X.509-compatible anonymous identity authentication and supervision method on block chain

By adopting anonymous identity authentication and supervision methods compatible with X.509 standards on the blockchain, using middleware to generate zero-knowledge proofs, and combining Merkel tree and accumulator for identity authentication, the problem of large-scale computing overhead and not supporting large-scale certificate registration and revocation in the existing technology is solved, and efficient and secure anonymous identity authentication and certificate management are achieved.

CN119544225AActive Publication Date: 2025-02-28XIDIAN UNIV
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202411610810.9
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-11-12
Publication Date
2025-02-28
Estimated Expiration
2044-11-12

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

When the existing anonymous certificate system builds a zero-knowledge proof system on the blockchain and uses sparse Merkel trees to maintain certificate lists, the calculation overhead is high, and large-scale certificate registration and revocation are not supported. There are also problems with security and standard certificate format compatibility.

Method used

Anonymous identity authentication and supervision method on the blockchain that is compatible with X.509 standards is adopted, and the user generates the first zero knowledge proof based on his own private key and legal certificate calculation middleware, and combines the Merkel tree and accumulator to prove that the ID card identification number is not in the revocation list to generate the second zero knowledge proof.

Benefits of technology

Reduces the zero-knowledge proof overhead of generating proofs that are not on the revocation list, supports large-scale certificate registration and revocation, and ensures system security and compatibility of standard certificate formats.

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Abstract

The invention provides an X.509-compatible anonymous identity authentication and supervision method on a block chain, and the method comprises the steps: calculating a middleware which is legally held by each user side according to a private key of the user side and a legal certificate of the user side, and generating a first zero-knowledge proof; in combination with a Merkel tree and an accumulator, it is proved that the identity card identification number of the server is not in the revocation list of the server to obtain a second zero-knowledge proof, and a plurality of secret values and public values are generated; and sending a request to the service party, providing the first zero-knowledge proof, the second zero-knowledge proof and the public value, performing authentication by the service party, and if the first zero-knowledge proof, the second zero-knowledge proof and the public value pass verification, responding to the request sent by the user party. According to the method, basic privacy guarantee is provided by anonymously accessing various services of a service party by using a standard X.509 specification certificate, and meanwhile, a certification scheme supporting large-scale magnitude certificate revocation is designed, so that the zero-knowledge certification overhead that the generated certification is not in a revocation list is greatly reduced.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application belongs to the field of identity authentication technology, and specifically relates to an anonymous identity authentication and supervision method on a blockchain compatible with X.509. Background Art

[0002] Typically, web users need to prove they are not a robot, are old enough to access age-restricted videos, or are eligible to download e-books from their local public library without being tracked. Anonymous certificates were developed to address these issues.

[0003] Privacy-preserving identification is an apparent contradiction in terms: one cannot wish to identify oneself and remain private at the same time. But it is increasingly necessary on today’s Internet. For example, China imposes age restrictions on access to certain video content, requiring identity verification before access. The tracking and data exposure risks brought about by such requirements can be eliminated through privacy-preserving encryption technology: anonymous certificates allow users to assert that they meet certain access criteria, such as being over 18, without revealing any other information about themselves.

[0004] In the past decade, blockchain has become more popular than centralized systems due to its strong integrity and availability as well as its transparent and permissionless nature. Although permissionless access in blockchain promotes the development of decentralization, in blockchain (or on-chain) applications, it is still necessary to restrict access to users who meet specific access criteria, which involves the above-mentioned identity identification problem of privacy protection, so the development of anonymous certificates is needed to complete the access control of on-chain identities.

[0005] An anonymous certificate system should meet the two most basic characteristics, unlinkability and revocability. Unlinkability ensures that the system will not reveal the connection between the user and the certificate issuing center. Revocability is based on the need to supervise the user's certificates. The certificate issuing center will maintain a certificate revocation list. Certificates that appear in the list are unusable certificates. The certificate presented by the user must not be on the list to be a legal certificate. Most existing anonymous certificate schemes choose to build a zero-knowledge proof system on the chain to complete the certificate issuance and verification work, so as to ensure the unlinkability of the anonymous certificate system. For revocability, most of them use a sparse Merkle tree to maintain a certificate list. The list contains the legal certificates that have been issued. When revoking, you only need to delete the certificate from the sparse Merkle tree.

[0006] However, whether it is building a zero-knowledge proof system on the chain or using a sparse Merkle tree to maintain the certificate list, it requires high computational overhead. In order to reduce the cost of building a zero-knowledge proof system, most solutions will choose to use zero-knowledge proof-friendly cryptographic primitives, such as replacing the standard sha256 hash function with the low-overhead Poseidon hash function, and at the same time customize the certificate format to reduce the amount of data that needs to be proved, thereby reducing the computational overhead. However, this involves two problems: first, the low-overhead hash function has not been proven to be a secure hash function, which will cause the entire system to face security threats; second, customizing the certificate format is not advisable. The industry has a standard certificate format, so the certificates issued by the anonymous certificate system should follow the recognized standard certificate format, namely the X.509 certificate format. The overhead of using a sparse Merkle tree to maintain the certificate list mainly comes from the fact that as the number of issued certificates increases, the size of the tree will become larger and larger, and the computational overhead of each verification of whether the certificate exists in the list will also increase.

[0007] The prior art paper “zk-creds: Flexible Anonymous Credentials from zkSNARKs and Existing Identity Infrastructure” describes an anonymous identity authentication method. The certificate is in the form of a cryptographic commitment, which contains the user's key and the user's attribute information, that is, personal information such as age and gender, and uses a Merkle forest to store issued certificates. The user will generate a cryptographic commitment for his or her personal information. Since this is done independently by the user, it is believed that it can achieve the purpose of protecting the user's privacy. When the certificate issuance center adds the user's cryptographic commitment to the certificate list, that is, the certificate is a node in the Merkle tree, and its path leads to the root node of the tree. The issuer informs the user of the path and believes that the certificate has been issued to the user. In order to solve the problem that the scale of the Merkle tree increases with the number of certificates issued, the paper solution constructs a Merkle forest. Specifically, multiple Merkle trees are constructed to form a forest list. The user needs to simultaneously indicate that the certificate has a path leading to the root node on a certain tree and that the tree exists in the forest list to complete the certificate legitimacy proof. When revocation is involved, the issuing authority removes the path to the corresponding certificate from the Merkle forest.

[0008] In order to reduce the cost of building a zero-knowledge proof system to complete certificate issuance and verification, the existing technology chooses to use zero-knowledge proof-friendly cryptographic primitives, which brings security issues to the entire system. However, if this is not done, there will be a high cost problem of building a zero-knowledge proof system on the chain, and the certificates of the existing schemes do not follow the recognized standard certificate format, namely the X.509 certificate format; secondly, the cost of the certificate revocation scheme of the existing technology will explode with the increase in the number of certificates, and does not support large-scale certificate registration and revocation. Summary of the invention

[0009] In order to solve the above problems existing in the prior art, this application provides an anonymous identity authentication and supervision method on a blockchain compatible with X.509. The technical problem to be solved by this application is achieved through the following technical solutions:

[0010] An anonymous identity authentication and supervision method on a blockchain compatible with X.509 includes:

[0011] S100, each user party calculates the middleware legally held by itself according to its own private key and the legal certificate held by itself, and generates a first zero-knowledge proof using the middleware;

[0012] S200, each user party combines the Merkle tree and the accumulator to prove to the service party that its ID card identification number is not in the service party's revocation list, obtains a second zero-knowledge proof, and generates multiple secret values ​​and public values ​​in the proof process;

[0013] S300, when each user sends a request to the service provider, the user provides the first zero-knowledge proof, the second zero-knowledge proof and the public value to the service provider;

[0014] S400, the service provider verifies the first zero-knowledge proof, the second zero-knowledge proof, and the public value. If all three pass the verification, it is confirmed that the user party holds a legal certificate, and responds to the request sent by the user party.

[0015] Beneficial effects:

[0016] This application provides an anonymous identity authentication and supervision method on a blockchain compatible with X.509. Each user party calculates the middleware that it legally holds based on its own private key and the legal certificate it holds, and uses the middleware to generate a first zero-knowledge proof; each user party combines the Merkle tree and the accumulator to prove to the service party that its ID card identification number is not in the service party's revocation list, obtains the second zero-knowledge proof, and generates multiple secret values ​​and public values ​​in the proof process; when each user party sends a request to the service party, it provides the first zero-knowledge proof, the second zero-knowledge proof and the public value to the service party, and the service party performs authentication. If all three pass the verification, the request sent by the user party is responded to. This application uses standard X.509 specification certificates to anonymously access various services of the service party to provide basic privacy protection. The X.509 specification certificate is a standard format certificate specified by the public key infrastructure and is authoritative. At the same time, this application designs a proof scheme that supports large-scale certificate revocation, which greatly reduces the overhead of generating zero-knowledge proofs that prove that they are not in the revocation list.

[0017] The present application will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0018] Figure 1 This is a system environment diagram for the application of an anonymous identity authentication and supervision method on a blockchain compatible with X.509 provided by this application;

[0019] Figure 2 This is a flowchart of an anonymous identity authentication and supervision method on a blockchain compatible with X.509 provided by this application;

[0020] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the process of combining the Merkle tree with the accumulator provided by this application;

[0021] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the proof process of zero-knowledge proof provided by this application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0022] The present application is further described in detail below in conjunction with specific embodiments, but the implementation methods of the present application are not limited thereto.

[0023] refer to Figure 1, the supervision method of this application involves CA institutions, service providers and users. This application believes that the certificates provided to users should follow the standard certificate format, namely the X.509 certificate format, so the anonymous certificate scheme we proposed is based on the X.509 certificate format; secondly, considering the system security issues, this application believes that the standard sha256 hash function should be used as the cryptographic primitive of the zero-knowledge proof system, so all the places in this application scheme involving the use of hash functions use the standard sha256 hash function; finally, this application proposes a certificate revocation scheme that combines Merkle trees and accumulators to solve the problem that existing schemes do not support large-scale certificate registration and revocation.

[0024] This application aims to provide basic privacy protection for various services of anonymous access service providers using standard X.509 specification certificates, while ensuring efficient system construction and certificate revocation functions.

[0025] Combination Figure 1-Figure 4 , this application provides an anonymous identity authentication and supervision method on a blockchain compatible with X.509, including:

[0026] S100, each user party calculates the middleware legally held by itself according to its own private key and the legal certificate held by itself, and generates a first zero-knowledge proof using the middleware; the first zero-knowledge proof is used to prove that the user party has generated the legal middleware;

[0027] In a specific implementation of the present application, S100 includes:

[0028] S110, each user uses the public key of the issuing agency Signed legal X.509 certificate Cert and the public key The corresponding private key calculates the middleware that it legally holds; the middleware is represented as:

[0029] Hash = Sha256 (id, sk) (1);

[0030] Where id is the serial number field in the X.509 certificate, sk is the user's private key field, and Hash represents the output result of the standard sha256 hash function.

[0031] Considering that the size of a standard X.509 certificate is between 1KB and 4KB, using the standard hash function sha256 to hash it in a zero-knowledge proof environment requires huge computational overhead. This application proposes a middleware concept, that is, extracting important fields that can prove identity from an X.509 certificate in a zero-knowledge proof environment as a middleware for subsequent use of the certificate. This middleware will meet the following two requirements: (1) Extracting fields that can prove identity in a zero-knowledge proof environment, which are strongly bound to the original certificate and do not require high computational overhead. (2) Since the subsequent access service provider will use the service provider's zero-knowledge proof system when anonymously proving that it holds a legitimate certificate, this situation allows the service provider to perform trusted settings for the zero-knowledge proof system; however, when building the middleware, it is impossible to obtain a service provider's zero-knowledge proof system in advance, so the zero-knowledge proof system used when building the middleware must be publicly verifiable, rather than only verifiable by a certain service provider, so as to ensure the availability of the middleware.

[0032] S120, each user generates a first zero-knowledge proof π1 using its own middleware, where the first zero-knowledge proof π1 is expressed as:

[0033]

[0034] Hash = Sha256 (id, sk) (3);

[0035] In the formula, Verify represents the verification function, and True means that the verification result is true.

[0036] In order to ensure that the computing middleware and the X.509 certificate are strongly bound, it is necessary to generate the first zero-knowledge proof π1 to prove the following information: (1) The user holds the public key issued by the public issuing authority. Signed legal X.509 certificate Cert. is public information, and Cert is secret information; (2) the user calculates the middleware Hash = Sha256 (id, sk) according to the process of step S110, where Hash is public information, and sk and id are secret information.

[0037] S200, each user party combines the Merkle tree and the accumulator to prove to the service party that its ID card identification number is not in the service party's revocation list, obtains a second zero-knowledge proof, and generates multiple secret values ​​and public values ​​in the proof process; the second zero-knowledge proof is used to prove that the user party's ID card identification number is not in the service party's revocation list, and the user party legally holds the middleware;

[0038] After completing step S100, the user needs to prove that he has a legal certificate to prove his legal identity when accessing a specific service of the service provider. At this time, it is necessary to show the legal middleware in hand, and at the same time, explain the validity of the middleware in hand according to the revocation list RL of the service provider. This application combines the Merkle tree and the accumulator to construct a solution to prove that the user is not in the revocation list RL.

[0039] As a specific implementation of the present application, S200 includes:

[0040] S210, each user proves to the service provider that his / her id belongs to a certain value range id1 <id<id k , where id1 and id k is the value range of the accumulator v selected by the user, which contains the values ​​from id1 to id k A total of k identity information;

[0041] S220, each user proves to the service provider that although its id value is within the value range of accumulator v, it does not belong to the range from id1 to id k Any one of these k identity information is represented as And obtain multiple secret values ​​and public values;

[0042] As a specific implementation of this application, refer to Figure 3 , S220 includes:

[0043] S221, each user uses the accumulator v to calculate c=g0 c(α) , where α is the private information of the service provider, and the public information that the user can obtain is where g0 is a generator over a finite field chosen by the server, It means that g0 is divided into α, α 2 ,α 3 ,...,α k Perform power operation, v(α) is used to calculate the accumulator v selected by the user, v(α) is a polynomial with respect to the variable α, expressed as v(α) = a k α k +a k-1 α k-1 +...+a1α+a0, where a k ,a k-1 ,...,a1,a0 represent polynomial coefficients, then v=g0 v(α) , c(α) is the quotient obtained by polynomial division of v(α) and (id+α), and d is the remainder obtained by polynomial division of v(α) and (id+α);

[0044] S221, each user selects an accumulator v as a secret value, and randomly selects a random number t as the secret value, and calculates v t =t·v, and v t As a public value;

[0045] S223, each user selects a generator g0 on a finite field selected by the server as a public value, selects d as a secret value, and selects t as a secret value, and calculates And the result g0 dt As a public value;

[0046] S234, each user selects t and c as secret values ​​and calculates c t = t·c, and the result c t As a public value;

[0047] S235, each user uses c, t and the user's certificate serial number id as a secret value to calculate c id·t =id·t·c, and the result c id·t As a public value;

[0048] S236, each user party calculates Prove to the server that although its id value is within the value range of accumulator v, it does not belong to the range from id1 to id k Any of these k identity information.

[0049] S230, each user proves to the service provider that the accumulator v selected by the user is an element of the Merkle tree; wherein the Merkle tree records the information of the entire revocation list RL;

[0050] S240, each user generates a second zero-knowledge proof π2 using the proof process of S210-S230. The second zero-knowledge proof π2 is expressed as:

[0051] id1 <id<id k (4);

[0052] v t =t·v(5);

[0053]

[0054] c t =t·c(7);

[0055] c id·t =id·t·c(8);

[0056] v∈Merkle-Tree(9);

[0057] Hash = Sha256 (id, sk) (10);

[0058] In the formula, Merkle-Tree represents the Merkle tree that stores the serial numbers of all revoked certificates.

[0059] The second zero-knowledge proof π2 proves the following information: (1) the correct calculations were performed as described in steps 4.2.2 to 4.2.5, and (2) the user id exists in a certain value range id1 <id<id k , where id1 and id k It is the accumulator domain selected by the user, that is, the accumulator contains the accumulators from id1 to id k A total of k identity information. (3) The user holds the legal middleware.

[0060] S300, when each user sends a request to the service provider, the user provides the first zero-knowledge proof, the second zero-knowledge proof and the public value to the service provider;

[0061] S400, the service provider verifies the first zero-knowledge proof, the second zero-knowledge proof, and the public value. If all three pass the verification, it is confirmed that the user party holds a legal certificate, and responds to the request sent by the user party.

[0062] As a specific implementation of this application, refer to Figure 4 , S400 includes:

[0063] S410, when the service provider receives the request from the user, it calculates c using its own private information and the received public value αt =c t α;

[0064] Since α is a secret information held by the server, the server can calculate c by itself αt =c t ·α.

[0065] S420, the service provider verifies the first zero-knowledge proof π1, the second zero-knowledge proof π2, and If all three are verified, it is confirmed that the user who sent the request holds a legal certificate, and the request sent by the user is responded to.

[0066] This application proposes a middleware concept, which extracts important fields that can prove identity from X.509 certificates in a zero-knowledge proof environment as middleware for subsequent use of certificates. Since the size of a standard X.509 specification certificate is between 1KB and 4KB, using this idea can greatly reduce the computational overhead of building a zero-knowledge proof system using standard specification certificates.

[0067] This application combines Merkle trees and accumulators to propose a low-overhead proof scheme that supports large-scale certificates that are not on the revocation list. The user proves that the value of his certificate serial number exists in the domain value of a certain accumulator, but is not an element of the accumulator. At the same time, it proves that the accumulator belongs to the Merkle tree that stores all revoked user serial numbers, which can prove that his certificate serial number is not on the revocation list. The accumulator can contain multiple certificate information, and proving that an element does not belong to the accumulator does not require the construction of a zero-knowledge proof system, so the computational overhead of the zero-knowledge proof is only to prove that the accumulator belongs to the Merkle tree. Even if the number of certificates is large, it will not bring a large computational overhead of zero-knowledge proof.

[0068] It is worth noting that the terms "first" and "second" in this application are used for descriptive purposes only and cannot be understood as indicating or implying relative importance or implicitly indicating the number of the indicated technical features. Therefore, the features defined as "first" and "second" may explicitly or implicitly include one or more of the features. In the description of this application, the meaning of "plurality" is two or more, unless otherwise clearly and specifically defined.

[0069] Although the present application is described herein in conjunction with various embodiments, in the process of implementing the claimed application, those skilled in the art may understand and implement other variations of the disclosed embodiments by reviewing the drawings, the disclosure, and the appended claims. In the claims, the word "comprising" does not exclude other components or steps, and "a" or "an" does not exclude a plurality of components or steps.

[0070] The above content is a further detailed description of the present application in combination with specific preferred implementation methods, and it cannot be determined that the specific implementation of the present application is limited to these descriptions. For ordinary technicians in the technical field to which the present application belongs, several simple deductions or substitutions can be made without departing from the concept of the present application, which should be deemed to fall within the scope of protection of the present application.

Claims

1. An anonymous identity authentication and supervision method on a blockchain compatible with X.509, characterized in that: include: S100, each user party calculates the middleware legally held by itself according to its own private key and the legal certificate held by itself, and generates a first zero-knowledge proof using the middleware; S200, each user party combines the Merkle tree and the accumulator to prove to the service party that its ID card identification number is not in the service party's revocation list, obtains a second zero-knowledge proof, and generates multiple secret values ​​and public values ​​in the proof process; S300, when each user sends a request to the service provider, the user provides the first zero-knowledge proof, the second zero-knowledge proof and the public value to the service provider; S400, the service provider verifies the first zero-knowledge proof, the second zero-knowledge proof, and the public value. If all three pass the verification, it is confirmed that the user party holds a legal certificate, and responds to the request sent by the user party.

2. The anonymous identity authentication and supervision method on the X.509-compatible blockchain according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The first zero-knowledge proof is used to prove that the user has generated legal middleware.

3. The anonymous identity authentication and supervision method on the X.509-compatible blockchain according to claim 2 is characterized in that: S100 includes: S110, each user uses the public key of the issuing agency Signed legal X.509 certificate Cert and the public key The corresponding private key calculates the middleware that it legally holds; the middleware is represented as: Hash = Sha256 (id, sk) (1); Where id is the serial number field in the X.509 certificate, sk is the user's private key field, and Hash represents the output result of the standard sha256 hash function. S120, each user generates a first zero-knowledge proof π1 using its own middleware, where the first zero-knowledge proof π1 is expressed as: Hash = Sha256 (id, sk) (3); In the formula, Verify represents the verification function, and True means that the verification result is true.

4. The anonymous identity authentication and supervision method on the X.509-compatible blockchain according to claim 3 is characterized in that: S200 includes: S210, each user proves to the service provider that his / her id belongs to a certain value range id1 <id<id k , where id1 and id k is the value range of the accumulator v selected by the user, which contains the values ​​from id1 to id k A total of k identity information; S220, each user proves to the service provider that although its id value is within the value range of accumulator v, it does not belong to the range from id1 to id k Any one of these k identity information is represented as And obtain multiple secret values ​​and public values; S230, each user proves to the service provider that the accumulator v selected by the user is an element of the Merkle tree; wherein the Merkle tree records the information of the entire revocation list RL; S240, each user generates a second zero-knowledge proof π2 using the proof process of S210-S230.

5. The anonymous identity authentication and supervision method on the X.509-compatible blockchain according to claim 4 is characterized in that: S220 includes: S221, each user uses the accumulator v to calculate c=g0 c(α) , where α is the private information of the service provider, and the public information that the user can obtain is g0 is a generator on a finite field chosen by the server, It means that g0 is divided into α, α 2 ,α 3 ,...,α k Perform power operation, v(α) is used to calculate the accumulator v selected by the user, v(α) is a polynomial with respect to the variable α, expressed as v(α) = a k α k +a k-1 α k-1 +...+a1α+a0, where a k ,a k-1 ,...,a1,a0 represent polynomial coefficients, then v=g0 v(α) , c(α) is the quotient obtained by polynomial division of v(α) and (id+α), and d is the remainder obtained by polynomial division of v(α) and (id+α); S221, each user selects an accumulator v as a secret value, and randomly selects a random number t as the secret value, and calculates v t =t·v, and v t As a public value; S223, each user selects a generator g0 on a finite field selected by the server as a public value, selects d as a secret value, and selects t as a secret value, and calculates And the result g0 dt As a public value; S234, each user selects t and c as secret values ​​and calculates c t = t·c, and the result c t As a public value; S235, each user uses c, t and the user's certificate serial number id as a secret value to calculate c id·t =id·t·c, and the result c id·t As a public value; S236, each user party calculates Prove to the server that although its id value is within the value range of accumulator v, it does not belong to the range from id1 to id k Any of these k identity information.

6. The anonymous identity authentication and supervision method on the X.509-compatible blockchain according to claim 5 is characterized in that: The second zero-knowledge proof is used to prove that the user's ID card identification number is not in the service provider's revocation list and that the user legally holds the middleware.

7. The anonymous identity authentication and supervision method on the X.509-compatible blockchain according to claim 6 is characterized in that: The second zero-knowledge proof π2 is expressed as: id1 <id<id k (4); v t =t·v(5); c t =t·c(7); c id·t =id·t·c(8); v∈Merkle-Tree(9); Hash = Sha256 (id, sk) (10); In the formula, Merkle-Tree represents the Merkle tree that stores the serial numbers of all revoked certificates.

8. The anonymous identity authentication and supervision method on the X.509-compatible blockchain according to claim 7 is characterized in that: S400 includes: S410, when the service provider receives the request from the user, it calculates c using its own private information and the received public value αt =c t α; S420, the service provider verifies the first zero-knowledge proof π1, the second zero-knowledge proof π2, and If all three are verified, it is confirmed that the user who sent the request holds a legal certificate, and the request sent by the user is responded to.

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