Time-accurate integrated broadcasting process
The method uses synchronized terrestrial beacons to ensure precise and integrity-guaranteed time services by detecting and correcting clock or position biases, addressing failures and malicious acts in terrestrial beacon networks.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- FR2022011178
- Authority / Receiving Office
- FR · FR
- Patent Type
- Patents
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2022-10-27
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-01
- Estimated Expiration
- 2042-10-27
AI Technical Summary
Existing methods fail to provide precise and integrity-guaranteed time services in the absence of satellite visibility or when relying on terrestrial beacons, especially in the presence of accidental failures or malicious acts affecting clock synchronization or positioning.
A method involving at least four synchronized terrestrial time transfer beacons, using a maximum likelihood criterion to calculate pseudo-distances, resolve positions and time offsets, and determine integrity through a test variable T, with alert thresholds and non-centrality parameters to detect and correct clock or position biases.
Ensures precise time synchronization and integrity monitoring, detecting and correcting biases in terrestrial beacon networks, maintaining time service integrity with high reliability.
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Abstract
Description
Title of the invention: Integrated time-accurate broadcasting method Technical field
[0001] The invention relates to the field of radiofrequency broadcasting of time information from terrestrial beacons, so that a mobile or semi-mobile receiver can have access to a time service, i.e., a time synchronized with the time of the beacon network. The invention relates in particular to a method for guaranteeing the accuracy of the time service broadcast by the beacon network in the event of an accidental failure (such as a beacon clock failure, a beacon synchronization failure, or a beacon positioning error) or malicious act (such as the movement of a beacon in such a way as to disrupt the measurement), as well as the lifting of the alert when the integrity of the time service no longer meets established standards. Previous technique
[0002] Sharing a common, highly accurate time reference between several devices can be essential. This is generally the case whenever it is necessary to synchronize devices, such as for time-division multiplexed (TDMA) or code-division multiplexed (CDMA) radio transmissions, or those using frequency-hopping spread spectrum (FHSS). The required accuracy depends on the application, but a standard order of magnitude for the desired accuracy is microseconds or less.
[0003] Generally, equipment seeking to determine a precise time uses GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) positioning, which makes it possible to accurately determine a position and time by measuring a pseudo-range with at least four satellites, the positions of the satellites being known. However, in some cases, broadcasting a time via a satellite network is not possible. This is the case, for example, when satellite visibility conditions are poor or disrupted, when there are no means of receiving satellite signals, or when it is not desired to rely on a GNSS network.
[0004] It is also possible to transmit precise time information via wired connections, but this solution is not applicable when the equipment is mobile or semi-mobile (i.e. fixed but movable).
[0005] Another solution consists of transmitting a time marker via three or more terrestrial time transfer beacons over a radio channel. Once the beacons are precisely synchronized (by wired channels or high-precision clocks) and their positions are transmitted or known to the equipment seeking to determine the network time, it is possible to calculate a distance to each beacon and deduce the equipment's position. This determination is performed in a manner comparable to GNSS positioning, by estimating pseudo-distances to each beacon, obtained by measuring the propagation time, and then by multilateration from the pseudo-distances.
[0006] One of the technical problems of the invention consists of providing a precise time service, and guaranteeing its integrity by detecting accidental failures of the beacons (such as the failure of the clock of a beacon or its problems of synchronization with other beacons or of location) or malicious acts (such as the movement of a time transfer beacon).
[0007] Integrity monitoring is a very common function in the field of positioning in air navigation, with RAIM-type algorithms (Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring). These algorithms are used to guarantee position service for GNSS-based navigation (Global Navigation Satellite System) in the face of potential satellite clock failures. Their objective is to provide, within a specified time frame, malfunction alerts when the positioning system no longer meets navigation accuracy requirements, for a given probability of non-detection and a given probability of false alarm. They make it possible to determine a protection zone 102 (also called an integrity zone) around the aircraft, shown in [Fig.[l], defined by a horizontal protection level (HPL) along the horizontal axis and a vertical protection level (VPL) along the vertical axis. Within the protection zone, the position of the wearer 101 is guaranteed with a given probability of non-detection of errors and false alarms. As long as the alert threshold is not exceeded and the protection zone 102 is less than an alert zone (or confidence zone) 103, defined by a horizontal alert limit (HAL) along the horizontal axis and a vertical alert limit (VAL) along the vertical axis, the integrity of the positioning solution is guaranteed. When the alert threshold is exceeded or when the protection zone exceeds the alert zone, the integrity of the positioning measurement is no longer guaranteed under the specified conditions.RAIM GNSS relies on an analysis of pseudo-distances calculated from at least 5 satellites for error detection, and at least 6 satellites for accuracy. capable of identifying and rejecting the defective satellite.
[0008] State-of-the-art integrity control methods, adapted for satellite positioning systems, apply to the positioning service but not to the time service, nor to failures based on position biases of time transfer beacons (for example, malicious movement of a beacon) in addition to failures based on clock biases of time transfer beacons (following, for example, a malfunction or spoofing).
[0009] An object of the invention is therefore to describe a method of broadcasting time and measuring the integrity of broadcast time, specifically adapted to the integral transfer of a time by a network of beacons, and for which a protection zone (in the form of an interval on the estimated time offset of the receiver clock) is defined with respect to a possible position or clock bias of one or more time transfer beacons. Summary of the invention
[0010] To this end, the present invention describes a method for broadcasting time and measuring the integrity of broadcast time for a receiver linked by radio frequency to at least four synchronized terrestrial time transfer beacons, each broadcasting a time message comprising a time marker and a transmission time. The described method comprises: - a first step of calculating the arrival time of the time messages transmitted by said terrestrial time transfer beacons, the positions of the terrestrial time transfer beacons being known by the receiver or transmitted to the receiver, and of determining a pseudo-distance measurement associated with each terrestrial time transfer beacon, - a second step of implementing a resolution algorithm optimizing a maximum likelihood criterion using the pseudodistances calculated in the first step and jointly solving the positions of the terrestrial time transfer beacons, the position of the receiver and the time offset of the receiver, - a third step of calculating a test variable T equal to the sum of the squared residuals of the positions of the receiver and the terrestrial time transfer beacons, weighted by variances of the positions of the receiver and the terrestrial time transfer beacons, - a fourth step of determining an alert threshold on the test variable T as a function of a given false alarm probability Pfa, and when the test variable T is greater than or equal to the alert threshold, raising an integrity loss alert, and otherwise - a fifth step of determining a non-centrality parameter X of the test variable T for the false alarm probability Pfa and for a given detection probability Pd, - a sixth step of determining a minimum detectable clock bias for each terrestrial time transfer beacon, from the test variable T and the non-centrality parameter X, - a seventh step of determining a minimum detectable position bias for each terrestrial time transfer beacon, based on the test variable T and the non-centrality parameter X, - an eighth step of determining a protection zone for the receiver's time-shift information calculated during the second step, based on the minimum detectable biases calculated during the sixth and seventh steps of the process, and raising an alert for loss of integrity when said protection zone is greater than or equal to an alert zone.
[0011] According to different embodiments, the algorithm using a maximum likelihood criterion implemented during the second step can be a Gauss-Newton algorithm or a Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm.
[0012] According to one embodiment, the second step of the time broadcasting and time integrity measurement method of the invention comprises: - the construction of a state vector X comprising an estimated position of the receiver, an estimated time offset of the receiver, and estimated positions of the terrestrial time transfer beacons, - the construction of an observation vector X' comprising the known or transmitted positions of the terrestrial time transfer beacons and the pseudo-distances calculated during the first step, the construction of a linearized observation vector Y comprising a difference between the known or transmitted positions of said at least three terrestrial time transfer beacons and their estimated positions, and a difference between the pseudo-distances calculated during the first step and the pseudo-distances constructed from the values of the state vector X, - the construction of a Jacobian matrix H from the state vector X and the observation vector X such that u- _ jh , and the iterative solution of the system, n “ ùx by calculating X = H* Y where H* is the left pseudo-inverse of the Jacobian matrix H.
[0013] According to one embodiment, the test variable T calculated during the third step of the process according to the invention follows a mathematical law of x2.
[0014] According to an embodiment of the time and measurement broadcasting method of a broadcast time integrity according to the invention, the eighth step of determining a time offset information protection zone includes the calculation of a maximum undetectable estimation error with a probability greater than or equal to the probability of detection Pd of a clock or position bias of one or more of the terrestrial time transfer beacons.
[0015] According to an embodiment of the method according to the invention in which the receiver is in radio frequency link with N synchronized terrestrial time transfer beacons each broadcasting a time message comprising a time marker and a time of transmission, with N greater than or equal to 5, when a loss of integrity alert is raised during the fourth step or during the eighth step, the method according to the invention is successively reimplemented on each subset of terrestrial time transfer beacons of size N - M, with 1 M < N - 4, so as to determine a subset of terrestrial time transfer beacons not raising an integrity alert in order to identify the time transfer station(s) affected by a clock bias or a position bias.
[0016] The invention also relates to radiocommunication equipment linked by radio frequency to at least four synchronized terrestrial time transfer beacons, each transmitting a time message comprising a time marker and a transmission time. This radiocommunication equipment includes a radio chain configured to receive and interpret the time message transmitted by the beacons. It further includes computing means configured to implement a method for broadcasting time and measuring the integrity of the broadcast time according to an embodiment of the invention.
[0017] The invention also relates to a computer program comprising program code instructions for executing the steps of the time broadcasting process and measuring the integrity of the broadcast time according to an embodiment of the invention when said program is executed on a computer.
[0018] Finally, the invention relates to a computer-readable recording medium on which this computer program is recorded. Brief description of the drawings
[0019] The invention will be better understood and other features, details and advantages will become clearer from the following description, given by way of non-limiting reason, and from the accompanying figures, given by way of example.
[0020] [Fig.1] Fig.1 illustrates the definition of a time lag information protection zone, and an alert zone around an aircraft.
[0021] [Fig.2] Fig.2 represents an operational configuration in which the time and integrity measurement method can be implemented. broadcast time according to the invention.
[0022] [Fig.3] Fig.3 schematically represents the steps of a time broadcasting process and measurement of the integrity of the broadcast time according to an embodiment of the invention.
[0023] [Fig.4] Fig.4 gives an example of a false alarm curve and a non-detection curve for a test variable such as that defined in the time broadcasting method and measurement of broadcast time integrity according to the invention. Description of the implementation methods
[0024] The invention applies to the case of a network of terrestrial time transfer beacons whose position is known, possibly imperfectly. This application is common when deploying a network temporarily on a site in the absence of GNSS service, or in the case of so-called "ad-hoc" networks (decentralized wireless networks not based on a fixed architecture of access points). In these networks, each node can act as a time transfer beacon, and thus contributes to the synchronization of the other nodes in the network. Since the nodes may be mobile or movable, their position is not necessarily known with great precision. The accuracy of the broadcast time may then not reach the desired levels of precision, particularly when the nodes are distant, even when the time transfer beacons are perfectly synchronized.
[0025] Figure 2 represents an equipment configuration in which a method for broadcasting time and measuring the integrity of broadcast time according to the invention can be implemented. It comprises a radiocommunication device 201 seeking to synchronize temporally with at least four terrestrial time transfer beacons 202 to 205 with which it is in radio contact. The terrestrial time transfer beacons may be mobile or fixed, and their positions may be known precisely or imperfectly.
[0026] In theory, the beacons must be synchronized very precisely, for example by incorporating high-precision clocks such as atomic clocks or by being connected to a wired or dedicated radio network implementing a precise synchronization mechanism. However, the method according to the invention takes into account any inaccuracies in the beacon positions. It also makes it possible to detect any clock or position bias in the time transfer beacons and, provided that the number of beacons is sufficient, to reject that beacon or those beacons.
[0027] Hereafter, we will consider that the network is planar, and that the unknowns relate only to orthogonal positions x and y in a horizontal plane, which is an approximation generally valid in the case of time transfer by Ground-based beacons. Only three time transfer beacons are then required to allow radio equipment to retrieve accurate time information. However, the invention also applies in three dimensions by adding the z-dimension orthogonal to x and y, in which case a minimum of four stations is required. Adding additional time transfer stations further improves the accuracy of time determination by smoothing out measurement noise.
[0028] In order to enable the detection of a beacon whose position or clock is biased, the time broadcasting and time integrity measurement method according to the invention requires at least one additional time transfer beacon, i.e., at least four beacons. One additional beacon, i.e., five time transfer beacons, makes it possible to identify the biased time transfer beacon.
[0029] The time broadcasting and time integrity measurement method according to the invention consists, firstly, of explicitly taking into account the positions of the time transfer beacons in a least-squares estimator in order to jointly estimate the beacon positions, the receiver position, and its time bias relative to the beacon array. Next, the estimator results are used with the pseudo-distance measurements to calculate a test variable and compare it with an alert threshold defined based on a specified false alarm rate. When the threshold is not exceeded, it then allows the calculation of a protection radius associated with the false alarm rate and a detection probability specifically targeting the time information transfer, and then comparing this protection radius with an alert radius.The protection radius is determined by quantifying the minimum detectable biases on the position or clock of one or more of the time transfer beacons. It therefore allows: - to detect any inconsistency in the pseudo-distance measurements, for a given probability of false alarm, and with a given probability of detecting a failure; - to reject erroneous tags (subject to sufficient redundancy of measures), - to guarantee a safety interval, or confidence zone, T AL (English acronym for Time Alert Level, or time alert level) of time information, within which the absence of failure detection is guaranteed to the probability of detection.
[0030] To this end, the method according to the invention identifies failures likely to affect the time transfer service, constructs the corresponding failure models, and then implements a specific integrity control algorithm adapted to the broadcasting of time information and to the identified failure models.
[0031] It assumes the existence of a radio waveform adapted to the need for time transfer by radio broadcasting, that is, the transmission by the beacons of a time message and a periodic clock pulse, which the radio receiver to be synchronized can receive and measure precisely. The time message contains the transmission time of the clock pulse, defined according to the reference time of the beacon network. The position of each beacon (potentially imprecise) can be transmitted in the time message, stored in the receiver, or transmitted to the receiver via a data link.
[0032] Figure 3 schematically represents the steps of a time broadcasting and time integrity measurement process according to an embodiment of the invention. It comprises the following steps: - a step 301 of pseudo-range measurements with at least four time-transfer terrestrial beacons, the positions of the time-transfer terrestrial beacons being known by or transmitted to the receiver, and of determination of a pseudo-range measurement PD; associated with each time-transfer terrestrial beacon, - a step 302 implementing a solution algorithm optimizing a maximum likelihood criterion using the pseudo-distances PD; calculated in step 301 and jointly solving the position of the terrestrial time transfer beacons, the position of the receiver and the time offset of the receiver relative to the terrestrial time transfer beacons, - a step 303 calculating a test variable T equal to the sum of the squared residuals (vector of differences between the observed and predicted measurements) of the positions of the receiver and the terrestrial time transfer beacons, weighted by variances of the positions of the receiver and the terrestrial time transfer beacons, - a step 304 of determining an alert threshold on the variable T, based on a given false alarm probability. When the variable T is greater than or equal to the alert threshold, a loss of integrity alert is raised, meaning that one of the beacons is very likely (relative to the false alarm probability) affected by a clock or position bias, and the process can be stopped at this step (for the cycle considered). - a step 305 of determining a non-centrality parameter 2 of the law of the / 2 followed by the test variable T for the given false alarm probability and for a given detection probability, - a step 306 of determining a minimum detectable clock bias for each terrestrial time transfer beacon, from the test variable T and the non-centrality parameter 2, - a step 307 for determining a minimum detectable position bias for each terrestrial time transfer beacon, from the test variable T and the non-centrality parameter X, a step 308 of determining a protection zone for the receiver time-shift information calculated in the second step 302, from the minimum detectable biases calculated in steps 306 and 307, and comparing the protection zone with an alert zone to determine if the receiver time-shift measurement is intact.
[0033] Step 301 is a usual step for a person skilled in the art, which consists of detecting the synchronization peaks in the signals transmitted by the N terrestrial time transfer beacons to determine an arrival time of the signal, and comparing them with their transmission times, transmitted in the time message contained in the signal, in order to calculate a time difference, and consequently a pseudo-distance between the receiver and the terrestrial time transfer beacons with which it is in radio contact.
[0034] The measurements of the arrival times of the time markers follow a normal law N(0, at), with the standard deviation on the measurements of arrival times of the signals.
[0035] The pseudo-distance PD; measured between the time transfer beacon i and the receiver is PD; = c(TOAi + At - Te; + e;) = d; + c. At + ce;, with: TOAi the arrival time of the synchronization top in the signal from beacon i, measured by the receiver from its local clock, Te; the transmission time by the beacon of the synchronization top, time measured according to the time reference of the beacon system and transmitted in the time message, At the receiver clock bias, i.e. the difference between the beacon system time and the receiver's local clock time, e; a Gaussian white noise affecting the measurement i, c the speed of light (speed of propagation of the radio signal), and di the distance between the beacon i and the receiver.
[0036] Step 302 consists of simultaneously estimating the position of the carrier, its clock bias At, and the position of each terrestrial time transfer beacon using an algorithm that optimizes a maximum likelihood criterion. This step can be implemented, for example, by a Gauss-Newton algorithm, well known to those skilled in the art, or by an equivalent least-squares algorithm, such as a Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm.
[0037] For a solution by a Gauss-Newton algorithm, step 302 includes the construction of a state vector X comprising the estimated position p of the receiver, the estimated clock bias and the estimated positions p of the terrestrial transfer beacons of time, with for example the estimated x of the vector X constructed as follows:
[0039] The vector p comprises the set of p's. The indices x and y are the decomposition positions respectively along the x-axis or the y-axis of the orthonormal plane in which The measurements are taken.
[0040] Hereafter, we will denote by Aj the positions of the known or transmitted terrestrial time transfer beacons to the receiver, Pi their exact positions, and A the vector comprising the set of A^ with A, - P, + / / being the positioning error initial of the terrestrial time transfer beacon, and PD the vector comprising the set of pseudodistances PD{.
[0041] Step 302 also includes the construction of a 3' observation vector including the At positions of the terrestrial time transfer beacons and the pseudo distances, or A, and its linearized counterpart Y including the gap between the PD\ Ai positions of terrestrial time transfer beacons and p positions estimated at the previous iteration, and the difference between the pseudo-distances PD; and pseudo-distances constructed from the estimated positions p of the receiver and p of the time-transfer terrestrial beacons, and the estimated time lag between the receiver and the beacons, i.e.
[0042] 41 Al 41-41
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[0053] .PD-dc.Xt. ^xN " ^xN A 4^ ■ 4v PD r d r c.Xt with j the distance between the estimated position p of the receiver and the estimated position p of the time-transfer terrestrial beacon of index i, and j the vector constructed from the j. During the first iteration, the estimated positions p of the terrestrial beacons of time transfers are equal to their known or transmitted positions to receiver A, and the estimated time shift is zero. The solution to the problem is obtained by solving the equation: Y = HX + e, where H is a Jacobian resolution matrix, and e is centered random noise When the terrestrial time transfer beacons are not affected by clock or position bias, the Jacobian matrix H is: By construction, . and 44^ _ .. Therefore: dp. ~ 1 dp* “ 1 ■âf = [o 0 ... 0 1 0 Cf A u -ÿd- — [ 0 0 ■ ■ ■ 0 0 1 OA L By design, as always: WD; [ P^P* , MWWWWV 222J I »■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■ _ ■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■ | L d< such that: -]■ 0 0 4^ 44 0 0 di cl;
[0054] 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 ■ ■ ■ • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 H = 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Py^Py hrA. d । 1 ErE E 0 0 0 0 PyN^. 1 P^E dN 1 0 0 0 0 P^y E En-E
[0055] During the first iteration of the solution algorithm by optimizing a maximum likelihood criterion, the matrix H is calculated by taking as the receiver position p an initial position estimate obtained by any method, such as multilateration on the measured pseudo-distances PD, or more advantageously by a pseudo-linear estimation method based on a clause-form implemented on the measured pseudo-distances, that is to say, a form directly giving the desired solution in the absence of noise. The initial positions of the time-transfer ground beacons used are the positions known to the receiver or transmitted to it. In subsequent iterations, the values of the Y matrix and the H matrix are recalculated from the values contained in the state vector x calculated during the previous iteration of the algorithm.
[0056] The observation covariance matrix is:
[0057]
[0058] Or : T / z is the error covariance matrix on the knowledge of the beacon positions, where aP is the standard deviation on the measurements of the co position coordinates and I2N the identity matrix of size 2N, is the covariance matrix of the PD pseudo-distance measures;, with L;; = E^PD^'PD1) = c^IN.
[0059] An efficient estimator is the maximum likelihood estimator. The noise being generally assumed to be a centered Gaussian random vector, the maximum likelihood estimator then coincides with the least squares estimator weighted, and has the following expression:
[0060] v _ (
[0061] The matrix is jj*_
[0062] The covariance matrix of the estimator is:
[0063] r± = (h^h)' 1 .
[0064] The equations given above are formed from matrices arranged in a specific organization for illustrative purposes only. The same results can be obtained by arranging the matrices differently, for example by permuting their rows, without affecting the accuracy of the calculations or the results obtained.
[0065] Step 302 of the method according to the invention performs the joint optimization of the receiver's position, its clock bias, and the positions of the time transfer beacons. This joint optimization makes it possible to account for any inaccuracies in the position of the time transfer beacons when calculating the receiver's clock bias, so as to calculate an optimal receiver time offset, even when the beacon positions are not very precise. However, this result is biased if one of the time transfer beacons suffers from a position bias or a time bias, since the estimator is based on an assumption of centered Gaussian white noise and cannot correct measurements whose noise is outside the assumption, such as non-centered position measurements. Furthermore, the time transfer stations are assumed to be perfectly synchronized.Therefore, the method according to the invention aims, in the following steps, to determine a protection zone for time-shift information, taking into account any potential position or clock bias of the terrestrial time transfer beacons.
[0066] To this end, it includes a third step 303, during which a test variable T is calculated and subsequently used to determine a time-shift information protection zone around the receiver.
[0067] This variable T is constructed as equal to the sum of the squares of the variance-weighted residuals, that is, the square of the Mahalanobis distance between the measure vector Y and the theoretical measures HX associated with the estimated state x, i.e., T = AY*T'}. AY with AF the sum of the squares of the residuals, and F the covariance matrix of the pseudodistance measures.
[0068] The sum of the squared (linearized) residuals AY is equal to AY = Y - HX = Y-HH^Y = Y-
[0069] Thus, by setting q-^j_ HH^F^! - onaT - YSGY-
[0070] When the system is just determined, that is to say there are only three time transfer tags, the test variable T is necessarily equal to 0. It is therefore not possible to identify the presence of a bias on one of the tags.
[0071] When the system is overdetermined, that is to say, when there are more than three beacons of In time transfer, the test variable T follows a chi-squared distribution with K - N - 3 degrees of freedom. We say that T~%2(K).
[0072] When the measures are unbiased, AY is centered and the x2 law is centered.
[0073] When the position or clock of one of the time transfer ground beacons is biased, the x2 distribution is off-center. T then follows a non-centered x2 distribution of order K.
[0074] Step 304 of the method according to the invention consists of determining an alert threshold on the variable T, as a function of a given probability of false alarm, and of raising an alert of loss of integrity in the event of exceeding this alert threshold.
[0075] The alert threshold is calculated by observing the cumulative distribution function of the test variable T. The decision threshold Td for the test variable T is positioned relative to a false alarm probability Pfa of the given integrity function, and is equal to s2, where s is the value of the alert threshold over the Mahalanobis distance. A value of T greater than or equal to Td triggers an integrity loss alert, and generally means, i.e., according to the specified false alarm rate, that one of the time transfer terrestrial beacons is affected by a bias, and that the time service is not functioning properly.
[0076] We have F^s2, K) — 1-Pfa, with F^s2, K) the value at point S2 of the cumulative distribution function of the K-order centered X2 distribution. Therefore: I0077! 5=^(1-^ Kf
[0078] The threshold can therefore be easily determined for the given false alarm probability, thanks to the distribution function of the K-centered X2 law. Since it is a value that does not depend on the pseudo-distance measurements, it can also be calculated upstream and stored in memory.
[0079] When the variable T is greater than or equal to the threshold s, an alert is raised and the process can be stopped at this stage (for the cycle considered) since at least one of the measurements taken from the terrestrial time transfer beacons is probably biased and the time service is not intact.
[0080] Otherwise, the method includes a fifth step 305 of determining a non-centrality parameter X of the test variable T for the same false alarm probability, and for a given detection probability. This step includes determining the non-centrality parameter 2 of the χ² distribution followed by the test variable T for a specified detection probability Pj and for the false alarm probability Pfa. For this, the following relationship is used:
[0081] F^s2 K,À) = 1-Pd
[0082] with F?(52, K, À ) the distribution function of the K-order X2 law off-center by a parameter 2 at the point v 2 (determined in the previous step) and Pd the probability of detection of a specified failure (bias on the position or clock measurements of one of the time transfer land beacons).
[0083] Therefore, the non-centrality parameter A for a given false alarm probability and a given detection probability is:
[0084] 2 = K, 1-Pd).
[0085] Figure 4 gives an example of positioning the threshold v2 401 in relation to a given false alarm probability 402, and represents the detection probability 403 of the test variable.
[0086] Subsequently, the impact on the test variable T of two types of bias on the time transfer tags are considered and referenced by an index j: a clock bias (j = 0) and a position bias (j = 1).
[0087] The sixth step 306 of the method according to the invention consists of determining the minimum detectable clock bias for each time transfer beacon, from the test variable T and the non-centrality parameter X, i.e., for the given false alarm probability and detection probability. This step consists of characterizing the minimum detectable bias Bminjj in the case of a "scalar" bias corresponding to a clock bias (j = 0) on one of the time transfer beacons.
[0088] The clock bias on the terrestrial time transfer beacon of index / (with / varying between 0 and N) and for a scalar bias model (J = 0) translates on the test variable T by a decentering of the law of the J2 of non-centrality parameter ^i,j.
[0089] We have:
[0090] = =
[0091] Since the non-centrality parameter is defined by 2 and increases with the bias, the minimum detectable bias for the failure and the measurement(s) considered can be determined by finding the solution to the equation:
[0092]
[0093] Since the failures are characterized by biases of the form = b.Wj where b is a real scalar and Vf2 is a binary vector zero except at the position of the pseudodistance measurement relative to the time transfer beacon i considered, we have:
[0094] « _ / r~~~\ \^w'GWt / '
[0095] A bias Bi0 results in an estimation error AX of the state vector X-. During a failure with a bias less than Btni / h Oj, the maximum error in the estimation of the state vector is given by XmaxiQ = . 0-
[0096] The seventh step 307 of the method according to the invention consists of determining the minimum detectable position bias for each time-transfer terrestrial beacon, from the test variable T and the non-centrality parameter X, i.e., for the given false alarm probability and detection probability. This step consists of characterizing the minimum detectable bias Bmi^ in the case of a position bias
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[0110] [YES]
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[0117] 2D (y = 1) on a terrestrial time transfer beacon. The BtA bias is the sum of a bias on the x-coordinate and on the y-coordinate of the transfer beacon's position, such that: BU = where Wxi (respectively) is a zero binary vector except at the x (respectively y) coordinate of the position of the time transfer beacon i considered. The position bias BjA translates on the test variable T into a shift in the chi-square distribution, with a non-centrality parameter. A failure in the position measurement of the time transfer beacon i exhibiting the smallest detectable bias (i.e., detection probability Pd) satisfies: with T ( BL} ) = B[(l-HH* ) B^ = B^GB^. We deduce two possible values of by as a function of bx when T (B) = A ■ -G ( x^y. ] b G ( ) by-G ( y^y. ] ( Z^G ( ) -À ) bx “ / , G(y^) with xi and y, the coordinates of the terrestrial time transfer beacon of index i. The error AX associated with the bias Bu affecting the state vector x is: A = H*B« = b^W^b^Wy^ The minimum detectable bias B„,;„ , i = (Bm;„ri i, Bmi„v , d for measurement i in the case of a 2D position bias on a time transfer beacon (J = 1) corresponding to the largest estimation bias O can therefore be determined by finding the maximum of the function r^b^) for bx varying between 0 and BmaxxJA, considering the two possible solutions for by, with B M AXx,U = ( ) ^1- It is not necessary to examine the negative solutions of bx because the maxima are identical for the opposite solutions. We then have: = argmaxt^) For with r,(b} = \b,H VJr] + byH'w^ the notation V[t] denoting the time component of a state vector V, and
[0118]
[0119]
[0120]
[0121]
[0122]
[0123]
[0124]
[0125]
[0126]
[0127]
[0128] n _ "G( G ¢. -W / ) ( y^) ) ( B^-jyG ( X^ ) -2 ) 1 — ~7 \ • The eighth step 308 of the method according to the invention consists of determining a protection zone for the receiver's time-shift information calculated in the second step 302, from the minimum detectable biases calculated in steps 306 and 307, and comparing it with an alert zone (or confidence zone). This protection zone associated with the time broadcasting service corresponds to a TPL (Time Protection Level) circle whose radius is equal to the maximum undetectable bias on the state vector estimation, associated with the ith measurement and the jth type of failure, that is: T PL- with : - in the case of a clock bias on a time transfer beacon (j — 0) ) Wp pOUr * = * ' • ' N - in the case of a position bias on a time transfer beacon (j = 1) = max(BmM)H*Wxi + blyiH*Wyn + l)2yiH*Wyi) for i — 1, ..., N, with bly.i = -G (xi yi)B„lmx^G(xi yi)vi.vG (Br!mv<^G(xi xi)-) G(yi, yi) b2y,i = -c(xi,yi)B^^+yjG(xi, yi) ''B„mu:^ yi) {BmiruJfG(xi, xi)-) G(yi, yi) In the absence of an alert at the fourth step 304 of the process, the TPL protection zone on the time service is then guaranteed with a given probability Pj (i.e. an integrity risk 1- Pd) and a given false alarm probability P fa as long as the temporal protection radius is less than the alert boundary, i.e. as long as the protection zone of the time offset information is included in the confidence zone (TPL < TAL). However, the time service is no longer guaranteed under the defined integrity conditions when: • an alert is triggered, i.e. when T > Td (fifth step of the process), and / or • TPL > TAL. The time broadcasting and time integrity measurement method described above allows for the detection of position or synchronization bias on one of the terrestrial time transfer beacons. When the number of beacons is five or more, it also allows for the determination and correction of reject the biased tag.
[0129] To this end, when the test variable T exceeds the alert threshold Td (fourth step 304 of the method according to the invention) or when the protection zone (or integrity zone) TPL defined in the eighth step 308 of the method according to the invention is greater than or equal to the alert zone (or confidence zone) TAL, the method is repeated N times, each time considering the signals from a group of N - 1 different beacons. Only one of these tests will result in both an absence of an alert on the test variable and the definition of a protection zone smaller than the alert zone, thus directly identifying the biased time transfer beacon. This beacon can then be excluded from the implementation of the time transfer method according to the invention, thereby ensuring more accurate time service.
[0130] The same principle can be extended to the determination of sets of M terrestrial time transfer beacons affected by a position or time bias, by implementing the method on groups of beacons in such a way as to successively exclude each possible set of M beacons, provided that N -M is greater than or equal to 4.
[0131] The invention therefore relates to a method of broadcasting time and measuring the integrity of broadcast time for a radio frequency receiving terminal with at least four synchronized terrestrial time transfer beacons each broadcasting a time message including a time marker and a time of transmission, but also on the terminal itself.
[0132] Such a terminal must have a radio chain enabling it to receive and interpret the time message broadcast by the beacons to determine an arrival time of time markers, and computing means enabling it to implement the process, such as for example a microprocessor, a DSP (English acronym for Digital Signal Processor), an FPGA (English acronym for Field Programmable Gate Array), an ASIC (English acronym for Application-Specific Integrated Circuit), any combination of these means, or any hardware component enabling it to perform the aforementioned functions.
[0133] Finally, it relates to a computer program comprising program code instructions for the execution of the steps of the time broadcasting and time integrity measurement process according to the invention when said program is executed on a computer, as well as on a computer-readable recording medium on which such a computer program is recorded.
Claims
1. Claims Method for broadcasting time and measuring the integrity of the broadcast time for a receiver (101) in radiofrequency connection with at least four synchronized terrestrial time transfer beacons (102, 103, 104) each broadcasting a time message comprising a time marker and a transmission time, the method for broadcasting time and measuring the integrity of the broadcast time being characterized in that it comprises: - a first step (301) of calculating an arrival time of the time messages transmitted by said terrestrial time transfer beacons, the positions of said terrestrial time transfer beacons being known by the receiver or transmitted to the receiver, and of determining a pseudodistance measurement associated with each terrestrial time transfer beacon, - a second step (302) of implementing a resolution algorithm optimizing a maximum likelihood criterion using the pseudo-distances calculated in the first step (301) and jointly resolving the positions of the terrestrial time transfer beacons, the position of the receiver and the time offset of the receiver, - a third step (303) of calculating a test variable T equal to the sum of the square of the residuals of the positions of the receiver and the terrestrial time transfer beacons, weighted by variances of the positions of the receiver and the terrestrial time transfer beacons, - a fourth step (304) of determining an alert threshold on the test variable T as a function of a given false alarm probability Pfa, and when the test variable T is greater than or equal to said alert threshold, of raising a loss of integrity alert, and otherwise - a fifth step (305) of determining a non-centrality parameter 2 of the test variable T for said false alarm probability Pfa and for a given detection probability Pd, - a sixth step (306) of determining a minimum detectable clock bias for each terrestrial transfer beacon of time, from the test variable T and the non-centrality parameter 2, - a seventh step (307) of determining a minimum detectable position bias for each terrestrial time transfer beacon, from the test variable T and the non-centrality parameter 2, - an eighth step (308) of determining a protection zone for the receiver time offset information calculated during the second step (302), from the minimum detectable biases calculated during the sixth step (306) and the seventh step (307) of the method, and of raising a loss of integrity alert when said protection zone is greater than or equal to an alert zone.
2. A method of broadcasting time and measuring integrity of broadcast time according to claim 1, wherein the algorithm using a maximum likelihood criterion implemented in the second step (302) is a Gauss-Newton algorithm or a Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm.
3. A method of broadcasting time and measuring an integrity of the broadcast time according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the second step (302) comprises: - constructing a state vector X comprising an estimated position of the receiver, an estimated time offset of the receiver, and estimated positions of said terrestrial time transfer beacons, - constructing an observation vector y comprising the known or transmitted positions of said terrestrial time transfer beacons and the pseudo-distances calculated during the first step (301), constructing a linearized observation vector Y comprising a difference between the known or transmitted positions of said at least three terrestrial time transfer beacons and their estimated positions, and a difference between the pseudo-distances calculated during the first step (301) and pseudo-distances constructed from the values of the state vector X,- the construction of a Jacobian matrix H from the vector, of state X and the observation vector such that ej _ , and the re- dx iterative solution of the system, by calculating x = H*Y-
4. A method of broadcasting time and measuring integrity of broadcast time according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the test variable T calculated in the third step (303) follows a mathematical law of x1.
5. A method of broadcasting time and measuring an integrity of the broadcast time according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the eighth step (308) of determining a protection zone of the time offset information comprises calculating a maximum estimation error not detectable with a probability greater than or equal to the detection probability Pd of a clock or position bias of one or more of the terrestrial time transfer beacons.
6. Method for broadcasting time and measuring the integrity of the broadcast time according to one of the preceding claims, in which the receiver (101) is in radiofrequency link with N synchronized terrestrial time transfer beacons each broadcasting a time message comprising a time marker and a transmission time, with N greater than or equal to 5, and where when a loss of integrity alert is raised during the fourth step (304) or during the eighth step (308), the method is re-implemented successively on each subset of terrestrial time transfer beacons of size N - M, with 1 £ M < N - 4, so as to determine a subset of terrestrial time transfer beacons not raising a loss of integrity alert in order to identify the time transfer station(s) affected by a clock bias or a position bias.
7. Radiocommunications equipment (101) in radiofrequency link with at least four synchronized terrestrial time transfer beacons (102, 103, 104) each broadcasting a time message comprising a time marker and a transmission time, the radiocommunications equipment comprising a radio chain configured to receive and interpret the time message transmitted by the terrestrial time transfer beacons, the radiocommunications equipment being characterized in that it further comprises calculation means configured to implement a method for broadcasting time and measuring an integrity of the broadcast time according to one of the re- previous claims.
8. A computer program comprising program code instructions for performing the steps of the method of broadcasting time and measuring an integrity of the broadcast time according to one of claims 1 to 6 when said program is executed on a computer.
9. A computer-readable recording medium having a computer program recorded thereon according to claim 8.
