System, etc.

Abstract

To provide a system and the like which can reduce risks of theft or the like by relay attack in a vehicle or the like which already mounts a smart entry system or the like.SOLUTION: A vehicle system which is provided with a function to perform smart operation to be at least operation of either unlock or engine start of a vehicle on the basis of a response signal from a smart key with respect to a request signal transmitted to the smart key from the vehicle, a system is retrofitted. The system is provided with at least either a function to prohibit the smart operation in the vehicle system or a function to notify when a part of the smart operation is performed.SELECTED DRAWING: Figure 1

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to a system or the like associated with a vehicle or the like.

Background Art

[0002] Conventional vehicle thefts generally used methods such as using a tow truck at night or in a place with few pedestrians, or using an immobilizer. In order to reduce the risk of vehicle theft by such methods, a retrofitted security device that generates an alarm sound when an impact or door opening is detected and notifies a security remote control has been used.

[0003] A system (so-called smart entry system) has emerged that enables the arming (security on) and disarming (security off) of a vehicle without key operation by linking with the vehicle's original key. Crimes have occurred in which the RF signal at the time of unlocking the original key (smart key) of the smart entry system is hacked and the security function of the vehicle is released using this signal to steal the vehicle. In order to prevent vehicle theft by this method, there are cases where disarming with the original key is made impossible. In this case, even if the smart entry system is installed, the smart key must be operated when getting into the vehicle.

[0004] Furthermore, even when the vehicle and the smart key are separated, a theft method called a relay attack has begun to appear, which enables the unlocking of the vehicle door and the starting of the engine by enabling communication between the two using a repeater or the like.

[0005] Patent Document 1 below discloses a smart entry system (smart key system) that prevents vehicle theft by relay attack. The in-vehicle device of this smart key system includes a noise measurement unit, a transmission intensity determination unit that determines the transmission intensity of a response signal so as to be lower than a pre-specified intensity and to increase as the noise increases, a first transmission unit that wirelessly transmits a request signal including instruction information for instructing the transmission intensity within a pre-specified area, a first reception unit that receives the response signal, and an authentication unit that authenticates the portable device based on first authentication information regarding the pre-registered portable device and second authentication information included in the response signal. The portable device includes a second reception unit, a transmission intensity setting unit that sets the transmission intensity of the response signal, and a second transmission unit that wirelessly transmits a response signal including the second authentication information at the transmission intensity set by the transmission intensity setting unit when the second reception unit receives the request signal.

Prior Art Documents

Patent Documents

[0006]

Patent Document 1

Summary of the Invention

Problems to be Solved by the Invention

[0007] The smart entry system (smart key system) disclosed in Patent Document 1 can be installed in newly manufactured vehicles, but it is difficult to retrofit and incorporate it into vehicles that already have a smart entry system installed.

[0008] An object of the present invention is to provide a system or the like that can reduce the risk of theft or the like by relay attack, for example, in a vehicle or the like that already has a smart entry system or the like installed.

[0009] The object of the invention of the present application is not limited to this, and the applicant also has the intention of obtaining rights through divisional applications, amendments, etc. for configurations that aim to obtain effects resulting from parts of the configurations disclosed in this specification, drawings, etc. For example, in this specification, the problem of reading the part described as "can be" as "is a problem" is disclosed in this specification. The problems are described as independent ones, and the applicant also has the intention of obtaining rights through divisional applications, amendments, etc. alone for the configurations for solving these problems. Even if the problems are implicitly understood from the description of the specification, the applicant has the intention of making part of the configurations described in this specification the scope of claims through amendment or divisional application. Also, problems combining these independent problems are disclosed.

Means for Solving the Problems

[0010] (1) A system retrofitted to a vehicle system having a function of performing a smart operation which is at least one of unlocking the vehicle and starting the engine based on a response signal from the smart key to a request signal transmitted from the vehicle to the smart key, the system having retrofitting means having at least one of a function of prohibiting the smart operation in the vehicle system and a function of notifying when a part of the smart operation has been executed.

[0011] By prohibiting the smart operation for the vehicle system, the risk of vehicle theft due to relay attack can be reduced. Also, by notifying when a part of the smart operation has been executed, vehicle users such as drivers can be aware that a suspicious smart operation has been performed. Thereby, the risk of vehicle theft due to relay attack can be reduced.

[0012] The attachment means can be realized by any of the following three types of configurations. The first configuration is composed of both an in-vehicle device mounted on the vehicle and a device carried by the vehicle user. The second configuration includes the in-vehicle device and does not require a device carried by the vehicle user. The third configuration includes a device carried by the vehicle user and does not require the in-vehicle device. Examples of the first to third configurations will be described later.

[0013] When the smart key receives a request signal from the vehicle, it may transmit the identification information indicating that the smart key is a legitimate one to the vehicle, included in the response signal. It is particularly preferable to include a vehicle-specific ID code in the request signal, and have the smart key convert the ID code in the received request signal based on the ID code specific to the smart key, and include the converted code in the response signal and transmit it to the vehicle. By doing so, the risk of vehicle theft can be further reduced.

[0014] The function to prohibit smart operations or the function to give a notification when a part of the smart operations is executed may be executed, for example, when a predetermined smart operation prohibition condition is satisfied. The "smart operation prohibition condition" may be set to be satisfied when a situation where the vehicle is at high risk of theft occurs, when the user of the vehicle performs an operation to prohibit smart operations, etc. As a situation where the vehicle is at high risk of theft, for example, it may be a situation where the user of the vehicle is separated from the vehicle by a certain distance. In this case, when the user of the vehicle approaches within a certain distance from the vehicle, the prohibition of smart operations may be released. For example, as the "certain distance", a distance at which the intensity of radio waves attenuates to a certain value may be adopted. In this case, at least one of the vehicle and the remote device carried by the user of the vehicle has a function of emitting radio waves, and the other has a function of receiving the radio waves. Also, the "certain distance" may be specified based on the straight-line distance between the vehicle and the user of the vehicle. This straight-line distance can be measured by providing a GPS function to the remote device carried by the user of the vehicle and the in-vehicle device mounted on the vehicle. When the smart operations are prohibited by the user of the vehicle performing an operation to prohibit smart operations, the prohibition of smart operations may be released when the user of the vehicle operates the smart key to unlock the door of the vehicle.

[0015] The "function to prohibit smart operations" may be, for example, a function in which the retrofitted means prevents the vehicle system from unlocking when it detects that an operation to unlock the door of the vehicle has been performed. Or, the retrofitted means may always set the vehicle system to a smart operation prohibited state and not release the smart operation prohibited state when an operation to unlock the door is performed.

[0016] As a method for setting the vehicle system to the smart operation prohibited state, it is advisable to invalidate the effective / invalid state of the smart operation in the vehicle system via in-vehicle networks such as CAN and connectors such as OBD connectors. The power supply to the device (such as the collation ECU) that controls the smart operation may be cut off. Signal lines such as door switches, foot brake switches, and push start switches may be short-circuited or opened.

[0017] Regarding the smart entry system, there are various names depending on the automobile manufacturer. For example, there are names such as smart entry & start system, intelligent key system, Honda smart key·smart card key system, keyless start system, keyless access & push start, keyless operation system, key-free system, advanced keyless entry & start system, passive entry & start system, smart entry & start system, advanced key system, keyless go & hands-free access, comfort access, personal car communication & keyless drive, intelligent access & push button start, etc. Generally, those that provide the following functions are called smart entry systems.

[0018] The smart entry system is composed of an in-vehicle device mounted on a vehicle and a portable device (smart key) carried by a user of the vehicle. The in-vehicle device and the smart key are associated with each other. When the user of the vehicle approaches the vehicle while carrying the smart key, the door of the vehicle can be unlocked without touching the smart key. For example, when the user of the vehicle grasps the door knob, the door of the vehicle is unlocked. Conversely, when the user of the vehicle gets out of the vehicle while carrying the smart key, the door of the vehicle can be locked without touching the smart key. Hereinafter, in this specification, the locking and unlocking of the door of the vehicle are simply referred to as "locking" and "unlocking". For example, when the user of the vehicle touches a specific part of the door knob, it can be locked. Further, when the user of the vehicle gets into the vehicle while carrying the smart key, the engine can be started without touching the smart key. For example, when the user of the vehicle operates the engine start button, the engine can be started.

[0019] (2) The retrofitting means includes an in-vehicle device mounted on and used in the vehicle, and a remote device carried together with the smart key and radiating radio waves. The in-vehicle device may be a system having a function of prohibiting the smart operation when the intensity of the radio wave from the remote device is equal to or lower than a determination level.

[0020] Even if a relay attack is launched by relaying a wireless signal between the in-vehicle device of the smart entry system and the smart key, if the remote device of the retrofitting means is away from the vehicle and the intensity of the radio wave from the remote device is equal to or lower than the determination level, the smart operation is prohibited. Therefore, when the vehicle is outside the radio wave range emitted by the remote device, the vehicle is not unlocked and the engine is not started. Therefore, the risk of vehicle theft due to a relay attack can be reduced. This retrofitting means corresponds to a first configuration composed of both an in-vehicle device mounted on the vehicle and a device carried by the user of the vehicle.

[0021] The in-vehicle device with retrofit means may include a radio wave receiving unit that receives radio waves from a smart key and a determination unit that determines the intensity of the radio waves. To prohibit the smart operation, for example, the in-vehicle device with retrofit means is connected to the vehicle system, and a signal to prohibit the smart operation is sent to the vehicle control unit (hereinafter referred to as the collation ECU) that controls the smart operation of the vehicle from the in-vehicle device. The in-vehicle device with retrofit means may be connected to an in-vehicle network such as CAN. The connection to the in-vehicle network may be made via a connector such as an OBD connector. When the smart operation is prohibited, the collation ECU may continue the prohibited state of the smart operation until the smart operation is permitted. The functions of this in-vehicle device may be incorporated into an OBD adapter so that the enable / disable of these functions can be set with a DIP switch or the like.

[0022] When the intensity of the radio waves from the remote device exceeds a certain level, the in-vehicle device with retrofit means may allow the smart operation. Thereby, the original vehicle user who carries the smart key and the remote device with retrofit means can approach the vehicle and utilize the functions of the smart entry system.

[0023] In order to make it difficult to relay the radio waves transmitted and received between the in-vehicle device with retrofit means and the remote device, radio waves in a frequency band different from the frequency band of the radio waves used in the smart entry system may be used as the radio waves for communication between the in-vehicle device with retrofit means and the remote device.

[0024] As the remote device, it is advisable to use a mobile terminal such as a smartphone equipped with a short-range wireless communication function such as Bluetooth or WiFi. In this case, the in-vehicle device with the retrofitting means is associated with the mobile terminal, and for example, it is advisable to determine whether the intensity of radio waves such as Bluetooth or WiFi from the associated mobile terminal is below the determination level. For example, when communication via Bluetooth or WiFi is impossible, it may be determined that the intensity of the radio wave is below the determination level. In this case, the position information of the location where the vehicle is locked is stored in the mobile terminal, and when returning to near the location where the vehicle was locked, for example, when the distance from the current position of the mobile terminal to the locked location is equal to or less than a predetermined distance, the detection of communication availability may be started. Thereby, the consumption of the battery due to unnecessary communication can be suppressed (battery saving).

[0025] It is advisable to periodically wirelessly transmit a signal including an ID from the remote device to the in-vehicle device. Based on the electric field intensity of this signal, it is advisable to make the in-vehicle device detect the approach and departure of the remote device.

[0026] (3) The retrofitting means has a function of acquiring the current position information of the vehicle, a function of receiving the current position information of the mobile terminal from the mobile terminal that is associated with the vehicle and carried together with the smart key to transmit the current position information, and a function of prohibiting the smart operation based on the relationship between the current position of the vehicle and the current position of the mobile terminal and it is advisable to form a system having this.

[0027] For example, based on the relationship between the current position of the vehicle and the current position of the mobile terminal, it is advisable to determine whether the user of the vehicle is away from the vehicle by a predetermined distance or more. When the user of the vehicle is away from the vehicle by a predetermined distance or more, it is advisable to prohibit the smart operation. Thereby, the risk of vehicle theft due to relay attack is reduced. This retrofitting means corresponds to the first configuration composed of both the in-vehicle device mounted on the vehicle and the device carried by the user of the vehicle.

[0028] The function of obtaining the current position of the vehicle and the function of receiving the current position information of the mobile terminal carried by the user of the vehicle may be realized by an in-vehicle device mounted on the vehicle. As the mobile terminal carried by the user of the vehicle, it is advisable to use a general smartphone or the like installed with dedicated application software. Alternatively, a dedicated terminal may be prepared as the mobile terminal carried by the user of the vehicle.

[0029] When the distance from the current position of the vehicle to the current position of the mobile terminal becomes less than the determination value in a state where the smart operation is prohibited, it is advisable to allow the smart operation. As a result, the user of the vehicle can perform unlocking by the smart operation.

[0030] The vehicle and the mobile terminal may obtain the current position by using the GPS function. When the distance from the current position of the vehicle to the current position of the mobile terminal cannot be calculated because the GPS radio wave does not reach, it is advisable to prohibit the smart operation. Thereby, the risk of vehicle theft due to relay attack can be reduced. In this case, the user of the vehicle can unlock the vehicle by operating the smart key. After the vehicle is unlocked by operating the smart key, it is advisable to allow the smart operation. After allowing the smart operation, engine start by the smart operation becomes possible.

[0031] (4) The after-attaching means A system having a function of detecting a remote control lock operation, which is an operation of locking the vehicle by the user operating the smart key, and a function of prohibiting the smart operation when the remote control lock operation is detected is advisable.

[0032] When the user performs a remote control lock operation to lock the vehicle, the risk of vehicle theft by relay attack is reduced. This retrofit means corresponds to a second configuration that includes an in-vehicle device and does not require a remote device. The vehicle user does not need to carry a device other than the genuine smart key of the vehicle.

[0033] When the vehicle is locked by a remote control lock operation, unlocking by a smart operation cannot be performed. In this case, the user can unlock the vehicle by operating the smart key. After the vehicle is unlocked by operating the smart key, it is preferable to allow smart operation. Thereby, the user can start the engine by smart operation.

[0034] When the possibility of a relay attack is low, for example, when parked in a home parking lot, it is preferable to perform a lock by smart operation without performing a remote control lock operation. By doing so, for example, a vehicle parked in a home parking lot can be unlocked by smart operation. When the possibility of a relay attack is high, for example, when parked in a shopping center parking lot, it is preferable to lock by remote control lock operation. By doing so, the risk of vehicle theft by relay attack can be reduced.

[0035] (5) The retrofit means has a function of detecting that the user has performed a specified operation when getting out of the vehicle, and a function of prohibiting the smart operation based on the detection results of the specified operation and the lock operation by smart operation and it is preferable to use a system having these functions.

[0036] By explicitly performing a specified operation, the user can disable the smart operation and reduce the risk of vehicle theft by relay attack. This retrofit means corresponds to a second configuration that includes an in-vehicle device and does not require a remote device. The vehicle user does not need to carry any device other than the genuine smart key of the vehicle.

[0037] As the specified operation, for example, it may be an operation on the vehicle. As an operation on the vehicle, for example, it may be an operation such as an operation button, an operation lever, an operation switch, etc. attached to the vehicle by retrofit, or an operation that is not performed during normal getting out of the vehicle. For example, it may be an operation that combines two or more operations on the vehicle. As an operation that combines two or more operations, for example, it may be an operation such as stepping on the brake pedal with the door open. Basic information for detecting whether the brake pedal is stepped on with the door open may be obtained from the vehicle by the in-vehicle device of the retrofit means via an in-vehicle network such as CAN and an OBD connector, for example.

[0038] When the vehicle is locked by the smart operation together with the specified operation, the unlocking by the smart operation cannot be performed. In this case, the user can unlock the vehicle by operating the smart key. After the vehicle is unlocked by operating the smart key, the smart operation may be allowed. Thereby, the user can start the engine by the smart operation.

[0039] Contrary to the process of disabling the smart operation when the user performs the specified operation, the smart operation may be disabled when the user does not perform the specified operation, and the smart operation may be allowed when the user performs the specified operation.

[0040] (6) The retrofit means may be a system having a function of disabling the smart operation until a specified time elapses from the time when the vehicle is locked.

[0041] Vehicle thieves using relay attacks tend to follow users who have gotten out of the vehicle and initiate a relay attack when the user leaves the vehicle. Therefore, after the user has gotten out of the vehicle and a long time has passed, the risk of vehicle theft by relay attack decreases. By prohibiting smart operations until a specified time has elapsed since the vehicle was locked, the risk of vehicle theft by relay attack can be reduced. This post-installation means corresponds to a second configuration that includes an in-vehicle device and does not require a remote device. Vehicle users do not need to carry any device other than the genuine smart key for the vehicle. Also, vehicle users do not need to perform any special operation to prohibit smart operations.

[0042] The post-installed in-vehicle device may obtain information that the vehicle is locked via an in-vehicle network such as CAN and a connector such as an OBD connector, and immediately send a signal to the verification ECU to prohibit smart operations. This in-vehicle device has a clock, and when a specified time has elapsed since the vehicle was locked, it may be configured to send a signal to the verification ECU to allow smart operations.

[0043] The post-installation means may have a function of unlocking the vehicle when it receives an unlock signal by operating the smart key by the user within a specified time after the vehicle is locked. Then, when the user gets into the vehicle before the specified time has elapsed since the vehicle was locked, the user can unlock the vehicle by operating the smart key.

[0044] (7) The post-installation means has a function of registering the user of the vehicle by biometric authentication, and a function of identifying a person around the vehicle by biometric authentication and prohibiting the smart operation when it cannot be determined that the registered user is present around the vehicle. It is preferably a system having

[0045] Since smart operations are prohibited when the registered user cannot be found around the vehicle, the risk of vehicle theft by relay attack is reduced when the user is away from the vehicle. When the user approaches the vehicle and the user's presence is confirmed by biometric authentication, the user can unlock the vehicle by smart operations. This retrofitting means corresponds to a second configuration that includes an in-vehicle device and does not require a remote device. The vehicle user does not need to carry any device other than the vehicle's original smart key. In addition, the vehicle user does not need to perform any special operations to prohibit smart operations.

[0046] The process of finding a registered user may be executed, for example, when an unlock operation is performed by a smart action. For example, the smart action may be always prohibited, and the smart action prohibition may be cancelled when a registered user is found.

[0047] The biometric authentication may be face authentication, fingerprint authentication, etc. When face authentication is used, a camera that captures images of the vehicle's surroundings may be installed inside the vehicle. When fingerprint authentication is used, a fingerprint authentication sensor may be attached to the door handle, etc.

[0048] (8) The retrofitting means may have a key storage means carried by the user of the vehicle in a state in which radio waves emitted from the smart key are shielded by storing the smart key therein, and the key storage means may be a system that realizes a function of prohibiting the smart operation by preventing the response signal from the smart key from reaching the vehicle.

[0049] By storing the smart key in the key storage means, the risk of vehicle theft by relay attack can be reduced. When the user wants to unlock the vehicle, he or she simply removes the smart key from the key storage means. This retrofitting means includes a device carried by the vehicle user and corresponds to the third configuration that does not require an on-board device. With this system, there is no need to retrofit any device to the vehicle.

[0050] The key storage means may be provided with a function of issuing an alarm when receiving a request signal from the vehicle. When unlocking the vehicle by smart operation, a request signal is transmitted from the vehicle to the smart key. Since the distance at which this request signal reaches is as short as about 1 m, usually, the key storage means does not receive the request signal when the user is away from the vehicle. If the key storage means receives the request signal even though the user is away from the vehicle, there is a high possibility that a relay attack has been launched. The user of the vehicle can be alerted by the alarm from the key storage means that a relay attack may be being launched against their vehicle. This makes it possible to prevent vehicle theft.

[0051] Instead of the key storage means almost completely shielding the radio wave, the radio wave may be attenuated so that the reach distance of the radio wave is limited to an extremely short distance. When a thief launches a relay attack, the thief has to approach the user in order to receive and relay the radio wave from the smart key carried by the user. If the key storage means attenuates the radio wave, the thief has to approach the user to an unnatural distance in order to receive the radio wave. If the thief cannot receive the radio wave even when approaching to a distance at which the radio wave from a normal smart key can be received, the thief is likely to give up stealing the vehicle by relay attack. Therefore, the risk of vehicle theft by relay attack is reduced.

[0052] The key storage means may attenuate the radio wave so that the distance at which the transceiver used for the relay attack can receive the radio wave from the smart key is such that it is considered that the user approaches an unnatural distance to a third party. For example, the radio wave may be attenuated so that the receivable distance of the radio wave from the smart key is about 50 cm. Even when the user stores the smart key in the key storage means, the user can perform unlocking by smart operation by approaching very close to the vehicle.

[0053] Instead of the key storage means almost completely shielding the radio waves, the key storage means may impart directivity to the radio waves radiated from the smart key. For example, the user may carry the key storage means with its posture fixed so as to have directivity in front of the user. Generally, thieves tend to approach the user from behind. When the user carries the key storage means with its posture fixed so as to have directivity in front of the user, radio waves from the smart key are not radiated to the rear of the user. Therefore, even if a thief approaches the user from behind, the thief cannot receive the radio waves from the smart key. If a thief cannot receive radio waves even when approaching the user from behind, the thief is likely to give up stealing the vehicle by relay attack. For this reason, the risk of vehicle theft by relay attack is reduced.

[0054] Since radio waves are radiated in front of the user, the user can perform an unlocking operation by a smart operation facing the vehicle even with the smart key stored in the key storage means.

[0055] (9) It is preferable that the retrofitting means is a system having a function of determining whether the mode of the operation for unlocking the vehicle by the smart operation is abnormal, and prohibiting the smart operation when it is determined to be abnormal.

[0056] Thieves often perform an unlocking operation by a smart operation on the vehicle in a mode different from the normal unlocking operation. An abnormal operation mode for unlocking the vehicle may be an operation different from the normal operation when the user opens the door. For example, usually, it is only necessary to grasp the door knob once to unlock the vehicle, but thieves tend to repeat the operation of grasping the door knob a plurality of times in a short period. By prohibiting the smart operation when the operation mode for unlocking is abnormal, the risk of vehicle theft by relay attack can be reduced. This retrofitting means corresponds to a second configuration including an in-vehicle device and not requiring a remote device. The vehicle user does not need to carry a device other than the genuine smart key of the vehicle.

[0057] For example, after performing an unlocking operation, if the unlocking operation is repeatedly performed a plurality of times without the door opening again, it may be determined that the mode of the unlocking operation is abnormal. The unlocking operation depends on the specifications of the smart entry system installed in the vehicle. For example, an operation of grasping the door knob is regarded as the unlocking operation.

[0058] (10) The after-attaching means may be a system including an accessory device that is carried together with the smart key and emits an alarm when detecting the response signal from the smart key.

[0059] When a user carrying a smart key approaches the vehicle, a response signal is transmitted from the smart key in response to a request signal from the vehicle. If an alarm is emitted even though the user is not approaching the vehicle, it can be considered that a relay attack has been launched and the radio wave of the request signal is relayed from the vehicle to the smart key. The user can notice from the alarm issued by the accessory device that there is a high possibility that a relay attack has been launched on their vehicle. This can prevent vehicle theft. This after-attaching means includes a device carried by the vehicle user and corresponds to a third configuration that does not require an in-vehicle device.

[0060] As the alarm emitted by the accessory device, sound, light, etc. may be used. Since the accessory device is often stored and carried in a pocket or a bag, it is preferable to emit an alarm sound. Some smart keys are equipped with an element (such as an LED) having a light-emitting function, and when transmitting a response signal, the light-emitting element is lit or blinked. The accessory device corresponding to such a smart key may detect the light emission from the smart key and emit an alarm sound.

[0061] (11) The after-attaching means imaging means for imaging at least one of an image inside and around the vehicle; Processing means for storing the image data acquired by the imaging means in a storage means or uploading it to an external server from the time when the vehicle is locked or when an unlocking operation by a smart operation is detected The system according to any one of claims 1 to 10 may be used.

[0062] Vehicle thieves using relay attacks tend to follow the driver after they get out of the vehicle and commit crimes when the vehicle is out of sight, and do not tend to follow the driver around for a long time. For this reason, the probability of theft by relay attack occurring within a certain period after the vehicle is locked is high. Also, when a vehicle theft by relay attack is committed, an unlocking operation by a smart operation is detected. When an image is acquired by the imaging means from the time when the vehicle is locked or when the unlocking operation is detected, it is highly likely that the thief is captured in the image. Therefore, the image data stored in the storage means or uploaded to the server can be important evidence for identifying the thief.

[0063] When a predetermined time has elapsed since the vehicle was locked, the risk of theft by relay attack decreases. Therefore, it is advisable to stop imaging by the imaging means when a predetermined time has elapsed since the vehicle was locked. The battery consumption can be reduced compared to the case of continuously acquiring image data at all times. This after-installation means corresponds to a second configuration that includes an in-vehicle device and does not require a remote device.

[0064] (12) The vehicle includes a collation ECU that is set to either a smart operation prohibited state in which the smart operation is prohibited or a smart operation permitted state in which the smart operation is permitted. The system according to any one of claims 1 to 11 may be used, wherein the after-installation means sets the collation ECU to the smart operation prohibited state.

[0065] By setting the retrofit means to set the verification ECU to the smart operation prohibited state, it is possible to prevent unlocking by smart operation and starting the engine by smart operation. When the state of the verification ECU is the smart operation prohibited state, the risk of vehicle theft due to relay attack is reduced.

[0066] When the verification ECU is in the smart operation prohibited state, it is preferable not to transmit a request signal for the smart key from the vehicle. If the request signal is not transmitted, no response signal will be returned from the smart key, so unlocking by smart operation will not be performed.

[0067] (13) The vehicle has an antenna for wirelessly transmitting the request signal. The retrofit means switching means for switching the conduction and non-conduction states of the power supply line of the antenna, and processing means for controlling the switching means to make the power supply line non-conductive to prohibit the smart operation to form a system.

[0068] When the power supply line of the antenna is made non-conductive, the radio wave of the request signal is not radiated from the vehicle. As a result, the smart operation is not performed, and the risk of vehicle theft due to relay attack is reduced. The retrofit means can prohibit the smart operation without changing the state of the verification ECU. As the switching means, a relay that mechanically switches conduction and non-conduction, or a semiconductor switching element that electrically switches conduction and non-conduction, may be used.

[0069] (14) The retrofit means may form a system that prohibits the smart operation by deactivating a sensor that detects an operation to unlock the vehicle by smart operation or by blocking the transmission of the detection result from the sensor.

[0070] When the sensor becomes inoperative or the transmission of the detection result from the sensor is interrupted, unlocking by the smart operation becomes impossible. As a result, the risk of vehicle theft due to relay attack is reduced. This sensor may be configured to detect, for example, grasping of a door knob. In this case, even if the user grasps the door knob, the vehicle will not be unlocked.

[0071] (15) The retrofitting means may be a system that prohibits the smart operation by cutting off the power supply to the collation ECU that controls the transmission of the request signal and the reception of the response signal.

[0072] The retrofitting means may be configured to cut off the power supply to the collation ECU when a predetermined smart operation prohibition condition is satisfied. By cutting off the power supply to the collation ECU, unlocking by the smart operation and starting of the engine by the smart operation become impossible. When the smart operation prohibition condition is no longer satisfied, the power supply to the collation ECU may be restarted. The vehicle battery and the collation ECU may be connected via a dedicated adapter, and by controlling the dedicated adapter, the power supply to the collation ECU may be cut off and restarted.

[0073] (16) The retrofitting means may include a remote device carried together with the smart key, and the remote device may have a function of radiating interfering radio waves in at least one of the frequency bands of the request signal and the response signal when detecting radio waves in the frequency band of the request signal.

[0074] When the interfering radio waves are radiated, the smart key may be unable to detect the request signal relayed by the repeater held by the thief, or the repeater held by the thief may relay the response signal from the smart key together with the interfering radio waves, so that the vehicle may be unable to detect the response signal. As a result, the thief will be unable to unlock the vehicle by relay attack.

[0075] When a vehicle user gets into the vehicle, the vehicle can be unlocked by performing a remote control unlocking operation. It is preferable to provide a switch or button on the remote device to disable the function of radiating interfering radio waves. The vehicle user can unlock the vehicle by operating the switch or button to disable the function of radiating interfering radio waves and then performing an unlocking operation by smart operation. This after-installation means includes a device carried by the vehicle user and corresponds to a third configuration that does not require an in-vehicle device.

[0076] When the frequency of the interfering radio waves radiated by the remote device is within the frequency band of the request signal, it is preferable to radiate the interfering radio waves for a time such that the smart key cannot decode the data included in the request signal. For example, the stop of the radiation of the interfering radio waves may be after the rising edge of the request signal in a general smart entry system. Note that, within the period from the rising edge to the falling edge of the request signal, the interfering radio waves may be radiated only for a time such that the decoding of some of the data included in the request signal becomes impossible. The intensity of the interfering radio waves should be increased to such an extent that the smart key carried together with the remote device cannot detect the request signal. Also, it should be decreased to such an extent that it does not have an adverse effect on the smart keys of third parties around the vehicle user.

[0077] When the frequency of the interfering radio waves radiated by the remote device is within the frequency band of the response signal, it is preferable to radiate the interfering radio waves for a time such that the vehicle cannot decode the data included in the response signal from the smart key. For example, the stop of the radiation of the interfering radio waves may be after the falling edge of the response signal in a general smart entry system. Note that, within the period from the rising edge to the falling edge of the response signal, the interfering radio waves may be radiated only for a time such that the decoding of some of the data included in the response signal becomes impossible. The intensity of the interfering radio waves should be increased to such an extent that the vehicle cannot detect the response signal.

[0078] (17) The remote device acquires a physical quantity that depends on the distance from the vehicle to the remote device, compares the physical quantity that depends on the distance with a predetermined level, and further has a function of not emitting the interfering radio wave when it is determined that the distance from the vehicle to the remote device is equal to or less than the distance corresponding to the predetermined level. It is preferable to adopt such a system.

[0079] The user can unlock the vehicle by approaching their vehicle to a distance equal to or less than the distance corresponding to the predetermined level and performing an unlocking operation by means of a smart action.

[0080] As the physical quantity that depends on the distance from the vehicle to the remote device, it is preferable to use the radio wave intensity of a signal periodically transmitted from an in-vehicle device mounted on the vehicle to the remote device. This signal may include a vehicle ID for identifying the vehicle to associate the remote device with the vehicle. The remote device may use the RSSI value of the radio wave of the signal including the vehicle ID of the associated vehicle as the physical quantity that depends on the distance from the vehicle to the remote device. As such a radio wave, it is preferable to use a radio wave that satisfies the specific low-power radio standard. Also, a radio wave conforming to the Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) standard may be used.

[0081] The inventions described in (1) to (17) above can be arbitrarily combined. For example, it may be configured to add at least a part of the configuration of at least one of the inventions after (2) to all or part of the configuration of the invention described in (1). In particular, it is preferable to make an invention in which at least a part of the configuration of at least one of the inventions after (2) is added to the invention described in (1). Also, any configuration may be extracted from the inventions described in (1) to (17), and the extracted configurations may be combined. The applicant of the present application intends to obtain rights for inventions including these configurations. Also, even if there is a description such as "in the case of ~" or "when ~", it is not described as a configuration limited to that case or that time. The disclosure also includes configurations that are not these cases or times, and the applicant intends to obtain rights for them. Also, the order in the descriptions with an order is not limited to this order. The disclosure also includes configurations in which some parts are deleted or the order is changed, and the applicant intends to obtain rights for them.

Effect of the Invention

[0082] In a vehicle or the like already equipped with a smart entry system or the like, it becomes possible to reduce the risk of theft or the like due to relay attack.

[0083] The effects of the invention of the present application are not limited to this, and the effects achieved from the parts of the configurations disclosed in this specification and the drawings are also disclosed, and the applicant intends to obtain rights for the configurations achieving such effects by divisional application, amendment, etc. For example, the parts described as "can ~" in this specification are descriptions that clearly show the achieved effects, and even if there is no description of "can ~", there are parts that show the effects. Also, even without such a description, there are effects grasped by the said configuration.

Brief Description of the Drawings

[0084]

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[0085] [First Embodiment] With reference to FIGS. 1A to 2B, the system according to the first embodiment will be described. FIG. 1A and FIG. 1B are schematic diagrams of a vehicle system to which the system according to the first embodiment is applied. The vehicle system to which the system according to the first embodiment is provided includes a vehicle 100 and a smart key 102. An in-vehicle device 101 of a smart entry system is mounted on the vehicle 100. The in-vehicle device 101 and the smart key 102 constitute a so-called smart entry system. The smart key 102 is carried by a user such as a driver of the vehicle 100.

[0086] Regarding the smart entry system, there are various names depending on the automobile manufacturer. For example, there are names such as Smart Entry & Start System, Intelligent Key System, Honda Smart Key·Smart Card Key System, Keyless Start System, Keyless Access & Push Start, Keyless Operation System, Keyless Free System, Advanced Keyless Entry & Start System, Passive Entry & Start System, Smart Entry & Start System, Advanced Key System, Keyless Go & Hands-Free Access, Comfort Access, Personal Car Communication & Keyless Drive, Intelligent Access & Push Button Start, etc. Generally, a system that provides the following functions is called a smart entry system.

[0087] The in-vehicle device 101 and the smart key 102 are associated with each other. When the user of the vehicle 100 carries the smart key 102 and approaches the vehicle, the door of the vehicle 100 can be unlocked by grasping the door knob of the vehicle 100 without touching the smart key 102. Conversely, when the user of the vehicle 100 gets out of the vehicle while carrying the smart key 102, the door can be locked by touching a specific location for locking the door knob of the vehicle 100 without touching the smart key 102. Further, when the user of the vehicle 100 gets into the vehicle while carrying the smart key 102, the engine can be started by operating the engine start button without touching the smart key 102. Such locking, unlocking, and engine starting are referred to as smart operations. Also, such locking operation and unlocking operation are referred to as "smart lock operation" and "smart unlock operation", respectively.

[0088] The system according to the first embodiment includes a remote device 22 carried by the user together with the smart key 102, and an in-vehicle device 21 mounted on the vehicle 100. Radio waves are periodically radiated from the remote device 22, and the in-vehicle device 21 receives the radio waves from the remote device 22. When the radio wave intensity from the remote device 22 exceeds a predetermined threshold (when the in-vehicle device 21 is within the range of the remote device 22 (FIG. 1A)), the in-vehicle device 21 permits the smart operation of the vehicle system. When the radio wave intensity from the remote device 22 is less than the predetermined threshold (when the in-vehicle device 21 is outside the range of the remote device 22 (FIG. 1B)), the in-vehicle device 21 prohibits the smart operation of the vehicle system. In this specification, the situation where the in-vehicle device 21 is within or outside the range of the remote device 22 may be described as the remote device 22 being within or outside the range with reference to the vehicle 100.

[0089] If it is much greater than the "predetermined threshold value", the user has to bring the remote device 22 too close to the vehicle 100 in order to perform the smart unlock operation. If the "predetermined threshold value" is made too small, the vehicle 100 may be unlocked by the smart unlock operation even when the user carrying the remote device 22 is far away from the vehicle 100. The "predetermined threshold value" is set to be small enough so as not to cause inconvenience when the user performs a normal smart unlock operation, and the smart operation is prohibited when the user is away from the vehicle 100 by a distance such that the user does not notice the theft of the vehicle 100.

[0090] FIG. 2A is a block diagram of a vehicle system 110 and a system 20 according to a first embodiment retrofitted to the vehicle system 110. The system 20 according to the first embodiment includes an in-vehicle device 21 and a remote device 22. The vehicle system 110 includes a vehicle 100 and a smart key 102, and the system 20 according to the first embodiment is retrofitted to the vehicle system 110. The vehicle 100 includes an authentication ECU 103, a receiver 104, a transmitter 105, and an OBD connector 106 connected to a CAN 107.

[0091] The authentication ECU 103 monitors whether the smart key 102 is present in the vicinity of the vehicle. When it is determined that the smart key 102 is present in the vicinity of the vehicle 100, the state of the vehicle 100 is set to a smart operation permission state. When it is determined that the smart key 102 is not present in the vicinity of the vehicle 100, the state of the vehicle 100 is set to a smart operation prohibition state. When the state of the vehicle 100 is in the smart operation permission state, when a smart lock operation, a smart unlock operation, or an engine start operation is performed, a command to execute locking, unlocking, or starting of the engine of the vehicle is transmitted to each ECU that performs these controls via the CAN 107. When the state of the vehicle 100 is in the smart operation prohibition state, even when a smart lock operation, a smart unlock operation, or an engine start operation is performed, a command to execute the operations of locking, unlocking, or starting of the engine of the vehicle is not transmitted.

[0092] The transmitter 105 wirelessly transmits a request signal from the transmission antenna 108 to the smart key 102. The frequency of the request signal is, for example, in the LF band (e.g., 124 kHz, 134 kHz, etc.), and the reach distance is about 1 m. When the smart key 102 receives the request signal, it wirelessly transmits a response signal to the vehicle 100. The frequency of the response signal is, for example, in the UHF band (e.g., 312 MHz - 315 MHz). The authentication ECU 103 electronically collates the ID code on the vehicle 100 side and the ID code on the smart key 102 side, and if both match, enables smart operations such as locking, unlocking, and engine starting of the vehicle 100.

[0093] The in-vehicle device 21 of the retrofittable system 20 is connected to the CAN 107 via the OBD connector 106. The in-vehicle device 21 has functions such as acquiring signals flowing through the CAN 107 and communicating with the authentication ECU 103 via the CAN. The remote device 22 wirelessly transmits a confirmation signal periodically. The in-vehicle device 21 determines whether the remote device 22 is outside or inside the range with respect to the vehicle 100 according to the radio field intensity of the confirmation signal. Based on the determination result, it transmits a smart operation prohibition command signal or a smart operation permission command signal to the authentication ECU 103.

[0094] Figure 2B is a state transition diagram for explaining the operations of the vehicle system 110 (Figure 2A) and the retrofittable system 20 (Figure 2A). When the ignition switch of the vehicle system 110 is turned off, the authentication ECU 103 sets the state of the vehicle 100 to the smart operation permission state. This state is stored in the authentication ECU 103. When the remote device 22 moves from inside to outside the range with respect to the vehicle 100, the in-vehicle device 21 transmits a smart operation prohibition signal to the authentication ECU 103. When the authentication ECU 103 receives the smart operation prohibition signal, it sets the vehicle 100 to the smart operation prohibition state.

[0095] When the remote device 22 moves from out of the coverage area to within the coverage area, the in-vehicle device 21 transmits a smart operation permission signal to the collation ECU 103. When receiving the smart operation permission signal, the collation ECU 103 sets the vehicle 100 to the smart operation permission state.

[0096] Next, the excellent effects of the system according to the first embodiment will be described. When the system 20 according to the first embodiment is not used, when a relay attack is launched, even if the user carrying the smart key 102 moves away from the vehicle 100 to outside the coverage area, the request signal and the response signal are relayed and unlocking by the smart operation is permitted.

[0097] When the system 20 according to the first embodiment is used, when the remote device 22 is outside the coverage area with respect to the vehicle 100, the vehicle 100 is set to the smart operation prohibited state. Therefore, even if a relay attack that relays the communication between the vehicle 100 and the smart key 102 is launched, the vehicle 100 cannot be unlocked by the smart operation. Further, even if a thief intrudes into the vehicle, since the smart operation is prohibited, the engine cannot be started by the smart operation. Thereby, the risk of theft of the vehicle 100 due to a relay attack can be reduced.

[0098] When the user carrying the remote device 22 approaches the vehicle 100, the collation ECU 103 sets the state of the vehicle 100 to the smart operation permission state, so that the user can perform unlocking by the normal smart operation and start the engine.

[0099] Next, the excellent effects when compared with a system called a conventional keyless system (manufactured by Yupeitel) will be described. The keyless system is retrofitted and used in vehicles that are not equipped with a smart entry system and that lock and unlock using an old-fashioned remote control key. The keyless system is composed of an in-vehicle device and a remote control device carried by the user. When a user carrying the remote control device approaches the vehicle, the in-vehicle device detects the approach of the remote control device and unlocks the vehicle. When the remote control device moves away from the vehicle, the in-vehicle device locks the vehicle. Therefore, the user can lock and unlock the vehicle without operating the genuine remote control key.

[0100] In such a keyless system, locking and unlocking may be repeated near a threshold value for determining whether the remote control device has approached the vehicle. When using the system according to the first embodiment, locking and unlocking of the vehicle are performed by a smart lock operation and a smart unlock operation. For example, locking and unlocking of the vehicle are performed by an operation in which the user touches a predetermined location for locking the doorknob and an operation of grasping the doorknob. Therefore, unnecessary locking and unlocking are not repeated.

[0101] [Modification Example of the First Embodiment] Next, a modified example of the first embodiment will be described. In the first embodiment, the remote device 22 periodically transmits a confirmation signal. However, when the remote device 22 is clearly out of the service area with respect to the vehicle 100, it is advisable to stop the periodic transmission of the confirmation signal. Thereby, the battery consumption can be reduced. To realize this function, it is advisable to equip the remote device 22 with a GPS function. For example, when the remote device 22 stores the current position at the time when the vehicle 100 is locked, and the distance from the position where the vehicle was locked to the current position of the remote device 22 is longer than a predetermined determination threshold value, it is advisable to stop the periodic transmission of the confirmation signal. As the "predetermined determination threshold value", it is advisable to use the distance from the vehicle 100 to the user when the user is far enough away from the vehicle 100 that there is no possibility of performing normal smart lock operation or smart unlock operation.

[0102] The in-vehicle device 21 may have a function of adjusting the threshold value of the radio wave intensity for determining whether the remote device 22 is within or outside the service area. Thereby, the size of the area where smart operation is possible can be changed.

[0103] It is advisable to incorporate the functions of the in-vehicle device 21 of the system 20 according to the first embodiment into an OBD adapter so that these functions can be turned on and off with a mechanical switch such as a DIP switch.

[0104] As the remote device 22, it is advisable to use a general smartphone, tablet terminal, etc. with a short-range wireless communication function such as WiFi or Bluetooth. By installing a dedicated app on these terminals, it is possible to operate these general-purpose terminals as the remote device 22 of the system 20 according to the first embodiment. The in-vehicle device 21 may determine whether the intensity of radio waves such as Bluetooth or WiFi from the terminal is below the determination level. For example, when communication via Bluetooth or WiFi is impossible, it may be determined that the intensity of the radio waves is below the determination level. In this case, the location information of the place where the vehicle was locked is stored in the terminal, and when returning close to the place where the vehicle was locked, for example, when the distance from the current position of the terminal to the locked place is equal to or less than a predetermined distance, detection of the availability of communication may be started. Thereby, it is possible to suppress (battery saving) the consumption of the battery due to unnecessary communication.

[0105] In order to make it difficult to relay the radio waves transmitted and received between the in-vehicle device 21 and the remote device 22, it is advisable to use radio waves in a frequency band different from the frequency band of the radio waves used in the smart entry system as the radio waves used for communication between the in-vehicle device 21 and the remote device 22.

[0106] The remote device 22 may periodically wirelessly transmit a signal including an ID to the in-vehicle device 21. The in-vehicle device 21 may detect the approach and departure of the remote device 22 based on the intensity of the radio waves of the signal including this ID.

[0107] [Second Embodiment] Next, with reference to FIG. 3, the system according to the second embodiment will be described. Hereinafter, the description of the configuration common to the system 20 (FIG. 2A) according to the first embodiment will be omitted.

[0108] FIG. 3 is a block diagram of the vehicle system 110 and the system 20 according to the second embodiment retrofitted to the vehicle system 110. The in-vehicle device 21 and the remote device 22 of the system 20 according to the second embodiment are each equipped with a GPS receiver. In the first embodiment, based on the radio wave intensity of the confirmation signal transmitted from the remote device 22, the in-vehicle device 21 determines whether to prohibit the smart operation. In the second embodiment, the remote device 22 transmits a confirmation signal including information indicating the current position of the remote device 22. The in-vehicle device 21 determines whether to prohibit the smart operation of the in-vehicle device 21 based on the current position of the in-vehicle device 21 and the current position of the remote device 22. For example, when the distance from the in-vehicle device 21 to the remote device 22 is longer than the determination threshold value, the in-vehicle device 21 performs a process of prohibiting the smart operation.

[0109] Next, the excellent effects of the system according to the second embodiment will be described. Also in the second embodiment, similarly to the first embodiment, the risk of vehicle theft due to relay attack can be reduced. Further, in the second embodiment, when the distance from the vehicle 100 to the remote device 22 is farther than the determination threshold value, even if the confirmation signal transmitted from the remote device 22 to the in-vehicle device 21 is relayed by a thief, the smart operation will not be permitted unless the information on the current position of the remote device 22 is rewritten. Therefore, the risk of vehicle theft due to relay attack can be further reduced.

[0110] [Modification Example of the Second Embodiment] As the remote device 22 of the system 20 according to the second embodiment, a general smartphone, a tablet terminal, etc. installed with a dedicated app may be used. When the current position cannot be specified because the GPS radio wave does not reach at least one of the in-vehicle device 21 and the remote device 22, the in-vehicle device 21 may be made to prohibit the smart operation. Thereby, the risk of vehicle theft due to relay attack can be reduced. At this time, it is preferable to enable the user of the vehicle 100 to unlock the vehicle 100 by operating the unlock button of the smart key 102.

[0111] [Third Embodiment] Next, with reference to FIGS. 4A and 4B, the system 20 according to the third embodiment will be described. Hereinafter, the description of the configurations common to the system 20 (FIG. 2A) according to the first embodiment will be omitted.

[0112] FIG. 4A is a block diagram of the vehicle system 110 and the system 20 according to the third embodiment retrofitted to the vehicle system 110. The smart key 102 is provided with a lock button 102L and an unlock button 102U. When the user of the vehicle 100 performs an operation of pressing the lock button 102L (remote control lock operation), the collation ECU 103 detects that the operation of the lock button 102L has been performed and locks the vehicle 100. Similarly, when the user of the vehicle 100 performs an operation of pressing the unlock button 102U (remote control unlock operation), the collation ECU 103 detects that the operation of the unlock button 102U has been performed and unlocks the vehicle 100. The collation ECU 103 performs locking by the remote control lock operation and unlocking by the remote control unlock operation regardless of whether the state of the vehicle 100 is in the smart operation prohibited state or the permitted state.

[0113] The system 20 according to the third embodiment is composed of the in-vehicle device 21. In the third embodiment, the device corresponding to the remote device 22 of the system 20 according to the first embodiment is unnecessary.

[0114] FIG. 4B is a state transition diagram for explaining the operation of the vehicle system 110 and the retrofitted system 20. When the ignition switch of the vehicle 100 is turned off, the collation ECU 103 sets the state of the vehicle 100 to the smart operation permitted state. When the user gets out of the vehicle and performs a smart lock operation, for example, an operation of touching a predetermined position for locking the doorknob without operating the smart key 102, the in-vehicle device 21 transmits a smart operation permission signal to the collation ECU 103. The collation ECU 103 maintains the state of the vehicle 100 in the smart operation permitted state.

[0115] When the user gets out of the vehicle and performs a remote control lock operation, a signal indicating that this operation has been performed flows through CAN107. When the in-vehicle device 21 detects a signal indicating that a remote control lock operation has been performed via CAN107 and the OBD connector 106, it sends a smart operation prohibition signal to the collation ECU 103. When the collation ECU 103 receives the smart operation prohibition signal, it sets the state of the vehicle 100 to the smart operation prohibited state.

[0116] When the collation ECU 103 detects that the unlock button 102U of the smart key 102 has been operated while the vehicle 100 is in the smart operation prohibited state, the collation ECU 103 unlocks the vehicle 100. When the in-vehicle device 21 detects that the unlock button 102U of the smart key 102 has been operated via CAN107 and the OBD connector 106, it sends a smart operation permission signal to the collation ECU 103. When the collation ECU 103 receives the smart operation permission signal, it sets the vehicle 100 to the smart operation permitted state.

[0117] Next, the excellent effects of the system 20 according to the third embodiment will be described. When the user gets out of the vehicle 100 and performs a remote control lock operation, the in-vehicle device 21 sets the vehicle 100 to the smart operation prohibited state, so the risk of vehicle theft due to relay attack can be reduced. The user does not need to carry the remote device 22 of the first embodiment together with the smart key 102.

[0118] When the user parks the vehicle 100 in a parking lot where there is a high risk of a relay attack being launched, for example, a parking lot such as a shopping center where an unspecified number of third parties may approach the vehicle 100, it is advisable to perform a remote control lock operation to set it to the smart operation prohibited state. By doing so, the risk of vehicle theft due to relay attack can be reduced. After the user performs a remote control unlock operation and gets into the vehicle 100, the engine can be started by smart operation.

[0119] When parking the vehicle 100 in a parking lot where relay attacks are unlikely to occur, such as a parking lot at home, the user may perform a smart lock operation. Then, the user can perform a smart unlock operation and get into the vehicle 100.

[0120] [Modification of the Third Embodiment] In the third embodiment, the vehicle 100 was set to the smart operation prohibited state by performing a remote lock operation when getting out of the vehicle. Instead of the function of detecting the remote lock operation, a function of detecting that the user has performed a specified operation when getting out of the vehicle may be provided. When the in-vehicle device 21 detects that the specified operation has been performed, the smart operation may be prohibited.

[0121] As the specified operation, for example, an operation on the vehicle may be used. As an operation on the vehicle, for example, an operation of an operation button, an operation lever, an operation switch, etc. attached to the vehicle as an after-market accessory, or an operation that is not normally performed when getting out of the vehicle may be used. For example, an operation combining two or more operations on the vehicle may be used. As an operation combining two or more operations, for example, an operation of stepping on the brake pedal with the door open may be used. The basic information for detecting whether the brake pedal has been stepped on with the door open may be obtained from the vehicle 100 by the in-vehicle device 21 via the CAN 107 and the OBD connector 106, for example.

[0122] Contrary to the process of prohibiting the smart operation when the user performs the specified operation, the smart operation may be prohibited when the user does not perform the specified operation, and the smart operation may be allowed when the user performs the specified operation.

[0123] [Fourth Embodiment] Next, a system according to the fourth embodiment will be described with reference to FIG. 5. Hereinafter, the description of the configuration common to the system 20 (FIG. 2A) according to the first embodiment will be omitted.

[0124] FIG. 5 is a state transition diagram for explaining the operation of the vehicle system 110 and the system 20 according to the fourth embodiment to be retrofitted. The system 20 according to the fourth embodiment has an in-vehicle device 21, similar to the system 20 according to the third embodiment shown in FIG. 4A, and does not require a remote device to be carried by the user.

[0125] When the ignition switch is turned off, the in-vehicle device 21 detects that the ignition switch has been turned off via the CAN 107 and the OBD connector 106. When the in-vehicle device 21 detects that the ignition switch has been turned off, it transmits a smart operation prohibition signal to the collation ECU 103. Thereby, the collation ECU 103 sets the vehicle 100 to the smart operation prohibited state.

[0126] After the vehicle 100 is locked thereafter, the in-vehicle device 21 acquires information that the vehicle 100 has been locked via the CAN 107 and the OBD connector 106. The in-vehicle device 21 measures the elapsed time from the time when the vehicle 100 is locked. When a specified time has elapsed since the locking time, the in-vehicle device 21 transmits a smart operation permission signal to the collation ECU 103. Thereby, the collation ECU 103 sets the vehicle 100 to the smart operation permitted state.

[0127] When a remote unlock operation is performed while the vehicle 100 is in the smart operation prohibited state, the collation ECU 103 unlocks the vehicle 100. When the in-vehicle device 21 detects that the remote unlock operation has been performed, it transmits a smart operation permission signal to the collation ECU 103. Thereby, the collation ECU 103 sets the vehicle 100 to the smart operation permitted state.

[0128] Next, the excellent effects of the system 20 according to the fourth embodiment will be described. In the fourth embodiment, the state of the vehicle 100 is set to the smart operation prohibited state until a specified time has elapsed after the vehicle 100 is locked. Even if a relay attack is launched during this period, the risk of vehicle theft is low.

[0129] Vehicle thieves using relay attacks tend to follow users who have gotten out of the vehicle and initiate a relay attack when the user leaves the vehicle. Therefore, after the user has gotten out of the vehicle and a long time has passed, the risk of vehicle theft by relay attack decreases. Thus, even if smart operation is allowed after a specified time has elapsed since the vehicle 100 was locked, a sufficient effect of reducing the risk of vehicle theft by relay attack can be obtained. The "specified time" may be, for example, a time when the thief gives up initiating a relay attack.

[0130] [Fifth Embodiment] Next, a system according to the fifth embodiment will be described with reference to FIGS. 6A and 6B. Hereinafter, description of configurations common to the system 20 (FIG. 2A) according to the first embodiment will be omitted.

[0131] FIG. 6A is a block diagram of a vehicle system 110 and a system 20 according to the fifth embodiment retrofitted to the vehicle system 110. In the fifth embodiment, the in-vehicle device 21 of the system 20 includes a processing device 23 and a camera 24. The camera 24 images the surroundings of the vehicle 100 and generates image data. The processing device 23 has a function of analyzing the image data generated by the camera 24 by a face authentication application and determining whether a pre-registered user is present in the image.

[0132] FIG. 6B is a state transition diagram for explaining the operations of the vehicle system 110 and the retrofitted system 20. When the ignition switch is turned off, the processing device 23 detects that the ignition switch has been turned off and transmits a smart operation prohibition signal to the collation ECU 103. Thereby, the collation ECU 103 sets the vehicle 100 to the smart operation prohibited state.

[0133] When a smart unlock operation is performed, the processing device 23 detects that the smart unlock operation has been performed. The processing device 23 acquires image data from the camera 24 and determines whether a pre-registered user exists in the image. If it is determined that the pre-registered user does not exist in the image, the processing device 23 maintains the smart operation prohibited state without sending a signal to allow the smart operation to the collation ECU 103. When the processing device 23 determines that the pre-registered user exists in the image, the processing device 23 sends a smart operation allow signal to the collation ECU 103. Thereby, the collation ECU 103 sets the vehicle 100 to the smart operation allow state.

[0134] Next, the excellent effects of the system 20 according to the fifth embodiment will be described. Usually, when a relay attack is launched, the user is not present near the vehicle 100. For this reason, even if a relay attack is launched, the vehicle 100 is maintained in the smart operation prohibited state. Therefore, the risk of vehicle theft due to a relay attack can be reduced.

[0135] When a pre-registered user performs an unlock operation on the vehicle 100, it is determined that the user exists in the image captured by the camera 24. Therefore, the user can unlock the vehicle 100 by performing a smart unlock operation. Usually, since the user stands near the driver's side door and performs a smart unlock operation, the camera 24 is preferably arranged to capture at least the outside of the driver's side door.

[0136] When a smart unlock operation is performed, the processing device 23 controls the camera 24 to perform imaging and executes a face authentication application. Therefore, compared with the case where imaging and the face authentication application are executed periodically, the battery consumption can be reduced.

[0137] [Modification Example of the Fifth Embodiment] In the fifth embodiment, face authentication is used to determine whether the user is present, but other biometric authentications may also be used. For example, fingerprint authentication or the like may be used. When using fingerprint authentication, a fingerprint authentication sensor may be attached to a doorknob or the like.

[0138] In the fifth embodiment, upon the occurrence of a smart unlock operation, it was determined whether the user was present in the vicinity of the vehicle 100. However, regardless of the presence or absence of the smart unlock operation, it may be determined periodically whether the user is present in the vicinity of the vehicle 100. In this case, when the processing device 23 determines that the user is present in the vicinity of the vehicle 100, it may transmit a smart operation permission signal to the collation ECU 103, and when it determines that the user is not present, it may transmit a smart operation prohibition signal.

[0139] [Sixth Embodiment] Next, a system according to the sixth embodiment will be described with reference to FIGS. 7A and 7B. Hereinafter, descriptions of configurations common to the system 20 (FIG. 2A) according to the first embodiment will be omitted.

[0140] FIG. 7A is a block diagram of a vehicle system 110 and a system 20 according to the sixth embodiment retrofitted to the vehicle system 110. In the first embodiment, the retrofitted system 20 was composed of an in-vehicle device 21 and a remote device 22 carried by the user. However, the system 20 according to the sixth embodiment is composed of a remote device 22 carried by the user and does not require an in-vehicle device mounted on the vehicle 100.

[0141] FIG. 7B is a block diagram of the remote device 22 constituting the system 20 according to the sixth embodiment. The smart key 102 (FIG. 7A) is stored in the smart key storage unit 30. The smart key storage unit 30 is covered with an electromagnetic shield 31. The electromagnetic shield 31 shields radio waves radiated from the smart key 102 stored in the smart key storage unit 30 and radio waves directed toward the smart key 102.

[0142] The processing device 33 has a function of receiving a request signal transmitted from the vehicle 100 (Fig. 7A) and a response signal transmitted from the smart key 102 (Fig. 7A) via the receiver 32. By operating the deregistration button 35 by the user, the remote device 22 can be set to the registered state. When the remote device 22 is in the registered state, the processing device 33 has a function of registering the ID of the corresponding vehicle 100 and the ID of the smart key 102 by receiving the request signal transmitted from the corresponding vehicle 100 and the response signal transmitted from the corresponding smart key 102. By operating the deregistration button 35 by the user, the registered ID can also be erased. When the processing device 33 receives a request signal from the corresponding vehicle 100 or a response signal from the corresponding smart key 102, it causes the alarm device 34 to issue an alarm. As the alarm device 34, for example, a speaker may be used.

[0143] Next, the excellent effects of the system 20 according to the sixth embodiment will be described. Even if the vehicle 100 transmits a request signal, when the smart key 102 is stored in the smart key storage unit 30, the request signal does not reach the smart key 102. Or, even if the request signal reaches the smart key 102 and the smart key 102 transmits a response signal, the response signal does not reach the vehicle 100. Therefore, even if a relay attack is launched, the vehicle 100 is not unlocked.

[0144] When the user carries the remote device 22 and moves away from the vehicle 100, the request signal from the vehicle 100 cannot reach the remote device 22. For example, the distance at which the request signal can reach is about 1 m. Therefore, when the user is outside the area where the request signal can reach (out of the range), the remote device 22 does not issue an alarm. If an alarm is issued even though the user is outside the range, there is a high possibility that a relay attack has been launched. The user can notice from the issued alarm that there is a high possibility that a relay attack has been launched on their own vehicle 100. This alarm function operates effectively even when the smart key 102 is forgotten in the smart key storage unit 30.

[0145] [Modification Example of the Sixth Embodiment] Referring to FIG. 7C, a first modification example of the sixth embodiment will be described. In the sixth embodiment, the smart key storage unit 30 is almost completely electromagnetically shielded, but in the first modification example, as shown in FIG. 7C, a non-electromagnetically shielded portion is provided. Therefore, directivity is imparted to the sensitivity of the radio wave incident on the smart key 102 stored in the smart key storage unit 30 and the radio wave radiated from the smart key 102.

[0146] The user may carry the remote device 22 while maintaining its posture so as to have directivity in front of themselves. Generally, thieves tend to approach the user from behind. When the user fixes and carries the remote device 22 so as to have directivity in front of themselves, even if a relay of the relay attack is used to radiate the radio wave of the request signal from behind the user towards the user, the request signal does not reach the smart key 102. Or, even if the radio wave of the response signal is radiated from the smart key 102, the radio wave of the response signal does not reach the relay held by the thief approaching from behind the user. If the thief cannot receive the radio wave from the smart key 102 even when approaching the user from behind, the thief is highly likely to abandon the theft of the vehicle by relay attack. Therefore, the risk of vehicle theft by relay attack is reduced.

[0147] Since the radio waves from the front of the user can be received by the smart key 102 and the radio waves from the smart key 102 are radiated in front of the user, if the user faces the vehicle and performs a smart unlock operation, the vehicle can be unlocked.

[0148] In the second modification of the sixth embodiment, instead of the remote device 22 almost completely shielding the radio waves, the radio waves are attenuated so as to limit the reach distance of the radio waves to an extremely short distance. When a thief attempts a relay attack, the thief has to get close to the user in order to receive and relay the radio waves from the smart key 102 carried by the user. When the remote device 22 attenuates the radio waves, the thief has to get unnaturally close to the user in order to receive the radio waves. If the thief cannot receive the radio waves even when getting close to the distance at which the radio waves from the normal smart key 102 can be received, the thief is likely to give up stealing the vehicle by relay attack. For this reason, the risk of vehicle theft by relay attack is reduced.

[0149] The remote device 22 may attenuate the radio waves to such an extent that the thief has to approach the user to an unnatural distance in order for the repeater used in the relay attack to receive the radio waves from the smart key 102. For example, the radio waves may be attenuated so that the receivable distance of the radio waves from the smart key 102 is about 50 cm. In this case, even if the user stores the smart key 102 in the remote device 22, the user can perform an unlock by smart operation by approaching very close to the vehicle.

[0150] [Seventh Embodiment] Next, a system according to the seventh embodiment will be described with reference to FIGS. 8A and 8B. Hereinafter, description of the configurations common to the system 20 (FIG. 2A) according to the first embodiment will be omitted.

[0151] FIG. 8A is a block diagram of the vehicle system 110 and the system 20 according to the seventh embodiment attached to the vehicle system 110. The system 20 according to the seventh embodiment is composed of the in-vehicle device 21. In the seventh embodiment, the device corresponding to the remote device 22 of the system 20 according to the first embodiment is unnecessary.

[0152] FIG. 8B is a state transition diagram for explaining the operation of the vehicle system 110 and the system 20 according to the seventh embodiment attached later. When the ignition switch is turned off, the in-vehicle device 21 detects that the ignition switch has been turned off and transmits a smart operation permission signal to the collation ECU 103. Thereby, the collation ECU 103 sets the vehicle 100 to the smart operation permission state.

[0153] When an unlocking operation of the vehicle is performed, the in-vehicle device 21 receives a signal corresponding to the unlocking operation. The in-vehicle device 21 determines whether the mode of the unlocking operation is abnormal. When it is determined that the mode of the unlocking operation is abnormal, the in-vehicle device 21 transmits a smart operation prohibition signal to the collation ECU 103. When receiving the smart operation prohibition signal, the collation ECU 103 sets the vehicle 100 to the smart operation prohibition state.

[0154] Next, the excellent effects of the system 20 according to the seventh embodiment will be described. Thieves often perform an unlocking operation on the vehicle 100 in a manner different from the normal smart unlocking operation. For example, usually, to unlock the vehicle 100, it is only necessary to grasp the doorknob once, but thieves tend to repeat the operation of grasping the doorknob a plurality of times in a short time. By prohibiting the smart operation when the mode of the operation for unlocking is abnormal, the risk of theft of the vehicle 100 due to a relay attack can be reduced.

[0155] An abnormal operation mode of the smart unlock operation for unlocking the vehicle 100 may be an operation different from the normal operation performed when the user opens the door. For example, when the smart unlock operation is performed and then the smart unlock operation is repeated multiple times without the door opening, it may be determined that the operation mode of the unlocking operation is abnormal. The smart unlock operation depends on the specifications of the smart entry system mounted on the vehicle 100. For example, the operation of gripping the door knob is often used as the smart unlock operation.

[0156] [Eighth Embodiment] Next, the system according to the eighth embodiment will be described with reference to FIGS. 9A to 9C. Hereinafter, the description of the configuration common to the system 20 (FIG. 7A) according to the sixth embodiment will be omitted.

[0157] FIG. 9A is a block diagram of the vehicle system 110 and the system 20 according to the eighth embodiment retrofitted to the vehicle system 110. The remote device 22 according to the sixth embodiment had a smart key storage unit 30 (FIG. 7B) for storing the smart key, but the remote device 22 according to the eighth embodiment is carried by the user together with the smart key 102. It is not always necessary to accommodate the smart key 102 in a container.

[0158] FIG. 9B is a block diagram of the remote device 22 constituting the system 20 according to the eighth embodiment. The remote device 22 includes a receiver 32, a processing device 33, an alarm issuing device 34, and a registration / cancellation button 35. The processing device 33 has a function of receiving a response signal transmitted from the smart key 102 via the receiver 32. The user can operate the registration / cancellation button 35 to set the remote device 22 to the registered state. The processing device 33 has a function of registering the ID of the corresponding smart key 102 by receiving the response signal transmitted from the corresponding smart key 102 during the period when it is in the registered state. The user can also erase the registered ID by operating the registration / cancellation button 35.

[0159] FIG. 9C is a diagram showing a signal transmission / reception sequence when a relay attack is being launched. A request signal transmitted from vehicle 100 is relayed by relays 50 and 51 for relay attack and transmitted to smart key 102. When smart key 102 transmits a response signal, the response signal is transmitted to vehicle 100 via relays 51 and 50. The response signal transmitted from smart key 102 is also received by remote device 22. When processing device 33 of remote device 22 receives the response signal from smart key 102, it causes alarm device 34 to issue an alarm. As the alarm device 34, for example, a speaker may be used.

[0160] Next, the excellent effects of system 20 according to the sixth embodiment will be described. The user of vehicle 100 can be alerted by the alarm from remote device 22 that there is a high possibility that a relay attack is being launched. When the user notices the alarm, the user can immediately return to vehicle 100 or take measures such as reporting to the police.

[0161] [Ninth Embodiment] Next, the system according to the ninth embodiment will be described with reference to FIGS. 10A and 10B. Hereinafter, descriptions of configurations common to system 20 (FIGS. 6A and 6B) according to the fifth embodiment will be omitted.

[0162] FIG. 10A is a block diagram of vehicle system 110 and system 20 according to the ninth embodiment retrofitted to vehicle system 110. System 20 includes a processing device 23, a camera 24, a storage device 25, and a transmission circuit 26. Camera 24 is installed in vehicle 100 so as to capture at least one of an image inside and outside vehicle 100. Storage device 25 stores the image data captured by camera 24. Transmission circuit 26 wirelessly transmits the image data to an external server or the like.

[0163] FIG. 10B is a diagram showing the operation of the processing device 23 of the system 20 according to the ninth embodiment. When the ignition switch is turned off and the operation of locking the vehicle 100 or the smart unlock operation is detected, the processing device 23 controls the camera 24 to start imaging. When a predetermined time has elapsed since the start of imaging, the imaging is stopped. The captured image data is stored in the storage device 25 and uploaded from the transmission circuit 26 to an external server.

[0164] Next, the excellent effects of the system 20 according to the ninth embodiment will be described. Vehicle thieves by relay attack tend to follow the driver who has gotten out of the vehicle 100 and commit crimes when the vehicle 100 becomes invisible, and do not tend to follow the driver around for a long time. Therefore, the probability of theft by relay attack occurring within a certain period after the vehicle 100 is locked is high. Also, when the vehicle 100 is stolen by relay attack, an unlock operation by smart operation is detected. When an image is acquired by the camera 24 from the time when the vehicle 100 is locked or when a smart unlock operation is detected, there is a high possibility that the thief is captured in the image. Therefore, the image data stored in the storage device 25 or the image data uploaded to the server can be important evidence for identifying the thief.

[0165] When a predetermined time has elapsed since the vehicle 100 was locked, the risk of theft by relay attack decreases. Therefore, imaging by the camera 24 may be stopped at the time when a predetermined time has elapsed since the vehicle 100 was locked. The battery consumption can be reduced compared to the case of continuously acquiring the image data at all times. The "predetermined time" may be set to the time from when the user locks the vehicle 100 until the risk of vehicle theft by relay attack is almost eliminated.

[0166] Next, a modification of the ninth embodiment will be described. In the ninth embodiment, the image data is stored in the storage device 25 and uploaded from the transmission circuit 26 to the server, but either one of these processes may be executed.

[0167] [Embodiment 10] Next, the system 20 according to the tenth embodiment will be described with reference to FIG. 11. Hereinafter, the description of the configuration common to the system 20 (FIG. 2A) according to the first embodiment will be omitted. In the tenth embodiment, a method of setting the vehicle 100 to the smart operation prohibited state will be described. The tenth embodiment can be applied to various embodiments in which the retrofitted system 20 includes the in-vehicle device 21.

[0168] FIG. 11 is a block diagram of the vehicle system 110 and the system 20 according to the tenth embodiment retrofitted to the vehicle system 110. The system 20 includes the in-vehicle device 21. The collation ECU 103 of the vehicle 100 includes a storage device that stores the smart operation prohibition flag 120. When the in-vehicle device 21 transmits a smart operation prohibition signal to the collation ECU 103, the collation ECU 103 sets the smart operation prohibition flag. When the in-vehicle device 21 transmits a smart operation permission signal to the collation ECU 103, the collation ECU 103 resets the smart operation prohibition flag.

[0169] The state in which the smart operation prohibition flag 120 is set corresponds to the smart operation prohibited state, and the state in which the smart operation prohibition flag 120 is reset corresponds to the smart operation permitted state.

[0170] As in the tenth embodiment, the state of the vehicle 100 may be set to the smart operation prohibited state or the smart operation permitted state by setting and resetting the smart operation prohibition flag 120. When the vehicle 100 is in the smart operation prohibited state, the collation ECU 103 may not transmit a request signal for the smart key 102 from the vehicle 100. If the request signal is not transmitted, no response signal will be returned from the smart key 102, so unlocking by smart operation will not be performed.

[0171] [Embodiment 11] Next, the system 20 according to the 11th embodiment will be described with reference to FIG. 12. Hereinafter, the description of the configurations common to the system 20 (FIG. 2A) according to the 1st embodiment will be omitted. In the 11th embodiment, a method for setting the vehicle 100 to the smart operation prohibited state will be described. The 11th embodiment can be applied to various embodiments in which the retrofitted system 20 includes the in-vehicle device 21.

[0172] FIG. 12 is a block diagram of the vehicle system 110 and the system 20 according to the 11th embodiment retrofitted to the vehicle system 110. The system 20 is composed of a processing device 23 and a relay 27. The relay 27 is inserted into the power supply line from the transmitter 105 to the transmission antenna 108. The processing device 23 controls the on / off of the relay 27.

[0173] When the processing device 23 turns off the relay 27, the request signal is no longer radiated from the transmission antenna 108. For this reason, locking and unlocking by the smart operation are no longer executed. The state in which the relay 27 is off corresponds to the smart operation prohibited state, and the state in which the relay 27 is on corresponds to the smart operation permitted state.

[0174] [12th Embodiment] Next, the system 20 according to the 12th embodiment will be described with reference to FIG. 13. Hereinafter, the description of the configurations common to the system 20 (FIG. 2A) according to the 1st embodiment will be omitted. In the 12th embodiment, a method for setting the vehicle 100 to the smart operation prohibited state will be described. The 12th embodiment can be applied to various embodiments in which the retrofitted system 20 includes the in-vehicle device 21.

[0175] FIG. 13 is a block diagram of the vehicle system 110 and the system 20 according to the 12th embodiment retrofitted to the vehicle system 110. The sensor 109 of the vehicle system 110 is connected to the verification ECU 103 via the CAN 107. The sensor 109 detects a smart unlock operation by the user of the vehicle 100, for example, an operation in which the user grasps the doorknob. When an unlock operation is performed, the verification ECU 103 receives a signal from the sensor 109 notifying that the unlock operation has been performed.

[0176] The system 20 is composed of a processing device 23 and a relay 28. The relay 28 is inserted into the communication line between the sensor 109 and the CAN 107. The processing device 23 controls the on / off state of the relay 28. When the relay 28 is turned off, a signal notifying that a smart unlock operation has been performed does not reach the verification ECU 103. Therefore, even if a smart unlock operation is performed, the vehicle 100 is not unlocked. The state in which the relay 28 is turned off corresponds to the smart operation prohibited state, and the state in which the relay 28 is turned on corresponds to the smart operation permitted state.

[0177] [13th Embodiment] Next, the system 20 according to the 13th embodiment will be described with reference to FIG. 14. Hereinafter, the description of the configuration common to the system 20 (FIG. 2A) according to the 1st embodiment will be omitted. In the 13th embodiment, a method for setting the vehicle 100 to the smart operation prohibited state will be described. The 13th embodiment can be applied to various embodiments in which the retrofitted system 20 includes the in-vehicle device 21.

[0178] FIG. 14 is a block diagram of the vehicle system 110 and the system 20 according to the 13th embodiment retrofitted to the vehicle system 110. The system 20 is composed of an adapter 29. Power is supplied from the battery 113 of the vehicle 100 to the collation ECU 103 via the adapter 29. The adapter 29 turns on and off the power supply from the battery 113 to the collation ECU 103. When the adapter 29 turns off the power supply to the collation ECU 103, the collation ECU 103 stops operating, so that locking and unlocking by smart operation cannot be performed. The state where the adapter 29 cuts off the power supply corresponds to the smart operation prohibited state, and the state where power is supplied to the collation ECU 103 via the adapter 29 corresponds to the smart operation permitted state.

[0179] An alarm device such as a speaker may be provided in the adapter 29. For example, when the adapter 29 detects that a smart unlock operation has been performed in the smart operation prohibited state, an alarm sound may be output from the alarm device. Thereby, the effect of preventing theft of the vehicle 100 due to relay attack can be obtained.

[0180] [14th Embodiment] Next, with reference to FIGS. 15A to 15C, the system 20 according to the 14th embodiment will be described. Hereinafter, the description of the configuration common to the system 20 according to the 1st embodiment will be omitted. The system according to the 14th embodiment includes a remote device 22 (FIG. 2A) carried by the user together with the smart key 102 (FIG. 2A), and the in-vehicle device 21 (FIG. 2A) is not necessarily required.

[0181] FIG. 15A is a diagram showing a signal transmission / reception sequence when a relay attack is being carried out. A request signal transmitted from the vehicle 100 is relayed by relays 50 and 51 for relay attack and transmitted to the smart key 102. Radio waves in the frequency band of the relayed request signal (for example, LF band such as 124 kHz, 134 kHz, etc.) are detected by the remote device 22 carried by the user.

[0182] When the remote device 22 detects radio waves in the frequency band of the request signal, it radiates interfering radio waves in the frequency band of the request signal. Since this interfering radio wave propagates up to the smart key 102, the smart key 102 cannot detect the request signal. In this way, the remote device 22 functions as a jammer.

[0183] Figure 15B is a timing chart of signals between the vehicle 100 and the smart key 102 in a general smart entry system. The vehicle 100 periodically transmits a wake signal. The wake signal is a signal for starting the operation of the smart key 102. When the smart key 102 receives the wake signal, it returns an ACK signal to the vehicle 100. When the vehicle 100 receives the ACK signal, it transmits a request signal including information such as the vehicle ID to the smart key 102. When the smart key 102 receives the request signal, it transmits a response signal to the vehicle. Note that the wake signal can also be considered as a request signal that requests the start of operation to the smart key 102. Therefore, in this specification, the wake signal and the request signal shown in FIG. 15B are collectively referred to as a request signal. Note that depending on the smart entry system, there may be a case where the vehicle 100 transmits a request signal without the smart key 102 returning an ACK signal to the wake signal.

[0184] Figure 15C is a timing chart of signals between the vehicle 100, the smart key 102, and the remote device 22 when the system according to the 14th embodiment is used. When the remote device 22 detects radio waves in the frequency band of the wake signal (request signal), it radiates interfering radio waves in the same frequency band. For this reason, the smart key 102 cannot detect the wake signal. Furthermore, during the period when the interfering radio wave is being radiated, the request signal after the wake signal cannot be detected either.

[0185] Next, the excellent effects of the system according to the 14th embodiment will be described. In the 14th embodiment, due to the radiated interference waves from the remote device 22, the smart key 102 cannot detect the request signal from the vehicle 100. For this reason, the smart key 102 does not return a response signal. Since no response signal is returned to the vehicle 100, a thief cannot unlock the vehicle by relay attack. Thereby, the risk of vehicle theft by relay attack can be reduced. Even when interference waves are radiated, the user of the vehicle 100 can unlock the vehicle by performing a remote unlock operation.

[0186] [Modification Example of the 14th Embodiment] Next, a modification example of the 14th embodiment will be described. It is preferable to provide a switch for disabling the radiating function of interference waves on the remote device 22. The user of the vehicle can unlock the vehicle by performing a smart unlock operation by operating the switch to disable the radiating function of interference waves.

[0187] The remote device 22 preferably has a function of disabling the radiating function of interference waves according to the level of a physical quantity depending on the distance from the vehicle 100 to the remote device 22. For example, when comparing this physical quantity depending on the distance with a predetermined level and determining that the distance from the vehicle 100 to the remote device 22 is equal to or less than the distance corresponding to the predetermined level, it is preferable not to radiate interference waves. If the remote device 22 has this function, the user can approach their vehicle and unlock the vehicle by performing a smart unlock operation. The "predetermined level" should correspond to a level within a range of distance that ensures a distance at which the user will not be inconvenienced when performing an unlocking operation by normal smart operation and at which the user can notice the theft of the vehicle 100.

[0188] As a physical quantity that depends on the distance from the vehicle 100 to the remote device 22, it is preferable to use the radio wave intensity of a signal that is periodically transmitted from the in-vehicle device 21 (Fig. 2A) mounted on the vehicle 100 to the remote device 22. This signal may include a vehicle ID for identifying the vehicle 100 to associate the remote device 22 with the vehicle 100. The remote device 22 may use the RSSI value of the radio wave of the signal including the vehicle ID of the associated vehicle 100 as a physical quantity that depends on the distance from the vehicle 100 to the remote device 22. As such radio waves, it is preferable to use radio waves that satisfy the specific low-power radio standard. Also, radio waves conforming to the Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) standard may be used.

[0189] For a time when the smart key 102 cannot decode the data included in the request signal, the remote device 22 may emit interfering radio waves. For example, the stop of the emission of interfering radio waves may be after the rising edge of the request signal in a general smart entry system. Note that during the period from the rising edge to the falling edge of the request signal, interfering radio waves may be emitted only for a time when decoding of some of the data included in the request signal becomes impossible. The intensity of the interfering radio waves should have a lower limit such that the smart key 102 carried together with the remote device 22 cannot detect the request signal, and an upper limit such that it does not have an adverse effect on the smart keys of third parties around the user of the vehicle 100.

[0190] [15th Embodiment] Next, with reference to Fig. 16, the system according to the 15th embodiment will be described. Hereinafter, descriptions of configurations common to the system 20 (Fig. 15A) according to the 14th embodiment will be omitted. In the 14th embodiment, the remote device 22 emitted interfering radio waves in the frequency band of the request signal, but in the 16th embodiment, the remote device 22 emits interfering radio waves in the frequency band of the response signal (for example, the UHF band such as 312 MHz to 315 MHz).

[0191] FIG. 16 is a diagram showing a signal transmission / reception sequence when a relay attack is being carried out. A request signal transmitted from vehicle 100 is relayed by relays 50 and 51 for relay attack and transmitted to smart key 102. Radio waves in the frequency band of the relayed request signal (for example, 124 kHz, 134 kHz band) are detected by remote device 22 carried by the user and smart key 102.

[0192] Smart key 102 transmits a response signal to vehicle 100. Remote device 22 that has detected radio waves in the frequency band of the request signal radiates interfering radio waves in the frequency band of the response signal. For this reason, relay 51 carried by the thief cannot relay the response signal. As a result, the vehicle cannot be unlocked by a relay attack. Thereby, the risk of vehicle theft by a relay attack can be reduced. Even when interfering radio waves are being radiated, the user of vehicle 100 can unlock the vehicle by performing a remote unlock operation.

[0193] [Modification Example of the 15th Embodiment] Also in the 15th embodiment, similar to the modification example of the 14th embodiment, it is preferable to have a function of disabling the radiation of interfering radio waves according to the distance from vehicle 100 to remote device 22.

[0194] Remote device 22 may radiate interfering radio waves for a time when vehicle 100 cannot decode the data included in the response signal from smart key 102. For example, the stop of the radiation of interfering radio waves may be after the fall of the response signal in a general smart entry system. Note that, during the period from the rise to the fall of the response signal, interfering radio waves may be radiated for only a time when decoding of some of the data included in the response signal becomes impossible. The intensity of the interfering radio waves may be increased to such an extent that relay 51 cannot normally detect the response signal.

[0195] The frequency of the radio wave used for the response signal varies for each vehicle manufacturer. The system according to the 15th embodiment may cover all frequency bands of the radio waves used by various manufacturers. Also, for each manufacturer, the system according to the 15th embodiment may be constructed.

[0196] The scope of the present invention is not limited to the configurations explicitly described in the specification or limited ones, but also includes combinations of various aspects of the present invention disclosed in this specification within its scope. Among the present invention, the configuration for which a patent is sought has been specified in the appended claims, but even a configuration not currently specified in the claims has the intention of making the configuration disclosed in this specification the claims in the future.

[0197] The present invention of the application is not limited to the configurations described in the above-described embodiments. The constituent elements of the above-described embodiments and modification examples may be arbitrarily selected and combined. Also, any constituent element of each embodiment or modification example may be arbitrarily combined with any constituent element described in the means for solving the invention or a constituent element embodying any constituent element described in the means for solving the invention. Regarding these, there is also the intention of obtaining rights in the amendment or divisional application of this application. Also, even if there is a description such as "in the case of ~" or "when ~", it is not described as a configuration limited to that case or that time. Configurations that are not these cases or times are also disclosed and have the intention of obtaining rights. Also, the parts with sequential descriptions are not limited to this order. Configurations with some parts deleted or the order reversed are also disclosed and have the intention of obtaining rights.

[0198] Also, through a change application to a design application, it has the intention to acquire rights for the overall design or partial design. Although the drawings depict the entire device in solid lines, the drawings include not only the overall design but also partial designs that claim for some parts of the device. For example, not only can some members of the device be regarded as partial designs, but the drawings also include partial designs for some parts of the device regardless of the members, such as parts of the members. As some parts of the device, they can be either some members of the device or parts of those members. Regarding the overall design as well as any part of the solid-line portions in the drawings being made into a broken-line portion, it has the intention to obtain rights for the partial design.

Explanation of Reference Signs

[0199] 20 System 21 Vehicle-mounted Device of the System 22 Remote Device of the System 23 Processing Device 24 Camera 25 Storage Device 26 Transmission Circuit 27, 28 Relay 29 Adapter 30 Smart Key Storage Section 31 Electromagnetic Shield 32 Receiver 33 Processing Device 34 Alarm Issuing Device 35 Registration Cancellation Button 50, 51 Repeater 100 Vehicle 101 Vehicle-mounted Device 102 Smart Key 102L Lock Button 102U Unlock Button 103 Verification ECU 104 Receiver 105 Transmitter 106 OBD Connector 107 CAN 108 Transmission Antenna 109 Sensor 110 Vehicle System 113 Battery 120 Smart operation prohibition flag

Claims

1. A vehicle key storage device having a key storage means carried by a vehicle user in a state where radio waves emitted from a smart key are shielded, The key storage means is configured to attenuate radio waves so that the radio wave reach is limited to an extremely short distance so that unlocking can be performed by a smart operation by approaching very close to the vehicle, so that when a thief launches a relay attack, the thief is required to approach an unnatural distance to the user of the vehicle in order to receive and relay radio waves from the smart key carried by the user. A device for storing a smart key characterized by the above.

2. A configuration in which directionality is imparted to the sensitivity of radio waves incident on the smart key stored in the key storage means and to the radio waves emitted from the smart key.

2. A smart key storage device according to claim 1.

Images