Remote control operation system and method based on centralized control center

By generating remote power outage commands through the centralized control center, and combining encrypted communication and impedance matching units, the problems of command tampering and surge current in remote control are solved, realizing safe and reliable remote control of the 35kV equipment in the substation and ensuring the stability of the power grid.

CN121840911APending Publication Date: 2026-04-10HAMI YAOHUI PHOTOVOLTAIC POWER CO LTD +2
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Patent Information

Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2025-11-25
Publication Date
2026-04-10

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing technologies lack a complete closed-loop system for remote control of 35kV substation equipment during power outages. Command transmissions are not securely encrypted and are easily tampered with. Surge currents can damage equipment during tripping operations, and the lack of consideration for load conditions can affect grid stability.

Method used

The system uses a centralized control center to generate remote power outage commands, and uses a dynamic token authentication mechanism through an encrypted communication module to generate encrypted commands. It also uses an impedance matching unit to suppress surge current and obtains load prediction results in the control module, and performs a tripping operation only when the load value is below the threshold.

Benefits of technology

It achieves security and reliability of remote control, prevents command tampering, protects equipment from surge current damage, ensures that the tripping operation does not affect the stability of the power grid, and improves the operation and management level and security of the power system.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Patent Text Reader

Abstract

The invention provides a remote control operation system and method based on a centralized control center, and the system generates a remote power failure instruction through the centralized control center, an encryption communication module employs a timestamp and equipment identifier hash to generate an authentication mechanism of a dynamic token, carries out the safety verification of the instruction, and generates an encryption instruction. The control module comprises an impedance matching unit and a circuit breaker control unit which are connected in sequence, the control module responds to the encryption instruction, obtains a load prediction result and generates an opening signal to control the circuit breaker to be opened only when a load value in a preset time period is lower than a first threshold value; the problems that in the prior art, remote control lacks a power failure operation complete closed loop, instruction transmission is free of security encryption and is prone to being tampered, surge current damages equipment during opening, and opening operation is not combined with a load state and is prone to affecting the stability of a power grid are solved.
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Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application relates to the field of power system automation control technology, and in particular to a remote control operation system and method based on a centralized control center. BACKGROUND

[0002] In the field of power system automation control, the 35kV equipment of the booster station is a key link of power transmission, and the timeliness and reliability of its power-off control directly affect the safe operation of the power grid. With the development of the power grid, the remote control mode has become a development trend in the industry because it can reduce the dependence on field operation and maintenance and improve response efficiency.

[0003] In the prior art, the temperature and humidity data collection and fan start-stop control of the equipment in the booster station are mainly realized through remote control. The communication adopts the Modbus RTU protocol, and the signal transmission path is the monitoring center, the communication module, the field monitoring unit and the controlled equipment. The core focuses on environmental parameter monitoring and auxiliary equipment control, and does not involve the power-off operation function of the high-voltage equipment core.

[0004] Moreover, in the prior art, only equipment state monitoring and auxiliary equipment control are supported, and there is a lack of 35kV equipment power-off operation. The remote breaking of the circuit breaker cannot be performed, it is difficult to meet the real-time requirements of power-off control, and there is no encryption verification mechanism, which is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks leading to tampering of instructions, and cannot guarantee the reliability and security of the power-off operation. SUMMARY

[0005] The present application provides a remote control operation system and method based on a centralized control center, which solves the problems of lack of complete closed loop of power-off operation, lack of secure encryption of instruction transmission, vulnerability to tampering, damage to equipment by inrush current during breaking, and influence on power grid stability due to breaking operation not combined with load state in the prior art.

[0006] In one aspect, the present application provides a remote control operation system based on a centralized control center, comprising: a centralized control center, an encrypted communication module, and a control module arranged in a booster station; The control module comprises an impedance matching unit and a circuit breaker control unit connected in sequence, and the circuit breaker control unit is connected with a 35kV circuit breaker; The centralized control center is configured to generate a remote power-off instruction; The encrypted communication module is configured to receive the remote power-off instruction, and perform security verification on the remote power-off instruction using an authentication mechanism based on a dynamic token to generate an encrypted instruction. The dynamic token is generated by a timestamp and a device identifier through a hash operation; The impedance matching unit is provided with an impedance matching circuit, which is configured to adjust the parameters of the impedance matching circuit before the execution of the remote power-off instruction, so as to suppress the inrush current generated during the breaking operation; The control module is used for: In response to the received encryption instruction, obtain the load prediction result; If the load prediction result is lower than the first threshold within a preset time period, a tripping execution signal is generated to control the tripping operation of the 35kV circuit breaker.

[0007] Optionally, the control module further includes functions for: In response to the detection that the short-circuit fault current exceeds the second threshold, a forced tripping operation is triggered within the first delay. In response to detecting that the load current exceeds a third threshold, a tripping operation is triggered after a second delay; the second delay is greater than the first delay.

[0008] Optionally, the control module further includes an optocoupler-isolated control unit; The optocoupler isolation control unit is used to transmit the tripping control signal between the encrypted communication module and the circuit breaker control unit in an electrically isolated manner.

[0009] Optionally, the control module further includes a load forecasting unit; The load forecasting unit is used for: Obtain the historical load data and load data of the booster station; The historical load data and the load data are input into a pre-trained load prediction model, which outputs the load prediction results for a preset time period.

[0010] Optionally, the dynamic impedance matching unit has a pre-stored impedance parameter mapping table; The dynamic impedance matching unit is also used for: The rate of change of current in the control circuit of the 35kV circuit breaker was collected; Based on the current change rate, the impedance parameter mapping table is consulted to determine the target inductance value and the target capacitance value; Based on the target inductance value and the target capacitance value, the switch array of the 35kV circuit breaker is controlled to switch to the corresponding impedance combination.

[0011] Optionally, the encrypted communication module, when performing security verification, is further configured to: Generate dynamic tokens ; Received dynamic token With dynamic tokens A comparison is performed; wherein, the dynamic token The formula for generating it is: ; in, For timestamps, For device identifier, For rolling keys; If the dynamic token With the dynamic token If they are the same, then an encryption command is generated.

[0012] Optionally, both the central control center and the control module are equipped with physically unclonable function units; The physically non-clonable function unit is used for: Obtain the first random number generated by the central control center at a preset update time and send it to the control module; The control module receives a second random number generated based on the first random number; Based on the second random number, a first response value is generated, and the second random number and the first response value are sent to the central control center. The first random number and the second random number are used to generate a second response value; If the first response value matches the second response value, then a rolling key is generated based on the first random number and the second random number using a key derivation function.

[0013] Optionally, the control module further includes a discharge ultrasonic sensor; Before controlling the tripping operation of the 35kV circuit breaker, the control module is also used for: The amount of partial discharge detected by the discharge ultrasonic sensor is obtained; If the partial discharge amount is lower than a preset safety threshold, the circuit breaker tripping operation is permitted. If the partial discharge exceeds the safety threshold, the tripping operation is blocked, and an equipment insulation abnormality alarm signal is generated and sent to the central control center.

[0014] Optionally, it also includes a vibration sensor disposed on the 35kV circuit breaker; The control module is also used for: After the tripping execution signal is issued, a monitoring window of a preset duration is started to collect the vibration signal detected by the vibration sensor; The waveform of the vibration signal is compared with the standard vibration waveform template representing a successful circuit breaker trip. If the similarity is lower than a preset threshold, it is determined that the tripping operation has failed mechanically, and an alarm signal including the mechanical fault type is generated and sent to the central control center.

[0015] On the other hand, the present invention also provides a remote control operation method based on a centralized control center, comprising: Generate remote power outage commands; A dynamic token-based authentication mechanism is used to perform security verification on the remote power outage command and generate an encrypted command; the dynamic token is generated by hashing a timestamp and a device identifier. Adjust the impedance matching circuit parameters to suppress the surge current generated during the tripping operation; In response to the received encryption instruction, obtain the load prediction result; If the load prediction result is lower than the first threshold within a preset time period, a tripping execution signal is generated to control the tripping operation of the 35kV circuit breaker.

[0016] On the other hand, the present invention also provides an electronic device, including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor executes the program to implement the remote control operation method based on a central control center as described above.

[0017] On the other hand, the present invention also provides a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, which, when executed by a processor, implements the remote control operation method based on a central control center as described above.

[0018] On the other hand, the present invention also provides a computer program product, including a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the remote control operation method based on a central control center as described above.

[0019] This invention provides a remote control operating system and method based on a centralized control center. The system generates remote power outage commands through the centralized control center, employs an encrypted communication module using a dynamic token authentication mechanism generated from timestamps and device identifier hashes to securely verify the commands and generate encrypted commands, and includes a control module comprising a sequentially connected impedance matching unit and a circuit breaker control unit. The control module responds to the encrypted commands, obtains load forecast results, and generates a tripping signal to control the circuit breaker to trip only when the load value is lower than a first threshold within a preset time period. This solves the problems in existing technologies such as the lack of a complete closed-loop power outage operation in remote control, the lack of secure encryption in command transmission making it susceptible to tampering, surge current damage to equipment during tripping, and the failure to consider load conditions during tripping operations, which can easily affect grid stability. Attached Figure Description

[0020] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in this invention or the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are some embodiments of this invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained from these drawings without creative effort.

[0021] Figure 1This is one of the schematic diagrams of a remote control operating system structure based on a centralized control center provided in the embodiments of the present invention; Figure 2 This is the second schematic diagram of the remote control operating system structure based on the centralized control center provided in the embodiments of the present invention; Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the remote control operation method based on a centralized control center provided in an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of the electronic device provided in an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0022] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of this invention clearer, the technical solutions of this invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some, not all, of the embodiments of this invention. All other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art based on the embodiments of this invention without creative effort are within the scope of protection of this invention.

[0023] The following is combined Figures 1 to 3 This invention describes the detailed scheme of a remote control operating system and method based on a centralized control center provided in the embodiments of the present invention.

[0024] Figure 1 This is one of the schematic diagrams of a remote control operating system structure based on a centralized control center provided in the embodiments of the present invention.

[0025] like Figure 1 As shown, the remote control operating system based on a centralized control center provided in this embodiment of the invention includes: The system includes a central control center 110, an encrypted communication module 120, and a control module 130 located at the booster station.

[0026] The control module 130 includes an impedance matching unit 1301 and a circuit breaker control unit 1302 connected in sequence. The circuit breaker control unit 1302 is connected to the 35kV circuit breaker 140.

[0027] The central control center 110 is used to generate remote power outage commands.

[0028] The central control center 110 can generate remote power outage commands based on the actual operational needs of the substation. For example, based on power grid dispatch planning, equipment operation and maintenance plans, or equipment status information fed back from the front end, the internal control logic determines the 35kV equipment objects that need to be powered out and the timing of the operation, and then generates a remote power outage command containing equipment identification, operation type, and execution time period, and sends the power outage command to the encrypted communication module 120 to start the remote control process.

[0029] The encrypted communication module 120 is used to receive remote power outage commands and to perform security verification on the remote power outage commands using a dynamic token-based authentication mechanism to generate encrypted commands; the dynamic token is generated by hashing a timestamp and a device identifier.

[0030] The encrypted communication module 120 is designed to ensure the security and legitimacy of remote power outage commands during transmission, preventing tampering, theft, or illegal forgery of the commands and providing a secure link for their transmission. For example, when the encrypted communication module 120 receives a remote power outage command from the central control center 110, it initiates a dynamic token-based authentication mechanism. First, it extracts the current timestamp and the unique identifier of the target substation's 35kV circuit breaker 140, generates a dynamic token through hash calculation, and then associates and verifies the dynamic token with the remote power outage command to confirm the legitimacy and integrity of the command's source. After successful verification, the command is encrypted to generate an encrypted command, which is then transmitted to the substation's control module 130, effectively blocking security risks such as man-in-the-middle attacks and command tampering throughout the entire process.

[0031] Impedance matching unit 1301 is equipped with an impedance matching circuit, which is used to adjust the parameters of the impedance matching circuit before the remote power outage command is executed, so as to suppress the surge current generated during the tripping operation.

[0032] Among them, the impedance matching unit 1301 can suppress the surge current before the 35kV circuit breaker 140 is tripped, so as to avoid the surge current from causing hardware damage to the 35kV circuit breaker 140 and surrounding power equipment, and ensure the hardware safety of the tripping operation.

[0033] Specifically, the impedance matching unit 1301 has a built-in impedance matching circuit. Before the remote power outage command enters the execution stage, it first detects the actual impedance value of the current circuit in real time. Then, based on the detected impedance data, it adjusts the parameters of the inductor and capacitor in the impedance matching circuit through an internal adjustment mechanism, so that the matching impedance of the circuit approaches the characteristic impedance of the system. By eliminating the problem of circuit impedance mismatch through impedance matching, the peak value of the surge current is greatly reduced during the tripping operation, thereby achieving the surge current suppression effect.

[0034] Control module 130 is used for: In response to the received encrypted command, obtain the load forecast result.

[0035] If the load forecast result is lower than the first threshold within the preset time period, a trip execution signal is generated to control the 35kV circuit breaker 140 to trip.

[0036] The control module 130 can determine the timing of remote power outage commands based on load status, ensuring that the tripping operation will not affect the stable operation of the power grid, and drive the 35kV circuit breaker 140 to complete the tripping. Specifically, the control module 130 responds to the encrypted command received from the encrypted communication module 120, decrypts the encrypted command, and calls the load forecasting model to obtain the load forecasting results of the line where the target 35kV equipment is located.

[0037] Next, according to the preset control logic, it is determined whether the load value in the preset time period in the load forecast result is lower than the set first threshold. The first threshold can be determined according to the grid carrying capacity and line safety operation standards. If the load value meets the condition of being lower than the first threshold, it means that the current grid load state is suitable for power outage operation. The control module 130 generates a tripping execution signal and transmits the tripping execution signal to the circuit breaker control unit 1302 connected to it. The circuit breaker control unit 1302 drives the 35kV circuit breaker 140 to operate, and finally completes the tripping operation. If the load value does not reach the threshold, the tripping is not performed temporarily. The operation is started after the load value is lower than the first threshold to ensure the stable operation of the grid.

[0038] Through the coordinated operation of the above modules, the remote control operating system based on the central control center enables precise and safe remote control of the 35kV circuit breaker 140 at the substation. The central control center 110 can generate remote power outage commands based on comprehensive decision-making from multiple factors, providing an operational basis for remote control; the encrypted communication module 120 ensures that commands are not maliciously interfered with during transmission through a dynamic token authentication mechanism, guaranteeing the security and integrity of command transmission; the impedance matching unit 1301 effectively suppresses surge currents before the tripping operation, protecting power equipment from hardware damage; the control module 130 accurately determines the execution timing based on load forecast results, ensuring that the tripping operation will not affect the stable operation of the power grid, and ultimately drives the 35kV circuit breaker 140 to complete the tripping operation, effectively improving the operation management level and security of the power system.

[0039] In some embodiments, the control module 130 further includes functions for: In response to the detection that the short-circuit fault current exceeds the second threshold, a forced tripping operation is triggered within the first delay. In response to the detection that the load current exceeds the third threshold, a tripping operation is triggered after a second delay; the second delay is longer than the first delay.

[0040] Specifically, in addition to performing routine tripping operations based on load forecast results, the control module 130 also has a graded emergency response function for short-circuit faults and overload faults, in order to quickly handle high-risk faults, prevent fault escalation, and ensure the stability of power grid operation. Specifically, the control module 130 collects the current signal of the line where the 35kV circuit breaker 140 is located in real time. When a short-circuit fault current is detected in the line and the short-circuit fault current value exceeds a second threshold, for example, the second threshold is set to 10kA, it is determined to be an emergency fault endangering equipment insulation and power grid safety. The highest priority tripping response is immediately initiated, directly triggering a forced tripping operation within the first delay. The circuit breaker control unit 1302 drives the 35kV circuit breaker 140 to instantly disconnect, preventing the high temperature and electrodynamic damage caused by the continuous short-circuit current from damaging the equipment or causing a wider power outage.

[0041] When the line load current is detected to exceed the third threshold, for example, the third threshold is 1.2 times the rated current, it is determined to be a non-emergency overload state. Considering that there may be short-term load fluctuations in the power grid, in order to avoid frequent tripping affecting the continuity of power supply, a secondary priority tripping response will be initiated. The tripping operation will be triggered after a second delay, for example, the second delay is 200ms. If the load current falls back below the third threshold during the 200ms delay, the tripping command will be canceled. This prevents the equipment from overheating and being damaged due to long-term overload operation, and also reduces unnecessary power outage operations.

[0042] In some embodiments, such as Figure 2 As shown, the control module 130 also includes an optocoupler isolation control unit 1303; the input terminal of the optocoupler isolation control unit 1303 is connected to the encrypted communication module 120, and the output terminal is connected to the circuit breaker control unit 1302. The optocoupler isolation control unit 1303 is used to transmit the tripping control signal between the encrypted communication module 120 and the circuit breaker control unit 1302 in an electrically isolated manner.

[0043] Specifically, the optocoupler isolation control unit 1303 included in the control module 130 is an intermediate link to achieve safe and stable transmission of the tripping control signal. The optocoupler isolation control unit 1303 establishes an electrical isolation barrier between the encrypted communication module 120 and the circuit breaker control unit 1302 through a non-contact signal transmission method of photoelectric conversion, cutting off the direct electrical connection between the two circuits. This ensures the accurate transmission of the tripping control signal and prevents high-voltage interference or voltage surge into the low-voltage side from damaging the equipment.

[0044] The input terminal of the optocoupler isolation control unit 1303 is connected to the signal output terminal of the encrypted communication module 120 via a signal line, receiving the tripping control signal sent by the encrypted communication module 120; the output terminal is connected to the signal input terminal of the circuit breaker control unit 1302 via a drive line, outputting a control signal that meets the execution requirements to the circuit breaker control unit 1302. The operation of the optocoupler isolation control unit 1303 is based on the principle of optical coupling. When the input terminal receives the tripping control signal from the encrypted communication module 120, the light-emitting diode inside the unit is energized and emits light. The light shines on the adjacent phototransistor, causing the phototransistor to conduct and output a corresponding electrical signal, thereby transmitting the tripping command to the circuit breaker control unit 1302.

[0045] Because the light-emitting diode and the phototransistor transmit signals only through light, without any metal wire connection, electrical isolation between the input and output sides is achieved. For example, using the optocoupler chip 817C, whose isolation voltage is ≥5kV, in a 35kV substation scenario, if the circuit breaker control unit 1302 experiences a momentary high voltage due to line fluctuations, the optocoupler isolation control unit 1303 can use its 5kV isolation capability to block the high voltage from entering the encrypted communication module 120, preventing the encrypted communication module 120 from burning out due to the high voltage impact. At the same time, when a large motor near the substation starts or stops, generating strong electromagnetic interference, the electrical isolation structure can prevent interference signals from entering the tripping control circuit through the line, avoiding faults such as tripping without command or failing to trip with command. For example, if an electromagnetic pulse is generated on a 35kV line due to construction on the adjacent side, and no optocoupler isolation is set, the interference signal may cause the tripping signal output by the encrypted communication module 120 to be superimposed with noise, resulting in the circuit breaker control unit 1302 being unable to recognize it. However, when transmitted through the optocoupler isolation control unit 1303, the interference signal is isolated on the output side, and the tripping signal at the input end can still be accurately transmitted after photoelectric conversion, ensuring that the circuit breaker can reliably trip according to the command.

[0046] In some embodiments, such as Figure 2 As shown, the control module 130 also includes a load prediction unit 1304; Load forecasting unit 1304 is used for: Obtain historical load data and load data of the booster station; Historical load data and load data are input into a pre-trained load prediction model, which outputs load prediction results for a preset time period.

[0047] Specifically, the load prediction unit 1304 can adapt the tripping operation to the load status. By combining historical load patterns with real-time load trends, it can predict load changes within a preset time period, providing a basis for the control module 130 to determine whether to perform the tripping operation, thus avoiding a sudden drop in grid load or power outage for users due to blind tripping.

[0048] The working process of the load forecasting unit 1304 can be divided into three steps: data acquisition and preprocessing, model input and calculation, and forecast result output.

[0049] Data acquisition can be achieved by using the power monitoring devices at the substation, such as current transformers, voltage transformers, and smart meters, to collect real-time load data of the 35kV line. At the same time, load curves based on historical load data of the substation can be retrieved from the database, such as the load peaks during peak electricity consumption periods like 9:00-11:00 and 18:00-20:00 each day, as well as the load valleys from 2:00-4:00 AM. The real-time load data and historical load data are then preprocessed.

[0050] Then, the preprocessed historical load data and real-time load data are input into a pre-trained load forecasting model, which is typically built based on the time-series characteristics of electricity load. For example, a Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) neural network model can be used. During the training phase, the LSM model has had its parameters optimized using a large amount of historical load data from substations, regional electricity demand data, and meteorological data, resulting in stable forecasting accuracy. Finally, the long short-term memory network neural network model will output the load prediction results within the preset time period according to the preset tripping plan window. The result can be in the form of a load change curve, which will be used by the control module 130 to determine whether the tripping condition of the load value being lower than the first threshold is met.

[0051] For example, taking a 35 kV step-up substation supporting a certain wind farm as an example, the 35 kV step-up substation needs to perform a scheduled power outage from 15:00 to 16:00 on a certain day for the maintenance of the 35 kV switchgear. The load prediction unit 1304 of the control module 130 first collects the real-time load data from 14:00 to 14:30 on that day, one point every 5 minutes, which are 15.2 MW, 14.8 MW, 14.5 MW, 14.1 MW, 13.8 MW, and 13.5 MW respectively. Due to the decrease in wind speed in the afternoon, the wind power output gradually decreases, and the load shows a slow downward trend. At the same time, the historical load data from 14:00 to 16:00 every Friday in the past two months is retrieved. The average load in the historical same period is 13 MW, the lowest is 10 MW, and it mostly shows a pattern of gradually decreasing in the afternoon. After preprocessing the data, it is input into the pre-trained load prediction model. The preset time period is set to 15:00 to 16:00 on that day, and the load prediction model finally outputs the load prediction result for this period: the load range is 10.2 MW - 12.8 MW, and the average is 11.5 MW. The control module 130 combines the preset first threshold. For example, the step-up substation is set to 10 MW according to the grid connection requirements of the wind farm. It is judged that although the predicted load average value of 11.5 MW is slightly higher than the first threshold, the lowest load of 10.2 MW within the period is close to the threshold, and the overall shows a downward trend. It is expected that the load can be stably lower than 10 MW after 15:30. Therefore, it is determined to trigger the opening operation at 15:30, which not only avoids the waste of wind farm output caused by opening the switch when the load is high at 15:00, but also ensures the completion of the power outage maintenance on time.

[0052] In some embodiments, the dynamic impedance matching unit 1301 pre-stores an impedance parameter mapping table; The dynamic impedance matching unit 1301 is further configured to: Collect the current change rate of the control loop of the 35 kV circuit breaker 140; Based on the current change rate, query the impedance parameter mapping table to determine the target inductance value and the target capacitance value; According to the target inductance value and the target capacitance value, control the switch array of the 35 kV circuit breaker 140 to switch to the corresponding impedance combination.

[0053] The impedance parameter mapping table is obtained by fitting a large amount of experimental data. The table includes the target inductance and capacitance values ​​corresponding to different current change rate ranges. The collected current change rate data, after filtering, is input to the dynamic impedance matching unit 1301. Based on a pre-set algorithm, the dynamic impedance matching unit 1301 quickly locates the target inductance and capacitance values ​​matching the current current change rate in the impedance parameter mapping table. After determining the target inductance and capacitance values, the dynamic impedance matching unit 1301 sends control commands to the switch array of the 35kV circuit breaker 140. By controlling the opening and closing of different switches in the switch array, the impedance combination of the 35kV circuit breaker 140 is switched to the combination state corresponding to the target inductance and capacitance values, thus completing the dynamic impedance matching process.

[0054] For example, taking the No. 1 main transformer circuit of a 35kV substation as an example, the rated current of the No. 1 main transformer circuit is 300A, and the system characteristic impedance is set to 50Ω. Before a planned power outage, the dynamic impedance matching unit 1301 collected the circuit current change rate di / dt = 48A / ms through the Hall current sensor, which is close to the operating condition of di / dt = 50A / ms in the impedance parameter mapping table. Then, it consulted the impedance parameter mapping table and determined the target parameters to be L = 8mH and C = 3.2μF. Subsequently, it sent a switching command to the switch array, and the solid-state relay completed the branch switching, connecting the 8mH inductor and the 3.2μF capacitor to the control circuit. At this time, the circuit impedance was detected to be 49.8Ω, with a deviation of only 0.4% from the 50Ω characteristic impedance.

[0055] In some embodiments, the encrypted communication module 120, during security verification, is further configured to: Generate dynamic tokens ; Received dynamic token With dynamic tokens A comparison is performed; among them, dynamic tokens The formula for generating it is: ; in, For timestamps, For device identifier, For rolling keys; If dynamic token With dynamic tokens If they are the same, then an encryption command is generated.

[0056] Specifically, the encrypted communication module 120 first initiates the dynamic token generation process, according to the preset dynamic token... The generation formula calculates the local dynamic token. .

[0057] in To obtain and synchronize the current timestamp with the central control center 110, This is a unique identifier for the 35kV target equipment in the substation. A rolling key, pre-agreed and periodically updated, is used between the encrypted communication module 120 and the central control center 110. This is a hash algorithm.

[0058] After the encrypted communication module 120 extracts the dynamic token T_k2 transmitted along with the received remote power outage command data packet, the encrypted communication module 120 will use the locally generated... With extraction A bit-by-bit comparison is performed. If the two are completely consistent, it is determined that the remote power outage command is legitimate and has not been tampered with during transmission. Then, an encryption algorithm is used to encrypt the remote power outage command, generating an encrypted command with transmission security and sending it to the booster station control module 130. If the two are inconsistent, the command is directly intercepted and an alarm is triggered to prevent illegal commands from entering the subsequent control process.

[0059] In some embodiments, such as Figure 2 As shown, both the central control center 110 and the control module 130 are equipped with physically unclonable function units 1101; Physically non-clonable function unit 1101 is used for: Obtain the first random number generated by the central control center 110 at the preset update time and send it to the control module 130; The receiving control module 130 combines the first random number with the generated second random number; Based on the second random number, generate the first response value, and send the second random number and the first response value to the central control center 110; Calculate the first random number and the second random number to generate the second response value; If the first response value matches the second response value, a rolling key is generated based on the first and second random numbers using a key derivation function.

[0060] Specifically, at the preset rolling key update time, the physical non-cloning function unit 1101 of the central control center 110 generates a highly random first random number and sends it to the physical non-cloning function unit 1101 of the control module 130. Upon receiving the first random number, the physical non-cloning function unit 1101 of the control module 130 generates a second random number based on its own characteristics and feeds the second random number back to the physical non-cloning function unit 1101 of the central control center 110. After receiving the second random number, the physical non-cloning function unit 1101 of the central control center 110 generates a first response value based on the second random number, and then sends the second random number and the first response value back to the control module 130. Simultaneously, the physical non-cloning function unit 1101 of the central control center 110 performs specific operations on the first and second random numbers to generate a second response value. Next, the control module 130 compares its generated first response value with the second response value calculated by the central control center 110. If they match, it indicates that the interaction between the two physical non-cloning function units 1101 is normal and reliable. In this case, the central control center 110 and the control module 130 generate a new rolling key based on the first and second random numbers using a pre-set key derivation function, thereby ensuring the security of subsequent communication and control processes.

[0061] Among them, the control module 130 has unique physical characteristic parameters. These physical characteristic parameters are fixed inside the physically unclonable function unit 1101 during the manufacturing process and cannot be copied or tampered with, ensuring that each physically unclonable function unit 1101 has a unique identity and response characteristics.

[0062] In some embodiments, such as Figure 2 As shown, the control module 130 also includes a discharge ultrasonic sensor 1305; Before controlling the tripping operation of the 35kV circuit breaker 140, the control module 130 is also used for: The partial discharge quantity detected by the discharge ultrasonic sensor 1305 is obtained; If the partial discharge is lower than the preset safety threshold, the circuit breaker tripping operation is permitted. If the partial discharge exceeds the safety threshold, the tripping operation will be blocked, and an equipment insulation abnormality alarm signal will be generated and sent to the central control center 110.

[0063] Among them, the discharge ultrasonic sensor 1305 is a detection component for checking the insulation defects of the 35kV circuit breaker 140 before the tripping operation. The discharge ultrasonic sensor 1305 can capture the ultrasonic signal generated by the partial discharge of the equipment to determine the internal insulation status of the 35kV circuit breaker 140, so as to avoid abnormal arcs, equipment damage or even power grid failures during tripping due to poor insulation, and add a pre-protection link for insulation safety verification for tripping operation.

[0064] For example, after the control module 130 receives an encryption instruction and completes the load prediction threshold judgment, it does not directly perform the opening operation. Instead, it first triggers the discharge ultrasonic sensor 1305 to start detection, captures the ultrasonic signal accompanied by partial discharge generated inside the 35kV circuit breaker 140 due to insulation defects, and converts the ultrasonic signal into quantifiable partial discharge quantity data.

[0065] After obtaining the partial discharge data, it is uploaded to the control module 130; the control module 130 compares the partial discharge data with a preset insulation safety threshold; if the detected partial discharge quantity is lower than the safety threshold, it indicates that the insulation state inside the 35kV circuit breaker 140 is good, without the risk of short circuit or arc, and the control module 130 allows the subsequent issuance of the opening execution signal.

[0066] If the partial discharge quantity is higher than the safety threshold, it is determined that there is an insulation abnormality in the 35kV circuit breaker 140. At this time, the control module 130 will immediately block the opening operation to avoid strong arcs generated by insulation breakdown during opening, which may damage the circuit breaker contacts or cause phase-to-phase short circuits. At the same time, it automatically generates an equipment insulation abnormality warning signal. Among them, the equipment insulation abnormality warning signal includes the abnormal equipment number, the current partial discharge quantity value, and the detection time, and is transmitted back to the centralized control center 110 through the encrypted communication module 120 to remind the operation and maintenance personnel to arrive at the site for maintenance in time. After the insulation hidden danger is eliminated and the partial discharge quantity returns below the safety threshold, the opening operation can be restarted. Among them, the safety threshold is set according to the insulation grade standard of the 35kV circuit breaker 140. For example, for 10kV - 35kV high-voltage equipment, the safety threshold is set to 50pC, that is, when the partial discharge quantity ≤ 50pC, the insulation is determined to be qualified.

[0067] For example, due to long-term outdoor operation of the 35kV circuit breaker 140 in a certain wind farm, dust accumulates on the surface of the insulator and it is partially humid. Before a planned power outage and opening operation, the discharge ultrasonic sensor 1305 detects that the partial discharge quantity of the 35kV circuit breaker 140 is 120pC. The control module 130 immediately blocks the opening and sends an alarm to the centralized control center 110; after the operation and maintenance personnel arrive at the site to clean the dust on the surface of the insulator and dry the humid parts, the detected partial discharge quantity drops to 30pC again, and the control module 130 allows the opening operation to be executed, effectively avoiding the circuit breaker burnout accident caused by insulation breakdown.

[0068] In some embodiments, as Figure 2 shown, it further includes a vibration sensor 1401 disposed on the 35kV circuit breaker 140; The control module 130 is further configured to: After sending the opening execution signal, start a monitoring window with a preset duration and collect the vibration signal detected by the vibration sensor 1401; The similarity of the vibration signal waveform with the standard vibration waveform template representing successful circuit breaker tripping is compared. If the similarity is lower than the preset threshold, it is determined that the tripping operation has failed mechanically, and an alarm signal including the mechanical fault type is generated and sent to the central control center 110.

[0069] By collecting vibration signals, the dynamic response of mechanical components during the tripping operation can be monitored in real time. The standard vibration waveform template is derived in advance through experiments and data analysis, representing the typical characteristics of vibration signals when the circuit breaker is successfully tripped under different operating conditions.

[0070] When the similarity between the collected vibration signal and the standard vibration waveform template is lower than a preset threshold, the control module 130 determines the type of mechanical fault based on the vibration signal. For example, vibration signals of spring failure and transmission mechanism jamming have specific characteristics. Then, the alarm signal containing the specific fault type is quickly sent to the central control center 110 so that maintenance personnel can take corresponding maintenance measures in a timely manner to ensure the safe and stable operation of the power system.

[0071] Based on the same general inventive concept, this invention also protects a remote control operation method based on a centralized control center. The remote control operation method based on a centralized control center provided by this invention will be described below. The remote control operation method based on a centralized control center described below can be referred to in correspondence with the remote control operating system based on a centralized control center described above.

[0072] In some embodiments, such as Figure 3 As shown, this embodiment of the invention also provides a remote control operation method based on a centralized control center, including: 201. Generate a remote power outage command; 202. A dynamic token-based authentication mechanism is used to perform security verification on remote power outage commands and generate encrypted commands.

[0073] The dynamic token is generated by hashing a timestamp and a device identifier. 203. Adjust the impedance matching circuit parameters to suppress the surge current generated during the tripping operation; 204. In response to the received encryption command, obtain the load forecast result; 205. If the load forecast result is lower than the first threshold within the preset time period, a trip execution signal is generated to control the 35kV circuit breaker 140 to trip.

[0074] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of the electronic device provided in an embodiment of the present invention.

[0075] like Figure 4As shown, the electronic device may include a processor 410, a communications interface 420, a memory 430, and a communication bus 440. The processor 410, communications interface 420, and memory 430 communicate with each other via the communication bus 440. The processor 410 can call logical instructions from the memory 430 to execute remote control operations based on a central control center.

[0076] Furthermore, the logical instructions in the aforementioned memory 430 can be implemented as software functional units and sold or used as independent products, and can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present invention, in essence, or the part that contributes to the prior art, or a part of the technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the methods described in the various embodiments of the present invention. The aforementioned storage medium includes various media capable of storing program code, such as USB flash drives, portable hard drives, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), magnetic disks, or optical disks.

[0077] On the other hand, the present invention also provides a computer program product, which includes a computer program that can be stored on a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium. When the computer program is executed by a processor, the computer is able to perform the remote control operation method based on the central control center provided by the above methods.

[0078] In another aspect, the present invention also provides a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, which, when executed by a processor, is implemented to perform the remote control operation methods based on the central control center provided by the above methods.

[0079] The device embodiments described above are merely illustrative. The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate. The components shown as units may or may not be physical units; that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of the modules can be selected to achieve the purpose of this embodiment according to actual needs. Those skilled in the art can understand and implement this without any creative effort.

[0080] Through the above description of the embodiments, those skilled in the art can clearly understand that each embodiment can be implemented by means of software plus necessary general-purpose hardware platforms, and of course, it can also be implemented by hardware. Based on this understanding, the above technical solutions, in essence or the part that contributes to the prior art, can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, such as ROM / RAM, magnetic disk, optical disk, etc., and includes several instructions to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to execute the methods described in the various embodiments or some parts of the embodiments.

[0081] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, and not to limit them; although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that modifications can still be made to the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments, or equivalent substitutions can be made to some of the technical features; and these modifications or substitutions do not cause the essence of the corresponding technical solutions to deviate from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention.

Claims

1. A remote control operating system based on a centralized control center, characterized in that, include: Centralized control center, encrypted communication module, and control module located at the booster station; The control module includes an impedance matching unit and a circuit breaker control unit connected in sequence, and the circuit breaker control unit is connected to a 35kV circuit breaker. The central control center is used to generate remote power outage commands; The encrypted communication module is used to receive the remote power outage command and perform security verification on the remote power outage command using a dynamic token-based authentication mechanism to generate an encrypted command; the dynamic token is generated by hashing a timestamp and a device identifier. The impedance matching unit is equipped with an impedance matching circuit, which is used to adjust the parameters of the impedance matching circuit before the remote power outage command is executed, so as to suppress the surge current generated during the tripping operation. The control module is used for: In response to the received encryption instruction, obtain the load prediction result; If the load prediction result is lower than the first threshold within a preset time period, a tripping execution signal is generated to control the tripping operation of the 35kV circuit breaker.

2. The remote control operating system based on a centralized control center according to claim 1, characterized in that, The control module also includes functions for: In response to the detection that the short-circuit fault current exceeds the second threshold, a forced tripping operation is triggered within the first delay. In response to detecting that the load current exceeds a third threshold, a tripping operation is triggered after a second delay; the second delay is greater than the first delay.

3. The remote control operating system based on a centralized control center according to claim 1, characterized in that, The control module also includes an optically isolated control unit; The optocoupler isolation control unit is used to transmit the tripping control signal between the encrypted communication module and the circuit breaker control unit in an electrically isolated manner.

4. The remote control operating system based on a centralized control center according to claim 1, characterized in that, The control module also includes a load prediction unit; The load forecasting unit is used for: Obtain the historical load data and load data of the booster station; The historical load data and the load data are input into a pre-trained load prediction model, which outputs the load prediction results for a preset time period.

5. The remote control operating system based on a centralized control center according to claim 1, characterized in that, The dynamic impedance matching unit has a pre-stored impedance parameter mapping table. The dynamic impedance matching unit is also used for: The rate of change of current in the control circuit of the 35kV circuit breaker was collected; Based on the current change rate, the impedance parameter mapping table is consulted to determine the target inductance value and the target capacitance value; Based on the target inductance value and the target capacitance value, the switch array of the 35kV circuit breaker is controlled to switch to the corresponding impedance combination.

6. The remote control operating system based on a centralized control center according to claim 1, characterized in that, The encrypted communication module, during security verification, is also used for: Generate dynamic tokens ; Received dynamic token With dynamic tokens A comparison is performed; wherein, the dynamic token The formula for generating it is: ; in, For timestamps, For device identifier, For rolling keys; If the dynamic token With the dynamic token If they are the same, then an encryption command is generated.

7. The remote control operating system based on a centralized control center according to claim 6, characterized in that, Both the central control center and the control module are equipped with physically unclonable function units. The physically non-clonable function unit is used for: Obtain the first random number generated by the central control center at a preset update time and send it to the control module; The control module receives a second random number generated based on the first random number; Based on the second random number, a first response value is generated, and the second random number and the first response value are sent to the central control center. The first random number and the second random number are used to generate a second response value; If the first response value matches the second response value, then a rolling key is generated based on the first random number and the second random number using a key derivation function.

8. The remote control operating system based on a centralized control center according to claim 1, characterized in that, The control module also includes a discharge ultrasonic sensor; Before controlling the tripping operation of the 35kV circuit breaker, the control module is also used for: The amount of partial discharge detected by the discharge ultrasonic sensor is obtained; If the partial discharge amount is lower than a preset safety threshold, the circuit breaker tripping operation is permitted. If the partial discharge exceeds the safety threshold, the tripping operation is blocked, and an equipment insulation abnormality alarm signal is generated and sent to the central control center.

9. The remote control operating system based on a centralized control center according to claim 1, characterized in that, It also includes a vibration sensor installed in the 35kV circuit breaker; The control module is also used for: After the tripping execution signal is issued, a monitoring window of a preset duration is started to collect the vibration signal detected by the vibration sensor; The waveform of the vibration signal is compared with the standard vibration waveform template representing a successful circuit breaker trip. If the similarity is lower than a preset threshold, it is determined that the tripping operation has failed mechanically, and an alarm signal including the mechanical fault type is generated and sent to the central control center.

10. A remote control operation method based on a centralized control center, characterized in that, include: Generate remote power outage commands; A dynamic token-based authentication mechanism is used to perform security verification on the remote power outage command and generate an encrypted command. The dynamic token is generated by hashing a timestamp and a device identifier. Adjust the impedance matching circuit parameters to suppress the surge current generated during the tripping operation; In response to the received encryption instruction, obtain the load prediction result; If the load prediction result is lower than the first threshold within a preset time period, a tripping execution signal is generated to control the tripping operation of the 35kV circuit breaker.