Efficient and secure data processing using domain-aware masking
Domain-oriented masking techniques in ICs share circuit resources to enhance security against SCA, reducing costs and size while maintaining cryptographic integrity.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- JP2024535870
- Authority / Receiving Office
- JP · JP
- Patent Type
- Applications
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2023-05-15
- Publication Date
- 2024-12-26
- Estimated Expiration
- 2043-05-15
AI Technical Summary
Existing methods to prevent unauthorized access to integrated circuits (ICs) are costly and spatially difficult, and attackers can exploit side channel analysis (SCA) to extract secret information.
Implement domain-oriented masking techniques that share circuit resources like flip-flops and data between different parts of an IC, using shared flip-flops and random number generation to secure AES S-Boxes, reducing the need for costly entropy generation circuits.
This approach enhances security against SCA while reducing circuit size and cost without compromising cryptographic integrity.
Smart Images

Figure 2024546936000001_ABST
Abstract
Description
[Background technology]
[0001] Electronic devices often contain at least one integrated circuit (IC) that enables various functions. To securely perform some of these functions, the electronic device may store or operate using secret information restricted to certain access levels within the IC. Attackers may attempt to gain unauthorized access to this secret information in order to impair or alter the operation of the IC. However, existing approaches to preventing unauthorized access to ICs are often costly and space challenging. Summary of the Invention
[0002] This specification discloses techniques, devices, and systems for efficient and secure data processing using domain-oriented masking. In an aspect, efficient and secure data processing using domain-oriented masking allows circuit resources (e.g., flip-flops, data) to be shared between different parts of an integrated circuit (IC). Specifically, the input register of a Galois Field (GF) multiplier and the pipeline register in a stage of a substitution box (S-Box) of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) can be implemented to share a single flip-flop. The term "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)" refers to a specification for encryption of electronic data established by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in 2001. Some ICs may use multiple S-Boxes with multiple GF multipliers that are provided with a random number every time the input is updated. In this case, to limit the need for entropy generation circuits, the output from a previous stage of a first S-Box can be provided as a random number to a subsequent stage of a second S-Box. In this way, efficient and secure data processing using domain-oriented masking can reduce circuit cost and circuit size without affecting security.
[0003] An IC is described that includes an AES S-Box. The AES S-Box comprises a first stage including a masked GF multiplier, at least two input registers to the masked GF multiplier, and at least two pipeline registers from the first stage to a second stage of the AES S-Box. A first flip-flop is implemented that is configured to operate with a first pair of registers including a first input register of the at least two input registers to the masked GF multiplier and a first pipeline register of the at least two pipeline registers from the first stage to the second stage. A second flip-flop is also implemented that is configured to operate with a second pair of registers including a second input register of the at least two input registers and a second pipeline register of the at least two pipeline registers.
[0004] Another IC is described that includes at least two AES S-Boxes, where the first AES S-Box includes a front stage that includes a first GF multiplier, where an output of the first GF multiplier is coupled to a random number input of a second GF multiplier in a subsequent stage of a more advanced AES S-Box of the at least two AES S-Boxes.
[0005] Methods of performing cryptographic operations using one or more ICs of the present disclosure are also described.
[0006] This Summary is provided to introduce simplified concepts for implementing efficient and secure data processing using domain-aware masking. The simplified concepts are further described in the Detailed Description below. This Summary is not intended to identify essential features of the claimed subject matter, nor is it intended for use in determining the scope of the claimed subject matter.
[0007] One or more aspects of the described systems and methods for efficient and secure data processing using domain-aware masking are described in detail below. The use of the same reference numbers in different instances in the description and figures indicates similar elements. [Brief description of the drawings]
[0008] [Figure 1A] 1 shows a first-order masked multiplier and a first-order domain-oriented masked multiplier. [Figure 1B] 1 illustrates an example of an operating environment including an electronic device in which domain-aware masking can be used to implement efficient and secure data processing. [Diagram 2] 1 illustrates an exemplary embodiment of an exemplary security circuit that includes multiple circuit components that can be implemented to support aspects of efficient and secure data processing using domain-aware masking. [Diagram 3] 1 illustrates an example of an AES unit that can implement efficient and secure data processing using domain-aware masking, according to one or more aspects. [Figure 4] 1 illustrates an example hardware configuration of an AES Substitution Box (S-Box) in accordance with one or more aspects of efficient and secure data processing using domain-aware masking. [Diagram 5] 1 shows an example hardware configuration of an AES S-Box that includes multiple Galois field multipliers with entropy injection circuitry. [Figure 6] 1 illustrates an example hardware configuration of multiple AES S-Boxes in accordance with one or more aspects of efficient and secure data processing using domain-aware masking. [Figure 7] 1 illustrates an example method for performing a cryptographic operation according to one or more aspects of efficient and secure data processing using domain-aware masking. [Figure 8] 1 illustrates an example of an electronic device capable of implementing one or more aspects of efficient and secure data processing using domain-aware masking. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS
[0009] In general, there are a wide variety of methods that an attacker may use to obtain sensitive information about an IC's cryptographic process. For example, side-channel analysis (SCA) can be used to extract secret assets (e.g., keys) by measuring the power consumption, electromagnetic emissions, padding operations, operation timing, etc. of an IC during operation. In some cases, SCA can be effective because these channels (e.g., the power consumption, electromagnetic emissions, padding operations, or operation timing of an IC) depend on intermediate values created and / or processed by the IC.
[0010] To mitigate SCA, Boolean masking can be implemented to make these channels independent of the true values generated and / or processed by the integrated circuit. In an aspect, Boolean masking is performed by randomizing intermediate values generated during execution of the circuit. In this way, the channels are still data dependent, but can show randomized data rather than the actual true intermediate values, making it impossible for an attacker to determine useful information from SCA. In one example, Boolean masking can be performed on a function. Specifically, a function can be replicated to generate two copies of the function in parallel, each copy of the function operating on either the mask or the mask data. In another embodiment, the two operations can be performed on one function instance by separating the operations in time.
[0011] In either implementation, a mask value (e.g., mask) can be added to the input value and processed by one execution of the function. A separate execution of the function can also process only the mask. After the function returns values for both operations, the outputs of the function (e.g., from the mask and the mask data) can be combined (e.g., summed) to create the true output. In Galois / Finite Field Arithmetic, which is commonly used in cryptographic blocks, this summation operation produces the true output of the function when an input value is provided, since the additive inverse of two elements is the elements themselves. For example, an addition operation can be thought of as a subtraction operation such that an element sums with itself to zero. However, this only works if the function used to process the data is a linear operation.
[0012] If the function is a nonlinear operation, special processing may be required to implement the Boolean mask. Specifically, mixing of the input value with the mask may be required since the mask and input may not be able to be processed separately. From an SCA perspective, processing mixed data may present design challenges and new random numbers may be required to perform remasking. A simple nonlinear masking implementation uses masked AND gates to calculate Aq and Bq from Ax, Ay, Bx, and By. Specifically, A may represent the mask data and B may represent the mask. (As described below with respect to FIG. 4, subscript "x" refers to the input and subscript "y" refers to the output. Subscript q represents the mixed data.) In an embodiment, this implementation can be written arithmetically as Aq+Bq=(Ax+Bx)*(Ay+By). In FIG. 1A, a first-order masked multiplier 10 is shown. In this simple implementation, four AND gates 12 are used as multipliers for input 14. A new random number (Z0) is added (e.g., via XOR gate 16) to the intermediate result in a re-sharing step before recombining the results using the final two XOR gates 18. Since the power consumption still depends on the output value (e.g., Aq+Bq) or the data being processed (e.g., Ax, Ay), certain events during the circuit operation may allow individuals to determine information about the IC via SCA.
[0013] For example, a glitch (e.g., at Bx) can occur in an IC where a signal transient causes the voltage to drop from a high value to a low value (e.g., a bit flips) and then back down. Glitches can occur frequently in digital circuits because many implementations define signals as stable only at the end of a clock cycle. As a result, intermediate changes (e.g., glitches) can occur within each cycle. Often, these glitches can result in a power signature that depends on the true value of the data. For example, a glitch can occur at Bx (e.g., Bx drops from 1 to 0 and then back to 1). As a result of a glitch, the number of gates that switch depends on the values of the other inputs, as shown in Table 1 below for various input values.
[0014] [Table 1]
[0015] From Table 1, we can see that the total number of gates to be flipped depends uniquely on the value of y, such that the number of gates to be flipped determines the value of y or the values of Ay and By, which in turn affects the power signature.
[0016] To minimize the impact of glitches on the power signature, flip-flops and / or registers can be inserted in the functions that control the transient effects of the signal. In FIG. 1A, a first-order domain-oriented masked multiplier 20 is shown. As shown, flip-flops and / or registers 22 may be added to the output of an AND gate that receives Ax and Ay as inputs, and to the output of an AND gate that receives Bx and By as inputs. Flip-flops and / or registers 22 may also be added to the output of an intermediate XOR gate (e.g., XOR gate 16). As a result, a new random number (Z0) is added to the result of the AND gate. Furthermore, by placing these flip-flops and / or registers 22 at specific locations in the circuit, the circuit is transformed from a mask circuit to a domain-oriented mask circuit (e.g., first-order domain-oriented masked multiplier 20). Analysis of the impact of glitches after flip-flops and / or registers 22 are placed in the circuit shows that the glitches do not affect the power signature as it depends on the true value of the data.
[0017] However, for modern circuits, logic synthesis tools may attempt to optimize the design of the circuit to obtain the minimum circuit size, operations, or power required. In this way, the synthesis tool may optimize away essential parts of the circuit that are used to protect against SCA. For example, the synthesis tool may shift flip-flops that are executed after intermediate values are combined, allowing copies of different functions to share the flip-flop, reducing the number of flip-flops required from four to two. While this optimization may produce correct values, it may also introduce side channel leakage, creating power signatures or other channel signatures that depend on the true value in the event of a glitch. To eliminate the ability of the synthesis tool to optimize away SCA protection, it may be necessary to disable circuit optimizations that are automatically performed during synthesis (e.g., the circuit synthesis tool).
[0018] Disabling circuit synthesis tools to prevent security mitigations may prevent the circuit from performing valuable optimizations that reduce circuit size and circuit cost. Therefore, it may be valuable to determine cryptographically secure circuit optimizations that can be implemented in a circuit design that saves cost and space without increasing the risk of successful cryptographic attacks. In aspects, techniques, apparatus, and systems for efficient and secure data processing using domain-oriented masking enable sharing of circuit resources in a cryptographically secure manner.
[0019] To enable the cryptographic functions mentioned above, many ICs incorporate a cryptographic module or cryptographic IC. Some ICs may implement an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) unit that utilizes random numbers to implement security functions through a secure circuit. One example of such a secure circuit is the Substitution Box (S-Box). An S-Box can be used to encrypt / decrypt data or keys used in cryptographic operations. An S-Box can utilize domain-oriented masking to handle sensitive information that, if exposed to an attacker through, for example, SCA, could compromise the IC. Therefore, an S-Box can be improved through cryptographically secure optimizations.
[0020] An S-Box is composed of multiple stages including Galois Field (GF) multipliers. Each GF multiplier can receive multiple inputs (e.g., masks and mask data) from upstream input registers. These input registers can be used to control the release of data to the GF multipliers. Similarly, each stage can include one or more pipeline registers that provide data from the previous stage to the subsequent stage. In some S-Box designs, each of the input and pipeline registers can be coupled to a separate flip-flop that controls the occurrence of glitches in the signal. However, in the techniques, apparatus, and systems for efficient and secure data processing using domain-oriented masking, the input registers and the corresponding pipeline registers may hold the same value, so a shared flip-flop can be used to control the occurrence of glitches in the data released from the registers. In this way, one flip-flop for each pair of input registers and pipeline registers can be removed from the S-Box design, thereby reducing the circuit size and circuit cost.
[0021] Although we have described optimizations within each S-Box above, this technique can also be applied to optimizations between multiple S-Boxes. In general, many AES units contain multiple S-Boxes to complete more complex operations in less time. During execution, the GF multiplier of each S-Box may be required to provide a new random (or pseudorandom) number every time the multiplier input is updated. If this requirement is not followed, the operation of the AES unit may become deterministic and side channel leakage may occur. To meet this requirement, the S-Box usually contains a random number generator and buffer logic to accurately provide entropy to each multiplier, which often requires large and costly circuitry.
[0022] In contrast to these methods, efficient and secure data processing using domain-oriented masking allows the output from a previous stage of a first S-Box to be utilized as a random number for a subsequent stage of a second S-Box. For example, multiple S-Boxes may be communicatively coupled such that data indicative of the masked output or masked data output from the first S-Box may be connected to the random number input of the second S-Box. By linking the output of the previous stage to the input of the next stage, random numbers can be provided by the subsequent stage only when the input to the multiplier is updated in the subsequent stage as required for cryptographically secure operation. In this way, costly random number generation / distribution circuitry can be removed from the S-Box without affecting the cryptographic guarantees.
[0023] It should be noted that these are just a few examples of efficient and secure data processing using domain-oriented masking as described herein; other examples are described below. The present disclosure next describes an example operating environment, followed by an example secure circuit that includes an AES unit and one or more S-Boxes thereof, various techniques for utilizing efficient and secure data processing using domain-oriented masking, and an example electronic device in which efficient and secure data processing using domain-oriented masking can be implemented.
[0024] 1B illustrates an example environment 100 including devices 102 in which aspects of efficient and secure data processing using domain-aware masking can be implemented. The devices 102 may be implemented as any suitable devices (e.g., electronic devices), some of which are shown as a smartphone 102-1, a tablet computer 102-2, a laptop computer 102-3, a game console 102-4, a desktop computer 102-5, a server computer 102-6, a wearable computing device 102-7 (e.g., a smart watch), and a broadband router 102-8 (e.g., a mobile hotspot). Although not shown, the devices 102 may be implemented as any of a mobile station (e.g., a fixed or mobile STA), a mobile communication device, a client device, a user equipment, a mobile phone, an entertainment device, a mobile game console, a personal media device, a media playback device, a health monitoring device, a drone, a camera, an Internet home appliance capable of wireless Internet access and browsing, an IoT device, and / or other types of electronic devices. Device 102 may provide other functionality or may include components or interfaces that are omitted from FIG. 1B for clarity or visual simplicity.
[0025] The device 102 includes an IC 104 that utilizes one or more processors 106 and a computer-readable medium (CRM 108), which may include a memory medium or storage medium. The processor 106 may be implemented as a general-purpose processor (e.g., a multi-core central processing unit (CPU) or application processor (AP)), an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a graphics processing unit (GPU), or a system-on-chip (SoC) integrated with other components of the device 102. The CRM 108 may include any suitable type of memory medium or storage medium, examples of which include read-only memory (ROM), programmable ROM (PROM), random access memory (RAM), dynamic RAM (DRAM), static RAM (SRAM), or flash memory. In the context of this description, the computer-readable medium 108 of the device 102 is implemented as at least one hardware-based or physical storage device that does not include a transitory signal or carrier wave. Applications, firmware, and / or an operating system (not shown) of the device 102 may be implemented on the computer-readable medium 108 as processor-executable instructions and executed by the processor 106 to provide various functions described herein. The computer-readable medium 108 may also store device data 110, such as user data or user media, accessible via the applications, firmware, or operating system of the device 102.
[0026] In this example, the IC 104 includes a security circuit 112. The device 102, the IC 104, or the security circuit 112 may implement a secure cryptographic processor. The security circuit 112 may be implemented using one or more circuit components 114, such as circuit components 114-1 through 114-n. The circuit components 114 may be configured to perform any number of operations to enable functionality of the device 102. Examples of circuit components include a processor and multiple functional components, as illustrated in FIG. 2. The security circuit 112 may be realized, for example, as a protected enclave, a trusted chip platform, a hardware-based Root of Trust (RoT) chip (e.g., a silicon RoT), etc. Regardless of how or where the security circuit 112 is incorporated into the electronic device, the security circuit 112 may resist many types of attacks.
[0027] The security circuit 112 may include one or more AES units 116 that may perform encryption operations for the IC 104. In an aspect, the AES unit 116 may implement one or more S-Boxes 118 that include one or more registers 120. The S-Boxes 118 may be used to perform encryption operations, such as encrypting data and decrypting data. As a non-limiting example, the data may be image data (e.g., captured by a camera or video camera) or audio data (e.g., captured by a microphone). In one example, the S-Boxes 118 may be used to generate a private / public key pair. The public key is transmitted from the device 102 via the transceiver 126 and / or the I / O port 128. Data (e.g., image / audio data) that is encrypted using the public key and received by the device 102 via the transceiver 126 and / or the I / O port 128 may be decrypted using the private key. Alternatively or additionally, data, such as image data or audio data, may be hashed using a private key to generate a hash digest, and the data and hash digest may be transmitted from device 102 via transceiver 126 and / or I / O port 128 so that the hash digest acts as a signature of the data that can be verified by a third party using the public key.
[0028] In another example, the AES unit 116 may perform Boolean masking and remasking operations on data manipulated by the IC 104. The AES unit 116 may handle device secrets used to ensure proper use and performance of the IC 104, such as, for example, encryption keys or other sensitive information. To protect the sensitive information handled by the AES unit 116, cryptographically secure operations may be performed to protect against various attacks that may expose device secrets or information about the IC 104. An example operation of the AES unit 116 is described in further detail with reference to FIG.
[0029] The S-Box 118 or the AES unit 116 may be implemented according to one or more aspects of efficient and secure data processing using domain-oriented masking. These techniques may utilize cryptographically secure optimizations to reduce circuit cost and circuit size without introducing security vulnerabilities. One or more aspects of efficient and secure data processing using domain-oriented masking are described in more detail with reference to Figures 4 to 6.
[0030] As shown, the security circuitry 112 is coupled to an interconnect 122. The interconnect 122 may be implemented using, for example, a bus, a switching fabric, or a bus network that allows the various circuit components to communicate. Each circuit element may be directly or indirectly coupled to the interconnect 122.
[0031] The device 102 may also include a display 124, a transceiver 126, input / output ports (e.g., I / O ports 128), and / or sensors 130. The display 124 may be operatively connected to one of the processors 106 (e.g., a graphics processing unit (GPU)) and configured to graphically display the operating system or applications of the device 102. The transceiver 126 may be configured to enable wired or wireless communication of data (e.g., device data 110) over a wired or wireless network according to any suitable communication protocol. The I / O ports 128 of the device 102 may include universal serial bus (USB) ports, coaxial cable ports, and other serial or parallel connectors (including internal connectors) useful for connecting the device 102 to various components, peripherals, or accessories, such as a keyboard, microphone, camera, etc.
[0032] The device 102 also includes sensors 130 that enable the device 102 to sense various properties, changes, stimuli, or characteristics of the environment in which the device 102 operates. For example, the sensors 130 may include various motion sensors, ambient light sensors, acoustic sensors, capacitance sensors, infrared sensors, temperature sensors, radar sensors, or magnetic sensors. In an embodiment, the sensors 130 may be used to generate entropy for the S-Box 118 or the AES unit 116 in general. Alternatively or additionally, the sensors 130 may enable the device 102 to interact with or accept input from a user, such as by touch sensing or proximity sensing.
[0033] 2 illustrates an exemplary implementation 200 of an exemplary security circuit 112 including a number of circuit components, such as examples of a number of circuit components 114 that may be implemented to support aspects of efficient and secure data processing using domain-oriented masking. As shown, the security circuit 112 includes a processor 106 coupled to an interconnect 122. Each processor 106, a number of memories, and a number of other circuit components 114 may be directly or indirectly coupled to the interconnect 122. In aspects, the components of FIG. 2 may be embodied as a secure computing platform or a secure SoC that implements a RoT and / or other secure cryptographic functions.
[0034] In an exemplary embodiment, the memories may include a read only memory (ROM 202), a static random access memory (SRAM 204), and a flash memory 206. In an embodiment, the ROM 202, the SRAM 204, or the flash memory 206 may be implemented in the security circuit 112 or in a CRM (e.g., the CRM 108). The circuit components 114 may include an alert handler 208, an AES unit 116, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) engine (HMAC engine 210), and a serial peripheral interface (SPI) device (SPI device 212). The circuit components 114 may also include a universal asynchronous receiver / transmitter (UART) unit (UART unit 214), a general purpose input / output (GPIO) interface (GPIO interface 216), a pin multiplexer (pin MUX 218), and a pad controller 220. The plurality of circuit components 114 may further include a random number generator (RNG 222) and a timer 224. Additionally, the circuit components 114 may include any memory, as shown in Figure 2. Although particular examples of memory and other circuit components 114 are shown in Figure 2 or described herein, a given implementation of the security circuit 112 may include more, fewer, and / or different instances of processors, controllers, memories, modules, or peripheral devices (including duplicates thereof).
[0035] The illustrated circuit components may operate synchronously based on one or more clock signals. Although not shown in FIG. 2, the security circuit 112 may include at least one clock generator for generating a clock signal or may include a reset circuit for resetting one or more individual components independently of one another, resetting multiple components jointly, or resetting the entire IC chip. Alternatively, the security circuit 112 may receive at least one clock or reset signal from a source external to the security circuit 112, which may or may not be on a separate chip. One or more separate circuit components 114 may each operate in an individual clock domain. For example, the circuit components may be synchronized to a clock local to the respective component. Components in different clock domains may operate or communicate asynchronously with respect to one another.
[0036] Exemplary implementations of the illustrated circuit components 114 are described below. The processor 106 may be implemented as the "main," "central," or "core" processor of the security circuit 112. The processor 106 may be implemented, by way of example only, with a 32-bit in-order reduced instruction set computing (RISC) core with a multi-stage pipeline. For example, using RISC-V capabilities, the processor may implement M (machine) and U (user) modes. Activating a reset pin (not shown) (e.g., by deassertion of an active-low reset pin) causes the processor 106 to exit reset and begin executing code at a reset vector. The reset vector may begin in ROM 202, thereby enabling that code before jumping to an emulated embedded flash (e-Flash). In other words, it is expected that code will be instantiated in the e-Flash before reset is released. In some cases, the reset of the entire security circuit 112 may be asynchronous active-low according to a compatibility specification to support interoperability between various circuit components. The reset may be generated by the alert handler 208 as a security measure, may be generated by a watchdog timer, etc. A reset signal may also be sent to other circuit components (such as one of the memories or one of the other circuit components 114).
[0037] A debug module 226 (DM) and an interrupt controller 228 (ItC) are coupled to the processor 106 and may be compatible with either of them. The debug module 226 provides debug access to the processor 106. The logic of the debug module 226 interfaces with specific pins of the IC to allow the processor 106 to enter a debug mode and provides the ability to inject code into the device (e.g., by emulating instructions) or memory. The interrupt controller 228 may be located close to the processor 106. The interrupt controller 228 may accept a vector of interrupt sources from within the security circuit 112. The interrupt controller 228 may also assign a level and priority to the interrupt before forwarding it to the processor 106 for processing.
[0038] The processor 106 may provide any desired level of performance or include any internal circuit components. For example, the processor 106 may include at least one arithmetic logic unit (ALU) (e.g., an "extra" ALU to calculate branch targets and remove latency cycles for conditional branches) and multiple pipeline stages. With multiple pipeline stages, the pipeline may perform register write-back to reduce latency cycles from loads and stores and prevent pipeline stalls where the response to a load or store is available the cycle after the request. The processor 106 may implement a single-cycle multiplier or generate an imprecise exception in error response to a store, which allows the processor to continue execution beyond the store without waiting for a response. Although not shown, the processor 106 specifically, or the security circuitry 112 generally, may include an instruction cache that provides single-cycle access times for instructions.
[0039] In the illustrated example 200, the components of the security circuit 112 include or have access to three memory address spaces for instructions and data. The ROM 202 is the target of the processor 106 after it is released from reset. The ROM 202 includes hard-coded instructions to perform a subset of platform checks before checking the next stage code. The next stage code (e.g., a boot loader stored in e-Flash memory) may be the first piece of code that is not hard-coded into the silicon of the device. Therefore, this next stage code is signature checked for integrity to improve security. The ROM 202 can perform this signature check by implementing a Rivest-Shamir-Adleman check (RSA check) algorithm on all of the boot loader contents.
[0040] The flash memory 206 can be implemented as an e-flash memory for storing code. The e-flash can contain the boot loader mentioned herein as well as overlaying operating systems and applications. The SPI device 212 can be used to bulk load the e-flash memory. The debug module 226 can also be used for code loading. The SRAM 204 can act as a scratchpad SRAM available for data storage by the processor 106 (e.g., for stack and heap information). The SRAM 204 can also store code.
[0041] The security circuitry 112 may include circuit components 114, which may be subordinate execution units, coupled to the processor 106 via an interconnect 122. Each of these circuit components 114 may adhere to an interface framework that ensures compatibility with each other and with the processor 106. The compatibility scheme may specify how the processor 106 communicates with a given circuit component (e.g., using the interconnect 122), how the circuit component communicates with the processor 106 (e.g., using interrupts), how the circuit component communicates security events (e.g., using alert indications) to other circuit components such as the alert handler 208, how the circuit component communicates with peripheral devices (e.g., by chip I / O), or a combination thereof. The illustrated circuit components 114 may include circuit components associated with alert-related functions provided by the alert handler 208, associated with the processor 106, associated with one or more memories, associated with the chip I / O, etc. Thus, memories may also include circuit components 114 associated with each other, or other illustrated circuit components.
[0042] The circuit or chip I / O includes a pin MUX 218 and a pad controller 220. The pin MUX 218 provides signaling routes between at least some of the circuit components 114 and available multiplexable I / O nodes of the security circuit 112 (e.g., pins of the chip on which various components are integrated, or interfaces to other parts of the SoC). The pad controller 220 manages the control or pad attributes, such as drive strength, technology, pull-up vs. pull-down, etc., of each circuit component. The pin MUX 218 and the pad controller 220 may themselves be peripheral devices on the interconnect 122. As such, each may have or be associated with at least one register collection that provides software configurability.
[0043] The UART section 214 can implement UART characteristics such as single lane dual UART functionality. Its outputs and inputs can be configured to connect to any circuit I / O via pin MUX 218. The GPIO interface 216 creates G-bit bidirectional communication to external circuitry via pin MUX 218, where G is a positive integer such as 16, 32, or 64. With respect to memory I / O, the SPI device 212 can implement a firmware mode, where the firmware mode can enable the ability of an external driver to send firmware update code to a bank of the flash memory 206 for in-field firmware updates. The firmware mode can include addressing of memory using SPI transactions. Although not shown, the security circuit 112 can include an Inter-Integrated Circuit (I2C) host to enable commands for I2C devices. The commands for I2C devices can include standard mode, full mode, and high-speed mode.
[0044] Also shown are several "core security" components, including an encryption engine and an alert handler 208. The AES unit 116 (e.g., "Encryption IP block 116" of FIG. 2), which may be implemented as described with reference to FIG. 1, may provide various symmetric encryption and decryption functions, such as by using one or more protocols and / or various key sizes, such as 128b, 192b, or 256b. In an aspect, the AES unit 116 may include one or more S-Boxes 118 and their registers 120, according to one or more aspects of secure and efficient data processing using domain-oriented masking. The components may select encryption or decryption of data arriving in, for example, 16-byte amounts, to be encrypted or decrypted using different block cipher operating modes. The AES unit 116 may support Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode, Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode, Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode, Output Feedback (OFB) mode, Counter (CTR) mode, etc. Data transfers may be made available to the processor. For example, keys and data material may be passed to the encryption engine via register writes. Alternatively, it may include a private channel for transferring keys and data material to reduce exposure from potentially untrusted processor activity.
[0045] The HMAC engine 210 can utilize the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) SHA-256 as a hash algorithm, for example. SHA-256 is part of the SHA-2 family of hash algorithms with a digest (or hash output) length of 256b, regardless of the input data size being hashed. After announcing the start of a hash request, data is sent to the HMAC engine 210, which zeroes out the internal state to an initial condition (e.g., 32b at a time). Once the data has been sent by the client component, the client can indicate completion of the hash request (optionally using a partial word last write). In accordance with an exemplary portability interface scheme, the HMAC engine 210 generates a hash result, which is available for read in a register by the requesting client. The data transfer can be made available to the processor or can be kept private to reduce exposure to potentially untrusted processor activity.
[0046] HMAC is a message authentication protocol layered on top of a hash function (e.g., SHA-256) and mixes it with a secret key for encryption. HMAC is the specific application of adding a secret key in a prescribed manner (e.g., twice) to the message hashing (via SHA-256). To provide this functionality, the 256b key can be programmed into the circuitry before the message hashing begins. The timing of authentication completion may vary and may result in longer latencies than when using native SHA-256. Again, the hash information or secret key may be made available to the processor for convenience or processing efficiency, or may be kept private in some fashion to improve security.
[0047] The alert handler 208 is responsible for processing and responding to alerts, such as those provided by other circuit components 114. Alerts can be considered security-critical interrupts that need to be processed in a timely manner to respond to a sensed security threat. Unlike "standard" interrupts, alerts are not handled solely by software running on the processor 106. An alert can trigger a first stage request that is handled by the software as a "normal" interrupt. However, if the software is unable to respond to the interrupt triggered by the alert and remediate appropriately, the alert handler 208 triggers a second stage response. The second stage response can include taking security measures, examples of which include terminating processing, erasing or otherwise removing data, removing power from a circuit portion, or resetting an IC chip or part thereof. This ensures that the underlying problem (the sensed security threat) is addressed even if the processor 106 is busy, unresponsive, or under attack.
[0048] Thus, an alert may be implemented as an elevated interrupt-type signal or alert indication that the alert handler 208 receives from other circuit components and that indicates a potential security threat. In operation, the alert handler 208 may collect alerts from other circuit components 114 of the security circuit 112 and convert them into interrupts that the processor 106 can address. However, if the processor 106 does not clear the interrupt, the alert handler 208 provides a hardware response to address the potential security threat.
[0049] The security circuit 112 may also include a RNG 222. In general, random numbers contribute to security functions by introducing variance at run time and making it impossible for an attacker to predict the right time to launch an attack. For example, random numbers can provide secret material used for identification or encryption. The RNG 222 can be incorporated into algorithmic calculations to hide sensitive data values. In an embodiment, the RNG 222 is utilized in an entropy generation process to provide random (or pseudorandom) numbers to the AES unit 116 (e.g., for masking). In general, the RNG 222 provides better performance as its number generation becomes more and more truly random, and can also be hardened against attacks. Some encryption processes may not require strong randomness assurance.
[0050] The RNG 222 may be implemented as a "true" RNG (TRNG) or with a design having analog portions to exploit some non-deterministic physical event or process. Exemplary TRNG designs rely on metastability, electronic noise, timing variations, thermal noise, quantum variations, etc. The TRNG filters the resulting variable(s) and sends them to an entropy pool that the device can sample at a given time for the current randomization function. In some cases, the interface to the entropy pool may include a read request for available random bits. The TRNG interface indicates the number of bits available, and the requesting circuitry or software may read from this pool within the range of available bits. An interrupt or alert may be triggered if an attempt is made to read an entropy bit that is not available.
[0051] Two other circuit components 114 include a timer 224 and a flash controller (not shown). The latter is described in the next paragraph. The timer 224 can support accurate performance by the processor 106, for example. The timer 224 is made up of multiple bits (e.g., 64 bits) and operates as a free-running timer with a guaranteed frequency within a certain percentage. The timer 224 may enable the circuit component 114 to determine an appropriate time interval for performing an operation. For example, the AES unit 116 can perform various operations according to the timer 224 (e.g., along clock cycles). Another timer (not explicitly shown) can function as a watchdog timer to assist the processor 106 if the processor becomes unresponsive. The unresponsiveness may be due to unresponsive development code, security attacks, etc.
[0052] Although not shown, the flash controller may control the flash memory 206 available for code and data storage. The primary read path for this data may be located within a standard memory address space. However, because flash memory is not written to in a standard manner, writes to that address space may be ignored. Instead, to write to the flash memory 206, software interacts with the flash controller. Flash functions may include three main commands: read, erase, and program. Read commands may be standardized and may use the address space of the chip memory. Erase commands are performed at the page level, with the page size being parameterizable by the flash controller. Upon receiving an erase request, the flash controller erases the contents of the targeted page, forcing the data to a "1" state (e.g., 0xFFFFFFFF per word). Software may then program individual words to any value. Because flash bits never return to a "1" state unless erased again, future contents are effectively changed by ANDing the current contents with the written value. Erase and program commands are relatively slow. Typical erase times are measured in milliseconds, while program times are in the microsecond range. Security is also a concern since sensitive data may be stored in the flash memory 206. Therefore, a degree of memory protection may be provided by the flash controller.
[0053] The security circuit 112 is shown in FIG. 2 with a particular set of circuit components. However, a given security circuit may have more, fewer, or different circuit components. Also, the circuit components may be interconnected or operated differently from the exemplary manner described herein. Furthermore, some circuit components may be omitted while other circuit components are implemented in multiple instances. For example, the alert handler 208 may be duplicated or distributed, or there may be multiple AES units 116 in any security circuit. Furthermore, in cases where the security circuit 112 is an IC chip that forms only one core out of dozens of cores, the GPIO interface 216 may be omitted from the circuit components 114 of the security circuit 112.
[0054] In aspects, any of the circuit components 114 may include a cryptographic processor 230 that performs the cryptographic operations of the component. In some implementations, the cryptographic processor 230 is separate from the processor 106. In other implementations, the cryptographic processor 230 is implemented within the processor 106. Additionally, any of the circuit components 114 may include its own cryptographic processor 230 (or processing core) to perform the particular function of that component.
[0055] 3 illustrates an example of an AES unit 116 that can implement efficient and secure data processing using domain-oriented masking, according to one or more aspects. The AES unit 116 can provide symmetric encryption and decryption using one or more protocols and various key sizes, such as 128b, 192b or 256b. The components can select to encrypt or decrypt data arriving in 16 byte amounts, for example, that is encrypted or decrypted using different block cipher modes of operation.
[0056] In an embodiment, the AES unit 116 includes a PRNG 316 that generates pseudo-random numbers to determine a mask. The mask is mixed with the input data using a Boolean mask to create masked data. The mask data may be multiplexed and stored in the status register 302 and released to the Masked SubBytes 304 at the appropriate time.
[0057] In an embodiment, both the mask data and the mask are multiplexed and stored in a state register. Additionally, if masking is used, the state can include the mask data and the mask. For example, in FIG. 3, this is illustrated by blocks (e.g., State, Integrity Key, Decryption Key 310, ShiftRows 306, MixColumns 308) each having two boxes (e.g., one for the mask data and one for the mask). Masked SubBytes 304 and Masked KeyExpand 314 are single boxes since they process / mix both the mask data and the mask together. In additional embodiments, there may be multiple masks.
[0058] The input data may undergo non-linear operations within the Masked SubBytes 304. The Masked SubBytes 304 may include any number of S-Boxes or GF multipliers to implement domain-oriented masking. In an embodiment, the number of S-Boxes may have a significant impact on SCA resistance, circuit area, number of pseudo-random bits consumed per clock cycle and per S-Box evaluation, and throughput. In an embodiment, the Masked SubBytes 304 may include 16 Masked S-Boxes. During the SubBytes 304 process, bytes of the input data are permuted and shifted to generate a cryptographically secure method of weakening the correlation between the input and output bits. Partial results of one or more S-Box evaluations may be transferred to another S-Box for remasking, as described in more detail in FIG. 6. In some evaluations, a pseudo-random number may be provided by the PRNG 316 to perform the remasking. In general, the SubBytes 304 are implemented such that the circuit operation is SCA resistant.
[0059] Although the AES unit 116 is described in terms of a masked implementation, masking may be disabled when deemed appropriate, for example, when the AES unit 116 is used for random number generation, and thus may include unmasked S-Box implementations when masking is disabled.
[0060] The mask data then passes through a ShiftRows 306 stage where rows of the mask data are shifted during the forward process. In the ShiftRows 306 stage, the rows of the mask data (e.g., state array) are circularly shifted and the byte order of the input data may be scrambled (e.g., using a MUX). The mask data then passes through a MixColumn 308-1 stage where each byte in a column is replaced with a function of all the bytes in the same column (e.g., using an exclusive-or (XOR) gate or a MUX). Encryption / decryption may utilize multiple cycles (or stages) of operation.
[0061] Since the AES unit 116 can provide symmetric encryption and decryption using keys, the full key data can be encrypted using either the initial key or the decryption key 310. The full key can be stored in the full key register 312 to be released to the KeyExpand 314 stage masked at the appropriate time.
[0062] During encryption or decryption, each key may be masked and operated on by multiple S-Boxes and GF multipliers in the masked KeyExpAND 314 stage. Similar to the masked SubBytes 304, the masked KeyExpand 314 stage may be composed of multiple S-Boxes that evaluate in parallel to permute and shift data in a cryptographically secure manner. In some implementations, the masked KeyExpAND 314 stage may perform smaller operations than the masked SubBytes 304, and therefore the masked KeyExpAND 314 stage may use a smaller number of S-Boxes (e.g., four S-Boxes). In this way, the AES unit 116 may include separate S-Box groups, each with a different number of S-Boxes, to efficiently perform operations of different sizes. The different groups of S-Boxes may be separate from each other or may be linked. The S-Box used in the KeyExpAND314 stage may rely on entropy from the PRNG316, perform an initial remasking operation at the beginning of each round, and may forward partial results from previous evaluations of the S-Box for subsequent remasking operations, as described in more detail in Figure 6.
[0063] The resulting output of the masked KeyExpAND 314 stage is provided to a MixColumn 308-2 stage, which performs operations similar to the MixColumn 308-1 stage. The resulting key may then be mixed with the masked data to create the encrypted or decrypted data. The AES unit 116 may rely on multiple cycles of encryption / decryption, and thus the output may be fed back to the status register 302, and the process may be performed iteratively until all stages of the encryption or decryption process are completed. The AES unit 116 may be designed to implement one or more aspects of efficient and secure data processing using domain-oriented masking, which may utilize optimizations of cryptographically secure circuits to reduce the area or cost required to implement the AES unit 116.
[0064] 4 illustrates an example hardware configuration of an S-Box 118-1 in accordance with one or more aspects of efficient and secure data processing using domain-aware masking. In general, S-Boxes are particularly difficult to protect against SCA due to their complexity. As shown, the S-Box 118-1 includes five pipeline stages (Stage 1 402, Stage 2 404, Stage 3 406, Stage 4 408, Stage 5 410). Note that there are other S-Box implementations that may include more or fewer stages. For example, the S-Box may include eight stages.
[0065] At each stage, mask data 412 (A (wires carrying mask data are represented by solid lines)) and mask 414 (B (wires carrying mask are represented by dashed lines)) are input to an operator (in FIG. 4, the subscript “x” indicates input and the subscript “y” indicates output), e.g., GF multiplier 416.
[0066] The GF multiplier 416 is utilized as a complex circuit to perform an operation on the data input to the multiplier from the input register. The GF multiplier 416 may utilize domain-oriented masking to protect the S-Box 118-1 from side-channel leakage. Although not illustrated for simplicity, the GF multiplier 416 may utilize new random numbers (e.g., pseudorandom numbers) to prevent side-channel leakage during evaluation, as described in more detail with respect to FIG. 5.
[0067] While individual input registers are not shown for clarity, it should be noted that S-Box 118-1 may include input registers (examples of registers 120) in front of one or more instances of GF multiplier 416 to store input values until they are released at the appropriate time to GF multiplier 416. The stages may also include pipeline registers (examples of registers 120) that carry data from one pipeline stage to the next.
[0068] The mask data 412 and the mask 414 are linearly mapped by a series of linear operators. In an embodiment, the mask data 412 and the mask 414 are 8-bit inputs, but in other implementations, they may include larger or smaller inputs. As described in the overview, the linearly mapped output may contain temporal glitches (e.g., due to different wire lengths, gate delays, etc.), which may make the data susceptible to SCA. To mitigate this issue and ensure security by controlling the presence of glitches in the signal, flip-flops (not shown) may be placed in front of the input registers 424 (e.g., at least two input registers) and the pipeline registers 422 (e.g., at least two pipeline registers, pipeline register 422-1, pipeline register 422-2, pipeline register 422-3, and pipeline register 422-4) in stage 1 402. The input registers 424 and the pipeline registers 422 may hold the same data. Thus, each pair of an input register 424 and a corresponding pipeline register 422 is coupled to a shared flip-flop, reducing the need to have one flip-flop for each input register 424 and pipeline register 422 pair.
[0069] In stage 1 402, mask data 412 and mask 414 are operated on by GF(24) multiplier 416. Thus, input registers 424 may include four input registers, each with a corresponding pipeline register 422 that holds the same value. Thus, by sharing a flip-flop for each pair of these registers, four flip-flops can be saved without compromising SCA resistance.
[0070] Each stage of the S-Box 118-1 may be initiated on a particular clock cycle. In this manner, the pipeline registers 422 and the output registers (e.g., storing the value output from the GF multiplier 416, which is a scalar operator in stage 1 402) may store data until stage 2 404 begins operation. When stage 2 404 begins operation, data may be released from the output registers and pipeline registers 422 and provided to the stage 2 operator or the stage 2 pipeline registers. Data from the output registers may be passed to the pipeline registers 426 (e.g., pipeline register 426-1, pipeline register 426-2) and input registers 428.
[0071] In some S-Box designs, each of the input registers 248 and the pipeline registers 426 may be coupled to its own flip-flop that removes transient effects of signals passed to the registers. Considering that the input registers 428 (e.g., at least two input registers) and the pipeline registers 426 (e.g., at least two pipeline registers) may store the same value, one flip-flop may be shared for each pair of the pipeline registers 426 and the input registers 428. Specifically, each pair of the input register / pipeline register of the input registers 428 and the pipeline registers 426 may be coupled to a shared flip-flop. In some implementations, the input registers 428 may include four registers and the pipeline registers 426 may include four registers. Thus, four flip-flops may be removed from the S-Box 118-1 of stage 2 404. As discussed above, efficient and secure data processing using domain-oriented masking may reduce the circuit size required to implement the S-Boxes stage 1 402 and stage 2 404. In embodiments, this optimization can reduce the overall circuit area of the S-Box by approximately 10 percent.
[0072] The outputs of the operators in stage 2 may be combined and inverted in stage 3 406. This data may then be provided to a GF multiplier 416 in stage 3 406 in addition to data from pipeline register 426-2. The output of this multiplier may then be provided to a GF multiplier 416 in stage 4 408 along with data passed through the register from pipeline register 422. In stage 5 410, a series of linear operations may be performed on the output of GF multiplier 416 in stage 4 408 that implements an inverse linear map. The inverse linear map may then output a mask data output 418 and a mask output 420.
[0073] 5 illustrates an example hardware configuration of an AES S-Box 118-2 that includes multiple Galois field multipliers with entropy injection circuitry. In an embodiment, six GF multipliers 416 are shown in each stage (e.g., stage 1 402, stage 2 404, stage 3 406, stage 4 408), as described above with respect to FIG. 4. As described above, entropy may be required to perform a remasking process that prevents side channel leakage during evaluation of the GF multipliers 416.
[0074] An entropy injection circuit can be implemented for each GF multiplier 416 to provide new random numbers and avoid SCA leaks. In an embodiment, stage 1 utilizes a GF(24) multiplier 416 that requires 8-bit random numbers. To ensure that side channel leaks do not occur, new random numbers should only be applied in the same cycle that the input is updated. Providing new random numbers without updating the input or updating the input without applying new random numbers can result in side channel leaks.
[0075] The entropy injection circuit transfers entropy to the GF multiplier 416 when the associated multiplier is evaluated so that a new random number is provided only when necessary. If a new random number is not required (e.g., the GF multiplier 416 is not evaluating), the PRNG 316 provides a random number to the register 120, where the random number is buffered until remasking is required. For each input bit, this entropy injection may require two MUXs 502 (e.g., MUXs 502-1 and 502-2) and a register 120 (e.g., including a flip-flop). Across the S-Boxes, a new random number is required at each stage. For example, the second stage requires 4 bits of a new random number, while the third and fourth stages require a total of 8 bits per stage (e.g., 4 bits of a new random number for each of the two GF multipliers 416 within each stage). As a result, this implementation may require extensive circuitry and complex buffer logic to ensure that the GF multipliers 416 are randomly updated only when the associated input is updated.
[0076] FIG. 6 illustrates an example hardware configuration 600 of multiple AES S-Boxes 118 (e.g., S-Box 118-3 and S-Box 118-4) according to one or more aspects of efficient and secure data processing using domain-oriented masking. In an aspect, the S-Boxes 118 can perform operations similar to those described with respect to FIGS. 3-5. The S-Boxes 118 include five stages (e.g., Stage 1 402, Stage 2 404, Stage 3 406, Stage 4 408, and Stage 5 (not shown)). In contrast to the S-Boxes of FIG. 5, the S-Boxes 118 of FIG. 6 are coupled together such that an intermediate result (e.g., either a mask or mask data, but not both) from a previous stage of a first S-Box (e.g., S-Box 118-3) can be used as a random number in a subsequent stage of another S-Box (e.g., S-Box 118-4).
[0077] Connecting the GF multipliers 416 across the S-Boxes 118 can reduce the number of injection random number circuits required to inject new random numbers into the GF multipliers 416 at each stage, thereby reducing the circuit size. Instead of using a separate entropy injection circuit, the intermediate result of the first S-Box can be used as the new random number for the second S-Box. With this technique, only one entropy generation circuit may be needed per S-Box 118 to generate entropy for the GF multipliers 416 in Stage 1 402. For example, after Stage 1 402 is performed, the output of the first S-Box 118-3 of the previous stage can be used to provide entropy to the second S-Box 118-4 of the subsequent stage. This process can be repeated for any number of S-Boxes, with each S-Box providing and / or receiving random numbers from one or more different S-Boxes.
[0078] In some implementations, an S-Box can provide random numbers to multiple S-Boxes. For example, an intermediate result of an S-Box can provide more bits than are needed as a random number in a subsequent stage. In this way, a portion of the intermediate result can be used as a random number in a subsequent stage of a different S-Box and in another subsequent stage of a different S-Box. Alternatively or additionally, multiple S-Boxes in a previous stage can provide random numbers in a subsequent stage, where some of the partial results from each S-Box are combined and used as a random number. For example, a first S-Box and a second S-Box can provide random numbers to multiple GF multipliers 416 of one or more S-Boxes. In an embodiment, the multiple GF multipliers 416 that receive entropy may be in the same S-Box or in different S-Boxes. The first S-Box and the second S-Box can each include a GF multiplier that provides an output that includes a first portion and a second portion (e.g., a proper subset of the bits of the intermediate result).
[0079] In one embodiment, a first portion of the output of a first S-Box (e.g., from a GF multiplier 416 in a previous stage) is combined with a first portion of the output of a second S-Box (e.g., from a GF multiplier 416 in a previous stage) and provided as a random number to one GF multiplier (e.g., in a subsequent stage of a different S-Box) of the multiple GF multipliers 416. Thus, the GF multiplier 416 in the subsequent stage can receive random numbers from multiple S-Boxes 118, multiple GF multipliers 416, or both.
[0080] Similarly, a second portion of the output of the first GF multiplier of the first S-Box may be combined with a second portion of the output of the GF multiplier of the second S-Box and provided to a different GF multiplier of the multiple GF multipliers 416. In this manner, one GF multiplier can provide random numbers to multiple GF multipliers, multiple S-Boxes 118, or both.
[0081] In general, there may be multiple variations of entropy forwarding that provide entropy to or receive entropy from a different number of S-Boxes. In some instances, any of these variations may be appropriate as long as other restrictions are observed, such as only partial (e.g., intermediate) results are used (either mask or mask data, but not both) and entropy is forwarded to another S-Box (e.g., not to a subsequent stage within the same S-Box).
[0082] By providing entropy from a previous stage to a subsequent stage, the buffer logic in the entropy injection can be removed. For example, when the GF multiplier 416 of stage 1 402 of S-Box 118-3 evaluates, the intermediate output can be held in the register 120. Since the output of the intermediate result of the GF multiplier 416 of stage 1 402 is evaluated to indicate the GF multiplier 416 of stage 2 404 of another S-Box 118-4, this value can then be provided as entropy to the GF multiplier 416 of stage 2 404 of a different S-Box 118-4. In this way, new random numbers can be provided to the GF multiplier without the need for additional buffer logic, only when the input to the GF multiplier is updated, if necessary to prevent side channel leakage. This ensures accuracy and stability in applying the random numbers according to the desired clock cycle. This process can be implemented across each stage, with the previous stage providing the random numbers to the subsequent stage, and each S-Box in the group of S-Boxes 118 allowing daisy-chaining, reducing the circuit size.
[0083] To ensure the independence of the new random number, the new random number can be obtained from an S-Box other than the S-Box provided. In an embodiment, this creates independence between the input to the GF multiplier and the random number provided. A partial result from an S-Box can be used as a random number, e.g., mask data or mask, to ensure the independence of the operation from the true value of the data (e.g., the secret or the sum of the mask and the mask data). In fact, this independence can be mathematically proven. However, if both the mask and the mask data are used as random numbers, the provided random number may represent the secret of the operation, resulting in a side channel leak.
[0084] To further ensure security against SCA, higher order masking can be performed. In some implementations, first order masking is used where a single mask is added to the data to create mask data. However, in some implementations, higher order masking can be used. In higher order masking, multiple masks, e.g., n masks, can be added to the data to further enhance security against SCA. In this implementation, additional random numbers may be required to create the additional masks, which may or may not be forwarded from a previous stage as described above.
[0085] When providing random numbers, it can be important to ensure the uniformity of the input random numbers; that is, to ensure the random numbers provided are not statistically biased towards a particular value. To achieve this uniformity, intermediate results (e.g., masks or mask data) can be obtained from S-Boxes separate from the S-Box to which they are provided. Similar to the independence of random numbers, uniformity can be mathematically proven.
[0086] As described, any number of S-Boxes can be connected to provide random numbers to each GF multiplier. Thus, the number of S-Boxes used in each embodiment acts as degrees of freedom to leverage circuit size, computation time, and SCA resistance. For example, S-Boxes 118 are used iteratively, allowing fewer S-Boxes to process data correctly using more iterations (e.g., more computation time). Repeated use of the same S-Boxes 118 reduces SCA resistance because leaks in the system may become more noticeable to an attacker (e.g., due to the repetition or due to a lower noise floor from operating fewer S-Boxes). However, a reduced total number of S-Boxes 118 allows a circuit with a smaller circuit size to be designed, reducing costs. In a design with a larger number of S-Boxes 118, the contribution of more S-Boxes 118 allows the system to operate with a larger noise floor. As a result, effective SCA becomes more difficult, enhancing security.
[0087] This tradeoff allows multiple sets of connected S-Boxes 118 to be implemented in a design, allowing different numbers of S-Boxes 118 to be used based on the characteristics of each calculation. For example, a circuit may include a larger set of 16 connected S-Boxes 118 and a smaller set of 4 connected S-Boxes 118. In an embodiment, the smaller set of S-Boxes 118 may be used for smaller or fewer security integral calculations, and the larger set may be used for larger or more security integral calculations. Because the random number is updated only when the GF multiplier 416 is evaluated, a set of S-Boxes 118 that is too large may not be optimal for some calculations. Thus, using sets of S-Box loops of different sizes allows different calculations to be optimally handled.
[0088] The method 700 is illustrated as a set of blocks specifying operations that may be performed, but are not necessarily limited to the order or combinations shown for performing the operations by the respective blocks. Furthermore, any of one or more operations may be repeated, combined, rearranged, or linked to provide a variety of additional and / or alternative methods. These techniques are not limited to being performed by one entity or multiple entities operating on one device. In some aspects, the operations or actions of the method 700 are implemented or managed by an S-Box, a GF multiplier, or any other component. For clarity, the method is described with reference to the elements of FIG. 1B and / or the entities, components, or configurations described with reference to FIGS. 1-6.
[0089] 7 illustrates an exemplary method 700 for performing cryptographic operations in accordance with one or more aspects of efficient and secure data processing using domain-aware masking, which can reduce the need for entropy generation circuitry and buffer logic, and reduce the circuitry required to implement the S-Box 118.
[0090] At 702, a first GF multiplier (e.g., GF multiplier 416) of a first S-Box (e.g., S-Box 118) is evaluated. For example, a mask 414 and mask data 412 may be provided to the first GF multiplier 416, which are operated on when the multiplier is evaluated. If the first GF multiplier is in stage 1 402 of the first S-Box, the GF multiplier may be provided with entropy from an entropy generation circuit to perform remasking. The first GF multiplier may generate an intermediate result (e.g., mask 414 or mask data 412 after operations have been performed thereon) which may be combined to reveal a secret.
[0091] At 704, the intermediate result of the first S-Box is sent to a second GF multiplier (e.g., GF multiplier 416) of a second S-Box (e.g., S-Box 118). In an embodiment, the register 120 holding the intermediate result of the first S-Box may be coupled to a random number input of the second GF multiplier. The intermediate result of the first S-Box may be sent to the second GF multiplier in a subsequent stage of the second S-Box. In an embodiment, forwarding the intermediate result to a new S-Box after the first GF multiplier in the previous stage is executed may prevent side channel leakage.
[0092] At 706, the intermediate result of the first GF multiplier is received at a second GF multiplier. For example, the intermediate result may be received on the same clock cycle that the input to the second GF multiplier is being updated, thereby reducing the possibility of side channel leakage.
[0093] At 708, the intermediate results of the first GF multiplier may be used as new random numbers for remasking to evaluate the second GF multiplier. The second GF multiplier may evaluate the mask 414 and mask data 412 provided to the second GF multiplier. In an aspect, the intermediate results may be used for remasking after operations are performed on the mask 414 and mask data 412. By using the intermediate results from a previous stage as random numbers for a subsequent stage, costly entropy generation circuitry and buffer logic may be removed from the design of the S-Box 118.
[0094] FIG. 8 illustrates various components of an example electronic device 800 that can implement efficient and secure data processing using domain-oriented masking according to one or more aspects. The electronic device 800 may be implemented as any one or more of a fixed, mobile, standalone or embedded device. It may also be implemented in any form of consumer, computer, portable, user, server, communication, telephone, navigation, gaming, audio, camera, messaging, media playback, and / or other types of electronic device 800, such as a smartphone, shown as device 102 in FIG. 1B. One or more of the illustrated components may be realized as separate components or as components integrated on at least one integrated circuit of the electronic device 800. In general, the various components of the electronic device 800 are coupled via an interconnect 122 and / or one or more fabrics that support communication between the components according to one or more aspects of efficient and secure data processing using domain-oriented masking.
[0095] The electronic device 800 may include one or more communications transceivers 126 to enable wired and / or wireless communication of device data 110, such as, for example, received data, transmitted data, or other information identified herein. Examples of communications transceivers 126 include Near Field Communication (NFC) transceivers, wireless personal area network (PAN) (WPAN) radios conforming to the various IEEE 802.15 (Bluetooth®) standards, wireless local area network (LAN) (WLAN) radios conforming to any of the various IEEE 802.11 (WiFi®) standards, wireless wide area network (WAN) (WWAN) radios for cellular phones (e.g., those conforming to the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP®)), wireless metropolitan area network (MAN) (WMAN) radios conforming to the various IEEE 802.16 (WiMAX®) standards, infrared (IR) transceivers conforming to the Infrared Data Association (IrDA) protocol, and wired local area network (LAN) (WLAN) Ethernet transceivers.
[0096] The electronic device 800 may also include one or more data input ports (e.g., I / O ports 128) through which any type of data, media content, and / or other input may be received. Examples include user selectable inputs, messages, applications, music, television content, recorded video content, and any other type of audio, video, and / or image data received from any content and / or data source, including sensors such as microphones or cameras. The data input ports may include USB ports, coaxial cable ports, fiber optic ports for fiber optic interconnects or cables, and other serial or parallel connectors (including internal connectors) for flash memory, digital video disks (DVDs), compact disks (CDs), and the like. These data input ports may be used to couple the electronic device to components, peripherals, or accessories such as keyboards, microphones, cameras, or other sensors.
[0097] The electronic device 800 of this example includes at least one processor 106 (e.g., any one or more of an application processor, a microprocessor, a digital signal processor (DSP), a controller, etc.), which may include a combined processor and memory system (e.g., implemented as part of an SoC) that processes (e.g., executes) computer-executable instructions to control the operation of the device. The processor 106 may be implemented as an application processor, an embedded controller, a microcontroller, a security processor, an artificial intelligence (AI) accelerator, etc. In general, the processor or processing system may be implemented at least in part in hardware and may include components of integrated circuits or on-chip systems, digital signal processors (DSPs), application specific integrated circuits (ASICs), field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), complex programmable logic devices (CPLDs), and other implementations in silicon and / or other materials.
[0098] Alternatively or additionally, electronic device 800 may be implemented with any one or combination of electronic circuitry, which may include software, hardware, firmware, or fixed logic circuitry implemented in conjunction with processing and control circuitry, generally designated 802 (as electronic circuitry 802). This electronic circuitry 802 may implement executable or hardware-based modules (not shown in FIG. 8), such as by processing / computer-executable instructions stored on a computer-readable medium, logic circuitry, and / or hardware (e.g., FPGAs, etc.).
[0099] In aspects, electronic device 800 includes interconnect 122, which may include any one or more of a system bus, interconnect, crossbar, data transfer system, or other switch fabric coupling various components within the device. The system bus or interconnect may include any one or combination of a variety of bus structures, examples of which include a memory bus or memory controller, a peripheral bus, a parity block, an error correction code (ECC) block, a universal serial bus, and / or a processor bus or local bus utilizing any of a variety of bus architectures.
[0100] The electronic device 800 also includes one or more memory devices 804 that allow for data storage, examples of which include random access memory (RAM), non-volatile memory (e.g., read only memory (ROM), flash memory, erasable programmable read only memory (EPROM), electrically erasable programmable read only memory (EEPROM)), and disk storage devices. Thus, the memory device(s) 804 may be distributed throughout various logical storage levels of the system and among various physical components. The memory device(s) 804 provide a data storage mechanism for storing device data 110, other types of code and / or data, and various device applications 806 (e.g., software applications or programs). For example, an operating system 808 may be maintained as software instructions in the memory device 804 and executed by the processor 106.
[0101] In some implementations, the electronic device 800 also includes an audio and / or video processing system 810 that processes audio data and / or passes audio and video data to an audio system 812 and / or a display system 814 (e.g., a video buffer or a smartphone or camera screen). The audio system 812 and / or the display system 814 may include any device that processes, displays, and / or otherwise renders audio, video, display, and / or image data. The display data and audio signals may be communicated to the audio and / or display components via a radio frequency (RF) link, an S-video link, a high definition multimedia interface (HDMI), a composite video link, a component video link, a digital video interface (DVI), an analog audio connection, a video bus, or other similar communication link, such as a media data port 816. In some implementations, the audio system 812 and / or the display system 814 are external or separate components of the electronic device 800. Alternatively, for example, the display system 814 can be an integrated component of the example electronic device 800, such as part of an integrated touch interface.
[0102] The electronic device 800 of Figure 8 is an exemplary implementation of the apparatus 102 of Figure 1, i.e., an exemplary implementation of a device capable of implementing efficient and secure data processing using domain-oriented masking, as described with reference to Figures 1B to 7. The electronic device 800 can thus include a security circuit 112, which can be a separate IC chip or can be included as part of another IC chip or device, such as the processor 106, the electronic circuit 802 or the memory device 804. Thus, one or more of the illustrated components may be integrated on the same IC chip, such as an SoC, or at least on a single printed circuit board (PCB).
[0103] The security circuit 112 may include an AES unit 116 that performs cryptographically secure operations using encryption or decryption. The AES unit 116 may include any number of S-Boxes or registers thereof in accordance with one or more aspects of the secure and efficient data processing using domain-oriented masking described above. Thus, the principles of efficient and secure data processing using domain-oriented masking as described herein may be implemented by or in conjunction with the electronic device 800 of FIG.
[0104] Although aspects of the above techniques and systems for implementing efficient and secure data processing using domain-oriented masking have been described as applicable to the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), the above techniques and systems may also be applied to any of a variety of other encryption schemes and applications, such as the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) (e.g., SHA-1, SHA-2, SHA-3, Keccak), Authenticated Encryption and Hashing (ASCON), Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA), Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (3DES), Twofish, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), etc.
[0105] Unless the context indicates otherwise, the use of the word "or" herein may be considered as an "inclusive or" or as a term permitting the inclusion or application of one or more items linked by the word "or" (e.g., the phrase "A or B" may be interpreted as permitting only "A", permitting only "B", or permitting both "A" and "B"). Also, as used herein, a phrase referring to "at least one" of a list of items refers to any combination of those items, including single members. For example, "at least one of a, b, c" can cover not only a, b, c, ab, ac, bc, abc, but also any combination containing multiples of the same element (e.g., aa, aaa, aab, aac, abb, acc, bb, bbb, bbc, cc, ccc, or any other order of a, b, c). Additionally, items shown in the accompanying drawings and terms described herein may refer to one or more items or terms, and therefore may refer interchangeably to the singular or plural forms of the items and terms in this description. Although implementations of a secure cryptographic processor have been described in language specific to particular functions and / or methods, the subject matter of the appended claims is not necessarily limited to the specific functions or methods described. Rather, the specific functions and methods are disclosed as exemplary implementations of secure cryptographic operations.
[0106] An example of efficient and secure data processing using domain-aware masking is given below. Example 1: An integrated circuit including an Advanced Encryption Standard substitution box, a first stage including a masked Galois field multiplier, at least two input registers to the masked Galois field multiplier, at least two pipeline registers from the first stage to a second stage of the Advanced Encryption Standard substitution box, a first flip-flop configured to operate with a first pair of registers including a first input register of the at least two input registers to the masked Galois field multiplier and a first pipeline register of the at least two pipeline registers from the first stage to the second stage, and a second flip-flop configured to operate with a second pair of registers including a second input register of the at least two input registers and a second pipeline register of the at least two pipeline registers.
[0107] Example 2: The integrated circuit of example 1, wherein the at least two input registers to the masked Galois field multiplier include four input registers and / or the at least two pipeline registers from the first stage to the second stage of the Advanced Encryption Standard substitution box include four pipeline registers.
[0108] Example 3: The integrated circuit of Example 1, wherein the first stage further includes a third flip-flop configured to operate with a third pair of registers including a third input register of the at least two input registers to the masked Galois field multiplier and a third pipeline register of the at least two pipeline registers from the first stage to the second stage, and / or a fourth flip-flop configured to operate with a fourth pair of registers including a fourth input register of the at least two input registers to the masked Galois field multiplier and a fourth pipeline register of the at least two pipeline registers from the first stage to the second stage.
[0109] Example 4: The integrated circuit of Example 1, wherein the masked Galois field multiplier is a masked first Galois field multiplier and / or the Advanced Encryption Standard substitution box further includes a second stage, the second stage including the masked second Galois field multiplier and at least two input registers to the masked second Galois field multiplier. The second stage may further include at least two pipeline registers from the second stage to a third stage of the Advanced Encryption Standard substitution box, a third input register of the at least two input registers to the masked second Galois field multiplier, a third flip-flop configured to operate with a third pair of registers including the third pipeline register of the at least two pipeline registers from the second stage to the third stage, and a fourth input register of the at least two input registers to the masked second Galois field multiplier and a fourth flip-flop configured to operate with a fourth pair of registers including the fourth input register of the at least two input registers to the masked second Galois field multiplier and a fourth pipeline register of the at least two pipeline registers from the second stage to the third stage.
[0110] Example 5: The integrated circuit of example 4, wherein the at least two input registers to the masked second Galois field multiplier include four input registers and / or the at least two pipeline registers from the second stage to the third stage of the Advanced Encryption Standard permutation box include four pipeline registers.
[0111] Example 6: The integrated circuit of example 4, wherein the Advanced Encryption Standard substitution box further includes a second stage including a fifth flip-flop configured to operate with a fifth pair of registers including a fifth input register of the at least two input registers to the masked second Galois field multiplier and a fifth pipeline register of the at least two pipeline registers from the second stage to the third stage, and / or a sixth flip-flop configured to operate with a sixth pair of registers including a sixth input register of the at least two input registers to the masked second Galois field multiplier and a sixth pipeline register of the at least two pipeline registers from the second stage to the third stage.
[0112] Example 7: The integrated circuit of example 1, wherein the first pair of registers and the second pair of registers store a mask or mask data.
[0113] Example 8: The integrated circuit of example 1, wherein the circuit synthesis tool is disabled for at least a portion of the Advanced Encryption Standard substitution boxes.
[0114] Example 9: An integrated circuit comprising at least two Advanced Encryption Standard substitution boxes, wherein a first Advanced Encryption Standard substitution box of the at least two Advanced Encryption Standard substitution boxes includes a front stage including a first Galois field multiplier, and an output of the first Galois field multiplier is coupled to a random number input of a second Galois field multiplier in a subsequent stage of an additional Advanced Encryption Standard substitution box (e.g., different from the first Advanced Encryption Standard substitution box) of the at least two Advanced Encryption Standard substitution boxes.
[0115] Example 10: The integrated circuit of Example 9, wherein the output of the first Galois field multiplier is further coupled to a random number input of a third Galois field multiplier in a subsequent stage of the additional High Encryption Standard substitution box, or to a random number input of a fourth Galois field multiplier in a subsequent stage of another High Encryption Standard substitution box of the at least two High Encryption Standard substitution boxes, the other High Encryption Standard substitution box being different from the additional High Encryption Standard substitution box.
[0116] Example 11: The integrated circuit of Example 10, wherein a first portion of the output of the first Galois field multiplier is coupled to a random number input of a second Galois field multiplier, the first portion of the output having a smaller number of bits than the output, and / or a second portion of the output of the first Galois field multiplier is coupled to a random number input of a third Galois field multiplier, the second portion of the output having a smaller number of bits than the output.
[0117] Example 12: The integrated circuit of Example 11, wherein the output of the first Galois field multiplier is the first output, and the front stage of the first Advanced Encryption Standard substitution box further includes a fifth Galois field multiplier having a second output, wherein a third portion of the second output of the fifth Galois field multiplier is coupled to a random number input of the second Galois field multiplier, the third portion of the second output having a fewer number of bits than the second output, and / or a fourth portion of the second output of the fifth Galois field multiplier is coupled to a random number input of the third Galois field multiplier, and the fourth portion of the second output has a fewer number of bits than the second output.
[0118] Example 13: The integrated circuit of Example 9, wherein the output from the first Galois field multiplier includes a partial result of the first Galois field multiplier, the partial result including at least a portion of a mask or mask data.
[0119] Example 14: The integrated circuit of Example 9, wherein the at least two Advanced Encryption Standard substitution boxes are a first set of Advanced Encryption Standard substitution boxes, and the integrated circuit further includes a second set of Advanced Encryption Standard substitution boxes including at least two different Advanced Encryption Standard substitution boxes, and a second Advanced Encryption Standard substitution box of the at least two different Advanced Encryption Standard substitution boxes includes a previous stage including a masked sixth Galois field multiplier, and an output of the sixth Galois field multiplier is coupled to a random number input of a seventh Galois field multiplier in a subsequent stage of the additional Advanced Encryption Standard substitution box of the at least two different Advanced Encryption Standard substitution boxes.
[0120] Example 15: The integrated circuit of example 14, wherein the first set of Advanced Encryption Standard substitution boxes and the second set of Advanced Encryption Standard substitution boxes include different numbers of Advanced Encryption Standard substitution boxes.
[0121] Example 16: A method of performing a secure cryptographic operation using the integrated circuit of any one of Examples 1 to 15. For example, the method may include evaluating a first GF multiplier (e.g., GF multiplier 416) in a first S-Box (e.g., S-Box 118), sending an intermediate result of the first S-Box to a second GF multiplier (e.g., GF multiplier 416) in a second S-Box (e.g., S-Box 118), receiving the intermediate result of the first GF multiplier at the second GF multiplier, and evaluating the second GF multiplier using the intermediate result of the first GF multiplier as a new random number for remasking. As another example, the method may include operating, by a first flip-flop, on a first pair of registers including a first input register of at least two input registers to a masked Galois field multiplier included in a first stage of an Advanced Encryption Standard substitution box and a first pipeline register of at least two pipeline registers from the first stage to a second stage of the Advanced Encryption Standard substitution box, and operating, by a second flip-flop, on a second pair of registers including a second input register of the at least two input registers and a second pipeline register of the at least two pipeline registers. Each flip-flop may, for example, operate on a respective input register and pipeline register to control the occurrence of glitches (transient voltage changes) in the signal.
[0122] Although aspects of the described apparatus, systems, and methods for implementing efficient and secure data processing using domain-oriented masking have been described in function- and / or method-specific language, the subject matter of the appended claims is not necessarily limited to the specific functions or methods described. Rather, the specific functions and methods are disclosed as exemplary implementations of efficient and secure data processing using domain-oriented masking, and other equivalent functions and methods are intended to be within the scope of the appended claims. Furthermore, various aspects of efficient and secure data processing using domain-oriented masking have been described, with it being understood that each described aspect can be implemented independently or in conjunction with one or more other described aspects.
Claims
1. 1. An integrated circuit comprising an Advanced Encryption Standard (AESS) permutation box, comprising: a masked Galois field multiplier; at least two input registers to the masked Galois field multiplier; at least two pipeline registers from the first stage to the second stage of the Advanced Encryption Standard substitution box; a first flip-flop configured to operate with a first pair of registers including a first input register of the at least two input registers to the masked Galois field multiplier and a first pipeline register of the at least two pipeline registers from the first stage to the second stage; the first stage including a second input register of the at least two input registers and a second flip-flop configured to operate with a second pair of registers including a second pipeline register of the at least two pipeline registers.
2. the at least two input registers to the masked Galois field multiplier include four input registers; 2. The integrated circuit of claim 1, wherein the at least two pipeline registers from the first stage to the second stage of the Advanced Encryption Standard substitution box include four pipeline registers.
3. The first stage is a third flip-flop configured to operate with a third pair of registers including a third input register of the at least two input registers to the masked Galois field multiplier and a third pipeline register of the at least two pipeline registers from the first stage to the second stage; 3. The integrated circuit of claim 2, further comprising: a fourth input register of the at least two input registers to the masked Galois field multiplier; and a fourth flip-flop configured to operate on a fourth pair of registers including a fourth input register of the at least two input registers to the masked Galois field multiplier and a fourth pipeline register of the at least two pipeline registers from the first stage to the second stage.
4. the masked Galois field multiplier is a first masked Galois field multiplier; The Advanced Encryption Standard substitution box is a masked second Galois field multiplier; at least two input registers to the masked second Galois field multiplier; at least two pipeline registers from the second stage to the third stage of the Advanced Encryption Standard substitution box; a third flip-flop configured to operate with a third pair of registers including a third input register of the at least two input registers to the masked second Galois field multiplier and a third pipeline register of the at least two pipeline registers from the second stage to the third stage; 2. The integrated circuit of claim 1, further comprising: a fourth input register of the at least two input registers to the masked second Galois field multiplier; and a fourth flip-flop configured to operate on a fourth pair of registers including a fourth input register of the at least two input registers to the masked second Galois field multiplier and a fourth pipeline register of the at least two pipeline registers from the second stage to the third stage.
5. the at least two input registers to the masked second Galois field multiplier include four input registers; 5. The integrated circuit of claim 4, wherein the at least two pipeline registers from the second stage to the third stage of the Advanced Encryption Standard substitution box include four pipeline registers.
6. The Advanced Encryption Standard substitution box is a fifth flip-flop configured to operate with a fifth pair of registers including a fifth input register of the at least two input registers to the masked second Galois field multiplier and a fifth pipeline register of the at least two pipeline registers from the second stage to the third stage; 5. The integrated circuit of claim 4, further comprising: the second stage including a sixth input register of the at least two input registers to the masked second Galois field multiplier; and a sixth flip-flop configured to operate with a sixth pair of registers including a sixth input register of the at least two input registers to the masked second Galois field multiplier and a sixth pipeline register of the at least two pipeline registers from the second stage to the third stage.
7. 2. The integrated circuit of claim 1, wherein the first pair of registers and the second pair of registers store a mask or mask data.
8. The integrated circuit of claim 1 , wherein a circuit synthesis tool is disabled for at least a portion of the Advanced Encryption Standard substitution boxes.
9. 1. An integrated circuit comprising: At least two Advanced Encryption Standard (AESS) substitution boxes, the first Advanced Encryption Standard (AESS) substitution box comprising:
1. An integrated circuit comprising: a front stage including a first Galois field multiplier, an output of the first Galois field multiplier coupled to a random number input of a second Galois field multiplier in a subsequent stage of an additional Advanced Encryption Standard permutation box of the at least two Advanced Encryption Standard permutation boxes.
10. The output of the first Galois field multiplier is to a random number input of a third Galois field multiplier in the subsequent stage of the additional Advanced Encryption Standard permutation box; or 10. The integrated circuit of claim 9, further coupled to a random number input of a fourth Galois field multiplier in the subsequent stage of another of the at least two High Encryption Standard substitution boxes, the other High Encryption Standard substitution box being different from the additional High Encryption Standard substitution box.
11. a first portion of the output of the first Galois field multiplier is coupled to the random number input of the second Galois field multiplier, the first portion of the output having fewer bits than the output; 11. The integrated circuit of claim 10, wherein a second portion of the output of the first Galois field multiplier is coupled to the random number input of the third Galois field multiplier, the second portion of the output having fewer bits than the output.
12. the output of the first Galois field multiplier is a first output; the front stage of the first Advanced Encryption Standard substitution box further includes a fifth Galois field multiplier having a second output; a third portion of the second output of the fifth Galois field multiplier is coupled to the random number input of the second Galois field multiplier, the third portion of the second output having a smaller number of bits than the second output; 12. The integrated circuit of claim 11 , wherein a fourth portion of the second output of the fifth Galois field multiplier is coupled to the random number input of the third Galois field multiplier, the fourth portion of the second output having a fewer number of bits than the second output.
13. 10. The integrated circuit of claim 9, wherein the output from the first Galois field multiplier comprises a partial result of the first Galois field multiplier, the partial result comprising at least a portion of a mask or mask data.
14. the at least two Advanced Encryption Standard substitution boxes are a first set of Advanced Encryption Standard substitution boxes; The integrated circuit comprises: and a second set of Advanced Encryption Standard substitution boxes including at least two different Advanced Encryption Standard substitution boxes, the second Advanced Encryption Standard substitution box of the at least two different Advanced Encryption Standard substitution boxes comprising:
10. The integrated circuit of claim 9, further comprising a previous stage including a masked sixth Galois field multiplier, an output of the sixth Galois field multiplier being coupled to a random number input of a seventh Galois field multiplier in a subsequent stage of an additional Advanced Encryption Standard permutation box of the at least two different Advanced Encryption Standard permutation boxes.
15. 15. The integrated circuit of claim 14, wherein the first set of Advanced Encryption Standard substitution boxes and the second set of Advanced Encryption Standard substitution boxes include different numbers of Advanced Encryption Standard substitution boxes.
16. A method of performing a secure cryptographic operation using the integrated circuit of any one of claims 1 to 15.
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