An authentication method for encrypted radiometric measurements

Abstract

This invention relates to the field of radiation measurement technology, specifically to an authentication method for encrypted radiation measurement. It addresses the problem that existing technologies lack mechanisms to effectively shield and minimize the disclosure of sensitive information while maintaining identification efficiency, making them unsuitable for application scenarios where privacy protection demands are increasingly prominent. The method includes obtaining irradiation image data of a reference item and a test item, scaling their sizes to N×N, and denoting them as D₁ and D₂ respectively; introducing a key matrix λ; obtaining encryption matrices α₁ and α₂ through matrix multiplication of λ with D₁ and D₂ respectively; obtaining an absolute difference matrix β; obtaining a hash matrix σ; when β(i,j)>μ(i,j), setting σ(i,j) to 1, indicating that at this position, the difference between the reference item and the test item has exceeded the maximum difference, and the difference index increases by 1; when β(i,j)≤μ(i,j), setting σ(i,j) to 0, indicating that there is no difference between the two items at this position; scrambling and reducing the dimension of the hash matrix σ to obtain a hash sequence denoted as F, and using the elements of the hash sequence and H as the final difference index to accurately determine the identity or legitimacy of the test item.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of radiation measurement technology, and in particular to an authentication method for encrypted radiation measurement. Background Technology

[0002] Since the advent of X-rays, X-ray inspection, with its non-contact, penetrating, and imaging characteristics, has become a key technology for non-destructive testing, and its applications continue to expand in fields such as public security inspections, industrial structural assessments, and medical imaging. At the same time, with continuous upgrades in detector performance and imaging algorithms, X-ray imaging capabilities have significantly improved. Images acquired during security checks often reveal the internal morphology and detailed features of the inspected object, thus bringing new privacy and information security risks: on the one hand, the structure and contents of personal belongings may be overexposed; on the other hand, the inspection of sensitive components or special projects may also pose a risk of leakage of critical structural information. Current X-ray inspection processes typically rely on "clear imaging—manual or algorithmic interpretation," lacking mechanisms to effectively shield and minimize the disclosure of sensitive information while maintaining recognition efficiency, making it difficult to adapt to application scenarios where privacy protection demands are increasingly prominent. Summary of the Invention

[0003] In view of this, the purpose of this invention is to propose an authentication method for encrypted radiation measurement, in order to solve the problem that the existing technology lacks a mechanism to effectively shield and minimize the disclosure of sensitive information while meeting the requirements of identification efficiency, and is difficult to adapt to application scenarios where the demand for privacy protection is becoming increasingly prominent.

[0004] Based on the above objectives, this invention provides an authentication method for encrypted radiation measurement, comprising: obtaining irradiation image data of a reference object and a test object respectively, scaling their sizes to N×N, and denoting them as D1 and D2 respectively; introducing a key matrix λ of size N×N containing only the numbers 0 and 1; obtaining encryption matrices α1 and α2 by multiplying λ with matrices D1 and D2 respectively; performing element-wise subtraction at corresponding positions of α1 and α2 and taking the absolute value to obtain an absolute difference matrix β; obtaining 100 counting matrices about the reference object through measurement, matching and subtracting the 100 matrices, and taking the absolute value at each position. The maximum absolute difference is used to form a matrix μ. Then, the absolute difference matrix β is compared element by element with the matrix μ to obtain the hash matrix σ. When β(i,j)>μ(i,j), σ(i,j) is set to 1, indicating that at this position, the difference between the reference item and the item to be tested has exceeded the maximum difference, and the difference index is increased by 1. When β(i,j)≤μ(i,j), σ(i,j) is set to 0, indicating that there is no difference between the two items at this position. The hash matrix σ is scrambled and its dimension reduced in the same way. The resulting hash sequence is denoted as F. The elements of the hash sequence and H are used as the final difference index to accurately determine the identity or legitimacy of the item to be tested.

[0005] As a further improvement to this application, a key matrix λ of size N×N containing only digits 0 and 1 is introduced; encryption matrices α1 and α2 can be obtained by multiplying λ with matrices D1 and D2, respectively, including: αᵢ=λDᵢ,i=1,2; Wherein, Dᵢ is the irradiation image data, i.e., a two-dimensional numerical matrix, which is the X-ray transmission data and neutron activation analysis data obtained through irradiation measurement and contains the structural information of the item; λ is a key matrix containing only the numbers 0 and 1; αᵢ is the encrypted numerical matrix, which is the result of matrix operation between λ and Dᵢ, where i is 1 or 2, representing the irradiation numerical matrices of the reference item and the item to be inspected, respectively.

[0006] As a further improvement to this application, the step of performing element-by-element subtraction and taking the absolute value at the corresponding positions of α1 and α2 to obtain the absolute difference matrix β is as follows: β = |α1 - α2|; β is the absolute difference matrix, which is the result of the element-by-element absolute difference between the encryption matrices of the reference item and the item to be tested.

[0007] As a further improvement to this application, the method involves obtaining 100 counting matrices about the reference item through measurement, matching and subtracting the 100 matrices, and taking the maximum absolute difference at each position to form a matrix μ. Then, the absolute difference matrix β is compared element-wise with matrix μ to obtain a hash matrix σ, specifically: ; Where R is the radiation image data of the reference object, and x is the dependent variable.

[0008] As a further improvement to this application, when β(i,j)>μ(i,j), σ(i,j) is set to 1, indicating that at this position, the difference between the reference item and the item to be tested has exceeded the maximum difference, and the difference index increases by 1; when β(i,j)≤μ(i,j), σ(i,j) is set to 0, indicating that there is no difference between the two items at this position, specifically: .

[0009] As a further improvement to this application, the hash sequence obtained by scrambling and reducing the dimension of the hash matrix σ is denoted as F, and the elements of the hash sequence and H are used as the final difference index to accurately determine the identity or legality of the item to be tested, specifically as follows: ; Where H is the final difference index, arrange is the scrambling and dimensionality reduction, and σ is the hash matrix.

[0010] The beneficial effects of this invention are as follows: This invention proposes an encrypted radiation detection method that, through global image difference analysis, transforms the discriminative features in the radiation image into a secure representation that can be authenticated but is irreversibly restored, thereby enabling rapid verification of the identity or legitimacy of the inspected object and avoiding the leakage of specific sensitive details during the authentication process. This significantly improves the level of privacy protection while ensuring the reliability of identification, and effectively alleviates the security concerns brought about by strong X-ray security checks. Attached Figure Description

[0011] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in this invention or the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only for this invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0012] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of an authentication method for encrypted radiation measurement according to an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0013] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of this invention clearer, the invention will be further described in detail below with reference to specific embodiments.

[0014] It should be noted that, unless otherwise defined, the technical or scientific terms used in this invention should have the ordinary meaning understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which this invention pertains. The terms "first," "second," and similar terms used in this invention do not indicate any order, quantity, or importance, but are merely used to distinguish different components. Terms such as "comprising" or "including" mean that the element or object preceding the word encompasses the elements or objects listed following the word and their equivalents, without excluding other elements or objects. Terms such as "connected" or "linked" are not limited to physical or mechanical connections, but can include electrical connections, whether direct or indirect. Terms such as "upper," "lower," "left," and "right" are used only to indicate relative positional relationships; when the absolute position of the described object changes, the relative positional relationship may also change accordingly.

[0015] like Figure 1 As shown, an authentication method for encrypted radiation measurement includes... Irradiation image data of the reference item and the item to be tested are obtained respectively, and their size is scaled to N×N, and denoted as D1 and D2 respectively; Introduce a key matrix λ of size N×N containing only digits 0 and 1; the encryption matrices α1 and α2 can be obtained by multiplying λ with matrices D1 and D2, respectively, including: αᵢ=λDᵢ,i=1,2; Wherein, Dᵢ is the irradiation image data, i.e., a two-dimensional numerical matrix, which is the X-ray transmission data and neutron activation analysis data obtained through irradiation measurement and contains the structural information of the item; λ is a key matrix containing only the numbers 0 and 1; αᵢ is the encrypted numerical matrix, which is the result of matrix operation between λ and Dᵢ, where i is 1 or 2, representing the irradiation numerical matrices of the reference item and the item to be inspected, respectively.

[0016] The absolute difference matrix β is obtained by subtracting each element from the corresponding positions of α1 and α2 and taking the absolute value; specifically: β = |α1 - α2|; β is the absolute difference matrix, which is the result of the element-by-element absolute difference between the encryption matrices of the reference item and the item to be tested.

[0017] One hundred counting matrices about the reference item are obtained through measurement. These 100 matrices are matched and subtracted from each other, and the maximum absolute difference at each position is used to form a matrix μ. Then, the absolute difference matrix β is compared element-wise with matrix μ to obtain the hash matrix σ; specifically: ; Where R is the radiation image data of the reference object, and x is the dependent variable.

[0018] When β(i,j)>μ(i,j), let σ(i,j) be 1, indicating that at this position, the difference between the reference item and the test item has exceeded the maximum difference, and the difference index increases by 1; when β(i,j)≤μ(i,j), let σ(i,j) be 0, indicating that there is no difference between the two items at this position; specifically: .

[0019] The hash matrix σ is scrambled and reduced in dimension in the same way, resulting in a hash sequence denoted as F. The elements of this hash sequence and H are used as the final difference index to accurately determine the identity or legitimacy of the item being tested. Specifically: ; Where H is the final difference index, arrange is the scrambling and dimensionality reduction, and σ is the hash matrix.

[0020] Those skilled in the art should understand that the discussion of any of the above embodiments is merely exemplary and is not intended to imply that the scope of the invention (including the claims) is limited to these examples; within the framework of the invention, the technical features of the above embodiments or different embodiments can also be combined, the steps can be implemented in any order, and there are many other variations of the different aspects of the invention as described above, which are not provided in the details for the sake of brevity.

[0021] This invention is intended to cover all such substitutions, modifications, and variations that fall within the broad scope of the appended claims. Therefore, any omissions, modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc., made within the spirit and principles of this invention should be included within the scope of protection of this invention.

Claims

1. An authentication method for encrypted radiation measurement, characterized in that, include Irradiation image data of the reference item and the item to be tested are obtained respectively, and their size is scaled to N×N, and denoted as D1 and D2 respectively; Introduce a key matrix λ of size N×N containing only the digits 0 and 1; obtain encryption matrices α1 and α2 by multiplying λ with matrices D1 and D2 respectively; By subtracting each element from the corresponding positions of α1 and α2 and taking the absolute value, the absolute difference matrix β is obtained. One hundred counting matrices about the reference item are obtained by measurement. The 100 matrices are matched and subtracted from each other. The maximum absolute difference at each position is taken to form a matrix μ. Then, the absolute difference matrix β is compared with the matrix μ element by element to obtain the hash matrix σ. When β(i,j)>μ(i,j), let σ(i,j) be 1, indicating that at this position, the difference between the reference item and the test item has exceeded the maximum difference, and the difference index increases by 1; when β(i,j)≤μ(i,j), let σ(i,j) be 0, indicating that there is no difference between the two items at this position. The hash matrix σ is scrambled and reduced in dimension in the same way, and the resulting hash sequence is denoted as F. The elements of the hash sequence and H are used as the final difference index to accurately determine the identity or legitimacy of the item to be tested.

2. The authentication method for encrypted radiation measurement according to claim 1, characterized in that, The process introduces an N×N key matrix λ containing only 0s and 1s; encryption matrices α1 and α2 are obtained by multiplying λ with matrices D1 and D2, respectively, including: αᵢ=λDᵢ,i=1,2; Wherein, Dᵢ is the irradiation image data, i.e., a two-dimensional numerical matrix, which is the X-ray transmission data and neutron activation analysis data obtained through irradiation measurement and contains the structural information of the item. λ is a key matrix containing only the numbers 0 and 1. α is the encrypted numerical matrix, which is the result of matrix operation between λ and Dᵢ, where i is 1 or 2, representing the irradiation numerical matrices of the reference item and the item to be inspected, respectively.

3. The authentication method for encrypted radiation measurement according to claim 1, characterized in that, The absolute difference matrix β is obtained by subtracting each element at the corresponding positions of α1 and α2 and taking the absolute value. β=|α1-α2|； β is the absolute difference matrix, which is the result of the element-by-element absolute difference between the encryption matrices of the reference item and the item to be tested.

4. The authentication method for encrypted radiation measurement according to claim 1, characterized in that, The process involves obtaining 100 counting matrices about the reference item through measurement, matching and subtracting these 100 matrices, and taking the maximum absolute difference at each position to form a matrix μ. Then, the absolute difference matrix β is compared element-wise with matrix μ to obtain the hash matrix σ. Specifically: ； Where R is the radiation image data of the reference object, and x is the dependent variable.

5. The authentication method for encrypted radiation measurement according to claim 1, characterized in that, When β(i,j)>μ(i,j), σ(i,j) is set to 1, indicating that at this position, the difference between the reference item and the test item has exceeded the maximum difference, and the difference index increases by 1; when β(i,j)≤μ(i,j), σ(i,j) is set to 0, indicating that there is no difference between the two items at this position, specifically: 。 6. The authentication method for encrypted radiation measurement according to claim 1, characterized in that, The scrambled and dimension-reduced hash matrix σ yields a hash sequence denoted as F. The elements of this hash sequence and H are used as the final difference index to accurately determine the identity or legitimacy of the item under test. Specifically: ； Where H is the final difference index, arrange is the scrambling and dimensionality reduction, and σ is the hash matrix.

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