A radar deceptive jamming success rate monitoring method and system

Abstract

The application relates to the technical field of radar electronic countermeasure, in particular to a radar deceptive jamming dragging success rate monitoring method and system; the method comprises the following steps: obtaining target observation track data recorded by a radar and real track data of the target; for any moment in the jamming attempt process, judging whether the jamming dragging at the moment is effective; for any moment, in response to the effective jamming dragging at the moment, confirming the moment as a jamming moment; for any jamming attempt, counting the duration that the distance deviation corresponding to the effective jamming moment in the operation is greater than the spatial error threshold as a continuous duration, and in response to the continuous duration being greater than a preset duration threshold, considering that the jamming attempt dragging is successful; counting the number of times of dragging success in a preset evaluation period, and taking the proportion of the number of times of dragging success to the total number of jamming attempts in the evaluation period as the dragging success rate. The application has the effect of improving the monitoring accuracy of the dragging success rate.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of radar electronic countermeasures technology, and in particular to a method and system for monitoring the success rate of radar deception jamming. Background Technology

[0002] With the rapid development of modern radar detection technology, especially the application of phased array radar, pulse Doppler radar, and various adaptive signal processing algorithms, radar's target detection, continuous tracking, and situational awareness capabilities in complex electromagnetic environments have been significantly enhanced. In modern electronic warfare, to improve survivability and successfully execute missions, the attacking side often needs to implement effective active jamming against enemy radar. Radar jamming can be classified into suppressive jamming and deceptive jamming according to its mechanism of action. Suppressive jamming obscures target echoes by transmitting high-power noise signals, reducing the signal-to-interference ratio at the radar receiver and thus hindering radar target detection; while deceptive jamming transmits false signals with echo characteristics similar to those of the real target, causing the radar to obtain incorrect information or lose real target information, thereby disrupting the normal operation of the radar.

[0003] In deceptive jamming techniques, pull-off jamming is a core tactic targeting radar automatic tracking systems. Typical applications include range gate jamming (RGPO), velocity gate jamming (VGPO), and combined range-velocity jamming. Taking range gate jamming (RGPO) as an example, the jammer first intercepts the radar signal and generates a strong signal that highly overlaps with the echo of the real target through high-fidelity retransmission. Subsequently, the jammer precisely controls the parameters of the retransmitted signal (such as delay and amplitude), gradually increasing the retransmission delay to guide the radar's tracking gate to move with the false target signal and gradually deviate from the real target's position. This "same-to-different" deception process utilizes the closed-loop feedback characteristics of the radar tracking system. If the amplitude change of the jamming signal is similar to that of the real target and the rate of change of delay is within the response bandwidth of the radar tracking system, the radar will be unknowingly induced to track the false track.

[0004] In evaluating the effectiveness of jamming countermeasures, monitoring the drag success rate is of crucial technical value. The drag success rate is defined as the proportion of successful jamming attempts that cause the radar tracking gate to completely detach from the real target. Monitoring this indicator not only directly measures the extent to which jamming strategies disrupt radar tracking performance but also quantitatively assesses the accuracy of the jammer's signal modulation.

[0005] Existing methods for monitoring the success rate of towing largely rely on a single threshold criterion, such as determining success solely by observing whether the radar tracking gate deviates from the target by a certain distance. However, in actual combat, due to clutter interference, target maneuvering, and fluctuations in the power of jamming signals, radar gates often experience brief jitter or false unlocking. Traditional hard-criteria methods are prone to false alarms or missed alarms, making it difficult to provide high-reliability monitoring results in random combat scenarios. Summary of the Invention

[0006] To improve the accuracy of monitoring the success rate of towing, this application provides a method and system for monitoring the success rate of radar deception jamming towing.

[0007] Firstly, this application provides a method for monitoring the success rate of radar deception jamming, employing the following technical solution: A method for monitoring the success rate of radar deception jamming includes: acquiring target observation track data recorded by radar and the target's actual trajectory data; For any moment during the jamming attempt, calculate the distance deviation of the observed trajectory data relative to the actual trajectory, take the absolute difference between the distance deviation and the preset distance towing amount as the prediction deviation, and at the same time calculate the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio of the jamming signal at the radar receiver. In response to the prediction deviation and the fact that the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio meets the preset conditions, determine whether the jamming towing is effective at that moment. For any given moment, if the interference dragging is effective at that moment, the moment is confirmed as the interference moment; for any interference attempt, the duration for which the distance deviation corresponding to the effective interference moment in the operation is continuously greater than the spatial error threshold is counted as the duration; if the duration is greater than the preset duration threshold, the interference dragging attempt is considered successful. The number of successful drags within a preset evaluation period is counted, and the ratio of the number of successful drags to the total number of interference attempts within the evaluation period is used as the drag success rate.

[0008] By acquiring target observation track data and actual target trajectory data recorded by radar, a basis for comparison between observation results and objective reality is established. This allows the evaluation of towing effectiveness to no longer rely solely on the internal radar gate position, but instead introduces an independent actual trajectory as a reference benchmark, reducing misjudgments caused by single gate offset judgments. During the jamming attempt, the distance deviation between the observed track data and the actual trajectory is calculated at any given moment. The absolute difference between this distance deviation and the preset towing distance is used as the prediction deviation, thereby identifying whether the current radar-acquired target position offset is a controllable offset caused by jammer modulation. Simultaneously, the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SIR) of the jamming signal at the radar receiver is used as a signal strength criterion. Towing is deemed effective only when both the prediction deviation and the SIR simultaneously meet preset conditions, achieving dual constraints at the geometric and energy levels.

[0009] Subsequently, the effective interference moments were statistically analyzed, and spatial error thresholds and duration thresholds were introduced. The distance deviation was required to continuously exceed the spatial error threshold for a sufficient duration, eliminating transient jitter and short-term false unlocking phenomena, thus ensuring the time stability of the drag success determination. Finally, the drag success rate was obtained by statistically analyzing the ratio of the number of successful drags to the total number of attempts within the evaluation period, realizing the transformation from a single-trial criterion to a statistical evaluation indicator. Compared to the prior art that relied solely on a single threshold to monitor the drag success rate, the method in this application improves the accuracy and reliability of drag success rate monitoring.

[0010] Optionally, the target observation track data and the target's actual trajectory data acquired by the radar are obtained, including: time registration of the target observation track and the actual trajectory; and matching and associating the target observation track with the actual trajectory based on the spatial position difference between the target observation track and the actual trajectory.

[0011] Time registration aligns data from different sampling frequencies under a unified time reference, avoiding spurious distance deviations caused by inconsistent timestamps and improving the accuracy of subsequent calculations. Spatial matching establishes a one-to-one correspondence between observed tracks and actual trajectories, especially in multi-target scenarios, preventing false targets from being mistakenly associated with actual trajectories and ensuring that distance deviation calculations are based on the correct objects.

[0012] Optionally, the preset spatial error threshold is set to 3 to 5 times the range resolution unit of the radar under test.

[0013] The spatial error threshold is set to 3 to 5 times the range resolution unit of the radar under test, so that the judgment standard matches the radar's physical resolution capability. If the threshold is too small, normal measurement errors may be misjudged as unlocking; if the threshold is too large, situations where actual dragging has occurred may be missed.

[0014] Optionally, the preset duration threshold is set to 3 to 5 radar coherent processing intervals.

[0015] Setting the duration threshold to 3 to 5 radar coherent processing intervals ensures that the successful towing determination matches the radar signal processing cycle. Since the radar tracking system has filtering memory characteristics, short-term deviations do not necessarily indicate that the system has been deceived. By setting duration requirements for multiple coherent processing cycles, fluctuations caused by transient clutter flicker or short-term interference can be effectively eliminated, improving the reliability of successful towing determination.

[0016] Optionally, calculating the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SIR) of the interference signal at the radar receiver includes: using the peak power of the target signal after radar pulse compression as the signal power; extracting the energy of the target-free region in the radar range-Doppler plane as the mixed power of interference and clutter; and using the ratio of the signal power to the mixed power as the SIR.

[0017] Optional, real trajectory data includes: latitude, longitude and elevation data of the aircraft recorded by the Global Positioning System or spatial coordinate data recorded by an optical theodolite.

[0018] The actual motion trajectory data comes from the Global Positioning System or optical theodolites. By using high-precision trajectory data provided by an independent measurement system, the actual trajectory possesses high accuracy and independence.

[0019] Optionally, the distance deviation is the difference between the polar coordinate distance value of the target in the observed trajectory and the polar coordinate distance value of the target in the actual trajectory.

[0020] Distance dragging primarily operates on the distance dimension, directly using the polar coordinate distance difference as a deviation indicator to reduce error accumulation caused by complex 3D coordinate transformations and improve computational efficiency.

[0021] Optionally, the preset conditions are that the prediction deviation is less than a preset distance threshold and the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio is greater than the detection threshold inside the radar.

[0022] Optionally, time registration is performed between the target observation track and the actual trajectory, including: using the timestamp of the target's actual trajectory as a reference, a linear interpolation algorithm is used to generate interpolation points corresponding to each timestamp on the target observation track.

[0023] Linear interpolation algorithms are simple to implement, have low computational cost, and are highly stable. They can align data with different sampling rates while ensuring accuracy, reduce systematic errors caused by time differences, and improve the accuracy of deviation calculation.

[0024] Secondly, this application provides a monitoring system for the success rate of radar deception jamming, which adopts the following technical solution: A monitoring system for the success rate of radar deception jamming includes a processor and a memory, wherein the memory stores computer program instructions, and when the computer program instructions are executed by the processor, a method for monitoring the success rate of radar deception jamming is implemented as described above.

[0025] The aforementioned method for monitoring the success rate of radar deception jamming is generated into a computer program and stored in a memory for loading and execution by a processor. Thus, a system is created based on the memory and processor for convenient use.

[0026] This application achieves the following technical effects: First, it acquires target observation track data and target actual motion trajectory data recorded by radar, and performs time registration and spatial matching correlation. During the interference attempt, the distance deviation between the observed track and the actual trajectory is calculated, and the absolute difference between the distance deviation and the preset distance towing amount is used as the prediction deviation. Simultaneously, the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SNR) at the radar receiver is calculated. When the prediction deviation is less than a preset distance threshold and the SNR is greater than a detection threshold, the interference towing is determined to be effective at that moment. Finally, the duration for which the distance deviation is continuously greater than the spatial error threshold during the effective interference moments is further statistically analyzed. When the duration exceeds a preset duration threshold, the towing is considered successful, and the ratio of the number of successful towing attempts to the total number of interference attempts is calculated within the evaluation period as the towing success rate. This scheme achieves quantitative evaluation of the towing effect through a joint mechanism of distance deviation, signal strength constraints, and duration criteria, reducing false alarms and missed alarms, and improving monitoring accuracy and reliability. Attached Figure Description

[0027] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of a method for monitoring the success rate of radar deception jamming in an embodiment of this application.

[0028] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the process for determining whether interference dragging is effective at a certain sampling time according to an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0029] This application discloses a method for monitoring the success rate of radar deception jamming towing. By acquiring the track of the jammed target and the target's true trajectory recorded by the radar, an observation deviation sequence representing the deviation vector is generated through spatiotemporal matching, correlation, and subtraction. Subsequently, the modulation accuracy index and signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINNR) are calculated based on the modulation parameters preset by the jammer. Using these as criteria, and provided that the SINNR meets the detection threshold, the observation deviation sequence is dually judged using a spatial error threshold and a duration threshold to screen out effective towing states and count their proportion within the evaluation period, ultimately achieving the monitoring of the towing success rate.

[0030] Reference Figure 1 A method for monitoring the success rate of radar deception jamming includes steps S1-S4.

[0031] S1: Acquire target observation track data and target's actual trajectory data recorded by radar.

[0032] The target's true trajectory data can be the aircraft's latitude, longitude, and altitude data recorded by the Global Positioning System (GPS), or high-precision spatial coordinates recorded by an optical theodolite; The target observation track data refers to the interfered track data generated by the radar display and control terminal under electromagnetic interference environment, which includes errors caused by deception interference.

[0033] Since the data update rate of radar is usually inconsistent with the sampling rate of GPS or optical equipment, time registration is required. As a preferred solution, this embodiment uses a linear interpolation algorithm for time registration. Using the timestamp of the target's actual trajectory data as a reference, and leveraging the actual positions of two adjacent moments, an interpolation point strictly aligned with the radar sampling time is calculated, ensuring that the track points and trajectory points being compared subsequently are at the same absolute time. Linear interpolation algorithms are a conventional technique in this field and will not be elaborated upon here.

[0034] After time registration is completed, for any observed track, it is necessary to determine which actual trajectory it corresponds to. In this embodiment, spatiotemporal matching and association between the observed track data and the target is performed based on a spatial positioning threshold. Of course, if there is only one definite actual trajectory for the target, then no matching is needed; this mainly addresses the case of multiple targets.

[0035] For example, a spatial positioning threshold is set. In this embodiment, the preferred range for the spatial positioning threshold is 50 meters to 150 meters. When the threshold is below 50 meters, normal radar measurement system errors may be misjudged as mismatches, causing the association of the real target track to fail. When the threshold is above 150 meters, false target tracks that are relatively close may be incorrectly associated with real target tracks. Therefore, setting the threshold to 100 meters is preferred, which can balance the accuracy and error tolerance of the association. If the Euclidean distance between multiple consecutive data points in the radar observation track data and data points in the real trajectory is less than the set spatial positioning threshold, and the Euclidean distance between multiple data points in the observation track data and data points in other real trajectories is greater, then the observation track is determined to be successfully associated with the real target trajectory.

[0036] S2: For any moment during the jamming attempt, calculate the distance deviation of the observed trajectory data relative to the actual trajectory, take the absolute difference between the distance deviation and the preset distance towing amount as the prediction deviation, and at the same time calculate the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio of the jamming signal at the radar receiver. In response to the prediction deviation and the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio meeting the preset conditions, determine whether the jamming towing is effective at that moment.

[0037] The distance deviation between the observed target trajectory data and the actual target trajectory data at each sampling time is calculated. By comparing the distance deviation with a preset distance drag, it is determined whether this dimension meets the preset conditions. The preset distance drag can be obtained in real time from the jammer's mission parameter interface or imported from the mission planning file.

[0038] Radar typically operates in a polar coordinate system (range, azimuth, elevation), while the Global Positioning System (GPS) typically operates in a geocentric coordinate system (Cartesian coordinate system). Therefore, it is necessary to unify the two into a unified coordinate system before calculating the spatial differences in coordinate positions at different times.

[0039] The target's coordinates at each moment in the true trajectory data are mapped to the radar's polar coordinate system. For any given moment, the distance deviation between the target's coordinates in the radar-acquired observation track and its true trajectory is calculated. For ease of description, the polar coordinates extracted from the true trajectory data are used as the true coordinates, and the target's coordinates extracted from the radar-acquired observation track data are used as interference coordinates. The conversion of coordinates between different coordinate systems is a conventional technique in this field and will not be elaborated upon here.

[0040] The formula for calculating the distance deviation between the interference coordinates and the true coordinates at any given time can be expressed as: In the formula, This indicates the distance deviation between the interfering coordinates and the true coordinates; This represents the distance from the target to the origin of the polar coordinate system in the target interference coordinate system; This represents the distance from the target to the origin of the polar coordinate system in the real coordinate system.

[0041] In real-world radar electronic warfare scenarios, deviations from the target track acquired by radar can have various causes, such as high-G maneuvers by the target, clutter interference, or radar malfunctions. To demonstrate that the radar deviation is induced by a jammer, the range deviation is compared with a preset range drag to determine the effectiveness of the jamming drag.

[0042] Specifically, when a radar implements deceptive jamming, the jammer presets amplitude, time delay, and Doppler modulation parameters. For example, the time delay parameter is used to simulate the range shift of the false target; for instance, setting a 10-microsecond forward delay corresponds to a range drag of approximately 1.5 kilometers.

[0043] The absolute value of the difference between the distance deviation between the jammed coordinates and the true coordinates and the distance drag preset by the jammer is calculated as the prediction deviation. If the prediction deviation is less than the preset distance threshold, it indicates that the jammer's modulation accuracy is high, and the deviation in the coordinate position currently acquired by the radar is caused by the jammer. Conversely, it indicates modulation distortion, which can also be understood as the deviation in the target's coordinate position currently acquired by the radar not being caused by the jammer.

[0044] To assess the strength of interference at the signal level, the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SIR) of the interference signal at the radar receiver is calculated. The formula for calculating the SIR can be expressed as: In the formula, This indicates the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SIR) at the radar receiver. This represents the target signal power, i.e., the peak power after pulse compression; The power of clutter and interference mixture in the targetless region can be obtained by extracting the residual energy near the zero frequency point on the range-Doppler plane.

[0045] Combination Figure 2 In this embodiment, the preset condition is that if the prediction deviation is less than a preset distance threshold and the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) is greater than the detection threshold inside the radar, the interference dragging at that moment is determined to be effective.

[0046] As can be understood, pulse compression refers to the technique used by radar receivers to improve range resolution by performing time-domain compression on transmitted wide pulse signals through matched filters. For example, if the radar transmits a linear frequency modulated (LFM) signal, its pulse width is... bandwidth is After pulse compression, the signal is compressed to approximately [value missing] on the time axis. The peak power after pulse compression refers to the instantaneous power at the peak point of the signal in the distance-time domain after compression. For example, if the pulse gain of the input signal is... times ( If the peak power after pulse compression is significantly higher than the background noise level, the system will calculate the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio by extracting this peak power. If the peak power is much higher than the estimated background noise value, it indicates that the interference signal has successfully utilized the radar's pulse compression processing gain and has the energy basis to deceive the radar tracking loop.

[0047] As the target signal power increases, the input signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) rises accordingly; conversely, as the power of the clutter and interference mixture increases, the SINR decreases. In real-world radar electronic warfare scenarios, this means that if the suppressive or deceptive noise emitted by the jammer is too powerful, it will raise the radar receiver's noise floor, leading to a decrease in the true SINR and thus masking the echo of the real target.

[0048] It is important to understand that the detection threshold refers to the minimum signal strength limit set by the radar system during the signal detection and processing phase to distinguish real target signals from background noise and clutter. In actual radar operation, to control the false alarm rate (False Alarm Rate), algorithms such as Constant False Alarm Rate (CFAR) are typically used to dynamically calculate or preset a fixed energy threshold. In the deceptive towing jamming scenario described in this application, the towing false target signal generated by the jammer will only be recognized as a valid target by the radar signal processing system and sent into the subsequent track tracking loop if the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SNR) of the signal reaching the radar receiver is greater than this detection threshold. If it is lower than this detection threshold, the jamming signal will be treated as background noise or environmental clutter and filtered out by the radar, and the towing signal will be considered invalid. The detection threshold inside the radar can be obtained through the radar's factory calibration parameters.

[0049] S3: For any given moment, if the interference dragging is effective at that moment, the moment is confirmed as the interference moment; for any interference attempt, the duration for which the distance deviation corresponding to the effective interference moment in the operation is continuously greater than the spatial error threshold is counted as the duration. If the duration is greater than the preset duration threshold, the interference dragging attempt is considered successful.

[0050] Two key thresholds need to be set in advance: the spatial error threshold and the duration threshold.

[0051] For example, the spatial error threshold is the boundary used to determine whether the gate has substantially deviated from the target in terms of physical distance. The spatial error threshold is set to 3 to 5 times the range resolution unit of the measured radar. In this embodiment, it is set to 3 times the range resolution unit of the measured radar. If the spatial error threshold is less than 3 times the range resolution unit of the measured radar, it may cause misjudgment due to the target's own slight maneuvering or normal signal-to-noise ratio fluctuations; if the value is set to more than 5 times, the judgment condition is too strict and may miss moderate deviations that have substantially caused radar tracking failure. Therefore, setting it to 3 times can objectively reflect the state where the gate has completely lost the real target.

[0052] The duration threshold is used to exclude instantaneous system jitter. In this embodiment, the duration threshold is preferably set to be greater than the radar's coherent processing interval (CPI), for example, 3 to 5 coherent processing cycles. If the deviation exceeds the threshold by only 1 millisecond, it may be due to clutter flicker and not a true dragging success; only continuous deviations exceeding the set duration threshold can determine that the radar filtering algorithm (such as Kalman filtering) has been contaminated and diverged by false data.

[0053] S4: Count the number of successful drags within the preset evaluation period, and use the ratio of the number of successful drags to the total number of interference attempts within the evaluation period as the drag success rate.

[0054] Specifically, this step is used to summarize the effective towing status of a single instance into a system-level macro-evaluation metric. First, a preset evaluation period is determined. For example, the preset evaluation period can be the duration of a complete flight test sortie, or a specific adversarial training window in an electronic warfare simulator (e.g., a 5-minute engagement time). Within this preset evaluation period, the jamming opportunity initiates multiple deception towing attempts against the radar, and the total number of jamming actions is recorded, which is the total number of jamming attempts.

[0055] Subsequently, the number of times a valid dragging state satisfying the conditions in step S3 occurred within the preset evaluation period was counted. To intuitively quantify the overall penetration effectiveness of the interference system, a dragging success rate formula was established: In the formula, Indicates the success rate of dragging. This indicates the number of successful drag-and-drop operations within the preset evaluation period. This indicates the total number of interference attempts within the preset evaluation period.

[0056] When the number of effective dragging states increases, while the total number of jamming attempts remains constant or decreases, the dragging success rate obtained through division will rise. In actual electronic warfare effectiveness assessment scenarios, a higher dragging success rate directly reflects that the intermittent sampling and forwarding parameters and amplitude timing control strategies adopted by the jammer can very effectively break through the radar's anti-drag defense mechanisms (such as gate memory and acceleration limiting), successfully implementing tactical cover for the real target.

[0057] Finally, the system outputs the above-mentioned drag success rate monitoring results, completing the quantitative and closed-loop monitoring of the drag effectiveness of radar deception jamming.

[0058] This application also discloses a monitoring system for the success rate of radar deception jamming, including a processor and a memory. The memory stores computer program instructions, and when the computer program instructions are executed by the processor, a method for monitoring the success rate of radar deception jamming is implemented according to this application.

[0059] The system also includes other components well known to those skilled in the art, such as communication buses and communication interfaces, the settings and functions of which are known in the art and will not be described in detail here.

[0060] The above are all preferred embodiments of this application, and are not intended to limit the scope of protection of this application. Therefore, all equivalent changes made in accordance with the structure, shape and principle of this application should be covered within the scope of protection of this application.

Claims

1. A method for monitoring the success rate of radar deceptive jamming, characterized in that, include: Acquire target observation track data and target's actual trajectory data recorded by radar; For any moment during the jamming attempt, calculate the distance deviation of the observed trajectory data relative to the actual trajectory, take the absolute difference between the distance deviation and the preset distance towing amount as the prediction deviation, and at the same time calculate the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio of the jamming signal at the radar receiver. In response to the prediction deviation and the fact that the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio meets the preset conditions, determine whether the jamming towing is effective at that moment. For any given moment, if the interference dragging is effective at that moment, the moment is confirmed as the interference moment; for any interference attempt, the duration for which the distance deviation corresponding to the effective interference moment in the operation is continuously greater than the spatial error threshold is counted as the duration; if the duration is greater than the preset duration threshold, the interference dragging attempt is considered successful. The number of successful drags within a preset evaluation period is counted, and the ratio of the number of successful drags to the total number of interference attempts within the evaluation period is used as the drag success rate.

2. The method for monitoring the success rate of radar deception jamming according to claim 1, characterized in that, Acquire target observation track data and target real trajectory data recorded by radar, including: time registration of target observation track and real trajectory; matching and associating target observation track and real trajectory based on spatial position differences between target observation track and real trajectory.

3. The method for monitoring the success rate of radar deception jamming according to claim 1, characterized in that, The preset spatial error threshold is set to 3 to 5 times the range resolution unit of the radar under test.

4. The method for monitoring the success rate of radar deception jamming according to claim 1, characterized in that, The preset duration threshold is set to 3 to 5 radar coherent processing intervals.

5. The method for monitoring the success rate of radar deception jamming according to claim 1, characterized in that, Calculating the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SIR) of the interference signal at the radar receiver includes: taking the peak power of the target signal after radar pulse compression as the signal power; extracting the energy of the target-free region in the radar range-Doppler plane as the mixed power of interference and clutter; and taking the ratio of the signal power to the mixed power as the SIR.

6. The method for monitoring the success rate of radar deception jamming according to claim 1, characterized in that, The actual trajectory data includes: latitude, longitude and elevation data of the aircraft recorded by the Global Positioning System or spatial coordinate data recorded by an optical theodolite.

7. The method for monitoring the success rate of radar deception jamming according to claim 1, characterized in that, Distance deviation is the difference between the polar coordinate distance value of the target in the observed trajectory and the polar coordinate distance value of the target in the actual trajectory.

8. The method for monitoring the success rate of radar deception jamming according to claim 1, characterized in that, The preset conditions are that the prediction deviation is less than the preset distance threshold and the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio is greater than the detection threshold inside the radar.

9. A method for monitoring the success rate of radar deception jamming according to claim 2, characterized in that, Time registration of the target observation track and the actual trajectory includes: using the timestamp of the target's actual trajectory as a reference, and using a linear interpolation algorithm to generate interpolation points corresponding to each timestamp on the target observation track.

10. A monitoring system for the success rate of radar deception jamming, characterized in that, include: A processor and a memory, the memory storing computer program instructions that, when executed by the processor, implement a method for monitoring the success rate of radar deception jamming as described in any one of claims 1-9.

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