Vehicle control device

The vehicle control device optimizes secure boot processing by determining the necessity of secure boot steps based on unauthorized intrusion information, reducing startup time while maintaining integrity.

JP7581069B2Active Publication Date: 2024-11-12SUBARU CORP
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Patent Information

Application Number
JP2021015054
Authority / Receiving Office
JP · JP
Patent Type
Patents
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2021-02-02
Publication Date
2024-11-12
Estimated Expiration
2041-02-02

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing secure boot processes in vehicle ECUs take too long to complete within the strict startup time constraints, as they require communication with other ECUs to verify integrity, which is inefficient.

Method used

A vehicle control device that includes a control unit, storage units, and a hardware security module (HSM) to determine the necessity of secure boot processing based on unauthorized intrusion information, allowing the device to skip unnecessary secure boot steps when no tampering is detected.

Benefits of technology

This approach significantly reduces the processing time required for secure boot while ensuring integrity by determining the need for secure boot based on previous intrusion checks, thus optimizing startup times.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

To shorten processing time for secure boot processing while securing integrity when starting an ECU.SOLUTION: Provided is a control device for vehicles, comprising: a control section for controlling a control subject mounted in a vehicle; a storage section for storing illegal intrusion information indicating the presence or absence of an illegal intrusion into the vehicle; and a necessity determination section for determining the necessity of secure boot processing upon starting the control section based on the illegal intrusion information.SELECTED DRAWING: Figure 1
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Description

[Technical field]

[0001] The present invention relates to a vehicle control device, and more particularly to a vehicle control device that performs integrity verification at start-up. [Background technology]

[0002] A vehicle is equipped with a vehicle control device having multiple ECUs (Electronic Control Units), and the vehicle is controlled by the operation of each ECU based on a predetermined program. In recent years, the ECU also controls the vehicle's surroundings and automatic driving (running, turning, stopping, etc.) in autonomous driving technology. Therefore, for example, if the ECU program is tampered with illegally, it may hinder the safe driving of the vehicle.

[0003] In recent years, as vehicles have become capable of communicating with networks, problems such as the tampering of ECU programs through malicious external attacks have become apparent. In addition, ECUs may perform control based on programs stored in removable non-volatile memory, and there have been cases of tampering with programs, such as unauthorized replacement of non-volatile memory of an ECU that has entered a sleep state while the vehicle is parked.

[0004] Therefore, the ECU performs a secure boot process that verifies the integrity of the program at startup (boot) to prevent the execution of a program that has been tampered with. The secure boot process verifies the integrity of the program using encryption technology, and allows the ECU to start if the program has not been tampered with, but prevents the ECU from starting in that state if program tampering is detected.

[0005] On the other hand, the ECU has strict restrictions on the startup time from start to completion (for example, within tens to hundreds of milliseconds). In other words, it is required to complete the verification by the secure boot process within the startup time until the ECU starts control. For this reason, a technology for shortening the processing time in the secure boot process has been proposed (for example, Patent Document 1).

[0006] Patent document 1 discloses that information obtained from other ECUs when an ECU is stopped is verified against information obtained from other ECUs when an ECU is started, and if it is determined that there is a low possibility of tampering, the time required for secure boot processing is shortened by omitting part of the secure boot verification area. [Prior art documents] [Patent documents]

[0007] [Patent Document 1] Patent No. 6639615 Summary of the Invention [Problem to be solved by the invention]

[0008] However, in the secure boot process of Patent Document 1, verification at ECU startup uses status information obtained by communicating with other ECUs, so it is necessary to wait for the other ECUs to start up and begin communication, and therefore the time required for secure boot processing is not sufficiently reduced.

[0009] The present invention aims to address such a situation, that is, to shorten the processing time of the secure boot process while ensuring the integrity of the ECU at the time of booting. [Means for solving the problem]

[0010] In order to solve such problems, a vehicle control device according to the present invention has the following configuration. That is, one aspect of the present invention provides a vehicle control device comprising a control unit that controls a control object mounted on a vehicle, a memory unit that stores intrusion information indicating whether or not there has been an unauthorized intrusion into the vehicle, and a necessity determination unit that determines whether or not secure boot processing is necessary when the control unit is started based on the intrusion information. Effect of the Invention

[0011] A vehicle control device having such characteristics can reduce the processing time of the secure boot process while ensuring the integrity of the ECU at startup. [Brief description of the drawings]

[0012] [Figure 1] 1 is an explanatory diagram showing a schematic configuration of a vehicle control system including a vehicle control device according to an embodiment of the present invention; [Diagram 2] 1 is an explanatory diagram showing a schematic configuration of a vehicle control device according to an embodiment of the present invention; [Diagram 3] 5 is a flowchart showing a process for determining whether or not a secure boot process is required and an ECU startup process in the vehicle control device according to the embodiment of the present invention. [Figure 4] 4 is a flowchart showing an unauthorized intrusion determination process in the vehicle control device according to the embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS

[0013] Hereinafter, an embodiment of the present invention will be described with reference to the drawings. In the following description, the same reference numerals in different drawings indicate parts having the same function, and duplicated descriptions in each drawing will be omitted as appropriate.

[0014] As shown in FIG. 1, a vehicle control device (ECU) 10 according to an embodiment of the present invention is, for example, an ECU (Electronic Control Unit) 10 (including an occupant monitoring ECU 10A, a vehicle monitoring ECU 10B, a drive ECU 10C, a braking ECU 10D, a steering ECU 10E, etc., and when referring to all ECUs, it will be simply referred to as ECU 10) that is connected to various electronic devices (control targets) necessary for the running of a vehicle and controls these electronic devices.

[0015] These electronic devices and the ECU 10 that controls them are connected to each other via an in-vehicle network 3 such as a Controller Area Network (CAN) or a Local Interconnect Network (LIN) so that they can communicate with each other, and are also connected to a central gateway (CGW) 4 as a relay device to configure a vehicle control system 1. In the following description, detailed description and illustration of electronic devices and the like that are not directly related to the vehicle control device 10 according to this embodiment will be omitted.

[0016] 1, an ECU 10 included in a vehicle control system 1 is connected to electronic devices to be controlled that are mounted on a vehicle, and controls the operation of each connected electronic device based on information (data) acquired from an in-vehicle network 3. In addition, the ECU 10 outputs status information (data) such as the operating status of the connected electronic devices to the in-vehicle network 3.

[0017] For example, the occupant monitoring ECU 10A constitutes a part of a driver monitoring system (DMS) that monitors occupants in the vehicle, and monitors the occupants by controlling electronic devices included in the occupant monitoring system, such as a camera, a microphone, a seating sensor provided on a seat, and a door opening / closing sensor (none of which are shown). For example, the occupant monitoring ECU 10A determines whether or not the occupant of the vehicle is a legitimate user based on an image of the occupant captured by a camera. A user authentication result, which is the determination result by the occupant monitoring ECU, is output to the in-vehicle network 3 as status information.

[0018] The vehicle monitoring ECU 10B is connected to a vehicle door opening / closing sensor and a key sensor, and monitors the vehicle by controlling the opening and closing of the doors, the locking and unlocking of the doors, the matching of the keys when opening and closing the doors, etc. For example, the vehicle monitoring ECU determines whether the vehicle door is opened or closed, and whether the key used to unlock the door matches an authentication key preregistered in the vehicle, and outputs the door opening / closing history and the authentication key matching result to the in-vehicle network 3 as status information.

[0019] The drive ECU 10C, the brake ECU 10D, and the steering ECU 10E obtain information from the in-vehicle network 3 and control the running of the vehicle. In addition, the drive ECU 10C, the brake ECU 10D, and the steering ECU 10E output status information indicating the status of the electronic devices connected to the drive ECU 10C, the brake ECU 10D, and the steering ECU 10E (for example, vehicle speed information, information indicating the amount of depression of the foot brake, on / off information of the side brake, and steering angle information) to the in-vehicle network 3. In addition, the vehicle control system includes a plurality of ECUs 10 that control various electronic devices necessary for the vehicle to run, but these are not shown in FIG.

[0020] As shown in FIG. 2, an ECU 10 serving as a vehicle control device is connected to a controlled object, and includes a CPU (Central Processing Unit) 20, a first storage unit 30, a second storage unit 40, and an HSM (Hardware Security Module) 50.

[0021] The CPU 20 executes various processes based on the programs stored in the first storage unit 30. In this embodiment, the CPU 20 can function as the control unit 21, the state information acquisition unit 22, the unauthorized intrusion determination unit 23, and the necessity determination unit 24 shown in FIG. 2 by loading the programs stored in the first storage unit 30 into a memory such as the second storage unit 40 and executing them.

[0022] The control unit 21 starts up the ECU 10 based on the control program stored in the first storage unit 30, and executes processing for controlling the controlled object.

[0023] The status information acquisition unit 22 acquires, via the in-vehicle network 3, vehicle status information from other ECUs 10 connected to the in-vehicle network 3. The status information acquired by the status information acquisition unit 22 includes a user authentication result by the occupant monitoring ECU 10A and an authentication key matching result by the vehicle monitoring ECU 10B.

[0024] The unauthorized intrusion determination unit 23 determines whether or not there has been an unauthorized intrusion into the vehicle based on the status information acquired by the status information acquisition unit 22. The unauthorized intrusion determination unit 23 also generates unauthorized intrusion information based on the determination result, and stores the generated unauthorized intrusion information in the second storage unit 40. When the unauthorized intrusion determination unit 23 obtains a determination result indicating that an unauthorized intrusion has occurred as the unauthorized intrusion information, it stores a flag ON in the second storage unit 40 to execute a secure boot process.

[0025] Furthermore, when the unauthorized intrusion determination unit 23 obtains a determination result that there has been no unauthorized intrusion, it stores a flag OFF, indicating that secure boot processing is unnecessary, in the second storage unit 40. The unauthorized intrusion determination processing by the unauthorized intrusion determination unit 23 will be described later.

[0026] The necessity determination unit 24 determines whether or not secure boot processing is required when the control unit 21 starts up, i.e., when the control unit 21 starts up the ECU 10, based on the intrusion information stored in the second storage unit 40 when the control unit 21 last started up the ECU 10. For example, if a flag ON is stored in the second storage unit 40, it determines that secure boot processing is required, and if a flag OFF is stored in the second storage unit 40, it determines that secure boot processing is not required. The determination result by the necessity determination unit 24 is notified to the HSM 50, which will be described later.

[0027] The first storage unit 30 can be configured by a non-volatile memory (e.g., a flash memory). The first storage unit 30 stores a program to be executed by the CPU 20 when the ECU 10 operates. Note that the first storage unit 30 can also be a removable storage medium such as an SD card.

[0028] The second storage unit 40 can be used as a so-called RAM. The second storage unit 40 also stores the intrusion information generated by the intrusion information determination unit.

[0029] The HSM 50 executes a secure boot process to verify whether or not a program to be started (i.e., a program executed by the CPU 20) is appropriate when the ECU 10 is started. In the HSM 50 of this embodiment, when the determination result by the necessity determination unit 24 indicates that the secure boot process is required, the HSM 50 executes the secure boot process.

[0030] If the verification by the secure boot process shows that the program is correct, the HSM 50 permits the control unit 21 to start up the ECU 10. If the verification shows that the program is not correct, the HSM 50 does not permit the control unit 21 to start up the ECU 10.

[0031] For example, if the HSM 50 detects that a program stored in the first storage unit 30 has been tampered with, the HSM 50 notifies the control unit 21 that the program cannot be started. The control unit 21 starts the program only when the control unit 21 is notified of the permission to start the program based on the notification from the HSM 50. This makes it possible to prevent the ECU 10 from being started based on an unauthorized program.

[0032] On the other hand, if the determination result by the necessity determining unit 24 is that the secure boot process is not required, the HSM 50 permits the control unit 21 to start up the ECU 10 without executing at least a part of the secure boot process.

[0033] Next, the process flow in the vehicle control device (ECU) 10 configured as above will be described with reference to the flowcharts of FIG. 3 and FIG.

[0034] [Determining whether secure boot processing is necessary and ECU startup processing] 3 is a flowchart showing a secure boot process necessity determination process and an ECU startup process in the vehicle control device (ECU) 10. When the ECU 10 that is the target of the secure boot process starts startup, the necessity determination unit 24 checks whether the flag stored in the second storage unit 40 is ON or OFF (step S101).

[0035] In the flag confirmation process of step S101, if the flag ON is stored in the second storage unit 40, the necessity determination unit 24 notifies the HSM 50 that secure boot processing is required, and the HSM 50 executes the secure boot processing (step S102). If the flag OFF is stored in the second storage unit 40, the necessity determination unit 24 notifies the HSM 50 that secure boot processing is not required, and the HSM 50 permits the control unit 21 to start the ECU 10 without executing the secure boot processing.

[0036] In the secure boot process by the HSM 50, for example, the entire area in the first storage unit 30 or the like in which the program executed by the CPU 20 when the ECU 10 executes control of the control target is verified. In this way, when the ECU 10 is started, it is verified whether the program to be started is appropriate. If the verification result shows that the program is not appropriate, the HSM 50 does not permit the control unit 21 to start the ECU 10 (step S104) and ends the process.

[0037] If the program is found to be valid as a result of the secure boot process, the HSM 50 permits the control unit 21 to start the ECU 10 (step S105). If the start-up is successful, the ECU 10 starts normal operation, that is, performs control over the control target (step S106). In the ECU 10, in parallel with the normal operation, the unauthorized intrusion determination unit 23 performs unauthorized intrusion determination processing (step S107). The unauthorized intrusion determination processing will be described later.

[0038] If the unauthorized intrusion determination unit 23 determines that there has been no unauthorized intrusion (step S108), the flag OFF is stored in the second storage unit 40 as unauthorized intrusion information (step S109), and the process ends. If the unauthorized intrusion determination unit 23 determines that there has been unauthorized intrusion (step S108), the flag ON is stored in the second storage unit 40 as unauthorized intrusion information (step S110), and the process ends.

[0039] The unauthorized intrusion information (flag ON or flag OFF) stored in the second storage unit 40 by the unauthorized intrusion determination unit 23 is used when determining whether or not secure boot processing is required the next time the ECU 10 is started up.

[0040] Note that, prior to the process of confirming the intrusion information (secure boot continuation flag) in step S101, a verification may be performed on the memory area in which the programs and data related to the secure boot process are stored. By performing such a process, the integrity of the process of confirming the intrusion information can be further ensured.

[0041] [About the unauthorized intrusion detection process] FIG. 4 is a flowchart showing the unauthorized intrusion determination process performed by the unauthorized intrusion determination unit 23. As shown in FIG. The unauthorized intrusion determination unit 23 determines whether or not there has been an unauthorized intrusion into the vehicle based on the vehicle state information acquired from the state information acquisition unit 22. Specifically, the unauthorized intrusion determination unit 23 acquires state information indicating the result of authentication key matching by the vehicle monitoring ECU 10B, and determines whether the key used to unlock the vehicle door matches the authentication key registered in advance in the vehicle (step S201). If the key used to unlock the vehicle door does not match the authentication key, it determines that there has been an unauthorized intrusion (step S204), and ends the unauthorized intrusion determination process.

[0042] On the other hand, if the key used to unlock the vehicle matches the authentication key, the unauthorized intrusion determination unit 23 obtains status information indicating the user authentication result from the occupant monitoring ECU 10A and determines whether the occupant who has boarded the vehicle is a legitimate user (step S202).

[0043] If the user who got into the vehicle is not a legitimate user, the unauthorized intrusion determination unit 23 determines that unauthorized intrusion has occurred (step S204) and ends the unauthorized intrusion determination process. If the unauthorized intrusion determination unit 23 determines that the occupant who got into the vehicle is a legitimate user, it determines that unauthorized intrusion has not occurred (step S203) and ends the unauthorized intrusion determination process.

[0044] When the unauthorized intrusion determination process is completed, the process proceeds to step S108 in the flowchart of FIG. 3, and the unauthorized intrusion determination unit 23 stores the flag ON or OFF in the second memory unit 40 according to the determination result of the unauthorized intrusion determination process (steps S109 and S110 in FIG. 3).

[0045] The unauthorized intrusion determination process described above is an example, and does not necessarily have to be performed in the ECU that is the target of the secure boot process as described above. The unauthorized intrusion determination process may be executed by an ECU other than the ECU that is the target of the secure boot process, such as the occupant monitoring ECU 10A or the vehicle monitoring ECU 10B, and the result of the process may be output to the ECU that is the target of the secure boot process.

[0046] As described above, the vehicle control device according to the present embodiment judges the presence or absence of an unauthorized intrusion into the vehicle, thereby judging the possibility of tampering with the program used to control the control target. If there is a possibility of tampering with the program, the secure boot process is executed, whereas if there is no possibility of tampering with the program, the secure boot process can be omitted in part or in whole.

[0047] In this way, the need for secure boot processing is determined depending on the possibility of program tampering, so that when the possibility of program tampering is low, the time required from the start of ECU boot-up to its completion can be shortened.On the other hand, when the possibility of program tampering is high, security against tampering can be ensured by executing secure boot processing.

[0048] In other words, the verification scope of the secure boot process can be flexibly changed depending on the results of the unauthorized intrusion determination based on the vehicle monitoring status, making it possible to achieve both integrity at the time of ECU startup and a reduction in the time required for secure boot process.

[0049] In addition, when the ECU is successfully started, an intrusion determination process is performed and intrusion information is stored. This intrusion information is then used to determine whether or not secure boot processing is required at the next startup, so there is no need to communicate with other ECUs included in the vehicle control system 1 when the ECU is started.

[0050] Furthermore, for example, if the first memory unit 30 is a removable storage medium such as an SD card, it is possible that the first memory unit 30 itself may be tampered with by unauthorized intrusion into the vehicle and replaced, but since the need for secure boot processing is determined based on the unauthorized intrusion determination process, this can serve as a countermeasure against such tampering.

[0051] Although the embodiments of the present invention have been described in detail with reference to the drawings, the specific configuration is not limited to these embodiments, and the present invention includes design changes and the like that do not deviate from the gist of the present invention. In addition, the above-mentioned embodiments can be combined by utilizing each other's technologies as long as there are no particular contradictions or problems in the purpose, configuration, etc. [Explanation of symbols]

[0052] 1: Vehicle control system, 3: In-vehicle network, 10: Vehicle control device (ECU), 10A: Passenger monitoring ECU, 10B: Vehicle monitoring ECU, 10C: Drive ECU, 10D: Braking ECU, 10E: Steering ECU, 20: CPU, 21: Control unit, 22: Status information acquisition unit, 23: Unauthorized intrusion determination unit, 24: Necessity determination unit, 30: First memory unit, 40: Second memory unit, 50: HSM

Claims

1. A control unit that controls a control target mounted on a vehicle; a storage unit that stores unauthorized intrusion information indicating whether or not a person has illegally intruded into the vehicle; a necessity determination unit that determines whether or not a secure boot process is required for the control unit based on the unauthorized intrusion information before starting up the control unit, the unauthorized intrusion information is generated by an unauthorized intrusion determination process executed after the control unit is last started and is stored in the storage unit, The necessity determination unit is When the unauthorized intrusion information indicates that a person has unauthorizedly intruded into the vehicle, a secure boot process is performed on the control unit before the control unit is started up; When the unauthorized intrusion information indicates that there has been no unauthorized intrusion into the vehicle, the control unit is permitted to be started without executing a secure boot process on the control unit. Vehicle control device.

2. A control unit that controls a control target mounted on a vehicle; a storage unit that stores unauthorized intrusion information indicating whether or not a person has illegally intruded into the vehicle; a necessity determination unit that determines whether or not a secure boot process is required for the control unit based on the unauthorized intrusion information before starting up the control unit, the unauthorized intrusion information is generated by an unauthorized intrusion determination process executed after the control unit is last started and is stored in the storage unit, The unauthorized intrusion determination process performed by the vehicle control device includes: determining whether or not the key used to unlock the door of the vehicle matches an authentication key preregistered in the vehicle; storing the unauthorized intrusion information indicating that no unauthorized intrusion has occurred in the vehicle when the used key and the authentication key match in the storage unit; storing the unauthorized intrusion information, which indicates an unauthorized intrusion into the vehicle, in the storage unit when the used key does not match the authentication key; The necessity determination unit is When the unauthorized intrusion information indicates that a person has unauthorizedly intruded into the vehicle, a secure boot process is performed on the control unit before the control unit is started up; When the unauthorized intrusion information indicates that there has been no unauthorized intrusion into the vehicle, the control unit is permitted to be started without executing a secure boot process on the control unit. Vehicle control device.

3. The unauthorized intrusion determination process performed by the vehicle control device includes: determining whether or not the vehicle occupant is a legitimate user based on an image of the vehicle occupant captured by a camera; If the occupant is a legitimate user, the unauthorized intrusion information indicating that no unauthorized intrusion has occurred into the vehicle is stored in the storage unit; If the occupant is not a legitimate user, the unauthorized intrusion information indicating that a person has unauthorizedly intruded into the vehicle is stored in the storage unit. The vehicle control device according to claim 1.

4. A control unit for controlling a control target mounted on a vehicle; a storage unit that stores unauthorized intrusion information indicating whether or not a person has illegally intruded into the vehicle; a necessity determination unit that determines whether or not a secure boot process is required for the control unit based on the unauthorized intrusion information before starting up the control unit, the unauthorized intrusion information is generated by an unauthorized intrusion determination process executed after the control unit is last started and is stored in the storage unit, The unauthorized intrusion determination process performed by the vehicle control device includes: determining whether or not a key used to unlock the door of the vehicle matches an authentication key preregistered in the vehicle, and determining whether or not an occupant of the vehicle is a legitimate user based on an image of the occupant captured by a camera; If the used key and the authentication key match and if the occupant is a legitimate user, the unauthorized intrusion information indicating that no unauthorized intrusion has occurred in the vehicle is stored in the storage unit; storing the unauthorized intrusion information indicating an unauthorized intrusion into the vehicle by a person in the storage unit when the used key does not match the authentication key or when the occupant is not a legitimate user; The necessity determination unit is When the unauthorized intrusion information indicates that a person has unauthorizedly intruded into the vehicle, a secure boot process is performed on the control unit before the control unit is started up; When the unauthorized intrusion information indicates that there has been no unauthorized intrusion into the vehicle, the control unit is permitted to be started without executing a secure boot process on the control unit. Vehicle control device.

5. The control unit controls the control target by communicating via an in-vehicle network, The control unit and the necessity determination unit are capable of communicating with the storage unit without going through the in-vehicle network. The vehicle control device according to any one of claims 1 to 4.

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