Storing the diagnostic state of a secure virtual machine

JP2024533120A5Pending Publication Date: 2024-11-08INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINE CORPORATION
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Patent Information

Application Number
JP2024513747
Authority / Receiving Office
JP · JP
Patent Type
Applications
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2021-09-14
Filing Date
2022-09-12
Publication Date
2024-11-08

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Secure virtual machines cannot be accessed by hypervisors or administrators for diagnostic purposes due to security risks, as doing so could expose sensitive information like encryption keys or secret documents.

Method used

A method and system for securely storing the diagnostic state of a virtual machine by encrypting it before it can be read by untrusted entities, using application programming interfaces and cryptographic keys to manage access and encryption.

Benefits of technology

Ensures the security of the virtual machine's state is maintained while allowing diagnostic access, reducing processing complexity and improving system performance by minimizing unnecessary encryption and decryption cycles.

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Abstract

At least one request to store a diagnostic state of the virtual machine is obtained. A storing of the diagnostic state of the virtual machine is performed to provide a stored diagnostic state of the virtual machine based on obtaining the at least one request. The performing of the storing includes encrypting the diagnostic state of the virtual machine that is stored in the unencrypted form and preventing reading of the diagnostic state of the virtual machine by an untrusted entity prior to encrypting the diagnostic state of the virtual machine that is stored in the unencrypted form.
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Description

[Technical field]

[0001] One or more aspects relate generally to facilitating processing within a computing environment, and in particular to improving such processing. [Background technology]

[0002] A virtual machine diagnostic state save (also known as a virtual machine dump) provides the state of a virtual machine to a file for subsequent analysis. This save is often used to find the root cause of a virtual machine failure. The virtual machine state may include, for example, a copy of selected registers of one or more central processing units of the virtual machine in addition to a copy of the virtual machine's memory.

[0003] Some virtual machines are secure virtual machines, in which the computer system's hardware and firmware deny access to the state of the secure virtual machine, except to special memory areas that the virtual machine actively designates as shared. Such virtual machines cannot be accessed by the hypervisor, as would normally be possible, nor by administrators of the operating system that hosts the virtual machine. Access to the virtual machine's state means that authorized entities on the host system can read sensitive information, such as encryption keys or private documents, from the virtual machine's memory, which is a security risk.

[0004] Processing related to virtual machines, including storing the diagnostic state of a virtual machine, such as a secure virtual machine, should be facilitated. Summary of the Invention

[0005] Shortcomings of the prior art are overcome and additional advantages are provided by the provision of a computer program product for facilitating processing within a computing environment. The computer program product includes one or more computer readable storage media and program instructions collectively stored on the one or more computer readable storage media for performing a method. The method includes obtaining at least one request to store a diagnostic state of the virtual machine. Based on obtaining the at least one request, a storing of the diagnostic state of the virtual machine is performed to provide a stored diagnostic state of the virtual machine. The storing includes encrypting the unencrypted stored diagnostic state of the virtual machine and preventing reading of the diagnostic state of the virtual machine by an untrusted entity prior to encrypting the unencrypted stored diagnostic state of the virtual machine.

[0006] A diagnostic state of a virtual machine (eg, a secure virtual machine) may be stored while maintaining the security of the virtual machine's state being stored for diagnostic purposes.

[0007] As examples, the stored diagnostic state of a virtual machine may include the contents of the virtual machine's memory, or the stored diagnostic state of a virtual machine may include the contents of one or more processor registers of the virtual machine, or both.

[0008] In one example, a diagnostic state storage initiation request is obtained to initiate storage of a diagnostic state of a virtual machine. The diagnostic state storage initiation request is used to obtain a first encryption key for use in encrypting at least a portion of the diagnostic state of the virtual machine that is stored unencrypted.

[0009] In one example, obtaining the at least one request includes obtaining a diagnostic processor state store request. Performing the storing of the diagnostic state based on obtaining the diagnostic processor state store request includes, for example, encrypting at least selected content of at least one processor of the virtual machine using a first encryption key to provide the encrypted processor content, and storing the encrypted processor content.

[0010] In one example, obtaining the at least one request includes obtaining a transformation request from the secure memory. Performing storing of the diagnostic state based on obtaining the transformation request from the secure memory includes, for example, encrypting at least selected contents of the unencrypted virtual machine memory using a second encryption key, providing the encrypted contents of the memory, and storing the encrypted contents of the memory.

[0011] As an example, performing storing of the diagnostic state based on obtaining a conversion request from the secure memory may include, for example, determining whether the unit of memory whose contents are to be stored is encrypted and, based on a determination that the unit of memory is not encrypted, encrypting the unit of memory using a second encryption key, where the unit of memory that is encrypted is not re-encrypted.

[0012] By encrypting unencrypted content (and not re-encrypting the encrypted state), processing cycles and complexity are reduced, improving system performance.

[0013] In one example, the stored diagnostic state includes the encrypted contents of the memory. Further, in one example, a diagnostic memory state store request is obtained and metadata used to decrypt the encrypted contents of the memory based on obtaining the diagnostic memory state store request is stored.

[0014] By way of example, this metadata includes one or more selected component values ​​that are used to create one or more selected values ​​that are used to decrypt encrypted content in memory.

[0015] In one example, a completion request to complete the storage of the diagnostic state is obtained, and based on obtaining the completion request, data used to decrypt the encrypted and stored diagnostic state of the virtual machine is provided.

[0016] By way of example, this data includes a second encryption key used in decrypting the encrypted contents of the memory and a nonce value used to create one or more selected values ​​used in the encryption. Further, in one example, at least a portion of the data is encrypted.

[0017] Computer-implemented methods and systems relating to one or more aspects are also described and claimed herein. Additionally, services relating to one or more aspects may also be described and claimed herein.

[0018] Additional features and advantages are realized by the techniques described herein.Other embodiments and aspects are described in detail herein and are considered a part of the claimed aspects.

[0019] One or more aspects are particularly pointed out and distinctly claimed as examples in the claims at the end of this specification. The foregoing, as well as objects, features, and advantages of the one or more aspects, will become apparent from the following detailed description taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. [Brief description of the drawings]

[0020] [Figure 1] FIG. 1 illustrates an example of a computing environment for incorporating and using one or more aspects of the present invention. [Diagram 2]FIG. 1 illustrates one example of storing a diagnostic state of a configuration (e.g., a virtual machine), also referred to as performing a configuration dump, in accordance with one or more aspects of the present invention. [Diagram 3] FIG. 2 illustrates an example of a configuration dump initiation control block in accordance with one or more aspects of the present invention. [Figure 4A] FIG. 2 illustrates an example of a central processing unit (CPU) state dump control block in accordance with one or more aspects of the present invention. [Figure 4B] FIG. 2 illustrates an example of a secure central processing unit dump area in accordance with one or more aspects of the present invention. [Figure 4C] FIG. 2 illustrates one example of a translation control block from secure storage for use in accordance with one or more aspects of the present invention. [Diagram 5] FIG. 2 illustrates an example of a configuration storage state dump control block in accordance with one or more aspects of the present invention. [Figure 6] FIG. 2 illustrates an example of a configuration dump completion control block in accordance with one or more aspects of the present invention. [Figure 7A] FIG. 1 illustrates an example that facilitates processing in a computing environment in accordance with one or more aspects of the present invention. [Figure 7B] FIG. 1 illustrates an example that facilitates processing in a computing environment in accordance with one or more aspects of the present invention. [Figure 7C] FIG. 1 illustrates an example that facilitates processing in a computing environment in accordance with one or more aspects of the present invention. [Figure 8A] FIG. 1 illustrates another example of a computing environment for incorporating and using one or more aspects of the present invention. [Figure 8B] 8B illustrates further details of the memory of FIG. 8A in accordance with one or more aspects of the present invention. [Figure 9]FIG. 1 illustrates one embodiment of a cloud computing environment in accordance with one or more aspects of the present invention. [Figure 10] FIG. 2 illustrates an example of an abstract model layer in accordance with one or more aspects of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS

[0021] In accordance with one or more aspects of the present invention, capabilities are provided to facilitate processing within a computing environment. By way of example, the capabilities include techniques whereby a diagnostic state of a virtual machine (e.g., a secure virtual machine) may be stored (also referred to as dumped) while maintaining the security of the stored virtual machine's state. By way of example, the diagnostic state is encrypted before being made readable by an untrusted entity (e.g., a hypervisor).

[0022] In one example, the contents of the virtual machine's memory to be stored (i.e., dumped) for diagnostic analysis may be encrypted, for example, by using a selected key (also referred to as a first encryption key) referred to as a dump key. For example, memory that has been paged out and is currently encrypted using a paging key (also referred to as a second encryption key) is decrypted and re-encrypted using the selected key. As another example, in accordance with an aspect of the present invention, instead of re-encrypting the encrypted memory (encrypted using a paging key) to reduce the complexity and the number of central processing unit cycles used, a chosen unique value (e.g., a fine-tune value) for a unit of memory (e.g., a page of memory) is provided, and the paging key is encrypted using a selected key. Thus, pages that have been paged out do not need to be re-encrypted in order to be dumped, and only pages that have not yet been encrypted are re-encrypted in order to be dumped. To further illustrate, each unit of memory is given a value, e.g., an unsigned integer, referred to as a fine-tune value or chosen unique value. These values ​​are assigned consecutively, starting with an arbitrary integer. This value may, for example, be converted into a little-endian byte array and encryption of this value may be performed, for example using the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm.

[0023] In one or more aspects, an application programming interface is provided and used that uses instructions called Ultravisor Calls to securely facilitate storing a dump or diagnostic of a virtual machine (e.g., a secure virtual machine). The Ultravisor Call instructions are used to initiate one or more commands used to store the diagnostic state of the secure virtual machine. These commands include, for example, an initiate configuration dump command, a central processing unit state dump command, a convert from secure storage command, a configuration storage state dump command, and a configuration dump complete command, each of which is described further below.

[0024] One embodiment of a computing environment for incorporating and using one or more aspects of the present invention is described with reference to FIG. 1. By way of example, the computing environment is based on the z / Architecture® instruction set architecture provided by International Business Machines Corporation (Armonk, NY). One embodiment of the z / Architecture instruction set architecture is described in “z / Architecture Principles of Operation,” IBM Publication No. SA22-7832-12, Thirteenth Edition, September 2019, which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. However, the z / Architecture instruction set architecture is only one exemplary architecture, and other architectures or types of computing environments or both of International Business Machines Corporation or other entities may include and / or use one or more aspects of the present invention. z / Architecture and IBM are trademarks or registered trademarks of International Business Machines Corporation in at least one jurisdiction.

[0025] Referring to FIG. 1, in one example, a computing environment 100 includes a central processor complex (CPC) 102. The central processor complex 102 may be, for example, an IBM Z® server (or other server or machine provided by International Business Machines Corporation or another entity) and may include multiple components, such as, for example, one or more processor units (also referred to as processors) 110 and memory 104 (also referred to as system memory, main memory, primary storage, central storage, storage) coupled to an input / output (I / O) subsystem 111. Examples of processor units 110 include one or more general purpose processors (also known as central processors or central processing units (CPUs)) and / or one or more other processors. IBM Z is a trademark or registered trademark of International Business Machines Corporation in at least one jurisdiction.

[0026] The I / O subsystem 111 may be part of a central processor complex or may be separate from the central processor complex. The I / O subsystem 111 directs the flow of information between main memory 104 and the input / output control unit 108 and input / output (I / O) devices 106 coupled to the central processor complex.

[0027] Many types of I / O devices may be used. One particular type is a data storage device 140. The data storage device 140 may store one or more programs 142, one or more computer readable program instructions 144, or data, or a combination thereof, etc. The computer readable program instructions may be configured to perform the functions of an embodiment of an aspect of the present invention.

[0028] Central processing unit complex 102 may include and / or be coupled to removable / non-removable, volatile / non-volatile computer system storage media. For example, central processing unit complex 102 may include and / or be coupled to non-removable, non-volatile magnetic media (commonly referred to as "hard drives"), magnetic disk drives for reading from and writing to removable, non-volatile magnetic disks (e.g., "floppy disks"), and / or optical disk drives for reading from and writing to removable, non-volatile optical disks, such as CD-ROMs, DVD-ROMs, or other optical media. It should be understood that other hardware and / or software components may be used with central processing unit complex 102, including, but not limited to, microcode or millicode, device drivers, redundant processing units, external disk drive arrays, RAID systems, tape drives, and data archive storage systems.

[0029] Additionally, central processing unit complex 102 may operate in numerous other general purpose or special purpose computing system environments or configurations. Examples of well-known computing systems, environments, or configurations, or combinations thereof, that may be suitable for use with central processing unit complex 102 include, but are not limited to, personal computer (PC) systems, server computer systems, thin clients, thick clients, handheld or laptop devices, microprocessor systems, microprocessor-based systems, set-top boxes, programmable consumer electronics, network PCs, microcomputer systems, mainframe computer systems, and distributed cloud computing environments that include any of these systems or devices.

[0030] Central processing unit complex 102, in one or more embodiments, supports virtualization in which, for example, memory 104 includes one or more virtual machines 112 (also referred to as guests), a virtual machine manager such as hypervisor 114 that manages the virtual machines, trusted execution environment 115, and processor firmware 116. One example of hypervisor 114 is the z / VM® hypervisor offered by International Business Machines Corporation of Armonk, New York. A hypervisor may be referred to as a host. z / VM is a trademark or registered trademark of International Business Machines Corporation in at least one jurisdiction.

[0031] In one or more embodiments, the trusted execution environment 115 may be implemented at least in part in hardware and / or firmware configured to execute processes, for example, as described herein. The trusted execution environment is a trusted firmware (called an ultravisor) and / or hardware that utilizes memory protection hardware to enforce memory protection. The owner of the guest can securely pass information to the trusted execution environment (e.g., using IBM Secure Execution) by using a public host key embedded in a host key document. To process sensitive information, the trusted execution environment uses a matching private host key. The private host key is specific to the server (e.g., an IBM Z® server) and is hardware protected.

[0032] Processor firmware 116 may include, for example, the microcode or millicode of the processor. Processor firmware 116 may include, for example, hardware level instructions and / or data structures used in implementing higher level machine code. In one embodiment, processor firmware 116 may include, for example, microcode or millicode that includes trusted software, proprietary code that is typically provided as microcode or millicode specific to the underlying hardware and that controls operating system access to the system's hardware.

[0033] The virtual machine support of the central processor complex provides the ability to operate multiple virtual machines (also called guests) 112, each of which can operate with a different program 120 and run a guest operating system 122, such as the Linux® operating system. Each virtual machine 112 can function as a separate system; that is, each virtual machine can be reset independently, run a guest operating system, and operate with different programs. An operating system or application program running within a virtual machine appears to have access to the entire complete system, but in fact only a portion of it is available. Although z / VM and Linux are provided as examples, other virtual machine managers and / or operating systems may be used in accordance with one or more aspects of the present invention. The registered trademark Linux® is used pursuant to a sublicense from the Linux Foundation, an exclusive licensee of Linus Torvalds, owner of the trademark on a worldwide basis.

[0034] In one embodiment, one or more virtual machines 112 are secure virtual machines. The secure virtual machines are started by a hypervisor (e.g., hypervisor 114) in a manner that does not allow the hypervisor to observe the state (e.g., memory, registers, etc.) of the secure virtual machine. For example, in one embodiment of confidential computing, the hypervisor can start / stop the secure virtual machine, and the hypervisor identifies where the data used to start the secure virtual machine is, but cannot see inside the running secure virtual machine. The data used to load / start the secure virtual machine may be encrypted in a manner that does not allow the hypervisor to see into the secure machine. The owner of the secure virtual machine image places the sensitive data in the secure guest metadata and then generates the secure virtual machine image along with the secure guest metadata. After the secure virtual machine is loaded, all interactions with the state of the secure virtual machine are handled by a trusted execution environment, such as trusted execution environment 115.

[0035] In accordance with an aspect of the invention, the diagnostic state of the secure virtual machine may be stored (i.e., the secure virtual machine may be dumped) while maintaining the security of the virtual machine's state. In one example, the diagnostic state is encrypted before being made readable by an untrusted entity (e.g., a hypervisor). To securely facilitate the dumping of the secure virtual machine, in accordance with one or more aspects, an application programming interface with the hardware and firmware is used. This application programming interface allows the hypervisor to access an encrypted version of the virtual machine's state, which may be passed to the owner of the virtual machine. The owner can then (e.g., exclusively) decrypt this state and obtain an unencrypted virtual machine dump for analysis, since this is the instance (e.g., the only instance) in which the owner has a decryption key for the encrypted dump. For example, the metadata used to start the virtual machine includes a secret key, referred to herein as an owner key or communication key, which is protected such that, for example, only the trusted firmware can obtain the secret owner key. This key is used, for example, exclusively, to decrypt the encrypted diagnostic data.

[0036] As one example, the application programming interface is divided into multiple ultravisor calls for multiple commands, including, for example, a configuration dump initiate command, a central processing unit state dump command, a convert from secure storage command, a configuration storage state dump command, and a configuration dump complete command. For example, each command is specified in one embodiment in the execution of an ultravisor call instruction that includes an opcode and multiple operands that specify an ultravisor call operation. As an example, if the third operand (e.g., an immediate field) of the instruction specifies 0, a normal command is specified and the second operand (e.g., a register) of the instruction points to an ultravisor control block in storage that specifies the command to be executed by the ultravisor (or other trusted entity).

[0037] Exemplary commands and control blocks used to store diagnostic states that may be specified by an ultravisor call instruction are described with reference to Figures 2-6. For example, Figure 2 illustrates a process flow using commands, and Figures 3-6 illustrate various control blocks / information used by the commands, in accordance with one or more aspects of the present invention.

[0038] 2, a begin configuration dump command (also referred to as an begin diagnostic storage request) is invoked (200). For example, an ultravisor call instruction is issued, for example, by a hypervisor (e.g., hypervisor 114), which specifies a pointer to a control block containing the begin configuration dump command to be executed by a trusted entity, such as, for example, the ultravisor. An example of such a control block is described with reference to FIG.

[0039] In one example, the configuration dump initiate ultravisor control block 300 includes, for example, the following fields:

[0040] Length 302: This field (e.g., bytes 0-1) contains, e.g., an unsigned binary integer (e.g., 16 bits), whose value specifies the length in bytes of the control block (also called the parameter block). This length should specify the chosen value (e.g., hex 40), otherwise the chosen response code (e.g., hex 0005) applies.

[0041] Command Code 304: This field (eg, bytes 2-3) contains an unsigned binary integer (eg, 16 bits) whose value specifies the command code for the Begin Configuration Dump Ultravisor Invoke command.

[0042] Response Code 306: This field (e.g., bytes 4-5) contains an unsigned binary integer (e.g., 16 bits) whose value specifies the response code. This value is stored when the operation is completed.

[0043] Return Reason Code 308: This field (eg, bytes 6-7) contains the return reason code.

[0044] Secure Configuration Context Handle 310: This field (eg, bytes 24-31) contains a value (eg, a 64-bit value) that identifies the secure configuration (eg, virtual machine) for which the dump process should be initialized.

[0045] If a special condition exists, a response code other than the selected code (eg, hex 0001) is stored in the ultravisor call control block. Special conditions for the initiate configuration dump ultravisor call include, for example:

[0046] Hex 0003: A begin configuration dump ultravisor invocation command was issued on a configuration that did not issue a successful initialize ultravisor invocation command.

[0047] Hex 0005: A Begin Configuration Dump ultravisor invocation command was issued with a length not equal to the selected value (e.g., hex 40).

[0048] Hex 0020: The secure configuration context handle is not a valid handle for a defined secure configuration.

[0049] Hex 0101: The configuration did not allow dumping.

[0050] Hex 0102: The unpacked image validation ultravisor call for the specified configuration did not complete successfully.

[0051] Hex 0103: A configuration dump is already in progress.

[0052] The begin config dump ultravisor call is used to initialize the dump process for a specified secure configuration (e.g., a secure virtual machine). As part of this initialization, a unique dump key (e.g., an encryption key, referred to herein as the first encryption key for clarity) is derived to dump the selected secure configuration data (e.g., the encrypted processor state). By way of example, the command derives the dump key from a stored customer communication key (e.g., an owner key) and a key derivation seed. This key may be stored and later used to encrypt data provided via other commands.

[0053] In one example, the verify unpacked image ultravisor call (used to verify the integrity of the unpacked image, which is a secure decrypted image) for the specified configuration should complete successfully, otherwise no action is taken and a selected response code (e.g., hex 0101) is stored. If the complete configuration dump ultravisor call does not complete successfully and another initiate configuration dump ultravisor call for the specified configuration completes successfully, no action is taken and a selected response code (e.g., hex 0102) is stored.

[0054] In one example, if the secure virtual machine is still in the configuration process, the dump process should not be initiated because by the time the first instruction is executed, the state of the virtual machine is known to the owner. Additionally, as shown, this command initiates the dump process and allows other application programming interface commands to be invoked by the hypervisor. After the dump process is initiated, a second dump process of this secure virtual machine should not be initiated until the current process is completed. Thus, in one example, a determination is made as to whether a dump (also referred to as a diagnostic state store) of the selected configuration (e.g., virtual machine) is already in progress based on executing the initiate configuration dump command (210). If a dump of the configuration is already in progress, in one example, an error is indicated with respect to this process (212). However, if a dump of the configuration is not already in progress, processing continues as described herein.

[0055] For example, a determination is made as to whether the state of the virtual machine should be dumped based on initiating a configuration dump. Returning to FIG. 2, an inquiry is made as to whether the state of one or more central processing units should be dumped (220). If the state of one or more central processing units should be dumped, a central processing unit state dump command (also referred to as a diagnostic processor state store request) is initiated (230). For example, an ultravisor call instruction is issued, for example, by a hypervisor, which specifies a pointer to a control block containing a central processing unit state dump command to be executed, for example, by a trusted entity. An example of such a call control block is described with reference to FIG. 4A.

[0056] In one example, the central processor state dump ultravisor call control block 400 includes, for example, the following fields:

[0057] Length 402: This field (e.g., bytes 0-1) contains, e.g., an unsigned binary integer (e.g., 16 bits), whose value specifies the length of the control block in bytes. This length should specify the chosen value (e.g., hex 50), otherwise the chosen response code (e.g., hex 0005) applies.

[0058] Command Code 404: This field (eg, bytes 2-3) contains an unsigned binary integer (eg, 16 bits) whose value specifies the command code for the central processing unit state dump ultravisor invoke command.

[0059] Response Code 406: This field (e.g., bytes 4-5) contains an unsigned binary integer (e.g., 16 bits) whose value specifies the response code. This value is stored when the operation is completed.

[0060] Return Reason Code 408: This field (e.g., bytes 6-7) contains the return reason code. For the Central Processing Unit State Dump-Ultravisor Invoke command, this field is, for example, 0.

[0061] Secure Central Processing Unit Context Handle 410: This field (eg, bytes 24 through 31) contains a value (eg, a 64-bit value) that identifies the secure central processing unit whose state is to be dumped.

[0062] Secure central processing unit dump area start 412: This field (e.g., bits 0-51 of bytes 32-39), padded with a selected number (e.g., 12) of zeros, contains the logical address (e.g., a 64-bit logical address) of the secure central processing unit's dump area.

[0063] If a special condition exists, a response code other than the selected code (e.g., hex 0001) is stored in the ultravisor call control block. Special conditions for the central processor state dump ultravisor call include, for example:

[0064] Hex 0003: A Central Processor State Dump Ultravisor Invoke command was issued on a configuration that did not issue a successful Initialize Ultravisor Invoke command.

[0065] hex 0005: A Central Processor State Dump Ultravisor Invoke command was issued with a length not equal to the selected value (for example, hex 50).

[0066] Hex 0021: The secure central processor context handle is not a valid handle for a defined secure central processor.

[0067] Hex 0101: The initiate configuration dump ultravisor call did not complete for the secure configuration that contains the specified secure central processor.

[0068] Hex 0102: The central processor state for the specified central processor has already been dumped.

[0069] Hex 0103: The specified secure central processor is currently running.

[0070] Hex 0104: An access exception was recognized while attempting to access the secure central processor dump area.

[0071] One example of the format of the secure central processing unit dump area is described with reference to Figure 4B. By way of example, the secure central processing unit dump area 420 includes:

[0072] Secure central processor dump area version 422: This field (e.g., bytes 0-3) contains an unsigned binary integer (e.g., 32 bits) whose value specifies the version of the secure central processor dump area written by the ultravisor. This version number defines the layout of the other fields in the secure central processor dump area.

[0073] Secure central processing unit dump area length 424: This field (e.g., bytes 4-7) contains an unsigned binary integer (e.g., 32 bits) whose value specifies the number of bytes of data written by the ultravisor to the secure central processing unit dump area.

[0074] Initialization Vector 426: This field (e.g., bytes 8 through 19) contains a unique initialization vector used by the ultravisor when performing, for example, AES256-GCM (Galois / Counter Mode) encryption of the secure central processing unit dump area.

[0075] General Purpose Registers 428: This field (eg, bytes 32 through 159) contains the contents of selected general purpose registers (eg, general purpose registers 0 through 15) of a designated secure central processing unit.

[0076] Current Program Status Word 430: This field (eg, bytes 160-175) contains the contents of the current program status word of the specified secure central processing unit.

[0077] Prefix 432 - This field (e.g., bytes 184 through 187) contains selected bits (e.g., bits 32 through 63) of the prefix register of the specified secure central processing unit.

[0078] Floating Point Control Register 434 - This field (eg, bytes 188 through 191) contains the floating point control register of the specified secure central processing unit.

[0079] Time-of-Day (TOD) Programmable Register 436: This field (eg, bytes 196-199) contains the time-of-day programmable register of the designated secure central processing unit.

[0080] Central Processing Unit Timer 438: This field (eg, bytes 200-207) contains the central processing unit timer for the designated secure central processing unit.

[0081] Clock Comparator 440: This field (eg, bytes 209 through 215) contains selected bits (eg, bits 0 through 55) of the clock comparator of the designated secure central processing unit.

[0082] Access Register 442 - This field (eg, bytes 224 through 287) contains the contents of a selected access register (eg, access registers 0 through 15) of a designated secure central processing unit.

[0083] Control Register 444: This field (eg, bytes 288 through 415) contains the contents of a selected control register (eg, control registers 0 through 15) of a designated secure central processing unit.

[0084] Vector Register 446 - This field (eg, bytes 416 through 927) contains the contents of a selected vector register (eg, vector registers 0 through 31) of a specified secure central processing unit.

[0085] Protected Storage Designation Register 448: This field (eg, bytes 1448 through 1455) contains the contents of the protected storage designation register of the designated secure central processing unit.

[0086] Guarded Storage Section Mask Register 450 - this field (eg, bytes 1456 through 1463) contains the contents of the Guarded Storage Section Mask Register of the specified secure central processing unit.

[0087] Guarded Storage Event Parameter List Address Register 452 - This field (e.g., bytes 1464 through 1471) contains the contents of the protected storage event parameter list address register of the specified secure central processing unit.

[0088] Dump Flags 454 - This field (e.g., bytes 1536-1537) contains flags that convey information about the contents of the dumped central processing unit. An exemplary flag (e.g., bit 0) includes an outstanding secure instruction interception processing indicator. If this flag is set, partial instruction results may be included in the dumped central processing unit state.

[0089] Secure central processing unit dump area tag 456: This field (eg, the last 16 bytes of the secure central processing unit dump area) contains an authentication tag used to verify the authenticity of the contents of this area.

[0090] In one example, fields 422-426 are authenticated and fields 428-454 are encrypted.

[0091] For each central processing unit (or a subset of central processing units) of the virtual machine, a central processing unit dump ultravisor command may be executed, resulting in an encrypted state of the central processing unit. Encryption of the virtual machine state may be performed, for example, using a dump key. The encrypted central processing state may include, but is not limited to, the contents of general purpose registers, control registers, floating point registers, vector registers, as well as timers, floating point control registers, and / or the current instruction address. Additionally, in one example, the encrypted central processing state includes an unencrypted area, which may, for example, store an initialization vector used to encrypt the data, as well as length and version indications to facilitate subsequent decryption and interpretation of the dump data.

[0092] This command is used to dump the encrypted contents of a specified secure central processor (or another processor unit). The secure central processor dump area includes a plaintext header, containing, for example, version information, the size of the encrypted data, and the initialization vector used to encrypt the central processor state. The central processor state is encrypted, for example, using AES-GCM with a 256-bit dump key. An authentication tag for the encrypted central processor dump area is stored immediately following the encrypted area. The length of the secure central processor dump area is less than or equal to, for example, the storage length of the secure central processor, as returned, for example, by a query ultravisor call command.

[0093] The Begin Configuration Dump ultravisor call command should complete successfully before issuing the Central Processor State Dump ultravisor call command, otherwise the selected response code (e.g., hex 0101) is stored. If more than one Central Processor State Dump ultravisor call command is issued for the specified secure central processor context handle between the Begin Configuration Dump ultravisor call command and the Complete Configuration Dump ultravisor call command, the selected response code (e.g., hex 0102) is stored. If the specified secure central processor is currently running, the selected response code (e.g., hex 0103) is stored.

[0094] Returning to FIG. 2, in one example, based on initiating the configuration dump (200), a determination is also made as to whether the virtual machine's memory should be dumped (222). If the memory should be dumped, in one example, the dump occurs during a page-out process. For example, a determination is made as to whether the memory being dumped is currently mapped to a secure configuration (e.g., a secure virtual machine) (224). If the memory being dumped is mapped to a secure configuration, in one example, a translation from secure storage command is initiated (226). For example, an ultravisor call instruction is issued, for example, by the hypervisor specifying a translation from secure storage control block that specifies a translation from secure storage command to be executed, for example, by the ultravisor. One example of such a control block is described with reference to FIG. 4C.

[0095] In one example, the translation ultravisor call control block 470 from secure storage includes, for example, the following fields:

[0096] Length 472: This field (e.g., bytes 0-1) contains, e.g., an unsigned binary integer (e.g., 16 bits), whose value specifies the length of the control block in bytes. This length should specify the selected value (e.g., hex 20), otherwise the selected response code (e.g., hex 0005) applies.

[0097] Command Code 474: This field (eg, bytes 2-3) contains an unsigned binary integer (eg, 16 bits) whose value specifies the command code of the conversion ultravisor call command from secure storage.

[0098] Response Code 476: This field (e.g., bytes 4-5) contains an unsigned binary integer (e.g., 16 bits) that specifies the response code. This value is stored when the operation is completed.

[0099] Return reason code 478: This field (e.g., bytes 6-7) contains the return reason code. If a response code, e.g., hex "0001", is stored, a return reason code, e.g., hex "0000", is stored when the security properties of the specified unit of memory (e.g., a block of storage) are to be changed. If the security properties of the specified unit of memory are already set to the desired state, a return reason code, e.g., "0001", is stored.

[0100] Host absolute address 480: This field with a chosen number, e.g., 12 zero bits appended to the right (e.g., bits 0 through 51 of bytes 32 through 39), forms the absolute address of a unit of memory (e.g., a 4K byte block of storage) to convert to non-secure storage.

[0101] If a special condition exists, a response code other than the selected code (e.g., hex 0001) is stored in the ultravisor call control block. Special conditions for converting ultravisor calls from secure storage include, for example:

[0102] Hex 0003: A CONVERT FROM SECURE STORAGE ultravisor call command was issued on a configuration that did not issue a successful INITIALIZE ultravisor call command.

[0103] Hex 0005: A Convert Ultravisor Invoke command from Secure Storage was issued with a length not equal to the chosen value (e.g., hex 20).

[0104] Hexadecimal 0030: The R bit (e.g., bit 58) of the Home Address Space Control Element is set, e.g., to 1.

[0105] Hex 0031: Conversion exception when trying to access the variable storage area of ​​the configuration.

[0106] Hexadecimal 0032: The secure guest variable storage area contains a virtual address that is translated to a region-frame absolute address or a segment-frame absolute address.

[0107] Hex 0103: Host absolute address not available in host configuration.

[0108] Hex 0104: Host absolute address of ultravisor storage.

[0109] Hex 0105: The corresponding host virtual address has been translated from secure storage too many times.

[0110] In one example, a convert ultravisor command from secure storage is used to dump secure memory, where the unit of memory being dumped (e.g., a page of memory) is encrypted and stored, for example, using a paging key. The convert from secure storage command changes the security properties of a unit of memory (e.g., a 4K byte block of storage) associated with the secure configuration to become non-secure storage. If the specified unit of memory is already defined to be non-secure storage, the operation completes without further action and a selected response code (e.g., hex "0001") and a selected return reason code (e.g., hex "0001") is stored. If the unit of memory is not a defined shared storage, a digest is created from the contents of the unit of memory. In one example, this digest is maintained by a trusted entity (e.g., ultravisor). The contents of the unit of memory are encrypted (e.g., using a paging key) and then the unit of memory is made non-secure. If the unit of memory is shared storage defined, the unit of memory is made unsecure without any changes to the contents of the unit of memory.

[0111] If the specified host absolute address is owned by a trusted entity, then the specified unit of memory is left unchanged and the selected response code (eg, hexadecimal "0104") is stored.

[0112] 2, after conversion from secure storage, processing continues at inquiry 224. If the memory to be dumped is not currently mapped to the secure configuration, a configuration storage state dump command (also referred to as a diagnostic memory state store request) is initiated (232). For example, a hypervisor call instruction is issued, for example, by specifying a pointer to a configuration storage state dump control block that specifies a configuration storage state dump command to be executed, for example, by the ultravisor. One example of such a control block is described with reference to FIG. 5.

[0113] In one example, the configuration storage state dump ultravisor call control block 500 includes, for example, the following fields:

[0114] Length 502: This field (e.g., bytes 0-1) contains, e.g., an unsigned binary integer (e.g., 16 bits), whose value specifies the length of the control block in bytes. This length should specify the chosen value (e.g., hex 58), otherwise the chosen response code (e.g., hex 0005) applies.

[0115] Command Code 504: This field (eg, bytes 2-3) contains an unsigned binary integer (eg, 16 bits) whose value specifies the command code for the configuration storage state dump ultravisor invoke command.

[0116] Response Code 506: This field (e.g., bytes 4-5) contains an unsigned binary integer (e.g., 16 bits) whose value specifies the response code. This value is stored when the operation is completed.

[0117] Return Reason Code 508: This field (e.g., bytes 6-7) contains the return reason code. For the Configuration Storage State Dump Ultravisor Invoke command, this field is, for example, 0.

[0118] Secure Configuration Context Handle 510: This field (eg, bytes 24-31) contains a value (eg, a 64-bit value) that identifies the secure configuration whose state is to be dumped.

[0119] Secure configuration storage dump area start 512: This field (e.g., bits 0-51 of bytes 32-39), padded with a selected number (e.g., 12) of zeros, contains the logical address (e.g., a 64-bit logical address) of the secure configuration storage dump area.

[0120] Secure Configuration Absolute Address 514: This field (e.g., bits 0-43 of bytes 40-47), padded with a selected number (e.g., 20) of zeros, contains the secure configuration absolute address (e.g., 64-bit address) of, e.g., the first frame of 256 frames of storage for storing selected unique components (e.g., tweak components).

[0121] If a special condition exists, a response code other than the selected code (e.g., hex 0001) is stored in the ultravisor call control block. Special conditions for the Configuration Storage State Dump ultravisor call include, for example:

[0122] Hex 0003: A configuration storage state dump ultravisor call command was issued on a configuration that did not issue a successful initialize ultravisor call command.

[0123] Hex 0005: A Configuration Storage State Dump Ultravisor Invoke command was issued with a length not equal to the selected value (for example, hex 50).

[0124] Hex 0020: The secure configuration context handle is not a valid handle for a defined secure configuration.

[0125] Hex 0031: Translation exception when trying to access virtual storage area of ​​configuration.

[0126] Hex 0101: The initiate configuration dump ultravisor call did not complete for the specified secure configuration.

[0127] Hex 0102: An access exception was recognized when accessing the secure configuration storage dump area.

[0128] Hex 0103: The absolute address of the secure configuration is greater than, for example, the length of the secure configuration storage.

[0129] When a special selected unique component (e.g., a special fine-tuning component) is stored, selected bytes (e.g., bytes 14-15) contain flags that provide information about how to interpret the corresponding unit of memory (e.g., a 4K byte block of storage). Exemplary flags include the following:

[0130] Bits Description

[0131] 15 Zero Page

[0132] The corresponding unit of memory (a 4K byte block of storage) is not stored by the secure configuration and its contents may be assumed to be 0 (or another chosen value).

[0133] 14 Shared Pages

[0134] The corresponding memory unit (a 4K-byte block of storage) is the defined shared storage and is unencrypted.

[0135] 13 Mapped Pages

[0136] The corresponding unit of memory (a 4K byte block of storage) has a valid mapping to a secure page.

[0137] The configuration storage state dump command dumps selected unique component values ​​(e.g., fine-tuning component values) and state flags for each page of a specific amount of guest memory.

[0138] In one example, the CONFIG STORAGE STATE DUMP ULTRAVISOR CALL command stores, for example, 256 selected unique component values ​​(e.g., tweak component values) in a secure configuration dump area, starting with the selected unique value (e.g., tweak), for a unit of memory (e.g., a 4K byte block of storage) specified by an absolute address of the secure configuration. The size of the specified configuration dump area can be obtained, for example, from an ULTRAVISOR INFORMATION CALL ULTRAVISOR command.

[0139] The configuration storage state dump ultravisor call is used to dump, for example, 16 bytes of chosen unique component values ​​(e.g., tweak component values) that are used to derive a chosen unique value (e.g., tweak value) used when encrypting or decrypting the contents of a unit of memory (e.g., a 4K byte block) of secure configuration storage. The chosen unique component values ​​are output in order, starting with the value that corresponds to the unit of memory in the secure configuration, e.g., starting at absolute address 0. For example, if bytes 0-3 of the chosen unique component value are, e.g., hexadecimal "FFFFFFFF", then the unit of memory does not contain the specified chosen unique value, and bytes 14-15 of the chosen unique component value contain flags that provide further information about how the corresponding unit of memory should be interpreted. If the chosen unique component value is any other value, then the chosen unique component value is ORed with the decrypted chosen unique nonce value (e.g., tweak nonce), e.g., obtained from the configuration dump complete ultravisor call, and used as the chosen unique value for the AES-XTS operation.

[0140] Returning to FIG. 2 and in particular to queries 220, 222, if there are no more central processing units to dump or if there is no more memory to dump, then a configuration dump complete call (also referred to as a completion request) is made (240). For example, an ultravisor call instruction is issued by, for example, the hypervisor specifying a configuration dump complete control block that specifies a configuration dump complete command to be executed by the ultravisor. One example of such a control block is described with reference to FIG.

[0141] In one example, the configuration dump complete ultravisor call control block 600 includes, for example, the following fields:

[0142] Length 602: This field (e.g., bytes 0-1) contains, for example, an unsigned binary integer (e.g., 16 bits), whose value specifies the length of the control block in bytes. This length should specify a chosen value (e.g., a value of 64+N bytes), otherwise a chosen response code (e.g., hex 0005) applies. The value N may be obtained, for example, from the configuration finalize dump length returned by the ultravisor info query ultravisor call command.

[0143] Command Code 604: This field (eg, bytes 2-3) contains an unsigned binary integer (eg, 16 bits) whose value specifies the command code for the configuration state dump complete ultravisor call command.

[0144] Response Code 606: This field (e.g., bytes 4-5) contains an unsigned binary integer (e.g., 16 bits) whose value specifies the response code. This value is stored when the operation is completed.

[0145] Return Reason Code 608: This field (eg, bytes 6-7) contains the return reason code. For the configuration dump complete ultravisor call command, this field is, for example, 0.

[0146] Secure Configuration Context Handle 609: This field (eg, bytes 24 through 31) contains a value (eg, a 64-bit value) that identifies the secure configuration for which a dump is to be completed.

[0147] Key Derivation Seed 610: This field (eg, bytes 64-127) contains the seed used to derive the dump key used to encrypt the data in this control block, in addition to the central processing unit state.

[0148] Initialization Vector 612: This field (eg, bytes 128 through 143) contains the initialization vector used when encrypting data stored by this ultravisor call.

[0149] Fine-tuned Nonce (also known as Chosen Unique Nonce) 614: This field (e.g., bytes 144 through 159) contains the nonce value used for the chosen unique value (e.g., the fine-tuned value). This value is ORed with each non-special chosen unique component (e.g., the fine-tuned component) to create the chosen unique value used to encrypt a unit of memory (e.g., a 4K byte block of storage).

[0150] Storage Encryption Key 1 (616): This field (e.g., bytes 160 through 191) contains a first AES-256 XTS key that is used to encrypt chosen unique values ​​(e.g., tweak values), and then these chosen unique values ​​are used to decrypt the dumped unit of memory (e.g., a 4K byte block of storage).

[0151] Storage Encryption Key 2 (618): This field (e.g., bytes 192-223) contains a second AES-256 XTS key that is used with an encrypted chosen unique value (e.g., a fine-tune value) to decrypt a unit of memory (e.g., a 4K byte block of storage). In one example, Storage Encryption Key 1 is combined with Storage Encryption Key 2 to become the paging key.

[0152] Authentication Tag 620: This field (e.g., bytes 256 through 271) contains the AES-GCM authentication tag, which is derived from using the value to be authenticated (e.g., bytes 64 through 143) as additional authentication data and then calculating the remainder of the tag from the encrypted field (e.g., bytes 144 through 255).

[0153] If a special condition exists, a response code other than the selected code (eg, hex 0001) is stored in the ultravisor call control block. Special conditions for the configuration dump complete ultravisor call include, for example:

[0154] Hex 0003: A configuration dump complete ultravisor call command was issued on a configuration that did not issue a successful initialize ultravisor call command.

[0155] Hex 0005: A configuration dump complete ultravisor call command was issued with a length not equal to the selected value (e.g., hex 130).

[0156] Hex 0020: The secure configuration context handle is not a valid handle for a defined secure configuration.

[0157] Hex 0101: The initiate configuration dump ultravisor call did not complete for the specified secure configuration.

[0158] The Config Dump Complete ultravisor call is used to complete the dump process for a given secure configuration. This call returns data that is used by the customer to decrypt the dump and check its integrity. This call also completes the dump process and thus allows the initiation of a new dump process by the Config Dump Start call. This call includes, for example, the key derivation seed that was used to create the dump key, so that the virtual machine owner can calculate the dump key itself. This call also includes the initialization vector that is used to encrypt the encrypted portion of the returned data, and the authentication tag that should be used to authenticate and verify the contents of the encrypted data. The encrypted portion includes, for example, a selected unique nonce value that is ORed with each of the selected unique values ​​from the memory state dump call, plus the AES XTS (Advanced Encryption Standard XEX Tweakable Block Cipher with Ciphertext Stealing) key that is used to encrypt those selected unique values.

[0159] As described herein, a secure virtual machine may be dumped while maintaining the security of the state of the virtual machine being dumped by encrypting the dump before it is readable by untrusted entities. To securely facilitate dumping of a secure virtual machine, a dump application programming interface is employed. This interface uses multiple calls, each of which points to a control block, examples of which are described herein. Each control block / area described herein may, in one or more embodiments, include additional fields, fewer fields, or other fields, or combinations thereof. Furthermore, each field may be in a different position within the control block / area, or may be a field of a different size or data type, or both. Furthermore, the control block / area may include one or more spare fields. Many variations are possible.

[0160] In one or more aspects, the virtual machine's memory may be dumped using multiple techniques. For example, one technique involves directly encrypting the memory using a dump key. Using this technique, called central processing unit memory encryption, the secure virtual machine's pages are encrypted. The secure virtual machine's key and the hypervisor's key are different, so if the hypervisor reads or writes the result, it will be random data. For optimal security, the encryption key never leaves the central processing unit's memory controller, and therefore the encryption key cannot be used to dump the secure virtual machine's memory, since only the central processing unit on which the virtual machine is currently running can decrypt the pages. Additionally, the key is erased when the secure virtual machine is stopped.

[0161] Since the keys used to access the secure virtual machine's memory cannot normally be exported, this protection mechanism leaves one technique for dumping the secure virtual machine's memory: encrypting the memory with a special dump key that can be exported to replace the non-exportable access key. When a page is swapped to disk, it is brought back into the guest's memory to decrypt and re-encrypt the page. This causes additional memory load and processor cycles to be spent on encryption / decryption.

[0162] Another technique used to dump the memory of a secure virtual machine, according to one or more aspects, is called memory protection, which denies access to a page of the secure virtual machine except to the secure virtual machine to which the page belongs and to the trusted firmware (e.g., ultravisor) until the page is encrypted after a request to the firmware by the hypervisor. After encryption, the page is no longer usable by the secure virtual machine, but may be written to disk by the hypervisor. Similarly, a request to the firmware is used to decrypt the encrypted page, check its integrity, and map it back to the secure virtual machine so that the secure virtual machine can access the page again.

[0163] This protection mechanism can use the same key used when encrypting the pages to swap in for the dump. This means that after the page has been encrypted, it only needs to be returned to the guest if the guest wants to access the page again. Pages that have not yet been encrypted are encrypted, but pages that are already encrypted can be written directly to the dump, regardless of whether the page is still in memory or already on disk. This results in a significant reduction in the CPU cycles required for the dump if the page has already been paged to disk. In order to later decrypt the page when examining the dump, data specific to the encryption should be exported. Such data can include, for example, a chosen unique value (e.g., a tweak value) per page of memory.

[0164] In contrast to storing diagnostic state written by a failed kernel inside a virtual machine, as described in one or more aspects herein, storing diagnostic state is generated outside the virtual machine by the hypervisor, either triggered by the owner of the virtual machine or automatically triggered when the hypervisor determines that the virtual machine has failed and is not executing code properly.

[0165] One or more aspects of the present invention are closely related to computer technology and facilitate processing in a computer and improve its performance. Processing is facilitated by securely storing the diagnostic state of a virtual machine (e.g., a secure virtual machine) in a manner that is less complex, uses fewer processing cycles, and improves performance while maintaining security.

[0166] As processing within a computing environment relates to one or more aspects of the present invention, further details of one embodiment that facilitates such processing are described with reference to Figures 7A-7C.

[0167] 7A, in one embodiment, at least one request to store a diagnostic state of the virtual machine is obtained (700). Based on obtaining the at least one request, storing the diagnostic state of the virtual machine is performed (702) to provide a stored diagnostic state of the virtual machine. Performing the storing includes, for example, encrypting the unencrypted stored diagnostic state of the virtual machine and preventing reading of the diagnostic state of the virtual machine by untrusted entities prior to encrypting the unencrypted stored diagnostic state of the virtual machine (704).

[0168] A diagnostic state of a virtual machine (eg, a secure virtual machine) may be stored while maintaining the security of the virtual machine's state being stored for diagnostic purposes.

[0169] As an example, the stored diagnostic state of the virtual machine may include contents of the virtual machine's memory (706), or the stored diagnostic state of the virtual machine may include contents of one or more processor registers of the virtual machine (708), or both.

[0170] In one example, a diagnostic state storage initiation request to initiate storage of a diagnostic state of a virtual machine is obtained 710. The diagnostic state storage initiation request is used to obtain 712 a first encryption key to be used in encrypting at least a portion of the diagnostic state of the virtual machine that is stored unencrypted.

[0171] 7B , in one example, obtaining the at least one request includes obtaining a diagnostic processor state store request (720). Performing diagnostic state storage based on obtaining the diagnostic processor state store request includes, for example, encrypting at least selected content of at least one processor of the virtual machine using a first encryption key and providing the encrypted processor content (722), and storing the encrypted processor content (724).

[0172] In one example, obtaining the at least one request includes obtaining a transformation request from the secure memory (726). Performing storage of the diagnostic state based on obtaining the transformation request from the secure memory includes, for example, encrypting at least selected contents of the unencrypted virtual machine memory using the second encryption key and providing the encrypted contents of the memory (730), and storing the encrypted contents of the memory (732).

[0173] By way of example, performing storage of the diagnostic state based on obtaining the conversion request from the secure memory may include, for example, determining whether the unit of memory whose contents are to be stored is encrypted (736), and based on a determination that the unit of memory is not encrypted, encrypting the unit of memory using a second encryption key, where the encrypted unit of memory is not re-encrypted (738).

[0174] By encrypting unencrypted content (and not re-encrypting the encrypted state), processing cycles and complexity are reduced, improving system performance.

[0175] 7C, in one example, the stored diagnostic state includes the encrypted contents of the memory 750. Further, in one example, a diagnostic memory state store request is obtained 752, and metadata used to decrypt the encrypted contents of the memory based on obtaining the diagnostic memory state store request is stored 754.

[0176] By way of example, this metadata may include one or more selected component values ​​that are used to create one or more selected values ​​that are used to decrypt the encrypted content in memory (756).

[0177] In one example, a completion request to complete the storage of the diagnostic state is obtained (760), and based on obtaining the completion request, data used to decrypt the encrypted and stored diagnostic state of the virtual machine is provided (762).

[0178] By way of example, this data includes a second encryption key used in decrypting the encrypted contents of the memory and a nonce value used to create one or more selected values ​​used in the encryption (770). Additionally, in one example, at least a portion of the data is encrypted (772).

[0179] Other variations and embodiments are possible.

[0180] Aspects of the present invention may be used by many types of computing environments. Another embodiment of a computing environment for incorporating and using one or more aspects of the present invention is described with reference to FIG. 8A. In this example, the computing environment 36 includes a native central processing unit (CPU) 37, memory 38, and one or more input / output devices and / or interfaces 39, coupled together, for example, via one or more buses 40 or other connections or both. By way of example, the computing environment 36 may include a PowerPC® processor provided by International Business Machines Corporation (Armonk, NY), an HP Superdome with an Intel® Itanium® II processor provided by Hewlett-Packard Co. (Palo Alto, CA), or other machines based on architectures provided by International Business Machines Corporation, Hewlett-Packard Co., Intel Corporation, Oracle Corporation, or other companies, or combinations thereof. PowerPC is a trademark or registered trademark of International Business Machines Corporation in at least one jurisdiction. Intel and Itanium are trademarks or registered trademarks of Intel Corporation or its subsidiaries in the United States and other countries.

[0181] The native central processing unit 37 includes one or more native registers 41, such as one or more general purpose registers and / or one or more special purpose registers that are used during processing within the environment. These registers contain information that represents the state of the environment at any particular point in time.

[0182] Additionally, native central processing unit 37 executes instructions and code stored in memory 38. In one particular example, central processing unit executes emulator code 42 stored in memory 38. This code enables a computing environment configured with one architecture to emulate another architecture. For example, emulator code 42 enables machines based on an architecture other than the z / Architecture instruction set architecture (e.g., PowerPC processors, HP Superdome servers, etc.) to emulate the z / Architecture instruction set architecture and execute software and instructions developed based on the z / Architecture instruction set architecture.

[0183] Further details relating to emulator code 42 are described with reference to FIG. 8B. Guest instructions 43 stored in memory 38 include software instructions (e.g., correlated to machine instructions) developed to execute on an architecture other than that of native CPU 37. For example, guest instructions 43 may be designed to execute on a processor based on the z / Architecture instruction set architecture, but are instead emulated on native CPU 37, which may be, for example, an Intel Itanium II processor. In one example, emulator code 42 includes an instruction fetch routine 44 for retrieving one or more guest instructions 43 from memory 38 and optionally providing local buffering of the retrieved instructions. Emulator code 42 also includes an instruction conversion routine 45 for determining the type of the retrieved guest instruction and for converting the guest instruction into one or more corresponding native instructions 46. This conversion includes, for example, identifying a function performed by the guest instruction and selecting a native instruction to perform this function.

[0184] Additionally, emulator code 42 includes an emulation control routine 47 for causing execution of native instructions. Emulation control routine 47 may cause native CPU 37 to execute a routine of native instructions that emulate one or more already fetched guest instructions, and upon completion of such execution, return control to an instruction fetch routine for emulating the fetch of the next guest instruction or group of guest instructions. Execution of native instructions 46 may include reading data from memory 38 into a register, storing data from the register back to memory, or performing some type of arithmetic or logical operation as determined by a translation routine.

[0185] For example, each routine is implemented in software that is stored in memory and executed by the native central processing unit 37. In other examples, one or more of the routines or operations are implemented in firmware, hardware, software, or some combination thereof. Registers of the emulated processor may be emulated using registers 41 of the native CPU or by using locations in memory 38. In an embodiment, the guest instructions 43, native instructions 46, and emulator code 42 may reside in the same memory or may be distributed among different memory devices.

[0186] The instructions, commands or calls that may be emulated include the ultravisor calls described herein in accordance with one or more aspects of the present invention. Additionally, other instructions, commands, functions, operations, calls or one or more aspects of the present invention, or combinations thereof, may be emulated in accordance with one or more aspects of the present invention.

[0187] The aforementioned computing environments are only examples of computing environments that can be used. Other environments may be used, including, but not limited to, non-partitioned, partitioned, cloud, or emulated environments, or combinations thereof, and embodiments are not limited to any one environment. Although various examples of computing environments are described herein, one or more aspects of the present invention may be used with many types of environments. The computing environments provided herein are only examples.

[0188] Each computing environment can be configured to include one or more aspects of the present invention.

[0189] One or more aspects may relate to cloud computing.

[0190] Although this disclosure includes detailed descriptions of cloud computing, it should be understood that implementation of the recited content herein is not limited to a cloud computing environment. Embodiments of the invention may be implemented in conjunction with any other type of computing environment now known or later developed.

[0191] Cloud computing is a service delivery model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computational resources (e.g., networks, network bandwidth, servers, processing, memory, storage, applications, virtual machines, and services) and for rapidly provisioning and releasing these resources with minimal administrative effort or interaction with a service provider. This cloud model may include at least five characteristics, at least three service models, and at least four deployment models.

[0192] The features are as follows:

[0193] On-Demand Self-Service: Cloud customers can automatically provision server time and computing power, such as network storage, as needed, without the need for unilateral human interaction with the service provider.

[0194] Broad network access: Capabilities are available over the network and can be accessed through standard mechanisms, facilitating use by heterogeneous thin-client or thick-client platforms (e.g., cell phones, laptops, and PDAs).

[0195] Resource Pool: The provider's computing resources are pooled and offered to multiple consumers using a multi-tenant model, with different physical and virtual resources dynamically allocated and reallocated according to demand. There is a sense of location independence, where consumers typically have no control or knowledge regarding the exact location of the resources offered, although at higher levels of abstraction they may be able to specify a location (e.g., country, state, or data center).

[0196] Rapid Elasticity: Capacity is provisioned quickly and elastically, in some cases automatically, so it can be quickly scaled out and quickly released to quickly scale in. Capacity available for provisioning often appears to the consumer as unlimited, available for purchase in any quantity at any time.

[0197] Measured Services: Cloud systems leverage metering to automatically control and optimize resource usage at a level of abstraction appropriate to the type of service (e.g., storage, processing, bandwidth, and active user accounts). Resource usage can be monitored, controlled, and reported, providing transparency to both providers and consumers of the services used.

[0198] The service model is as follows:

[0199] Software as a Service (SaaS): The capability offered to the consumer is the use of the provider's applications running on a cloud infrastructure. Those applications can be accessed from a variety of client devices through thin-client interfaces such as web browsers (e.g., web-based email). The consumer does not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure, including the network, servers, operating systems, storage, or individual application functionality, except for the possibility of limited user-specific application configuration settings.

[0200] Platform as a Service (PaaS): The capability provided to a consumer is to deploy applications that the consumer creates or acquires, written using programming languages ​​and tools supported by the provider, onto a cloud infrastructure. The consumer does not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure, including networks, servers, operating systems, or storage, but does have control over the deployed applications and, in some cases, the configuration of the application hosting environment.

[0201] Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS): The capability provided to a consumer is the provisioning of processing, storage, network, and other basic computational resources over which the consumer can deploy and run any software, which may include operating systems and applications. The consumer does not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure, but has control over the operating systems, storage, deployed applications, and in some cases, limited control over selected network components (e.g., host firewalls).

[0202] The deployment model is as follows:

[0203] Private Cloud: This cloud infrastructure is operated solely for the organization. It can be managed by the organization or a third party and can exist on-premise or off-premise.

[0204] Community Cloud: This cloud infrastructure is shared by multiple organizations to support a specific community with shared concerns (e.g., mission, security requirements, policy, and compliance considerations). It can be managed by these organizations or a third party and can reside on-premise or off-premise.

[0205] Public Cloud: This cloud infrastructure is available for use by general users or large industry organizations and is owned by an organization that sells cloud services.

[0206] Hybrid cloud: This cloud infrastructure is a combination of two or more clouds (private, community, or public) that remain unique but are bound together by standardized or proprietary technologies that allow for the portability of data and applications (e.g., cloud bursting to balance the load between clouds).

[0207] A cloud computing environment is a service-oriented environment with an emphasis on statelessness, low coupling, modularity, and semantic interoperability. At the heart of cloud computing is an infrastructure that contains a network of interconnected nodes.

[0208] 9, an exemplary cloud computing environment 50 is shown. As shown, the cloud computing environment 50 includes one or more cloud computing nodes 52 with which local computing devices used by cloud consumers (e.g., a personal digital assistant (PDA) or mobile phone 54A, a desktop computer 54B, a laptop computer 54C, and / or an automobile computer system 54N) can communicate. The nodes 52 may communicate with each other. The nodes 52 may be physically or virtually grouped in one or more networks (not shown), such as in a private cloud, community cloud, public cloud, or hybrid cloud, or combinations thereof, as previously described herein. This enables the cloud computing environment 50 to provide infrastructure, platform, and / or software as a service without the cloud consumer having to maintain resources on a local computing device. The types of computing devices 54A-N illustrated in FIG. 9 are intended as examples only, and it will be understood that computing node 52 and cloud computing environment 50 may communicate with any type of computer-controlled device via any type of network and / or network-addressable connection (e.g., a connection using a web browser).

[0209] Referring now to Figure 10, there is shown a set of functional abstraction layers provided by cloud computing environment 50 (Figure 9). It should be understood in advance that the components, layers, and functions shown in Figure 10 are intended to be illustrative only and that embodiments of the present invention are not limited thereto. As shown, the following layers and corresponding functions are provided:

[0210] The hardware and software layer 60 includes hardware and software components. Examples of hardware components include mainframes 61, Reduced Instruction Set Computer (RISC) architecture based servers 62, servers 63, blade servers 64, storage devices 65, and networks and network components 66. In some embodiments, the software components include network application server software 67 and database software 68.

[0211] The virtualization layer 70 provides an abstraction layer that can provide virtual entities such as virtual servers 71 , virtual storage 72 , virtual networks including virtual private networks 73 , virtual applications and operating systems 74 , and virtual clients 75 .

[0212] In one example, the management layer 80 may provide the functions described below. Resource provisioning 81 provides dynamic procurement of computational and other resources utilized to execute tasks within the cloud computing environment. Metering and pricing 82 provides cost tracking as resources are utilized within the cloud computing environment and billing or invoicing for the utilization of those resources. In one example, those resources may include application software licenses. Security provides identity verification of cloud consumers and tasks, as well as protection of data and other resources. User portal 83 provides consumers and system administrators with access to the cloud computing environment. Service level management 84 provides allocation and management of cloud computational resources to meet required service levels. Service level agreement (SLA) planning and execution 85 provides advance provisioning and procurement of cloud computational resources in anticipation of upcoming demands and in accordance with SLAs.

[0213] The Workload Layer 90 illustrates examples of functionality available in a cloud computing environment. Examples of workloads and functionality that may be provided from this layer include mapping and navigation 91, software development and lifecycle management 92, virtual classroom instruction delivery 93, data analytics processing 94, transaction processing 95, and secure virtual machine dump processing 96.

[0214] Aspects of the invention may be systems, methods, and / or computer program products at any possible level of technical detail of integration. The computer program product may include one or more computer readable storage media containing computer readable program instructions for causing a processor to perform aspects of the invention.

[0215] A computer readable storage medium may be a tangible device that can hold and store instructions for use by an instruction execution device. The computer readable storage medium may be, for example, but is not limited to, an electronic storage device, a magnetic storage device, an optical storage device, an electromagnetic storage device, a semiconductor storage device, or any suitable combination thereof. A non-exhaustive list of more specific examples of computer-readable storage media includes portable floppy disks, hard disks, random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), static random access memory (SRAM), portable compact disc read-only memory (CD-ROM), digital versatile disk (DVD), memory sticks, floppy disks, mechanically encoded devices such as punch cards or ridges in grooves on which the instructions are recorded, and any suitable combinations of these. As used herein, computer-readable storage media should not be construed as being signals that are themselves ephemeral, such as radio waves or other freely propagating electromagnetic waves, electromagnetic waves propagating through a waveguide or other transmission medium (e.g., light pulses passing through a fiber optic cable), or electrical signals transmitted over wires.

[0216] The computer readable program instructions described herein may be downloaded from a computer readable storage medium to each computing device / processing device or to an external computer or storage device over a network (e.g., the Internet, a local area network, a wide area network, or a wireless network, or a combination thereof) that may include copper transmission cables, optical transmission fiber, wireless transmission, routers, firewalls, switches, gateway computers, and / or edge servers. A network adapter card or network interface within each computing device / processing device receives the computer readable program instructions from the network and transfers the computer readable program instructions for storage on a computer readable storage medium within each computing device / processing device.

[0217] The computer readable program instructions for carrying out the operations of the present invention may be source or object code written in any combination of one or more programming languages, including assembler instructions, instruction-set-architecture (ISA) instructions, machine instructions, machine-dependent instructions, microcode, firmware instructions, state setting data, configuration data for an integrated circuit, or object-oriented programming languages, such as Smalltalk®, C++, and procedural programming languages, such as the “C” programming language or similar programming languages. The computer readable program instructions may execute entirely on the user's computer, partially on the user's computer as a standalone software package, partially on the user's computer and on a remote computer, or entirely on a remote computer or server. In the latter scenario, the remote computer may be connected to the user's computer via any type of network, including a local area network (LAN) or a wide area network (WAN), or the connection may be to an external computer (e.g., via the Internet using an Internet Service Provider). In some embodiments, electronic circuitry including, for example, programmable logic circuitry, field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), or programmable logic arrays (PLAs), may execute computer-readable program instructions to customize the electronic circuitry by utilizing state information of the computer-readable program instructions to carry out aspects of the invention.

[0218] Aspects of the present invention are described herein with reference to flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams of methods, apparatus (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of the invention. It will be understood that each block of the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, and combinations of blocks included in the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, can be implemented by computer readable program instructions.

[0219] These computer readable program instructions may be provided to a processor of a computer or other programmable data processing apparatus to produce a machine, such that the instructions, executed by the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing apparatus, produce means for performing the functions / operations specified in one or more blocks of the flowcharts and / or block diagrams. These computer readable program instructions may be stored on a computer readable storage medium and capable of directing a computer, programmable data processing apparatus, or other device, or combination thereof, to function in a particular manner, such that the computer readable storage medium on which the instructions are stored comprises an article of manufacture containing instructions for performing aspects of the functions / operations specified in one or more blocks of the flowcharts and / or block diagrams.

[0220] Computer-readable program instructions may be loaded into a computer, other programmable data processing apparatus, or other device such that the instructions, which execute on the computer, other programmable apparatus, or other device, perform the functions / acts specified in one or more blocks of the flowcharts and / or block diagrams, thereby causing a series of operable steps to be performed on the computer, other programmable apparatus, or other device to produce a computer-implemented process.

[0221] The flowcharts and block diagrams in the figures illustrate the architecture, functionality, and operation of possible implementations of systems, methods, and computer program products according to various embodiments of the present invention. In this regard, each block in the flowcharts or block diagrams may represent a module, segment, or portion of instructions, comprising one or more executable instructions for implementing a specified logical function. In some alternative implementations, the functions shown in the blocks may occur in a different order than the order shown in the figures. For example, two blocks shown in succession may in fact be realized as one step, executed simultaneously, executed substantially simultaneously in a partially or fully overlapping manner in time, or executed in reverse order, depending on the functionality involved. It is also noted that each block in the block diagrams and / or flowchart diagrams, as well as combinations of blocks included in the block diagrams and / or flowchart diagrams, may be implemented by a dedicated hardware-based system that executes the specified functions or operations or executes a combination of dedicated hardware and computer instructions.

[0222] In addition to the above, one or more aspects may be provided, offered, deployed, managed, serviced, etc. by a service provider that provides management of a customer's environment. For example, a service provider may create, maintain, support, etc., computer code and / or computer infrastructure that implements one or more aspects for one or more customers. In return, the service provider may receive payments from the customer, for example, pursuant to a subscription and / or fee agreement. Additionally or alternatively, the service provider may receive payments from the sale of advertising content to one or more third parties.

[0223] In one aspect, an application may be deployed to execute one or more embodiments. As one example, deploying an application includes providing a computer infrastructure operable to execute one or more embodiments.

[0224] As a further aspect, a computing infrastructure may be deployed that includes integrating computer readable code into a computing system, where the code in combination with the computing system is capable of executing one or more embodiments.

[0225] As a further aspect, a process may be provided for integrating a computing infrastructure, the process including integrating computer readable code into a computer system, the computer system comprising a computer readable medium, the computer medium including one or more embodiments, the code in combination with the computer system capable of executing one or more embodiments.

[0226] Although various embodiments have been described above, they are merely examples. For example, computing environments of other architectures may be used to incorporate and / or use one or more aspects. Furthermore, various instructions, commands, functions, calls, or operations, or combinations thereof, may be used. Many variations are possible.

[0227] In this specification, various embodiments are described. Furthermore, many variations are possible without departing from the spirit of the embodiments of the present invention. It should be noted that each embodiment or feature described in this specification and its variations can be combined with any other embodiment or feature, unless specifically contradictory.

[0228] Additionally, other types of computing environments may be beneficial and may be used. By way of example, a data processing system may be used that includes at least two processors coupled directly or indirectly via a system bus to memory elements suitable for storing and / or executing program code. These memory elements may include, for example, local memory used during the actual execution of the program code, bulk storage, and cache memory for temporarily storing at least some of the program code to reduce the number of times the code must be retrieved from the bulk storage during execution.

[0229] Input / output or I / O devices (including but not limited to keyboards, displays, pointing devices, DASD, tapes, CDs, DVDs, thumb drives, and other storage media) may be coupled to the system either directly or through intervening I / O controllers. Network adapters may be coupled to the system to enable the data processing system to be coupled to other data processing systems or remote printers or storage devices through intervening private or public networks. Modems, cable modems, and Ethernet cards are just a few of the types of network adapters available.

[0230] The terms used herein are for the purpose of describing particular embodiments only and are not intended to be limiting. As used herein, the singular forms "a", "an" and "the" are intended to include the plural forms unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. It will be further understood that the terms "comprises" and / or "comprising", as used herein, indicate the presence of stated features, integers, steps, operations, elements, or components, or combinations thereof, but do not exclude the presence or addition of one or more other features, integers, steps, operations, elements, components, or groups thereof, or combinations thereof.

[0231] The corresponding structures, materials, operations, and equivalents of all means or steps and functional elements within the scope of the claims below are intended to include any structures, materials, or operations for performing functions in combination with other claimed elements, if any, when specifically claimed. The description of one or more embodiments is presented for purposes of illustration and description, but is not intended to be exhaustive and is not limited to the disclosed forms. Many modifications and variations will be apparent to those skilled in the art. The embodiments have been selected and described to best explain the various aspects and practical applications, and to enable others skilled in the art to understand various embodiments with various modifications as suitable for the particular use contemplated.

Claims

1. 1. A computer readable storage medium having recorded thereon a computer program for facilitating processing within a computing environment, the computer program comprising program instructions for: Obtaining at least one request to store a diagnostic state of a virtual machine; and performing a storage of a diagnostic state of the virtual machine to provide a stored diagnostic state of the virtual machine based on obtaining the at least one request, wherein the performing the storing includes encrypting the diagnostic state of the virtual machine that is stored in the unencrypted form and preventing reading of the diagnostic state of the virtual machine by an untrusted entity prior to encrypting the diagnostic state of the virtual machine that is stored in the unencrypted form.

2. The computer-readable storage medium of claim 1 , wherein the stored diagnostic state of the virtual machine comprises contents of a memory of the virtual machine.

3. 2. The computer-readable storage medium of claim 1, wherein the stored diagnostic state of the virtual machine comprises contents of one or more processor registers of the virtual machine.

4. 2. The computer-readable storage medium of claim 1, wherein the method further includes obtaining a diagnostic state storage initiation request to initiate storage of a diagnostic state of the virtual machine, the diagnostic state storage initiation request being used to obtain a first encryption key used in encrypting at least a portion of the diagnostic state of the virtual machine that is stored unencrypted.

5. The obtaining of the at least one request includes obtaining a diagnostic processor state store request, and the performing of the storing of the diagnostic state based on obtaining the diagnostic processor state store request includes: encrypting at least selected content of at least one processor of the virtual machine using the first encryption key and providing encrypted processor content; and storing the encrypted processor content.

6. The obtaining of the at least one request includes obtaining a conversion request from a secure memory, and performing the storing of the diagnostic state based on obtaining the conversion request from the secure memory includes: encrypting at least selected contents of the unencrypted memory of the virtual machine using a second encryption key to provide encrypted contents of the memory; and storing the encrypted contents of the memory.

7. performing the storing of the diagnostic state based on obtaining a conversion request from the secure memory; determining whether the unit of memory whose contents are to be stored is encrypted; and encrypting the unit of memory using the second encryption key based on determining that the unit of memory is unencrypted, wherein encrypted units of memory are not re-encrypted.

8. the stored diagnostic state includes encrypted contents of a memory, the method comprising: Obtaining a diagnostic memory status storage request; and storing metadata used to decrypt encrypted contents of the memory based on obtaining the diagnostic memory state store request.

9. 9. The computer-readable storage medium of claim 8, wherein the metadata includes one or more selected component values ​​used to create one or more selected values ​​used to decrypt encrypted content of the memory.

10. The method further comprising: obtaining a completion request to complete said storing of diagnostic status; 2. The computer-readable storage medium of claim 1, further comprising: providing data used to decrypt an encrypted stored diagnostic state of the virtual machine based on obtaining the completion request.

11. 11. The computer-readable storage medium of claim 10, wherein the data includes a second encryption key used in decrypting the encrypted contents of the memory and a nonce value used to create one or more chosen values ​​used in the encryption, and wherein at least a portion of the data is encrypted.

12. 1. A computer system for facilitating processing within a computing environment, the computer system comprising: Memory, and at least one processor in communication with the memory, the computer system being configured to execute a method, the method comprising: Obtaining at least one request to store a diagnostic state of a virtual machine; and performing a storage of a diagnostic state of the virtual machine to provide a stored diagnostic state of the virtual machine based on obtaining the at least one request, wherein the performing the storing includes encrypting the diagnostic state of the virtual machine that is stored in the unencrypted form and preventing reading of the diagnostic state of the virtual machine by an untrusted entity prior to encrypting the diagnostic state of the virtual machine that is stored in the unencrypted form.