it, the Cust uses its own secret key K C encrypts the CID and EUID, and generates a secret share for the UAV, then sends the secret share, ECID and the hash value H(gk) used to verify the correctness of the initial key to the UAV, after the UAV receives it, the PUF response and H(gk) are sent to the GCS.

[0095] After the end of the process, the EUID is used to ensure the anonymity of the UID, so that the attacker cannot know the real identity information of the UAV, the ECID is used to ensure that the UAVs belonging to the same company cannot be identified by the attacker, and the anonymity of the CID is also ensured. If the UAV has a malicious attack behavior, the Cust and the GCS can cooperate to identify the UID and CID of the UAV according to the EUID and ECID, so as to constrain it. And only the Cust and the GCS cooperate when needed to recover the UID and CID of the UAV, the attacker, the GCS and the Cust cannot recover the UID and CID simultaneously, so as to associate the UID and CID.

[0096] II. Unmanned aerial vehicle identity authentication and key negotiation stage: the GCS recovers the temporary authentication key according to the PUF response stored in the registration stage and the message sent by the UAV and the PUF response, then verifies the aggregated message authentication code and recovers the secret share, then recovers the initial key, and then calculates the group session key. Finally, the message authentication code and the related message are sent to the UAV, after the UAV receives the message sent by the GCS, the group session key is calculated first, and then the message authentication code is verified.

[0097] In this process, if the PUF(r i ) recovery fails, the protocol can be interrupted. If the PUF(r i ) is successfully recovered, the identity of the UAV can be verified, then the secret share is recovered, and the initial key is recovered. The identity of the UAV can also be verified, and finally the initial key is recovered according to the secret share of the UAV, and the initial key is hashed to ensure the correctness of the initial key. The GCS and the UAV complete mutual authentication and key negotiation, and can communicate using a secure session key, effectively preventing attacks by attackers.

[0098] III. Dynamic joining and exiting phase of the UAV: when the UAV in the group needs to join or exit, the GCS first completes the authentication of the UAV identity according to the message authentication code and the secret share, and then the GCS completes the negotiation and update of the session key in the UAV group and the update of the secret share. In this process, the disadvantage that the UAV cannot be regrouped after the authentication and key negotiation phase is avoided, the flexibility of the UAV is exerted, and the scheduling of UAV resources is beneficial. At the same time, the session key and the secret share of the UAV in the new group are updated, avoiding the disadvantage of long-term use of the same group session key and secret share.

[0099] The present application realizes mutual authentication, group key negotiation and dynamic joining and exiting of the UAV based on PUF and secret sharing technology; before performing authentication of the UAV and the GCS, the UAV initiates a registration request to the GCS and the Cust, the GCS performs an encryption step on the UID to obtain EUID, the Cust receives the EUID forwarded by the UAV, and performs an encryption step on the CID and the EUID, which guarantees the anonymity of the UID and the CID, and also guarantees the privacy of the UID and the CID through the EUID and the ECID; when authenticating and negotiating the key between the UAV and the GCS, the UAV uses the random response of the PUF as a temporary authentication key, and the LU uses the aggregated message authentication code to prove the identity of the UAV to the GCS, which also guarantees the integrity of the message authentication; when the UAV needs to dynamically join and exit, first, the identity of the UAV in the group is authenticated based on the message authentication code and the secret share, then a new group is established, and the secret share update of the UAV in the new group and the group session key update are completed.

[0100] In the development process, the security of the present application is analyzed using the Tamarin-Prover tool. Tamarin Prover is a formal verification tool based on multi-set rewriting rules, designed for modeling and analyzing security protocols. The tool uses the Dolev-Yao adversary model to discover potential attackers. By formalizing the protocol model and inputting the tool, the security properties can be verified. The verification result is divided into two types: if the protocol meets the specified properties, a formal security proof is provided; if a vulnerability is found, a reproducible attack trajectory is generated.

[0101] The authentication and key agreement phase and the dynamic joining or exiting phase of the application are analyzed for security using Tamarin-Prover. The security properties of the protocol participants: aliveness, injective agreement, and the secrecy of the finally negotiated session key are verified.

[0102] As shown in Figure 6 and Figure 7 The application verifies the lemmas of the protocol, mainly verifying the following lemmas: aliveness_Protocol, injective_agreement_GCS, injective_agreement_D, key_Secrecy_GCS and key_Secrecy_D. The verification results of the lemmas are all "verified", and the results show that the security goals are met in each phase of the application, and the security properties can be effectively guaranteed in the implementation process.

[0103] The specific implementation of the application is divided into three parts, which are UAV identity information registration, UAV identity authentication and key agreement, and dynamic joining and exiting of UAV.

[0104] First, the PUF is embedded into the UAV device, and the uniqueness and unclonability of the PUF are used to avoid the risk of long-term key leakage in the UAV, simplify the key distribution process, and once an enemy attempts to physically attack a legal UAV and steal the key information, the identity of the device will be forged, which will cause the UAV hardware to be damaged, unable to produce correct responses, unable to complete the identity authentication of the UAV and the GCS, and the GCS will not distribute session keys to the UAV, and the subsequent attack of the enemy will not be able to proceed, so that physical capture attacks can be resisted.

[0105] I. UAV identity information registration, which completes the establishment of the UAV identity information EUID on the GCS and the establishment of the commercial company information ECID on the Cust on the secure channel. The GCS and the Cust respectively use their own secret keys to complete the establishment of the UAV related identity information, and under the premise of not leaking the secret key, the attacker cannot obtain the real identity information of the UAV, ensuring the anonymity of the UAV, and at the same time, the attacker, the GCS and the Cust cannot simultaneously obtain the UID and the CID according to the EUID and the ECID, and associate the UID and the CID, which forms effective privacy protection for the UAV,

[0106] II. UAV identity authentication and key agreement, after the UAV identity information registration is completed, the UAV identity authentication and key agreement will be performed. The UAV will send the PUF(r i) as a temporary authentication key, then the LU aggregates the message authentication codes sent by each UAV in the group, and sends the authentication message and the aggregated message authentication code to the GCS, the GCS recovers the PUF(r i ) from the received message, and then verifies the aggregated message authentication code, and subsequently recovers the secret share of each UAV, recovers the initial key from the secret share, and processes the initial key and the PUF(r i ) as input, outputs the group session key, and finally the GCS distributes the group session key to each UAV in the group.

[0107] III. Dynamic joining and exiting of UAVs, when a UAV needs to join or exit the group, a double verification method is adopted, the GCS verifies the message authentication code and the secret share, which can effectively verify the identity of the UAV, after verification, the GCS will allocate the old group to form a new group according to the demand of the UAV to join or exit, and then distribute the new session key to the UAVs in the new group and update their secret shares, achieving the effect of joining or exiting the group.

[0108] Embodiment 1 (identity information registration)

[0109] In this embodiment, the UAV first sends an identity registration request to the ground control center through the wireless link, the ground control center generates a random value after receiving the UAV registration request, and calculates the pseudonym identity of the UAV by combining the real identity of the UAV, the session identifier and the task identifier, and sends the pseudonym identity of the UAV to the UAV; the UAV submits an identity registration request to the trusted third party, the trusted third party generates a pseudonym company identity according to the pseudonym identity of the UAV and the real identity of the company, and then generates a plurality of random number seeds and constructs a generation matrix, calculates the secret share according to the matrix, and sends the secret share, the pseudonym identity of the company and the hash value of the initial key to the UAV, and the UAV finally generates a PUF response and sends it and the hash value of the initial key to the GCS.

[0110] Through the above method, the identity of the UAV can be ensured to have the privacy protection effect of EUID and ECID in the initial registration stage, and the distribution of the secret share lays a secure foundation for subsequent authentication and key agreement.

[0111] Embodiment 2 (authentication and key agreement)

[0112] In this embodiment, each drone in the group generates a random number and calculates a message authentication code based on the temporary authentication key and related parameters, and sends the spliced message to the leader drone. The leader drone aggregates the message authentication codes of all drones and forwards the aggregated message authentication code and the message content to the ground control center. The ground control center first restores the temporary authentication key, then restores the real share information using the temporary authentication key, and verifies the correctness of the aggregated message authentication code, and then the ground control center restores the initial key by solving the matrix equation, and the ground control center converts the initial key obtained by solving the matrix into a hexadecimal string and calculates the hash value. Then compare with the stored hash value, if it matches correctly, confirm that the restored initial key is valid. Next, the ground control center obtains the hash value by taking each temporary authentication key as input, and the key is XORed with the hash value obtained by taking the temporary authentication key as input to obtain the final group session key, and the authentication information and the message authentication code are issued to all drones in the group. After receiving the message, the drone in the group first restores the group session key using the received information, and then compares the calculated message authentication code with the received message authentication code, and if they are consistent, it is confirmed that the ground control center identity is trusted and the group session key is correct.

[0113] This way not only improves the authentication efficiency, but also enhances the authentication by restoring the temporary authentication key and verifying the aggregated message authentication code. By aggregating the authentication messages through the leader drone, the processing load of the ground control center is reduced. When calculating the group session key, the ground control center takes the temporary authentication key and the initial key of all drones in the group as input parameters, which can ensure the uniqueness and unforgeability of the group session key in the communication process. The ground control center uses the temporary authentication key restored by itself to calculate the message authentication code, and uses the random number as one of the parameters, which can effectively resist man-in-the-middle attacks and replay attacks.

[0114] Embodiment 3 (drone joining)

[0115] In this embodiment, when a new drone needs to join the group, it first sends a join request to the ground control center, and attaches a message authentication code calculated based on the temporary authentication key and the secret share. The ground control center first restores the temporary authentication key, then verifies the message authentication code, and after verification, restores the secret share of the drone, and calculates a new session key combining the information of the existing group members, and updates the secret share and the group session key for all drones in the new group.

[0116] The mechanism guarantees the update of the group session key, the dynamically added drone does not obtain the information of the original group drone communication, and the security of the old message of the original group communication is protected, so that the security risk of information leakage caused by the addition of new members can be avoided. Meanwhile, by distributing the updated share information, it ensures that all drones in the group share the same new group session key.

[0117] Embodiment 4 (drone exit)

[0118] In this embodiment, when the drone needs to exit the group, it sends an exit request to the ground control center and proves its identity through the message authentication code. The ground control center first restores the temporary authentication key, then verifies the message authentication code, and after verification, generates a new random number seed, recalculates the group session key, and distributes the new group session key and the secret share to the remaining group drones, ensuring that the exiting drone cannot obtain the new group session key.

[0119] In this way, the potential information leakage problem caused by the non-update of the key after the drone exits can be effectively solved. The remaining drones in the group continue to communicate securely using the new group session key, while the exiting drone cannot continue to participate in the group communication due to the lack of updated shares and group session keys.

[0120] Embodiment 5

[0121] In this embodiment, the authentication system consists of three modules: registration module, authentication and key negotiation module, dynamic joining and exiting module. The registration module is responsible for generating related pseudonym identity for drones and distributing secret shares; the authentication and key negotiation module aggregates messages using the leader drone and completes authentication and key distribution by the ground control center; the dynamic joining and exiting module updates the group session key and secret share when the group topology changes.

[0122] This modular system architecture can effectively support the communication needs of drone groups in different scenarios. Its advantages are that the registration module lays the foundation for the authentication of drones and provides privacy protection for drones, the authentication module improves the efficiency of group authentication and key negotiation, and the dynamic module ensures the security of group expansion and reduction, thus forming a complete security system.

[0123] It should be noted that embodiments of the present application can be realized by hardware, software, or a combination of software and hardware. The hardware portion can be realized by a special logic; the software portion can be stored in a memory and executed by a proper instruction execution system, such as a microprocessor or a specially designed hardware. A person of ordinary skill in the art can understand that the above-mentioned apparatus and method can be realized by computer executable instructions and / or included in processor control codes, such as a carrier medium, such as a magnetic disk, CD or DVD-ROM, a programmable memory, such as a read-only memory (firmware), or a data carrier, such as an optical or electronic signal carrier. The apparatus of the present application and its modules can be realized by a hardware circuit, such as a very large scale integrated circuit or a gate array, a semiconductor, such as a logic chip, a transistor, or a programmable hardware device, such as a field programmable gate array, a programmable logic device, or the like, by software executed by various types of processors, or by a combination of the above-mentioned hardware circuit and software, such as firmware.

[0124] The above description is merely a specific implementation of the present application, but the protection scope of the present application is not limited thereto. Any modification, equivalent replacement, and improvement within the technical range disclosed by the present application, and within the spirit and principle of the present application, should be covered within the protection scope of the present application.

Claims

1. A method for authentication and key negotiation for dynamic drone swarms, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: S1. The drone initiates a registration request to the ground control center. The ground control center and a trusted third-party organization generate pseudonym identifiers for the drone and pseudonym identifiers for the company, and distribute secret shares. S2. The drones in the group send authentication messages. The leader drone collects and aggregates the authentication messages and forwards them to the ground control center. The ground control center completes identity authentication and distributes session keys based on the secret sharing mechanism. S3. When a drone needs to dynamically join or leave a group, the ground control center updates the group session key and secret share after authenticating its identity.

2. The method as described in claim 1, characterized in that, In step S1, after receiving the drone registration request, the ground control center generates a random value and calculates the drone pseudonym identity identifier by combining the drone's real identity identifier, session identifier, and task identifier, and sends the drone pseudonym identity identifier to the drone. drones Then, an identity registration request is submitted to a trusted third party. The trusted third party generates a pseudonym company identity based on the drone's pseudonym identity and the company's real identity. Then, multiple random number seeds are generated and a generation matrix is ​​constructed. The secret share is calculated based on the matrix. Finally, the secret share and the company pseudonym identity are sent to the drone.

3. The method as described in claim 1, characterized in that, In step S2, each UAV selects a random number to calculate a temporary authentication key and combines it with a secret share to generate a message authentication code. The message authentication code and authentication message are then sent to the leader UAV. The leader UAV aggregates the received message authentication codes and forwards them to the ground control center. The ground control center uses the recovered temporary authentication key to recover the share information, verifies the aggregated message authentication code, and completes the UAV's identity authentication after successful verification. The initial key is then recovered based on the matrix equation, and finally, the group session key is calculated.

4. The method as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The group session key is generated as follows: the ground control center converts the initial key recovered through secret sharing into a hexadecimal string, calculates its hash value, and compares it with the stored hash value; if the match is correct, the hash value of all UAVs is used as input and XORed with the initial key to finally obtain the group session key.

5. The method as described in claim 1, characterized in that, In S3, when a drone joins or leaves a group, it submits a message authentication code calculated based on a temporary authentication key to the ground control center. After the ground control center verifies the code and confirms its correctness, it generates a new random number seed, recalculates and updates the group session key, and updates the secret share of each drone in the group.

6. A method for dynamic joining and leaving a drone swarm, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: The drone generates a random number seed and calculates authentication parameters, then sends the authentication parameters and message authentication code to the ground control center. The ground control center restores the temporary authentication key and verifies the message authentication code, then restores the share information. If the share and message authentication code are verified correctly, a new random number seed is generated, the updated session key is calculated, and new secret shares and session keys are distributed to each drone in the group.

7. The method as described in claim 6, characterized in that, The update process includes: after receiving the update message, the UAV in the group calculates the message authentication code using the received update information and compares it with the received message authentication code. If they match, the identity of the ground control center is verified and the correctness of the calculated session key is confirmed. Finally, the local update of the secret share is completed.

8. An authentication system for dynamic drone swarms, characterized in that, include: The drone identity information registration module is used to distribute pseudonym identity identifiers, pseudonym company identity identifiers, and secret shares; The UAV identity authentication and key negotiation module is used by the ground control center to complete identity authentication and distribute group session keys after the leader UAV aggregates the authentication message; The drone dynamic join and leave module is used to complete identity authentication, session key update and secret share update when the group topology changes.

9. The system as described in claim 8, characterized in that, The drone identity authentication and key negotiation module calculates the row vectors by the secret share of drones in the group, then combines the row vectors to obtain the generation matrix, and combines the column vectors to form a matrix equation for solving, so as to recover the initial key and complete the generation of the group session key.

10. The system as described in claim 8, characterized in that, The UAV dynamic joining and leaving module employs a dual mechanism of secret share verification and message authentication code comparison when updating the session key to ensure the ground control center's identity is correct and the group session key is accurate.

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