Key information management system

Abstract

The present invention provides a key information management system capable of securely managing key information. The key information management system (100) is a key information management system (100) for managing key information used in the authentication of digital keys of an object device (1) for controlling a controlled object. It comprises: a distribution device (2) for distributing key information registered in the object device (1); and a sharing destination terminal (3) for receiving key information. The sharing destination terminal (3) sends inherent information to the distribution device (2). During the registration process of registering key information in the object device (1), the inherent information is input to the object device (1).

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to a key information management system. Background Technology

[0002] Patent Document 1 discloses a system comprising a cloud system for acquiring authentication information for a digital key used to access a vehicle, a vehicle for authenticating the digital key, and a user-carryable information processing terminal. This system also includes a mobile device capable of sending the digital key to the vehicle. In this system, the vehicle can be used when the digital key sent from the mobile device is successfully authenticated.

[0003] Existing technical documents

[0004] Patent documents

[0005] Patent Document 1: Japanese Patent Application Publication No. 2023-167755 Summary of the Invention

[0006] The problem that the invention aims to solve

[0007] In the system disclosed in Patent Document 1, the vehicle owner, as the vehicle's owner, can grant access to the vehicle to a visitor by requesting a shared key from a cloud system. However, in such a system, for example, when the key information required for digital key authentication by the visitor is provided to the visitor in the form of a QR code, the QR code is easily copied and stolen by a third party, raising concerns about unauthorized use of the vehicle. Therefore, a system capable of securely managing key information is desired.

[0008] The present invention was made in view of the above-mentioned technical problems, and provides a key information management system that can securely manage key information.

[0009] Solution for solving the problem

[0010] As a solution to the above problems, the present invention provides a key information management system that manages key information used in the authentication of digital keys of object devices used to control controlled objects. The key information management system includes: a distribution device that distributes key information registered in the object device; and a sharing destination terminal that receives the key information. The sharing destination terminal sends inherent information to the distribution device, and the inherent information is input to the object device during the registration process of registering the key information in the object device.

[0011] Based on the above configuration, the inherent information is sent to the distribution device and input to the target device during registration processing. Therefore, the inherent information can be verified in the target device, preventing unauthorized registration of key information. In other words, key information can be securely managed. Consequently, unauthorized use of the target device by third parties can be prevented.

[0012] Alternatively, the distribution device may send the converted information obtained by data conversion of the inherent information to the sharing destination terminal, and the sharing destination terminal may send the converted information to the object device.

[0013] Based on the above configuration, the inherent information used in the registration process of registering key information with the target device is converted into data, so that even if the key information is transmitted to a third party, the unauthorized use of the target device can be prevented.

[0014] Alternatively, the distribution device may send a first hash value to the shared destination terminal. The first hash value is the transformed information obtained by hashing the hashed information and the inherent information pre-stored in the object device. The shared destination terminal then sends the first hash value to the object device.

[0015] Based on the above configuration, the inherent information used in the registration process of registering key information with the object device is hashed into something that cannot be decoded, thus preventing unauthorized use of the object device even if the key information is passed to a third party.

[0016] Alternatively, the object device may acquire a second hash value, which is obtained by hashing the inherent information and the hashed information. When the first hash value sent from the shared destination terminal matches the second hash value, the key information is registered.

[0017] Based on the above configuration, when the first hash value matches the second hash value, the key information is registered in the target device. In other words, when the first hash value does not match the second hash value, the key information is not registered in the target device. Therefore, key information can be securely managed. As a result, unauthorized use of the target device by third parties can be prevented.

[0018] Alternatively, during the deletion process of deleting the key information registered in the object device, the inherent information is also input to the object device.

[0019] Based on the above structure, it can prevent third parties from illegally deleting key information and can securely manage key information.

[0020] Alternatively, the inherent information may be manually input into the object device by the user of the shared destination terminal.

[0021] Based on the above configuration, the user of the sharing destination manually inputs the proprietary information. Therefore, compared with the case where the proprietary information is sent from the sharing destination terminal to the target device, the theft of proprietary information can be prevented, and the anti-theft effect can be further expected.

[0022] Alternatively, the distribution device may be a shared source terminal owned by a shared source user that serves as a shared source for sharing the target device. The shared source terminal converts the first hash value and the key information into a QR code and sends it to the shared destination terminal.

[0023] Based on the above structure, the key information is converted into a QR code and sent to the sharing destination terminal. Therefore, even if the sharing source user does not know the contact information of the sharing destination user (email address, social application account information, etc.), the key information can be easily sent from the sharing source terminal to the sharing destination terminal.

[0024] Alternatively, the distribution device may be a management device that establishes a correspondence between the object device and the shared destination terminal to manage key information, and the management device may send website access information for registering the key information.

[0025] Based on the above configuration, key information can be managed in a unified manner through a management device (e.g., a server), which can make the management of key information more efficient.

[0026] Invention Effects

[0027] The key information management system according to the present invention can manage key information more securely. Attached Figure Description

[0028] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the key information management system of the first embodiment.

[0029] Figure 2 This is a block diagram illustrating the structure of the key information management system according to the first embodiment.

[0030] Figure 3 This is a flowchart of the information used in the key registration process of the first embodiment.

[0031] Figure 4 This is a timing diagram illustrating the key registration process in the first embodiment.

[0032] Figure 5 This is a timing diagram illustrating the unlocking process of the first embodiment.

[0033] Figure 6 This is a timing diagram illustrating the key deletion process in the first embodiment.

[0034] Figure 7 This is a block diagram illustrating the structure of the key information management system according to the second embodiment.

[0035] Figure 8A This is a timing diagram representing the first half of the key registration process in the second embodiment.

[0036] Figure 8B This is a timing diagram showing the latter half of the key registration process in the second embodiment.

[0037] Figure 9 This is a timing diagram illustrating the key deletion process in the second embodiment.

[0038] Figure 10A This is a timing diagram showing the first half of the key registration process in a variant of the second embodiment.

[0039] Figure 10B This is a timing diagram showing the latter half of the key registration process in a variation of the second embodiment. Detailed Implementation

[0040] Hereinafter, embodiments of the present invention will be described with reference to the accompanying drawings. It should be noted that the same or corresponding elements are labeled with the same reference numerals throughout the drawings, and repetition of detailed descriptions is omitted.

[0041] (First Implementation)

[0042] The digital key management system 100 of this embodiment (an example of a key information management system) is a system for managing digital keys DK, which are used to control (use) objects such as vehicles, entrance doors of residences, and parcel lockers. Users use the digital key DK to lock and unlock the objects (hereinafter referred to as "locking and unlocking"), thereby enabling them to use the objects. In addition to managing the digital key DK of the owner of the objects, the digital key management system 100 also manages digital keys DK used for sharing and using the objects among multiple users. It should be noted that, below, the embodiment will be described using a vehicle 1 as an example of an object.

[0043] (Brief Structure)

[0044] First, refer to Figure 1 The general structure of the digital key management system 100 is described below. Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the digital key management system 100.

[0045] like Figure 1As shown, the digital key management system 100 includes: a vehicle 1, which is a mobile vehicle such as a two-wheeled vehicle or a four-wheeled vehicle, shared by a first user U1 and a second user U2; a first terminal 2 owned by the first user U1; and a second terminal 3 owned by the second user U2. It should be noted that in this embodiment, the first user U1 is the sharing source user U1 on one side of the shared vehicle 1, and the second user U2 is the sharing destination user U2 on the other side. Hereinafter, the first terminal 2 owned by the sharing source user U1 will be referred to as the "sharing source terminal 2," and the second terminal 3 owned by the sharing destination user U2 will be referred to as the "sharing destination terminal 3."

[0046] Figure 2 This is a block diagram illustrating the structure of the digital key management system 100. For example... Figure 2 As shown, vehicle 1 includes a vehicle control unit 11, a vehicle communication unit 12, and a vehicle input / output unit 13. The vehicle control unit 11 controls the operation of various parts of vehicle 1. The vehicle control unit 11 also manages locking and unlocking of vehicle 1, authenticating (verifying) the digital key DK based on the content included in the key information DT associated with the digital key DK pre-registered in vehicle 1. Shared source user U1 and shared destination user U2, upon successful authentication based on the digital key DK, can use vehicle 1 (use its functions).

[0047] The shared source terminal 2 has a shared source control device 21, a shared source communication unit 22, and a shared source input / output unit 23. It should be noted that the shared source terminal 2 is configured with the authority to issue the shared key for vehicle 1. The shared destination terminal 3 has a shared destination control device 31, a shared destination communication unit 32, and a shared destination input / output unit 33. Both the shared source terminal 2 and the shared destination terminal 3 can be information processing terminals such as smartphones or tablets. Alternatively, the shared source terminal 2 and the shared destination terminal 3 can also be dedicated terminals of the digital key management system 100.

[0048] The vehicle control unit 11, the shared source control unit 21, and the shared destination control unit 31 each include a processor such as a CPU (Central Processing Unit) or an MPU (Microprocessing Unit) that collaborates with software to implement the specified functions. The vehicle control unit 11, the shared source control unit 21, and the shared destination control unit 31 can be constructed from hardware circuits such as dedicated electronic circuits or reconfigurable electronic circuits designed to implement the specified functions, or from various semiconductor integrated circuits. Examples of various semiconductor integrated circuits, besides CPUs and MPUs, include microcomputers, DSPs (Digital Signal Processors), FPGAs (Field Programmable Gate Arrays), and ASICs (Application Specific Integrated Circuits).

[0049] The vehicle control device 11, the shared source control device 21, and the shared destination control device 31 include memories such as RAM (Random Access Memory), ROM (Read Only Memory), and EEPROM (Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory). Hereinafter, the memory included in the vehicle control device 11 will be referred to as vehicle memory 11a, the memory included in the shared source control device 21 will be referred to as shared source memory 21a, and the memory included in the shared destination control device 31 will be referred to as shared destination memory 31a.

[0050] The vehicle memory 11a, the shared source memory 21a, and the shared destination memory 31a store programs for performing the key registration and key deletion processes described later, and can store the digital key DK and the key information DT required for authenticating the digital key DK. The processors of the vehicle control device 11, the shared source control device 21, and the shared destination control device 31 respectively execute the programs for performing key registration and key deletion processes stored in the vehicle memory 11a, the shared source memory 21a, and the shared destination memory 31a.

[0051] The vehicle communication unit 12, the shared source communication unit 22, and the shared destination communication unit 32 are configured to communicate with each other, and are hardware devices used for wireless communication according to wireless communication standards such as Ethernet, mobile dedicated communication standards, Wi-Fi (registered trademark), and Bluetooth (registered trademark). The vehicle communication unit 12, the shared source communication unit 22, and the shared destination communication unit 32 each include antennas for transmitting and receiving signals.

[0052] The vehicle input / output unit 13, the shared source input / output unit 23, and the shared source input / output unit 33 are, for example, touch displays, which serve as both input units that accept user touches and display units that display image information, text information, etc. to the user.

[0053] (Key registration processing)

[0054] Next, refer to Figure 3 and Figure 4 The key registration process for registering the digital key DK used to use vehicle 1 with vehicle 1 is explained.

[0055] Figure 3 It is a flowchart of information during the key registration process. For example... Figure 3 As shown, in the key registration process, random number information (an example of hashed information), friend information (an example of inherent information) and information representing hash values ​​(first hash value and second hash value) are exchanged (hereinafter referred to as hash value).

[0056] Random number information is a type of unpredictable information representing random numbers without any regularity; it consists of strings, number strings, or combinations thereof. The random number information is pre-stored in the vehicle memory 11a of vehicle 1 (see reference). Figure 2 Random number information, for example, is stored in the vehicle memory 11a of vehicle 1 when vehicle 1 leaves the factory.

[0057] Random number information is pre-sent from vehicle 1 to shared source terminal 2 before key registration processing (step S1). For example, random number information is sent from vehicle 1 to shared source terminal 2 when vehicle 1 is paired with shared destination terminal 3. Pairing of vehicle 1 and shared destination terminal 3 is performed, for example, during or before the registration of the digital key DK (hereinafter referred to as "shared source key DK1") possessed by shared source terminal 2 (shared source user U1).

[0058] Next, the shared destination control device 31 of the shared destination terminal 3 sends a friend message to the shared source control device 21 of the shared source terminal 2 (step S2).

[0059] For example, the destination terminal 3 sends friend information to the source terminal 2 using a messaging application such as email. In this embodiment, the friend information is inherent information that the destination user U2 can arbitrarily determine, such as information indicating the date of birth of the destination user U2.

[0060] Next, the sharing source control device 21 acquires the hash value obtained by hashing the random number information and friend information (hereinafter referred to as the "first hash value") (step S3), and sends the first hash value to the sharing destination terminal 3 (step S4). The first hash value is, for example, converted into a QR code and provided to the sharing destination terminal 3.

[0061] Next, the friend information is entered into vehicle 1 (step S5), and the first hash value is sent to vehicle 1 (step S6). The friend information and the first hash value are stored in the vehicle memory 11a.

[0062] The vehicle control device 11 hashes the random number information and the friend information to obtain a hash value (hereinafter referred to as the "second hash value") (step S7).

[0063] Next, the vehicle control device 11 compares the first hash value with the second hash value (step S8). When it is determined that the first hash value and the second hash value are consistent, the vehicle control device 11 completes the registration of the digital key (hereinafter referred to as "shared destination key DK2") possessed by the shared destination terminal 3. Thus, the vehicle 1 can be used through the shared destination key DK2.

[0064] Thus, in the key registration process of this embodiment, it is determined whether the first hash value and the second hash value are consistent. The first hash value and the second hash value are obtained by hashing random number information and friend information, respectively. The friend information is information that only the shared destination user U2, who owns the shared destination terminal 3, can know, and it is input to vehicle 1 during the key registration process. Therefore, the shared destination key DK2 can be securely managed; for example, even if the QR code obtained by converting the first hash value is stolen, illegal use of vehicle 1 by a third party can be prevented.

[0065] Next, refer to Figure 4 The timing of the key registration process in the first embodiment will be described in detail. Figure 4 This is a sequence diagram representing the key registration process. It should be noted that this is for reference only. Figure 4To explain the timing of the key registration process, it is assumed that the shared source terminal 2 has completed the registration of the shared source key DK1 of vehicle 1, and the key information used in the authentication of the shared source key DK1 (hereinafter referred to as "shared source key information") is stored in the vehicle memory 11a of vehicle 1 (registered in vehicle 1). The shared source key information includes information representing the ID information of vehicle 1, public key information, the number of times the shared source key DK1 has been used, and the validity period of the shared source key DK1. In addition, it is assumed that the shared source terminal 2 has obtained random number information from vehicle 1, and the random number information is stored in the shared source memory 21a of the shared source terminal 2.

[0066] like Figure 4 As shown, firstly, the sharing destination control device 31 of the sharing destination terminal 3 sends the friend information to the sharing source terminal 2 (an example of a distribution device) (step S101). Next, the sharing source control device 21 obtains a first hash value obtained by hashing the random number information and the friend information (step S103). It should be noted that the first hash value is an example of information transformation, and hashing is an example of data transformation.

[0067] Next, the shared source control device 21 creates a digital key (hereinafter referred to as "shared destination key DK2") for the shared destination user U2 to use vehicle 1 and key information (hereinafter referred to as "shared destination key information DT2") for authenticating the shared destination key DK2 (step S105). It should be noted that the shared destination key DK2 and the shared destination key information DT2 are created based on shared information. This shared information is created by the shared source user U1 inputting the required items to the shared source control device 21 via the shared source input / output unit 23 of the shared source terminal 2.

[0068] The shared destination key information DT2 includes the ID information of vehicle 1, the public key information of the shared destination key DK2, the ID information of the sharing source terminal 2, the number of times the shared destination key DK2 has been used, and the validity period of the shared destination key DK2. It should be noted that when the authentication method during key registration is public key encryption, the public key information included in the shared destination key information DT2 is omitted. After the key registration process is completed, the public key is shared between vehicle 1 and the sharing destination terminal 3 via BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy) communication, etc.

[0069] The shared source control device 21 signs the shared destination key information DT2 using the shared source key (private key in the case of public key encryption and public key in the case of public key encryption) stored in the shared source memory 21a (step S107).

[0070] Next, the shared source control device 21 converts the first hash value, the shared destination key DK2, and the signed shared destination key information DT2 into a QR code (registered trademark) (an example of a QR code) (step S109), and provides the QR code (registered trademark) to the shared destination terminal 3 (step S111).

[0071] The shared destination control device 31 obtains the first hash value, the shared destination key DK2, and the signed shared destination key information DT2 by reading the QR code (registered trademark) represented by the transmitted converted data (step S113). That is, the shared source control device 21 of the shared source terminal 2 sends (distributes) the first hash value, the shared destination key DK2, and the signed shared destination key information DT2 to the shared destination terminal 3, and the shared destination control device 31 of the shared destination terminal 3 receives the first hash value, the shared destination key DK2, and the signed shared destination key information DT2.

[0072] Next, the shared destination control device 31 sends the first hash value and the signed shared destination key information DT2 to vehicle 1 (step S115). It should be noted that the shared destination key information DT2 (shared destination key DK2) is also stored in the shared source memory 21a of the shared source terminal 2.

[0073] The vehicle control device 11 verifies the signature of the shared destination key information DT2 based on the shared source key DK1 (which is the public key in the case of public key encryption and the public key in the case of public key encryption) (step S117). It should be noted that in the verification of the shared destination key information DT2, the correctness of the vehicle 1's ID information and the digital key DK (the key obtained by hashing the shared destination key DK2) is confirmed.

[0074] In addition, at the same time, the sharing destination user U2 of the sharing destination terminal 3 manually inputs the friend information into the vehicle 1 (vehicle control device 11) by operating the vehicle input / output unit 13 of the vehicle 1 (step S119). The friend information is stored in the vehicle memory 11a.

[0075] The vehicle control device 11 obtains the second hash value based on the input friend information and random number information (step S121).

[0076] The vehicle control device 11 compares the first hash value with the second hash value (step S123). Specifically, the vehicle control device 11 determines whether the first hash value and the second hash value are consistent. When the first hash value and the second hash value are consistent, the signed shared destination key information DT2 is associated with the friend information and stored in the vehicle memory 11a of the vehicle 1 (registered in vehicle 1). Thus, the key registration process is completed, allowing the shared destination key DK2 to be used in vehicle 1. As a result, vehicle 1 can be locked and unlocked using the shared destination key DK2, and vehicle 1 can be used.

[0077] (Unlocking process)

[0078] Next, refer to Figure 5 The unlocking process performed when unlocking vehicle 1 is explained. Figure 5 This is a sequence diagram representing the unlocking process. In the unlocking process, in response to an unlocking request from the shared destination terminal 3, the shared destination terminal 3 authenticates the shared destination key DK2. If authentication is successful, vehicle 1 is unlocked, and the shared destination user U2 can use vehicle 1.

[0079] like Figure 5 As shown, the shared destination control device 31 creates an action message for performing the function of vehicle 1 (step S201) and sends it to vehicle 1 (step S203). The vehicle control device 11 generates a random number (e.g., a 16-byte random string) (step S205) and sends the random number information to the shared destination terminal 3 (step S207).

[0080] In the vehicle control device 11, during the period until the fourth hash value with a signature is received from the shared destination terminal 3, the random number information sent to the shared destination terminal 3 and the action message received from the shared destination terminal 3 are hashed to obtain the third hash value (step S209).

[0081] On the other hand, the shared destination control device 31 hashes the random number information and action message received from vehicle 1 to obtain a fourth hash value (step S211). The shared destination control device 31 signs the fourth hash value using the shared source key DK1 (the private key in the case of public key mode, and the public key in the case of public key mode) (step S213), and sends the signed fourth hash value to vehicle 1 (step S215).

[0082] Vehicle 1 verifies the signed fourth hash value sent from the shared destination terminal 3 (step S217). Specifically, vehicle control device 11 uses the shared destination key DK2 (a private key in the case of public key mode, and a public key in the case of public key mode) to verify the signature of the fourth hash value. Next, vehicle control device 11 compares the third hash value with the fourth hash value (step S219). Specifically, vehicle 1 determines whether the third hash value and the fourth hash value are consistent. If they are consistent, vehicle 1 confirms the information included in the shared destination key information DT2 (step S221). Vehicle 1 confirms, for example, the validity period and number of uses of the shared destination key DK2 included in the shared destination key information DT2. If the authentication conditions are met, authentication is successful, vehicle 1 is unlocked, and the unlocking process is completed. As a result, shared destination user U2 can use vehicle 1.

[0083] (Key deletion process)

[0084] Next, refer to Figure 6 This document explains the key deletion process for deleting the shared destination key DK2. Figure 6 This is a sequence diagram representing the key deletion process. Friend information is input (manually entered) into vehicle 1 during the deletion process of the shared destination key DK2 (shared destination key information DT2) registered in vehicle 1.

[0085] like Figure 6 As shown, the shared destination terminal 3 requests the deletion of the shared destination key DK2 (shared destination key information DT2) from the vehicle 1 (step S301). At the same time, the shared destination user U2 inputs friend information to the vehicle control device 11 via the vehicle input / output unit 13 of the vehicle 1.

[0086] Vehicle 1 verifies the entered friend information (step S303). Specifically, Vehicle 1 determines whether the entered friend information matches the friend information stored in vehicle memory 11a. When it is determined that the entered friend information matches the friend information stored in vehicle memory 11a, Vehicle 1 deletes the shared destination key information DT2 stored in vehicle memory 11a (step S305). It should be noted that during the key deletion process, the friend information is also deleted from vehicle memory 11a.

[0087] When the deletion of the shared destination key information DT2 is completed, the vehicle control device 11 sends a deletion completion notification to the shared destination terminal 3 (step S307). When the deletion completion notification is received from the vehicle 1, the shared destination control device 31 deletes the shared destination key DK2 and the shared destination key information DT2 stored in the shared destination memory 31a (step S309). Thus, the key deletion process is completed.

[0088] (Effects of the first implementation method)

[0089] As explained above, according to the digital key management system 100 of this embodiment, friend information is sent to the sharing source terminal 2, thus enabling secure management of the shared destination key information DT2. Specifically, during the registration process of registering the shared destination key information DT2 with vehicle 1, a first hash value obtained by hashing the friend information is sent to vehicle 1 via the sharing destination terminal 3, and the friend information is input into vehicle 1. In vehicle 1, by comparing the first hash value and the second hash value (the hash value obtained by hashing the friend information input into vehicle 1 and the random number information pre-stored in vehicle memory 11a), the friend information (shared destination user U2) can be verified, preventing unauthorized registration and deletion of the shared destination key DK2 by anyone other than the shared destination user U2. In other words, the shared destination key information DT2 can be securely managed. As a result, unauthorized use of vehicle 1 by a third party can be prevented.

[0090] (Second Implementation)

[0091] Next, the digital key management system 100 of the second embodiment will be described. Figure 7 This is a block diagram illustrating the configuration of the digital key management system 100 according to the second embodiment. For example... Figure 7 As shown, the second embodiment differs from the first embodiment in that the digital key management system 100 also includes a server (an example of a management device) for managing digital keys. Hereinafter, the second embodiment will be described focusing on the differences from the first embodiment, omitting descriptions of configurations identical to those in the first embodiment.

[0092] Server 4, for example, is a cloud server, and includes a server control unit 41 and a server communication unit 42. The server control unit 41 includes a CPU or MPU that works with software to perform specified functions. Furthermore, the server control unit 41 includes memory such as RAM, ROM, and EEPROM, as well as storage devices such as HDD (hard disk drive) and SSD (Solid State Drive). The server control unit 41 manages and establishes a correspondence between vehicle 1 and the sharing destination terminal 3. Hereinafter, the memory of the server control unit 41 will be referred to as server memory 41a.

[0093] The server communication unit 42 is configured to communicate with the vehicle communication unit 12, the shared source communication unit 22, and the shared destination communication unit 32. It is a hardware device used for wireless communication according to wireless communication standards such as Ethernet, mobile dedicated communication standards, Wi-Fi (registered trademark), and Bluetooth (registered trademark). The server communication unit 42 includes antennas for transmitting and receiving signals.

[0094] Figure 8A and Figure 8B This is a timing diagram illustrating the key registration process in the second embodiment. For example... Figure 8A As shown, the shared source control device 21 receives friend information from the shared destination terminal 3 (step S401). When it obtains the first hash value (step S403), it creates shared information including the ID of vehicle 1, etc. (step S405), and sends the shared information to the server 4 to make a sharing request (step S407). It should be noted that, similar to the first embodiment, the shared information is created by the shared source user U1 via the shared source input / output unit 23 of the shared source terminal 2.

[0095] The server control device 41 registers the sharing information (stored in the server memory 41a) (step S409), and issues website access information (hereinafter referred to as the URL) for registering the sharing destination key DK2 (step S411), and sends the URL to the sharing source terminal 2 (step S413). It should be noted that the URL is set to have a validity period of 24 hours, for example.

[0096] When the shared source control device 21 receives the URL from the server 4, it converts the URL and the first hash value into a QR code (registered trademark) (step S415) and sends it to the shared destination terminal 3 (step S417).

[0097] When the shared destination control device 31 obtains a QR code (registered trademark), it reads the obtained QR code (registered trademark) to obtain the first hash value (step S419). It should be noted that the shared destination control device 31 also obtains the URL by reading the QR code (registered trademark).

[0098] Next, the shared destination control device 31 creates the shared destination key DK2 and the shared destination key information DT2 (step S421), as follows: Figure 8B As shown, the site represented by the URL sent from the shared source terminal 2 is accessed, and the shared destination key information DT2 is sent to the server 4 (step S423).

[0099] The server control device 41 verifies the shared destination key information DT2 sent from the shared destination terminal 3 (step S425) and signs it using the server key DK3 (step S427).

[0100] Next, the server control device 41 sends the signed shared destination key information DT2 to the shared destination terminal 3 (step S429), and the shared destination control device 31 sends the signed shared destination key information DT2 and the first hash value of the server 4 to the vehicle 1 (step S431).

[0101] The vehicle control device 11 verifies the shared destination key information DT2 (step S433) based on the server key DK3 (private key in the case of public key encryption and public key in the case of public key encryption) pre-stored in the vehicle memory 11a.

[0102] In the future, if referred to Figure 4 As explained, similarly to the first embodiment, the shared destination user U2 of the shared destination terminal 3 inputs friend information into vehicle 1 (vehicle control device 11) (step S119). Vehicle control device 11 obtains a second hash value based on the input friend information and random number information (step S121). Vehicle control device 11 determines whether the first hash value and the second hash value are consistent (step S123). When they are consistent, the shared destination key information DT2 is stored in vehicle memory 11a. Thus, the key registration process is completed, allowing the shared destination key DK2 to be used in vehicle 1. As a result, vehicle 1 can be locked and unlocked (used) using the shared destination key DK2.

[0103] (Deleted)

[0104] In an example of the second implementation, such as Figure 9 As shown, similarly to the first embodiment, the shared destination control device 31 requests the vehicle 1 to delete the shared destination key DK2 (shared destination key information DT2) (step S601). At the same time, the shared destination user U2 inputs (manually inputs) friend information to the vehicle control device 11 via the vehicle input / output unit 13 of the vehicle 1.

[0105] The vehicle control device 11 verifies the input friend information (step S603). Specifically, the vehicle control device 11 determines whether the input friend information matches the friend information stored in the vehicle memory 11a. When it is determined that the input friend information matches the friend information stored in the vehicle memory 11a, the vehicle control device 11 deletes the shared destination key information DT2 stored in the vehicle memory 11a (step S605). It should be noted that during the key deletion process, the friend information is also deleted from the vehicle memory 11a.

[0106] When the deletion of the shared destination key information DT2 is completed, the vehicle control device 11 sends a deletion completion notification to the shared destination terminal 3 (step S607). When the shared destination control device 31 receives the deletion completion notification from the vehicle 1 and deletes the shared destination key DK2 and the shared destination key information DT2 stored in the shared destination memory 31a (step S609), the deletion completion notification is sent to the server 4 (step S611). Upon receiving the deletion completion notification, the server control device 41 deletes the shared destination key DK2 and the shared destination key information DT2 stored in the server memory 41a (step S613), and the key deletion process is completed. The server 4 may also notify the shared source terminal 2 that the key deletion is complete.

[0107] (A variation of the second embodiment)

[0108] Next, refer to Figure 10A and Figure 10B The digital key management system 100 of the second embodiment will be described. Figure 10A and Figure 10B This is a timing diagram of the key registration process in a variant of the second embodiment. It should be noted that the variant of the second embodiment differs from the second embodiment in that the first hash value is obtained by the server 4, not the shared source terminal 2. Hereinafter, the variant of the second embodiment will be described focusing on the differences from the second embodiment, omitting descriptions of configurations identical to those in the second embodiment.

[0109] like Figure 10A As shown, the shared source control device 21 creates shared information in the same way as the method described in the second embodiment (step S501), and sends the random number information and shared information pre-stored in the shared source memory 21a to the server 4 (step S503).

[0110] With reference Figure 8A and Figure 8B Similarly, the server control device 41 stores the sharing information (step S505) and issues a URL for sharing registration (step S507), and sends the URL to the sharing source terminal 2 (step S509).

[0111] When the URL is received from the server 4, the shared source control device 21 converts the URL into a QR code (registered trademark) (step S511) and sends it to the shared destination terminal 3 (step S513).

[0112] When the shared destination control device 31 reads the QR code (registered trademark) (step S515), similarly to the second embodiment, a shared destination key DK2 and shared destination key information DT2 are created (step S517), as follows. Figure 10B As shown, by accessing the site represented by the URL sent from the shared source terminal 2, the shared destination key information DT2 and friend information are sent to the server 4 (step S519).

[0113] The server control device 41 verifies the shared destination key information DT2 sent from the shared destination terminal 3 (step S521) and signs it using the server key DK3 (step S523).

[0114] Next, the server control device 41 hashes the random number information sent from the sharing source terminal 2 and the friend information sent from the sharing destination terminal 3 to obtain the first hash value (step S525). Then, the server control device 41 sends the signed sharing destination key information DT2 and the first hash value to the sharing destination terminal 3 (step S527), and the sharing destination control device 31 sends the signed sharing destination key information DT2 and the first hash value to the vehicle 1 (step S529).

[0115] From now on, with reference Figure 4 The first embodiment described and referenced Figure 8A and Figure 8B Similarly, in the second embodiment described, the shared destination user U2 of the shared destination terminal 3 inputs friend information into vehicle 1 (vehicle control device 11) (step S119). Vehicle control device 11 obtains a second hash value based on the input friend information and random number information (step S121). Vehicle control device 11 determines whether the first hash value and the second hash value are consistent (step S123). When they are consistent, the shared destination key information DT2 is stored in vehicle memory 11a. Thus, the key registration process is completed, allowing the shared destination key DK2 to be used in vehicle 1. As a result, vehicle 1 can be locked and unlocked (used) using the shared destination key DK2.

[0116] (Deleted)

[0117] In a variation of the second embodiment, compared with the reference... Figure 9 The deletion process is the same as described above.

[0118] (Effects of the second implementation method)

[0119] As explained above, the digital key management system 100 according to this embodiment, like the first embodiment, can securely manage the shared destination key information DT2. As a result, it can prevent unauthorized use of vehicle 1 by a third party.

[0120] As described above, the digital key management system 100 performs a digital key registration method (key registration processing), which includes the following steps: sending friend information from the shared destination terminal 3 to the shared source terminal 2 or server 4; obtaining a first hash value based on the friend information and pre-stored random number information by the shared source terminal 2 or server 4; sending the first hash value to vehicle 1 via the shared destination terminal; inputting friend information into vehicle 1; obtaining a second hash value based on the friend information and random number information by vehicle 1; and determining whether the first hash value and the second hash value are consistent, and when the first hash value and the second hash value are consistent, registering the shared destination key information DT2 used in the authentication of the shared destination key DK2 used by the shared destination user.

[0121] It should be noted that the computer program used to enable the computer to perform the key registration, unlocking, and key deletion processes described in the above embodiments can be distributed by storing it on a computer-readable recording medium such as a floppy disk, CD-ROM (Compact Disc-Read Only Memory), or DVD-ROM (Digital Versatile Disc-Read Only Memory). By installing this computer program on the computer, at least one of the following is configured: vehicle 1, shared source terminal 2, shared destination terminal 3, and server 4. Alternatively, the computer program can be pre-stored in the storage area of ​​a server device (cloud server) on a communication network such as the Internet, and downloaded by a conventional computer system, thus configuring at least one of the following: vehicle 1, shared source terminal 2, shared destination terminal 3, and server 4.

[0122] In the above embodiment, the case where the friend information is inherent information that the sharing destination user U2 can arbitrarily determine, such as the birth date of the sharing destination user U2, has been described. However, the friend information can also be information that the sharing destination user U2 cannot arbitrarily determine, such as the MAC address of the sharing destination terminal 3. In this case, the friend information input to the vehicle 1 is not manually input by the sharing destination user U2, but is sent from the sharing destination control device 31 to the vehicle control device 11 via the sharing destination communication unit 32 and the vehicle communication unit 12. Thus, the friend information is input to the vehicle control device 11.

[0123] In the above embodiments, random number information was used as an example of the hashed information. However, the hashed information can be any information that represents non-repeating English alphanumeric characters and is not limited to random number information.

[0124] Explanation of reference numerals in the attached figures

[0125] 1: Vehicle (object device); 2: Shared source terminal (distribution device); 3: Shared destination terminal; 4: Server (distribution device); 11: Vehicle control device; 11a: Vehicle memory; 12: Vehicle communication unit; 13: Vehicle input / output unit; 21: Shared source control device; 21a: Shared source memory; 22: Shared source communication unit; 23: Shared source input / output unit; 31: Shared destination control device; 31a: Shared destination memory; 32: Shared destination communication unit; 33: Shared destination input / output unit; 41: Server control device; 41a: Server memory; 42: Server communication unit; 100: Digital key management system; DK: Digital key; DK1: Shared source key; DK2: Shared destination key; DK3: Server key; DT: Key information; DT2: Shared destination key information; U1: Shared source user; U2: Shared destination user.

Claims

1. A key information management system for managing key information used in the authentication of digital keys for object devices used to control controlled objects, the key information management system comprising: The distribution device distributes key information registered with the object device; and The shared destination terminal receives the key information. The shared destination terminal sends its inherent information to the distribution device. During the registration process of registering the key information to the object device, the inherent information is input to the object device.

2. The key information management system according to claim 1, wherein, The distribution device sends the transformed information, obtained by data transformation of the inherent information, to the sharing destination terminal. The shared destination terminal sends the conversion information to the target device.

3. The key information management system according to claim 2, wherein, The distribution device sends a first hash value to the shared destination terminal. The first hash value is the transformed information obtained by hashing the hashed information and the inherent information pre-stored in the object device. The shared destination terminal sends the first hash value to the target device.

4. The key information management system according to claim 3, wherein, The object device acquires a second hash value, which is obtained by hashing the inherent information and the hashed information. When the first hash value sent from the shared destination terminal matches the second hash value, the key information is registered.

5. The key information management system according to claim 4, wherein, During the deletion process of deleting the key information registered in the object device, the inherent information is also input to the object device.

6. The key information management system according to claim 5, wherein, The inherent information is manually input into the target device by the user who owns the shared target terminal.

7. The key information management system according to any one of claims 3 to 6, wherein, The distribution device is a shared source terminal owned by a shared source user that serves as a shared source for sharing the object device. The shared source terminal converts the first hash value and the key information into a QR code and sends it to the shared destination terminal.

8. The key information management system according to any one of claims 1 to 6, wherein, The distribution device is a management device that establishes a correspondence between the target device and the shared destination terminal to manage key information. The management device sends website access information for registering the key information.

Images