Identity verification method between wireless communication distributed electric vehicle charging pile equipment nodes

By creating a security domain in the charging pile device and using an embedded key negotiation algorithm, the security and privacy issues of wireless communication distributed electric vehicle charging piles are solved, enabling fast and simple authentication and key negotiation, thus ensuring the security and privacy of communication.

CN118972840APending Publication Date: 2024-11-15浪潮智能终端有限公司
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202411165661.X
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-08-23
Publication Date
2024-11-15

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Traditional wireless communication distributed electric vehicle charging stations suffer from insufficient security and privacy. Any device can access them, and the communication is vulnerable to attacks, making it impossible to guarantee the security of user and manufacturer information.

Method used

A security domain is created in the flash chip of the charging pile equipment, the security domain ID and channel are configured, and authentication and key negotiation are performed through the embedded system. An embedded key negotiation algorithm such as the DH algorithm is used to generate a shared key for encrypted communication.

Benefits of technology

It enables fast and simple authentication and key negotiation on embedded systems, ensuring the security and privacy of communication while reducing system resource consumption and communication latency.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The invention discloses a wireless communication distributed electric vehicle charging pile equipment node authentication method, relates to the technical field of intelligent charging piles, and provides an equipment node authentication method on the basis of networking communication of traditional wireless communication distributed charging pile equipment, and handshake negotiation only needs three-step processing based on the characteristic of resource shortage of an embedded system. The implementation process is simple, the communication data volume is small, the occupied system resources are small, the processing and communication speed is high, the method can be deployed and used on an embedded system, and the influence on the real-time performance of a node discovery stage is small; simple and effective identity verification and rapid real-time key negotiation between nodes of distributed electric vehicle charging pile equipment based on embedded system wireless communication can be effectively realized.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of intelligent charging piles, and in particular to an identity authentication method between nodes of wireless communication distributed electric vehicle charging pile equipment. Background Art

[0002] Traditional wireless communication distributed electric vehicle charging piles use wireless communication protocols for networking communication. When deployed, devices are temporarily selected for network distribution and networking according to needs. They are more flexible to use, but any device using the same wireless communication protocol can be connected, and the communication process is vulnerable to attacks and data theft. Security cannot be guaranteed, and the privacy of user and manufacturer information cannot be guaranteed. Summary of the invention

[0003] In order to overcome the shortcomings of the above technologies, the present invention provides an identity authentication method between nodes of wireless communication distributed electric vehicle charging pile equipment, which effectively realizes simple and effective identity authentication and fast real-time key negotiation between nodes of wireless communication distributed electric vehicle charging pile equipment based on embedded system.

[0004] The technical solution adopted by the present invention to overcome the technical problems is: A wireless communication distributed electric vehicle charging pile device node identity authentication method includes: S1. Create a security domain, configure the security domain ID and channel in the flash chip of the charging pile device; S2. Configure security configuration information in the security domain, and enable security functions for charging piles in each security domain; S3. During network configuration and each power-on, the host checks the occupancy of the current channel. If the occupancy exceeds the set threshold, it switches to other channels. The slave checks the occupancy of the current channel. If the occupancy exceeds the set threshold, it switches to other channels. S4. When the host detects that the channel occupancy does not exceed the set threshold, the host broadcasts the device number of the slaves in the security domain; S5. The slave parses the broadcast information. When the host security configuration matches the slave security configuration, the slave replies to the host. The host registers and binds to establish a communication connection with the slave. S6. The host sends a command to obtain the cluster public key information. After receiving the public key of the slave, the host verifies the message signature with the slave public key. When the slave public key is legitimate and the signature is verified, the host performs key negotiation and secure handshake with the slave using the existing embedded key negotiation algorithm. S7. The host uses the local private key and the shared public key to calculate the local random number generated by each host using the existing embedded key negotiation algorithm; S8. The host uses the slave public key to call the key pair generation module to generate a pair of temporary keys. The host uses the slave's temporary key, the slave's public key, the host's private key, and the security domain ID to call the key exchange algorithm module to calculate the hash parameters and shared key; S9. The host signs the temporary key with the hash parameter and the host's private key to obtain a symmetric encryption key, and sends the symmetric encryption key to the slave; S10. The slave verifies the signature of the received temporary key. After verification, the slave uses the temporary public key of the host and its own private key and the security domain ID to call the key exchange algorithm module to calculate the hash parameters and shared key, and then compares and verifies with the hash parameters received from the responder to determine whether the key exchange is successful. S11. The host and the slave use a shared key for symmetric encryption and secure encrypted communication.

[0005] Furthermore, the scope of each security domain in step S1 includes a charging pile network that is interconnected and has a channel that is consistent with the security domain ID.

[0006] Furthermore, the security domain ID and channel are configured by RFID card swiping or LORA host computer configuration.

[0007] Furthermore, the security configuration information in step S2 includes the security level and whether secure communication is enabled.

[0008] Furthermore, the above security function is that the charging pile joins the network interconnection after passing the identity authentication, and the charging piles in the security domain have no communication with the charging piles outside the security domain.

[0009] Furthermore, the above security level includes a low security level and a high security level. The low security level is mutual identity authentication between the host and the slave, and the high security level is mutual identity authentication between every two charging piles.

[0010] Furthermore, the above broadcast includes its own domain ID, channel, and security configuration.

[0011] Furthermore, in step S5, the slave machine replies to the host machine with information including the slave machine's device number, domain ID, channel, security configuration, and address in the local network.

[0012] Furthermore, the above embedded key negotiation algorithm is a DH algorithm.

[0013] The beneficial effects of the present invention are: Based on the resource-constrained characteristics of embedded systems, handshake negotiation only requires three steps of processing, the implementation process is simple, the amount of communication data is small, the system resources occupied are small, the processing and communication speeds are fast, it can be deployed and used on embedded systems, and the real-time impact on the node discovery phase is small. It can effectively realize simple and effective identity authentication and fast real-time key negotiation between nodes of distributed electric vehicle charging pile equipment based on embedded system wireless communication. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0014] Figure 1 is a flow chart of the method of the present invention; Figure 2 It is a functional block diagram of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0015] The following is combined with Figure 1 , Attachment Figure 2 The present invention is further described.

[0016] A wireless communication distributed electric vehicle charging pile device node identity authentication method includes: S1. Create a security domain in the flash chip of the charging pile device and configure the security domain ID and channel.

[0017] S2. Configure security configuration information in the security domain, and enable security functions for charging piles in each security domain.

[0018] S3. During network configuration and each power-on, the host checks the occupancy of the current channel. If the occupancy exceeds the set threshold, it switches to other channels. The slave checks the occupancy of the current channel. If the occupancy exceeds the set threshold, it switches to other channels.

[0019] S4. When the host detects that the channel occupancy does not exceed the set threshold, the host broadcasts the slave device number in the security domain.

[0020] S5. The slave parses the broadcast information. When the host security configuration matches the slave security configuration, the slave replies to the host. The host registers and binds to establish a communication connection with the slave.

[0021] S6. The host sends a command to obtain the cluster public key information. After receiving the public key of the slave, the host uses the slave public key to verify the message signature. When the slave public key is legal and the signature is verified, the host performs key negotiation and security handshake with the slave using the existing embedded key negotiation algorithm.

[0022] S7. The hosts use the local private key and the shared public key to calculate the local random numbers generated by each host using the existing embedded key negotiation algorithm.

[0023] S8. The host uses the slave's public key to call the key pair generation module to generate a pair of temporary keys. The host uses the slave's temporary key, the slave's public key, the host's private key, and the security domain ID to call the key exchange algorithm module to calculate the hash parameters and shared key.

[0024] S9. The host signs the temporary key with the hash parameter and the host's private key to obtain a symmetric encryption key, and sends the symmetric encryption key to the slave.

[0025] S10. The slave verifies the signature of the temporary key of the received signature. After the verification is passed, the slave uses the temporary public key of the host and its own private key and the security domain ID to call the key exchange algorithm module to calculate the hash parameters and shared key, and then compares and verifies them with the hash parameters received from the responder to determine whether the key exchange is successful.

[0026] S11. The host and the slave use a shared key for symmetric encryption and secure encrypted communication.

[0027] Using existing security algorithms adapted to embedded systems, embedded software programming is performed in the controller of the embedded charging pile device, and the controller controls the peripheral system to implement functions.

[0028] Create a security domain in the flash chip of the embedded charging pile device, configure the security domain ID, channel, etc. through RFID card swiping or LORA host computer configuration, and create a charging pile key warehouse in the security domain, and create the public key and private key of the charging pile in the key warehouse. The scope of each security domain includes the charging pile network that can be interconnected and interoperable with the channel and domain ID. The charging piles in each security domain must enable the security function and must pass the identity authentication to join the network interconnection. The charging piles in the security domain cannot communicate with the charging piles that are not in the security domain. There are two security levels. The low security level requires mutual identity authentication only between the host and the slave; the high security level requires identity authentication between every two charging piles. The present invention takes the low security level and the LORA communication protocol as an example. When the network is configured and each power-on is started, the host checks the occupancy of the channel and switches to other channels when the occupancy is high. When the host detects that the channel is not occupied by a high proportion, the host broadcasts the slave device number in the security domain. The broadcast includes its own domain ID, channel, security configuration, etc. After the slave verifies whether the security configuration matches its own security configuration, it replies to the host with its own device number, domain ID, channel, security configuration, address in the network, etc. The host registers and binds to establish a communication connection.

[0029] After that, the host sends a command to obtain the public key information of the slave. The host starts to negotiate keys and perform secure handshakes with the slave using the existing embedded key negotiation algorithm. The host calculates the local random numbers generated by each of them using the local private key and the shared public key using the existing embedded key negotiation algorithm (such as adapting and modifying the DH algorithm for the embedded system used, and relying on hardware resources to perform hardware acceleration of the algorithm). After three-way handshake communication, a shared encryption and decryption symmetric key is generated to complete the identity authentication. Subsequently, the host and the slave use the shared symmetric key to perform symmetric encryption and secure encryption communication on the data to ensure the security and privacy of the charging pile data communication.

[0030] After the above three-way handshake communication, a shared encryption and decryption symmetric key is generated to complete key negotiation and identity authentication. After key negotiation and identity authentication are completed, the host and slave use the shared symmetric key to perform symmetrical encryption and secure encryption communication on the data to ensure the security and privacy of the charging pile data communication.

[0031] In one embodiment of the present invention, the scope of each security domain in step S1 includes a charging pile network that is interconnected and has a channel that is consistent with the security domain ID.

[0032] In one embodiment of the present invention, the security domain ID and channel are configured by RFID card swiping or LORA host computer configuration.

[0033] In one embodiment of the present invention, the security configuration information in step S2 includes the security level and whether secure communication is enabled.

[0034] In one embodiment of the present invention, the above-mentioned security function is that the charging pile joins the network interconnection after passing the identity authentication, and the charging piles in the security domain have no communication with the charging piles outside the security domain.

[0035] In one embodiment of the present invention, the above security level includes a low security level and a high security level. The low security level is mutual identity authentication between the host and the slave, and the high security level is mutual identity authentication between every two charging piles.

[0036] In one embodiment of the present invention, the above broadcast includes its own domain ID, channel, and security configuration.

[0037] In one embodiment of the present invention, in step S5, the slave machine replies to the master machine with information including the slave machine's device number, domain ID, channel, security configuration, and address in the local network.

[0038] In one embodiment of the present invention, the embedded key negotiation algorithm is a DH algorithm.

[0039] Finally, it should be noted that the above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the present invention. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the aforementioned embodiments, those skilled in the art can still modify the technical solutions described in the aforementioned embodiments or replace some of the technical features therein by equivalents. Any modification, equivalent replacement, improvement, etc. made within the spirit and principle of the present invention shall be included in the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A wireless communication distributed electric vehicle charging pile device node identity authentication method, characterized in that: include: S1. Create a security domain, configure the security domain ID and channel in the flash chip of the charging pile device; S2. Configure security configuration information in the security domain, and enable security functions for charging piles in each security domain; S3. During network configuration and each power-on, the host checks the occupancy of the current channel. If the occupancy exceeds the set threshold, it switches to other channels. The slave checks the occupancy of the current channel. If the occupancy exceeds the set threshold, it switches to other channels. S4. When the host detects that the channel occupancy does not exceed the set threshold, the host broadcasts the slave device number in the security domain; S5. The slave parses the broadcast information. When the host security configuration matches the slave security configuration, the slave replies to the host. The host registers and binds to establish a communication connection with the slave. S6. The host sends a command to obtain the cluster public key information. After receiving the public key of the slave, the host verifies the message signature with the slave public key. When the slave public key is legitimate and the signature is verified, the host performs key negotiation and secure handshake with the slave using the existing embedded key negotiation algorithm. S7. The host uses the local private key and the shared public key to calculate the local random number generated by each host using the existing embedded key negotiation algorithm; S8. The host uses the slave public key to call the key pair generation module to generate a pair of temporary keys. The host uses the slave's temporary key, the slave's public key, the host's private key, and the security domain ID to call the key exchange algorithm module to calculate the hash parameters and shared key; S9. The host signs the temporary key with the hash parameter and the host's private key, and sends the signature to the slave; S10. The slave verifies the signature of the received temporary key. After verification, the slave uses the temporary public key of the host and its own private key and the security domain ID to call the key exchange algorithm module to calculate the hash parameters and shared key, and then compares and verifies with the hash parameters received from the responder to determine whether the key exchange is successful. S11. A shared key is used between the host and the slave for symmetric encryption and secure encrypted communication.

2. The wireless communication distributed electric vehicle charging pile device node identity authentication method according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step S1, the scope of each security domain includes the charging pile network that can be interconnected and has the same channel as the security domain ID.

3. The wireless communication distributed electric vehicle charging pile device node identity authentication method according to claim 1, characterized in that: Configure the security domain ID and channel by RFID card swiping or LORA host computer configuration.

4. The wireless communication distributed electric vehicle charging pile device node identity authentication method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The security configuration information in step S2 includes the security level and whether secure communication is enabled.

5. The wireless communication distributed electric vehicle charging pile device node identity authentication method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The security function is that the charging pile joins the network interconnection after passing the identity authentication, and the charging piles in the security domain have no communication with the charging piles outside the security domain.

6. The wireless communication distributed electric vehicle charging pile device node identity authentication method according to claim 4, characterized in that: The security level includes a low security level and a high security level. The low security level is mutual identity authentication between the host and the slave, and the high security level is mutual identity authentication between every two charging piles.

7. The wireless communication distributed electric vehicle charging pile device node identity authentication method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The broadcast includes its own domain ID, channel, and security configuration.

8. The wireless communication distributed electric vehicle charging pile device node identity authentication method according to claim 7, characterized in that: In step S5, the slave machine replies to the master machine with information including the slave machine's device number, domain ID, channel, security configuration, and address in the local network.

9. The wireless communication distributed electric vehicle charging pile device node identity authentication method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The embedded key negotiation algorithm is the DH algorithm.

Citation Information

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