Ecological compensation method, system and equipment for cross-basin water diversion and transfer and storage medium

Abstract

The invention discloses an ecological compensation method and system for cross-basin water diversion, equipment and a storage medium, and belongs to the field of water conservancy and hydropower. According to the method, benefit related parties such as a water receiving party, upstream and downstream parties and the like are clarified through a market mechanism, water resource changes under multiple working conditions are accurately simulated by means of a water circulation physical model and natural laws, and the problem of data and quantization deviation is solved by combining objective data to quantify profit and loss of each party; the cooperation income and the compensation amount of different cooperation combinations are analyzed through the Shapley value, manual intervention is reduced, and the calculation efficiency of a complex scene is improved; and the cooperation income and the compensation amount are fed back and adjusted through water price regulation and control, and finally the ecological compensation scheme is determined through income verification, so that objective, high-landing-efficiency and accurate-quantification ecological compensation scheme determination is realized.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application pertains to the field of water conservancy and hydropower, and specifically relates to an ecological compensation method, system, equipment, and storage medium for inter-basin water diversion. Background Technology

[0002] Watershed ecological compensation is an important means of improving the ecological environment quality of a watershed. A sound and scientific watershed ecological compensation system aims to improve water resource utilization efficiency and promote coordinated development among different regions within the watershed by clarifying the rights and obligations of upstream and downstream entities. Inter-basin water diversion, as a key project for optimizing the spatial allocation of water resources, involves ecological compensation that covers multiple stakeholders, including water recipients, upstream and downstream parties, and must consider the impact of various factors such as water volume, water quality requirements, and protection measures. This makes it a key and challenging issue in the field of watershed ecological compensation.

[0003] In cross-basin water diversion scenarios, the water use behavior and ecological impacts of stakeholders exhibit dynamic changes. This results in a massive volume of water resource, economic, and environmental data to be collected, which is dynamically updated based on fluctuations in water diversion volume, water quality changes, and adjustments to protection measures. The processing of this massive amount of dynamic data is difficult to achieve efficiently and accurately, leading to insufficient accuracy in water resource change data and low precision in quantifying ecological impacts. Consequently, the basic data and results for compensation calculations show significant errors. Furthermore, due to the involvement of multiple stakeholders and dynamic combinations of various operating conditions, existing methods have complex and time-consuming calculation processes, requiring significant manual intervention for parameter setting and result adjustment. Compensation standards are also susceptible to subjective influence from manually set weights or rules, making it difficult to accurately match the contributions and rights of each party based on the actual dynamic gains and losses of water resources. Ultimately, the objectivity, accuracy, and implementation efficiency of compensation schemes fail to meet actual needs, making it difficult to accurately quantify compensation amounts and determine ecological compensation schemes. Summary of the Invention

[0004] In view of this, this application proposes a cross-basin water transfer ecological compensation method based on physical models and market mechanisms, which is used to construct an ecological compensation mechanism under the influence of cross-basin water transfer projects, so as to achieve ecological compensation with high objectivity, high accuracy and high implementation efficiency.

[0005] This application is achieved through the following technical solution: The first aspect provides an ecological compensation method for inter-basin water diversion, the ecological compensation method comprising: determining the stakeholders of inter-basin water diversion based on market mechanisms, the stakeholders including the water recipient, the upstream party, and the downstream party; A physical model of the water cycle is constructed, and the water resource changes before and after water diversion are simulated and analyzed under different combinations of water diversion volume, water quality requirements, and protection measures. The gains and losses of the stakeholders are analyzed based on economic data, population data, and the water resource changes, including the total losses of the upstream party, the total losses of the downstream party, and the water diversion benefits of the water recipient. The watershed ecological protection cost is determined based on the combination of water quality requirements and protection measures. A cooperative game model is constructed using the Shapley value method. Based on the total loss of the upstream party, the total loss of the downstream party, and the water diversion revenue of the water receiving party, the cooperative revenue of the alliance formed by the water receiving party, the upstream party, and the downstream party is analyzed, as well as the ecological compensation paid by the water receiving party, the total compensation received by the upstream party, and the total compensation received by the downstream party. The water price of the water recipient is regulated, and an ecological compensation scheme is determined when the actual benefit of the water recipient is positive. The actual benefit of the water recipient is obtained by deducting the ecological compensation amount paid by the water recipient from the water diversion revenue and deducting the ecological protection cost of the watershed.

[0006] The second aspect provides an ecological compensation system for inter-basin water diversion, which includes: The model building and execution module is used to simulate and analyze water resource changes before and after water diversion under different combinations of water diversion volume, water quality requirements and protection measures through a water cycle physical model; and to construct a cooperative game model using the Shapley value method, and to analyze the ecological compensation amount paid by the water recipient, the total compensation amount obtained by the upstream party and the total compensation amount obtained by the downstream party based on the profit and loss analysis of the stakeholders. The data acquisition and processing module is used to identify stakeholders in cross-basin water diversion based on market mechanisms, including the water recipient, upstream and downstream parties; and to analyze the gains and losses of the stakeholders based on economic data, population data and water resource change data, including the total losses of the upstream party, the total losses of the downstream party and the water diversion revenue of the water recipient; and to regulate the water price of the water recipient, and determine an ecological compensation scheme when the actual revenue of the water recipient is positive.

[0007] A third aspect provides an electronic device, wherein the electronic device includes a memory and a processor coupled to each other, the processor being used to execute program instructions stored in the memory to realize the above-described ecological compensation method for inter-basin water diversion.

[0008] This fourth aspect provides a computer-readable storage medium having program instructions stored thereon, which, when executed by a processor, implement the above-described ecological compensation method for inter-basin water diversion.

[0009] The ecological compensation method for inter-basin water diversion provided in this application first identifies stakeholders through market mechanisms, constructs a physical model to quantify upstream and downstream water resource changes, and statistically analyzes regional economic data to calculate the gains and losses of each party. Then, it uses the Shapley value method to construct a cooperative game model, analyzing the cooperative benefits and compensation amounts of different cooperation combinations. Finally, it regulates water prices for the water recipient, determining the ecological compensation scheme when the recipient's actual benefit is positive. This application clarifies stakeholders such as the water recipient and upstream and downstream parties through market mechanisms, integrates natural laws with a water cycle physical model to accurately simulate water resource changes under multiple operating conditions, and quantifies the gains and losses of each party using objective data, resolving the problem of data and quantification discrepancies. The Shapley value analysis of the cooperative benefits and compensation amounts of different cooperation combinations reduces human intervention and improves computational efficiency in complex scenarios. Water price regulation provides feedback to adjust cooperative benefits and compensation amounts, and finally, the ecological compensation scheme is determined through benefit verification, achieving objective, highly efficient, and precisely quantifiable ecological compensation scheme determination. Attached Figure Description

[0010] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of this application, the accompanying drawings used in the description of the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the accompanying drawings described below are only some embodiments of this application. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0011] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating an embodiment of the ecological compensation method for inter-basin water diversion provided in this application; Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of a watershed according to an embodiment provided in this application; Figure 3 This is a flowchart illustrating a specific embodiment of the ecological compensation method for inter-basin water diversion provided in this application; Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of an embodiment of an ecological compensation system; Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of an embodiment of the electronic device provided in this application; Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of an embodiment of the computer-readable storage medium provided in this application. Detailed Implementation

[0012] The present application is further illustrated below with reference to specific embodiments. It should be understood that these embodiments are for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to limit the scope of the present application. After reading the present application, any modifications of the present application in various equivalent forms by those skilled in the art fall within the scope defined by the appended claims.

[0013] This application provides an ecological compensation method for inter-basin water diversion, see reference. Figure 1 , Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating an embodiment of the ecological compensation method for inter-basin water diversion provided in this application, including the following steps: Step S1: Determine the stakeholders for inter-basin water diversion based on market mechanisms. The stakeholders include the water recipient, the upstream party, and the downstream party. Step S2: Simulate and analyze the changes in water resources before and after water diversion under different combinations of water diversion volume, water quality requirements, and protection measures using a water cycle physical model; and analyze the gains and losses of the stakeholders based on economic data, population data, and the water resource change data, including the total losses of the upstream party, the total losses of the downstream party, and the water diversion benefits of the water receiving party. Step S3: Construct a cooperative game model using the Shapley value method, and analyze the ecological compensation amount paid by the water recipient, the total compensation amount obtained by the upstream party, and the total compensation amount obtained by the downstream party based on the profit and loss analysis of the stakeholders. Step S4: Adjust the water price for the water recipient, and determine the ecological compensation plan when the actual benefit to the water recipient is positive.

[0014] The actual benefit of the water recipient is obtained by deducting the ecological compensation paid by the water recipient and the watershed ecological protection cost from the water diversion revenue of the water recipient. The watershed ecological protection cost is determined based on the combination of water quality requirements and protection measures.

[0015] In this embodiment, within the context of a cross-basin water diversion project, the focus is on constructing an inter-basin ecological compensation mechanism. Taking the perspectives of the upstream and downstream parties in the water supply area, and the water recipient, this approach treats these three parties as a whole, forming a cooperative game relationship based on market mechanisms and game theory. It considers the overall benefits gained by the alliance when the three parties cooperate, and obtains the compensation amounts received by the upstream and downstream parties, as well as the ecological compensation amount paid by the water recipient. When calculating the total losses of the upstream and downstream parties and the benefits of the water recipient, socio-economic and ecological factors are comprehensively considered, and the compensation amount for the water recipient and the overall benefits of the alliance are fully assessed. This application constructs a cross-basin multi-party ecological compensation mechanism, improving water resource utilization efficiency and promoting win-win cooperation among multiple parties.

[0016] Specifically, the system uses market mechanisms to clearly define the stakeholders, including water recipients and upstream and downstream parties. By leveraging a water cycle physics model that integrates natural laws, it accurately simulates water resource changes under various operating conditions. It also quantifies the gains and losses of each party using objective data, addressing the issue of data and quantification discrepancies. Furthermore, it analyzes the cooperation benefits and compensation amounts of different cooperation combinations through Shapley values, reducing human intervention and improving computational efficiency in complex scenarios. Water price regulation is used to adjust cooperation benefits and compensation amounts based on feedback. Finally, the system determines the ecological compensation scheme through benefit verification, achieving objective, highly efficient, and precisely quantifiable determination of the ecological compensation plan.

[0017] In step S1: Ecological compensation primarily employs market mechanisms and non-market mechanisms. Non-market mechanisms include government-led and socially participatory models. Unlike non-market mechanisms, which are driven by administrative directives or policy constraints, market mechanisms are often driven by economic interests, meaning that beneficiaries of water resources directly compensate those who protect or suffer losses. Ecological compensation mechanisms based on market mechanisms can also be termed market compensation.

[0018] For inter-basin water diversion projects, diverting water from one basin to other areas outside the basin (such as the receiving party) directly affects the flow and ecological environment of the original basin, causing various losses to both upstream (also known as the source area or upstream region) and downstream (also known as the downstream region) within the basin. Therefore, the upstream and downstream parties are the main losers; while the receiving party (also known as the receiving area) benefits from the water resources. Based on market mechanisms, the beneficiaries directly compensate the losers. The main stakeholders in inter-basin water diversion projects include the receiving party (denoted as R), the upstream party (denoted as U), and the downstream party (denoted as D).

[0019] In one embodiment, see Figure 2 , Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of a watershed according to an embodiment provided in this application. As shown in the diagram, the watershed flows through Reservoir A. Water is diverted from the reservoir to a city far from the watershed via a water diversion project, achieving inter-basin water diversion. Based on market-based ecological compensation, the core stakeholders of this inter-basin water diversion are generalized into three categories: the upstream area of ​​Reservoir A is the upstream party U, the downstream area of ​​the reservoir is the downstream party D, and the city receiving the diverted water is the water recipient (denoted as R).

[0020] In some specific embodiments, see Figure 3 , Figure 3 This is a flowchart illustrating a specific embodiment of the ecological compensation method for inter-basin water diversion provided in this application. Step S2 specifically includes the following steps: Step S21: Construct a water cycle physical model and use the water cycle physical model to simulate the changes in water resources upstream and downstream before and after water diversion. The changes in water resources include changes in water intake rights and changes in pollution discharge rights. Specifically, appropriate water cycle physical models should be constructed for the upstream and downstream sides respectively. For example, the EFDC model can be used for the upstream side and the SWAT model can be used for the downstream side.

[0021] Then, using a water cycle physics model, simulation analysis was conducted on different combinations of water transfer volumes and protection measures (point source and non-point source pollution control scenarios) proposed for inter-basin water transfer projects. The water cycle physics model can simulate the changes in water quality and quantity upstream and downstream before and after water transfer.

[0022] Finally, based on the simulation results, treatment plans that meet the surface water environmental quality standards (determined according to water quality category) of upstream and downstream areas are proposed. The treatment plans include water diversion volume, point source and non-point source pollution emission control, land use change, etc., and the water resource changes after the implementation of the treatment plans are obtained, such as changes in water rights and pollution discharge rights.

[0023] In this step, by constructing and using a water cycle physical model, the accuracy of data collection is improved, and the deviation in the assessment of water rights loss and pollution capacity loss is reduced by fully aligning with actual natural laws. At the same time, the standardized calculation of the model enables efficient integration and dynamic adaptation of massive dynamic data, which significantly improves the accuracy of basic data and profit and loss quantification results. Furthermore, in response to the processing needs of massive dynamic data in cross-basin water diversion scenarios, the standardized calculation logic of the model enables efficient data integration and dynamic updates, which significantly reduces the impact of data errors on compensation calculations and provides reliable support for compensation amount calculation.

[0024] In one specific embodiment, the upstream side uses the EFDC model and the downstream side uses the SWAT model. The simulation analysis results of the multi-level impact analysis of a certain watershed under the recommended governance scheme are shown in Table 1.

[0025] Table 1. Results of Multi-Level Impact Analysis of a Watershed under the Governance Scheme

[0026] In Table 1, COD Mn Permanganate index is a type of COD (Chemical Oxygen Demand), which represents the oxygen consumption of weak oxidants oxidizing organic matter. Mn Ammonia nitrogen (NH3-N), total nitrogen (TN), and total phosphorus (TP) are core indicators in wastewater treatment and water quality monitoring.

[0027] Step S22: Based on the changes in water intake rights and the changes in sewage discharge rights, obtain the water diversion losses of the upstream and downstream parties.

[0028] Among them, water diversion losses refer to the economic losses caused by changes in water resources before and after water diversion, including losses of water abstraction rights and pollution discharge rights. Water abstraction rights and pollution discharge rights (i.e., wastewater discharge rights) are the rights to possess, use, and benefit from water resources and water environment capacity. Their value lies in the economic benefits obtained from using water resources and water environment capacity, and the savings in wastewater treatment costs. For upstream and downstream parties, this includes the opportunity cost arising from the benefits of water abstraction rights and pollution discharge rights.

[0029] Under the premise of water diversion, the difference between the actual water intake and the corresponding theoretical (or prescribed) amount due to the provision of water resources of a specified quality to the water recipient constitutes the lost water intake right. Similarly, the difference between the actual wastewater discharge and the corresponding theoretical (or prescribed) amount constitutes the lost pollution discharge right. Based on this, the economic losses of upstream and downstream parties due to changes in water resources before and after water diversion can be calculated. The changes in water intake rights and pollution discharge rights are also the lost water intake rights and pollution discharge rights within the watershed.

[0030] In some embodiments, obtaining the economic losses of water resources changes before and after water diversion based on the changes in water rights and pollution discharge rights includes: obtaining the economic losses of the upstream party and the downstream party before and after water diversion based on the changes in water rights and pollution discharge rights, respectively.

[0031] Specifically, the calculation formulas for water loss caused by changes in water resources before and after water diversion from upstream and downstream are as follows: ; ; in, This is due to the water diversion loss from the upstream side. This refers to the water diversion losses downstream; The unit price of water rights, The unit price for pollution discharge rights; These represent the changes in water intake rights and pollution discharge rights of the upstream party before and after the water diversion. , These represent the changes in water intake rights and pollution discharge rights of downstream parties before and after the water diversion.

[0032] Furthermore, the changes in water intake rights and pollution discharge rights of the upstream parties before and after the water diversion. The rights to draw water and discharge wastewater can be obtained before and after water diversion, calculated using the following formula: ; ; in, These represent the water withdrawal rights of the upstream party before and after the water diversion; These refer to the upstream discharge rights before and after water diversion. , You can also refer to Similar calculation methods are used to obtain the results, which will not be elaborated here.

[0033] Step S23: Based on the per capita disposable income and population data within the basin, determine the development losses of the upstream and downstream sides, that is, the economic losses caused by the restriction of development rights of the upstream and downstream sides.

[0034] In one specific embodiment, the development losses of the upstream and downstream parties correspond to the opportunity cost input, calculated using the following formula: ; in, Opportunity cost input; To calculate the urban population of the area; The reference is the per capita disposable income of urban residents in the district; To calculate the per capita disposable income of urban residents in the region; For the agricultural population of the calculation area; The per capita disposable income of farmers in the reference area; To calculate the per capita disposable income of farmers in the region; The reference area can be a downstream area or an area with better economic development conditions within the same river basin or the same administrative unit. The parameter corresponding to the reference area can be the average level of the province or the country where the calculation area is located. When calculating the development loss of the upstream side, the calculation area in the formula corresponds to the region of the upstream side. When calculating the development loss of the downstream side, the calculation area in the formula corresponds to the region of the downstream side.

[0035] In one specific embodiment, based on the analysis and calculation results of water resource use rights and the requirements of multi-level protection before and after the construction of a certain water diversion project, in order to maintain the water resource development and utilization rate of the basin not exceeding 40%, the loss of water rights upstream of the reservoir after inter-basin water diversion is 94.5 million m3, and the loss of water rights downstream is 31.5 million m3. Based on the results of regional water rights listing and trading in the main province where the basin is located, the regional water rights trading unit price is 0.5 yuan / m3.

[0036] Based on the formula for water diversion losses, the water right loss upstream of the reservoir is calculated to be 47.25 million yuan, and the water right loss downstream is 15.75 million yuan. Referring to the impact analysis results of the dual water cycle model for inter-basin water diversion projects, the reduction in the upstream water body's pollution carrying capacity is calculated as COD... Mn 259.77 tons of COD and 51.39 tons of ammonia nitrogen were discharged, resulting in a reduction in the downstream water body's pollution carrying capacity. Mn595.4 tons, ammonia nitrogen 44.92 tons. COD Mn The secondary market listing price for pollution discharge rights, including ammonia nitrogen, is 4,000 yuan / (ton / year). The calculated pollution discharge right loss for the upstream party of the reservoir is 1.039 million yuan, and the pollution discharge right loss for the downstream party is 2.3816 million yuan (based on the larger loss value, COD). Mn (Calculation). The upstream water diversion loss includes the upstream water intake right loss and the upstream pollution discharge right loss, specifically amounting to 48.289 million yuan. The downstream loss includes the downstream water intake right loss and the downstream pollution discharge right loss, specifically amounting to 18.1316 million yuan.

[0037] The upstream population of the reservoir is 42,000 (all rural residents), with a per capita disposable income of 41,914 yuan. Using the administrative region as a reference, the per capita disposable income of farmers in that region is 43,408 yuan. Based on the formula for development loss, the upstream area's development loss is calculated to be 62.748 million yuan. Downstream, water rights are currently guaranteed, and domestic and industrial wastewater is treated to meet standards before being discharged into the basin. Considering the current situation, development rights are unaffected; therefore, the downstream area's development loss is 0.

[0038] In summary, the upstream losses include water diversion losses and development losses, while the downstream losses include water diversion losses and development losses. Therefore, the total upstream losses of the reservoir are calculated to be 111.04 million yuan, and the total downstream losses are 18.13 million yuan.

[0039] Step S24: Based on the water consumption structure, water supply price, and water quality of the water recipient, obtain the water diversion revenue of the water recipient.

[0040] In one embodiment, the formula for calculating the water diversion benefit for the receiving party is as follows: ; in, For the water receiving party's revenue from water diversion; For the first The industry's unit price for water supply; For the first The industry's water supply; To divert and adjust water volume; This is a water quality adjustment coefficient, determined according to the water quality categories in the "Surface Water Environmental Quality Standard" (GB3838-2002). When the water quality reaches or exceeds Class II, The value is 1; the water quality is Class III. The value is taken as 0.8; if the water quality is Class IV, The value is 0.55; if the water quality is Class V, The value is 0.25; if the water quality is worse than Grade V, The value is 0.

[0041] In one specific embodiment, the water consumption of the water recipient is divided into urban domestic water consumption, industrial and general service water consumption, and special industry water consumption. Among them, the urban domestic water price is 3.4 yuan / ton, accounting for 33.47% of the total water consumption; the industrial and general service water price is 6.12 yuan / ton, accounting for 64.48%; and the special industry water price is 13.8 yuan / ton, accounting for 13.8%. Based on the current water price, water consumption structure, and water quality, the water diversion revenue of the water recipient is calculated using the formula for calculating the water diversion revenue of the water recipient.

[0042] In step S3: In this step, the Shapley value method is used to construct a cooperative game model, directly analyzing the payment amount to the water recipient and the compensation amount received by upstream and downstream parties based on objective profit and loss data, replacing the complex calculation process with a large amount of manual intervention in traditional methods. Considering the diverse stakeholders and varied operating conditions in cross-basin water diversion, this method can significantly shorten the calculation cycle, improve calculation efficiency, quickly respond to dynamic changes in water diversion volume, protection measures, and other operating conditions, accurately measure the contribution and profit and loss of each stakeholder in cross-basin water diversion, and meet the need for efficient formulation of compensation schemes in actual projects.

[0043] In some embodiments, step S3, which involves constructing a cooperative game model using the Shapley value method to analyze the overall cooperative benefits and compensation amount of the alliance formed by the water recipient, upstream party, and downstream party, includes the following steps: Step S31: Form a cooperative game relationship between the water recipient R, the upstream party U, and the downstream party D. , where the set , For set any subset The corresponding characteristic function represents the overall alliance when participants cooperate. The benefits obtained from the alliance's water diversion program.

[0044] Specifically, any subset S in set N Alliance water transfer benefits when forming an alliance It can be calculated in the following way: When the alliance is formed S = At that time, the amount of water diverted by the receiving party Upstream Loss is recorded as Downstream Loss is recorded as Water transfer volume from the receiving party Water quality during water diversion Water diversion benefits at that time Alliance water diversion benefits: ; When the alliance is formedS = At that time, the available water supply in the receiving area decreases, while the water quality remains unchanged. The water diversion benefit for the receiving party is... Alliance water diversion benefits: ; When the alliance is formed S = At that time, the water quality of the water diverted to the receiving area and the water quality of the water flowing into the downstream area both declined, and the water diversion benefits for the receiving party were... The downstream water quality decline loss is Alliance water diversion benefits: ; When the alliance only has a water recipient Alliance formation S = The amount of water that can be diverted decreases, and the recipient must also bear the loss due to the decline in water quality. The benefits of water diversion for the receiving party are as follows: ; When the alliance lacks a water recipient, no water transfer revenue will be generated; that is, the alliance's water transfer revenue is as follows: , , .

[0045] Step S32: Construct a cooperative game model using the Shapley value method, based on the overall alliance. The benefits obtained from the alliance's water diversion To calculate the solution to a cooperative game, that is, to obtain the information of each participant. The formula for the cooperative benefits that should be obtained from participating in the cooperation is as follows: ; in, For participants The benefits that should be obtained from participating in the cooperation, Indicates due to participants The benefits that the addition brings to the alliance as a whole; It is a subset The number of elements in; It is a weighting factor, and its calculation formula is: Participants The value can be either U (upstream), D (downstream), or R (receiving water).

[0046] Specifically, the alliance as a whole satisfies both the principle of group rationality and the principle of individual rationality.

[0047] Specifically, the principle of group rationality states that if any alliance... and If there is no intersection, then The benefits of forming a new alliance are greater than or equal to those of the alliance. and The sum of the benefits of each action is shown in the following formula: .

[0048] The principle of individual rationality states that each participant gains at least as much benefit from cooperation as they would from acting alone, as shown in the following formula: ; in, For participants The benefits that should be obtained from participating in the cooperation.

[0049] In one specific embodiment, according to the Shapley value method, the benefits and weights of each cooperative combination of upstream party U, downstream party D, and water recipient R under the conditions of participation and non-participation are shown in Tables 2-4.

[0050] Table 2. Calculation of Participant U's Payout Combinations and Weights

[0051] Table 3. Calculation of Participant D's Profit Portfolio and Weights

[0052] Table 4. Calculation of Participant R's Payout Combinations and Weights

[0053] Specifically, the cooperative benefits that should be allocated to the three main parties involved in the inter-basin water transfer cooperation—upstream party U, downstream party D, and water recipient R—are calculated based on the Shapley value method. , and The specific formula is as follows: ; ; .

[0054] Step S33: Based on the aforementioned cooperation benefits, calculate the total compensation amount received by the upstream party. Total amount of compensation received by the downstream party And the total amount of ecological compensation paid by the water recipient. .

[0055] Total amount of compensation received by the upstream party For the upstream party's cooperation benefits Loss C from upstream U The sum of absolute values; the total amount of compensation received by the downstream party. For the cooperative benefits of downstream parties Downstream loss C DThe sum of the ecological compensation paid by the water recipient. For the water diversion revenue F of the water receiving area R -Cooperation benefits for the water recipient The formula for calculating the compensation amount is as follows: ; ; .

[0056] The total amount of ecological compensation paid by the water recipient is [amount missing]. =Total compensation received by the upstream party + Total compensation received by the downstream party .

[0057] In one specific embodiment, based on the 2023 and current water prices, the revenue of the water-receiving area under different alliance combinations is calculated as follows: When the alliance combination is... When the water quality in the source area is consistently up to standard, the revenue from water diversion in the receiving area is 56.7 million yuan; when the alliance is formed... When the downstream party does not participate in the alliance, the amount of water transferred out decreases by 578.2 million m3, while the water quality remains unchanged. In this case, the water transfer revenue for the receiving area is 42.53 million yuan. When the alliance is formed... When the upstream party does not participate in the alliance, the amount of water transferred out decreases by 68.18 million m3, and the water transfer revenue of the receiving area is 14.18 million yuan; when the alliance only includes the water transfer area (receiving area). At that time, the adjustable water volume is reduced to 0, and the loss of water quality degradation must be borne. At this time, the water diversion revenue of the receiving area is 0 yuan.

[0058] According to the formula for compensation amount, the compensation amount to be paid by the water-receiving area is 94.52 million yuan (of which the upstream water source area receives 77.57 million yuan in compensation and the downstream area receives 16.95 million yuan in compensation).

[0059] In step S4: The ecological compensation scheme includes the ecological compensation amount paid by the water recipient, the total compensation amount received by the upstream party, and the total compensation amount received by the downstream party. In determining the ecological compensation scheme, comprehensive consideration was given to various costs and expenses related to inter-basin water diversion, including the cost of reservoir infrastructure projects, construction and management fees, point and non-point source pollution control costs, and the water use structure of the water recipient. The scheme analyzes the actual benefits to the water-receiving area to ensure a positive return and guarantee that the water recipient is profitable after the inter-basin water diversion. This effectively protects the interests of both the water-receiving and water-importing areas in the inter-basin water diversion project, achieving mutual benefit and win-win results.

[0060] In this step, the water price for the water recipient is adjusted, and the payment amount for the water recipient and the compensation amount received by upstream and downstream parties in step S3 are adjusted based on the adjusted water price feedback until a threshold is reached where the actual benefit to the water recipient is positive, thus determining the final compensation plan. This dynamic adjustment process achieves more objective, efficient, and accurate quantification.

[0061] Specifically, the actual benefit to the water recipient is obtained by deducting the ecological compensation paid by the water recipient and the ecological protection costs of the watershed from the water diversion revenue. This can be expressed by the formula: Actual water reception benefit = Water diversion revenue of the water-receiving area F R - The amount of ecological compensation paid by the water recipient Z R -C3, the cost of watershed ecological protection.

[0062] When regulating water prices for water recipients, it is necessary to consider both the current water price and the calculated water price. Specifically, the water price for water recipients should be regulated based on the current water price and the calculated water price based on the amount of other property rights outside the watershed, so as to ensure that the actual benefits to water recipients are positive.

[0063] According to the provisions of the Water Law and the Civil Code, there are two allocation schemes for the water resource use rights of reservoir projects. One scheme is based on the spatial attributes of water users, dividing the water resource use rights of reservoir projects into watershed use rights. and the amount of use rights outside the basin Another approach is based on property rights. The water resource use rights of a reservoir project can be categorized into the self-owned property rights of the reservoir project. The quantity of other property rights and use rights of the reservoir hub project .

[0064] Water price determination must meet the following principles: (1) If the weights are used within the watershed The amount of other property rights to use the reservoir is less than or equal to Then the amount of use rights within the watershed There is no need to pay the reservoir construction cost C1, the operation and management cost of the key project C2, or the watershed compensation cost C4, nor is it necessary to pay reasonable profits, because this water volume falls within the scope of compensation for the impact on legitimate rights and interests; however, watershed ecological protection cost C3 needs to be paid, therefore this cost affects the water use rights within the watershed. It has contributed to the improvement of water quality.

[0065] (2) If the weights are used within the watershed The amount of other property rights to use the reservoir is greater than Then it exceeds the amount of other property rights to use. The portion requiring payment includes reservoir construction costs (C1), operation and management costs of the key project (C2), and watershed ecological protection costs (C3), but not watershed compensation costs (C4) or reasonable profits. (Other property rights and usage rights are not included.) The water price determination shall follow the principle mentioned above.

[0066] (3) Water use rights within the basin and the amount of use rights outside the basin The approved water price should cover all costs and reasonable profits.

[0067] Based on the above principles for water price determination, the mathematical model is constructed as follows: ; In the formula: These are the water prices calculated based on the amount of property rights held by others within the basin and the water prices calculated based on the amount of property rights held by oneself. The water price is calculated based on the amount of other property rights outside the basin; For the amount of usage rights within the watershed, For the quantity of other property rights to use within the watershed, The amount of property rights and usage rights within the watershed. For the amount of usage rights outside the watershed, P represents the amount of other property rights to use the reservoir's key infrastructure project; C represents the permitted revenue. 全 The permitted cost for water supply for inter-basin water diversion projects; C1 is the construction cost of the key project; C2 is the operation and management cost of the key project; C3 is the cost of watershed ecological protection; and C4 is the cost of watershed compensation.

[0068] Among them, C 全 C1, C2, and C3 are obtained through the allowable cost model for reservoir hub projects. The specific allowable cost model for reservoir hub projects is as follows, and some parameters can be found in the "Urban Water Supply Management Measures": ; In the formula: C 全 The permitted cost for water supply for inter-basin water diversion projects; C1 is the construction cost of the key project; C2 is the operation and management cost of the key project; C3 is the cost of watershed ecological protection; and C4 is the cost of watershed compensation.

[0069] In some embodiments, the watershed ecological protection cost C3 can be calculated using the treatment scheme determined in step S2 to determine the treatment costs of point source and non-point source pollution, including the treatment costs of point source and non-point source pollution upstream and downstream, as well as the costs corresponding to the protection measures.

[0070] In some embodiments, the watershed compensation cost C4 is the ecological compensation cost for the water recipient, which corresponds to the sum of the total losses of the upstream party and the total losses of the downstream party, including water diversion losses and development losses.

[0071] In one specific embodiment, the permitted cost of an inter-basin water diversion project specifically includes: a. Construction cost of the key project C1: The total dynamic investment of the reservoir's inter-basin water diversion project is 7.671 billion yuan. According to the financial calculation results from 2020 to 2023, the annual construction cost is approximately 313.84 million yuan.

[0072] b. Operation and management costs of the key project C2: The annual operation and management cost of the reservoir from 2020 to 2023 is approximately RMB 35.97 million.

[0073] c. Watershed Ecological Protection Cost C3: Based on the watershed ecological protection plan recommended by the dual water cycle model, which is divided into three aspects: point source pollution control, non-point source pollution control, and water source protection, and based on field surveys and investigations of investment funds for similar projects in surrounding areas, the engineering construction costs and operation and maintenance costs of the above measures are determined. In accordance with the relevant depreciation regulations such as the "Implementation Regulations of the Enterprise Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China", the annual ecological protection cost of the watershed is calculated to be RMB 69.5011 million.

[0074] The specific governance costs and accounting table corresponding to the watershed ecological protection cost C3 are shown in Table 5.

[0075] d. Watershed Compensation Costs (C4): Ecological compensation costs include the costs of water rights and pollution discharge rights compensation in the upstream and downstream areas of the watershed, as well as the resulting economic development costs, totaling 131.55 million yuan. Of this, the total ecological compensation for the upstream area is 111.04 million yuan, including 48.29 million yuan for water rights and pollution discharge rights compensation and 62.75 million yuan for economic losses; the total ecological compensation for the downstream area is 18.13 million yuan, mainly for water rights and pollution discharge rights compensation.

[0076] Specifically, the permitted return P can be obtained through a reasonable return calculation model, as follows: ; In the formula: P is the allowed revenue; For the permitted rate of return; The allowable rate of return and the tax rate can refer to common or general values ​​in the field, and are not limited here.

[0077] Table 5 Recommended Scheme and Cost Calculation for Watershed Ecological Protection

[0078] Specifically, the permitted return P can be obtained through a reasonable return calculation model, as follows: ; In the formula: P is the allowed revenue; For the permitted rate of return; The allowable rate of return and the tax rate can refer to common or general values ​​in the field, and are not limited here.

[0079] In one specific embodiment, the water prices for water rights within the basin, water rights outside the basin, and other property rights are calculated according to the formula as follows: the water price for water rights within the basin is 0.44 yuan / ton, and the water price for water rights outside the basin is 2.68 yuan / ton. Since the amount of water resources outside the basin cannot be distinguished from the amount of water rights outside the basin, for ease of operation, this study comprehensively considers the above two water supply prices and calculates the water price for water resources within the basin as 2.05 yuan / ton and the water price for water rights outside the basin as 4.14 yuan / ton, based on the proportion of water resource usage rights of water rights within the basin and other property rights.

[0080] The water price for water under other property rights outside the basin is compared with the current water price. If the current water price is higher than the water price for water under other property rights outside the basin, the current water price is used as the benchmark to calculate the revenue and actual revenue of the water-receiving area. If the actual revenue is less than 0, the water price is increased based on the current water price to ensure that the actual revenue of the water-receiving area is greater than 0. If the water price for water under other property rights outside the basin is greater than the current water price, the revenue F of the water-receiving area is calculated based on the water price for water under other property rights outside the basin. R And calculate the actual water revenue, then increase the water price to ensure that the actual water revenue is greater than 0.

[0081] To analyze the rationality of the water-receiving area's revenue, the ecological compensation and ecological protection costs (69.5011 million yuan) that should be paid were deducted from the water-receiving area's revenue. When calculating the current water price, the actual revenue of the water-receiving area was -107.32 million yuan, which means that the water-receiving area was in a loss-making state. Therefore, when the water price of the water-receiving area is set to the current water price, the actual revenue of the water-receiving area is negative, indicating that the water price is too low and the interests of the community of interests in the water-receiving and water-exporting areas cannot be guaranteed.

[0082] Therefore, based on the current water price, the comprehensive water price of the water supply area was increased, and the actual benefits to the water-receiving area under different water price conditions were calculated. The water price at which the actual benefits to the water-receiving area are greater than 0 was taken as the recommended comprehensive water price (the analysis and calculation results are shown in Table 6). The calculation showed that when the comprehensive water price reached 7.1 yuan / ton, the actual benefits to the water-receiving area were greater than 0, and the losses of both upstream and downstream parties were reasonably compensated, with additional benefits. The compensation amount for upstream parties was 159.32 million yuan, and the compensation amount for downstream parties was 44.19 million yuan. This achieved the determination of an ecological compensation scheme when the actual benefits to the water-receiving party are positive.

[0083] Table 6. Analysis of Alliance Revenue Based on Different Water Sales Prices (Comprehensive Water Price) in Water-Receiving Areas

[0084] In Table 6, the actual benefit of the water-receiving area = the water diversion benefit F of the water-receiving area. R -The total amount of ecological compensation that the water-receiving area needs to pay is Z. R - Ecological protection cost C3. Actual benefit to upstream water source area = Compensation amount received by upstream water source area Z U - Losses in the upstream water source area, i.e., the compensation amount Z received by the upstream water source area.U Subtract losses from the upstream water source area.

[0085] This application also provides an ecological compensation system for inter-basin water diversion, see reference. Figure 4 , Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of an embodiment of an ecological compensation system. The ecological compensation system 100 includes a model building and execution module 10 and a data acquisition and processing module 20.

[0086] The model building and execution module 10 is used to construct a water cycle physical model and simulate and analyze water resource changes before and after water diversion under different combinations of water diversion volume, water quality requirements, and protection measures. It also includes a Shapley value method for constructing a cooperative game model, analyzing the ecological compensation paid by the water recipient, the total compensation received by the upstream party, and the total compensation received by the downstream party based on the upstream party's total loss, the downstream party's total loss, and the water recipient's water diversion benefits. The execution module is used to simulate and analyze water resource changes before and after water diversion under different combinations of water diversion volume, water quality requirements, and protection measures using the water cycle physical model. It also includes a module for analyzing the ecological compensation paid by the water recipient, the total compensation received by the upstream party, and the total compensation received by the downstream party based on the upstream party's total loss, the downstream party's total loss, and the water recipient's water diversion benefits. The data acquisition and processing module 20 is used to determine the stakeholders of cross-basin water diversion based on market mechanisms, including the water recipient, upstream party, and downstream party; and to analyze the gains and losses of the stakeholders based on economic data, population data, and water resource change data, including the total losses of the upstream party, the total losses of the downstream party, and the water diversion revenue of the water recipient; and to determine the basin ecological protection cost based on the combination of water quality requirements and protection measures; and to regulate the water price of the water recipient, and determine an ecological compensation scheme when the actual revenue of the water recipient is positive; wherein the actual revenue of the water recipient is obtained by deducting the ecological compensation amount paid by the water recipient and the basin ecological protection cost from the water diversion revenue of the water recipient.

[0087] See Figure 5 , Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of an embodiment of the electronic device provided in this application. The electronic device 110 includes a memory 111 and a processor 112 coupled to each other. The processor 112 is used to execute program instructions stored in the memory 111 to implement the ecological compensation method for inter-basin water diversion provided in this application. In a specific implementation scenario, the electronic device 110 may include, but is not limited to, a display device, a microcomputer, or a server.

[0088] See Figure 6 , Figure 6This is a schematic diagram of an embodiment of the computer-readable storage medium provided in this application. The computer-readable storage medium 120 stores program instructions 121, which, when executed by a processor, implement the ecological compensation method for inter-basin water diversion in this application.

[0089] In the several embodiments provided in this application, it should be understood that the disclosed methods and apparatus can be implemented in other ways. For example, the apparatus implementations described above are merely illustrative. For instance, the division of modules or units is only a logical functional division, and in actual implementation, there may be other division methods. For example, units or components may be combined or integrated into another system, or some features may be ignored or not executed. Furthermore, the shown or discussed mutual couplings, direct couplings, or communication connections may be through some interfaces; indirect couplings or communication connections between devices or units may be electrical, mechanical, or other forms. Units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate, and components shown as units may or may not be physical units, i.e., they may be located in one place or distributed across network units. Some or all of the units can be selected to achieve the purpose of this embodiment according to actual needs.

[0090] Furthermore, the functional units in the various embodiments of this application can be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit can exist physically separately, or two or more units can be integrated into one unit. The integrated unit can be implemented in hardware or as a software functional unit. If the integrated unit is implemented as a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of this application, in essence, or the part that contributes to the prior art, or all or part of the technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) or processor to execute all or part of the steps of the methods in the various embodiments of this application. The aforementioned storage medium includes various media capable of storing program code, such as USB flash drives, portable hard drives, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), magnetic disks, or optical disks.

[0091] The above provides a detailed description of an ecological compensation method, system, device, and storage medium for inter-basin water diversion provided in the embodiments of this application. Specific examples have been used to illustrate the principles and implementation methods of this application. The descriptions of the above embodiments are only for the purpose of helping to understand the method and core ideas of this application. At the same time, for those skilled in the art, there will be changes in the specific implementation methods and application scope based on the ideas of this application. Therefore, the content of this specification should not be construed as a limitation of this application.

Claims

1. An ecological compensation method for inter-basin water diversion, characterized in that, include: The stakeholders for inter-basin water diversion are determined based on market mechanisms, and these stakeholders include the water recipient, upstream and downstream parties. The water cycle physical model is used to simulate and analyze the changes in water resources before and after water diversion under different combinations of water diversion volume, water quality requirements and protection measures; and the gains and losses of the stakeholders are analyzed based on economic data, population data and the water resource change data, including the total losses of the upstream party, the total losses of the downstream party and the water diversion benefits of the water receiving party. A cooperative game model was constructed using the Shapley value method. Based on the profit and loss analysis of the stakeholders, the ecological compensation amount paid by the water recipient, the total compensation amount obtained by the upstream party, and the total compensation amount obtained by the downstream party were analyzed. Regulate the water price for the water recipient and determine the ecological compensation plan when the actual benefit to the water recipient is positive; The actual benefit of the water recipient is obtained by deducting the ecological compensation paid by the water recipient and the watershed ecological protection cost from the water diversion revenue of the water recipient. The watershed ecological protection cost is determined based on the combination of water quality requirements and protection measures.

2. The ecological compensation method as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The analysis of water resource changes before and after water diversion using a water cycle physical model simulation includes: A physical model of the water cycle is constructed for both the upstream and downstream sides. Using the aforementioned water cycle physical model, simulation analysis was conducted on different combinations of water transfer volumes and protection measures proposed for inter-basin water transfer projects. Based on the simulation results, treatment schemes that meet the water quality requirements of upstream and downstream parties are proposed respectively, and the water resource change data before and after the implementation of the treatment schemes are quantified. The water resource change data includes changes in water rights and changes in pollution discharge rights.

3. The ecological compensation method as described in claim 2, characterized in that, The analysis of the gains and losses of stakeholders based on economic data, population data, and water resource change data, including total losses of upstream parties, total losses of downstream parties, and water diversion revenue of water recipients, includes: Based on the aforementioned water resource change data, determine the water diversion losses of the upstream party and the downstream party; and, Based on regional economic and population data, determine the development losses of the upstream party and the development losses of the downstream party; The total loss of the upstream party is determined by the upstream party's water diversion loss and development loss; and the total loss of the downstream party is determined by the downstream party's water diversion loss and development loss.

4. The ecological compensation method as described in claim 3, characterized in that, The upstream water diversion loss and the downstream water diversion loss are calculated using the following formulas: ； ； In the formula, This is due to the water diversion loss from the upstream side. For the water diversion loss of the downstream side, The unit price of water rights, The unit price for pollution discharge rights, These represent the changes in water intake rights and pollution discharge rights of the upstream party before and after the water diversion. , These represent the changes in water intake rights and pollution discharge rights of the downstream parties before and after the water diversion; and The opportunity cost input when the calculation area is the region corresponding to the upstream party is calculated using the following formula, and is determined as the development loss of the upstream party; and the opportunity cost input when the calculation area is the region corresponding to the downstream party is calculated, and is determined as the development loss of the downstream party. ； In the formula, For opportunity cost input, To calculate the urban population of the district, The reference is the per capita disposable income of urban residents in the district. To calculate the per capita disposable income of urban residents in the district, To calculate the agricultural population of the area, The per capita disposable income of farmers in the reference area This is to calculate the per capita disposable income of farmers in the region.

5. The ecological compensation method as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The cooperative game model constructed using the Shapley value method, based on the profit and loss analysis of the stakeholders, includes the ecological compensation amount paid by the water recipient, the total compensation amount received by the upstream party, and the total compensation amount received by the downstream party, including: The water recipient, upstream party, and downstream party are arranged into a cooperative game relationship. ; where, set U represents the upstream party, D represents the downstream party, and R represents the water receiving party; For set any subset The corresponding characteristic function represents the overall alliance when participants cooperate. The benefits obtained from the alliance's water diversion program; Based on the water transfer benefits of different alliance compositions, the Shapley value is used to calculate the cooperation benefits that the upstream party, downstream party and water recipient should obtain for participating in the cooperation. Based on the cooperative benefits, the total losses of the upstream party, the total losses of the downstream party, and the water diversion benefits of the water recipient, the total amount of compensation received by the upstream party, the total amount of compensation received by the downstream party, and the total amount of ecological compensation paid by the water recipient are determined.

6. The ecological compensation method as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The aforementioned regulation of water prices for water recipients, when the actual benefits to the water recipients are positive, determines an ecological compensation scheme, including: The calculated water price is obtained based on the water price assessment model for the amount of other property rights outside the watershed. If the current water price is higher than the calculated water price for other property rights outside the basin, the current water price will be used as the benchmark to calculate the water diversion revenue and actual revenue of the water recipient. If the actual revenue of the water recipient is less than 0, the water price will be increased based on the current water price to ensure that the actual revenue of the water recipient is greater than 0. If the calculated water price for other property rights outside the basin is higher than the current water price, the water diversion revenue and actual revenue of the water recipient shall be calculated based on the calculated water price for other property rights outside the basin. If the actual revenue of the water recipient is less than 0, the water price shall be increased based on the calculated water price for other property rights outside the basin to ensure that the actual revenue of the water recipient is greater than 0. An ecological compensation scheme is determined based on the amount of ecological compensation paid by the water recipient when the actual benefit of the water recipient is greater than 0, the total amount of compensation received by the upstream party, and the total amount of compensation received by the downstream party.

7. The ecological compensation method as described in claim 6, characterized in that, The water price determination model is as follows: ； In the formula: These are the water prices calculated based on the amount of property rights held by others within the basin and the water prices calculated based on the amount of property rights held by oneself. Water price is calculated for the amount of other property rights outside the basin; For the amount of usage rights within the watershed, For the quantity of other property rights to use within the watershed, The amount of property rights and usage rights within the watershed. For the amount of usage rights outside the watershed, P represents the amount of other property rights to use the reservoir's key infrastructure project; P represents the permitted revenue, obtained through a reasonable revenue calculation model; C represents... 全 The permitted cost for water supply from inter-basin water diversion projects is defined as follows: C1 is the construction cost of the key project, C2 is the operation and management cost of the key project, and C3 is the cost of ecological protection of the basin.

8. An ecological compensation system for inter-basin water diversion, characterized in that, include: The model building and execution module is used to simulate and analyze water resource changes before and after water diversion under different combinations of water diversion volume, water quality requirements and protection measures through a water cycle physical model; and to construct a cooperative game model using the Shapley value method, and to analyze the ecological compensation amount paid by the water recipient, the total compensation amount obtained by the upstream party and the total compensation amount obtained by the downstream party based on the profit and loss analysis of the stakeholders. The data acquisition and processing module is used to identify stakeholders in cross-basin water diversion based on market mechanisms, including the water recipient, upstream and downstream parties; and to analyze the gains and losses of the stakeholders based on economic data, population data and water resource change data, including the total losses of the upstream party, the total losses of the downstream party and the water diversion revenue of the water recipient; and to regulate the water price of the water recipient, and determine an ecological compensation scheme when the actual revenue of the water recipient is positive.

9. An electronic device, characterized in that, The electronic device includes a memory and a processor coupled to each other, the processor being used to execute program instructions stored in the memory to implement the ecological compensation method for inter-basin water diversion as described in any one of claims 1 to 7.

10. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, It stores program instructions, which, when executed by a processor, implement the ecological compensation method for inter-basin water diversion as described in any one of claims 1 to 7.

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