User controlled offline token system using tees
TEEs facilitate secure, offline transactions by managing blockchain accounts and verifying authenticity, addressing network dependency issues in blockchain systems, ensuring integrity and traceability.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- PCT/JP2026/014923
- Authority / Receiving Office
- WO · WO
- Patent Type
- Applications
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2025-05-08
- Filing Date
- 2026-04-10
- Publication Date
- 2026-11-12
AI Technical Summary
Existing blockchain-based transaction systems require a network connection for verification and transfer of digital tokens, leading to inefficiencies and potential disruptions due to network failures, especially in critical applications like supply chain management and vehicle battery passport verification.
Utilizing Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) to manage blockchain accounts and perform transactions offline, with extended remote attestation for authenticity verification, and generating cryptographically secure signatures to ensure integrity and traceability, allowing transactions to be recorded on the blockchain later.
Enables secure, decentralized, and tamper-proof transactions without network connectivity, ensuring transaction integrity and traceability, reducing reliance on central authorities, and enhancing system resilience and efficiency.
Smart Images

Figure JP2026014923_12112026_PF_FP_ABST
Abstract
Description
USER CONTROLLED OFFLINE TOKEN SYSTEM USING TEESCross Reference
[0001] This application claims the benefit of German Patent Application No. 102025117723.6 filed on May 8, 2025. The entire disclosure of the above application is incorporated herein by reference.
[0002] The present disclosure relates to a system and method for securely executing transactions with digital tokens, a digital currency or a cryptocurrency, wherein tokens may be unique, non-fungible tokens linked to physical assets or interchangeable, fungible tokens used as digital currency, or digital money, on decentralized ledger platforms such as blockchain networks, and in particular for the secure offline verification and transfer of ownership of such tokens or verification and transfer of ownership rights to physical objects represented by such tokens using Trusted Execution Environments (TEE), without the need for a permanent network connection.
[0003] Digitalization has led to many important new applications in diverse areas, which however rely on a persistent connection to a live network. Applications involving services such as access control to parking and charging, ID authentication, payment systems, product traceability / verification and other time critical services have been digitalized over the past years. Digitalization has increased efficiency, decreased cost and improved accessibility. Towards more services being provided online, it is important to tackle blind spots of digitalization in critical use cases.
[0004] One major risk factor is bad network connectivity or a network / system failure, as many digital applications effectively halt, or a process is left to wait until a connection is back up. There is a need for redundancy or fallback in case of such network outages to keep the digital services going. This is especially important in applications which store sensitive data with high trust, with widespread adoption among several participants.
[0005] According to an aspect of the present disclosure, a method is provided for executing a transaction with a digital token or a digital currency between a sending party and a receiving party when a network connection is not available. At least the sending party has a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), the TEE holds a predetermined number of root certificates signed by a trusted party that attest to both the authenticity of the TEE hardware and the software running on the TEE, the TEE manages a blockchain account whose private key is stored exclusively in the TEE, the digital token or the digital currency has been transferred to the TEE's blockchain account prior to the transaction, the TEE prepares and signs the transaction, the receiving party performs an extended remote attestation to verify that the TEE of the sending party and its software are authentic, using locally stored information on the root certificates, after a successful remote attestation, the TEE of the sending party transmits the transaction to the receiving party, and the receiving party receives the transaction and stores it locally in such a way that either the sending party or the receiving party can register the transaction on the blockchain at a later point in time.
[0006] The drawings described herein are for illustrative purposes only of selected embodiments and not all possible implementations and are not intended to limit the scope of the present disclosure.Fig. 1 shows an exemplary vehicle battery passport as it might be used in an exemplary legislative scenario.Fig. 2 illustrates a known centralized authentication system.Fig. 3 shows a schematic of an operational sequence in a known offline token manager.Fig. 4 shows an overview of offline blockchain transactions using a single TEE, according to a first embodiment.Fig. 5 shows a schematic of a deposit phase in a blockchain.Fig. 6 shows an overview of an offline transaction process involving two TEEs, according to a second embodiment.Fig. 7 shows an overview of an operational sequence in an online token deposit phase.Fig. 8 shows an overview of an operational flow in an offline connection phase.Fig. 9 shows an overview of an operational flow in an offline negotiation and transfer phase.Fig. 10 shows an overview of an operational flow in an online token settlement phase.
[0007] In the following, focus is on blockchain-based storage of data and so-called tokens, which represent ownership of some real-world objects or digital money (like bitcoins). Yet, the ideas also apply to similar systems which store important data agreed between different parties in very reliable way.
[0008] In the context of “blockchain-based,” a blockchain is a decentralized, unchangeable digital register that stores data in chronologically ordered, cryptographically linked blocks. Each block contains transaction data, a timestamp, a hash of the previous block and its own hash. This chaining creates a tamper-proof chain that is managed by a distributed network of nodes. New blocks are validated according to a consensus procedure (e.g., proof of work, proof of stake), which practically rules out manipulation without control over most of the network. The blockchain serves as a transparent, traceable, and trustless infrastructure for storing and verifying digital transactions. In a typical transaction, at least one party must have an active network connection to sign, verify and store any token transfers on the blockchain.
[0009] In other words, a blockchain is a decentralized and tamper proof ledger which is shared among a network of nodes. The blockchain enables the use of digital coins or tokens. The digital coins serve as currencies and tokens can be used for several applications like digital representation of physical assets.
[0010] So-called "offline tokens" have been introduced to enable offline transactions. However, such “offline tokens” require additional infrastructure to convert between online and offline modes and often lead to restrictions in token functionality. Alternatively, transaction systems with prior setup or the integration of a dedicated token manager have been proposed. However, such approaches require either a relationship of trust between the parties involved or a central controlling authority, which contradicts the idea of decentralized blockchain systems.
[0011] Another key technical obstacle is that many blockchain protocols require a transaction number (nonce) to ensure sequencing. The term "nonce" stands for "number used once" and in blockchain technology refers to a number that is used exactly once to ensure certain properties of a transaction or block. This nonce is generated from the current state of the blockchain and is not available in offline mode without access to the blockchain. Offline transactions can therefore be rejected when synchronization with the blockchain is subsequently attempted.
[0012] The blockchain thus offers a reliable system for the secure and traceable exchange of tokens such as NFTs (non-fungible tokens). An NFT is a unique digital identifier that is recorded in a blockchain and is used to certify ownership and authenticity. It cannot be copied, replaced, or shared. Ownership of an NFT is recorded in the blockchain and can be transferred by the owner.
[0013] As mentioned above, tokens such as non-fungible tokens (NFTs), can be used to represent products in the form of digital assets. For example, a vehicle battery can be represented in the form of an NFT which makes it easy to verify the origin, manufacturer, CO2 certificates and other essential information on the battery. As batteries must be traceable over a very long timespan, many companies are considering blockchain and token systems with high trust and traceability. Tokens can also enhance a decentralized infrastructure for charging and parking, and the traceability of products or other supply chain applications where participants want to access these services even from remote areas without good network connectivity.
[0014] As an example scenario, consider a battery passport verification and exchange system under new regulations that have made it mandatory for certain type of vehicle and component data to be digitally recorded. For example, as per EU regulation, all critical data about a vehicle battery needs to be recoded digitally, and the vehicle battery shall have a digital “battery passport” which can be verifiable and traceable throughout the lifetime of the battery. Information on the battery model, type, performance and so on can be digitized to the form of an NFT on the blockchain. Since the blockchain is tamper proof this provides a secure digital record which can last throughout the battery lifetime. In cases where a battery needs to be shipped from a supplier to an OEM, the OEM might need to verify the battery passport and the battery information.
[0015] Fig. 1 shows an example of a known battery passport in a scenario like that above. The battery passport may be designed to contain critical information such as battery type, model, manufacturer, performance, date of manufacture and so on. This information shall then be verifiable by other parties. If there is a change in ownership of the battery, this information of the chain of custody shall be recorded digitally.
[0016] Fig. 1 also demonstrates the need for secure, verifiable transmission of this information, for example when changing ownership (chain of custody), as well as its accessibility for authorized third parties as part of testing and verification processes.
[0017] Fig. 2 shows an example of a typical verification process for a battery passport with current technology, for example in the above battery-related scenario.
[0018] As can be seen from Fig. 2, a party A (e.g., an OEM, a supplier or some other entity) presents their battery passport to another party B. Party B sends the verification information from the battery passport to an authentication server over the internet. The authentication server verifies the battery passport and sends back the result (success / fail). In this case a network connection is required to accurately verify the authenticity of the battery passport.
[0019] However, there may be cases where there is no network connection (due to, for example, a remote area, connection failure, or network disruption). In these cases, party B will not be able to verify the battery passport.
[0020] In supply chain and factory use cases, several products are exchanged through different entities. In such cases, verification of products could be time sensitive. Network connection failures or disruptions can cause delays in supply chain or completely halt logistics.
[0021] With current solutions this battery information cannot be verified without a connection to a verification server. This can completely halt or delay the supply chain process, which can be time-critical.
[0022] The present disclosure is based on the task of providing a method, a process, a system, and a computer program product with which digital tokens, particularly those representing physical goods and assets, or a digital currency can be transferred offline in a secure, traceable, and trustworthy manner.
[0023] In cases like those mentioned above, the present disclosure generally seeks to improve offline integration, aiming at enhancing the efficiency of digitalization.
[0024] Main components of a method, system and computer program product as proposed according to the present disclosure involve a decentralized record / database or ledger like blockchain and a trusted execution environment (TEE). These components are used alongside cryptographic primitives like public key infrastructure and digital signature scheme to secure the system. Protocols are defined for different parts of the (payment) process to set rules on how different components in the system interact with each other. Also, the protocols are defined to prevent fraudulent activities by limiting the user interactions with the system.
[0025] With the present disclosure, for example and referring to the afore-mentioned battery passport, an OEM can verify a battery passport NFT without any network connection. It is also possible to make an ownership change of the battery pass from the supplier to the OEM offline. This ownership exchange can then be recorded on the blockchain when either party is back online. This provides complete traceability of the battery journey in a digital record.
[0026] The process, the system and the computer program product should allow a complete separation of online and offline mode, with later synchronization, guarantee security against manipulation, double spending and replay attacks, function exclusively with standardized tokens on existing blockchain networks, enable interactive authentication and verification of the parties involved, and integrate seamlessly into existing industrial processes and regulatory requirements. In particular, this should be possible without a permanent network connection, special offline tokens, a central token manager or a pre-established trust structure between the transaction parties.
[0027] In particular, the method, the system and the computer program product shall be usable in a blockchain system where digital coins and tokens can be securely exchanged without any connection to the internet or the blockchain network.
[0028] According to a first aspect of the present disclosure, a method is provided for executing a transaction with a digital token or a digital currency between a sending party and a receiving party without an existing network connection, wherein at least the sending party has a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), the TEE holds a predetermined number of root certificates signed by a trusted party that attest to both the authenticity of the TEE hardware and the software running on the TEE, the TEE manages a blockchain account whose private key is stored exclusively in the TEE, the digital token or the digital currency has been transferred to the TEE's blockchain account prior to the transaction, the TEE prepares and signs the transaction, the receiving party performs an extended remote attestation to verify that the TEE of the sending party and its software are authentic, using locally stored information on the root certificates, after a successful remote attestation, the TEE of the sending party transmits the transaction to the receiving party, and the receiving party receives the transaction and stores it locally in such a way that either the sending party or the receiving party can register the transaction on the blockchain at a later point in time.
[0029] Advantageously, also in a single TEE system in which only one party, e.g., the sending party, has a TEE, the party or parties without a TEE can still verify that the sending party is using an authentic TEE and that the software in this TEE is authentic. In a single-TEE system in which the sending party has the TEE, the receiving party verifies offline whether the sending party is using an authentic TEE and software in a remote attestation process such as extended remote attestation (ERA). In the context herein, ERA stands for Extended Remote Attestation. “Extended” herein means that additional certificates (e.g., manufacturer root certificates) and verification steps are referred to so that parties can authenticate TEEs and the software running inside them even when they cannot go online. Accordingly, in such an extended remote attestation process, the TEE has (root) certificates asserting that the TEE is authentic and the software running on the TEE is authentic. These certificates are signed by a trusted party (usually the TEE manufacturer). To perform the extended remote attestation offline in a single-TEE system, the receiving party stores information on the root certificates (e.g., as public keys to verify signatures) locally. As understood, these certificates are only necessary to check the authenticity of others and as such only have a public key. In a basic case, this is not needed in the TEE. The TEE or some TEE management on a chip needs private key(s) to issue these signed documents to ensure that the TEE and the TEE SW are authentic, i.e., ok. As further understood, the TEE is more important on the sending party as it has to manage the tokens properly. The TEE on the receiving party is advantageously useful for authentication, although other options exist and therefore there is no limitation thereto. Regarding a non-existent network connection, it is noted that there may be an (offline) local connection between the sending party and the receiving party (via Bluetooth, NFC or the like) to communicate with each other. Bluetooth is registered trademark. In other words, the parties can have a local connection, even also to other machines, but they cannot contact the (online) ledger or blockchain where the tokens are managed.
[0030] Also advantageously, both the parties, i.e., the sending party (whose TEE has prepared, signed, and transmitted the transaction) and the receiving party (that has received the transaction prepared and signed by the TEE) can record the transaction on the blockchain at a later time.
[0031] According to a second aspect of the present disclosure, which is dependent on the preceding first aspect, the TEE generates a digital signature which cryptographically secures the transaction including timestamp and transaction parameters.
[0032] The digital signature ensures the integrity of the transaction by ensuring that no part of the transaction (e.g., recipient, amount, token type, timestamp) can be subsequently changed without this being noticed. Any manipulation would invalidate the signature. As the private key is stored within the TEE (and cannot be read by the user or software), the signature guarantees that the transaction originates from the authorized hardware environment and not from a forged source, thus ensuring the authenticity of the origin. To protect against replay attacks, the timestamp in the signature also prevents an already signed transaction from being used again later (replay). This is particularly important in an offline context, where no direct comparison can be made with the blockchain. Non-repudiation is also ensured, as the signature is clearly assigned to the TEE and the sender cannot later deny having signed the transaction. This increases legal certainty and traceability, e.g., in the event of disputes. In addition, a trust anchor is provided in offline mode, as the TEE is the only trustworthy environment, especially in offline-capable systems. In a sense, the signature generated there replaces real-time verification by an online service and acts as a "digital receipt" with guaranteed trustworthiness. Another advantage is that the TEE generates the signature and no external token manager, notary or server is required. The hardware-based security replaces external trust authorities and this enables decentralized, autonomous interactions, which reduces the need for trust towards third parties. The signed transaction data also creates a basis for later blockchain synchronization, which can be used later, when re-entering the online environment, to register the transaction with provable origin and content on the blockchain. This facilitates asynchronous consistency assurance. All in all, a TEE-generated signature mechanism thus provides a hardware-based, non-manipulable layer of trust that is essential for secure, decentralized, and offline-capable transactions. This provides the highest level of confidentiality, integrity, and traceability even in scenarios without network access or central authority.
[0033] According to a third aspect of the present disclosure, which is dependent on the preceding first or second aspect, the receiving party uses a mobile terminal that locally verifies and stores the transaction.
[0034] Regarding offline capability with subsequent blockchain integration, the process enables transactions to be fully executed and bindingly concluded even without an online connection. The actual blockchain synchronization takes place asynchronously, i.e., subsequently, as soon as connectivity is restored. The advantage is that transactions are no longer dependent on online access, which is crucial for mobile, remote, or fail-safe applications (e.g., industrial plants, logistics, vehicle trading, military, disaster control). Complete decentralization without a central coordination instance is possible. As each participating TEE is autonomously able to sign, store and later register transactions, no central intermediary is required to confirm or forward transactions. This has the advantage of greater resilience, the elimination of single points of failure and maximum decentralization in accordance with the blockchain principle. If, for example, two TEEs are involved, both TEEs can store transaction data locally and later register it on the blockchain, this results in redundant, mutually verifiable proof of the transaction and thus secure proof through dual registration options, which has the advantage of protection against data loss (e.g. if one party remains offline or loses data), the possibility of dispute resolution, as both parties have independent transaction receipts, and greater legal certainty. In addition, the transaction is cryptographically secured by the TEE-signed data. Even if the actual registration is delayed, the integrity of the transaction is maintained. Advantageously, subsequent forgery and replay attacks can be ruled out and complete traceability (auditability) is provided, thus ensuring security against manipulation and traceability. A concept whereby either one or more TEEs can register the transaction results in a high degree of operational flexibility. For example, registration can take place automatically as soon as a connection is established, manually by one party or by both parties for mutual confirmation, with advantages in terms of adaptability to use cases with different infrastructure, responsibilities, or compliance requirements. Finally, network usage can be optimized by initially completing transactions offline and bundling or delaying registration, reducing network and blockchain load and providing scalability and efficiency benefits, e.g., for mass applications in IoT or supply chain networks. This process therefore makes it possible to carry out transactions in a decentralized, secure, offline, and autonomous manner, and still ensure verifiable, traceable, and blockchain-compliant registration as soon as a network connection is re-established. It thus combines offline functionality with the security guarantee of a blockchain and represents a robust solution for real application environments.
[0035] According to a fourth aspect of the present disclosure, which is dependent on one of the preceding aspects, the receiving party uses an identity verification for authentication.
[0036] Preferably, the identity verification can be carried out involving Self Sovereign Identity (SSI). However, with a precondition of being offline-capable, the authentication is not limited to SSI, and other forms of authentication such as NFC based authentication, advantageously and suitably providing proximity-based authentication, may be used as well.
[0037] According to the fourth aspect, strong authentication without a central identity provider is advantageous. With the identity verification, e.g., SSI preferably, the user manages his identity data independently, for example in a decentralized wallet (e.g., smartphone or hardware device), no central identity provider (IdP) is required. The immediate advantage of this is a reduction in dependencies, the elimination of the need to trust third parties and the absence of a single point of failure. The use of an SSI therefore represents an advantageous addition to the TEE-based peer-to-peer transaction model. However, data protection is also improved by selective disclosure (data minimization), as SSI allows the receiving party to disclose only certain attributes of their identity, such as "is a certified merchant" or "has permission X", without full disclosure of personal data. This has the advantage of providing data protection compliance (GDPR, eIDAS, etc.), only transmitting data necessary for a transaction and reducing the risk of misuse. SSI credentials (e.g., verifiable credentials, DID documents) can be stored offline in the wallet and signed or presented locally if required. Verification by the sender (TEE) can also take place offline if the required public keys are known or carried. In favor of offline-capable authentication, this has advantages in terms of seamless integration into offline protocols and the fact that no network connection is required for identity verification. The use of SSI is therefore ideal for industrial or mobile application scenarios. Furthermore, SSI is based on asymmetric cryptography. The receiving party can verify its identity using a digital signature, which can be checked by a verifying party (e.g., the TEE). The advantage of this is that it reduces the risk of forged identities, transaction partners can rely on the authenticity and tamper-proofing is provided without a central office. SSI is also ideally suited for use in blockchain systems, as it works with decentralized identifiers (DIDs) that can be referenced in smart contracts or registered in the blockchain. In terms of interoperability with blockchain and smart contracts, future integration into smart contracts or layer 2 logic is therefore possible using automated access and transaction logic based on identity features. Another advantage is user autonomy and role flexibility, as the receiving party retains full control over their identity and can manage multiple roles or proofs of identity (e.g., as a customer, OEM, supplier), resulting in further advantages in terms of flexible use in supply chains, decentralized marketplaces or IoT environments. The use of Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) by the receiving party as part of a TEE-supported, offline-capable token transfer thus significantly increases the security, privacy, decentralization, and flexibility of the entire system. It replaces centralized identity checks with tamper-proof, interoperable, offline-capable proofs, strengthening the trust core of the transaction without external dependencies.
[0038] According to a fifth aspect of the present disclosure, which is dependent on one of the preceding aspects, the TEE stores the transaction in a protected storage area and automatically transfers it to the blockchain once the network connection is restored.
[0039] The combination of secure storage in the TEE and automated blockchain transmission with network availability creates a secure, autonomous, and reliable bridge between offline transactions and the online state of the blockchain. It reduces risks, minimizes user interaction, increases traceability, and makes the system more robust, secure, and industrially applicable overall. Regarding tamper-proof intermediate storage, storage in the protected storage area (secure storage) of the TEE ensures that the transaction data cannot be subsequently changed, deleted, or falsified, even if the device is compromised. This results in advantages in terms of the integrity and immutability of the transaction as well as protection against manipulation, malware, and root attacks. For automated, reliable synchronization, the transfer to the blockchain takes place automatically as soon as a network connection is available again, without the user having to actively intervene. This has advantages in terms of error avoidance by users (e.g., an incorrect nonce, a forgotten transfer), greater user-friendliness and system availability, as well as minimizing friction losses in the process. In addition, the TEE-internal storage and subsequent registration ensures a consistent representation of the system status: the transaction, which was carried out offline with legal effect, appears on the blockchain in an authentic, verifiable, and chronologically correct manner. This in turn has the advantage of seamless status transitions from offline to online) as well as reliable traceability and auditability. Independence from user behavior is also improved. Even if the user switches off the device, forgets to establish the connection or does not have the technical capabilities for blockchain interaction, the TEE takes over the task independently as soon as it is back online. The advantages of this are increased operational reliability, even for inexperienced users, the elimination of risk due to human error and a high degree of automation combined with improved resilience in the event of disconnection. Finally, it is advantageous to prepare for automated smart contract integration, as automated registration allows smart contracts to be triggered automatically when returning to online mode, e.g., for payment approvals, status changes, compliance checks, etc.
[0040] According to a sixth aspect of the present disclosure, which is dependent on one of the preceding aspects, a smart contract is used to register the transaction on the blockchain when the online connection is restored.
[0041] A smart contract is a programmed contract on the blockchain that automatically and deterministically executes a defined action upon receipt of certain transaction data (e.g., a credit note, change of ownership, logging). The use of a smart contract provides automated, contract-compliant processing, as manual transaction verification is not required, human errors are minimized and standardized, rule-based processing is ensured. At the same time, a smart contract provides a secure validation mechanism, as the smart contract can perform additional checks before the transaction is accepted (e.g., for the validity of the signature, format, time window, role of the party, nonce synchronization, etc.). This has the advantage of increasing transaction security and integrity as well as protection against incorrect, expired, or reused transactions. In addition, the use of a smart contract reduces complexity on the client side, as the TEE only transfers the transaction and the smart contract takes over the interpretation, verification, and storage, so that no complex blockchain logic is required in the TEE itself. This has the advantage of conserving resources in the TEE, as less code is required in it, the system architecture is simplified and easier maintenance and updates are made possible by smart contract customization without changing the TEE logic. Finally, smart contracts leave a fully auditable trail on the blockchain, including logic, state change and trigger time. This increases the auditability and traceability of the entire system in terms of audit security, compliance capability and verifiability of rules and processes (e.g., for certifications, legal requirements). The use of a smart contract to register TEE-based offline transactions when the network connection is restored therefore provides the advantage of automated, trustless, and rule-based transaction processing. It makes the system scalable, traceable, secure, and interoperable without compromising offline functionality.
[0042] In addition, a smart contract can also solve a nonce problem which may typically come up when a transaction or a message needs a unique number (a nonce) to prevent replay attacks (where an attacker simply resends an old transaction) or to maintain order (e.g., in blockchains like Ethereum, where each account’s transactions must have incrementing nonces). For example, a smart contract can internally manage nonces by maintaining a counter or a mapping. Each time someone interacts with the contract (e.g., submitting a transaction, claiming a token, etc.), the contract can check and update the nonce linked to the user or the transaction. If a user sends a transaction, the smart contract verifies whether the provided nonce is exactly what it expects, if yes, process the action and increment the stored nonce, and if no, reject the transaction. In this manner, the smart contract can guarantee uniqueness and enforce order without relying purely on an external blockchain account's nonce system.
[0043] Moreover, a smart contract on Layer 1 (L1) can also solve critical problems that naturally arise when a blockchain is scaled using Layer 2 (L2) solutions. Layer 2 problems are mainly about trust, security, and finality because activity is moved off the main chain to gain speed and lower costs. In order to reduce risks introduced by such a move, for example, the smart contract can verify that L2 updates are correct by receiving state commitments from L2 and checking them, submitted L2 results can be challenged via the smart contract, or the smart contract can enforce penalties and correct the system, etc. In other words, a smart contract can represent an anchor of trust for an L2 system and solve the involved key risks by checking, holding, and enforcing.
[0044] According to a seventh aspect of the present disclosure, which is dependent on one of the preceding aspects, layer 2 technologies are used to cache and sequence transactions.
[0045] The use of layer 2 technologies in the TEE-based offline transaction context makes it possible to register transactions generated offline on layer 1 in a secure, efficient, and orderly manner, without conflicts, without data loss and with complete integrity. This significantly improves the scalability, consistency and resilience of the system and makes the solution suitable for practical and mass use. For example, layer 2 systems make it possible to collect and temporarily store transactions outside the main blockchain (layer 1) before they are collected and transferred to layer 1 in consolidated form. This has the advantage of avoiding collision problems, e.g., due to contradictory or double-signed transactions, and provides orderly processing, e.g., according to timestamp or priority, as well as protection against nonce conflicts when multiple transactions arise in offline-capable contexts. Since a challenge in the context of TEE-based offline transfers can be that several transactions are signed locally but put online at different times, layer 2 acts as a buffer zone to transfer these transactions asynchronously to layer 1. The advantage of this is a reduced dependency on blockchain availability and load states, a higher tolerance for network latencies or blockchain congestion, and overall, a significant optimization of the synchronization strategy. In addition, transactions that are initially only processed on layer 2 incur lower fees, as not every single operation has to be written immediately as an expensive layer 1 transaction data record. Finally, layer 2 systems can be modularly integrated into many modern blockchain architectures and allow flexible extensions, so that future functional extensions can be implemented without changing the layer 1 logic and easier integration of regulatory requirements (e.g., for a battery passport).
[0046] According to an eighth aspect of the present disclosure, which is dependent on one of the preceding aspects, the digital token is a token representing a physical object.
[0047] The use of a digital token such as a non-fungible token (NFT) to represent a physical object as part of a TEE-supported, offline-capable transaction process is advantageous in that uniqueness, ownership and object identity can be digitally secured and unmistakably verified even without an online connection. This enables tamper-proof, verifiable, and automatable supply and ownership chains for real goods. This is because NFTs are by definition unique, comparable to a digital twin of a physical object. In contrast to fungible tokens (such as currencies or credit notes), an NFT can be assigned to exactly one object, such as a specific vehicle battery, machine, or component number. The advantage of this is that the risk of confusion is eliminated and secure proof in the sense of "This transaction relates to exactly this one object." is possible.
[0048] While, in view of the above, the use of an NFT may be preferable, the representation of a physical object is not limited to an NFT, and any other forms of tokens, such as ERC-20 tokens or just coins, can be used as well.
[0049] According to a ninth aspect of the present disclosure, which is dependent on one of the preceding aspects, the receiving party also has a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). Advantages resulting from the presence of multiple TEEs are described above.
[0050] According to a tenth aspect of the present disclosure, which is dependent on the ninth aspect, a mutual remote attestation procedure is performed between the two TEEs prior to the transaction.
[0051] In order to perform the remote attestation offline in a system having two TEEs, both the sending party and the receiving party store information on the root certificates (i.e., public keys to verify signatures) locally, and both parties verify each other using extended remote attestation. This mutual remote attestation, or mutual extended remote attestation, between two TEEs prior to an offline transaction ensures that both parties are operating in a certified, tamper-proof, and trusted environment. It replaces traditional trust in central servers or human identity verification with hardware-secure, cryptographically verifiable reciprocity and thus forms a security feature for decentralized autonomous and offline-capable transaction systems.
[0052] The first step in such transaction systems is to ensure the trustworthiness of both parties to the transaction. Through mutual extended remote attestation, several TEEs, for example two, can check whether their counterpart is a genuine, certified TEE, is executing unmodified, authorized software and is not subject to external influence or a compromised state. The extended remote attestation thus advantageously provides protection against counterfeit devices, tampered protocols or malicious endpoints and a trust anchor without human intervention or centralized authority and creates a foundation for peer-to-peer transactions with hardware security.
[0053] Furthermore, the use of the extended remote attestation avoids asymmetric security risks. Without mutual verification, for example, a genuine TEE could communicate with a counterfeit device without a TEE. Attestation ensures equivalence and reciprocity of security levels and thus offers advantageous protection against trust downgrade attacks, ensuring equal security guarantees for both sides, which is particularly important for sensitive transactions such as property transfers.
[0054] The extended remote attestation also verifies that both TEEs execute the same signed protocol code, for example, the same logic for token handling, storage, verification, etc. It thus advantageously ensures uniform, verified transaction execution without deviations in rules, formats or security checks and the possibility of defense against attacks by modified protocol variants. After successful mutual attestation, a secure communication channel can then be established directly between the TEEs, with end-to-end secure communication even offline, protection against man-in-the-middle attacks and reduced need for external encryption layers. The results of the attestation can be archived (e.g., using hashes, signatures, timestamps) and used later as proof that a transaction was carried out under trustworthy conditions. Attestation thus creates legally robust proof of transaction and supports audits, complaints, insurance, or warranty processes.
[0055] According to an eleventh aspect of the present disclosure, which depends on the ninth or tenth aspect, the TEEs mutually validate and acknowledge the exchanged transaction to each other.
[0056] According to a twelfth aspect of the present disclosure, which is dependent on one of the ninth to eleventh aspects, the TEEs each generate, sign, and store a digital transaction receipt.
[0057] According to a thirteenth aspect of the present disclosure, which is dependent on one of the ninth to twelfth aspects, the transaction is fully negotiated and executed between the TEEs without user intervention.
[0058] According to a fourteenth aspect of the present disclosure, there is provided a system for performing the method according to any of the preceding aspects, comprising at least one device having a TEE comprising a digital wallet and a secured transaction interface.
[0059] According to a fifteenth aspect of the present disclosure, which is dependent on the fourteenth aspect, the device comprises means for offline data transmission to the receiving party.
[0060] According to a sixteenth aspect of the present disclosure, there is provided a computer program product comprising program code which, when executed on a computing system comprising TEE, performs the steps of a method according to any one of the first to thirteenth aspects.
[0061] The present disclosure thus addresses the underlying problem by providing a decentralized system that provides for the use of at least one Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) to enable the tamper-proof offline exchange of digital tokens or a digital currency. Access to cryptographic keys is controlled exclusively within the TEE so that a secure transfer of tokens, including transfers of ownership, can also take place without a direct connection to the blockchain. The authenticity of the parties involved and the integrity of the executing code are ensured via an extended remote attestation process.
[0062] The present disclosure makes it possible to manage digital representations of physical goods in the form of standardized blockchain tokens (e.g., NFTs) without having to rely on central intermediaries, special offline tokens, or pre-established trust relationships. The combination of TEEs, standardized protocols, and optional downstream synchronization with the blockchain creates a system that is robust against network failures and still meets the requirements for security, traceability, and legal compliance.
[0063] The task underlying the present disclosure is solved by a system and a method for the secure, offline-capable execution of transactions with digital tokens or a digital currency, whereby the transaction processing takes place within so-called Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), which are operated on the respective devices of the parties involved. The system allows the secure authentication, verification, and transfer of tokens, in particular those that digitally represent physical objects such as vehicle batteries, without the need for a permanent network connection or the presence of a central intermediary. The core of the present disclosure is the use of at least one TEE on the side of the sending party (Single TEE system) or one TEE by each of the sending and receiving parties (Double TEE system), respectively, which check each other's integrity and trustworthiness as part of an extended remote attestation. The TEEs execute standardized, publicly verifiable protocols that are secured before the transaction by authenticating the software environment and the associated certificates. These protocols are designed to avoid any kind of misuse of the tokens, the software must implement these protocols correctly, and remote attestation ensures that the software is finally operating correctly. In a preparatory online step, the digital tokens or the digital currency are / is first transferred to a dedicated TEE account that is controlled exclusively by the TEE.
[0064] During the offline phase, a secure connection is established between the two TEEs, the transaction parameters (e.g., token type, quantity) are negotiated, and the transaction is transmitted and signed by the sender TEE and verified by the recipient TEE.
[0065] After a successful transaction, a digitally signed transaction log (transaction receipt) is generated and stored locally in the TEE. When the network connection is restored, these transactions can be synchronized to the blockchain either directly or using a smart contract or a layer 2 solution. This can also circumvent or mitigate the problem of nonce synchronization in traditional blockchains.
[0066] The present disclosure thus enables a complete token transaction without an online connection, downstream synchronization with the blockchain without data loss, the use of standardized blockchain tokens without special offline versions, secure protection against double spending, replay attacks and manipulation by the user, and the elimination of external token managers or trusted third parties in the transaction path.
[0067] The measures described provide a system that is particularly suitable for use in logistics and time-critical applications where network availability is not guaranteed at all times, for example in the context of the digital battery passport regulation, decentralized charging infrastructures or industrial supply chain processes.
[0068] In particular, it is understood in the above context that an online transaction system as used herein may extend to a wide variety of use cases, such as the purchase, sale and / or temporary transfer of goods, merchandise, products and services of both a physical and digital nature, or transactions in the field of automotive mobility, such as refueling and charging processes, collection of fees (e.g. tolls, insurance), activation of vehicle functions that can be purchased and / or subscribed to, OTA updates, and the like. In this respect, there is no explicit restriction to the aforementioned examples.
[0069] In the above context and without being limited to it, various modifications, extensions, and / or optimizations are possible as described below.
[0070] In a first embodiment, only one party or participant, preferably the sending party or the sender, is equipped with a TEE. In a second embodiment, both parties or participants, i.e., the sender and the receiving party or the receiver, are equipped with TEEs.
[0071] The first and second embodiments are described below with reference to a blockchain as a form of ledger, i.e., an account and / or registry type structure that configures a decentralized, distributed, public or non-public digital database for recording transactions in a secure, traceable, and transparent manner. There is no restriction to blockchain. Instead of a blockchain, for example, another verifiable and / or decentralized or distributed database or such a register can also be used.
[0072] Simple blockchain transactions comprise keys and addresses (each participant has a public and private key pair. Their blockchain address is derived from their public key), transaction creation (in order to send tokens, the sender creates a transaction containing the amount of tokens, the sender's address, the receiver's address, and at least a timestamp), digital signature (the sender uses the private key to digitally sign the transaction, ensuring authenticity), broadcast (the signed transaction is broadcast to the blockchain network), verification (network nodes verify sufficient funds in the sender's account and the validity of the sender's digital signature), consensus and recording (nodes participate in a consensus mechanism (like mining) to agree on the transaction's validity and order. The transaction is then permanently recorded on the blockchain), and confirmation (once recorded, the receiver can verify the transaction's completion on the blockchain).
[0073] Trust in a blockchain transaction relies on both parties having access to the blockchain network. Blockchain networks prioritize preventing double spending. Double spending is a fundamental problem in blockchain systems and occurs when the same token or coin or digital asset is spent more than once. The verification part of the checking if the sender has sufficient funds and validity of the digital signatures of the sender ensures transaction uniqueness and that there is no double spending.
[0074] In offline blockchain transactions using Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), the following three aspects may be identified.
[0075] According to a first aspect, in a blockchain transaction between a sender and a receiver, an offline blockchain transaction can be performed with only the sender being equipped with a TEE (aka single TEE approach). The TEE executes the offline transaction process independent from any manipulation from the user. The isolated execution of TEE prevents security threats like double spending and provides trust in the offline blockchain transactions. The parties need to provide some kind of evidence that the complete system (hardware / software) they are using is secure and running a trusted software. This can be done using techniques like SSI, NFC authentication, etc.
[0076] According to a second aspect, before performing the offline transaction, the receiver verifies that the software running on the TEE wallet of the sender is authentic. This is done by an extended remote attestation for the TEE software where the TEE provides proof to the receiver that the software it is running will execute all the offline transaction protocols correctly. The software for offline transactions is made available for all parties to verify (e.g., hosted publicly). The receiver uses this knowledge to verify if the software running on the TEE is authentic. In this case, the offline transaction system is not reliant on a third-party intermediary.
[0077] When both parties involved in an offline transaction are equipped with a TEE and trusted software, either party can take the sender or receiver role. Before starting the offline transaction, both the parties need to attest and verify each other‘s TEE and trusted software (as in aspect two above). This establishes trust between the parties and gives confidence that the offline transaction is executed correctly. The combination of TEE and trusted software eliminates the need for any third-party intermediaries, offline tokens, or any prior setup between the parties to complete an offline transaction, resulting in overall more trust between both parties.
[0078] Fig. 4 shows an overview of offline blockchain transactions using such a single, i.e., only one, TEE, according to the first embodiment.
[0079] As shown in Fig. 4, in a single TEE flow and initial setup, the sender and the receiver have blockchain accounts (public and private keys). The sender and the receiver have SSI identity credentials (verifiable credentials). The sender and the receiver are equipped with digital wallets. The digital wallet of the sender is executed within a TEE. The sender has an offline blockchain account. The offline account is controlled by the TEE (only the public key is shared and the private key of the offline account is controlled by the TEE). The digital wallets execute specific trusted software which enables trusted offline blockchain transactions. Preferably, there is transparency in the software running on the TEE. To this effect, the software running on the TEE can be publicly hosted, for example, so that the receiver is able to verify the correctness of the software. The receiver has the information required to verify the trusted software stored locally (relying on hash or binary of the software). The software can have multiple trusted versions, all of which should be available for all parties for trusted verification.
[0080] The complete offline transaction between a sender and a receiver spans three phases: (i) An online deposit phase where the sender deposits a certain amount, or number, of tokens into the digital wallet. (ii) An offline transaction phase where the token or currency transaction between the sender and the receiver occurs. And (iii) an online settlement phase where offline transactions are recorded on to the blockchain.
[0081] In the deposit phase, the sender has connection to the blockchain network. Fig. 5 shows a schematic of such an online deposit phase.
[0082] In the deposit phase, the sender transfers a certain amount of tokens or currency from the blockchain account of the sender to the offline account of the sender which is controlled by the TEE. This transaction is recorded on the blockchain. This transaction is verified by the TEE. This verification can be performed in multiple ways. For example, the TEE can interact with trusted blockchain nodes to confirm the transaction is recorded. Also, a smart contract can be used to provide proof of the transaction completion. Or other methods can be used to verify the completion of the transaction by the TEE. After the transaction is verified by the TEE, the TEE updates its balance according to the amount of tokens or currency transferred by the sender. The sender is now free to spend the balance remaining on the TEE digital wallet using offline transactions.
[0083] In the offline transaction phase, the sender and the receiver have no connection to the blockchain network. In the transaction phase, the sender and the receiver create a secure communication channel. This can be established via Bluetooth (registered trademark) or NFC, or via other suitable communication protocols. The sender and the receiver authenticate each other using verifiable identity credentials (SSI). This ensures that the sender and the receiver confirm the identity of each other. This also ensures that the sender is transferring the tokens or the digital currency to the correct party. And ensures that the receiver can hold the sender liable in case of any inconsistencies during the offline transactions.
[0084] Using extended remote attestation, the receiver remotely attests / verifies the sender TEE and the software running on the TEE. Verification of the TEE means checking the TEE hardware is authentic, and verification of the software means verifying that the trusted software is running on the TEE.
[0085] The sender and the receiver negotiate the amount of tokens / digital currency and other services that need to be exchanged. The sender requests the TEE to transfer a certain amount of tokens or digital currency to the TEE. The TEE compares the amount requested to the balance in the TEE. If the TEE account has sufficient balance, the TEE creates the transaction for the requested amount to transfer it to the receiver’s account. The TEE signs the transaction and shares it with the receiver. The TEE updates its balance by deducting the amount transferred during the offline transaction. The receiver verifies the data and signature on the transaction. After successful verification, the receiver sends back a receipt to the sender.
[0086] In the (online) settlement phase, the sender and the receiver have connection to the network: In the settlement phase, either the receiver or the sender can record the transactions on the blockchain. The sender requests a transfer of tokens or digital currency from the TEE account to the blockchain account of the sender. The TEE creates and signs the transaction transferring the balance from its account to the sender account. The TEE updates its balance according to the tokens / digital currency transferred to the sender. The sender records the transaction on the blockchain. The same process is followed when the receiver records the transactions.
[0087] Because in the above-described single TEE approach only the party equipped with the TEE is able to transfer tokens or digital currency, the sender is preferably be equipped with a TEE that is running trusted software in order to be able to transfer tokens or digital currency. Because the parties require some kind of authentication since the receiver does not have a TEE, authentication methods like e.g. SSI must be used, and / or NFC may be used where the devices are in proximity with each other and both parties can authenticate each other easily.
[0088] The use of TEEs ensures that the installed trusted software correctly executes the offline transaction protocols. The identity credential verification ensures trust and provides liability to the parties. The trusted software verification / remote attestation ensures that the TEE and the software running on the TEE is authentic.
[0089] Hereinafter, a system and process overview of a system using two TEEs is now described, according to the second embodiment. It is understood that although the description is based on tokens, the operating procedures are equally applicable to digital currency.
[0090] Fig. 6 shows an overview of the offline transaction process, according to the second embodiment. In the system and process shown in Fig. 6, each user first sets up the respective TEEs before the offline transaction process can be initiated. A TEE blockchain account can, for example, be created by the manufacturer and come with the TEE or can be created by a trusted third party by following a set of rules. For example, private keys may be generated by the TEE and stored on the TEE. Accordingly, the user is allowed to only manage the account and as such has no access to the private keys of the TEE. The TEE blockchain account so generated is unique to the user and linked to the users blockchain account. The user uses a pin code as the authorization step to access the TEE.
[0091] Once the setup of the TEE(s) is completed, an offline transaction process may be carried out. Hereinafter, the detailed steps of a whole offline transaction process are described, and the flow of the different protocols involved therein is described along with sequence diagrams shown in Fig. 7 to Fig. 10. Fig. 7 shows an overview of an operational sequence in an online token deposit phase, according to one embodiment, and Fig. 8 shows an overview of an operational flow in an offline connection phase, Fig. 9 shows an overview of an operational flow in an offline negotiation and transfer phase; and Fig. 10 shows an overview of an operational flow in an online token settlement phase. The protocols are described considering interactions between two parties (receiving party and sending party).
[0092] As far as TEEs are concerned, the parties, or each party, respectively, run a trusted execution environment (TEE). These TEEs hold certificates which enable trusted authentication. The certificates are signed by a manufacturer or third party / organization or both of the TEE which ensures that the TEE executes the code on the enclave without any external interference. This means the TEE is not susceptible to commonly known security attacks. During the start of the offline transaction, the parties involved (i.e., both in the case of two parties) verify each other’s TEE using an extended remote attestation process. This ensures for the parties that the token exchange process will follow the offline transaction protocol. Specifically, the TEE may include a wallet enclave and a protected storage area that supports sealed storage and an anti-rollback monotonic counter. The wallet enclave may store a wallet state as sealed data, and the wallet enclave may update the sealed data only together with an increment of the anti-rollback monotonic counter. The wallet enclave may be configured to reject an offline transaction request when a presented wallet state does not match the sealed data associated with a latest monotonic counter value. The wallet enclave may obtain a trusted time value from a secure real-time clock or a monotonic timer within the TEE, and the wallet enclave rejects any transaction record that would produce a non-increasing trusted time value.
[0093] Only the owners of the TEEs can perform some action with their TEE. The users have very limited control over the TEE. A user is able to only perform the following functions: create account; connect (the user asks the TEE for a connection to the intended party); negotiate (enter the amount for token exchange or agree the amount for token exchange); deposit (the user can ask the TEE to accept deposits into the TEE account); withdraw (the user can ask the TEE to transfer tokens from TEE account to the account of that user); inventory check (the user can check the current balance or NFTs or other tokens on the TEE).
[0094] Due to the limited input from the user, this process allows the system to agree on token transfer and prepare the transfer in the absence of internet or network connection without any modifications.
[0095] Remote attestation, in the context of blockchain-integrated systems, refers technically to a cryptographic verification process wherein a computing entity-typically operating within a trusted execution environment (TEE) generates an integrity proof of its execution state, which is then securely transmitted to a remote verifier (on-chain or off-chain). The proof comprises a signed measurement of the platform's hardware and software stack, allowing an external validation mechanism to assess the trustworthiness of the originating environment without direct access. This mechanism enables blockchain systems to incorporate and act upon off-chain data or computations while preserving verifiability and integrity guarantees, by binding the authenticity of the external source to hardware-enforced attestations and cryptographic signatures issued by a platform-specific root of trust.
[0096] Using extended remote attestation herein, all the parties in the offline transaction system are expected to execute the same code on the TEE with the same policies (protocols). All parties should have access to the source code for public verification. Preferably, the source code is stored on a secure platform where it cannot be manipulated, such as e.g., a secure ledger or a Blockchain or a public secure cloud. Alternatively, there is trust in the providing party that the software is not corrupted. Each TEE creates a verifiable certificate (to digitally sign / attest the information on / about the TEE) about the software running on the TEE. Before starting the offline process, all the TEEs validate each other of the involved TEEs and trusted software running on the TEEs. This ensures that all TEEs are running the same software code, or, if the implementations differ, at least trusted software which operates correctly. This in turn ensures that all the parties are conforming to the same rules and policies during an offline transaction process. Specifically, a receiving party device may transmit an attestation challenge nonce to a sending-party TEE via an offline communication link. The sending party TEE may generate an attestation quote that includes the attestation challenge nonce, a measurement of the wallet enclave binary, a wallet policy version identifier, and a device public key bound to the TEE. The receiving party device may validate a certificate chain for the attestation quote up to a manufacturer root public key stored locally on the receiving party device. The receiving party device may compare the measurement of the wallet enclave binary to an expected reference measurement stored locally on the receiving-party device. The receiving party device may treat the sending party TEE as untrusted when the certificate chain validation fails or when the measurement comparison fails.
[0097] Once the TEEs are set up and remotely attested, transaction phases may be carried out. Basically, these transaction phases may be categorized into the four phases mentioned above: The online token deposit phase, the offline connection phase, the offline negotiation and transfer phase, and the online token settlement phase.
[0098] In the online token deposit phase as shown in Fig. 7, as a first step, tokens need to be deposited into the TEE blockchain account. To do so, the user makes a transaction to transfer the desired number of tokens from the user’s account to the TEE account. After this transaction is complete and recorded on the blockchain, the TEE reads the information from the blockchain and updates its balance. After the transfer is complete only the TEE can further update the TEE account balance. The user then decides about how many tokens and to whom to transfer these tokens. Based on this input the TEE transfers tokens from its account. As described above, during the setup phase, while creating the TEE blockchain account, the private keys of the account are securely stored on the TEE and are not accessible by anyone. Since the private keys of the TEE blockchain account are only known to the TEE, the user cannot make any transactions from the TEE account. This prevents the user from double spending.
[0099] In the following offline connection phase as shown in Fig. 8, two users initiate an offline transaction and then request their respective TEEs to connect with each other. In response thereto, the TEEs establish a secure communication channel to communicate with each other. During such communication, the first round of messages is to verify the authenticity of the TEEs wherein both TEEs perform extended remote attestation indicating trusted TEE and trusted code execution. Then the TEEs exchange the certificate linking the users and TEE blockchain account (account certificate). This ensures that the TEEs transfer tokens to the right account or verify transactions from the account. Specifically, Bluetooth or NFC may be used as a transport layer for exchanging messages, and confidentiality and integrity of the exchanged messages is provided by a session key generated inside the TEE. After a successful extended remote attestation, the two TEEs may execute an elliptic-curve key agreement protocol inside the TEEs to derive the session key. The two TEEs encrypt application-layer messages using an authenticated encryption with associated data scheme under the session key. The two TEEs bind the session key to the extended remote attestation by including an identifier of the attestation quote in associated data of the authenticated encryption with associated data scheme.
[0100] In the following offline negotiation and transfer phase, or transaction phase, as shown in Fig. 9, which is initiated by the user, the initiating user can take either of 2 roles, herein designated as a “payee” or a “payer”. The payee requests the amount or tokens to be transferred to the payees TEE. The payees TEE relays this information to the payer’s TEE. The payer’s TEE relays this information to the payer. The payer can accept or reject the request. When the payer accepts the request, the payer’s TEE checks if the payer has enough tokens available to complete the transaction. In the following offline transfer phase, i.e., after the negotiation phase, the payer’s TEE prepares the offline transaction to transfer tokens from its account to the payee’s TEE account. The payer’s TEE signs the transaction and sends it to the payee’s TEE. The payee’s TEE verifies the transaction signature, the amount, the timestamp and, as may be depending on the particular use case, other essential data of the transaction and sends back a receipt. The receipt serves as proof of transaction in case of disputes. After the transaction is complete, both TEEs update their account balances. Specifically, the payer’s TEE may store each offline transaction record in an append-only transaction log within the protected storage area. Each offline transaction record may include a transaction sequence number derived from the anti-rollback monotonic counter and include a hash pointer to an immediately preceding offline transaction record. The payee’s TEE may store a corresponding receipt record in an append-only receipt log, and the receipt record includes a hash of the offline transaction record received from the payer’s TEE. When an offline transaction record is missing or reordered, the hash pointer fails to verify, and the TEE treats the transaction log as corrupted.
[0101] In the then following online token settlement phase as shown in Fig. 10, which may be regarded as a final phase in the process, the user makes a settlement request to the TEE. After the settlement request from the user, the TEE needs to carry out 2 types of transactions to the blockchain. First, the TEE needs to record all offline transactions it holds to the blockchain. After recording the held transactions on the blockchain, the tokens are now on the TEEs account on the online ledger. The TEE then makes a second transaction to transfer the tokens to the user’s account. After the transactions are recorded on the blockchain and transferred to the user’s account, the tokens are on the user’s account which is reflected on the online ledger. This final token settlement process can be simplified using smart contract(s) where tokens transferred online by the TEE are automatically transferred to the user’s account. Specifically, a smart contract may verify an attestation signature associated with an offline transaction record before accepting the offline transaction record for settlement. The smart contract may store a last accepted transaction sequence number for the sending party TEE, and the smart contract may be configured to reject the offline transaction record when the transaction sequence number is not greater than the last accepted transaction sequence number. The smart contract may store a log root hash for an accepted batch of offline transaction records, and the smart contract may be configured to reject a batch when a computed log root hash does not match a log root hash provided in a settlement request signed by the TEE.
[0102] In the above system and process(es), as a rule, the complete offline transaction flow is controlled by the TEE. All TEEs follow the same protocol or rules, which is ensured by the extended remote attestation process, and the TEE securely stores all the certificates, transactions, and receipts in its memory. Specifically, the anti-rollback monotonic counter and the sealed storage prevent a compromised operating system from rolling back a wallet state to re-use an already spent balance. The append-only transaction log reduces a probability that an offline transaction record is deleted or reordered without detection. The settlement verification performed by the smart contract reduces a rate of rejection caused by offline-to-online synchronization conflicts and reduces a rate of acceptance of duplicated offline transaction records.
[0103] It is to be noted that it is currently standard protocol to attach a “transaction nonce” to each blockchain transaction. This transaction nonce is generated by querying the blockchain for the transaction count. The count from the blockchain is increased by 1 and used in the new transaction as the nonce.
[0104] As understood, in an offline setting where there is no connection to the blockchain, attributes of the blockchain transaction such as to, from, etc. except for a nonce can be set by the sender and do not need a connection to the blockchain. The nonce can be manually entered by the sender but if the count in the transaction does not match with the count from the blockchain, the transaction fails. This is because when the transaction is resting offline, the sender could have made several new transactions, and the offline transaction count does not match the count from the blockchain anymore.
[0105] In the offline system disclosed herein, both parties can record to the blockchain at any point of returning online. This might cause the transaction not to match the current state on the blockchain, and therefore the transaction made offline might be rejected by the blockchain nodes while trying to record the transaction. This is the case with blockchains that employ a transaction count as one of their security measures.
[0106] As a solution thereto, types of blockchain can be used that do not require such a mechanism and can record transactions without needing a transaction nonce. Smart contracts can also be used to verify and record offline transactions. Another solution resides in employing a layer 2 blockchain as a buffer for the transaction before finalizing the transactions on the layer 1 blockchain. This allows the layer 2 blockchain to sort the transactions and write valid transaction counts to the transaction which is accepted by the layer 1 blockchain.
[0107] As described above and according to the subject matter of various embodiments disclosed herein, the Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) as used herein are specifically designed to permit minimal operations from the user’s end and no control to any other entity. User actions are limited to connect, negotiate, deposit, withdraw and inventory check. The respective TEE controls the coin or token interactions which prevents a malicious user from spending the same coin or token more than once.
[0108] The TEEs in the offline transaction system disclosed herein execute the same functions following a set of rules. To ensure that these functions are executed, digital signatures are utilized. The authentication of the execution code and enforcement of the TEE rules can be ensured using trusted third-party certificates. These certificates are authenticated by the parties involved in coin or token transfer before starting an offline transaction. This eliminates the need to create a new trust setup every time a user initiates a transaction offline.
[0109] The whole process involves 3 phases: (i) a TEE deposit phase which is an online phase. Some amount of currency or tokens is deposited to the TEE. (ii) a transfer phase which is an offline phase. Here the sender and the receiver initiate the connection and negotiate through the TEEs. During the offline transaction process, the authentication, verification, coin / token transfer, receipt transfer are handled by the TEEs. The sender and the receiver are notified either of the success or the failure of the transaction. And (iii) a settlement phase which is an online phase. The user requests the TEE to make a withdrawal of coins / tokens from the TEEs account to another user account.
[0110] As further described above, the method, system, and computer program product according to the embodiments herein rely on a decentralized payment system. Yet the disclosed approach also applies to “ownership” tokens or NFTs which indicate the ownership or properties of things, e.g., batteries.
[0111] Considering traditional digital payment between two parties, at least one party needs to have a connection to the authentication server to verify whether a user is authentic and has the required funds to complete a transaction. Similar constraints persist in a decentralized token system where without a connection to the blockchain network, a participant who shall receive tokens cannot be sure whether the sending participant has sufficient coins or tokens.
[0112] As shown in Fig. 3, the state of the art for known offline blockchain coin or token transfer implementations employ special “offline coins or tokens.” Offline tokens are usable only in the offline context. They also require additional middleware infrastructure to manage the conversion of online coins or tokens to offline or tokens and vice versa. Other methods include establishing a trust setup for every new transaction, this involves sharing information and initiating the TEE computing environments based on the pre-shared information which can be inefficient.
[0113] In contrast thereto, and to address these constraints and facilitate a secure token system offline, “trusted execution environments” (TEEs) as used herein act as secure vaults used to execute code within a specific environment (e.g., processors). The data and the code in the TEE cannot be tampered with and is uninfluenced by any external code or data. For instance, on mobile phones or PCs, such TEEs are used to store passwords and similar credentials. All the protocols defined run on this secure enclave which protects them from any external interruptions. Verifiable certificates are used to verify the authenticity of the TEEs and the identity of the participant(s). By storing the root certificates in the TEEs secure memory, verification can be carried out without the use of a network connection. The whole transaction process occurs in 3 distinct phases of (1) depositing tokens or coins online in the TEE, (2) spending these coins or tokens offline and (3) when online again, recording the transactions that occurred offline to the distributed ledger.
[0114] Thus, while several approaches for offline ownership-changes of such tokens or digital coins exist, however, these approaches typically assume an additional trusted party that essentially controls a specific wallet or TEE. Also, in most cases special tokens or coins are needed.
[0115] In contrast thereto, as disclosed herein and in terms of token or coin transfers, with broad applicability for product traceability / ownership, digital coins and many others, the user is given more control and both extra trusted parties and special tokens are avoided, and also fraud problems like double spending of tokens or spending of fake tokens are avoided.
[0116] Modifications of the embodiments described above provide various options and improvements and are readily apparent to those skilled in the art by simply reading the foregoing description of embodiments with reference to illustrative, non-limiting examples.
[0117] For example, a first modification is conceivable in that an SSI credential is used for linking the user and TEE blockchain account. An SSI credential can be created to attest the blockchain accounts of the sender and the receiver to their respective TEE accounts. This can ensure the sender that they are communicating with TEE that belongs to the receiver and vice versa.
[0118] A second modification is conceivable in that a smart contract is used for transferring TEE tokens. The smart contract can be programed to automatically transfer the token from the TEE to the user’s blockchain account during the settlement phase. The smart contract can verify the user’s account using the SSI account linking credential(s) from the first modification above.
[0119] A third modification is conceivable in that a TEE account delete action is provided. The users could have more actions in addition to the actions available to interact with their TEE. A user can request the TEE to delete the existing TEE account and create a new one. Or to delete all the keys and certificates. An update action could be provided which replaces all the keys and certificates with new and / or updated ones.
[0120] In a fourth modification, cloud backup can be installed so that the TEE enclaves can be backed up on the cloud. This could protect all the keys and certificates from TEE malfunction or data corruption. The TEE could be recovered from the backup back to the user.
[0121] In a fifth modification, multiple trusted third parties can participate or be involved which can issue certificates attesting the authenticity of the TEE. These certificates can be verified using technologies like SSI or PKI and so on.
[0122] The present disclosure has been described with reference to preferred embodiments. However, it is to be understood that the present disclosure is not limited to the specifically described embodiments and may include and cover additional aspects, configurations, and modifications without departing from the scope of the present disclosure. Such additional aspects, configurations, and modifications may include, for example, a method, apparatus, device, system, computer program, and device for efficiently supporting digital service revocation and offline operation using compressed certificate revocation lists and explicit non-revocation certificates to resolve false positive issues.
[0123] In general, embodiments of the present disclosure may be implemented in hardware or specialized circuitry, software, logic, or any combination thereof. For example, some aspects may be implemented in hardware, while other aspects may be implemented in firmware or software that may be executed by a controller, microprocessor, or other computing device, although the present disclosure is not limited thereto. While various aspects of the present disclosure may be illustrated and described in the form of block diagrams, flowcharts or other pictorial representations, it is understood that the blocks, devices, systems, techniques or methods described herein may be implemented as non-limiting examples in hardware, software, firmware, specialized circuitry or logic, general purpose hardware or control devices, or other computing devices, or any combination thereof.
[0124] Embodiments of the present disclosure may be implemented by computer software executable by a data processor of a system unit, such as in the processor unit, or by hardware, or by a combination of software and hardware. In this regard, it should be noted that blocks of logic flow shown in the figures may represent program steps or interconnected logic circuits, blocks and functions or a combination of program steps and logic circuits, blocks, and functions. The software can be stored on physical media such as memory chips or memory blocks implemented in the processor, on magnetic media such as hard disks or floppy disks and on optical media such as DVDs and their data variants, CDs.
[0125] Memory can be of any type suitable for the local technical environment and can be implemented with any suitable data storage technology, e.g., semiconductor storage devices, magnetic storage devices and systems, optical storage devices and systems, read-only storage and removable storage. Data processors may be of any type suitable for the local technical environment and may include one or more general purpose computers, special purpose computers, microprocessors, digital signal processors (DSP), application specific integrated circuits (ASIC), gate level circuits and processors based on a multi-core processor architecture as non-limiting examples.
[0126] Embodiments of the present disclosures can be used in various components, such as integrated circuit modules. The design of integrated circuits is, by and large, a highly automated process. Complex and powerful software tools are available for converting a logic-level design into a semiconductor circuit design that can be etched and molded onto a semiconductor substrate.
[0127] EDA (Electronic Design Automation) programs and tools automatically route traces and place components on a semiconductor chip using proven design rules and libraries of pre-stored design modules. Once the design for a semiconductor circuit is complete, the resulting design can be sent in a standardized electronic format to a semiconductor fabrication facility or "fab" for manufacturing.
[0128] Disclosed herein is a method for executing a transaction with a digital token or a digital currency between a sending party and a receiving party without an existing network connection. At least the sending party has a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). The TEE holds a predetermined number of root certificates signed by a trusted party that attest to both the authenticity of the TEE hardware and the software running on the TEE. The TEE manages a blockchain account whose private key is stored exclusively in the TEE. The digital token or the digital currency has been transferred to the TEE's blockchain account prior to the transaction. The TEE prepares and signs the transaction. The receiving party performs an extended remote attestation to verify that the TEE of the sending party and its software are authentic, using locally stored information on the root certificates. After a successful remote attestation, the TEE of the sending party transmits the transaction to the receiving party. The receiving party receives the transaction and stores it locally in such a way that either the sending party or the receiving party can register the transaction on the blockchain at a later point in time. The complete offline transaction flow is controlled by the TEE. All involved TEEs follow the same protocol or rules, which is ensured by an extended remote attestation process, and the TEE securely stores all the certificates, transactions, and receipts in its memory. The method can be performed by a system comprising at least one device on a sending party with a TEE comprising a digital wallet and a secured transaction interface. A computer program product can comprise program code means which, when executed on a computing system comprising a TEE, performs the steps of the method. When the TEE prepares and signs the transaction, the wallet enclave executes an offline transaction state machine that increments a monotonic counter stored in sealed storage, constructs a transaction record including the counter value and a hash-chain pointer to a prior transaction record, and generates a signature using a device-unique private key that is non-exportable from the TEE. When the receiving party performs an extended remote attestation, the sending party TEE generates an attestation quote that includes a measurement of the wallet enclave binary, a policy version identifier, and a freshness challenge nonce received from the receiving party, and the receiving party validates a certificate chain up to a locally stored manufacturer root public key and verifies that the measurement matches an expected reference measurement. When storing the transaction locally, the receiving party may store the transaction record in an append-only log whose entries are linked by cryptographic hashes, and stores a latest log root hash in tamper-resistant storage of the receiving-party device, thereby detecting deletion, insertion, or reordering of offline records. The TEE may obtain a tamper-resistant time value from a secure real-time clock or a monotonic timer within the TEE, and rejects any offline transaction request that would produce a non-increasing time or counter value relative to a sealed state previously committed by the TEE. The preparing of transaction may include incrementing, by the TEE, a monotonic counter stored in sealed storage and including the monotonic counter in the signed transaction, and the receiving party may be configured to reject the transaction when the monotonic counter is not greater than a previously accepted counter value associated with the sending party.
[0129] The description made in this respect has given, as an exemplary and non-limiting example, a complete and informative description of the exemplary embodiment of the present disclosure. However, various modifications and adaptations may become apparent to those skilled in the relevant technical field in view of the foregoing description when read in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and the description. It is understood that all such and similar modifications of the subject matter according to the present disclosure still fall within the scope of the present disclosure.
Claims
1. A method for executing a transaction with a digital token or a digital currency between a sending party and a receiving party when a network connection is not available, at least the sending party having a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), the TEE holding a root certificate signed by a trusted party that attest to both authenticity of TEE hardware and software running on the TEE, the method comprising: managing, by the TEE, a blockchain account whose private key is stored exclusively in the TEE; transferring the digital token or the digital currency to the blockchain account managed by the TEE prior to the transaction; preparing and signing, by the TEE, the transaction; performing, by the receiving party, an extended remote attestation to verify that the TEE of the sending party and the software running on the TEE are authentic, using locally stored information on the root certificate; after a successful remote attestation, transmitting, by the TEE of the sending party, the transaction to the receiving party; and receiving, by the receiving party, the transaction and storing the transaction locally in such a way that either the sending party or the receiving party can register the transaction on a blockchain at a later point in time.
2. The method according to claim 1, further comprising generating, by the TEE, a digital signature which cryptographically secures the transaction including timestamp and transaction parameters.
3. The method according to claim 1 or 2, wherein the receiving party uses a mobile terminal device which verifies and stores the transaction locally.
4. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, wherein the receiving party uses an identity verification for authentication.
5. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 4, wherein the TEE stores the transaction in a protected storage area and automatically transfers the transaction to the blockchain once the network connection is restored.
6. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, wherein a smart contract is used to register the transaction on the blockchain when the network connection is restored.
7. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 6, wherein layer 2 blockchain technologies are used to cache and sequence the transaction.
8. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 7, wherein the digital token is a token representing a physical object.
9. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 8, wherein the receiving party also has a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE).
10. The method according to claim 9, wherein information on the root certificate is stored locally by each party to allow offline verification of TEE, and a mutual remote attestation procedure is performed between the TEE of the sending party and the TEE of the receiving party prior to the transaction.
11. The method according to claim 9 or 10, wherein the TEE of the sending party and the TEE of the receiving party mutually validate and acknowledge the exchanged transaction.
12. The method according to any one of claims 9 to 11, wherein the TEE of the sending party and the TEE of the receiving party each generates, signs, and stores a digital transaction receipt.
13. The method according to any one of claims 9 to 12, wherein the transaction is fully negotiated and executed between the TEE of the sending party and the TEE of the receiving party without user intervention.
14. A system for performing a method that executes a transaction with a digital token or a digital currency between a sending party and a receiving party when a network connection is not available, the system comprising at least one communication device on the sending party, wherein the at least one communication device has a TEE, which includes a digital wallet and a secured transaction interface, the TEE holds a root certificate signed by a trusted party that attest to both authenticity of TEE hardware and software running on the TEE, and the at least one communication device on the sending party is configured to: manage, by the TEE, a blockchain account whose private key is stored exclusively in the TEE, the digital token or the digital currency has been transferred to the blockchain account of the TEE prior to the transaction; prepare and sign, by the TEE, the transaction, the receiving party performing an extended remote attestation to verify that the TEE of the sending party and the software running on the TEE are authentic, using locally stored information on the root certificate; and after a successful remote attestation by the receiving party, transmit, by the TEE of the sending party, the transaction to the receiving party, the receiving party receiving the transaction and storing the transaction locally in such a way that either the sending party or the receiving party can register the transaction on the blockchain at a later point in time.
15. The system according to claim 14, wherein the at least one communication device is configured to perform offline data transmission to the receiving party.
16. A computer program product stored in a non-transitory tangible storage medium, the computer program product comprising program code, when executed on a computing system comprising a TEE, causes the computing system to perform steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 13.
