Region-based management method and apparatus for keys

Abstract

The present application relates to the technical field of communications, and particularly relates to a region-based management method and apparatus for keys, aiming to manage keys of a homomorphic task in a communication network to provide support for the application of the homomorphic task to the communication network. The method comprises: a first control network element acquiring a first homomorphic encryption key corresponding to a first region; the first control network element sending the first homomorphic encryption key to M first homomorphic enable units that belong to the first region, wherein M is an integer greater than or equal to 1; and the first control network element sending a first homomorphic computing key to N second homomorphic enable units that belong to the first region, wherein N is an integer greater than or equal to 1, and the first homomorphic computing key is determined on the basis of the first homomorphic encryption key and / or a first homomorphic decryption key corresponding to the first homomorphic encryption key.

Description

Key partition management method and device Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of communication technology, and in particular to a key partition management method and device. Background Art

[0002] With the convergence of communications, perception, and artificial intelligence, perception, as an inherent capability of future communication networks, can provide vast amounts of data for intelligent applications. Networks act as both producers and providers of data, providing trusted data services for various intelligent applications. Simultaneously, they act as consumers of network data, leveraging data-driven intelligent applications to improve network performance and operational efficiency.

[0003] Furthermore, with the advancement of society and the growing awareness of data ownership, the demand for data privacy protection is becoming increasingly stringent. How to fully tap and realize the value of data while meeting high security and privacy requirements, and efficiently utilize communication and computing resources within the communication network, while also ensuring end-to-end data privacy and security protection technologies while enabling new network capabilities (such as intrinsic intelligence and ubiquitous perception) and new services (such as immersive extended reality (XR), digital twins, and the metaverse), are pressing challenges.

[0004] Summary of the Invention

[0005] The present application provides a key partition management method and device, in order to manage the keys of homomorphic tasks in a communication network, support the application of homomorphic tasks to the communication network, and provide privacy computing capabilities for the communication network.

[0006] In the first aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a key partition management method, which can be executed by a first control network element, or by a component of the first control network element (such as a processor, a chip, or a chip system, etc.). Taking the execution of the first control network element as an example, the method includes: the first control network element obtains a first homomorphic encryption key corresponding to the first area; the first control network element sends the first homomorphic encryption key to M first homomorphic enabling units belonging to the first area, where M is an integer greater than or equal to 1; the first control network element sends a first homomorphic computation key to N second homomorphic enabling units belonging to the first area, where N is an integer greater than or equal to 1, and the first homomorphic computation key is determined based on the first homomorphic encryption key and / or the first homomorphic decryption key corresponding to the first homomorphic encryption key.

[0007] Among them, the homomorphic enabling unit (such as the first homomorphic enabling unit, the second homomorphic enabling unit, etc.) can be a terminal device, an access network device, a core network element, an independent node, or an application layer function node, etc.

[0008] Through the above method, homomorphic tasks and key management can be carried out in different regions. Each region corresponds to a homomorphic encryption key, and all users in each region correspond to the same homomorphic encryption key. The homomorphic encryption key can be decoupled from the user status and the specific homomorphic task, so that the same homomorphic ciphertext of the user can be provided to the homomorphic computing parties of different homomorphic tasks for homomorphic computing. This can improve the reusability of the user's homomorphic ciphertext and facilitate the flow of homomorphic ciphertext in different homomorphic tasks. At the same time, regional-level homomorphic encryption keys, rather than user-level homomorphic encryption keys (such as each homomorphic encryption party corresponds to a homomorphic encryption key), can reduce the number of homomorphic encryption keys involved in a homomorphic task, and is also conducive to reducing the derivation of homomorphic computing keys and the complexity of homomorphic computing, thereby improving the efficiency of homomorphic computing.

[0009] In one possible design, N second homomorphic enabling units are homomorphic computing parties participating in the first homomorphic task in the first area; the first homomorphic computing key is determined based on K homomorphic encryption keys and / or K homomorphic decryption keys corresponding to the K areas participating in the first homomorphic task, the participants of the first homomorphic task are distributed in K areas, the K areas include the first area, the K homomorphic encryption keys include the first homomorphic encryption key, the K homomorphic decryption keys include the first homomorphic decryption key, and K is an integer greater than or equal to 1.

[0010] In the above design, when the participants of the first homomorphic task are distributed in K areas, the first homomorphic computing key can be determined based on the K homomorphic encryption keys and / or K homomorphic decryption keys corresponding to the K areas, so that the first homomorphic computing key can be adapted to the homomorphic encryption keys and / or homomorphic decryption keys of the K areas, and support the calculation of the encrypted ciphertext from the K areas.

[0011] In one possible design, K areas are divided according to the network architecture layer and / or service type slices. Taking the first area as an example, the first area may correspond to the core network, or the access network, or the application layer; or the first area corresponds to a data network, or a cloud server, or a cloud server cluster, or an application at the application layer; or the first area corresponds to an access network set, and the access network set consists of P access network nodes or cells, where P is an integer greater than or equal to 1; or the first area corresponds to a public land mobile network (PLMN) of the core network, or one or more network elements within a PLMN of the core network; or the first area corresponds to a network slice, or a network slice of the core network, or a network slice of the application layer.

[0012] The above design provides different area division methods, which are conducive to meeting different key partition management requirements.

[0013] In one possible design, the first control network element obtaining the first homomorphic encryption key corresponding to the first region includes: the first control network element deriving the first homomorphic encryption key and the first homomorphic decryption key corresponding to the first region. In this design, the control network element derives the key, eliminating the need for excessive interaction during the key derivation process, thereby saving communication overhead.

[0014] In one possible design, the first control network element obtains the first homomorphic encryption key and the first homomorphic decryption key corresponding to the first area from the key management party. The key management party is, for example, a key management center (KMC). In this design, the key management party can obtain the homomorphic encryption key and homomorphic decryption key information (or key derivation-related parameters) of the area corresponding to each control network element, which is conducive to the key management party to quickly derive homomorphic computing keys applicable to multiple areas involved in homomorphic tasks.

[0015] The above two designs support different key derivation mechanisms. Homomorphic encryption keys and homomorphic decryption keys can be derived by the control network element or by the key management party, which can meet different key management requirements.

[0016] In one possible design, before the first control network element obtains the first homomorphic encryption key and the first homomorphic decryption key corresponding to the first area from the key management party, the method also includes: the first control network element determines to establish a secure channel with the key management party.

[0017] In the above design, before the control network element and the key management party interact with each other, they authenticate each other and establish a secure channel, which helps to avoid key leakage and improve security.

[0018] In one possible design, before the first control network element sends the first homomorphic computing key to N second homomorphic enabling units belonging to the first area, the method also includes: the first control network element receives a first homomorphic task request, the first homomorphic task request is used to request (or instruct) to configure the first homomorphic task; the first control network element sends task configuration information to Q third homomorphic enabling units participating in the first homomorphic task in the first area, the task configuration information includes the homomorphic task roles of the Q third homomorphic enabling units, the Q third homomorphic enabling units include N second homomorphic enabling units, the N second homomorphic enabling units are homomorphic computing parties participating in the first homomorphic task in the first area, and Q is an integer greater than or equal to N.

[0019] Alternatively, before the first control network element sends the first homomorphic computing key to the N second homomorphic enabling units belonging to the first area, the method also includes: the first control network element receives a first homomorphic task sub-requirement, and the first homomorphic task sub-requirement is used to request (or instruct) to configure the first homomorphic task in the first area; the first control network element sends task configuration information to the Q third homomorphic enabling units participating in the first homomorphic task in the first area, and the task configuration information includes the homomorphic task roles of the Q third homomorphic enabling units, and the Q third homomorphic enabling units include N second homomorphic enabling units, and the N second homomorphic enabling units are homomorphic computing parties participating in the first homomorphic task in the first area, and Q is an integer greater than or equal to N.

[0020] The above design supports partition management of homomorphic tasks. The control network element corresponding to each area can manage homomorphic tasks for the homomorphic enabling units in the corresponding area. Partition management can reduce the burden on the control network element and improve management efficiency.

[0021] In one possible design, the participants of the first homomorphic task are distributed in K areas, where the K areas include the first area, and K is an integer greater than 1. The method also includes: the first control network element sends the first homomorphic task sub-demand to K-1 control network elements corresponding to K-1 areas of the K areas except the first area, respectively, wherein the first homomorphic task sub-demand is used to request (or instruct) to configure the first homomorphic task in the K-1 areas.

[0022] In the above design, if the participants in the homomorphic task involve multiple regions, the homomorphic task request can be split into multiple homomorphic task sub-requirements by region, and the homomorphic task sub-requirements can be forwarded across regions through the control network elements of each region to support the implementation of cross-regional homomorphic tasks.

[0023] In one possible design, the method also includes: the first control network element sends the key parameters of the first area to the key management party, and the key parameters are determined based on the first homomorphic encryption key and / or the first homomorphic decryption key corresponding to the first area; the first control network element receives the first homomorphic computing key from the key management party.

[0024] In the above design, the key manager can derive the homomorphic computing key based on the key parameters of the K regions participating in the homomorphic task, enabling the homomorphic computing key to adapt to the homomorphic encryption keys of the K regions participating in the homomorphic task and supporting the cross-region implementation of the homomorphic task.

[0025] In one possible design, before the first control network element sends task configuration information to the Q third homomorphic enabling units participating in the first homomorphic task in the first area, the method also includes: the first control network element determines the homomorphic task roles of the Q third homomorphic enabling units participating in the first homomorphic task in the first area based on the first homomorphic task request and the homomorphic capability information of the L fourth homomorphic enabling units belonging to the first area, the L fourth homomorphic enabling units including Q third homomorphic enabling units, and L is an integer greater than or equal to Q.

[0026] The homomorphic capability information of the homomorphic enabling unit may include one or more of the following: the homomorphic enabling unit's identifier, type, homomorphic encryption capability level, homomorphic encryption security level, homomorphic encryption enable identifier, homomorphic decryption enable identifier, homomorphic computation enable identifier, supported homomorphic encryption algorithm identifier, supported homomorphic computation algorithm identifier, etc. A homomorphic task request may include one or more of the following: homomorphic task output type, homomorphic task type, homomorphic task quality requirements, data consumer parameters, number of data consumers, number of data providers, data provider parameters, etc.

[0027] Through the above design, the control network element can select the homomorphic enabling unit based on the homomorphic capability information of each homomorphic enabling unit and the requirements of the homomorphic task carried in the homomorphic task request, which is conducive to improving the reliability of the homomorphic task.

[0028] In one possible design, the method also includes: for any fourth homomorphic enabling unit among the L fourth homomorphic enabling units, the first control network element obtains homomorphic capability information of the fourth homomorphic enabling unit; the first control network element generates a homomorphic capability configuration file of the fourth homomorphic enabling unit based on the homomorphic capability information of the fourth homomorphic enabling unit.

[0029] Among them, the first control network element can obtain the homomorphic capability information of the homomorphic enabling unit by actively reporting through the homomorphic enabling unit (such as the fourth homomorphic enabling unit), or by sending a reporting request to the homomorphic enabling unit and requesting the homomorphic enabling unit to report. The above design is conducive to maintaining the homomorphic capability information of the homomorphic enabling unit on the first control network element side, supporting the selection of the homomorphic enabling unit based on the homomorphic capability information of the homomorphic enabling unit, and facilitating the reliability of homomorphic tasks.

[0030] In one possible design, the method also includes: the first control network element receives F first information from F second control network elements, and the first information from any second control network element among the F second control network elements includes homomorphic capability information of at least one homomorphic enabling unit belonging to the area corresponding to the second control network element; the first control network element determines the above-mentioned K-1 areas where the participants of the homomorphic encryption task are distributed based on the first homomorphic task request and the F first information, where F is an integer greater than or equal to 1.

[0031] In the above design, the control network element can determine the areas involved in the homomorphic task based on the homomorphic capability information of the homomorphic enabling units in each area and the requirements of the homomorphic task carried in the homomorphic task request, which is conducive to the accurate cross-regional scheduling of homomorphic tasks.

[0032] In the second aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a key partition management method, which can be executed by a key management party or by a component of the key management party (such as a processor, a chip, or a chip system, etc.). Taking the execution by the key management party as an example, the method includes: the key management party obtains the key parameters of K regions participating in the first homomorphic task from K control network elements, wherein the participants of the first homomorphic task are distributed in K regions, and the K control network elements correspond to the K regions respectively, and the key parameters of any region in the K regions are determined based on the homomorphic encryption key and / or homomorphic decryption key of the region, and K is an integer greater than or equal to 1; the key management party determines the first homomorphic calculation key of the first homomorphic task based on the key parameters of the K regions; the key management party sends the first homomorphic calculation key to the K control network elements respectively.

[0033] In one possible design, the K regions include a first region, the K control network elements include a first control network element corresponding to the first region, and the key management party obtains key parameters of the K regions participating in the first homomorphic task from the K control network elements, including: the key management party receives the key parameters of the first region from the first control network element, and the key parameters are determined based on the first homomorphic encryption key and / or the first homomorphic decryption key corresponding to the first region; the key management direction sends the first homomorphic computing key to the K control network elements respectively, including: the key management direction sends the first homomorphic computing key to the first control network element.

[0034] In one possible design, the K areas include a first area, and the K control network elements include a first control network element corresponding to the first area. The method also includes: the key management party derives a first homomorphic encryption key and a first homomorphic decryption key for the first area; and the key management direction sends the first homomorphic encryption key and the first homomorphic decryption key to the first control network element corresponding to the first area.

[0035] In one possible design, the key management party obtains the key parameters of K regions participating in the first homomorphic task from K control network elements, including: the key management party determines the key parameters of the first region based on the first homomorphic encryption key and / or the first homomorphic decryption key of the first region.

[0036] In one possible design, the K areas are divided into slices according to network architecture layers and / or service types.

[0037] In one possible design, the first area corresponds to the core network, or the access network, or the application layer; or, the first area corresponds to a data network, or a cloud server, or a cloud server cluster, or an application at the application layer; or, the first area corresponds to an access network set, and the access network set consists of P access network nodes or cells, where P is an integer greater than or equal to 1; or, the first area corresponds to a PLMN of the core network, or to one or more network elements within a PLMN of the core network; or, the first area corresponds to a network slice, or to a network slice of the core network, or to a network slice of the application layer.

[0038] In a third aspect, embodiments of the present application provide a communication device having the functionality to implement the method of the first or second aspect described above. The functionality may be implemented through hardware or through hardware executing corresponding software. The hardware or software includes one or more modules corresponding to the functionality, such as an interface unit and a processing unit.

[0039] In one possible design, the device may be a chip or an integrated circuit.

[0040] In one possible design, the device includes a memory and a processor, the memory is used to store instructions executed by the processor, and when the instructions are executed by the processor, the device can perform the method of the first aspect or the second aspect.

[0041] In a fourth aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a communication device, comprising an interface circuit and a processor, wherein the processor and the interface circuit are coupled to each other. The processor implements the method of the first or second aspect described above through a logic circuit or executing instructions. The interface circuit is configured to receive signals from other communication devices outside the communication device and transmit them to the processor, or to transmit signals from the processor to other communication devices outside the communication device. It will be understood that the interface circuit may be a transceiver, a transceiver, a transceiver, or an input / output interface.

[0042] Optionally, the communication device may further include a memory for storing instructions executed by the processor, or storing input data required by the processor to execute instructions, or storing data generated after the processor executes instructions. The memory may be a physically independent unit, or may be coupled to the processor, or the processor may include the memory (i.e., the processor and memory are integrated together).

[0043] In a possible implementation, the communication device is a chip.

[0044] In a fifth aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a key partition management system, which may include the first control network element of the first aspect and the key management party of the second aspect.

[0045] In a sixth aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium, in which a computer program or instruction is stored. When the computer program or instruction is executed by a processor, the method of the first or second aspect mentioned above can be implemented.

[0046] In the seventh aspect, an embodiment of the present application further provides a computer program product, including a computer program or instructions, which, when executed by a processor, can implement the method of the first or second aspect above.

[0047] In the eighth aspect, an embodiment of the present application also provides a chip system, which includes a processor, the processor is used to couple with a memory, and the memory is used to store programs or instructions. When the program or instruction is executed by the processor, the method of the first or second aspect above can be implemented.

[0048] The technical effects that can be achieved in the second to eighth aspects mentioned above can refer to the technical effects that can be achieved in the first aspect mentioned above, and will not be repeated here. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0049] Figures 1A, 1B, 1C, and 1D are schematic diagrams of a homomorphic encryption algorithm provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0050] FIG2 is a schematic diagram of a homomorphic encryption scheme provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0051] FIG3 is a schematic diagram of a possible, non-limiting communication system architecture provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0052] FIG4 is a schematic diagram of executing a homomorphic task in a communication network according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0053] FIG5 is a schematic diagram of a homomorphic encryption control function network element structure provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0054] FIG6 is a schematic diagram of a key partition management method provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0055] FIG7 is one of the regional division diagrams provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0056] FIG8 is a second schematic diagram of area division provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0057] FIG9 is a schematic diagram of a homomorphic encryption key architecture provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0058] FIG10 is a schematic diagram of a homomorphic task management architecture provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0059] FIG11 is a schematic diagram of a homomorphic task management process according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0060] FIG12 is a second schematic diagram of a homomorphic task management process according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0061] FIG13 is a schematic diagram of a cross-region homomorphic encryption task provided by an embodiment of the present application;

[0062] FIG14 is a schematic diagram of a key partition management process provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0063] FIG15 is a schematic diagram of a structure of a communication device according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0064] FIG16 is a second schematic diagram of the structure of the communication device provided in an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0065] In order to facilitate understanding by those skilled in the art, some terms in this application are first explained before introducing the embodiments of this application.

[0066] Homomorphic encryption (HE) aims to perform computations on ciphertext without exposing the plaintext data. It focuses on privacy-preserving computation and is a technology that enables data value mining while maintaining privacy. Homomorphic encryption builds on basic encryption by adding homomorphic computation capabilities over ciphertext. It allows computations to be performed directly on encrypted ciphertext, and the decrypted result is consistent with the plaintext result. Homomorphic encryption can be categorized as single homomorphic encryption, partially homomorphic encryption, and fully homomorphic encryption. Single homomorphic encryption only supports homomorphic addition or multiplication. Partially homomorphic encryption supports a finite number of arbitrary homomorphic operations, which can be homomorphic addition, multiplication, or other arithmetic operations. Fully homomorphic encryption supports an unlimited number of arbitrary homomorphic operations. Fully homomorphic encryption can be either asymmetric public-key encryption or symmetric encryption, as long as the ciphertext has a certain algebraic structure.

[0067] Homomorphic encryption (HE) consists of four algorithms: HE.Keygen (key generation), HE.Enc (homomorphic encryption), HE.Dec (homomorphic decryption), and HE.Eval (homomorphic evaluation), also known as homomorphic computation. The following describes homomorphic encryption using asymmetric encryption as an example, where n is the security parameter.

[0068] (1) Key generation: (pk,evk,sk)←HE.Keygen(1 n ). As shown in Figure 1A, the homomorphic key generator (HEKG) can input the key material (such as 1n) into the key generator and output the public key (pk) as the homomorphic encryption key: K enc =pk; output key K eval As the homomorphic evaluation key (evk), also known as the homomorphic computation key; output the private key (sk) as the homomorphic decryption key K dec =sk.

[0069] (2) Homomorphic encryption: c←HE.Enc pk (m). As shown in FIG1B , the homomorphic encryption party (HEenc for short) can use the homomorphic encryption key K enc =pk, encrypting a single-bit plaintext message m∈{0,1} into a ciphertext c.

[0070] (3) Homomorphic decryption: m←HE.Dec sk (c) As shown in FIG1C , the homomorphic decryption party (HEdec for short) can use the homomorphic decryption key K dec =sk, decrypt the ciphertext c and restore it to the plaintext message m∈{0,1}.

[0071] (4) Homomorphic evaluation (or homomorphic computation): c f ←HE.Eval evk (f,c1,…,c l ), which can also be called homomorphic computing. Referring to FIG1D , based on the input ciphertext c1,…,c l and homomorphically compute the key K eval =evk, the homomorphic computation method (HEcalc, or HEeval) can execute the homomorphic computation function f∶{0,1} under the ciphertext. l →{0,1}, obtain the output ciphertext c of the homomorphic calculation f .

[0072] Where f represents an arithmetic circuit with addition and multiplication gates on GF(2) (GF stands for finite field, which is the abbreviation of Galois Field). Generally, homomorphic computation HE.Eval can be decomposed into multiple basic operators, such as homomorphic addition c add ←HE.Add evk (c1,c2) ​​and homomorphic multiplication c mult ←HE.Mult evk (c1,c2).

[0073] The entire homomorphic encryption scheme HE = (HE.Keygen, HE.Enc, HE.Dec, HE.Eval) is shown in Figure 2. The ciphertext calculation result is equivalent to the plaintext calculation result after decryption. Homomorphic key generator A generates homomorphic encryption key K enc , homomorphically compute the key K eval , homomorphic decryption key K dec , needs to be distributed to the homomorphic encryption party B, the homomorphic computing party C, and the homomorphic decryption party D respectively.

[0074] In a homomorphic task, there can be multiple homomorphic encryptors encrypting data from different sources, multiple homomorphic computation parties executing homomorphic computation circuits, and single-hop or multi-hop homomorphic computation parties. A homomorphic task can also have multiple homomorphic decryptors, and the decryption results can be provided to multiple data users. Depending on the key deployment, the homomorphic decryptor and the data user can be the same or different entities. Fully homomorphic encryption can be either asymmetric public key encryption or symmetric encryption, as long as the ciphertext has a certain algebraic structure. The homomorphic encryption keys used by multiple homomorphic encryptors in a homomorphic task can be the same or different. Homomorphic computation keys can include a bootstrapping key (BSK) and a key switching key (KSK). The BSK can be used in the homomorphic computation decryption circuit in the ciphertext state to reduce noise. The KSK can be used to convert the ciphertext product into a new ciphertext with the same dimension as the original ciphertext after computation, eliminating the cross terms of the corresponding keys to reduce the ciphertext size increase caused by ciphertext multiplication.

[0075] Additionally, it should be understood that the term "and / or" in this application describes the relationship between associated objects, indicating that three possible relationships exist. For example, "A and / or B" can represent three situations: A exists alone, A and B exist simultaneously, and B exists alone. The character " / " generally indicates that the associated objects are in an "or" relationship.

[0076] In this application, "at least one" refers to one or more, and "a plurality" refers to two or more. In the description of this application, words such as "first" and "second" are used only for the purpose of distinguishing descriptions and should not be understood as indicating or implying relative importance or order.

[0077] The previous section introduces some of the terms involved in the embodiments of this application. Next, the communication system architecture applicable to the embodiments of this application will be introduced.

[0078] Figure 3 shows a possible, non-limiting communication system architecture applicable to embodiments of the present application. As shown in Figure 3, the communication system 3000 includes a radio access network (RAN) 100 and a core network (CN) 200. Optionally, the communication system 3000 may also include the Internet 300. The RAN 100 includes at least one network device (such as 110a and 110b in Figure 3, collectively referred to as 110) and at least one terminal device (such as 120a-120j in Figure 3, collectively referred to as 120). The RAN 100 may also include other RAN nodes, such as wireless relay devices and / or wireless backhaul devices (not shown in Figure 3). The terminal device 120 is connected to the network device 110 via a wireless connection. The network device 110 is connected to the core network 200 via a wireless or wired connection. The core network device in the core network 200 and the network device 110 in the RAN 100 can be different physical devices, or they can be the same physical device that integrates the core network logical functions and the radio access network logical functions.

[0079] The RAN 100 may be a cellular system related to the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), such as a fourth generation (4G) or fifth generation (5G) mobile communication system, or an evolved system beyond 5G (such as a 6G mobile communication system). The RAN 100 may also be an open access network (O-RAN or ORAN), a cloud radio access network (CRAN), or a WiFi system. The RAN 100 may also be a communication system that integrates two or more of the above systems.

[0080] It will be understood that FIG3 only illustrates one possible communication system architecture that may be applied in an embodiment of the present application. In other possible scenarios, the communication system architecture may also include other devices.

[0081] The network device 110 is a node in the radio access network (RAN), which can also be called an access network device or a RAN node (or device). The network device 110 is used to help terminal devices achieve wireless access. The multiple network devices 110 in the communication system 3000 can be nodes of the same type or different types. In some scenarios, the roles of the network device 110 and the terminal device 120 are relative. For example, the network element 120i in Figure 3 can be a helicopter or a drone, which can be configured as a mobile base station. For terminal devices 120j that access the RAN 100 through the network element 120i, the network element 120i is a base station; but for the base station 110a, the network element 120i is a terminal device. The network device 110 and the terminal device 120 are sometimes referred to as communication devices. For example, the network elements 110a and 110b in Figure 3 can be understood as communication devices with base station functions, and the network elements 120a-120j can be understood as communication devices with terminal device functions.

[0082] In one possible scenario, a network device can be a base station, an evolved NodeB (eNodeB), a transmitting and receiving point (TRP), a transmitting point (TP), a next-generation NodeB (gNB), a next-generation base station in a sixth-generation (6G) mobile communication system, a base station in a future mobile communication system, a satellite, an access point (AP) in a WiFi system, an integrated access and backhaul (IAB) node, a mobile switching center, or a network device in a non-terrestrial network (NTN) communication system, i.e., it can be deployed on a high-altitude platform or satellite. The network device can be a macro base station (such as 110a in Figure 3), a micro base station or an indoor station (such as 110b in Figure 3), a relay node or a donor node, or a wireless controller in a CRAN scenario. The network device can also be a device that functions as a base station in device-to-device (D2D) communication, vehicle-to-vehicle communication, drone communication, or machine communication. Optionally, the network device may also be a server, a wearable device, a vehicle or an onboard device, etc. For example, the access network device in vehicle to everything (V2X) technology may be a road side unit (RSU).

[0083] In another possible scenario, multiple network devices collaborate to assist the terminal device in achieving wireless access, and different network devices respectively implement part of the functions of the base station. For example, the network device can be a centralized unit (CU), a distributed unit (DU), a CU-control plane (CP), a CU-user plane (UP), or a radio unit (RU). The CU and DU can be set separately, or they can also be included in the same network element, such as a baseband unit (BBU). The RU can be included in a radio frequency device or a radio frequency unit, such as a remote radio unit (RRU), an active antenna unit (AAU), or a remote radio head (RRH). It can be understood that the network device can be a CU node, a DU node, or a device including a CU node and a DU node. In addition, the CU can be divided into a network device in the access network RAN, or the CU can be divided into a network device in the core network CN, which is not limited here.

[0084] In the embodiments of the present application, the form of the network device is not limited. The device used to implement the function of the network device can be a network device; it can also be a device that can support the network device to implement the function, such as a chip system. The device can be installed in the network device or used in conjunction with the network device.

[0085] The terminal device 120, which may also be referred to as a terminal, user equipment (UE), mobile station (MS), mobile terminal (MT), etc., is a device used to provide voice or data connectivity to users, or an IoT device. For example, the terminal device includes a handheld device with wireless connection capabilities, an in-vehicle device, etc. Currently, terminal devices can include: mobile phones, tablet computers, laptop computers, PDAs, mobile internet devices (MIDs), wearable devices (such as smart watches, smart bracelets, pedometers, etc.), vehicle-mounted devices (such as cars, bicycles, electric vehicles, airplanes, ships, trains, high-speed trains, etc.), satellite terminals, virtual reality (VR) devices, augmented reality (AR) devices, smart point-of-sale (POS) machines, customer-premises equipment (CPE), wireless terminals in industrial control, smart home devices (such as refrigerators, televisions, air conditioners, electricity meters, etc.), intelligent robots, robotic arms, workshop equipment, wireless terminals in unmanned driving, wireless terminals in telemedicine, wireless terminals in smart grids, wireless terminals in transportation safety, wireless terminals in smart cities, wireless terminals in smart homes, and flying devices (such as intelligent robots, hot air balloons, drones, airplanes). Terminal devices can also be other devices with terminal functions, for example, terminal devices can also be devices that function as terminals in D2D communication.

[0086] The embodiments of this application do not limit the device form factor of the terminal device. The device used to implement the functions of the terminal device can be the terminal device; it can also be a device that supports the terminal device to implement the functions, such as a chip system. The device can be installed in the terminal device or used in conjunction with the terminal device. In the embodiments of this application, the chip system can be composed of a chip or include a chip and other discrete components.

[0087] Each network element or device in the communication system (also referred to as a communication network) shown in Figure 3 may have homomorphic encryption and / or homomorphic computing capabilities. Therefore, in an embodiment of the present application, it is possible to consider supporting homomorphic tasks corresponding to homomorphic encryption in the communication network to provide privacy computing capabilities for the communication network.

[0088] FIG4 is an example of performing a homomorphic task in a communication network provided by the present application, wherein the communication network may also be referred to as a communication network. The communication network may be deployed as cells, and each cell may have thousands of terminal devices wirelessly accessing its own service cell. In FIG4 , terminal devices such as smart cars, smart phones, VR / AR devices, smart cameras, etc. equipped with on-board units (OBUs) may have homomorphic encryption capabilities. When privacy protection is required, the generated sensitive data may be homomorphically encrypted and then transmitted to other terminal nodes, roadside units (RSUs), base stations, functional network elements (NFs) in the core network (hereinafter referred to as NFs in the core network), cloud providers, and other nodes in the communication network for homomorphic calculation under ciphertext. The ciphertext data after the final calculation is transmitted to the data user for homomorphic decryption and use.

[0089] A communication network may contain numerous homomorphic tasks (e.g., homomorphic tasks 1-4 in Figure 4). Based on (fully) homomorphic encryption technology, the communication network can provide privacy protection and privacy computing services for highly secure and sensitive services. When applying homomorphic tasks to communication networks, the design of the key architecture for homomorphic encryption tasks and the management of their keys are issues worth considering.

[0090] Based on this, this application provides a key partition management solution to manage the keys of homomorphic tasks in communication networks, support the application of homomorphic tasks to communication networks, and provide privacy computing capabilities for communication networks. The following is a detailed description of the embodiments of this application in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.

[0091] Referring to Figure 5, a schematic diagram of the structure of a homomorphic encryption control function (HECF) network element provided in an embodiment of the present application is provided. The HECF network element may include the functions of some or all of the units such as a homomorphic task management unit, a homomorphic capability management unit, a key management unit, a ciphertext data storage management unit (CDSM) and a HECF interface management (HECF interface management, HEinterM) unit.

[0092] In some implementations, a homomorphic task may also be referred to as a homomorphic encryption task, a homomorphic task management unit may also be referred to as a homomorphic encryption task management (HETM) unit, a homomorphic capability management unit may also be referred to as a homomorphic encryption capability management (HECapM) unit, and a key management unit may also be referred to as a homomorphic encryption key management (HEKM) unit.

[0093] Among them, the homomorphic task management unit may have one or more functions including homomorphic task request management, homomorphic task scheduling management, and homomorphic task profile management. The homomorphic task request management function may be used to manage all homomorphic task requests, receive homomorphic task requests from homomorphic task requesters, perform parsing, perform homomorphic task responses based on homomorphic task scheduling management results, and screen out duplicate or unreasonable homomorphic task requests. The homomorphic task scheduling management function may be used to perform homomorphic task scheduling (or orchestration) based on homomorphic task request parsing results, homomorphic capability information lists, etc., and issue homomorphic task configurations to homomorphic encryption parties, homomorphic computing parties, homomorphic decryption parties, etc., and receive homomorphic configuration responses / task responses, etc. The homomorphic task profile management function may be used to generate homomorphic task profiles (which may be stored in the homomorphic task management unit) based on homomorphic task requests (or homomorphic task request parsing results), homomorphic task scheduling results, etc., and may perform profile management such as forwarding, updating, storing, and destroying.

[0094] The homomorphic capability management unit can have the functions of homomorphic enabling unit capability management and homomorphic capability profile management, and can receive homomorphic capability information reports from homomorphic enabling units (such as homomorphic encryption parties, homomorphic computing parties, homomorphic decryption parties, etc.), and generate, store, or update homomorphic capability profiles registered by homomorphic enabling units based on the homomorphic capability information, where the homomorphic capability profiles registered by the homomorphic enabling units can be stored in the homomorphic encryption capability management unit.

[0095] The key management unit manages the keys of homomorphic tasks. For example, the key management unit can interact with other key interaction parties, and the content of the interaction may include one or more of the following: key material, historical keys, and public parameters used to generate homomorphic task keys. It also generates encryption / decryption keys (symmetric / asymmetric / homomorphic encryption keys, symmetric / asymmetric / homomorphic decryption keys), as well as homomorphic computation keys, and manages key distribution, usage, updates, storage, destruction, and key lifecycle management.

[0096] The ciphertext data storage management unit may have one or more of the functions of ciphertext reception and transmission management, ciphertext storage lifecycle management, and ciphertext storage management. Ciphertext reception and transmission management supports receiving ciphertext from the homomorphic enabling unit or the encryption party, and sending ciphertext to the homomorphic enabling unit or the decryption party. The ciphertext storage lifecycle management supports setting a lifecycle for each ciphertext, starting from the receipt of the ciphertext and deleting the ciphertext after the ciphertext lifecycle ends. Ciphertext storage management supports partitioned storage of ciphertexts, and specifically, the ciphertext storage area can be divided according to one or more of the following: the user to which the ciphertext belongs (and the homomorphic enabling unit), the encryption key corresponding to the ciphertext, the network layer associated with the ciphertext, the network slice type associated with the ciphertext, the security context associated with the ciphertext, etc., to store the ciphertext.

[0097] In an embodiment of the present application, the homomorphic enabling unit can be a terminal device, an access network device, a core network element, an independent node (IN), or an application layer function (AF) node, etc., and can serve as a participant in homomorphic tasks such as a homomorphic encryption party, a homomorphic computing party, or a homomorphic decryption party. Key interaction parties may include units in the symmetric key architecture of the universal subscriber identity module (USIM) in the communication network that store symmetric keys or security contexts of users at all levels, such as unified data management (UDM) / authentication credential repository and processing function (ARPF), authentication server function (AUSF), security anchor function (SEAF), access and mobility management function (AMF), gNB / non-3GPP interworking function (N3IWF), USIM / mobile equipment (ME) and other network elements or infrastructure in the communication network, as well as a third-party key management center (KMC) with an independent key architecture.

[0098] The HECF network element can be deployed in the communication network and can be deployed separately as a functional network element or node of the communication network; it can also be co-located with existing network elements or nodes in the communication network, for example: the network exposure function (NEF) network element in the communication network can have the functions of the HECF network element, the access and mobility management function (AMF) network element can have the functions of the HECF network element, the session management function (SMF) network element can have the functions of the HECF network element, etc. It can be understood that one or more HECF network elements can be deployed in the communication network, or one or more network elements with the functions of the HECF network element can be deployed, and the above-mentioned HECF network elements may have different names in different communication systems.

[0099] FIG6 is a schematic diagram of a key partition management method provided in an embodiment of the present application. FIG6 illustrates the method by taking a control network element as an example. It is understood that the control network element may be the HECF network element described above, or a network element having the functions of the HECF network element described above, or a component of a network element having the functions of the HECF network element described above (e.g., a processor, chip, or chip system, etc.), or a device used in conjunction with the same.

[0100] S601: The first control network element obtains a first homomorphic encryption key corresponding to the first area.

[0101] In an embodiment of the present application, the communication network can be divided into multiple homomorphic task management areas, which are managed separately by multiple control network elements. Each control network element can be responsible for homomorphic task management, homomorphic capability management, key management, interface (such as HECF interface) management, ciphertext data storage management, etc. in its corresponding area.

[0102] In some implementations, the area can be divided according to the network architecture layer and / or service type (service type) slicing. Among them, service type slicing can also be called business type slicing, which can refer to a logical network with specific network characteristics divided according to service type (or business type) in the operator's communication network, that is, a network slice. The network performance requirements of different network slices may be different, such as network slices requiring ultra-reliable low-latency communications (uRLLC), network slices requiring massive machine type communication (mMTC), network slices requiring enhanced mobile broadband (eMBB), etc.

[0103] Taking the first area corresponding to (or managed by) the first control network element as an example, the first area may correspond to the core network, or the access network, or the application layer; or, the first area may correspond to a data network of the application layer, or a cloud server, or a cloud service cluster, or an application, etc.; or, the first area may also correspond to a PLMN of the core network, or one or more network elements within a PLMN of the core network, etc.

[0104] In addition, the first area can also correspond to an access network set, and the access network set can be composed of P access network nodes or cells, where P is an integer greater than or equal to 1. The access network set can be determined (or identified) by one or more of a cell identifier (cell id), an access network node identifier (gNB id), an access management function-related identifier (such as an AMF identifier (AMF id), an AMF set identifier (AMF set id), an AMF region identifier (AMF region id)), a tracking area identifier (TAI), or a network slice identifier, etc. P access network nodes or cells.

[0105] The first area may also correspond to a network slice, or a network slice of the core network, or a network slice of the application layer. The network slice may be determined or identified by network slice selection assistance information (NSSAI) or a slice / service type identifier (SST).

[0106] As an example: referring to the regional division diagram shown in Figure 7, the communication network can be divided into areas corresponding to the access network (AN), core network (CN), and application (APP) layers according to the network architecture layering of the access network (AN), core network (CN), and application (APP) layers, and each of them is managed by different control network elements (such as HECF network elements).

[0107] With reference to the regional division diagram shown in FIG8 , the communication network can also be first divided into regions according to the access network (network architecture layer (level) 1), the core network (network architecture layer 2), and the application layer (network architecture layer 3). For the access layer and the core network, regional division can also be performed according to the service type (ST), such as the network slice type; for the access network, regional division can also be performed according to the access network set (or access network node). For example: in FIG8 , ST1, ST2, and ST3 can represent different types of network slices respectively. The network slices of the application layers ST1, ST2, and ST3 can be divided into different regions. The network slices of the core networks ST1, ST2, and ST3 can be divided into different regions. Different access network sets in the access network, such as 3GPP's access network set 1 (3GPP AN1), 3GPP's access network set 2 (3GPP AN2), and non-3GPP's access network set 3 (Non-3GPP AN3), can be divided into different regions.

[0108] It should be understood that in the embodiments of the present application, the rules for dividing multiple regions may be the same or different, and there may or may not be intersections between different regions. For example, if region 0 corresponds to PLMN0, region 1 corresponds to network slice 1 in PLMN0, and region 2 corresponds to network slice 2 in PLMN0, then region 0 may include region 1 and region 2.

[0109] In the embodiment of the present application, the homomorphic encryption key can be regional, that is, each region corresponds to a homomorphic encryption key. Still taking the regional division shown in FIG8 as an example, referring to the schematic diagram of the homomorphic encryption key architecture shown in FIG9, each region in FIG8 corresponds to a homomorphic encryption key. For example, the region corresponding to the network slice of the application layer ST1 corresponds to the homomorphic encryption key K APP，ST1 , the area of ​​the network slice corresponding to the application layer ST2 corresponds to the homomorphic encryption key K APP，ST2 , the area of ​​the network slice corresponding to the application layer ST3 corresponds to the homomorphic encryption key K APP，ST3 , ..., corresponding to the homomorphic encryption key K in the area of ​​the access network Non-3GPP AN3 非-AN3 The homomorphic decryption key for each region can be stored only in the control network element corresponding to the region.

[0110] The homomorphic encryption key and the corresponding homomorphic decryption key corresponding to each area can be derived by the control network element corresponding to the area, or by the key management party, or by the control network element and the key management party in collaboration. The key management party can be KMC, or network elements or infrastructure such as ARPF and AMF in the communication network.

[0111] Still taking the first area as an example, the first control network element can input the public parameters used for key derivation (such as the above-mentioned security parameters) and the public reference quantity into the key generator to derive the first homomorphic encryption key and the first homomorphic decryption key corresponding to the first area, and can also derive a set of temporary homomorphic computing keys corresponding to the first area. Among them, the security parameters can be determined by the first control network element, and the public reference quantity can be a common reference string (CRS) provided by the key management party. The key generator can refer to a key derivation algorithm, function or algorithm process, etc.

[0112] In some implementations, since the key generators corresponding to different homomorphic encryption algorithms may be different, in an embodiment of the present application, the key generator can be determined based on the homomorphic encryption algorithm supported by the homomorphic enabling unit in the first area. For example: the homomorphic enabling unit in the first area, or the homomorphic enabling unit in the first area that can serve as a homomorphic encryption party all support homomorphic encryption algorithm 1, the first control network element can select a key generator applicable to homomorphic encryption algorithm 1 for key derivation.

[0113] S602: The first control network element sends a first homomorphic encryption key to M first homomorphic enabling units belonging to the first area, and correspondingly, the M first homomorphic enabling units receive the first homomorphic encryption key, where M is an integer greater than or equal to 1.

[0114] In one possible implementation, the M first homomorphic enabling units belonging to the first region may refer to all homomorphic enabling units in the first region, or one or more homomorphic enabling units in the first region that can serve as homomorphic encryption parties (such as supporting homomorphic encryption). After obtaining the first homomorphic encryption key corresponding to the first region, the first control network element may send the first homomorphic encryption key to all homomorphic enabling units in the first region, or one or more homomorphic enabling units in the first region that can serve as homomorphic encryption parties.

[0115] In another possible implementation, the M first homomorphic enabling units belonging to the first region may also refer to one or more homomorphic enabling units in the first region that serve as homomorphic encryption parties in a homomorphic task (such as the first homomorphic task). The first control network element may also send the first homomorphic encryption key to the one or more homomorphic enabling units in the first region that serve as homomorphic encryption parties in the homomorphic task (such as the first homomorphic task) after the homomorphic task (such as the first homomorphic task) is scheduled (or orchestrated) in the first region.

[0116] S603: The first control network element sends a first homomorphic computing key to N second homomorphic enabling units belonging to the first area. Correspondingly, the N second homomorphic enabling units receive the first homomorphic computing key.

[0117] Wherein, N is an integer greater than or equal to 1, and the first homomorphic computation key can be determined based on the first homomorphic encryption key and / or the first homomorphic decryption key corresponding to the first homomorphic encryption key.

[0118] In some implementations, the first control network element may, after a homomorphic task (such as a first homomorphic task) is scheduled (or orchestrated) in the first region, send the first homomorphic computing key to the N second homomorphic enabling units in the first region that serve as homomorphic computing parties for the homomorphic task. For example, the first control network element may, after configuring the homomorphic task roles (such as homomorphic computing parties, homomorphic encryption parties, etc.) of the homomorphic enabling units participating in the homomorphic task in the first region and establishing the homomorphic task, send the first homomorphic computing key to the N second homomorphic enabling units in the first region that serve as homomorphic computing parties for the homomorphic task.

[0119] In the embodiments of the present application, a homomorphic task corresponds to a set of homomorphic computation keys. The set of homomorphic computation keys corresponding to a homomorphic task may include one or more keys used for homomorphic computation. For example, the homomorphic computation keys corresponding to the first homomorphic task may include BSK and KSK. The functions of BSK and KSK can be referred to the above description of homomorphic encryption and will not be repeated here.

[0120] The homomorphic computing key corresponding to the homomorphic task can be determined based on the K homomorphic encryption keys and / or K homomorphic decryption keys corresponding to the K regions distributed by the participants of the homomorphic task (such as the homomorphic encryption party, the homomorphic computing party, etc.), where K is an integer greater than or equal to 1.

[0121] Taking the homomorphic task as the first homomorphic task, K equals 1, and the participants of the first homomorphic task are distributed in the first region as an example, the first homomorphic computation key corresponding to the first homomorphic task can be determined by the first control network element and / or the key management party based on the first homomorphic encryption key and / or the first homomorphic decryption key corresponding to the first region. For example, when the first control network element derives the first homomorphic encryption key and the first homomorphic decryption key through the key generator, a set of temporary homomorphic computation keys corresponding to the first region can be used as the first homomorphic computation key corresponding to the first homomorphic task.

[0122] Taking the homomorphic task as the first homomorphic task, K greater than 1, and the participants of the first homomorphic task are distributed in K areas including the first area as an example, the first homomorphic computing key corresponding to the first homomorphic task can be determined by the key management party based on the K homomorphic encryption keys and / or K homomorphic decryption keys corresponding to the K areas.

[0123] As an example: the control network element corresponding to each of the K regions can send key parameters based on the region to the key management party, wherein the key parameters of each region are determined based on the homomorphic encryption key and / or homomorphic decryption key corresponding to the region. The key management party derives the first homomorphic computing key corresponding to the first homomorphic task based on the key parameters of the K regions, and can send the first homomorphic computing key to the K control network elements corresponding to the K regions, so that the K control network elements can issue the first homomorphic computing key to the homomorphic computing parties participating in the first homomorphic task in the K regions.

[0124] The following provides an example of a key manager (taking KMC as an example) deriving a first homomorphic computing key corresponding to a first homomorphic task based on key parameters of K regions, where i = 0, 1, 2, ... K, and HECF network element represents a control network element.

[0125] During the homomorphic encryption key and homomorphic decryption key derivation phase:

[0126] 0) The HECF control network element in region i first derives the homomorphic decryption key (private key) s i is the component of the homomorphic decryption key of region i, which can be generated through a key derivation function based on the random parameters or secret parameters such as the key of the region. Represents a polynomial ring with ciphertext modulus q, where the superscript 2 represents the dimension.

[0127] 1) KMC generates a common reference quantity and sends it to all HECF network elements in the area. The common reference quantities are a and g. (random polynomial vector), g∈Z d is the gadget vector, Z d is a set of integers of dimension d.

[0128] 2) The HECF network element in region i is based on the public reference quantity and the homomorphic decryption key s i Generate public key b for zone i i and the temporary homomorphic computation key D i , and send it to KMC.

[0129] Public key (homomorphic encryption key) b of region i i , the generation method is not limited, the following is only for illustration. e i Random "noise" introduced for ciphertext security.

[0130] Temporary homomorphic evaluation key for region i The generation method is not limited, and the following is only for illustration. i is a small polynomial sample from a random distribution.

[0131] d i,1 from Sampling from a uniform distribution on ;

[0132] According to the homomorphic decryption key component s i , public parameter g, newly introduced random quantity r i , temporary homomorphic evaluation key component d i,1 , calculate the temporary homomorphic evaluation key component d i,0 .

[0133] According to the homomorphic decryption key component s i , public parameters a and g, newly introduced random quantity r i , calculate the temporary homomorphic evaluation key component d i,2 .

[0134] In the derivation phase of the K-party joint homomorphic computation keys corresponding to the K regions (such as the first homomorphic computation key of the first homomorphic task):

[0135] 3) The HECF network element in area i can use the public key b of area i i and the temporary homomorphic computation key D i This homomorphic task involves K regions of homomorphic encryption and decryption keys. The KMC generates K-party joint homomorphic computation keys (KSK and BSK) based on K public keys and temporary homomorphic computation keys, and distributes them to multiple homomorphic computation parties (as long as the computation party has computing power, there is no need to limit the number of computation parties).

[0136] K-party joint key switching key (KSK), KSK = {Ki,j} 1≤i,j≤k , the generation method is not limited, the following is only for illustration.

[0137] K-party joint bootstrapping key (BSK), BSK = {d i,j ,F i,j}, the generation method is not limited, the following is just an example: d i,j =r i,j a+s i,j ·g+e i,j

[0138] According to the homomorphic decryption key component s i,j , public parameters a and g, newly introduced random quantity r i,j , random noise component e i,j , calculate the K-party joint bootstrap key component d i,j .

[0139] K parties jointly bootstrap the key component F i,j = [f0,f1], sample f1 from a random uniform distribution, and then calculate f0 according to the following formula. f0 = -z i f1+r i,j ·g+e i,j

[0140] According to the new homomorphic encryption key component z i , public parameter g, newly introduced random quantity r i,j , random noise component e i,j , calculate the K-party joint bootstrap key component F i,j .

[0141] It should be understood that in an embodiment of the present application, homomorphic encryption and decryption keys (including homomorphic encryption keys and homomorphic decryption keys) can be decoupled from homomorphic tasks, and the life cycles of homomorphic encryption and decryption keys and homomorphic computing keys can be different. For example: the life cycle of a homomorphic computing key is only during its corresponding homomorphic task. After a homomorphic task ends, the homomorphic computing key corresponding to the homomorphic task needs to be destroyed (or invalidated). For example: after the first homomorphic task ends, the homomorphic computing party participating in the first homomorphic task deletes the homomorphic computing key corresponding to the first homomorphic task. The homomorphic encryption and decryption keys of the sub-region are decoupled from the homomorphic task. After a homomorphic task ends, the homomorphic encryption and decryption keys of the sub-region do not need to be destroyed (or invalidated) and can continue to be used. For example: the homomorphic encryption and decryption keys of a certain region (such as the first region) can be derived after the control network element (such as the first control network element) of the region determines to establish a secure channel with the key management party. All homomorphic encryptions in the region use the same derived homomorphic encryption key. After a homomorphic task ends, the homomorphic encryption and decryption keys of the region do not need to be destroyed (or invalidated) and can continue to be used.

[0142] In some implementations, periodic updates or triggered updates can be selected for homomorphic encryption and decryption keys.

[0143] As shown in FIG10 , in an embodiment of the present application, each control network element (in FIG10 , the control network element is an HECF network element as an example) can be responsible for homomorphic task management, homomorphic capability management, key management, interface (e.g., HECF interface) management, ciphertext data storage management, etc. within its corresponding area. The homomorphic enabling unit can interact with the control network element in its area through a control plane (CP) interface, such as reporting homomorphic capability information to the control network element and receiving task configuration information from the control network element. The homomorphic task requester can send a homomorphic task request to the control network element (e.g., HECF network element 1) in its area (e.g., area 1). The control network element in the area can parse the homomorphic task request and exchange homomorphic capability configuration files of the homomorphic enabling units in the managed area with the control network elements in other areas through the control plane interface (e.g., HECF interface). When the participants in the homomorphic task involve homomorphic enabling units in other areas (e.g., areas 2 and 3), homomorphic task sub-requirements can be sent to the control network elements in other areas. Different homomorphic enabling units can transmit user plane (UP) data or ciphertext based on the configuration of homomorphic tasks.

[0144] In some implementations, the participants of the above-mentioned homomorphic tasks may include one or more of the homomorphic encryption party, homomorphic calculation party, homomorphic decryption party, data provider, data user, key management party, etc. of the homomorphic task.

[0145] The following example illustrates that the participants of the first homomorphic task are distributed in K areas (area 1, area 2, and area 3), the HECF network element (first control network element) that receives the first homomorphic task request splits the first homomorphic task request into multiple first homomorphic task sub-requirements, and forwards the first homomorphic task sub-requirements across areas (to areas 2 and 3), and the HECF network elements (control network elements) in K areas perform scheduling (or orchestration) of the first homomorphic task.

[0146] FIG11 is a schematic diagram of a possible homomorphic task management process provided by an embodiment of the present application. The process includes:

[0147] S1101: The homomorphic task requesting direction sends a first homomorphic task request to HECF network element 1 (first control network element), and HECF network element 1 receives the first homomorphic task request.

[0148] S1102: HECF network element 1 sends a first homomorphic task sub-requirement to HECF network element 2 and HECF network element 3 respectively.

[0149] In an embodiment of the present application, the homomorphic task request may include one or more of the homomorphic task output type, homomorphic task type, homomorphic task quality requirements, data user parameters, number of data users, number of data providers, data provider parameters, etc. After the HECF network element 1 receives the first homomorphic task request, it can determine the area where the participants of the first homomorphic task are distributed based on the first homomorphic task request.

[0150] As an example, HECF network element 1 can obtain first information of F areas, where F can be an integer greater than or equal to K-1, and the F areas can be other areas in the PLMN where area 1 is located, or other areas of the same type of network slice as area 1. This application does not limit this. The first information of each area may include the homomorphic capability information of at least one homomorphic enabling unit in the area (taking L as an example in Figure 10), and the homomorphic capability information of each homomorphic enabling unit may include one or more of the identifier, type, homomorphic encryption capability level, homomorphic encryption security level, homomorphic encryption enable identifier, homomorphic decryption enable identifier, homomorphic computing enable identifier, supported homomorphic encryption algorithm identifier, supported homomorphic computing algorithm identifier, etc. of the homomorphic enabling unit. The first information of each area can be sent to HECF network element 1 by the HECF network element corresponding to the area.

[0151] After receiving the first homomorphic task request, HECF network element 1 obtains the identifiers of multiple data providers included in the first homomorphic task through parsing. HECF network element 1 combines the first information of area 1 and the first information of F areas to learn that the multiple data providers correspond to the homomorphic enabling units of area 1, area 2 and area 3 respectively. Then, HECF network element 1 can send the first homomorphic task sub-requirement to HECF network element 2 corresponding to area 2 and HECF network element 3 corresponding to area 3, respectively, to instruct HECF network element 2 and HECF network element 3 to configure the first homomorphic task in area 2 and area 3, respectively.

[0152] The information included in the first homomorphic task sub-demand may be the same as or partially the same as the first homomorphic task request, or may be different, and can instruct the HECF network element receiving the first homomorphic task sub-demand to configure the first homomorphic task for the participants of the first homomorphic task in the area corresponding to the HECF network element. For example, the first homomorphic task sub-demand sent by HECF network element 1 to HECF network element 2 corresponding to area 2 may only include parameters for the data provider of the first homomorphic task located in area 2, and does not include parameters for the data providers of the first homomorphic task located in areas 1 and 3.

[0153] S1103: HECF network element 1 sends task configuration information to at least one third homomorphic enabling unit participating in the first homomorphic task in area 1, HECF2 sends task configuration information to at least one third homomorphic enabling unit participating in the first homomorphic task in area 2, and HECF3 sends task configuration information to at least one third homomorphic enabling unit participating in the first homomorphic task in area 3.

[0154] After HECF network element 1, HECF network element 2 or HECF network element 3 receives the first homomorphic task request (or the first homomorphic task sub-requirement), it can parse the first homomorphic task request (or the first homomorphic task sub-requirement) and perform the first homomorphic task scheduling (or orchestration), and send task configuration information to at least one third homomorphic enabling unit participating in the first homomorphic task in the corresponding area, and the task configuration information includes the homomorphic task role of at least one third homomorphic enabling unit.

[0155] Taking HECF network element 1, HECF network element 1 determines the homomorphic task roles of Q third homomorphic enabling units participating in the first homomorphic task in the first area according to the first homomorphic task request and the homomorphic capability information of L fourth homomorphic enabling units belonging to area 1 as an example, where Q is an integer greater than or equal to 1, and L is an integer greater than or equal to Q. HECF network element 1 can parse the first homomorphic task request, such as obtaining parameters of the data provider (such as quantity, identification, etc.), and according to the homomorphic capability information of the L fourth homomorphic enabling units in area 1, such as homomorphic encryption enabling information and homomorphic computing enabling information, select a corresponding number of homomorphic enabling units as homomorphic encryption parties with correct (true) homomorphic encryption enablement for the data provider, and select a homomorphic enabling unit as homomorphic computing party with true homomorphic encryption enablement for performing calculations on the encrypted ciphertext, etc. After determining the homomorphic task roles of the Q third homomorphic enabling units participating in the first homomorphic task in the first area, HECF network element 1 can send task configuration information to the Q third homomorphic enabling units participating in the first homomorphic task in area 1, and the task configuration information includes the homomorphic task roles of the Q third homomorphic enabling units (such as homomorphic computing parties, homomorphic encryption parties, etc.).

[0156] S1104: HECF network element 1 receives a task configuration response sent by at least one third homomorphic enabling unit participating in the first homomorphic task in area 1, HECF network element 2 receives a task configuration response sent by at least one third homomorphic enabling unit participating in the first homomorphic task in area 2, and HECF network element 3 receives a task configuration response sent by at least one third homomorphic enabling unit participating in the first homomorphic task in area 3.

[0157] S1105: HECF network element 2 sends a first homomorphic task sub-response to HECF network element 1, and HECF network element 2 sends a first homomorphic task sub-response to HECF network element 1.

[0158] S1106: HECF network element 1 sends a first homomorphic task response to the homomorphic task requester.

[0159] After receiving the task configuration information, the third homomorphic enabling unit may reply with a task configuration response to the HECF network element that sent the task configuration information. The task configuration response may be used to indicate that the third homomorphic enabling unit has received the task configuration information. After HECF network element 2 or HECF network element 3 receives the task configuration response from at least one third homomorphic enabling unit in the corresponding area, it may send a first homomorphic task sub-response to HECF network element 1 to inform HECF network element 1 that area 2 or area 3 has completed the configuration of the first homomorphic task. After HECF network element 1 receives the task configuration response from at least one third homomorphic enabling unit in area 1 and the first homomorphic task sub-responses from HECF network element 2 and HECF network element 3, it may reply with a first homomorphic task response to the homomorphic task requester to inform the homomorphic task requester that the first homomorphic task configuration is complete.

[0160] It should be understood that in some implementations, the first homomorphic task may also involve only one area, such as only area 1 corresponding to HECF network element 1 that receives the first homomorphic task request. In this case, only HECF network element 1 schedules the first homomorphic task in area 1.

[0161] The capability information of the L homomorphic enabling units in each HECF network element can be reported by the homomorphic enabling unit to the HECF network element in the area to which it belongs, or by the homomorphic enabling unit in response to the homomorphic capability information reporting request of the HECF network element. This application does not limit this. The HECF network element can generate or update the homomorphic capability profile of the homomorphic enabling unit for each homomorphic enabling unit in the corresponding area based on the homomorphic capability information obtained for the homomorphic enabling unit. The homomorphic capability profile of the homomorphic enabling unit includes the homomorphic capability information of the homomorphic enabling unit. Taking the example that area 1 corresponding to HECF network element 1 includes the fourth homomorphic enabling unit, HECF network element 1 can obtain the homomorphic capability information of the fourth homomorphic enabling unit and generate or update the homomorphic capability profile of the fourth homomorphic enabling unit based on the homomorphic capability information.

[0162] Through the homomorphic task management process shown in Figure 11, when the participants of the homomorphic task involve not only the area where the HECF network element receiving the homomorphic task request is located, but also other areas, the HECF network element receiving the homomorphic task request can send the homomorphic task sub-requirements split based on the homomorphic task request to the HECF network elements in other areas, thereby realizing cross-regional homomorphic task configuration (or scheduling), which can meet the user's needs for implementing homomorphic tasks across regions.

[0163] FIG12 is a schematic diagram of another possible homomorphic task management process provided in an embodiment of the present application. The process includes:

[0164] S1201: The homomorphic task requesting direction sends a first homomorphic task request to HECF network element 0 (ie, HECF0), and HECF network element 0 receives the first homomorphic task request.

[0165] S1202: HECF network element 0 sends a first homomorphic task sub-demand to HECF network element 1 (ie, HECF1) and HECF network element 2 (ie, HECF2) respectively.

[0166] S1203 : HECF1 sends task configuration information to at least one third homomorphic enabling unit participating in the first homomorphic task in region 1 , and HECF2 sends task configuration information to at least one third homomorphic enabling unit participating in the first homomorphic task in region 2 .

[0167] S1204: HECF network element 1 receives a task configuration response sent by at least one third homomorphic enabling unit participating in the first homomorphic task in area 1, and HECF network element 2 receives a task configuration response sent by at least one third homomorphic enabling unit participating in the first homomorphic task in area 2.

[0168] S1205: HECF network element 1 sends a first homomorphic task sub-response to HECF network element 0, and HECF network element 2 sends a first homomorphic task sub-response to HECF network element 0.

[0169] S1206: HECF network element 0 sends a first homomorphic task response to the homomorphic task requester.

[0170] Different from the homomorphic task management process shown in FIG11 , in the homomorphic task management process shown in FIG12 , the HECF network element 0 that receives the first homomorphic task request may not directly send task configuration information to the homomorphic enabling unit to schedule the homomorphic enabling unit. As an example, the area 0 corresponding to the HECF network element 0 may include the area 1 corresponding to the HECF network element 1 and the area 1 corresponding to the HECF network element 2. For example, area 0 corresponds to PLMN0, area 1 corresponds to the network slice 1 in PLMN0, and area 2 corresponds to the network slice 2 in PLMN1. Then area 0 may include area 1 and area 2. After the HECF network element 0 receives the first homomorphic task request, the first homomorphic task request may be split into multiple first homomorphic task sub-requirements, and the HECF network elements (such as HECF network element 1 and HECF network element 2) corresponding to the multiple areas (such as area 1 and area 2) included in area 0 send task configuration information to the homomorphic enabling unit.

[0171] The homomorphic task management process shown in FIG12 is similar in principle to the homomorphic task management process shown in FIG11 . The implementation of S1201 - S1206 may refer to the implementation of S1101 - S1106 and will not be described in detail.

[0172] Through the homomorphic task management process shown in Figure 12, when the participants of the homomorphic task are distributed in other areas outside the area where the HECF network element that receives the homomorphic task request is located, the HECF network element that receives the homomorphic task request can send the homomorphic task sub-requirements split based on the homomorphic task request to the HECF network elements in other areas, thereby realizing cross-regional homomorphic task configuration (or scheduling), which can meet the user's needs for implementing homomorphic tasks across regions.

[0173] In an embodiment of the present application, homomorphic decryption can be implemented by a HECF network element (i.e., a control network element). If all homomorphic participants in a homomorphic task are in one area, then decryption can be performed by the HECF network element in that area.

[0174] If the homomorphic encryption parties in a homomorphic task span K regions (K>1), the HECF network elements in the region where the K homomorphic encryption parties are located can first decrypt the ciphertext separately, and then the data user can add the data decrypted by the K HECF network elements to obtain the final decryption result. Or,

[0175] If the homomorphic encryption party of a homomorphic task spans K regions (K>1), then the HECF network element in the region where the data user is located can also first apply to the HECF network element in the region where the homomorphic encryption party is located for the decryption key of the encryption party's region (such as the homomorphic decryption key, etc.), and then the HECF network element in the region where the data user is located will perform joint decryption based on (the decryption keys of K regions).

[0176] Referring to FIG13 , a schematic diagram of a cross-region homomorphic encryption task provided in an embodiment of the present application is shown. The data provider of the homomorphic task can be slice 1 (slice 1) and slice 2 (slice) at the APP level, where slice 1 and slice 2 correspond to two different regions, which are different network slice instances (NSI), such as NSI 1 and NSI 2. The homomorphic encryption party can be a homomorphic enabling unit on the terminal device (such as UE), such as the APP of the UE. The homomorphic encryption key of slice 1 is K APP，slice1 (denoted by K1 in Figure 13), the homomorphic encryption key of slice 2 is K APP，slice2 (Indicated by K2 in Figure 13) The homomorphic computing party can be the APP that provides services on the network side (provider APP), such as the HECF in the APP that provides services (such as HECF APP) network element, and homomorphic computing parties can be terminal devices, access network elements (such as base stations, roadside stations, non-3GPP access points, etc.), core network elements or entities (such as core network function (NF) and independent nodes, etc.). Regardless of the number of homomorphic encryption parties in a homomorphic task, the number of homomorphic encryption keys in the task depends only on the number of regions.

[0177] Taking the division of regions according to PLMN as an example, the participants in the first homomorphic task belong to the first region "PLMN1" and the second region "PLMN2", and the control network elements corresponding to PLMN1 and PLMN2 are the first control network element "HECF network element 1" and the second control network element "HECF network element 2" respectively. Figure 14 is a schematic diagram of a key partition management process provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0178] S1401: HECF network element 1 obtains a first homomorphic encryption key corresponding to PLMN1, and HECF network element 2 obtains a second homomorphic encryption key corresponding to PLMN2.

[0179] Taking the derivation of the first homomorphic encryption key corresponding to PLMN1 and the second homomorphic encryption key corresponding to PLMN2 from KMC as an example, for PLMN1, the homomorphic enabling unit within PLMN1 (such as the network element in AN, CN, and UE, etc.) can report cryptographic capabilities to the HECF network element 1 in the area, such as the security level of homomorphic encryption, the supported homomorphic encryption algorithm identifier, and other homomorphic encryption capabilities. After receiving the cryptographic capabilities sent by the homomorphic enabling unit within PLMN1, HECF network element 1 can send a homomorphic encryption key and homomorphic decryption key derivation request to KMC, and can carry the identifier of the homomorphic encryption algorithm in the derivation request. Among them, the identifier of the homomorphic encryption algorithm carried in the derivation request can be determined according to the identifier of the homomorphic encryption algorithm supported by the homomorphic enabling unit in PLMN1. For example: all the homomorphic enabling units in PLMN1 support homomorphic encryption algorithm 1, and HECF1 can carry the identifier of homomorphic encryption algorithm 1 in the homomorphic encryption key and homomorphic decryption key derivation request sent to KMC; or the homomorphic enabling units in PLMN1 exceeding the set proportion threshold support homomorphic encryption algorithm 1, and HECF1 can also carry the identifier of homomorphic encryption algorithm 1 in the homomorphic encryption key and homomorphic decryption key derivation request sent to KMC, and can determine that the homomorphic enabling units in PLMN1 that support homomorphic encryption algorithm 1 can be orchestrated or scheduled as the homomorphic computing party of the homomorphic task to ensure the reliable execution of the homomorphic task.

[0180] After KMC receives the homomorphic encryption key and homomorphic decryption key derivation request from HECF network element 1, it can derive the first homomorphic encryption and first homomorphic decryption keys corresponding to PLMN1 based on the key deriver corresponding to the identifier of the homomorphic encryption algorithm carried in the derivation request, and send them to HECF network element 1.

[0181] For the implementation of HECF network element 2 obtaining the second homomorphic encryption key and the second homomorphic decryption key corresponding to PLMN2, you can refer to the implementation of HECF network element 1 obtaining the first homomorphic encryption key and the first homomorphic decryption key corresponding to PLMN1, and will not be repeated here.

[0182] It is understood that before the above process, network authentication can be performed between the AN in the PLMN (such as PLMN1 and PLMN2), the network element in the CN, the HECF, and the KMC, and a secure channel can be established. The UE can also access the network (such as the AN and / or CN) and authenticate with the network (such as performing authentication and key agreement (AKA)) to establish a secure channel.

[0183] S1402: HECF network element 1 sends a first homomorphic encryption key to a first homomorphic enabling unit belonging to PLMN1, and HECF network element 2 sends a second homomorphic encryption key to a first homomorphic enabling unit belonging to PLMN2.

[0184] S1403: HECF network element 1 and HECF network element 2 perform first homomorphic task scheduling (or orchestration).

[0185] Taking the application layer APP as the homomorphic task requester to send a first homomorphic task request and request the calculation results of data related to UE1 in PLMN1 and UE2 in PLMN2 as an example, after the HECF network elements in the communication network (such as HECF network element 1 and HECF network element 2) receive the first homomorphic task request (or first homomorphic task sub-requirement) corresponding to the first homomorphic task, homomorphic task scheduling (or orchestration) can be performed, such as selecting homomorphic enabling units participating in the first homomorphic task, where the selected homomorphic enabling units participating in the first homomorphic task may include homomorphic encryption parties and homomorphic computing parties participating in the first homomorphic task.

[0186] S1404: HECF network element 1 sends a homomorphic computing key derivation request to KMC, and HECF network element 2 sends a homomorphic computing key derivation request to KMC.

[0187] Among them, the homomorphic computing key derivation request sent by HECF network element 1 to KMC can carry the identifier of the first homomorphic task, the key parameters determined based on the first homomorphic encryption key and / or the first homomorphic decryption key, and the public parameters for deriving the first homomorphic encryption key and / or the first homomorphic decryption key, etc., wherein the key parameters determined based on the first homomorphic encryption key and / or the first homomorphic decryption key can refer to the first homomorphic encryption key and / or the first homomorphic decryption key, or one or more of the first homomorphic encryption key, the first homomorphic decryption key, and the first temporary homomorphic computing key, and can also refer to the key parameters for deriving the first homomorphic encryption key and / or the first homomorphic decryption key, etc. The HECF network element 2 can send the homomorphic computing key derivation request to KMC with reference to the implementation of HECF network element 1 and will not be repeated here.

[0188] It should be understood that if the key parameters carried in the homomorphic computing key derivation request sent by HECF network element 1 and / or HECF network element 2 to KMC are already stored in KMC, step S1404 may not be executed. For example: if the homomorphic encryption key and homomorphic decryption key of HECF network element 1 and HECF network element 2 are both derived from KMC, and the key parameters for homomorphic computing key derivation corresponding to HECF network element 1 and HECF network element 2 are stored in KMC, step S1404 may not be executed.

[0189] S1405: KMC derives a two-party homomorphic computation key for the first homomorphic task.

[0190] After receiving the key parameters from HECF network element 1 and the key parameters from HECF network element 2, KMC can derive the two-party homomorphic calculation keys corresponding to PLMN1 and PLMN2 based on the key parameters of HECF network element 1 and the key parameters from HECF network element 2.

[0191] S1406: KMC sends the homomorphic computing key to HECF network element 1 and HECF network element 2.

[0192] S1407: HECF network element 1 sends the homomorphic computing key to the second homomorphic enabling unit in PLMN1 that serves as the homomorphic computing party, and HECF network element 2 sends the homomorphic computing key to the second homomorphic enabling unit in PLMN2 that serves as the homomorphic computing party.

[0193] It should be understood that the above is an introduction based on the cryptographic capabilities reported by the homomorphic enabling unit (such as AN, network elements in CN, and UE, etc.), including homomorphic encryption capabilities, such as the security level of homomorphic encryption, the supported homomorphic encryption algorithm identifier, etc., and the HECF network element obtains homomorphic encryption keys and homomorphic decryption keys. It is understandable that the above cryptographic capabilities can also include symmetric / asymmetric cryptographic capabilities that do not contain homomorphic characteristics, such as whether corresponding / asymmetric encryption is supported, etc. The HECF network element can also obtain symmetric / asymmetric encryption keys and decryption keys that do not contain homomorphic characteristics, such as deriving regional-level symmetric / asymmetric encryption keys and decryption keys through KMC, and sending regional-level symmetric / asymmetric encryption keys to the encryption party. In this case, if the computing party (such as the homomorphic computing party) receives symmetric / asymmetric ciphertext, it can first convert the symmetric ciphertext into homomorphic ciphertext, and then perform homomorphic calculation. The homomorphic ciphertext obtained after calculation can be sent to the decryption party (such as a HECF network element), or the homomorphic ciphertext obtained after calculation can be converted into symmetric / asymmetric ciphertext and sent to the decryption party. This application does not limit this.

[0194] Through the solution of this application, homomorphic tasks and key management can be carried out in different regions. Each region corresponds to a homomorphic encryption key, and each user in each region corresponds to the same homomorphic encryption key. The homomorphic encryption key can be decoupled from the user status and the specific homomorphic task, so that the same homomorphic ciphertext of the user can be provided to the homomorphic computing parties of different homomorphic tasks for homomorphic computing, which can improve the reusability of the user's homomorphic ciphertext and facilitate the flow of homomorphic ciphertext in different homomorphic tasks. At the same time, regional-level homomorphic encryption keys, rather than user-level homomorphic encryption keys (such as each homomorphic encryption party corresponds to a homomorphic encryption key), can reduce the number of homomorphic encryption keys involved in a homomorphic task, and are also conducive to reducing the derivation of homomorphic computing keys and the complexity of homomorphic computing, thereby improving the efficiency of homomorphic computing.

[0195] The following describes the communication device provided in an embodiment of the present application. Refer to Figure 15, which is a schematic diagram of the structure of the communication device in an embodiment of the present application. The communication device may include units or modules corresponding to all or part of the steps in the above-mentioned method embodiment, and may be used to execute the steps performed by the control network element (such as the first control network element) or the key management party (such as the KMC) in the above-mentioned embodiment. For details, please refer to the relevant description in the above-mentioned method embodiment.

[0196] As shown in Figure 15 , communication device 1500 includes a processing unit 1510 and an interface unit 1520. Processing unit 1510 may be a processor or processing circuit, and interface unit 1520 may be a transceiver unit or input / output interface. Communication device 1500 may be used to implement the steps performed by the control network element or key management party in the above-described embodiments.

[0197] When the communication device 1500 is used to implement the steps performed by the first control network element in the above embodiment:

[0198] The processing unit 1510 is configured to obtain a first homomorphic encryption key corresponding to the first region;

[0199] Interface unit 1520 is used to send a first homomorphic encryption key to M first homomorphic enabling units belonging to the first area, where M is an integer greater than or equal to 1; and to send a first homomorphic computation key to N second homomorphic enabling units belonging to the first area, where N is an integer greater than or equal to 1, and the first homomorphic computation key is determined based on the first homomorphic encryption key and / or the first homomorphic decryption key corresponding to the first homomorphic encryption key.

[0200] For other implementation methods, please refer to the relevant introduction of the first control network element or the key management party in the aforementioned embodiment, which will not be repeated here.

[0201] As shown in Figure 16, the present application also provides a communication device 1600, which includes a processor 1610 and may also include a communication interface 1620. The processor 1610 and the communication interface 1620 are coupled to each other. It is understandable that the communication interface 1620 can be a transceiver, an input / output interface, an input interface, an output interface, an interface circuit, etc. Optionally, the communication device 1600 may further include a memory 1630 for storing instructions executed by the processor 1610 or storing input data required by the processor 1610 to execute instructions or storing data generated after the processor 1610 executes instructions. The memory 1630 may be a physically independent unit, or may be coupled to the processor 1610, or the processor 1610 may include the memory 1630.

[0202] When the communication device 1600 is used to implement the steps performed by the first control network element or the key management party in the above embodiment, the processor 1610 can be used to implement the functions of the above processing unit 1510, and the communication interface 1620 can be used to implement the functions of the above interface unit 1520.

[0203] It is understood that the processor in the embodiments of the present application may be a central processing unit (CPU), or may be other general-purpose processors, digital signal processors (DSP), application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC), logic circuits, field programmable gate arrays (FPGA) or other programmable logic devices, transistor logic devices, hardware components, or any combination thereof. The general-purpose processor may be a microprocessor or any conventional processor.

[0204] The method steps in the embodiments of the present application can be implemented by hardware or by a processor executing software instructions. The software instructions can be composed of corresponding software modules, and the software modules can be stored in a random access memory, a flash memory, a read-only memory, a programmable read-only memory, an erasable programmable read-only memory, an electrically erasable programmable read-only memory, a register, a hard disk, a mobile hard disk, a CD-ROM or any other form of storage medium well known in the art. An exemplary storage medium is coupled to the processor so that the processor can read information from the storage medium and write information to the storage medium. Of course, the storage medium can also be an integral part of the processor. The processor and the storage medium can be located in an ASIC. In addition, the ASIC can be located in a network device or a terminal device. Of course, the processor and the storage medium can also be present in a network device or a terminal device as discrete components.

[0205] In the above embodiments, all or part of the embodiments can be implemented using software, hardware, firmware, or any combination thereof. When implemented using software, all or part of the embodiments can be implemented in the form of a computer program product. The computer program product includes one or more computer programs or instructions. When the computer program or instructions are loaded and executed on a computer, the processes or functions described in the embodiments of the present application are performed in whole or in part. The computer can be a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, a computer network, a network device, a user device, or other programmable device. The computer program or instructions can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another. For example, the computer program or instructions can be transmitted from one network device, terminal, computer, server, or data center to another network device, terminal, computer, server, or data center via wired or wireless means. The computer-readable storage medium can be any available medium that can be accessed by a computer or a data storage device such as a server or data center that integrates one or more available media. The available medium can be a magnetic medium, such as a floppy disk, hard disk, or magnetic tape; it can also be an optical medium, such as a digital video disk; or it can be a semiconductor medium, such as a solid-state drive. The computer-readable storage medium may be a volatile or nonvolatile storage medium, or may include both volatile and nonvolatile types of storage media.

[0206] In the various embodiments of the present application, unless otherwise specified or there is a logical conflict, the terms and / or descriptions between different embodiments are consistent and can be referenced by each other. The technical features in different embodiments can be combined to form new embodiments according to their inherent logical relationships.

[0207] Furthermore, it should be understood that in the embodiments of this application, the word "exemplary" is used to indicate an example, illustration, or description. Any embodiment or design described in this application as "exemplary" should not be construed as preferred or advantageous over other embodiments or designs. Rather, the use of the word "exemplary" is intended to present concepts in a concrete manner.

[0208] It is understood that the various numbers used in the embodiments of this application are merely for ease of description and are not intended to limit the scope of the embodiments of this application. The order of the sequence numbers of the above-mentioned processes does not necessarily imply a specific order of execution; the order of execution of the processes should be determined by their functions and inherent logic.

Claims

1. A key partition management method, characterized in that: include: The first control network element obtains a first homomorphic encryption key corresponding to the first area; The first control network element sends the first homomorphic encryption key to M first homomorphic enabling units belonging to the first area, where M is an integer greater than or equal to 1; The first control network element sends a first homomorphic computing key to N second homomorphic enabling units belonging to the first area, where N is an integer greater than or equal to 1, and the first homomorphic computing key is determined based on the first homomorphic encryption key and / or a first homomorphic decryption key corresponding to the first homomorphic encryption key.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The N second homomorphic enabling units are homomorphic computing parties participating in the first homomorphic task in the first area; The first homomorphic computing key is determined based on K homomorphic encryption keys and / or K homomorphic decryption keys corresponding to K areas, the participants of the first homomorphic task are distributed in the K areas, the K areas include the first area, the K homomorphic encryption keys include the first homomorphic encryption key, the K homomorphic decryption keys include the first homomorphic decryption key, and K is an integer greater than or equal to 1.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that The K areas are divided according to network architecture layers and / or service type segments.

4. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that The first area corresponds to a core network, or an access network, or an application layer; or, The first area corresponds to a data network, a cloud server, a cloud server cluster, or an application program at the application layer; or, The first area corresponds to an access network set, the access network set consists of P access network nodes or cells, where P is an integer greater than or equal to 1; or, The first area corresponds to a public land mobile network PLMN of the core network, or corresponds to one or more network elements in a PLMN of the core network; or, The first area corresponds to a network slice, or corresponds to a network slice of the core network, or corresponds to a network slice of the application layer.

5. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 4, characterized in that The first control network element obtaining the first homomorphic encryption key corresponding to the first area includes: The first control network element derives the first homomorphic encryption key and the first homomorphic decryption key corresponding to the first area; or, The first control network element obtains the first homomorphic encryption key and the first homomorphic decryption key corresponding to the first area from a key management party.

6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that Before the first control network element obtains the first homomorphic encryption key and the first homomorphic decryption key corresponding to the first area from the key management party, the method further includes: The first control network element determines to establish a secure channel with the key management party.

7. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 6, characterized in that Before the first control network element sends the first homomorphic computing key to the N second homomorphic enabling units belonging to the first area, the method further includes: The first control network element receives a first homomorphic task request, where the first homomorphic task request is used to request configuration of the first homomorphic task; The first control network element sends task configuration information to Q third homomorphic enabling units participating in the first homomorphic task in the first area, the task configuration information including the homomorphic task roles of the Q third homomorphic enabling units, the Q third homomorphic enabling units include the N second homomorphic enabling units, the N second homomorphic enabling units are homomorphic computing parties participating in the first homomorphic task in the first area, and Q is an integer greater than or equal to N.

8. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 6, characterized in that Before the first control network element sends the first homomorphic computing key to the N second homomorphic enabling units belonging to the first area, the method further includes: The first control network element receives a first homomorphic task sub-demand, where the first homomorphic task sub-demand is used to indicate that the first homomorphic task is to be configured in the first area; The first control network element sends task configuration information to Q third homomorphic enabling units participating in the first homomorphic task in the first area, wherein the task configuration information includes homomorphic task roles of the Q third homomorphic enabling units, The enabling unit includes the N second homomorphic enabling units, the N second homomorphic enabling units are homomorphic computing parties participating in the first homomorphic task in the first area, and Q is an integer greater than or equal to N.

9. The method according to claim 7, characterized in that Participants of the first homomorphic task are distributed in K regions, the K regions include the first region, K is an integer greater than 1, and the method further includes: The first control network element sends a first homomorphic task sub-demand to K-1 control network elements corresponding to K-1 areas among the K areas except the first area, wherein the first homomorphic task sub-demand is used to indicate configuration of the first homomorphic task in the K-1 areas.

10. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 9, characterized in that The method further comprises: The first control network element sends a key parameter of the first region to a key management party, where the key parameter is determined based on the first homomorphic encryption key and / or the first homomorphic decryption key corresponding to the first region; The first control network element receives the first homomorphic computing key from the key manager.

11. The method according to claim 7, characterized in that Before the first control network element sends task configuration information to the Q third homomorphic enabling units participating in the first homomorphic task in the first area, the method further includes: The first control network element determines the homomorphic task roles of Q third homomorphic enabling units participating in the first homomorphic task in the first area based on the first homomorphic task request and the homomorphic capability information of L fourth homomorphic enabling units belonging to the first area, the L fourth homomorphic enabling units including the Q third homomorphic enabling units, and L is an integer greater than or equal to Q.

12. The method according to claim 11, characterized in that The method further comprises: For any fourth homomorphic enabling unit among the L fourth homomorphic enabling units, the first control network element obtains homomorphic capability information of the fourth homomorphic enabling unit; The first control network element generates a homomorphic capability configuration file of the fourth homomorphic enabling unit according to the homomorphic capability information of the fourth homomorphic enabling unit.

13. The method according to claim 9, characterized in that The method further comprises: The first control network element receives F first information from F second control network elements, where the first information from any second control network element among the F second control network elements includes homomorphic capability information of at least one homomorphic enabling unit belonging to an area corresponding to the second control network element; The first control network element determines the K-1 areas where the participants of the homomorphic encryption task are distributed according to the first homomorphic task request and the F first information.

14. A key partition management method, characterized in that: include: The key management party obtains key parameters of K areas participating in the first homomorphic task from K control network elements, wherein the participants of the first homomorphic task are distributed in the K areas, the K control network elements correspond to the K areas respectively, and the key parameters of any area among the K areas are determined based on the homomorphic encryption key and / or the homomorphic decryption key of the area, and K is an integer greater than or equal to 1; The key management party determines a first homomorphic computing key for the first homomorphic task based on the key parameters of the K regions; The key management direction sends the first homomorphic computing key to the K control network elements respectively.

15. The method according to claim 14, characterized in that The K regions include a first region, the K control network elements include a first control network element corresponding to the first region, and the key management party obtains key parameters of the K regions participating in the first homomorphic task from the K control network elements, including: The key management party receives key parameters of the first area from the first control network element, where the key parameters are determined based on a first homomorphic encryption key and / or a first homomorphic decryption key corresponding to the first area; The key management direction sends the first homomorphic computing key to the K control network elements respectively, including: The key management direction sends the first homomorphic computing key to the first control network element.

16. The method according to claim 14 or 15, characterized in that The K areas include a first area, the K control network elements include a first control network element corresponding to the first area, and the method further includes: The key management party derives a first homomorphic encryption key and a first homomorphic decryption key of the first region; The key management direction sends the first homomorphic encryption key and the first homomorphic decryption key to the first control network element corresponding to the first area.

17. The method according to claim 16, characterized in that The key management party obtains the key parameters of the K regions participating in the first homomorphic task from the K control network elements, including: The key management party determines the first region based on the first homomorphic encryption key and / or the first homomorphic decryption key of the first region. The key parameters for the domain.

18. The method according to any one of claims 15 to 17, characterized in that The K areas are divided according to network architecture layers and / or service type segments.

19. The method according to any one of claims 15 to 18, characterized in that The first area corresponds to a core network, or an access network, or an application layer; or, The first area corresponds to a data network, a cloud server, a cloud server cluster, or an application program at the application layer; or, The first area corresponds to an access network set, the access network set consists of P access network nodes or cells, where P is an integer greater than or equal to 1; or, The first area corresponds to a public land mobile network PLMN of the core network, or corresponds to one or more network elements in a PLMN of the core network; or, The first area corresponds to a network slice, or corresponds to a network slice of the core network, or corresponds to a network slice of the application layer.

20. A communication device, characterized in that: including an interface unit and a processing unit; An interface unit for receiving and sending data; A processing unit, configured to execute the method according to any one of claims 1 to 19 through the interface unit.

21. A communication device, characterized in that: It includes a processor and an interface circuit, wherein the interface circuit is used to receive signals from other communication devices outside the communication device and transmit them to the processor, or send signals from the processor to other communication devices outside the communication device, and the processor is used to implement the method as described in any one of claims 1-19 through logic circuits or execution instructions.

22. A computer program product, characterized in that The method comprises a computer program or an instruction, and when the computer program or the instruction is executed by a processor, the method according to any one of claims 1 to 19 is implemented.

23. A chip system, characterized in that: The chip system includes a processor, the processor is coupled to a memory, the memory is used to store computer programs or instructions, and when the computer program or instructions are executed by the processor, the method as described in any one of claims 1-19 is implemented.

24. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that: The storage medium stores a computer program or instruction. When the computer program or instruction is executed by a processor, the method according to any one of claims 1 to 19 is implemented.

25. A key partition management system, characterized in that: The system includes a first control network element and a key management party; The first control network element is used to implement the method according to any one of claims 1 to 13; The key management party is used to implement the method according to any one of claims 14-19.

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