Risk assessment method and device for bus side knife switch operation

Abstract

The application provides a bus side knife switch operation risk assessment method and device, and relates to the technical field of electric power engineering. The method comprises the following steps: if the knife switch in the power system is a bus side knife switch, the wiring type of the power system is obtained; then, according to the wiring type, the operation type corresponding to the wiring type is determined; then, according to the wiring type and the operation type, the simulation fault equipment of the power system is determined; finally, according to the simulation fault equipment, the power grid accident risk level of the power system is determined. Through the method, the accuracy of the risk assessment of the bus side knife switch operation can be improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of power engineering technology, and in particular to a risk assessment method and apparatus for busbar side disconnector operation. Background Technology

[0002] In power systems, a disconnector is a switching device used to isolate or connect circuits. Disconnector operation is typically performed remotely via dispatch and status confirmation. The devices connected to disconnectors are usually critical equipment such as busbars, transformers, and circuit breakers. A busbar can connect multiple electrical devices; non-single busbar wiring typically involves multiple busbars and their connections and distribution. Multiple busbars enhance the redundancy and reliability of the power system, preventing a system outage caused by a single busbar failure.

[0003] Since disconnection operations are usually performed when the power system needs maintenance, repair, or protection, improper disconnection operations may pose a risk to the power grid.

[0004] However, current risk assessments typically target the main equipment in the circuit that directly affects the system's operation, resulting in limitations in the assessment results. Summary of the Invention

[0005] This application provides a risk assessment method and apparatus for bus-side disconnector operation, which improves the accuracy of assessing the impact of disconnector operation on the power system.

[0006] In a first aspect, embodiments of this application provide a risk assessment method and apparatus for bus-side disconnector operation, including:

[0007] If the disconnector in the power system is a bus-side disconnector, obtain the wiring type of the power system;

[0008] Determine the operation type corresponding to the wiring type based on the wiring type;

[0009] Based on the wiring type and operation type, determine the equipment for simulating power system faults;

[0010] Based on the simulated faulty equipment, the risk level of power grid accidents in the power system is determined.

[0011] In one possible implementation, determining the operation type corresponding to the wiring type based on the wiring type includes:

[0012] If the wiring type is double busbar wiring, determine whether the operation type is whether the disconnector is performing a busbar switching operation or a disconnector is performing a closing operation;

[0013] If the wiring type is 3 / 2 wiring or internal / external bridge wiring, determine the operation type as whether the disconnector is closed.

[0014] In one possible implementation, the simulated fault equipment for the power system is determined based on the wiring type and operation type, including:

[0015] If the wiring type indicates that the power system adopts a double busbar connection, and the operation type indicates that the disconnector performs a hot busbar switching operation, then the simulated fault equipment of the power system is determined to be the two busbars connected by the disconnector.

[0016] If the wiring type indicates that the power system adopts a double busbar connection, and the operation type indicates that the disconnector has not performed a busbar switching operation and the disconnector has performed a closing operation, then the simulated fault equipment of the power system is determined to be the busbar connected to the disconnector.

[0017] If the wiring type indicates that the power system adopts a double busbar connection, and the operation type indicates that the disconnector performs a cold busbar transfer operation or a closing operation, then the simulated fault equipment of the power system is determined to be the busbar connected to the disconnector.

[0018] In one possible implementation, the method further includes:

[0019] If the wiring type indicates that the power system adopts a 3 / 2 wiring configuration, and the operation type indicates that the disconnector is closed, then the simulated fault device of the power system is determined to be the bus connected to the disconnector.

[0020] In one possible implementation, the method further includes:

[0021] If the wiring type indicates that the power system adopts internal and external bridge wiring, the operation type indicates that the disconnector is closed, and the disconnector is a segmented disconnector, then the simulated fault equipment of the power system is determined to be the busbar connected to the disconnector and its segmented busbars.

[0022] If the wiring type indicates that the power system uses internal and external bridge wiring, and the operation type indicates that the disconnector is closed, and the disconnector is not a segmented disconnector, then the simulated fault equipment of the power system is determined to be the line and main transformer connected by the disconnector.

[0023] In one possible implementation, determining the power grid accident risk level of the power system based on simulated faulty equipment includes:

[0024] Based on the simulated faulty equipment, determine the number of power plants and stations that experienced pressure loss due to the simulated faulty equipment;

[0025] Based on the preset risk level assessment criteria, the power grid accident risk level of the power system is determined according to the number of power plants and substations that have lost power.

[0026] In one possible implementation, the power grid accident risk level of the power system is determined based on a preset risk level assessment standard and the number of substations experiencing power outages, including:

[0027] If the number of power plants experiencing power outages is less than or equal to the threshold for power plants experiencing power outages in the risk level assessment criteria, then the power grid accident risk level is determined to be low risk.

[0028] If the number of power plants experiencing power outages exceeds the power plant outage threshold, the power grid accident risk level is determined to be high risk.

[0029] In one possible implementation, the method further includes:

[0030] If the operation type indicates that the disconnector is being disconnected, the power grid accident risk level of the power system is determined to be zero.

[0031] In one possible implementation, before obtaining the wiring type of the circuit under test where the switch is located, the method further includes:

[0032] Get the list of devices connected to the disconnect switch;

[0033] If the equipment list includes busbar equipment but excludes voltage transformer equipment and high-voltage reactor equipment, and the disconnector is not grounded, then the disconnector is determined to be a busbar-side disconnector.

[0034] Secondly, embodiments of this application provide a risk assessment device for busbar-side disconnector operation, comprising:

[0035] The acquisition module is used to obtain the wiring type of the power system if the disconnector in the power system is a bus-side disconnector;

[0036] The first determining module is used to determine the operation type corresponding to the wiring type based on the wiring type.

[0037] The second determination module is used to determine the simulated fault equipment of the power system based on the wiring type and operation type;

[0038] The third determination module is used to determine the power grid accident risk level of the power system based on the simulated faulty equipment.

[0039] In one possible implementation, the first determining module is specifically used for:

[0040] If the wiring type is double busbar wiring, determine whether the operation type is whether the disconnector is performing a busbar switching operation or a disconnector is performing a closing operation;

[0041] If the wiring type is 3 / 2 wiring or internal / external bridge wiring, determine the operation type as whether the disconnector is closed.

[0042] In one possible implementation, the second determining module is specifically used for:

[0043] If the wiring type indicates that the power system adopts a double busbar connection, and the operation type indicates that the disconnector performs a hot busbar switching operation, then the simulated fault equipment of the power system is determined to be the two busbars connected by the disconnector.

[0044] If the wiring type indicates that the power system adopts a double busbar connection, and the operation type indicates that the disconnector has not performed a busbar switching operation and the disconnector has performed a closing operation, then the simulated fault equipment of the power system is determined to be the busbar connected to the disconnector.

[0045] If the wiring type indicates that the power system adopts a double busbar connection, and the operation type indicates that the disconnector performs a cold busbar transfer operation or a closing operation, then the simulated fault equipment of the power system is determined to be the busbar connected to the disconnector.

[0046] In one possible implementation, the second determining module is further configured to:

[0047] If the wiring type indicates that the power system adopts a 3 / 2 wiring configuration, and the operation type indicates that the disconnector is closed, then the simulated fault device of the power system is determined to be the bus connected to the disconnector.

[0048] In one possible implementation, the second determining module is further configured to:

[0049] If the wiring type indicates that the power system adopts internal and external bridge wiring, the operation type indicates that the disconnector is closed, and the disconnector is a segmented disconnector, then the simulated fault equipment of the power system is determined to be the busbar connected to the disconnector and its segmented busbars.

[0050] If the wiring type indicates that the power system uses internal and external bridge wiring, and the operation type indicates that the disconnector is closed, and the disconnector is not a segmented disconnector, then the simulated fault equipment of the power system is determined to be the line and main transformer connected by the disconnector.

[0051] In one possible implementation, the third determining module is specifically used for:

[0052] Based on the simulated faulty equipment, determine the number of power plants and stations that experienced pressure loss due to the simulated faulty equipment;

[0053] Based on the preset risk level assessment criteria, the power grid accident risk level of the power system is determined according to the number of power plants and substations that have lost power.

[0054] In one possible implementation, the third determining module is further configured to:

[0055] If the number of power plants experiencing power outages is less than or equal to the threshold for power plants experiencing power outages in the risk level assessment criteria, then the power grid accident risk level is determined to be low risk.

[0056] If the number of power plants experiencing power outages exceeds the power plant outage threshold, the power grid accident risk level is determined to be high risk.

[0057] In one possible implementation, the third determining module is further configured to:

[0058] If the operation type indicates that the disconnector is being disconnected, the power grid accident risk level of the power system is determined to be zero.

[0059] In one possible implementation, the first determining module is further configured to:

[0060] Get the list of devices connected to the disconnect switch;

[0061] If the equipment list includes busbar equipment but excludes voltage transformer equipment and high-voltage reactor equipment, and the disconnector is not grounded, then the disconnector is determined to be a busbar-side disconnector.

[0062] Thirdly, embodiments of this application provide an electronic device, including: a memory and a processor;

[0063] The memory stores the instructions that the computer executes;

[0064] The processor executes computer execution instructions stored in memory, causing the processor to perform the first aspect and / or various possible implementations of the first aspect as described above.

[0065] Fourthly, embodiments of this application provide a computer-readable storage medium storing computer-executable instructions, which, when executed by a processor, are used to implement the first aspect and / or various possible implementations of the first aspect.

[0066] Fifthly, embodiments of this application provide a computer program product, including a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the first aspect and / or various possible implementations of the first aspect.

[0067] The risk assessment method and apparatus for bus-side disconnector operation provided in this application, through in-depth analysis of bus-side disconnectors, obtains the wiring type of the power system and then determines the corresponding operation type based on the wiring type. This more accurately reflects the operational characteristics under different wiring structures, thereby more accurately assessing risks. It also focuses on critical operations with a greater impact on the system, avoiding over-assessment of non-critical disconnectors and improving the relevance of the assessment. Then, by dynamically determining simulated faulty equipment based on the physical characteristics of different wiring structures, it avoids relying on a single risk assumption. That is, by combining wiring type and operation type, it dynamically generates a list of equipment that may cause faults due to disconnector operation failure, enhancing the correlation with the actual power system topology and simulating more realistic fault scenarios. By performing pre-operation risk prediction for bus-side disconnector operations, simulating the impact range of faulty equipment, and comprehensively calculating the power grid accident risk level, it is possible to more scientifically assess the severity of accidents. This facilitates the quantification of risk levels into specific indicators, enabling maintenance personnel to make more reasonable decisions based on simulation analysis results, such as prioritizing high-risk operations and avoiding chain reactions caused by improper disconnector operations, further ensuring the stability of the power grid. Attached Figure Description

[0068] The accompanying drawings, which are incorporated in and form part of this specification, illustrate embodiments consistent with this application and, together with the description, serve to explain the principles of this application.

[0069] Figure 1 A flowchart illustrating the risk assessment method for bus-side disconnector operation provided in this application embodiment. Figure 1 ;

[0070] Figure 2 A flowchart illustrating the risk assessment method for bus-side disconnector operation provided in this application embodiment. Figure 2 ;

[0071] Figure 3 A flowchart illustrating the risk assessment method for bus-side disconnector operation provided in this application embodiment. Figure 3 ;

[0072] Figure 4 A schematic diagram of the risk assessment device for bus-side disconnector operation provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0073] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided in an embodiment of this application.

[0074] The accompanying drawings have illustrated specific embodiments of this application, which will be described in more detail below. These drawings and descriptions are not intended to limit the scope of the concept in any way, but rather to illustrate the concept of this application to those skilled in the art through reference to specific embodiments. Detailed Implementation

[0075] Exemplary embodiments will now be described in detail, examples of which are illustrated in the accompanying drawings. When the following description relates to the drawings, unless otherwise indicated, the same numbers in different drawings denote the same or similar elements. The embodiments described in the following exemplary embodiments do not represent all embodiments consistent with this application. Rather, they are merely examples of apparatuses and methods consistent with some aspects of this application as detailed in the appended claims.

[0076] The terms "first," "second," "third," "fourth," etc., used in the specification, claims, and accompanying drawings of this application are used to distinguish similar objects and are not necessarily used to describe a specific order or sequence. It should be understood that such data can be used interchangeably where appropriate. For example, without departing from the scope of this document, first information can also be referred to as second information, and similarly, second information can also be referred to as first information.

[0077] Depending on the context, the word "if" as used here can be interpreted as "when," "when," or "in response to determination."

[0078] Furthermore, as used herein, the singular forms “a,” “one,” and “the” are intended to also include the plural forms, unless the context indicates otherwise.

[0079] It should be further understood that the terms “comprising” or “including” indicate the presence of features, steps, operations, elements, components, items, kinds, and / or groups, but do not exclude the presence, occurrence, or addition of one or more other features, steps, operations, elements, components, items, kinds, and / or groups.

[0080] The terms “or” and “and / or” as used herein are interpreted as inclusive, or mean any one or any combination thereof. Therefore, “A, B, and / or C” means “any one of the following: A; B; C; A and B; A and C; B and C; A, B, and C.” Exceptions to this definition occur only when combinations of elements, functions, steps, or operations are inherently mutually exclusive in some way.

[0081] In existing technologies, because main equipment such as transformers, generators, and circuit breakers directly affect the reliability and economy of power supply, current power system risk assessments typically focus on the inherent faults of main equipment (such as insulation aging and mechanical wear). However, as auxiliary isolation devices, disconnectors' operational risks are often categorized as human error or secondary system problems and are not included in the main equipment reliability analysis framework. Therefore, the impact of disconnector operational errors on the power system is ignored when determining risks, leading to limitations in the assessment results and an inability to accurately estimate the scope of faults.

[0082] Based on this, the risk assessment method for bus-side disconnector operation provided in this application specifically analyzes the potential fault range under different non-single busbar connection methods, taking into account the power system's wiring structure and the possible operations of the disconnectors under that structure. Specifically, traditional assessment methods only focus on the main equipment, neglecting specific wiring types to identify particular risks. Therefore, by first obtaining and analyzing the power system's wiring type to determine the corresponding disconnector operation type, operating rules can be designed based on the physical characteristics of different wiring structures (such as redundant paths and protection configurations), flexibly responding to complex scenarios. Furthermore, by combining wiring type and operation type and dynamically adjusting the simulated faulty equipment, it is possible to focus on the key operations of the bus-side disconnectors and more accurately identify specific risks.

[0083] The technical solution of this application and how the technical solution of this application solves the above-mentioned technical problems are described in detail below with specific embodiments. These specific embodiments can be combined with each other, and the same or similar concepts or processes may not be described again in some embodiments. The embodiments of this application will now be described with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0084] In this application, an electronic device is used as the execution subject to perform a risk assessment method for bus-side disconnector operation according to the following embodiments. Specifically, the execution subject can be a hardware device of the electronic device, or a software application implementing the following embodiments in the electronic device, or a computer-readable storage medium installed with the software application implementing the following embodiments, or code implementing the software application.

[0085] Figure 1 A flowchart illustrating the risk assessment method for bus-side disconnector operation provided in this application embodiment. Figure 1 .like Figure 1 As shown, the method in this embodiment may include the following steps:

[0086] S101. If the disconnector in the power system is a bus-side disconnector, obtain the wiring type of the power system.

[0087] In a power system, the busbar is the main conductor used to connect multiple power sources and loads. A busbar-side disconnector refers to a disconnector installed on the busbar, responsible for disconnecting or connecting the busbar to other circuits.

[0088] Wiring type refers to the connection method between various devices in a power system, which determines the structure and operation of the power system. For example, the system can be a single busbar connection, a double busbar connection, a ring connection, etc.

[0089] It should be noted that this embodiment analyzes non-single busbar connection methods, that is, connection methods that provide redundant paths for equipment through multiple busbars or other means, including double busbar connection, 3 / 2 connection, and internal / external bridge connection. Double busbar connection refers to power equipment (such as transformers, circuit breakers, etc.) being connected to two independent busbars. 3 / 2 connection (one and a half phases connection) refers to power equipment using three phase lines and two busbars, where one busbar connects only two phases, while the other connects three phases, providing a certain degree of redundancy. Internal / external bridge connection refers to installing bridging devices (such as disconnectors) between two busbars to ensure flexible switching or interconnection between them. Internal bridge connection means the circuit breaker is installed on the inner side of the bridge (closer to the busbar side), and the transformer is directly connected to the line through a disconnector. External bridge connection means the circuit breaker is installed on the outer side of the bridge (closer to the line side), and the transformer is directly connected to the busbar through the circuit breaker.

[0090] Because power systems with non-single busbar connections typically include multiple busbars or backup paths, power transmission between devices does not entirely depend on a single busbar. When one busbar fails, other busbars or paths can continue to supply power, preventing the entire system from shutting down. Therefore, they offer higher reliability and fault tolerance. However, this connection method requires flexible control via disconnectors or the design of protection and control devices, making design and maintenance more complex. Consequently, if the disconnector fails to operate (the disconnector does not perform its intended action during opening or closing), it may lead to improper circuit isolation or connection, causing serious power grid faults.

[0091] In this embodiment, when the power system is not connected by a single busbar, it is first necessary to check the position of the disconnector (busbar side) in the power system and determine the wiring type according to the equipment connection method, thereby determining the position and function of the disconnector in the power system.

[0092] S102. Determine the operation type corresponding to the wiring type based on the wiring type.

[0093] The operation type can refer to the category of operations required based on the wiring type, such as switching busbars, bus transfer, hot bus transfer, adding load, disconnecting load, etc. These operations are usually for ensuring the stability of the power grid, load scheduling, or fault recovery.

[0094] In this embodiment, the impact of different wiring types on the system's operation mode and strategy is analyzed to determine the corresponding operation type. For example, if it is a double busbar connection, it may involve operations such as load switching.

[0095] S103. Determine the simulated fault equipment of the power system according to the wiring type and operation type.

[0096] Among them, simulated fault devices can refer to hypothetical fault devices determined in system simulation based on wiring type and operation type. These devices can be used for fault analysis, emergency response, and accident recovery assessment.

[0097] In this embodiment, the simulated faulty device is the one most severely affected by a disconnector operation. Based on the wiring type and operation type, potential faults in the power system are tested and predicted, and devices that may be affected under fault conditions (such as circuit breakers, transformers, lines, etc.) are speculated.

[0098] Understandably, for systems with non-single busbar connections, the fault modes and risk assessments are more complex than those for single busbar connections due to the presence of multiple buses and redundant paths. Therefore, analyzing simulated fault equipment in the power system by considering connection type and operation type can effectively reduce errors in risk assessment and avoid safety hazards caused by overly simplistic judgment logic.

[0099] S104. Determine the power grid accident risk level of the power system based on the simulated faulty equipment.

[0100] Among them, the power grid accident risk level is an indicator for assessing the degree of risk to the power system when a fault occurs. It is usually divided into different levels (such as high, medium, and low risk levels) based on the probability of the fault occurring and its impact on the operation of the power grid, and is used to guide emergency response and decision-making.

[0101] In this embodiment, based on the simulated faulty equipment, and combined with the corresponding designed fault scenarios, the possible impact of the system fault can be analyzed, the risk of possible power grid accidents can be assessed, and the risk level can be determined, thereby determining whether there are major safety hazards in the power grid, and taking subsequent emergency response measures accordingly.

[0102] In one possible implementation, prior to step S101, the method may further include the following steps:

[0103] Obtain the list of devices connected to the disconnect switch; if the list of devices includes busbar devices but does not include voltage transformer devices or high-voltage reactor devices, and the disconnect switch is not grounded, then the disconnect switch is determined to be a busbar-side disconnect switch.

[0104] The equipment list can refer to a list of other electrical equipment connected to a specific power system device (such as a disconnector). This list may include busbars, transformers, circuit breakers, voltage transformers, and high-impedance devices. Based on the equipment list, the functions and interrelationships of the equipment can be analyzed. Voltage transformers are devices used to convert high-voltage signals to low-voltage signals. They are typically used for measurement and protection in power systems, providing an output proportional to the system voltage for voltage monitoring and control. High-impedance devices are devices with high impedance characteristics, typically used in power systems to limit fault currents or for protection equipment, such as high-impedance protection devices and electrical load equipment.

[0105] In this embodiment, the first step is to determine whether the disconnector is a bus-side disconnector based on the list of devices connected to it. This involves comprehensively understanding the devices connected to the disconnector and their environment based on the device list. Each device in the list is numbered, allowing for rapid fault location based on the disconnector number during subsequent processing and selection of fault simulation devices. Specifically, if the device list includes bus-side equipment, it means the disconnector is likely used to connect to or be connected to the bus. If the device list does not include voltage transformer equipment, it indicates the disconnector is not related to voltage measurement, and therefore is not connected to voltage monitoring or measurement equipment. If the device list does not include high-voltage reactance equipment, it means the disconnector is not directly connected to equipment used to limit fault current. If the disconnector is not grounded, its potential function as a grounding device is ruled out. Therefore, if the above conditions are met, the disconnector is determined to be a bus-side disconnector. Once the disconnector is confirmed to be a bus-side disconnector, the next step is to... Figure 1 The steps in this embodiment involve obtaining the wiring type of the power system and continuing with subsequent processing.

[0106] Understandably, by adding this judgment step, the specific location and function of the disconnect switch can be identified more accurately, confirming whether it is a bus-side disconnect switch, which helps to reduce misjudgments and improve the reliability of the system's disconnect switch operation.

[0107] The risk assessment method for bus-side disconnector operation provided in this application identifies fault simulation equipment by clarifying the wiring type and corresponding operation type. By simulating faulty equipment, the risk level of the accident is assessed, enabling operation and maintenance personnel to identify high-risk areas in advance and take corresponding preventive and emergency measures to reduce the probability of power grid faults. This allows for better prediction and prevention of potential faults in the power system. Targeted analysis of the potential impact of disconnector operation facilitates prevention of such impacts, thereby improving the reliability and stability of the system.

[0108] Figure 2 A flowchart illustrating the risk assessment method for bus-side disconnector operation provided in this application embodiment. Figure 2 .like Figure 2As shown, in this embodiment... Figure 1 Based on the embodiments, the risk assessment method for busbar side disconnector operation is described in detail. The method of this embodiment may include the following steps:

[0109] S201. If the wiring type is double busbar wiring, determine whether the operation type is whether the disconnector is performing a busbar switching operation or a disconnector is performing a closing operation.

[0110] Busbar switching operation refers to the operation of transferring loads in a power system from one busbar to another. For example, busbar switching operations are performed during busbar maintenance or repair to ensure continuous power supply to the power system.

[0111] Closing a disconnect switch means that the switch is in the closed position, connecting two electrical devices and allowing current to flow. Conversely, when the switch is open, the current is cut off, and no current is transmitted between the devices. If the switch malfunctions, i.e., it fails to close, the devices may not receive power, resulting in a power outage.

[0112] In this embodiment, if the wiring type is a double busbar connection, the system will further determine whether the disconnector needs to perform a busbar switching operation or whether to continue to keep the disconnector closed, so as to achieve normal switching of system load and power transmission.

[0113] It should be noted that when the disconnector is open, there is no current transmission between the devices, so there can be no risk, and the risk level of the power grid accident is zero.

[0114] S202. If the wiring type is 3 / 2 wiring or internal / external bridge wiring, determine the operation type as whether the disconnector is to be closed.

[0115] In this embodiment, if the wiring type is 3 / 2 wiring or internal / external bridge wiring, the bus switching operation cannot be performed. It is only necessary to determine the status of the disconnect switch. If the disconnect switch is closed, it is necessary to ensure the normal operation of the power equipment to avoid system interruption and power grid risk caused by the disconnect switch operation not being performed properly.

[0116] Understandably, by determining the corresponding operation type based on different wiring types, targeted analysis of disconnectors can be performed, thereby flexibly adjusting the state of power equipment under different wiring methods and ensuring the safety of the power system.

[0117] S203. If the wiring type indicates that the power system adopts a double busbar connection, and the operation type indicates that the disconnector performs a hot busbar switching operation, the simulated fault equipment of the power system is determined to be the two busbars connected by the disconnector.

[0118] In this embodiment, due to the hot busbar switching operation, if an operational error occurs during load switching via the disconnect switch, it may cause both busbars to short-circuit or lose power simultaneously, affecting multiple devices on the dual busbars. Therefore, the simulated faulty devices should be the two busbars connected to the disconnect switch.

[0119] As an example, when a hot busbar switching operation is performed in a substation via a disconnector, during the process of switching the line from busbar 1 to busbar 2, the disconnector of busbar 1 is directly disconnected without confirming that the parallel circuit breaker is conducting. The disconnector arcs, causing a flashover to ground on busbar 1. At the same time, the arc travels to busbar 2, causing the protection of both busbar sections to trip simultaneously, resulting in a loss of voltage in the entire substation and a complete power outage in the downstream substations.

[0120] It should be noted that the simulated faulty equipment identified in this embodiment represents the most severe possible fault, thereby creating redundancy in the corresponding emergency response measures and ensuring the adequacy of the solution.

[0121] S204. If the wiring type indicates that the power system adopts a double busbar connection, and the operation type indicates that the disconnector has not performed a busbar switching operation and the disconnector has performed a closing operation, then the simulated fault equipment of the power system is determined to be the busbar connected to the disconnector.

[0122] In this embodiment, if the disconnector does not perform a bus switching operation and instead performs a closing operation, the bus may not be switched due to a delay in the switching or a failure in the switching operation. Instead, the original bus connection will remain in place, resulting in no load switching and the power equipment remaining on the original bus, leading to a prolonged load interruption. Because the bus status of the system remains unchanged, a simulated fault in a dual-bus system will only affect a single device connected to that bus. That is, a fault occurs on the bus connected to the disconnector in a dual-bus system, and the bus connected to the disconnector may then be taken out of service due to the fault.

[0123] S205. If the wiring type indicates that the power system adopts a double busbar connection, and the operation type indicates that the disconnector performs a cold busbar transfer operation or a closing operation, then the simulated fault equipment of the power system is determined to be the busbar connected to the disconnector.

[0124] It should be noted that the switching operation can include cold switching and hot switching. Cold switching refers to the operation where the switch is in the open position, one set of disconnectors on each side of the switch is disconnected, and then the other set of disconnectors on each side of the switch is closed. Hot switching refers to the operation where the switch is in the closed position, one set of disconnectors on each side of the switch is closed, and then the other set of disconnectors on each side of the switch is disconnected.

[0125] This embodiment is similar to the embodiment of step S203 above. The difference is that the disconnector performs a cold busbar switching operation to switch the power load from one busbar to another. This may cause minor interference because the switch is open when the cold busbar switching operation is performed. Therefore, the load switching in the system will affect the busbar connected to the switched busbar. That is, the busbar connected to the disconnector in the double busbar connection may fail.

[0126] As an example, if a substation uses a double busbar configuration, and busbar 1 experiences an insulation breakdown short circuit due to a lightning strike, the busbar differential protection trips, opening all outgoing circuit breakers on busbar 1. At this point, a cold busbar switching operation is required: disconnecting the disconnectors on busbar 1 and closing the disconnectors on busbar 2. After confirming sufficient capacity on busbar 2, power supply is restored, resulting in a relatively short load interruption. Ideally, busbar 2 successfully carries the entire load without overload, and the system operates stably. However, if the disconnector operation is not performed correctly—for example, due to slow speed, operational errors, or insufficient remaining busbar capacity—a single fault may escalate into a systemic collapse, causing a fault on the busbar connected to the disconnector.

[0127] Understandably, for dual-busbar connections, hot busbar switching typically occurs during load switching. Therefore, simulating faults in multiple devices can verify the system's response capability under multi-point fault conditions. This helps assess whether multiple device failures during a hot busbar switching operation will cause excessive interference or instability to the power system. For systems that do not perform busbar switching or perform cold busbar switching, the simulated fault is limited to the current busbar. In this case, the system can quickly assess the impact of a single device failure, simplifying fault testing and saving testing resources.

[0128] S206. If the wiring type indicates that the power system adopts a 3 / 2 wiring, and the operation type indicates that the disconnector is closed, the simulated fault equipment of the power system is determined to be the bus connected to the disconnector.

[0129] In this embodiment, because the disconnector is closed and the system uses a 3 / 2 connection, even if multiple devices can be connected to the bus, the fault only simulates the bus currently directly connected to the disconnector and will not affect other buses that are not directly connected, since the disconnector remains closed and no switching is performed.

[0130] As an example, if a substation uses a 3 / 2 connection, and bus 1 experiences a ground fault due to equipment aging, the bus differential protection trips circuit breakers CB1 and CB2, closes the bypass disconnector of circuit breaker CB3 (i.e., closes the disconnector), and switches the line to bus 2 for power supply. Ideally, the load transfer is seamless, the power outage time is 0 seconds, satisfying the N-1 criterion, meaning that even if any component in the system fails, the system can still operate normally without causing a power outage or other serious problems. However, if the disconnector operation is not performed correctly, resulting in the faulty bus not being isolated in time, it may trigger a secondary fault, causing a fault on the bus connected to the disconnector.

[0131] Understandably, the 3 / 2 connection configuration itself provides a certain degree of fault tolerance, allowing the equipment to continue operating through the other busbar even if one busbar fails. By simulating a fault on the busbar connected to the disconnect switch, we can check whether the system can operate effectively in the face of such localized faults, thereby further optimizing the system's stability.

[0132] S207. If the wiring type indicates that the power system adopts internal and external bridge wiring, the operation type indicates that the disconnector is closed, and the disconnector is a segmented disconnector, the simulated fault equipment of the power system is determined to be the busbar connected to the disconnector and its segmented busbar.

[0133] Among them, sectional disconnectors are generally installed at the sectional points of the busbar to connect or isolate adjacent busbar sections.

[0134] In this embodiment, for internal bridge wiring, the sectionalizing disconnector is typically located between two busbar sections, and its closure enables parallel operation of the busbars. For external bridge wiring, the sectionalizing disconnector is used to connect adjacent busbar sections, and its closure merges the power supply range of the busbars. Therefore, closing the sectionalizing disconnector electrically connects the originally segmented busbar sections, forming an operation mode similar to a single busbar, which generally leads to simultaneous failures in both, i.e., both the busbar connected to the disconnector and its segmented busbars fail.

[0135] As an example, if an internal bridge connection is used, after closing the sectional disconnect switch, if there is an undetected metallic grounding fault on bus 1, the closing operation will cause the fault current to flow through the sectional disconnect switch to bus 2, resulting in the simultaneous loss of voltage on both bus sections.

[0136] As another example, if an external bridge connection is used, when the sectional disconnect switch is closed, if the mechanical jamming of the disconnect switch causes the contacts to not close completely, the excessive contact resistance will cause local overheating, which may burn out the bus connection. In this case, the bus section connected to the disconnect switch and its adjacent area will be faulty.

[0137] S208. If the wiring type indicates that the power system adopts internal and external bridge wiring, and the operation type indicates that the disconnector is closed, and the disconnector is not a segmented disconnector, then the simulated fault equipment of the power system is determined to be the line and main transformer connected by the disconnector.

[0138] In this context, the main transformer refers to the primary equipment used for stepping up or stepping down voltage. It is typically connected between the generator and the transmission system to ensure that electricity is delivered at an appropriate voltage level during transmission. A disconnector that is not a sectionalizing disconnector may be a line disconnector or a main transformer disconnector, directly connecting to the line or main transformer when closed.

[0139] In this embodiment, the power system adopts an internal and external bridge connection method, where multiple devices (such as main transformers) are connected to the same busbar through bridging. This ensures that even if a disconnector operation causes a winding short circuit or protection trip, resulting in a fault in the single main transformer connected to the disconnector and its shutdown, other devices in the system can still maintain power supply to the entire load through the remaining main transformers and the bridging circuit, continuing operation. In this configuration, when a disconnector in the power system closes, and the disconnector is not a segmented disconnector, the current in the system continues to flow, and the connection between devices remains effective, thus simultaneously affecting the lines and main transformers connected to the disconnector.

[0140] Understandably, the internal and external bridge wiring method itself has a certain degree of fault tolerance, allowing equipment to share load and serve as backups for each other in the event of a failure. By simulating a main transformer failure, it is possible to verify whether the system has sufficient backup capacity and ensure that the system can continue to operate stably.

[0141] S209. Based on the simulated faulty equipment, determine the number of power plants and stations that experience pressure loss due to the simulated faulty equipment.

[0142] Among them, power plants experiencing voltage loss refer to those that are unable to supply power normally due to equipment failure in the power system. These plants may be unable to continue providing power, or their power output may be limited, leading to voltage instability or voltage loss in the power grid. The number of power plants experiencing voltage loss directly affects the stability and reliability of the system.

[0143] In this embodiment, the number of power plants in a specific area that may lose power due to a fault can be analyzed using a power system topology model, taking into account factors such as the area where the fault occurs, the connectivity between the faulty equipment and other equipment, and the operation of protection devices. Additionally, data such as the number of load losses caused by simulated faulty equipment can be considered, combined with the number of power plants experiencing power outages, to determine a power grid accident risk level that reflects the actual power grid situation.

[0144] In some embodiments, a fault simulation calculation program can be developed based on the topology model and historical data of the power system. By inputting a list of devices that simulate faults, the program can output the number of power plants that lose voltage and the estimated losses.

[0145] S210. Based on the preset risk level judgment criteria, determine the power grid accident risk level of the power system according to the number of power plants and substations that have lost voltage.

[0146] In this embodiment, the preset risk level standard sets the number of depressurization plants and the accident risk level accordingly. The standard is assumed to be set as follows:

[0147] Low risk: The number of power plants experiencing pressure loss is relatively small, and the impact of the failure on the system is minimal.

[0148] Medium risk: The number of power plants experiencing power outages is moderate. The failures will have some impact on the system, but can be restored by other power sources or equipment.

[0149] High risk: There are a large number of power plants and substations that have lost power, and the impact of the failure is significant, potentially leading to large-scale power outages or system collapse.

[0150] Therefore, by simulating faulty equipment to determine the number of substations experiencing power outages, the risk level of an accident can be assessed based on these preset standards. A larger number of substations experiencing power outages indicates a higher risk level for the system, potentially requiring immediate emergency measures (such as activating backup power or dispatching other grid power) to restore power supply. Conversely, a smaller number of substations experiencing power outages results in a lower risk level, allowing the system to operate more smoothly.

[0151] For example, according to the preset risk level judgment criteria, if a fault occurs in a substation during a hot busbar switching operation via a disconnector, causing a power outage in all 10 downstream substations, it can be considered a high-risk situation, requiring immediate emergency response measures.

[0152] Understandably, by determining the number of substations experiencing power loss due to simulated equipment failure, the impact of the failure on each substation in the system can be accurately assessed, helping to identify the most vulnerable areas or equipment in the system. Furthermore, after determining the number of substations experiencing power loss, based on preset risk level standards, the risk level of a power grid accident can be quickly assessed. This allows maintenance personnel to promptly develop and implement emergency measures according to different risk levels, thereby reducing further damage to the power grid system after an accident occurs.

[0153] In one possible implementation, step S210 can be specifically implemented as follows:

[0154] If the number of power plants experiencing power outages is less than or equal to the threshold for power plants experiencing power outages in the risk level assessment criteria, then the power grid accident risk level is determined to be low risk.

[0155] If the number of power plants experiencing power outages exceeds the power plant outage threshold, the power grid accident risk level is determined to be high risk.

[0156] The substation undervoltage threshold refers to a preset limit value in the power system used to distinguish between low-risk and high-risk substations, representing an acceptable number of substations under voltage. If the number of substations under voltage in the system exceeds this threshold, it is considered a more serious fault, thus increasing the risk level. The substation undervoltage threshold can be determined based on the operating characteristics of the power grid and historical data.

[0157] It should be noted that the threshold for power plant failure can be multiple numbers, set according to the level of power grid accident risk.

[0158] In this embodiment, the risk level judgment criteria can be set based on historical data and experience. For example, when the number of pressure loss plants is 1, the risk level is 4; when the number of pressure loss plants is 2, the risk level is 3; when the number of pressure loss plants is 3 to 7, the risk level is 2; when the number of pressure loss plants is greater than 7, the risk level is 1, and its importance increases sequentially according to the number of pressure loss plants.

[0159] Understandably, setting thresholds for power grid failures to determine the risk level simplifies the risk assessment process. The system can clearly distinguish between low and high risk based on preset thresholds, helping maintenance personnel take swift action. This allows power grid operation and maintenance to be conducted according to clear standards, avoiding unnecessary complex calculations or uncertain judgments, thereby enhancing the system's emergency response capabilities.

[0160] The risk assessment method for bus-side disconnector operation provided in this application allows the system to flexibly adjust the state of power equipment under different wiring methods by judging the wiring type and disconnector status. Furthermore, by conducting specific analysis based on different wiring types and operation types, it can help the power system more accurately assess the impact of disconnector operation on the system. In addition, by simulating faulty equipment, the number of substations experiencing power outages can be determined, and the risk level of power grid accidents can be assessed based on the number of substations experiencing power outages using preset risk level standards. This helps the power system better assess the impact of faults, which is conducive to taking effective measures to restore system stability, thereby reducing power outage time and scope of impact, and ensuring the continuity and reliability of power supply.

[0161] Figure 3 A flowchart illustrating the risk assessment method for bus-side disconnector operation provided in this application embodiment. Figure 3 .like Figure 3 As shown, in Figure 1 and Figure 2 Based on the illustrated embodiment, the method of this embodiment may include the following steps:

[0162] S301. Determine whether the disconnector type is a bus-side disconnector.

[0163] S302. If it is a busbar side disconnect switch, then determine the wiring type.

[0164] S303. If it is a double busbar connection, determine whether the operation type is a busbar switching operation.

[0165] S304. If it is a mother-to-mother operation, then determine whether the operation type is a hot mother-to-mother operation.

[0166] S305. If it is not a busbar switching operation, or a hot busbar switching operation, or a 3 / 2 connection, or an internal / external bridge connection, then determine whether the operation type includes the step of closing the disconnect switch.

[0167] S306. For double busbar connections or 3 / 2 connections, if the step of closing the disconnect switch is included, then a fault is simulated on the busbar connected to the disconnect switch.

[0168] S307. Calculate the number of power plants and stations that lose power due to busbar faults.

[0169] S308. The output risk level is the power grid accident event level corresponding to the number of power plants with undervoltage calculated in step S307.

[0170] S309. For internal and external bridge connections, if the step of closing the disconnect switch is included, then a fault is simulated in the main transformer connected to the disconnect switch.

[0171] S310. Calculate the number of power plants and substations that lose power due to a main transformer failure.

[0172] S311. The output risk level is the power grid accident event level corresponding to the number of power plants with undervoltage calculated in step S310.

[0173] S312. If it is a hot busbar switching operation, then simulate a fault in the two busbar sections connected by the hot busbar switching of the switch.

[0174] S313. Calculate the number of power plants and stations that lose power due to faults in two busbar sections.

[0175] S314. The output risk level is the power grid accident event level corresponding to the number of power plants with undervoltage calculated in step S313.

[0176] S315. If the step of closing the switch is not included, the output risk level is zero.

[0177] The risk assessment method for bus-side disconnector operation provided in this application analyzes disconnector type and operation type hierarchically for different wiring types, thereby obtaining the possible fault range and simulating the fault. This can effectively prevent power grid risks caused by disconnector operation not being performed properly and improve the accuracy of risk assessment.

[0178] Figure 4 A schematic diagram of the structure of the risk assessment device for bus-side disconnector operation provided in the embodiments of this application is shown below. Figure 4 As shown, the risk assessment device 40 for bus-side disconnector operation provided in this embodiment includes:

[0179] The acquisition module 401 is used to acquire the wiring type of the power system if the disconnector in the power system is a bus-side disconnector.

[0180] The first determining module 402 is used to determine the operation type corresponding to the wiring type based on the wiring type;

[0181] The second determining module 403 is used to determine the simulated fault equipment of the power system based on the wiring type and operation type;

[0182] The third determination module 404 is used to determine the power grid accident risk level of the power system based on the simulated faulty equipment.

[0183] In one possible implementation, the first determining module 402 is specifically used for:

[0184] If the wiring type is double busbar wiring, determine whether the operation type is whether the disconnector is performing a busbar switching operation or a disconnector is performing a closing operation;

[0185] If the wiring type is 3 / 2 wiring or internal / external bridge wiring, determine the operation type as whether the disconnector is closed.

[0186] In one possible implementation, the second determining module 403 is specifically used for:

[0187] If the wiring type indicates that the power system adopts a double busbar connection, and the operation type indicates that the disconnector performs a hot busbar switching operation, then the simulated fault equipment of the power system is determined to be the two busbars connected by the disconnector.

[0188] If the wiring type indicates that the power system adopts a double busbar connection, and the operation type indicates that the disconnector has not performed a busbar switching operation and the disconnector has performed a closing operation, then the simulated fault equipment of the power system is determined to be the busbar connected to the disconnector.

[0189] If the wiring type indicates that the power system adopts a double busbar connection, and the operation type indicates that the disconnector performs a busbar switching operation or a disconnector performs a closing operation, then the simulated fault equipment of the power system is determined to be the busbar connected to the disconnector.

[0190] In one possible implementation, the second determining module 403 is further configured to:

[0191] If the wiring type indicates that the power system adopts a 3 / 2 wiring configuration, and the operation type indicates that the disconnector is closed, then the simulated fault device of the power system is determined to be the bus connected to the disconnector.

[0192] In one possible implementation, the second determining module 403 is further configured to:

[0193] If the wiring type indicates that the power system adopts internal and external bridge wiring, the operation type indicates that the disconnector is closed, and the disconnector is a segmented disconnector, then the simulated fault equipment of the power system is determined to be the busbar connected to the disconnector and its segmented busbars.

[0194] If the wiring type indicates that the power system uses internal and external bridge wiring, and the operation type indicates that the disconnector is closed, and the disconnector is not a segmented disconnector, then the simulated fault equipment of the power system is determined to be the line and main transformer connected by the disconnector.

[0195] In one possible implementation, the third determining module 404 is specifically used for:

[0196] Based on the simulated faulty equipment, determine the number of power plants and stations that experienced pressure loss due to the simulated faulty equipment;

[0197] Based on the preset risk level assessment criteria, the power grid accident risk level of the power system is determined according to the number of power plants and substations that have lost power.

[0198] In one possible implementation, the third determining module 404 is further configured to:

[0199] If the number of power plants experiencing power outages is less than or equal to the threshold for power plants experiencing power outages in the risk level assessment criteria, then the power grid accident risk level is determined to be low risk.

[0200] If the number of power plants experiencing power outages exceeds the power plant outage threshold, the power grid accident risk level is determined to be high risk.

[0201] In one possible implementation, the third determining module 404 is further configured to:

[0202] If the operation type indicates that the disconnector is being disconnected, the power grid accident risk level of the power system is determined to be zero.

[0203] In one possible implementation, the first determining module 402 is further configured to:

[0204] Get the list of devices connected to the disconnect switch;

[0205] If the equipment list includes busbar equipment but excludes voltage transformer equipment and high-voltage reactor equipment, and the disconnector is not grounded, then the disconnector is determined to be a busbar-side disconnector.

[0206] The risk assessment device for bus-side disconnector operation provided in this embodiment can execute the method provided in the above-described method embodiment. Its implementation principle and technical effect are similar, and will not be described in detail here.

[0207] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided in an embodiment of this application. Figure 5 As shown, the electronic device 50 provided in this embodiment includes at least one processor 501 and a memory 502. Optionally, the device 50 further includes a communication component 503. The processor 501, memory 502, and communication component 503 are connected via a bus 504.

[0208] In a specific implementation, at least one processor 501 executes computer execution instructions stored in memory 502, causing at least one processor 501 to perform the above-described method.

[0209] The specific implementation process of processor 501 can be found in the above method embodiments, and its implementation principle and technical effect are similar. It will not be repeated here.

[0210] In the above embodiments, it should be understood that the processor can be a Central Processing Unit (CPU), or other general-purpose processors, digital signal processors (DSPs), application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), etc. The general-purpose processor can be a microprocessor or any conventional processor. The steps of the method disclosed in this invention can be directly implemented by a hardware processor, or implemented by a combination of hardware and software modules within the processor.

[0211] The memory may include random access memory (RAM) and may also include non-volatile memory (NVM), such as at least one disk storage device.

[0212] The bus can be an Industry Standard Architecture (ISA) bus, a Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) bus, or an Extended Industry Standard Architecture (EISA) bus, etc. Buses can be categorized as address buses, data buses, control buses, etc. For ease of illustration, the buses shown in the accompanying drawings are not limited to a single bus or a single type of bus.

[0213] This application also provides a computer program product, including a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the above-described method.

[0214] This application also provides a computer-readable storage medium storing computer-executable instructions, which, when executed by a processor, implement the above-described method.

[0215] The aforementioned readable storage medium can be implemented by any type of volatile or non-volatile storage device or a combination thereof, such as static random access memory (SRAM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), programmable read-only memory (PROM), read-only memory (ROM), magnetic storage, flash memory, magnetic disk, or optical disk. The readable storage medium can be any available medium accessible to a general-purpose or special-purpose computer.

[0216] An exemplary readable storage medium is coupled to a processor, enabling the processor to read information from and write information to the readable storage medium. Of course, the readable storage medium can also be a component of the processor. The processor and the readable storage medium can reside in an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC). Alternatively, the processor and the readable storage medium can exist as discrete components in the device.

[0217] The division of units is merely a logical functional division; in actual implementation, there may be other division methods. For example, multiple units or components may be combined or integrated into another system, or some features may be ignored or not executed. Furthermore, the coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed may be indirect coupling or communication connection through some interfaces, devices, or units, and may be electrical, mechanical, or other forms.

[0218] The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate. The components shown as units may or may not be physical units; that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of the units can be selected to achieve the purpose of this embodiment according to actual needs.

[0219] In addition, the functional units in the various embodiments of the present invention can be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit can exist physically separately, or two or more units can be integrated into one unit.

[0220] If a function is implemented as a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of this invention, or the part that contributes to the prior art, or a part of the technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the methods of the various embodiments of this invention. The aforementioned storage medium includes various media capable of storing program code, such as USB flash drives, portable hard drives, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), magnetic disks, or optical disks.

[0221] Those skilled in the art will understand that all or part of the steps of the above-described method embodiments can be implemented by hardware related to program instructions. The aforementioned program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. When executed, the program performs the steps of the above-described method embodiments; and the aforementioned storage medium includes various media capable of storing program code, such as ROM, RAM, magnetic disks, or optical disks.

[0222] Finally, it should be noted that other embodiments of the invention will readily occur to those skilled in the art upon consideration of the specification and practice of the invention disclosed herein. This invention is intended to cover any variations, uses, or adaptations of the invention that follow the general principles of the invention and include common knowledge or customary techniques in the art not disclosed herein, and is not limited to the precise structures described above and shown in the accompanying drawings, and various modifications and changes can be made without departing from its scope. The scope of the invention is limited only by the appended claims.

Claims

1. A risk assessment method for busbar-side disconnector operation, characterized in that, include: If the disconnector in the power system is a bus-side disconnector, obtain the wiring type of the power system; Based on the wiring type, determine the operation type corresponding to the wiring type; Based on the wiring type and the operation type, determine the simulated fault equipment of the power system; Based on the simulated faulty equipment, the power grid accident risk level of the power system is determined.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of determining the operation type corresponding to the wiring type based on the wiring type includes: If the wiring type is a double busbar wiring, determine whether the operation type is whether the disconnector is performing a busbar switching operation or whether the disconnector is performing a closing operation; If the wiring type is 3 / 2 wiring or internal / external bridge wiring, the operation type is determined as whether the disconnector is closed.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of determining the simulated fault equipment of the power system based on the wiring type and the operation type includes: If the wiring type indicates that the power system adopts a double busbar connection, and the operation type indicates that the disconnector performs a hot busbar switching operation, then the simulated fault equipment of the power system is determined to be the two busbars connected to the disconnector. If the wiring type indicates that the power system adopts the double busbar wiring, and the operation type indicates that the disconnector has not performed a busbar switching operation and the disconnector has performed a closing operation, then the simulated fault device of the power system is determined to be the busbar connected to the disconnector. If the wiring type indicates that the power system adopts the double busbar wiring, and the operation type indicates that the disconnector performs a cold busbar switching operation or a closing operation, then the simulated fault device of the power system is determined to be the busbar connected to the disconnector.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that, The method further includes: If the wiring type indicates that the power system adopts a 3 / 2 wiring, and the operation type indicates that the disconnector performs a closing operation, then the simulated fault device of the power system is determined to be the bus connected to the disconnector.

5. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that, The method further includes: If the wiring type indicates that the power system adopts internal and external bridge wiring, the operation type indicates that the disconnector performs a closing operation, and the disconnector is a segmented disconnector, then the simulated fault equipment of the power system is determined to be the busbar and its segmented busbar connected to the disconnector; If the wiring type indicates that the power system adopts internal and external bridge wiring, and the operation type indicates that the disconnector performs a closing operation, and the disconnector is not a segmented disconnector, then the simulated fault equipment of the power system is determined to be the line and main transformer connected to the disconnector.

6. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that, The step of determining the power grid accident risk level of the power system based on the simulated fault equipment includes: Based on the simulated faulty equipment, determine the number of power plants and stations that experienced pressure loss due to the simulated faulty equipment; Based on preset risk level judgment criteria, the power grid accident risk level of the power system is determined according to the number of power plants that have lost power.

7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that, The method of determining the power grid accident risk level of the power system based on the preset risk level judgment criteria and the number of power plants experiencing power outages includes: If the number of power plants experiencing power outages is less than or equal to the threshold for power plants experiencing power outages in the risk level assessment criteria, then the power grid accident risk level is determined to be low risk. If the number of power plants experiencing power outages exceeds the power plant outage threshold, then the power grid accident risk level is determined to be high risk.

8. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that, The method further includes: If the operation type indicates that the disconnector is disconnected, the power grid accident risk level of the power system is determined to be zero.

9. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that, Prior to obtaining the wiring type of the power system, the method further includes: Obtain the list of devices connected to the disconnect switch; If the equipment list includes busbar equipment but does not include voltage transformer equipment or high-resistance equipment, and the disconnector is not grounded, then the disconnector is determined to be the busbar-side disconnector.

10. A risk assessment device for busbar-side disconnector operation, characterized in that, include: The acquisition module is used to acquire the wiring type of the power system if the disconnector in the power system is a bus-side disconnector; The first determining module is used to determine the operation type corresponding to the wiring type based on the wiring type; The second determining module is used to determine the simulated fault device of the power system based on the wiring type and the operation type; The third determining module is used to determine the power grid accident risk level of the power system based on the simulated fault equipment.

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