A method and device for classifying safety conditions of a thermal power plant building structure

Abstract

The application relates to the technical field of thermal power plant building structure safety, and discloses a thermal power plant building structure safety condition classification method and device. The method comprises the following steps: obtaining structure information and component apparent damage information of a thermal power plant building structure; generating component nodes corresponding to load-bearing components and regional nodes corresponding to structure systems or functional regions based on the structure information; determining a force transmission path according to the load transmission relationship between the load-bearing components, taking regional node failure as a top event and component node failure as a bottom event, and determining the failure logic relationship corresponding to the force transmission path; constructing a force transmission tree model based on the component nodes, the regional nodes, the force transmission path and the failure logic relationship; mapping the component apparent damage information to the component nodes and quantifying the component apparent damage information into damage indexes; determining an influence weight according to the hierarchical position of the component nodes, the force transmission path and the failure logic relationship, calculating a regional safety condition index, and determining a regional safety condition category. The application can improve the accuracy and traceability of the safety condition classification of the thermal power plant building structure.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of safety technology for thermal power plant buildings and structures, specifically to a method and apparatus for classifying the safety status of thermal power plant buildings and structures. Background Technology

[0002] Thermal power, as the cornerstone of electricity supply, is directly related to energy security and the economic lifeline through its safe and stable operation. Modern thermal power plants are becoming increasingly large in scale and structurally complex. These structures, including the main plant, chimneys, cooling towers, and coal conveyor bridges, serve as the physical carriers of electricity production. Their safety is crucial in every stage of power plant planning, design, construction, operation, and even decommissioning, forming the fundamental guarantee for safe electricity production. It is worth noting that thermal power plant structures differ from traditional industrial buildings. They not only need to withstand conventional loads but also face long-term challenges such as vibration, high temperatures, and corrosion. Safety risks in thermal power plants are characterized by their hidden, cumulative, and sudden nature.

[0003] The construction and operation of thermal power plants are highly complex and unique, and their structures face severe safety challenges under the combined influence of various extreme operating conditions. According to power industry safety statistics, in recent years, structural safety hazards and even accidents caused by design flaws, construction quality issues, material aging, fatigue damage, and environmental erosion have occurred frequently. These not only risk unplanned generator outages and significant economic losses but also threaten the lives of operating personnel and the stable supply of the regional power grid. For example, the main plant structure may develop fatigue cracks under long-term vibration, and the chimney's anti-corrosion layer is prone to damage in high-temperature, corrosive flue gas environments. These microscopic damages accumulate gradually and may eventually lead to macroscopic structural defects.

[0004] Currently, the safety management of thermal power plant buildings and structures still faces a significant problem of insufficient systematization. Most enterprises' safety management models remain fragmented and phased. During the infrastructure construction phase, safety control is often limited to immediate safety during construction, lacking a holistic consideration of the building's entire life cycle. During operation and maintenance, management measures tend to be reactive, failing to establish a closed-loop management chain from initial design to final disposal. This fragmented management model leads to inconsistent technical standards, information gaps, and unclear responsibility boundaries, making it difficult to form a systematic safety defense.

[0005] Traditional safety management systems have significant shortcomings in terms of systematicness, foresight, and refinement. On the one hand, current management models rely excessively on personnel experience and discrete inspections, lacking data-driven scientific decision support. On the other hand, safety control measures are mostly reactive and passive responses rather than proactive preventative interventions. Simultaneously, management departments generally prioritize equipment safety while paying relatively insufficient attention to the structural safety of thermal power plant buildings, making structural safety a weak link in the power plant safety management system. Particularly during the transfer from infrastructure to production, critical information regarding thermal power plant buildings is severely lost, resulting in a lack of sufficient technical basis for subsequent operation and maintenance, significantly increasing safety risks.

[0006] The life-cycle theory provides a systematic approach and methodology for solving the safety problems of thermal power plant structures. Originating from systems engineering concepts, this theory emphasizes constructing a comprehensive safety assurance system that spans the entire process, encompassing both the time dimension (planning, design, construction, operation, and decommissioning) and the element dimension (human, machine, environment, and management). Applying life-cycle management in the field of thermal power engineering means treating the safety of thermal power plant structures as a dynamic and continuous systems engineering project. By establishing forward-looking and backward-looking technical standards and management processes, it ensures that the entire process from the construction to decommissioning of the building is under control.

[0007] The application of a full-cycle safety technology system in the management of thermal power plant structures has multi-dimensional value. At the safety level, it achieves a fundamental shift from passive response to proactive prevention through source control and process management. At the economic level, it can reduce maintenance costs and accident losses throughout the entire life cycle, improving the overall economic efficiency of the power plant. At the management level, it leverages standardized and process-oriented methods to break down information barriers between departments and stages, forming a collaborative and efficient management mechanism.

[0008] In conclusion, constructing a full-lifecycle safety technology system for thermal power plant structures has become an inevitable choice and an urgent task for improving the safety management level of the power industry. This system not only focuses on solving the specific safety problems currently facing thermal power plant structures, but also strives to establish a sustainable and scalable safety management model to adapt to the higher requirements of the power system for safe production in the new era. By deeply integrating the full life-cycle concept with modern information technology, and creating a technical standards and management system covering the entire process of thermal power plant structures, the overall safety level of thermal power plants can be improved, providing a solid guarantee for the sustainable development of the energy and power industry. Summary of the Invention

[0009] To address the problem that existing safety status assessment processes for thermal power plant buildings and structures lack clear force transmission path and failure logic connections between apparent damage to local components and the overall structural safety status, leading to reliance on manual experience and insufficient accuracy in safety status classification, this application provides a method and apparatus for classifying the safety status of thermal power plant buildings and structures. This method abstracts load-bearing components, structural systems, or functional areas into nodes, and constructs a force transmission tree model based on load transfer relationships and fault tree analysis theory. This allows component damage information to be mapped to the regional safety status along the force transmission path and failure logic, thereby improving the accuracy and traceability of regional safety status classification for thermal power plant buildings and structures.

[0010] Firstly, this application provides a method for classifying the safety status of thermal power plant buildings and structures, including: Obtain structural information and apparent damage information of components of thermal power plant buildings; Based on the structural information, load-bearing components and structural systems or functional areas in the thermal power plant buildings are identified, and component nodes corresponding to the load-bearing components and area nodes corresponding to the structural systems or functional areas are generated respectively. Based on the load transfer relationship between the load-bearing components, determine the force transmission paths between the component nodes and between the component nodes and the area nodes; Using the failure of the regional node as the top event and the failure of the component node as the bottom event, the failure logic relationship corresponding to the force transmission path is determined by fault tree analysis theory; wherein, the failure logic relationship includes OR gate logic and AND gate logic, the OR gate logic indicates that the failure of a single component node leads to the failure of the corresponding regional node, and the AND gate logic indicates that the simultaneous failure of multiple component nodes leads to the failure of the corresponding regional node. A force transmission tree model is constructed based on the component nodes, the region nodes, the force transmission path, and the failure logic relationship. The apparent damage information of the component is mapped to the corresponding component node in the force transmission tree model, and the apparent damage information of the component is quantified to obtain the damage index of the corresponding component node. Based on the hierarchical position of the component node in the force transmission tree model, its force transmission path, and failure logic relationship, determine the influence weight of the component node on the corresponding region node; The regional safety status index is calculated based on the influence weight and the damage index, and the regional safety status category of the thermal power plant buildings is determined according to the regional safety status index.

[0011] Through the above technical solution, this application does not only evaluate component damage in isolation, but classifies and judges component damage within the force transmission path and failure logic relationship of thermal power plant buildings and structures. This allows the degree of damage to component nodes, structural importance, and failure transmission relationship to jointly participate in the classification of regional safety status, which is conducive to improving the consistency between the classification results and the actual structural safety status.

[0012] Furthermore, the structural information includes at least one of design drawings, as-built documentation, on-site inspection data, and historical maintenance records. The component surface damage information includes at least one of on-site inspection records, surface damage images, deformation monitoring data, and vibration monitoring data.

[0013] Furthermore, the apparent damage information of the component is acquired using at least one of the following devices: a three-dimensional laser scanning system, a UAV oblique photography system, a crack width measuring instrument, and a vibration sensor. By processing the acquired apparent condition data, at least one of the following is extracted: crack width, crack distribution, concrete spalling area, steel corrosion degree, component deformation, vibration frequency, and vibration amplitude, thereby obtaining structured apparent damage information of the component.

[0014] Furthermore, determining the force transmission path includes: parsing the component geometry, material properties, connection methods, and support relationships in the structural information; determining the parent-child relationship between adjacent component nodes based on the direction of load transfer from the load-bearing component to the supporting component or foundation component; and associating multiple component nodes in the same structural system or functional area with corresponding area nodes based on the parent-child relationship to form the force transmission path.

[0015] Furthermore, determining the failure logic relationship includes: when the failure of any component node will cause the corresponding area node to fail, or when the failure of any component node will block the main force transmission path of the corresponding area node, the failure logic relationship between the component node and the corresponding area node is determined as an OR gate logic; when multiple component nodes are in a redundant force transmission path, and the failure of the corresponding area node is caused only when the multiple component nodes fail simultaneously, the failure logic relationship between the multiple component nodes and the corresponding area node is determined as an AND gate logic.

[0016] Furthermore, the influence weights are determined based on the hierarchical position of the component node in the force transmission tree model, its corresponding force transmission path, and its failure logic relationship. Specifically, based on the hierarchical position of the component node in the force transmission tree model, the hierarchical influence factor of the component node is determined; based on whether the force transmission path in which the component node is located is a main force transmission path or a branch force transmission path, the path influence factor of the component node is determined; based on whether the failure logic relationship corresponding to the component node is OR gate logic or AND gate logic, the failure logic influence factor of the component node is determined; and then, based on the hierarchical influence factor, path influence factor, and failure logic influence factor, the influence weights are determined using the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) or fuzzy comprehensive evaluation method.

[0017] Furthermore, the regional security status index is calculated using the following formula: S = Σ (Wi' × Di) Where S is the regional security status index, Di is the damage index of the i-th component node, and Wi' is the corrected influence weight of the i-th component node; when there is no coupling effect, Wi' is the influence weight of the i-th component node; when there is a coupling effect, Wi' is the influence weight corrected based on the coupling effect.

[0018] Furthermore, when the apparent damage information of the same component node or multiple component nodes connected through the failure logic relationship contains multiple damage types, the coupling effect between the multiple damage types is determined based on the failure logic relationship; the quantified value of the coupling effect is used as a correction factor to perform multiplicative or additive correction on the influence weight to obtain the corrected influence weight. The coupling effect includes the joint blocking effect of the damage types of multiple component nodes located on the same force transmission path on the force transmission path, and / or the superimposed weakening effect of multiple damage types on the component bearing capacity.

[0019] Furthermore, the method also includes: assessing the structural reliability of the regional nodes based on the failure logic relationship in the force transmission tree model to obtain the reliability index of the corresponding regional nodes; and determining the inspection cycle, periodic inspection content, and maintenance strategy of the corresponding region according to the regional safety status category and the reliability index.

[0020] Furthermore, the method also includes: generating an assessment report containing the regional safety status category, regional safety status index, reliability index, key damaged component information, and maintenance strategy; when the updated component apparent damage information of the thermal power plant buildings is obtained, mapping the updated component apparent damage information to the corresponding component nodes in the force transmission tree model, and updating the failure logic relationship and / or regional safety status category in the force transmission tree model based on the updated damage index.

[0021] Secondly, this application provides a safety condition classification device for thermal power plant buildings and structures, comprising: The acquisition module is used to acquire structural information and component surface damage information of thermal power plant buildings and structures. The node generation module is used to identify load-bearing components and structural systems or functional areas in the thermal power plant buildings based on the structural information, and generate component nodes corresponding to the load-bearing components and area nodes corresponding to the structural systems or functional areas respectively. The force transmission path determination module is used to determine the force transmission paths between the component nodes and between the component nodes and the area nodes based on the load transfer relationship between the load-bearing components. The failure logic determination module is used to determine the failure logic relationship corresponding to the force transmission path by taking the failure of the regional node as the top event and the failure of the component node as the bottom event, and using fault tree analysis theory. The model building module is used to construct a force transmission tree model based on the component nodes, the region nodes, the force transmission path, and the failure logic relationship; The damage quantification module is used to map the apparent damage information of the component to the corresponding component node in the force transmission tree model, and to quantify the apparent damage information of the component to obtain the damage index of the corresponding component node. The weight determination module is used to determine the influence weight of the component node on the corresponding region node based on the hierarchical position of the component node in the force transmission tree model, the force transmission path it is located in, and the failure logic relationship. The classification module is used to calculate the regional safety status index based on the influence weight and the damage index, and to determine the regional safety status category of the thermal power plant buildings and structures according to the regional safety status index.

[0022] Thirdly, this application provides an electronic device, including a processor, a memory, and a computer program stored in the memory and capable of running on the processor, wherein the processor executes the computer program to implement the above-mentioned method for classifying the safety status of thermal power plant structures.

[0023] Fourthly, this application provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the above-described method for classifying the safety status of thermal power plant structures.

[0024] This application has at least the following beneficial effects: This application establishes a structured relationship between the apparent damage of local components of thermal power plant buildings and the overall safety status of the region by constructing a force transmission tree model that includes component nodes, regional nodes, force transmission paths and failure logic relationships. This avoids the classification bias caused by relying solely on the degree of damage of a single component or human experience in traditional assessment methods.

[0025] This application determines the influence weight based on the hierarchical position of component nodes in the force transmission tree model, the force transmission path they are located in, and the failure logic relationship. This makes component nodes located in the main force transmission path, in critical hierarchical positions, or with single-point failure risk have a higher degree of influence in the regional safety status classification, thereby making the classification results more consistent with the actual stress and failure laws of thermal power plant buildings and structures.

[0026] This application introduces damage index and coupling effect correction when calculating regional safety status indicators, which can identify the superimposed weakening effect between multiple damage types of the same component, as well as the joint blocking effect of damage to related components on the force transmission path, thereby reducing the probability of underestimating the risk of multiple defects coupling.

[0027] This application can further combine regional safety status categories and reliability indicators to generate inspection cycles, periodic inspection contents and maintenance strategies, realizing closed-loop management from safety status classification to operation and maintenance decisions, and is applicable to the whole life cycle safety management scenario of thermal power plant buildings and structures. Attached Figure Description

[0028] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating the method for classifying the safety status of thermal power plant buildings and structures according to an embodiment of this application; Figure 2 This is a structural block diagram of the safety status classification device for thermal power plant buildings provided in the embodiments of this application; Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the force transmission tree model structure provided in the embodiments of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0029] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of this application clearer, the technical solutions in the embodiments of this application will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some, not all, of the embodiments of this application. All other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art based on the embodiments of this application without creative effort are within the scope of protection of this application.

[0030] Unless otherwise defined, all technical and scientific terms used herein have the same meaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which this application belongs. The terminology used herein is for the purpose of describing particular embodiments only and is not intended to be limiting of the application.

[0031] Example 1 like Figure 1 As shown, this embodiment provides a method for classifying the safety status of thermal power plant buildings and structures. This method is used to determine the regional safety status category of thermal power plant buildings and structures based on structural information and apparent damage information of components, combined with the force transmission relationship between load-bearing components within the buildings and structures and the impact logic of component failure on regional failure.

[0032] In this embodiment, the thermal power plant buildings and structures may include the main plant building, chimney, cooling tower, coal conveyor bridge, turbine foundation, coal bunker, deaerator room, and other buildings and structures used for thermal power production, transmission, support, or auxiliary operation. The area safety status category can be intact, slightly damaged, severely damaged, or hazardous, or it can be classified into Level 1, Level 2, Level 3, Level 4, etc., according to the thermal power plant building and structure operation and maintenance specifications or internal enterprise standards.

[0033] The method in this embodiment includes the following steps: Step S100: Obtain structural information and apparent damage information of components of the thermal power plant buildings.

[0034] Structural information is used to characterize the structural composition, component connection relationships, and load transfer foundation of thermal power plant buildings. Structural information can include at least one of the following: design drawings, as-built documentation, on-site inspection data, and historical maintenance records. Specifically, design drawings can include architectural construction drawings, structural construction drawings, node details, component reinforcement drawings, and steel structure connection details; as-built documentation can include the actual dimensions of components after construction, material strength, connection methods, and change records; on-site inspection data can include the measured cross-sectional dimensions of components, component material strength, component deformation data, and component connection status data; historical maintenance records can include information on component repairs, replacements, reinforcements, crack treatments, anti-corrosion treatments, and conclusions of previous inspections.

[0035] Component apparent damage information is used to characterize the current or historical damage status of various components in thermal power plant structures. Component apparent damage information may include at least one of the following: on-site inspection records, apparent damage images, deformation monitoring data, and vibration monitoring data. Damage types in component apparent damage information may include cracks, spalling, corrosion, deformation, settlement, tilting, loose connections, fatigue damage, and abnormal vibration.

[0036] In one implementation, a 3D laser scanning system is used to acquire 3D point cloud data of the power plant's structures, and the deformation, tilt, or geometric deviation of the components is extracted based on the point cloud data. An unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) oblique photography system is used to acquire images of apparent damage in high-altitude areas of chimneys, cooling towers, coal conveyor bridges, or main plant buildings, and crack distribution, spalling area, or corrosion area are extracted based on image recognition methods. Crack widths in the components are acquired using a crack width gauge. Vibration sensors are used to acquire the vibration frequency, amplitude, or spectral changes of the components. After data cleaning, registration, identification, normalization, or structuring, the apparent damage information of the components corresponding to them is obtained.

[0037] Step S200: Based on structural information, identify load-bearing components and structural systems or functional areas in the thermal power plant buildings and generate component nodes and area nodes respectively.

[0038] Component nodes correspond to load-bearing components in the buildings and structures of a thermal power plant. Load-bearing components may include beams, columns, slabs, roof trusses, supports, foundations, shear walls, steel trusses, supports, connection nodes, etc. Area nodes correspond to structural systems or functional areas in the buildings and structures of a thermal power plant. Structural systems may include frame structures, truss structures, floor systems, roof systems, support systems, foundation systems, etc.; functional areas may include the main plant area, deaerator area, coal bunker area, turbine base area, coal conveyor bridge area, etc.

[0039] When generating nodes, a unique component node identifier can be generated for each load-bearing component based on the component number, axis position, floor information, component type, structural system to which the component belongs, or functional zone to which the component belongs. A unique area node identifier can also be generated for each structural system or functional zone. For example, for the frame column at the intersection of axis A and axis 3 in the main plant, component node C-A3 can be generated; for the deaerator area, area node R-CYJ can be generated.

[0040] Step S300: Based on the load transfer relationship between load-bearing components, determine the force transmission paths between component nodes and between component nodes and area nodes.

[0041] Specifically, the structural information is analyzed, including the component geometry, material properties, connection methods, and support relationships. Based on the load transfer direction from the load-bearing components to the supporting or foundation components, the parent-child relationship between adjacent component nodes is determined. For floor structures, loads can be transferred sequentially from the floor slab to the secondary beams, from the secondary beams to the main beams, from the main beams to the columns, and from the columns to the foundation. For roof structures, loads can be transferred from the roof panels to the purlins, from the purlins to the roof trusses, and from the roof trusses to the columns or support system. For coal conveying trestle bridges, loads can be transferred from the bridge deck or coal conveying equipment supports to the longitudinal beams, transverse beams, trusses, or piers.

[0042] After determining the parent-child relationship between adjacent component nodes, multiple component nodes within the same structural system or functional area are associated with corresponding area nodes, forming a force transmission path from the component node to the area node. The force transmission path not only reflects the physical connection relationship between components, but also reflects the potential transmission path of component damage to the safety status of the corresponding area node.

[0043] Step S400: Using the failure of regional nodes as the top event and the failure of component nodes as the bottom event, the failure logic relationship corresponding to the force transmission path is determined using fault tree analysis theory.

[0044] Regional node failure refers to a structural system or functional area failing to meet safety requirements, load-bearing capacity requirements, or normal operation requirements. Component node failure refers to the failure of the corresponding load-bearing component to meet requirements in terms of load-bearing capacity, stiffness, or stability due to cracks, spalling, corrosion, deformation, fatigue, or connection failure.

[0045] In one implementation, when the failure of any component node leads to the failure of the corresponding area node, or when the failure of any component node blocks the main force transmission path of the corresponding area node, the failure logic relationship between the component node and the corresponding area node is determined as an OR gate logic. For example, if a main load-bearing column is located on the main force transmission path, its failure will directly cause the superstructure to lose support. In this case, the component node corresponding to the main load-bearing column and the area node can be determined as an OR gate logic.

[0046] In another implementation, when multiple component nodes are in redundant force transmission paths, and the failure of the corresponding area node only occurs when multiple component nodes fail simultaneously, the failure logic relationship between the multiple component nodes and the corresponding area node is determined as an AND gate logic. For example, in a floor system of a certain area, the load is shared by multiple beams. After the failure of a single secondary beam, the load can be redistributed through adjacent beams. Only when multiple beams fail simultaneously will the floor area fail. Therefore, the relationship between the multiple beam component nodes and the area node can be determined as an AND gate logic.

[0047] Step S500: Construct a force transmission tree model based on component nodes, region nodes, force transmission paths, and failure logic relationships.

[0048] like Figure 3 As shown, the force transmission tree model includes component nodes, region nodes, and the connections between nodes. The connections between nodes include force transmission paths and failure logic relationships. The force transmission tree model unifies the expression of physical components, structural systems or functional areas, load transmission paths, and the logical relationships between component failures and region failures in thermal power plant buildings, enabling subsequent damage information to be located, quantified, and transmitted within this model.

[0049] In the force transmission tree model, region nodes can be considered upper-level nodes, and component nodes can be considered lower-level nodes. Critical component nodes located on the main force transmission path can have a higher level of influence, while component nodes located on branch force transmission paths or non-critical force transmission paths can have a lower level of influence. The force transmission tree model can be stored in a tree-like topology structure, or in the form of a node table, edge table, and logic gate table.

[0050] Step S600: Map the apparent damage information of the component to the corresponding component node in the force transmission tree model, and quantify the apparent damage information of the component to obtain the damage index of the corresponding component node.

[0051] Specifically, based on the component number, location coordinates, axis information, floor information, or image recognition positioning results from the component's apparent damage information, the damage information is matched with the corresponding component nodes in the force transmission tree model. After matching, the degree of damage is quantified to obtain a damage index. The damage index can be a normalized value, for example, ranging from 0 to 1, where a larger value indicates a more severe degree of damage.

[0052] For example, for crack damage, the crack damage index can be calculated based on crack width, crack length, number of cracks, and crack distribution density; for corrosion damage, the corrosion damage index can be calculated based on corrosion area, corrosion depth, or cross-sectional loss rate; for deformation damage, the deformation damage index can be calculated based on deflection, tilt, or settlement; and for abnormal vibration, the vibration damage index can be calculated based on vibration frequency change rate, vibration amplitude, or dynamic characteristic changes.

[0053] Step S700: Determine the influence weight of the component node on the corresponding region node based on the hierarchical position of the component node in the force transmission tree model, the force transmission path it is located in, and the failure logic relationship.

[0054] Specifically, the hierarchical influence factor of a component node is determined based on its hierarchical position in the force transmission tree model. Component nodes located in the main hierarchy, close to regional nodes, or bearing the load of the superstructure can have a higher hierarchical influence factor; component nodes located in the terminal branches or in local functional components can have a lower hierarchical influence factor.

[0055] The path influence factor of a component node is determined based on whether its force transmission path is a main force transmission path or a branch force transmission path. Component nodes located on the main force transmission path can have a higher path influence factor; component nodes located on branch force transmission paths or with alternative force transmission paths can have a lower path influence factor.

[0056] Based on the failure logic relationships corresponding to component nodes being OR gate logic or AND gate logic, the failure logic influence factor of component nodes is determined. Component nodes corresponding to OR gate logic can have a higher failure logic influence factor because their failure may directly lead to the failure of regional nodes; component nodes corresponding to AND gate logic can have a relatively lower failure logic influence factor due to the existence of redundant force transmission relationships.

[0057] After determining the hierarchical influence factor, path influence factor, and failure logic influence factor, the influence weight of component nodes on corresponding regional nodes can be determined using the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) or fuzzy comprehensive evaluation method.

[0058] In one specific implementation, the hierarchical influence factor, path influence factor, and failure logic influence factor are denoted as Ai, Bi, and Ci, respectively. For component nodes close to region nodes and located in the main hierarchy, Ai takes a larger value; for component nodes located in terminal branches, Ai takes a smaller value. For component nodes located on the main force transmission path, Bi takes a larger value; for component nodes located on branch force transmission paths, Bi takes a smaller value. For component nodes corresponding to OR gate logic, Ci takes a larger value; for component nodes corresponding to AND gate logic, Ci takes a smaller value.

[0059] A judgment matrix can be constructed based on Ai, Bi, and Ci. The weight vector of each component node can be calculated using the analytic hierarchy process (AHP). The weight vector can then be normalized to obtain the influence weight Wi of each component node on the corresponding region node.

[0060] Step S800: Calculate the regional safety status index based on the impact weight and damage index, and determine the regional safety status category of the thermal power plant buildings and structures based on the regional safety status index.

[0061] In one implementation, the regional security status index is calculated using the following formula: S = Σ (Wi' × Di) Where S is the regional security status index, Di is the damage index of the i-th component node, and Wi' is the corrected influence weight of the i-th component node. When there is no coupling effect, Wi' is the influence weight of the i-th component node; when there is a coupling effect, Wi' is the influence weight corrected based on the coupling effect.

[0062] After calculating the regional safety status index, the index is matched with preset threshold ranges to determine the corresponding regional safety status category. For example, when S is less than the first threshold, the corresponding area is determined to be intact; when S is greater than or equal to the first threshold and less than the second threshold, the corresponding area is determined to be slightly damaged; when S is greater than or equal to the second threshold and less than the third threshold, the corresponding area is determined to be severely damaged; and when S is greater than or equal to the third threshold, the corresponding area is determined to be dangerous. These thresholds can be set based on the type of thermal power plant buildings, structural design standards, operation and maintenance specifications, or historical monitoring data.

[0063] Through the above steps, this embodiment can transform local component damage information into regional safety status categories associated with structural force transmission paths and failure logic, thereby improving the objectivity and accuracy of safety status classification for thermal power plant buildings and structures.

[0064] Example 2 This embodiment is a further improvement on Embodiment 1. This embodiment is used to address the problem that simply using damage index weighting calculation may underestimate the regional safety risk when there are multiple damage types in the same component node or related component nodes.

[0065] When the apparent damage information of the same component node or multiple component nodes connected by failure logic relationships contains multiple damage types, the coupling effect between multiple damage types is determined based on the failure logic relationships in the force transmission tree model.

[0066] In one implementation, for multiple component nodes located on the same force transmission path, if all component nodes have damage types that weaken or block the force transmission path, then a combined blocking effect is determined to exist. For example, if a main beam node and a secondary beam node are on the same force transmission path, and the main beam node has crack damage while the secondary beam node has large deflection deformation, the combination of the two may significantly reduce the load-bearing capacity of the force transmission path, in which case a combined blocking effect can be determined.

[0067] In another implementation, if multiple damage types exist simultaneously in the same component node, a cumulative weakening effect is determined. For example, if a steel column has both corrosion and fatigue cracks, corrosion reduces the cross-sectional area, and fatigue cracks reduce the component's fatigue resistance and ductility. The combined effect of these two damage types will cause a greater reduction in the component's load-bearing capacity than a single damage type, thus confirming a cumulative weakening effect.

[0068] After determining the coupling effect, the quantified value of the coupling effect is used as a correction factor to perform multiplicative or additive correction on the influence weights, thus obtaining the corrected influence weights.

[0069] When using multiplicative correction, the corrected influence weight can be expressed as: Wi' = Wi × (1 + α) Where Wi' is the corrected influence weight of the i-th component node, Wi is the influence weight of the i-th component node, and α is the coupling effect correction factor. α can be determined based on the combination of damage types, damage severity, importance of the force transmission path, or historical detection data.

[0070] When using additive correction, the corrected impact weight can be expressed as: Wi'=Wi+β Here, β is an additional correction for the coupling effect. β can be determined based on the superposition relationship or joint blocking relationship between multiple damage types.

[0071] In one specific implementation, the coupling effect correction factor α is determined based on the number of damage types, the degree of damage, and the importance of the force transmission path. If the same component node has two damage types, and each damage index is less than a preset severe damage threshold, then α takes a first correction value; if the same component node has more than two damage types, or at least one damage index is greater than or equal to the preset severe damage threshold, then α takes a second correction value, wherein the second correction value is greater than the first correction value. For example, α is 0.1-0.5.

[0072] For multiple component nodes located on the same main force transmission path, when the damage index of multiple component nodes is greater than the preset path blocking threshold, it is determined that there is a joint blocking effect, and α is increased to the third correction value.

[0073] When using additive correction, β can be determined based on the sum of damage indices, the number of damage types, or the importance of the force transmission path.

[0074] Through the above-mentioned coupling effect correction, this embodiment can enable component nodes under the combined action of multiple defects to obtain a more reasonable degree of influence in the regional safety status classification, thereby reducing the probability of underestimating structural safety risks.

[0075] Example 3 This embodiment is a further improvement based on Embodiment 1 or Embodiment 2. This embodiment is used to generate inspection cycles, periodic inspection contents, and maintenance strategies by further combining structural reliability indicators after determining the regional safety status category.

[0076] Specifically, based on the failure logic relationships in the force tree model, structural reliability assessment is performed on regional nodes to obtain the reliability index of the corresponding regional nodes. The reliability index is used to quantify the safety margin of the corresponding regional nodes.

[0077] In one implementation, when the failure logic corresponding to the regional node is an OR gate logic, the failure of any critical component node may lead to the failure of the regional node. Therefore, the reliability index of the regional node can be determined based on the lowest reliability or failure probability combination among multiple critical component nodes. When the failure logic corresponding to the regional node is an AND gate logic, the failure of multiple component nodes must occur simultaneously to cause the regional node to fail. Therefore, the reliability index of the regional node can be determined based on the joint reliability or joint failure probability of multiple component nodes.

[0078] After obtaining the regional security status category and reliability index, the corresponding inspection cycle, periodic inspection content, and maintenance strategy are determined based on these criteria. Specifically, the worse the security status indicated by the regional security status category, or the lower the reliability index, the shorter the corresponding inspection cycle, the more detailed the periodic inspection content, and the more proactive the maintenance strategy.

[0079] For example, when the safety status of a certain area is classified as hazardous, or the reliability index is lower than the preset reliability threshold, the inspection cycle for that area is set to a shorter cycle, and the maintenance strategy is determined to be priority repair, reinforcement, restricted use, or shutdown for inspection. When the safety status of a certain area is classified as severely damaged but the reliability index is still higher than the preset reliability threshold, the maintenance strategy can be determined to be key monitoring, special inspection, or time-limited repair. When the safety status of a certain area is classified as intact or slightly damaged, the maintenance strategy can be determined to be routine maintenance or continued monitoring.

[0080] Furthermore, an assessment report is generated that includes regional safety status categories, regional safety status indicators, reliability indicators, information on critical damaged components, and maintenance strategies. The assessment report can be output in the form of tables, graphs, force tree models, regional risk distribution maps, or text descriptions. The assessment report is used to guide the development of inspection cycles for thermal power plant buildings and structures, the arrangement of periodic inspection projects, the formulation of maintenance and reinforcement plans, and the management of safety throughout the entire life cycle.

[0081] In one specific implementation, the reliability index of a component node can be obtained by converting the component node's damage index Di. For example, the failure probability P of a component node... fi The failure probability P of regional nodes can be determined based on the damage index Di, the importance of the component, and historical failure statistics. fR Calculated based on the corresponding failure logic relationship.

[0082] When a region node corresponds to an OR gate logic, the failure probability P of the region node is... fR The failure probability P of each critical component node can be determined based on the union of the failure probabilities of each node; when a region node corresponds to an AND gate logic, the failure probability P of the region node is... fRIt can be determined based on the intersection of the failure probabilities of multiple component nodes.

[0083] After obtaining the regional node failure probability P fR Then, it can be converted into a reliability index β according to reliability theory. The smaller the β, the lower the regional safety margin.

[0084] Example 4 This embodiment is a further improvement based on any one of Embodiments 1 to 3. This embodiment is used to enable the force tree model to be updated as the damage state of thermal power plant structures changes.

[0085] When updated component apparent damage information of thermal power plant buildings is obtained, the updated component apparent damage information is mapped to the corresponding component nodes in the force transmission tree model, and the failure logic relationship and / or area safety status category in the force transmission tree model are updated based on the updated damage index.

[0086] For example, when the crack width of a component node expands from a smaller width in the first detection cycle to a larger width in the second detection cycle, the damage index of the component node is recalculated, and the regional safety status index of the corresponding regional node is recalculated based on the updated damage index. If the updated damage index indicates that the component node has developed from general damage to severe damage that may block the main force transmission path, the failure logic relationship between the component node and the regional node can be adjusted from AND gate logic to OR gate logic.

[0087] For example, if the damage index of a component node decreases after repair or reinforcement, the damage index of that component node can be updated based on the re-inspection data, and the regional safety status index and regional safety status category can be recalculated. Through the above dynamic update mechanism, the force tree model can be adjusted as the detection data changes, ensuring that the classification results are consistent with the actual safety status of the thermal power plant's buildings and structures.

[0088] Example 5 like Figure 2 As shown, this embodiment provides a safety condition classification device for thermal power plant buildings and structures. This device is used to execute the safety condition classification method for thermal power plant buildings and structures described in any of the above embodiments. The device includes an acquisition module, a node generation module, a force transmission path determination module, a failure logic determination module, a model construction module, a damage quantification module, a weight determination module, and a classification module.

[0089] The acquisition module is used to acquire structural information and component surface damage information of thermal power plant buildings and structures. Structural information may include at least one of design drawings, as-built documentation, on-site inspection data, and historical maintenance records; component surface damage information may include at least one of on-site inspection records, surface damage images, deformation monitoring data, and vibration monitoring data. The acquisition module can obtain relevant information through communication interfaces, data acquisition interfaces, database interfaces, or file reading interfaces.

[0090] The node generation module is used to identify load-bearing components and structural systems or functional areas in the buildings of thermal power plants based on structural information, and generate component nodes corresponding to the load-bearing components and area nodes corresponding to the structural systems or functional areas.

[0091] The load transfer path determination module is used to determine the load transfer paths between component nodes and between component nodes and area nodes based on the load transfer relationships between load-bearing components. This module can parse the component geometry, material properties, connection methods, and support relationships from the structural information, and determine the parent-child relationships between adjacent component nodes based on the load transfer direction.

[0092] The failure logic determination module uses fault tree analysis theory to determine the failure logic relationships corresponding to the force transmission path, with regional node failure as the top event and component node failure as the bottom event. The failure logic relationships include OR gate logic and AND gate logic.

[0093] The model building module is used to construct a force transmission tree model based on component nodes, region nodes, force transmission paths, and failure logic relationships. The force transmission tree model can be stored using a tree topology, graph structure, node relationship table, or database structure.

[0094] The damage quantification module is used to map the apparent damage information of components to the corresponding component nodes in the force transmission tree model, and to quantify the apparent damage information of components to obtain the damage index of the corresponding component nodes.

[0095] The weight determination module is used to determine the influence weight of a component node on the corresponding region node based on the component node's hierarchical position in the force transmission tree model, its force transmission path, and its failure logic relationship. The weight determination module can also adjust the influence weight based on coupling effects when they exist.

[0096] The classification module is used to calculate regional safety status indicators based on impact weights and damage indices, and to determine the regional safety status category of thermal power plant buildings and structures based on the regional safety status indicators.

[0097] In one embodiment, the device further includes a reliability assessment module, a strategy generation module, a report generation module, and a model update module. The reliability assessment module assesses the structural reliability of regional nodes based on the failure logic relationships in the force transmission tree model, obtaining the reliability index of the corresponding regional nodes. The strategy generation module determines the inspection cycle, periodic inspection content, and maintenance strategy for the corresponding region based on the regional safety status category and reliability index. The report generation module generates an assessment report containing the regional safety status category, regional safety status index, reliability index, information on key damaged components, and maintenance strategies. The model update module updates the damage index, failure logic relationships, and / or regional safety status category in the force transmission tree model when updated component apparent damage information is obtained.

[0098] Each module in this embodiment can be implemented by hardware circuitry, by a processor executing a computer program stored in memory, or by a combination of hardware and software.

[0099] Example 6 This embodiment provides an electronic device. The electronic device includes a processor, a memory, and a computer program stored in the memory and capable of running on the processor. When the processor executes the computer program, it implements the method for classifying the safety status of thermal power plant structures as described in any of the above embodiments.

[0100] The processor can be a central processing unit, a graphics processing unit, a digital signal processor, an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a field-programmable gate array (FPGA), or other programmable logic devices. The memory can include read-only memory, random access memory, flash memory, hard disk, solid-state drive, or other storage devices capable of storing computer programs and data.

[0101] Electronic devices can be servers, industrial control computers, edge computing devices, inspection terminals, portable testing equipment, or computing devices deployed in the safety management platform of a thermal power plant. These devices can communicate with 3D laser scanning systems, UAV oblique photography systems, crack width gauges, vibration sensors, database servers, or operation and maintenance management systems to obtain structural information, component surface damage information, or historical maintenance data, and output regional safety status categories, assessment reports, and maintenance strategies.

[0102] Example 7 This embodiment provides a computer-readable storage medium. The computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, implements the method for classifying the safety status of thermal power plant structures as described in any of the above embodiments.

[0103] The computer-readable storage medium may be a read-only memory, random access memory, flash memory, portable hard drive, magnetic disk, optical disk, solid-state hard drive, USB flash drive, or other non-transitory storage medium capable of storing computer programs.

[0104] When a computer program is executed by a processor, the processor can perform the following steps: acquire structural information and apparent damage information of components of the thermal power plant buildings; generate component nodes and region nodes; determine force transmission paths; determine failure logic relationships; construct a force transmission tree model; map the apparent damage information of components to component nodes and quantify it into a damage index; determine the impact weights; calculate the regional safety status index; and determine the regional safety status category.

[0105] These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable storage medium that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing device to function in a particular manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer-readable storage medium produce an article of manufacture including instruction means, which are implemented in a process Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The function specified in one or more boxes.

[0106] These computer program instructions may also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing equipment to cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer or other programmable equipment to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby providing instructions that execute on the computer or other programmable equipment for implementing the process. Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The steps of the function specified in one or more boxes.

[0107] This application may take the form of a completely hardware embodiment, a completely software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Furthermore, this application may take the form of a computer program product implemented on one or more computer-usable storage media (including, but not limited to, disk storage, readable storage media, optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program code.

[0108] This application is described with reference to flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams of methods, apparatus (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of this application. It will be understood that each block of the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, and combinations of blocks in the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, special-purpose computer, embedded processor, or other programmable data processing apparatus to produce a machine, such that the instructions, which execute via the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing apparatus, generate instructions for implementing the flowchart... Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1A device that provides the functions specified in one or more boxes.

[0109] Obviously, the described embodiments are only some, not all, of the embodiments in this application. All other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art based on the embodiments in this application without inventive effort should fall within the scope of protection of this application.

[0110] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of this application, and are not intended to limit them. Although this application has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that modifications can still be made to the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments, or equivalent substitutions can be made to some of the technical features. Such modifications or substitutions do not cause the essence of the corresponding technical solutions to deviate from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of this application.

Claims

1. A method for classifying the safety status of structures in thermal power plants, characterized in that, include: Obtain structural information and apparent damage information of components of thermal power plant buildings; Based on the structural information, load-bearing components and structural systems or functional areas in the thermal power plant buildings are identified, and component nodes corresponding to the load-bearing components and area nodes corresponding to the structural systems or functional areas are generated respectively. Based on the load transfer relationship between the load-bearing components, determine the force transmission paths between the component nodes and between the component nodes and the area nodes; Using the failure of the regional node as the top event and the failure of the component node as the bottom event, the failure logic relationship corresponding to the force transmission path is determined by fault tree analysis theory; wherein, the failure logic relationship includes OR gate logic and AND gate logic, the OR gate logic indicates that the failure of a single component node leads to the failure of the corresponding regional node, and the AND gate logic indicates that the simultaneous failure of multiple component nodes leads to the failure of the corresponding regional node. A force transmission tree model is constructed based on the component nodes, the region nodes, the force transmission path, and the failure logic relationship. The apparent damage information of the component is mapped to the corresponding component node in the force transmission tree model, and the apparent damage information of the component is quantified to obtain the damage index of the corresponding component node. Based on the hierarchical position of the component node in the force transmission tree model, its force transmission path, and failure logic relationship, determine the influence weight of the component node on the corresponding region node; The regional safety status index is calculated based on the influence weight and the damage index, and the regional safety status category of the thermal power plant buildings is determined according to the regional safety status index.

2. The method for classifying the safety status of thermal power plant buildings and structures according to claim 1, characterized in that, The acquisition of structural information and component surface damage information of thermal power plant buildings includes: Obtain at least one of the following: design drawings, as-built documentation, on-site inspection data, and historical maintenance records of the thermal power plant buildings and structures, as the structural information; At least one of the following can be obtained as the apparent damage information of the component: on-site inspection records, apparent damage images, deformation monitoring data and vibration monitoring data; The acquisition of apparent damage information of components includes: The appearance status data of the thermal power plant buildings and structures are collected by at least one of the following devices: a three-dimensional laser scanning system, an unmanned aerial vehicle oblique photography system, a crack width measuring instrument, and a vibration sensor. The apparent condition data is processed to extract at least one of the following: crack width, crack distribution, concrete spalling area, steel corrosion degree, component deformation, vibration frequency, and vibration amplitude, to obtain the apparent damage information of the component.

3. The method for classifying the safety status of thermal power plant buildings and structures according to claim 1, characterized in that, The determination of the force transmission paths between component nodes and between component nodes and region nodes based on the load transfer relationship between the load-bearing components includes: Analyze the component geometric dimensions, material properties, connection methods, and support relationships in the structural information; Determine the parent-child relationship between adjacent component nodes based on the direction of load transfer from the load-bearing component to the supporting component or foundation component; Based on the parent-child relationship, multiple component nodes in the same structural system or functional area are associated with corresponding area nodes to form the force transmission path.

4. The method for classifying the safety status of thermal power plant buildings and structures according to claim 1, characterized in that, The method of determining the failure logic relationship corresponding to the force transmission path using fault tree analysis theory includes: When the failure of any component node will cause the corresponding area node to fail, or when the failure of any component node will block the main force transmission path of the corresponding area node, the failure logic relationship between the component node and the corresponding area node is determined as an OR gate logic. When multiple component nodes are in a redundant force transmission path, and the failure of the corresponding area node only occurs when the multiple component nodes fail simultaneously, the failure logic relationship between the multiple component nodes and the corresponding area node is determined as an AND gate logic.

5. The method for classifying the safety status of thermal power plant buildings and structures according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of determining the influence weight of the component node on the corresponding region node based on the hierarchical position of the component node in the force transmission tree model, its force transmission path, and failure logic relationship includes: Based on the hierarchical position of the component node in the force transmission tree model, determine the hierarchical influence factor of the component node; Based on whether the force transmission path where the component node is located is the main force transmission path or a branch force transmission path, determine the path influence factor of the component node. Based on the failure logic relationship corresponding to the component node being OR gate logic or AND gate logic, the failure logic influence factor of the component node is determined. The influence weights are determined using the hierarchical influence factor, the path influence factor, and the failure logic influence factor, employing either the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) or the fuzzy comprehensive evaluation method.

6. The method for classifying the safety status of thermal power plant buildings and structures according to claim 1, characterized in that, The calculation of the regional safety status index based on the influence weight and the damage index, and the determination of the regional safety status category of the thermal power plant buildings and structures based on the regional safety status index, includes: The damage degree in the apparent damage information of the component is normalized to obtain a damage index whose value is within a preset range. For multiple component nodes belonging to the same region node, a weighted calculation is performed based on the influence weight and damage index of each component node to obtain the regional safety status index; The regional security status indicators are matched with preset threshold ranges to determine the corresponding regional security status category; The regional security status index is calculated using the following formula: S = Σ (Wi' × Di); Where S is the regional security status index, Di is the damage index of the i-th component node, and Wi' is the corrected influence weight of the i-th component node; when there is no coupling effect, Wi' is the influence weight of the i-th component node; when there is a coupling effect, Wi' is the influence weight corrected based on the coupling effect.

7. The method for classifying the safety status of thermal power plant buildings and structures according to claim 6, characterized in that, The method further includes: When the apparent damage information of the same component node or multiple component nodes connected by the failure logic relationship contains multiple damage types, the coupling effect between the multiple damage types is determined based on the failure logic relationship. The quantized value of the coupling effect is used as a correction factor to perform multiplicative or additive correction on the influence weight to obtain the corrected influence weight. The coupling effect includes: the combined blocking effect of damage types of multiple component nodes located on the same force transmission path on the force transmission path, and / or the superimposed weakening effect of multiple damage types on the component bearing capacity.

8. The method for classifying the safety status of thermal power plant buildings and structures according to claim 1, characterized in that, The method further includes: Based on the failure logic relationship in the force transmission tree model, the structural reliability of the regional nodes is evaluated to obtain the reliability index of the corresponding regional nodes. Based on the regional security status category and the reliability index, determine the corresponding regional inspection cycle, periodic inspection content, and maintenance strategy; The worse the security status indicated by the regional security status category, or the lower the reliability index, the shorter the inspection cycle, the more detailed the regular inspection content, and the more proactive the maintenance strategy for the corresponding region.

9. The method for classifying the safety status of thermal power plant buildings and structures according to claim 8, characterized in that, The method further includes: Generate an assessment report that includes the area's safety status category, the area's safety status index, the reliability index, information on critical damaged components, and maintenance strategies; When the updated apparent damage information of the thermal power plant buildings is obtained, the updated apparent damage information is mapped to the corresponding component nodes in the force transmission tree model, and the failure logic relationship and / or regional safety status category in the force transmission tree model are updated based on the updated damage index.

10. A device for classifying the safety status of buildings and structures in a thermal power plant, characterized in that, include: The acquisition module is used to acquire structural information and component surface damage information of thermal power plant buildings and structures. The node generation module is used to identify load-bearing components and structural systems or functional areas in the thermal power plant buildings based on the structural information, and generate component nodes corresponding to the load-bearing components and area nodes corresponding to the structural systems or functional areas respectively. The force transmission path determination module is used to determine the force transmission paths between the component nodes and between the component nodes and the area nodes based on the load transfer relationship between the load-bearing components. The failure logic determination module is used to determine the failure logic relationship corresponding to the force transmission path by taking the failure of the regional node as the top event and the failure of the component node as the bottom event, and using fault tree analysis theory. The model building module is used to construct a force transmission tree model based on the component nodes, the region nodes, the force transmission path, and the failure logic relationship; The damage quantification module is used to map the apparent damage information of the component to the corresponding component node in the force transmission tree model, and to quantify the apparent damage information of the component to obtain the damage index of the corresponding component node. The weight determination module is used to determine the influence weight of the component node on the corresponding region node based on the hierarchical position of the component node in the force transmission tree model, the force transmission path it is located in, and the failure logic relationship. The classification module is used to calculate the regional safety status index based on the influence weight and the damage index, and to determine the regional safety status category of the thermal power plant buildings and structures according to the regional safety status index.

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