A new energy terminal collaborative control system with terminal security node protection function

By collecting the damped oscillation characteristics of power semiconductor switches in new energy microgrids, establishing individual terminal fingerprint mapping relationships, and combining self-consistent deviation and nonlinear penalty kernels, the problem of power conversion terminals being vulnerable to attacks is solved, hardware authentication and security verification are realized, and the stability and economy of the system are guaranteed.

CN123121577APending Publication Date: 2026-11-17BEIJING FUBON INTELLIGENT CONTROL POWER TECH CO LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202611478749.6
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2026-09-22
Publication Date
2026-11-17

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In existing new energy microgrids, power conversion terminals are easily replaced or cloned by attackers, leading to the counterfeiting of communication modules and control boards, tampering with power scheduling instructions, and threatening the safe and stable operation of the system. Existing software authentication mechanisms are unable to detect identity spoofing attacks at the hardware level.

Method used

By collecting the damped oscillations of power semiconductor switch turn-off transients during the offline registration phase of the terminal, an individual power-transient fingerprint mapping relationship is established. Combined with the trusted platform module and the cooperative controller, the physical fingerprint of the terminal is verified in real time. Self-consistent bias and nonlinear security penalty kernel function are introduced, and a distributed optimization algorithm is embedded for security verification and power cooperative optimization.

Benefits of technology

It achieves trusted hardware authentication for terminals, blocks software authentication vulnerabilities, ensures the safe and stable operation of microgrids, and maintains economy and system regulation capabilities while ensuring safety, providing a continuous security monitoring and isolation mechanism.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

This invention discloses a new energy terminal collaborative control system with terminal security node protection function, belonging to the field of power grid control technology. The invention includes a collaborative controller, a power conversion terminal, a trusted platform module, a high-frequency sampling and measurement module, a communication and security channel, and a physical network disconnection actuator. This invention utilizes the physical characteristic of the transient decay oscillation period of power semiconductor devices during shutdown as a terminal identity fingerprint. Any attacking terminal that replaces the communication module or clones the digital certificate will inevitably deviate from the baseline model in its decay oscillation period due to microscopic differences between the power hardware and the registered terminal. This method establishes an individual-specific power-transient fingerprint mapping function through offline registration and compares the self-consistent deviation between the measured value and the expected value in real time during online operation, fundamentally blocking security vulnerabilities that can be bypassed by relying solely on software certificate authentication, and achieving hardware trusted authentication at the terminal physical layer.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of power grid control technology, and in particular relates to a new energy terminal collaborative control system with terminal safety node protection function. Background Technology

[0002] In new energy microgrids, power conversion terminals such as photovoltaic inverters and energy storage converters are widely connected. Existing mainstream technical solutions typically adopt communication authentication mechanisms based on digital certificates and keys. Digital certificate authentication refers to issuing a unique identity credential to each terminal through a public key infrastructure. During communication, the terminal uses its private key to sign the scheduling message, and the controller verifies the signature using the public key to confirm that the instruction has not been tampered with and that its source is trustworthy. However, communication modules and control boards are easily replaced or cloned. Attackers can retain legitimate communication certificates while replacing the underlying power hardware, or impersonate legitimate terminals to access the microgrid, tamper with power scheduling instructions, and threaten the safe and stable operation of the system. Existing software-based security authentication mechanisms are difficult to detect such hardware-level identity impersonation attacks. Therefore, we propose a new energy terminal collaborative control system with terminal security node protection functions. Summary of the Invention

[0003] To solve the above-mentioned technical problems, the present invention is achieved through the following technical solution: This invention is a new energy terminal collaborative control system with terminal security node protection function, including a collaborative controller, a power conversion terminal, a trusted platform module, a high-frequency sampling and measurement module, a communication and security channel, and a physical network disconnection actuator; The workflow of the control system is as follows: Step S1: Offline registration and model solidification of terminal physical fingerprint. Before the terminal is connected to the grid and put into operation, the terminal is placed in offline registration mode to enable the terminal to cover different power commands and maintain the DC bus voltage and power module junction temperature within the preset range. The decay oscillation of the power semiconductor switch turn-off transient is collected, the decay oscillation period under each operating condition is obtained, the power-transient fingerprint mapping relationship of the terminal is established, and the mapping relationship is encrypted and stored in the trusted platform module and the security node fingerprint library of the cooperative controller on the terminal. Step S2: The collaborative controller generates power baseline instructions and self-consistent challenges. During the online operation phase, the collaborative controller collects load and new energy forecast data periodically, generates initial power baseline instructions for each terminal, and independently generates time-varying random challenge numbers for each terminal. After encryption with a session key, the numbers are sent to the corresponding terminals. Step S3: The terminal receives the instruction and performs local transient self-consistency verification. The terminal decrypts to obtain the power reference instruction and challenge number. Instead of directly performing power regulation, it captures a power semiconductor switch turn-off transient during the power regulation preparation stage, measures the actual decay oscillation period, and obtains the terminal's current DC bus voltage and junction temperature. Step S4: Local fingerprint mapping calculation and self-consistency deviation generation. The terminal calls the fingerprint mapping relationship stored in the registration stage, takes the power reference command, the current DC bus voltage and junction temperature as input, calculates the expected decay oscillation period, and calculates the self-consistency deviation between the actual decay oscillation period and the expected decay oscillation period. Step S5: Self-consistency decision and hierarchical security response. The terminal compares the self-consistency deviation with the preset security threshold. If the self-consistency deviation does not exceed the security threshold, the self-consistency verification is deemed to have passed. The output power is adjusted to the power reference command, and the measured power value, self-consistency deviation, and message authentication code generated using the challenge number are packaged and sent back to the collaborative controller. If the self-consistency deviation exceeds the security threshold, the self-consistency verification is deemed to have failed. The current power command is refused to be executed, and the abnormal information is reported through the backup security channel. Step S6: The collaborative controller collects confirmation messages and builds a set of trusted terminals. Within a preset time window, the collaborative controller performs integrity verification on the received response messages, includes terminals that pass the verification into the set of trusted terminals for this round of optimization, and excludes terminals that do not respond, fail verification, or return self-consistency failure from the power collaborative allocation in this round. Step S7: Distributed cooperative optimization with embedded security penalty terms. The cooperative controller aims to minimize the system operating cost. It introduces a security penalty term based on self-consistency deviation into the objective function. The security penalty term nonlinearly limits the deviation of terminal power from the reference command according to the magnitude of the self-consistency deviation, and performs power cooperative optimization allocation for terminals in the trusted terminal set. Step S8: Distributed iterative solution and terminal status update. The optimization problem in step S7 is solved using a distributed optimization algorithm to obtain the optimal power setting value for each terminal. This value is then used as the baseline instruction for the next control cycle and returned to step S2 to form a rolling closed loop. At the same time, the collaborative controller accumulates the number of self-consistency verification failures for each terminal. For terminals whose consecutive failure counts reach a preset threshold, the terminal identity is frozen and a physical network disconnection is implemented.

[0004] Furthermore, the collaborative controller is deployed in the microgrid energy management layer for load and new energy forecasting, reference power command generation, random challenge number generation, message integrity verification, trusted terminal set construction, distributed collaborative optimization solution with embedded security penalty kernel, terminal status monitoring and physical network disconnection command issuance; internally, it integrates a security node fingerprint library to store the ciphertext and hash value of the fingerprint mapping function coefficients of each terminal. The power conversion terminal is a photovoltaic inverter or energy storage converter, integrating power semiconductors, digital signal processors, sensors, high-frequency sampling modules and trusted platform module interfaces; it establishes a physical fingerprint model, receives instructions during operation, performs transient self-consistency verification, calculates self-consistency deviation and responds in stages, and the AC end is connected to the grid via a grid disconnection actuator. The internal bus connects to the trusted platform module and the high-frequency sampling and measurement module. The trusted platform module is deployed within a hardware security chip in each terminal, encrypting and storing the terminal-specific power-transient fingerprint mapping function coefficients to prevent unauthorized reading or tampering. It connects to the terminal's digital signal processor via an internal integrated circuit bus or serial peripheral interface, allowing access only to calling processes within the trusted execution environment. The high-frequency sampling and measurement module is used to simulate the input terminal being connected to the drain and source terminals of the power semiconductor via a high-voltage differential probe, and the power circuit current being coupled through a Rogowski coil; the digital output terminal is connected to the high-speed capture interface of the digital signal processor, used to capture the transient decaying oscillation waveform of the switch and calculate the decaying oscillation period in real time; The communication and security channel provides a bidirectional encrypted data transmission channel between the collaborative controller and each terminal, including a main encrypted channel and an independent backup security channel. The main channel uses session key encryption and carries the transmission of power scheduling messages and the return of security confirmation messages. The backup channel uses different encryption mechanisms and is dedicated to reporting abnormal information when terminal self-consistency verification fails. The physical medium can be fiber optic Ethernet or power line carrier. The physical disconnect actuator is a circuit breaker or solid-state switch configured for each terminal, connected in series between the terminal's AC output terminal and the microgrid's common connection point; the control coil or drive terminal is connected to the digital output module of the co-controller via hardwiring or industrial communication protocol, and when the number of consecutive self-consistency failures of the terminal reaches a preset threshold, it receives a trip command to physically disconnect the terminal.

[0005] Further, step S1 includes the following steps: Step S11: Cover the terminal with power from 0 to rated power. Within the range, select Discrete power command points , Maintain DC bus voltage and power module junction temperature At the preset value, at each power point The following applies to power semiconductor devices During the next switching operation, the damp-source voltage decay oscillation during the turn-off transient is recorded. The time positions of three consecutive oscillation peaks are captured, and the average of the intervals between adjacent peaks is calculated as the decay oscillation period. Simultaneously record the DC bus voltage under the corresponding operating conditions. and junction temperature ; Step S12: To establish a quantitative mapping relationship between terminal power command, DC bus voltage and junction temperature and switch decay oscillation period, as a benchmark model for self-consistent verification in subsequent operation phases, the collected triplet data is used. and decaying oscillation period We use regularized multinomial regression to fit the terminal... Power-transient fingerprint mapping function: in, , , , , The terminal obtained through least squares estimation The individual-specific coefficients, the mapping function takes power command, DC bus voltage and junction temperature as input, and outputs the expected decay oscillation period of the terminal under this operating condition; Step S13: Encrypt and store the coefficients of the mapping function in the trusted platform module on the terminal, and upload the ciphertext of the coefficients and the secure hash value to the secure node fingerprint database of the collaborative controller as the benchmark model for self-consistent verification during the terminal operation phase.

[0006] Furthermore, step S2 includes: the collaborative controller independently generating random challenge numbers for each terminal. It is used to generate a message authentication code by combining the measured power and self-consistency deviation when the terminal sends back the confirmation message, so as to bind the fingerprint verification result with the communication session and resist replay attacks.

[0007] Further, step S3 includes the following steps: Step S31: The terminal decrypts the scheduling message and obtains the power reference command. and random challenge number ; Step S32: The internal digital signal processor of the terminal transiently sets the power loop reference value to the preload value. This puts the converter into a power boost preparation state; Step S33: From the current power to During the dynamic adjustment process, the terminal triggers the high-frequency sampling module, which captures the drain-source voltage after detecting the zero-crossing signal of the output current and delaying the dead time. The first damped oscillation is measured using a comparator and counter to determine the time interval between three consecutive oscillation peaks, and the average damped oscillation period is calculated. ; Step S34: The terminal obtains the DC bus voltage through an analog-to-digital converter. The current junction temperature is estimated using a transient thermal model based on a thermal resistance network, based on temperature sensor measurements of the power module substrate temperature. .

[0008] Further, step S4 includes the following steps: Step S41: To obtain the normal damped oscillation period that the terminal should exhibit under the current operating conditions, so as to compare it with the actual measured value, the terminal calls the fingerprint mapping function stored in the trusted platform module. Substitute the current power reference command DC bus voltage and junction temperature Calculate the expected decaying oscillation period The formula is as follows: Step S42: To quantify the deviation between the current terminal hardware physical characteristics and the registered benchmark model, and to serve as the basis for subsequent security decisions and collaborative penalties, calculate the absolute difference between the measured decay oscillation period and the expected decay oscillation period, as the self-consistency deviation: In the formula, For the terminal Self-consistency bias, This is the actual measured period of the damped oscillation.

[0009] Further, step S5 includes the following steps: Step S51: The terminal will adjust the self-consistency deviation. With safety threshold Comparison, safety threshold The standard deviation of measurement noise and the aging drift characteristics of power devices were determined based on a large number of samples during the terminal registration phase. Step S52: If If the self-consistency check passes, the terminal will release the preload and adjust the output power to [value missing]. The measured output power was collected after steady-state conditions were reached. To bind the power execution result with the physical fingerprint verification result and prevent the message from being tampered with or forged, the terminal utilizes the challenge number. Generate hash message authentication code: In the formula, For the terminal The generated hash message authentication code, It is a hash-based message authentication code algorithm. This is a self-consistency bias; Will , and Package it into a security confirmation message and send it back to the collaborative controller; Step S53: If If the self-consistency check fails, the terminal will refuse to execute the current power command, maintain the current output, and report the error code and self-consistency deviation. The terminal identifier is reported to the collaborative controller through an independent backup security channel, which uses a different encryption mechanism than the main channel.

[0010] Further, step S6 includes the following steps: Step S61: The collaborative controller listens for terminal responses within a preset time window. For terminals that return a security acknowledgment message, it uses the corresponding challenge number. Recalculate the hash message authentication code and perform integrity verification; Step S62: After verification, extract the measured power. and self-consistency deviation The corresponding terminals will be included in the trusted terminal set for this round of optimization. ; Step S63: For terminals that do not respond, fail verification, or return self-consistency failure information, the collaborative controller will adjust the corresponding terminal's current power base value. Force the value to zero and move it to the observation list to accumulate the anomaly count.

[0011] Furthermore, in step S7, to adaptively limit the power adjustment authority of each terminal based on the self-consistency deviation of the physical fingerprint during power collaborative allocation, so that terminals with smaller self-consistency deviations have greater adjustment freedom, and the adjustment authority of terminals with self-consistency deviations close to the threshold is nonlinearly suppressed, thus achieving a smooth trade-off between safety constraints and economic operation, the collaborative controller constructs an optimization model with a safety penalty term: The constraint is the active power balance of the microgrid: in, The total load of the microgrid, For microgrid network losses; and the upper and lower limits of output of each terminal ; In the formula, To minimize the objective function, For trusted terminal set All terminals Summation, For the terminal The power generation or energy storage loss cost function, This is a global penalty coefficient used to adjust the weighting of safety penalties against operating costs. This is a nonlinear safety penalty kernel function based on self-consistency bias, used to adjust the penalty intensity according to the magnitude of the self-consistency bias. The specific form of the safety penalty kernel function is as follows: in, For a set small normal number; when the self-consistency deviation Much smaller than the threshold At that time, the safety penalty kernel function Approaching zero, the penalty term is approximately zero, allowing the corresponding terminal to flexibly participate in power regulation; when the self-consistency deviation... Approaching the threshold At that time, the safety penalty kernel function A sharp increase forces the corresponding terminal power towards the reference value. The regression limits the extent to which the terminal participates in power regulation.

[0012] Further, step S8 includes the following steps: Step S81: The cooperative controller uses the alternating direction multiplier method to solve the optimization problem described in claim 8, constructing the optimization problem into an augmented Lagrangian form. Each trusted terminal interacts with the controller using Lagrangian multipliers and local power values. After iterative convergence, the optimal power setpoint for each terminal is obtained. ; Step S82: In the next control cycle, the cooperative controller will As a new benchmark directive Return to step S2 to form a rolling closed loop; Step S83: The collaborative controller accumulates the number of self-consistency verification failures of each terminal. When the number of consecutive failures of any terminal reaches a preset threshold... When the terminal's identity is frozen from the security node fingerprint database, the circuit breaker or solid-state switch is controlled to physically disconnect the terminal from the network, thus realizing active protection of the terminal security node based on hardware fingerprint.

[0013] The present invention has the following beneficial effects: 1. This invention utilizes the physical characteristic of the transient decay oscillation period during the turn-off of power semiconductor devices as a terminal identity fingerprint. This physical characteristic is determined by microstructural parameters such as internal parasitic capacitance and module bond wire inductance. These parameters possess physical uniqueness that cannot be cloned due to the discreteness of the manufacturing process. Any attack terminal that replaces the communication module or clones the digital certificate will inevitably deviate from the baseline model in terms of its decay oscillation period due to the microscopic differences between the power hardware and the registered terminal. This method establishes a unique power-transient fingerprint mapping function for each individual through offline registration and compares the self-consistent deviation between the measured value and the expected value in real time during online operation. This fundamentally blocks the security vulnerability that can be bypassed by relying solely on software certificate authentication, achieving hardware-trusted authentication at the physical layer of the terminal.

[0014] 2. This invention introduces a nonlinear security penalty kernel function based on self-consistent deviation, quantifying the physical fingerprint verification result into continuous self-consistent deviation values ​​and embedding them into the collaboratively optimized penalty terms. Terminals with small self-consistent deviations have penalty terms approaching zero, allowing them to flexibly participate in economic dispatch; terminals with self-consistent deviations close to the threshold have penalty terms that increase sharply, adaptively suppressing their adjustment authority while still maintaining online operation. This smooth compromise mechanism avoids the loss of system regulation capacity caused by simply eliminating suspicious terminals, maintaining the economy of microgrid collaborative operation while ensuring security constraints.

[0015] 3. This invention arranges the measurement of the decaying oscillation period to be completed during the pre-tightening phase of power regulation, capturing the switching transient by utilizing the brief dynamic process before the power command is executed, without introducing additional test conditions or interrupting normal power output; the sampling, calculation, and decision of self-consistent verification are all completed in a closed loop within the local terminal, without relying on external communication or remote servers, and the verification result is transmitted back along with the power execution result via message authentication code. This design enables hardware fingerprint verification and power collaborative control to be tightly linked in timing and deeply integrated in process, without the terminal needing to perform offline testing separately, achieving zero-disturbance embedding of security verification into normal operation.

[0016] 4. This invention executes a complete self-consistent verification closed loop in each control cycle, constructing a rolling continuous security monitoring mechanism; the collaborative controller accumulates the number of self-consistent verification failures of each terminal, and once a terminal fails verification multiple times in a row, it is determined that the terminal has a continuous security anomaly, automatically freezes its identity identifier and triggers a physical network disconnection operation; this progressive response strategy based on accumulated evidence can not only filter out single misjudgments caused by occasional measurement noise, but also quickly implement active isolation after confirming that the terminal has been tampered with or replaced, forming a complete security handling link from detection, judgment, suppression to isolation.

[0017] Of course, any product implementing this invention does not necessarily need to achieve all of the advantages described above at the same time. Attached Figure Description

[0018] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, the accompanying drawings used in the description of the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0019] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the architecture of a new energy terminal collaborative control system with terminal security node protection function according to the present invention; Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating a new energy terminal collaborative control system with terminal security node protection function according to the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0020] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0021] Please see Figure 1-2 As shown, the present invention is a new energy terminal collaborative control system with terminal security node protection function, including a collaborative controller, a power conversion terminal, a trusted platform module, a high-frequency sampling and measurement module, a communication and security channel, and a physical network disconnection actuator; The control system's workflow is as follows: Step S1: Offline registration and model solidification of terminal physical fingerprint. Before the terminal is connected to the grid and put into operation, the terminal is placed in offline registration mode to enable the terminal to cover different power commands and maintain the DC bus voltage and power module junction temperature within the preset range. The decay oscillation of the power semiconductor switch turn-off transient is collected, the decay oscillation period under each operating condition is obtained, the power-transient fingerprint mapping relationship of the terminal is established, and the mapping relationship is encrypted and stored in the trusted platform module and the security node fingerprint library of the cooperative controller on the terminal. Step S2: The collaborative controller generates power baseline instructions and self-consistent challenges. During the online operation phase, the collaborative controller collects load and new energy forecast data periodically, generates initial power baseline instructions for each terminal, and independently generates time-varying random challenge numbers for each terminal. After encryption with a session key, the numbers are sent to the corresponding terminals. Step S3: The terminal receives the instruction and performs local transient self-consistency verification. The terminal decrypts to obtain the power reference instruction and challenge number. Instead of directly performing power regulation, it captures a power semiconductor switch turn-off transient during the power regulation preparation stage, measures the actual decay oscillation period, and obtains the terminal's current DC bus voltage and junction temperature. Step S4: Local fingerprint mapping calculation and self-consistency deviation generation. The terminal calls the fingerprint mapping relationship stored in the registration stage, takes the power reference command, the current DC bus voltage and junction temperature as input, calculates the expected decay oscillation period, and calculates the self-consistency deviation between the actual decay oscillation period and the expected decay oscillation period. Step S5: Self-consistency decision and hierarchical security response. The terminal compares the self-consistency deviation with the preset security threshold. If the self-consistency deviation does not exceed the security threshold, the self-consistency verification is deemed to have passed. The output power is adjusted to the power reference command, and the measured power value, self-consistency deviation, and message authentication code generated using the challenge number are packaged and sent back to the collaborative controller. If the self-consistency deviation exceeds the security threshold, the self-consistency verification is deemed to have failed. The current power command is refused to be executed, and the abnormal information is reported through the backup security channel. Step S6: The collaborative controller collects confirmation messages and builds a set of trusted terminals. Within a preset time window, the collaborative controller performs integrity verification on the received response messages, includes terminals that pass the verification into the set of trusted terminals for this round of optimization, and excludes terminals that do not respond, fail verification, or return self-consistency failure from the power collaborative allocation in this round. Step S7: Distributed cooperative optimization with embedded security penalty terms. The cooperative controller aims to minimize the system operating cost. It introduces a security penalty term based on self-consistency deviation into the objective function. The security penalty term nonlinearly limits the deviation of terminal power from the reference command according to the magnitude of the self-consistency deviation, and performs power cooperative optimization allocation for terminals in the trusted terminal set. Step S8: Distributed iterative solution and terminal status update. The optimization problem in step S7 is solved using a distributed optimization algorithm to obtain the optimal power setting value for each terminal. This value is then used as the baseline instruction for the next control cycle and returned to step S2 to form a rolling closed loop. At the same time, the collaborative controller accumulates the number of self-consistency verification failures for each terminal. For terminals whose consecutive failure counts reach a preset threshold, the terminal identity is frozen and a physical network disconnection is implemented.

[0022] The collaborative controller is deployed in the energy management layer of the microgrid for load and renewable energy forecasting, reference power command generation, random challenge number generation, message integrity verification, trusted terminal set construction, distributed collaborative optimization solution with embedded security penalty kernel, terminal status monitoring and physical network disconnection command issuance; it integrates a security node fingerprint library to store the ciphertext and hash value of the fingerprint mapping function coefficients of each terminal. The power conversion terminal is a photovoltaic inverter or energy storage converter, integrating power semiconductors, digital signal processors, sensors, high-frequency sampling modules and trusted platform module interfaces; it establishes a physical fingerprint model, receives instructions during operation, performs transient self-consistency verification, calculates self-consistency deviation and responds in stages, and the AC end is connected to the grid via a grid disconnection actuator. The internal bus connects to the trusted platform module and the high-frequency sampling and measurement module. The trusted platform module is deployed within a hardware security chip in each terminal, encrypting and storing the terminal-specific power-transient fingerprint mapping function coefficients to prevent unauthorized reading or tampering. It connects to the terminal's digital signal processor via an internal integrated circuit bus or serial peripheral interface, allowing access only to processes within the trusted execution environment. The high-frequency sampling and measurement module is used to connect the analog input terminal to the drain and source terminals of the power semiconductor via a high-voltage differential probe, and couple the power circuit current through a Rogowski coil; the digital output terminal is connected to the high-speed capture interface of the digital signal processor to capture the transient decaying oscillation waveform of the switch and calculate the decaying oscillation period in real time. The communication and security channel provides a bidirectional encrypted data transmission channel between the collaborative controller and each terminal, including a main encrypted channel and an independent backup security channel. The main channel uses session key encryption and carries power scheduling message delivery and security confirmation message return. The backup channel uses different encryption mechanisms and is dedicated to reporting abnormal information when terminal self-consistency verification fails. The physical medium can be fiber optic Ethernet or power line carrier. The physical disconnect actuator is a circuit breaker or solid-state switch configured for each terminal, connected in series between the terminal's AC output and the microgrid's common connection point; the control coil or drive end is connected to the digital output module of the co-controller via hardwiring or industrial communication protocol. When the number of consecutive self-consistency failures of the terminal reaches a preset threshold, it receives a trip command to physically disconnect the terminal.

[0023] Step S1 includes the following steps: Step S11: Cover the terminal with power from 0 to rated power. Within the range, select Discrete power command points , Maintain DC bus voltage and power module junction temperature At the preset value, at each power point The following applies to power semiconductor devices During the next switching operation, the damp-source voltage decay oscillation during the turn-off transient is recorded. The time positions of three consecutive oscillation peaks are captured, and the average of the intervals between adjacent peaks is calculated as the decay oscillation period. Simultaneously record the DC bus voltage under the corresponding operating conditions. and junction temperature ; Step S12: To establish a quantitative mapping relationship between terminal power command, DC bus voltage and junction temperature and switch decay oscillation period, as a benchmark model for self-consistent verification in subsequent operation phases, the collected triplet data is used. and decaying oscillation period We use regularized multinomial regression to fit the terminal... Power-transient fingerprint mapping function: in, , , , , The terminal obtained through least squares estimation The individual-specific coefficients, the mapping function takes the power command, DC bus voltage and junction temperature as inputs, and outputs the expected damped oscillation period of the terminal under this operating condition; Step S13: Encrypt and store the coefficients of the mapping function in the trusted platform module on the terminal, and upload the ciphertext of the coefficients and the secure hash value to the secure node fingerprint database of the collaborative controller as the benchmark model for self-consistent verification during the terminal operation phase.

[0024] Step S2 includes: the collaborative controller independently generating random challenge numbers for each terminal. It is used to generate a message authentication code by combining the measured power and self-consistency deviation when the terminal sends back the confirmation message, so as to bind the fingerprint verification result with the communication session and resist replay attacks.

[0025] Step S3 includes the following steps: Step S31: The terminal decrypts the scheduling message and obtains the power reference command. and random challenge number ; Step S32: The internal digital signal processor of the terminal transiently sets the power loop reference value to the preload value. This puts the converter into a power boost preparation state; Step S33: From the current power to During the dynamic adjustment process, the terminal triggers the high-frequency sampling module, which captures the drain-source voltage after detecting the zero-crossing signal of the output current and delaying the dead time. The first damped oscillation is measured using a comparator and counter to determine the time interval between three consecutive oscillation peaks, and the average damped oscillation period is calculated. ; Step S34: The terminal obtains the DC bus voltage through an analog-to-digital converter. The current junction temperature is estimated using a transient thermal model based on a thermal resistance network, based on temperature sensor measurements of the power module substrate temperature. .

[0026] Step S4 includes the following steps: Step S41: To obtain the normal damped oscillation period that the terminal should exhibit under the current operating conditions, so as to compare it with the actual measured value, the terminal calls the fingerprint mapping function stored in the trusted platform module. Substitute the current power reference command DC bus voltage and junction temperature Calculate the expected decaying oscillation period The formula is as follows: Step S42: To quantify the deviation between the current terminal hardware physical characteristics and the registered benchmark model, and to serve as the basis for subsequent security decisions and collaborative penalties, calculate the absolute difference between the measured decay oscillation period and the expected decay oscillation period, as the self-consistency deviation: In the formula, For the terminal Self-consistency bias, This is the actual measured period of the damped oscillation.

[0027] Step S5 includes the following steps: Step S51: The terminal will adjust the self-consistency deviation. With safety threshold Comparison, safety threshold The standard deviation of measurement noise and the aging drift characteristics of power devices were determined based on a large number of samples during the terminal registration phase. Step S52: If If the self-consistency check passes, the terminal will release the preload and adjust the output power to [value missing]. The measured output power was collected after steady-state conditions were reached. To bind the power execution result with the physical fingerprint verification result and prevent the message from being tampered with or forged, the terminal utilizes the challenge number. Generate hash message authentication code: In the formula, For the terminal The generated hash message authentication code, It is a hash-based message authentication code algorithm. This is a self-consistency bias; Will , and Package it into a security confirmation message and send it back to the collaborative controller; Step S53: If If the self-consistency check fails, the terminal will refuse to execute the current power command, maintain the current output, and report the error code and self-consistency deviation. The terminal identifier is reported to the collaborative controller through an independent backup security channel, which uses a different encryption mechanism than the main channel.

[0028] Step S6 includes the following steps: Step S61: The collaborative controller listens for terminal responses within a preset time window. For terminals that return a security acknowledgment message, it uses the corresponding challenge number. Recalculate the hash message authentication code and perform integrity verification; Step S62: After verification, extract the measured power. and self-consistency deviation The corresponding terminals will be included in the trusted terminal set for this round of optimization. ; Step S63: For terminals that do not respond, fail verification, or return self-consistency failure information, the collaborative controller will adjust the corresponding terminal's current power base value. Force the value to zero and move it to the observation list to accumulate the anomaly count.

[0029] In step S7, to adaptively limit the power regulation authority of each terminal based on the self-consistency deviation of the physical fingerprint during power cooperative allocation, so that terminals with smaller self-consistency deviations have greater regulation freedom, and terminals with self-consistency deviations close to the threshold have their regulation authority nonlinearly suppressed, thus achieving a smooth trade-off between safety constraints and economic operation, the cooperative controller constructs an optimization model with a safety penalty term: The constraint is the active power balance of the microgrid: in, The total load of the microgrid, For microgrid network losses; and the upper and lower limits of output of each terminal ; In the formula, To minimize the objective function, For trusted terminal set All terminals Summation, For the terminal The power generation or energy storage loss cost function, This is a global penalty coefficient used to adjust the weighting of safety penalties against operating costs. This is a nonlinear safety penalty kernel function based on self-consistency bias, used to adjust the penalty intensity according to the magnitude of the self-consistency bias. The specific form of the safety penalty kernel function is as follows: in, For a set small normal number; when the self-consistency deviation Much smaller than the threshold At that time, the safety penalty kernel function Approaching zero, the penalty term is approximately zero, allowing the corresponding terminal to flexibly participate in power regulation; when the self-consistency deviation... Approaching the threshold At that time, the safety penalty kernel function A sharp increase forces the corresponding terminal power towards the reference value. The regression limits the extent to which the terminal participates in power regulation.

[0030] Step S8 includes the following steps: Step S81: The cooperative controller uses the alternating direction multiplier method to solve the optimization problem of claim 8, constructing the optimization problem into an augmented Lagrangian form. Each trusted terminal interacts with the controller using Lagrangian multipliers and local power values. After iterative convergence, the optimal power setpoint for each terminal is obtained. ; Step S82: In the next control cycle, the cooperative controller will As a new benchmark directive Return to step S2 to form a rolling closed loop; Step S83: The collaborative controller accumulates the number of self-consistency verification failures of each terminal. When the number of consecutive failures of any terminal reaches a preset threshold... When the terminal's identity is frozen from the security node fingerprint database, the circuit breaker or solid-state switch is controlled to physically disconnect the terminal from the network, thus realizing active protection of the terminal security node based on hardware fingerprint.

[0031] One specific application of this embodiment is: This embodiment relates to the field of new energy microgrid control technology, specifically to a terminal security node protection and collaborative control system based on power semiconductor physical fingerprints, which is applicable to distributed microgrid scenarios containing a large number of power conversion terminals such as photovoltaic inverters and energy storage converters.

[0032] System Architecture The new energy terminal collaborative control system described in this embodiment consists of six parts: a collaborative controller, a power conversion terminal, a trusted platform module (TPM), a high-frequency sampling and measurement module, a communication and security channel, and a physical network disconnection actuator. The functions and connections of each component are as follows: Cooperative Controller: Deployed at the microgrid energy management layer, the hardware utilizes an industrial-grade edge computing server with a 2.2GHz clock speed, 16GB of memory, and integrated 4 Gigabit Ethernet interfaces and 16 digital output modules. Internally, it integrates a secure node fingerprint database, using AES-256 encryption to store the ciphertext and SHA-256 hash values ​​of the fingerprint mapping function coefficients for each terminal. Key functions include: load and renewable energy output prediction, baseline power command generation, time-varying random challenge number generation, message integrity verification, trusted terminal set construction, distributed cooperative optimization solution with embedded security penalty kernel, terminal status monitoring, and physical network disconnection command issuance.

[0033] Power conversion terminal: This embodiment uses a three-phase photovoltaic inverter with a rated power of 50kW as a typical terminal, integrating a power semiconductor IGBT module, a 32-bit floating-point digital signal processor (DSP), a voltage / current sensor, a high-frequency sampling module, and a TPM interface. The AC output terminal is connected to the microgrid's point of common coupling via a physical disconnect actuator. The internal bus is connected to the trusted platform module via an SPI interface and to the high-frequency sampling and measurement module via a parallel interface.

[0034] Trusted Platform Module: Employs a hardware security chip compliant with the TPM 2.0 standard, soldered inside the terminal control board. It encrypts and stores the terminal's individual power-transient fingerprint mapping function coefficients, allowing only processes within the DSP's trusted execution environment to access them via the I2C bus, preventing unauthorized reading or tampering.

[0035] High-frequency sampling and measurement module: The analog input terminal uses a 100MHz bandwidth high-voltage differential probe connected to the drain and source terminals of the IGBT, and uses a Rogowski coil to couple the power loop current; the digital output terminal is connected to the high-speed capture interface of the DSP, and the sampling frequency is set to 1GHz, which is used to accurately capture the decaying oscillation waveform of the IGBT turn-off transient and calculate the oscillation period in real time.

[0036] Communication and security channels: These include a primary encrypted channel and an independent backup security channel. The primary channel uses fiber optic Ethernet physical media and employs the TLS 1.3 protocol to establish a session key encrypted connection, carrying power scheduling message delivery and security confirmation message return. The backup channel uses power line carrier physical media and is encrypted using the SM4 national cryptographic algorithm, specifically for reporting abnormal information when terminal self-consistency verification fails.

[0037] Physical network disconnect actuator: Each terminal is equipped with a solid-state switch with a rated current of 100A, connected in series between the terminal's AC output and the microgrid's common connection point. The drive end is hardwired to the digital output module of the co-controller, with a response time of less than 10ms, used to achieve physical isolation when a terminal experiences a continuous safety anomaly.

[0038] Implementation steps: The complete workflow of the control system is as follows: Step S1: Offline registration and model solidification of terminal physical fingerprints Before the terminal is connected to the network and put into operation, the terminal is placed in offline registration mode to complete the establishment and solidification of the individual's unique physical fingerprint model, which specifically includes: Step S11: Acquisition of Transient Data under Multiple Operating Conditions Terminal coverage Up to rated power Select evenly within the range Discrete power command points ( The junction temperature of the power module is controlled via a constant temperature chamber. Maintain at Maintain DC bus voltage via DC power supply At each power point The following applies to the execution of IGBTs During the next switching operation, the damp-source voltage decay oscillation during the turn-off transient is recorded. The time positions of three consecutive oscillation peaks are captured, and the average of the intervals between adjacent peaks is calculated as the decay oscillation period at that power point. Simultaneously record the DC bus voltage under the corresponding operating conditions. and junction temperature .

[0039] Step S12: Fitting the power-transient fingerprint mapping function Using the collected triples and the corresponding decaying oscillation period A second-order polynomial regression with L2 regularization was used to fit the terminal... Individual-specific power-transient fingerprint mapping function: in, , , , , The terminal obtained through least squares estimation The mapping function takes power command, DC bus voltage, and junction temperature as inputs and outputs the expected damped oscillation period of the terminal under this operating condition.

[0040] Step S13: Encrypted storage and synchronization of fingerprint model The coefficients of the mapping function Encrypted using the terminal's unique private key, the data is stored in the local TPM chip. Simultaneously, the ciphertext of the coefficients and their SHA-256 hash values ​​are uploaded to the security node fingerprint database of the collaborative controller, serving as a benchmark model for self-consistent verification during subsequent operation.

[0041] Step S2: Co-controller generates power reference commands and faces self-consistency challenges During the online operation phase, the coordinated controller collects total microgrid load and renewable energy output forecast data in 1-second control cycles, and uses an economic dispatch algorithm to generate initial power reference commands for each terminal. Simultaneously, a 128-bit time-varying random challenge number is independently generated for each terminal. After being encrypted using the current session key, it is packaged together with the power reference command and sent to the corresponding terminal. The random challenge number is used to generate a message authentication code when the terminal sends back a confirmation message, binding the fingerprint verification result to the communication session to resist replay attacks.

[0042] Step S3: The terminal receives the instruction and performs a local transient self-consistency check. After receiving the encrypted scheduling message, the terminal uses the session key to decrypt it and obtain the power reference command. and random challenge number Instead of directly performing power regulation, local transient self-consistency verification is completed during the power regulation preparation phase, specifically including: Step S31: The terminal's internal DSP transiently sets the power loop reference value to the preload value. This puts the inverter into a power boost preparation state.

[0043] Step S32: From the current power to During the dynamic adjustment process, the DSP triggers the high-frequency sampling module, which detects the zero-crossing signal of the output current and delays the dead time. Then, capture the drain-source voltage of the IGBT. The first decaying oscillation waveform.

[0044] Step S33: Measure the time interval between three consecutive oscillation peaks using the DSP's internal comparator and counter, and calculate the average decaying oscillation period. .

[0045] Step S34: Obtain the current DC bus voltage via a 16-bit analog-to-digital converter. Based on the measurements from the substrate temperature sensor, the current junction temperature is estimated using the transient thermal model of the IGBT module's thermal resistance network. .

[0046] Step S4: Local fingerprint mapping calculation and self-consistent deviation generation The terminal calls the fingerprint mapping function stored in the TPM. Substitute the current power reference command DC bus voltage and junction temperature Calculate the expected damped oscillation period under this operating condition: Calculate the absolute difference between the measured damped oscillation period and the expected damped oscillation period, as the self-consistency bias: This deviation quantifies the degree of deviation between the current terminal hardware physical characteristics and the registered benchmark model, serving as the basis for subsequent security decisions and collaborative penalties.

[0047] Step S5: Self-consistent Decision and Tiered Security Response The terminal will have self-consistency deviation With preset safety threshold In comparison, the security threshold in this embodiment... Based on the noise standard deviation of 10,000 measurements during the registration phase ( The combined characteristics of the 10-year aging drift of IGBT devices were determined as follows: .

[0048] like The self-consistency check is deemed successful. The terminal releases the preload and adjusts the output power to [value missing]. After the power reaches a steady state, the measured output power is collected. And using random challenge numbers Generate hash message authentication code: in, Using the SHA-256 algorithm, This indicates data concatenation. , and It is packaged into a secure confirmation message and sent back to the collaborative controller through the main encrypted channel.

[0049] like If the self-consistency check fails, the terminal will refuse to execute the current power command and maintain the current output. Simultaneously, the error code and self-consistency deviation will be recorded. The terminal's unique identifier is reported to the collaborative controller through an independent backup security channel.

[0050] Step S6: The collaborative controller collects acknowledgment messages and constructs a trusted terminal set. The collaborative controller operates within a preset time window. Internally monitor responses from all terminals: For terminals that return a security acknowledgment message, use the corresponding challenge number. Recalculate the hash message authentication code and compare it with the one in the message. Perform a comparison to complete the integrity verification.

[0051] After the verification is passed, extract the measured power. and self-consistency deviation This terminal will be included in the trusted terminal set for this round of optimization. .

[0052] For terminals that do not respond, fail verification, or return self-consistency failure information, the collaborative controller forcibly sets their current power base value to zero, moves them to the observation list, and accumulates the anomaly count.

[0053] Step S7: Distributed Cooperative Optimization with Embedded Security Penalty Terms The cooperative controller aims to minimize system operating costs. It introduces a nonlinear security penalty term based on self-consistent bias into the objective function to perform coordinated power allocation among terminals within the trusted terminal set. The optimization model is as follows: Constraints: Microgrid active power balance constraints: in, The total load of the microgrid, For microgrid network losses.

[0054] Terminal output upper and lower limit constraints: Lower limit of photovoltaic inverter output , the upper limit of output .

[0055] Parameter description: For the terminal The power generation loss cost function, in this embodiment, is in quadratic form: .

[0056] The global penalty coefficient is set to [value]. It is used to adjust the weighting of safety penalties against operating costs.

[0057] The nonlinear safety penalty kernel function based on self-consistent bias has the following specific form: in, It is a small positive number, used to avoid the denominator being zero.

[0058] When self-consistency deviation Much smaller than the threshold hour, Approaching zero, the penalty term is approximately zero, allowing the terminal to flexibly participate in power regulation; when Approaching hour, A sharp increase forces the terminal power toward the reference value. Regression limits its adjustment range.

[0059] Step S8: Distributed iterative solution and terminal state update The cooperative controller uses the alternating direction multiplier method to solve the above optimization problem, constructing the optimization problem into an augmented Lagrangian form. Each trusted terminal interacts with the controller using Lagrangian multipliers and local power values, and the optimal power setpoint for each terminal is obtained after iterative convergence. .

[0060] In the next control cycle, the cooperative controller will As a new benchmark directive Return to step S2 to form a rolling closed-loop control.

[0061] The collaborative controller accumulates the number of self-consistency verification failures for each terminal and sets a consecutive failure threshold. When the number of consecutive failures of any terminal reaches... When the terminal is identified, its identity is frozen from the security node fingerprint database, and a trip command is sent to the corresponding physical disconnect actuator to physically disconnect the terminal from the microgrid, thus realizing active protection of the terminal security node based on hardware fingerprint. In the description of this specification, references to terms such as "an embodiment," "example," "specific example," etc., indicate that a specific feature, structure, material, or characteristic described in connection with that embodiment or example is included in at least one embodiment or example of the invention. In this specification, illustrative expressions of the above terms do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment or example. Furthermore, the specific features, structures, materials, or characteristics described may be combined in any suitable manner in one or more embodiments or examples.

[0062] The preferred embodiments of the present invention disclosed above are merely illustrative of the invention. These preferred embodiments do not exhaustively describe all details, nor do they limit the invention to the specific implementations described. Clearly, many modifications and variations can be made based on the content of this specification. This specification selects and specifically describes these embodiments to better explain the principles and practical applications of the invention, thereby enabling those skilled in the art to better understand and utilize the invention. The invention is limited only by the claims and their full scope and equivalents.

Claims

1. A new energy terminal collaborative control system with terminal security node protection function, characterized in that, This includes a collaborative controller, a power conversion terminal, a trusted platform module, a high-frequency sampling and measurement module, a communication and security channel, and a physical network disconnection actuator; The workflow of the control system is as follows: Step S1: Offline registration and model solidification of terminal physical fingerprint. Before the terminal is connected to the grid and put into operation, the terminal is placed in offline registration mode to enable the terminal to cover different power commands and maintain the DC bus voltage and power module junction temperature within the preset range. The decay oscillation of the power semiconductor switch turn-off transient is collected, the decay oscillation period under each operating condition is obtained, the power-transient fingerprint mapping relationship of the terminal is established, and the mapping relationship is encrypted and stored in the trusted platform module and the security node fingerprint library of the cooperative controller on the terminal. Step S2: The collaborative controller generates power baseline instructions and self-consistent challenges. During the online operation phase, the collaborative controller collects load and new energy forecast data periodically, generates initial power baseline instructions for each terminal, and independently generates time-varying random challenge numbers for each terminal. After encryption with a session key, the numbers are sent to the corresponding terminals. Step S3: The terminal receives the instruction and performs local transient self-consistency verification. The terminal decrypts to obtain the power reference instruction and challenge number. Instead of directly performing power regulation, it captures a power semiconductor switch turn-off transient during the power regulation preparation stage, measures the actual decay oscillation period, and obtains the terminal's current DC bus voltage and junction temperature. Step S4: Local fingerprint mapping calculation and self-consistency deviation generation. The terminal calls the fingerprint mapping relationship stored in the registration stage, takes the power reference command, the current DC bus voltage and junction temperature as input, calculates the expected decay oscillation period, and calculates the self-consistency deviation between the actual decay oscillation period and the expected decay oscillation period. Step S5: Self-consistency decision and hierarchical security response. The terminal compares the self-consistency deviation with the preset security threshold. If the self-consistency deviation does not exceed the security threshold, the self-consistency verification is determined to be passed. The output power is adjusted to the power reference command, and the measured power value, self-consistency deviation and message authentication code generated by the challenge number are packaged and sent back to the collaborative controller. If the self-consistency deviation exceeds the safety threshold, the self-consistency check is deemed to have failed, the current power command is rejected, and the abnormal information is reported through the backup safety channel. Step S6: The collaborative controller collects confirmation messages and builds a set of trusted terminals. Within a preset time window, the collaborative controller performs integrity verification on the received response messages, includes terminals that pass the verification into the set of trusted terminals for this round of optimization, and excludes terminals that do not respond, fail verification, or return self-consistency failure from the power collaborative allocation in this round. Step S7: Distributed cooperative optimization with embedded security penalty terms. The cooperative controller aims to minimize the system operating cost. It introduces a security penalty term based on self-consistency deviation into the objective function. The security penalty term nonlinearly limits the deviation of terminal power from the reference command according to the magnitude of the self-consistency deviation, and performs power cooperative optimization allocation for terminals in the trusted terminal set. Step S8: Distributed iterative solution and terminal status update. The optimization problem in step S7 is solved using a distributed optimization algorithm to obtain the optimal power setting value for each terminal. This value is then used as the baseline instruction for the next control cycle and returned to step S2 to form a rolling closed loop. At the same time, the collaborative controller accumulates the number of self-consistency verification failures for each terminal. For terminals whose consecutive failure counts reach a preset threshold, the terminal identity is frozen and a physical network disconnection is implemented.

2. A new energy terminal collaborative control system with terminal security node protection function according to claim 1, characterized in that, The collaborative controller is deployed in the microgrid energy management layer and is used for load and new energy prediction, reference power command generation, random challenge number generation, message integrity verification, trusted terminal set construction, distributed collaborative optimization solution with embedded security penalty kernel, terminal status monitoring and physical network disconnection command issuance; it integrates a security node fingerprint library to store the ciphertext and hash value of the fingerprint mapping function coefficients of each terminal. The power conversion terminal is a photovoltaic inverter or energy storage converter, integrating power semiconductors, digital signal processors, sensors, high-frequency sampling modules and trusted platform module interfaces; it establishes a physical fingerprint model, receives instructions during operation, performs transient self-consistency verification, calculates self-consistency deviation and responds in stages, and the AC end is connected to the grid via a grid disconnection actuator. The internal bus connects to the trusted platform module and the high-frequency sampling and measurement module. The trusted platform module is deployed within a hardware security chip in each terminal, encrypting and storing the terminal-specific power-transient fingerprint mapping function coefficients to prevent unauthorized reading or tampering. It connects to the terminal's digital signal processor via an internal integrated circuit bus or serial peripheral interface, allowing access only to calling processes within the trusted execution environment. The high-frequency sampling and measurement module is used to simulate the input terminal being connected to the drain and source terminals of the power semiconductor via a high-voltage differential probe, and the power circuit current being coupled through a Rogowski coil; the digital output terminal is connected to the high-speed capture interface of the digital signal processor, used to capture the transient decaying oscillation waveform of the switch and calculate the decaying oscillation period in real time; The communication and security channel provides a bidirectional encrypted data transmission channel between the collaborative controller and each terminal, including a main encrypted channel and an independent backup security channel. The main channel uses session key encryption and carries the transmission of power scheduling messages and the return of security confirmation messages. The backup channel uses different encryption mechanisms and is dedicated to reporting abnormal information when terminal self-consistency verification fails. The physical medium can be fiber optic Ethernet or power line carrier. The physical disconnect actuator is a circuit breaker or solid-state switch configured for each terminal, connected in series between the terminal's AC output terminal and the microgrid's common connection point; the control coil or drive terminal is connected to the digital output module of the co-controller via hardwiring or industrial communication protocol, and when the number of consecutive self-consistency failures of the terminal reaches a preset threshold, it receives a trip command to physically disconnect the terminal.

3. A new energy terminal collaborative control system with terminal security node protection function according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step S1 includes the following steps: Step S11: Cover the terminal with power from 0 to rated power. Within the range, select Discrete power command points , Maintain DC bus voltage and power module junction temperature At the preset value, at each power point The following applies to power semiconductor devices During the next switching operation, the damp-source voltage decay oscillation during the turn-off transient is recorded. The time positions of three consecutive oscillation peaks are captured, and the average of the intervals between adjacent peaks is calculated as the decay oscillation period. Simultaneously record the DC bus voltage under the corresponding operating conditions. and junction temperature ; Step S12: To establish a quantitative mapping relationship between terminal power command, DC bus voltage and junction temperature and switch decay oscillation period, as a benchmark model for self-consistent verification in subsequent operation phases, the collected triplet data is used. and decaying oscillation period We use regularized multinomial regression to fit the terminal... Power-transient fingerprint mapping function: in, , , , , The terminal obtained through least squares estimation The individual-specific coefficients, the mapping function takes power command, DC bus voltage and junction temperature as input, and outputs the expected decay oscillation period of the terminal under this operating condition; Step S13: Encrypt and store the coefficients of the mapping function in the trusted platform module on the terminal, and upload the ciphertext of the coefficients and the secure hash value to the secure node fingerprint database of the collaborative controller as the benchmark model for self-consistent verification during the terminal operation phase.

4. A new energy terminal collaborative control system with terminal security node protection function according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step S2 includes: the collaborative controller independently generating random challenge numbers for each terminal. It is used to generate a message authentication code by combining the measured power and self-consistency deviation when the terminal sends back the confirmation message, so as to bind the fingerprint verification result with the communication session and resist replay attacks.

5. A new energy terminal collaborative control system with terminal security node protection function according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step S3 includes the following steps: Step S31: The terminal decrypts the scheduling message and obtains the power reference command. and random challenge number ; Step S32: The internal digital signal processor of the terminal transiently sets the power loop reference value to the preload value. This puts the converter into a power boost preparation state; Step S33: From the current power to During the dynamic adjustment process, the terminal triggers the high-frequency sampling module, which captures the drain-source voltage after detecting the zero-crossing signal of the output current and delaying the dead time. The first damped oscillation is measured using a comparator and counter to determine the time interval between three consecutive oscillation peaks, and the average damped oscillation period is calculated. ; Step S34: The terminal obtains the DC bus voltage through an analog-to-digital converter. The current junction temperature is estimated using a transient thermal model based on a thermal resistance network, based on temperature sensor measurements of the power module substrate temperature. .

6. A new energy terminal collaborative control system with terminal security node protection function according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step S4 includes the following steps: Step S41: To obtain the normal damped oscillation period that the terminal should exhibit under the current operating conditions, so as to compare it with the actual measured value, the terminal calls the fingerprint mapping function stored in the trusted platform module. Substitute the current power reference command DC bus voltage and junction temperature Calculate the expected decaying oscillation period The formula is as follows: Step S42: To quantify the deviation between the current terminal hardware physical characteristics and the registered benchmark model, and to serve as the basis for subsequent security decisions and collaborative penalties, calculate the absolute difference between the measured decay oscillation period and the expected decay oscillation period, as the self-consistency deviation: In the formula, For the terminal Self-consistency bias, This is the actual measured damped oscillation period.

7. A new energy terminal collaborative control system with terminal security node protection function according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step S5 includes the following steps: Step S51: The terminal will adjust the self-consistency deviation. With safety threshold Comparison, safety threshold The standard deviation of measurement noise and the aging drift characteristics of power devices were determined based on a large number of samples during the terminal registration phase. Step S52: If If the self-consistency check passes, the terminal will release the preload and adjust the output power to [value missing]. The measured output power was collected after steady-state conditions were reached. To bind the power execution result with the physical fingerprint verification result and prevent the message from being tampered with or forged, the terminal utilizes the challenge number. Generate hash message authentication code: In the formula, For the terminal The generated hash message authentication code, It is a hash-based message authentication code algorithm. This is a self-consistency bias; Will , and Package it into a security confirmation message and send it back to the collaborative controller; Step S53: If If the self-consistency check fails, the terminal will refuse to execute the current power command, maintain the current output, and report the error code and self-consistency deviation. The terminal identifier is reported to the collaborative controller through an independent backup security channel, which uses a different encryption mechanism than the main channel.

8. A new energy terminal collaborative control system with terminal security node protection function according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step S6 includes the following steps: Step S61: The collaborative controller listens for terminal responses within a preset time window. For terminals that return a security acknowledgment message, it uses the corresponding challenge number. Recalculate the hash message authentication code and perform integrity verification; Step S62: After verification, extract the measured power. and self-consistency deviation The corresponding terminals will be included in the trusted terminal set for this round of optimization. ; Step S63: For terminals that do not respond, fail verification, or return self-consistency failure information, the collaborative controller will adjust the corresponding terminal's current power base value. Force the value to zero and move it to the observation list to accumulate the anomaly count.

9. A new energy terminal collaborative control system with terminal security node protection function according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step S7, to adaptively limit the power adjustment authority of each terminal based on the self-consistency deviation of the physical fingerprint during power cooperative allocation, so that terminals with smaller self-consistency deviations have greater adjustment freedom, and terminals with self-consistency deviations close to the threshold have their adjustment rights nonlinearly suppressed, thus achieving a smooth trade-off between safety constraints and economic operation, the cooperative controller constructs an optimization model with a safety penalty term: The constraint is the active power balance of the microgrid: in, For the total load of the microgrid, For microgrid network losses; and the upper and lower limits of output of each terminal ; In the formula, To minimize the objective function, For trusted terminal set All terminals Summation, For the terminal The power generation or energy storage loss cost function, This is a global penalty coefficient used to adjust the weighting of safety penalties against operating costs. This is a nonlinear safety penalty kernel function based on self-consistency bias, used to adjust the penalty intensity according to the magnitude of the self-consistency bias. The specific form of the safety penalty kernel function is as follows: in, For a set small normal number; when the self-consistency deviation Much smaller than the threshold At that time, the safety penalty kernel function Approaching zero, the penalty term is approximately zero, allowing the corresponding terminal to flexibly participate in power regulation; when the self-consistency deviation... Approaching the threshold At that time, the safety penalty kernel function A sharp increase forces the corresponding terminal power towards the reference value. The regression limits the extent to which the terminal participates in power regulation.

10. A new energy terminal collaborative control system with terminal security node protection function according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step S8 includes the following steps: Step S81: The cooperative controller uses the alternating direction multiplier method to solve the optimization problem described in claim 8, constructing the optimization problem into an augmented Lagrangian form. Each trusted terminal interacts with the controller using Lagrangian multipliers and local power values. After iterative convergence, the optimal power setpoint for each terminal is obtained. ; Step S82: In the next control cycle, the cooperative controller will As a new benchmark directive Return to step S2 to form a rolling closed loop; Step S83: The collaborative controller accumulates the number of self-consistency verification failures of each terminal. When the number of consecutive failures of any terminal reaches a preset threshold... When the terminal's identity is frozen from the security node fingerprint database, the circuit breaker or solid-state switch is controlled to physically disconnect the terminal from the network, thus realizing active protection of the terminal security node based on hardware fingerprint.