A quantum voting system based on quantum homomorphic signature
Through a quantum voting system based on quantum homomorphic signatures, using GHZ entangled state and quantum key distribution, the problems of insufficient security and high resource consumption in the existing technology are solved, and the security verification and fairness of multiple voting sub-information are achieved. , improves the practicality and efficiency of the system.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN201910090005.0
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2019-01-30
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-22
- Estimated Expiration
- 2039-01-30
AI Technical Summary
The existing quantum voting systems have problems such as insufficient security, high resource consumption, and inability to widely use, especially since most solutions are only targeted at one voter and lack signature verification of their work by multiple roles.
Using a quantum voting system based on quantum homomorphic signatures, the identity verification and voting information of voters, vote counters and vote monitors can be realized through GHZ entangled states and quantum key distribution, and the properties of quantum states are used for safe transmission and verification. Eavesdropping detection and aggregation of signatures to ensure the security and impartiality of the voting process.
The aggregation signature and verification of multiple voting sub-information is realized, ensuring the reliability of each link, preventing duplicate voting, ensuring the unconditional security and fairness of the voting process, and improving the practicality and efficiency of the system.
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Figure CN109816844B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The invention relates to a quantum voting system, in particular to a quantum voting system based on quantum homomorphic signature. Background Art
[0002] With the rapid development of information processing technology and the popularization of the Internet, traditional voting methods have been gradually replaced by a new form of voting - electronic voting. Electronic voting can not only motivate voters to vote, but also reduce resource consumption, such as manpower, financial resources and material resources, greatly improving efficiency. The first concept of electronic voting in the cryptographic sense was first proposed by Chaum. The protocol uses the public key cryptography system to encrypt information. However, the security of the electronic voting protocol based on classical signatures is mainly based on the assumption of computational complexity and cannot be proved to be unconditionally secure. As the computing power of attackers continues to increase, these algorithms or protocols will gradually become unsafe. Fortunately, quantum cryptography has begun to attract attention because it can make up for this defect, because the security of quantum cryptography technology is based on the physical properties of quantum states rather than computational complexity. For example, the quantum key distribution protocol BB84 and B92 have been strictly proven to be unconditionally secure.
[0003] In 2005, Vaccaro et al. first proposed the concept of quantum voting, and then Hillery proposed two voting methods: mobile voting and distributed voting to make up for the lack of security in the classical scheme. In 2006, Dolev et al. proposed a voting scheme that does not require quantum measurement. The election results in this scheme can be read directly from the ground state without complex measurements, but the protocol cannot detect the problem of repeated voting by voters. Once some voters have cheating behaviors such as repeated voting, the election may be disrupted. In 2008, Li Yuan proposed a mobile anonymous voting scheme based on entangled states based on Hillery. Two entangled particles are prepared in the scheme, and voting is completed by operating the particles. In 2010, Xu made improvements on efficiency and security based on Vaccaro. This voting scheme is based on phase shift operations, the voting function is relatively simple, and the counting party knows the final voting results, and there is no vote monitoring party to verify it. In 2016, Cao et al. proposed a voting scheme using quantum proxy signatures. Voters can convert their voting content into quantum information, which expands the function of voting. However, it consumes a lot of resources and cannot be widely used in practice. In addition, there are two major shortcomings in the existing quantum voting schemes: 1. Most quantum voting schemes only target one voter at a time, which affects the practicality and efficiency of the quantum voting system. 2. In actual situations, we often hope that each role in the voting system can be responsible for their own work, that is, to sign, while most existing schemes only include the signature of the voting management agency CA. Summary of the invention
[0004] In view of the defects or shortcomings of the prior art, the object of the present invention is to provide a quantum voting system based on quantum homomorphic signature.
[0005] The system provided by the present invention includes n voters, a voting management agency, a vote counter, a vote monitor, and a classical quantum fusion channel; the n voters, the voting management agency, the vote counter, the vote monitor, and the classical quantum fusion channel are used to realize the following functions:
[0006] (1) The voting management agency prepares multiple extended GHZ entangled states containing n+1 particles (hereinafter referred to as GHZ entangled states). The voting management agency keeps the n+1th particle in each GHZ entangled state for itself, generating a particle sequence L CA , distribute the first n particles of each GHZ entangled state to each voter, generating a sequence of n particles
[0007] For any sequence Before distribution, the voting management agency generates a set of non-orthogonal particles, each of which is randomly in one of the four states |0>, |1>, |+> and |->. The voting management agency inserts these non-orthogonal particles into The random position of the voting management agency CA and any voter Alice i Joint detection of eavesdropping, i = 1, ..., n;
[0008] If there is eavesdropping, then Alice i The obtained particles are discarded and the voting management agency redistributes them; if there is no eavesdropping, Alice i Generate and distribute shared quantum keys with vote scrutineers The vote monitor and the voting management agency generate and distribute the shared key K C,C ;
[0009] (2) The voting management agency issues quantum key strings as quantum identity IDs to the n voters, vote counters, and vote monitors for identity verification of the voters, vote counters, and vote monitors;
[0010] Any voter Alice i , the vote counter and the vote monitor send their identity information quantum ID to the voting management agency, and then the voting management agency CA determines whether the quantum ID of each party is qualified and determines whether Alice i Whether eligible to vote, i=1,…,n;
[0011] If Alice is unqualified or ineligible to vote, the voting management agency CA will refuse to issue the ticket; if Alice is qualified and eligible to vote, the CA will issue the ticket to the legitimate voter Alice.i Register to vote and randomly assign the voter a unique ballot ID;
[0012] (3) Voter Alice i Share your voting information with the shared key Perform a direct sum operation to complete the blinding operation of the voting sub-information; voter Alice i The blinded voting sub-information is encoded in its own entangled particle sequence through unitary transformation. On the new particle sequence The new particle sequence is voter Alice i The quantum signature particle, i = 1,…,n;
[0013] Particle Sequence Alice i Generate a set of non-orthogonal particles, each particle is randomly in one of the four states |0>, |1>, |+> and |->, Alice i Alice inserts these non-orthogonal particles into the random positions of their respective quantum signature particles. i The blinded voting sub-information and the quantum signature particles with non-orthogonal particles are transmitted to the vote counter through the classical quantum fusion channel; at the same time, Alice i to work with the vote counters to detect wiretaps;
[0014] If there is eavesdropping, the vote counter discards the obtained particles and re-executes the voting process from (1); if there is no eavesdropping, the information obtained by the vote counter is valid and the voting system continues to run;
[0015] (4) The voting management agency determines the particle sequence L CA Each particle in the unitary operation is performed, and the particle order after the operation is L′ CA For the voting management body to Alice i Quantum blind signature of the voting process, i = 1,…,n;
[0016] The voting management agency generates a set of non-orthogonal particles, each of which is randomly in one of the four states |0>, |1>, |+> and |->. The voting management agency inserts these non-orthogonal particles into the particle sequence L′ CA At a random position, the voting management agency transmits the quantum blind signature with non-orthogonal particles to the vote counter through a classical quantum fusion channel, and the voting management agency and the vote counter jointly detect eavesdropping;
[0017] If there is eavesdropping, the vote counter discards the previously obtained particles and re-executes the voting process from (1); if there is no eavesdropping, the information obtained by the vote counter is valid and the voting system continues to run;
[0018] (5) The vote counter receives the vote from Alice i After all the particles of the quantum signature of the vote counter and the quantum blind signature of the voting management agency CA are sequenced, the vote counter's voting information is aggregated and signed, and the aggregate signature and the encrypted voting aggregate information are transmitted to the vote monitor through the classical quantum fusion channel; before transmitting the aggregate signature particles, the vote counter generates a group of non-orthogonal particles, each particle is randomly in one of the four states |0>, |1>, |+> and |->. The vote counter inserts these non-orthogonal particles into the aggregate signature particles to be transmitted, and jointly detects eavesdropping with the vote monitor using their own quantum measurement devices;
[0019] If there is eavesdropping, the vote monitor discards the previously obtained particles and the vote counter regenerates the aggregate signature particles; when the vote counter and the vote monitor believe that there is no eavesdropping in the channel, the vote monitor uses the received particles to verify the aggregate information signature and announces the aggregate voting results of all n voters.
[0020] Furthermore, the n voters, voting management agency, vote counters, vote monitors and classical quantum fusion channels in the voting system of the present invention are used to implement the following steps:
[0021] Step 1: The voting management agency prepares N GHZ entangled states containing n+1 particles. CA retains the n+1th particle in each GHZ and obtains the particle sequence L CA =(P1(n+1),P2(n+1),...,P N (n+1)), distribute the first n particles of each GHZ entangled state to each voter Alice i (i=1,…,n), generate n particle sequences
[0022] Before distribution, for any sequence The voting management agency generates a set of non-orthogonal particles, each of which is randomly in one of the four states |0>, |1>, |+>, |->, and then inserts these particles into The n new particle sequences obtained by CA are recorded as And send to each voter;
[0023] CA and voter Alice i Together with the detection of eavesdropping, CA declares the position and basis information of the inserted non-orthogonal particles (B Z ={|Z0>,|Z1>}={|0>,|1>} or B x ={|X0>,|X1>}={|+x>,|-x>}),Alice i from Select these non-orthogonal particles and measure them with the corresponding basis, i = 1, ..., n;
[0024] CA compares the measurement results of the non-orthogonal particles he inserted with Alice's i The measurement results of the particles at the corresponding positions are used to detect eavesdropping; if the error rate is less than the set threshold δ, the channel is considered to be secure and there is no eavesdropping attack;
[0025] Step 2. Voter Alice i Share quantum key with Charlie, the vote watcher The quantum key K is shared between Charlie, the poll watcher, and CA, the voting management agency. C,C ;
[0026] Step 3. Voter Alice i Send your identity information to the ballot management center, and the CA will use zero-knowledge quantum identity authentication to authenticate Alice. i The CA determines whether Alice is eligible to vote. If not, the invoice is rejected. If Alice is eligible to vote, the CA i Register to vote and randomly assign a unique ballot ID to the voter, and each ballot ID is known only to the corresponding voter;
[0027] Step 4: n voters internally perform arbitrary direct and decomposition of their N bits of voting information m, so that each voter Alice i Holds N bits of voting information satisfy
[0028] Voter Alice i Share your voting information with the shared key Perform a direct sum operation to complete the blinding operation of the voting sub-information. Voter Alice i according to For its possession All particles in the same way are unitary:
[0029] like If the jth position of is 1, then The jth particle implements Z(σ Z )’s unitary transformation operation;
[0030] like The jth position of is 0, then The j-th particle of implements the unitary transformation operation of I, where j = 1, 2, ..., N;
[0031] Voter Alicei The particle order of the particles in hand after unitary operation is set to It's Alice i Voting information The generated signature;
[0032] Then, Alice i Insert non-orthogonal particles into The particle sequence is sent to the vote counter Bob, and the position and basis information of the detection particles are declared;
[0033] Alice i Alice compares the initial state and these measurement results with Bob to detect eavesdropping. If the error rate is less than the set threshold δ, the channel is considered secure and there is no eavesdropping attack. i The particle sequence after the unitary operation is passed to Bob Meanwhile, Alice i The blinded voting information Send it to the vote counter Bob via the classical quantum fusion channel;
[0034] Step 5, CA uses the key K C,C The particle order L in the hand CA Each particle in performs the unitary operation accordingly:
[0035] If the key K C,C The jth position is 1, then for L CA The jth particle implements Z(σ Z )’s unitary transformation operation;
[0036] If the key K C,C The jth position of is 0, then for L CA The j-th particle of implements the unitary transformation operation of I;
[0037] The particle order of the particles in CA after unitary operation is set to L′ CA CA and vote counter Bob use detection particles to eavesdrop on L′ CA Sent to vote counter Bob, L′ CA It is the CA’s blind signature on the voting information;
[0038] Step 6. The vote counter Bob counts the particle sequence in his hand. and L′ CA The jth particle in the x ={|X0>,|X1>}={|+x>,|-x>} for measurement, where j=1,2,...,N; if the measured quantum state is |Φ0(j)> 0,1,...,n, then |+x> is generated; if the measured quantum state is |Φ1(j)> 0,1,...,n , then |-x> is generated, and a new particle sequence S is obtained, where S is Bob’s aggregate signature of the aggregate information;
[0039] After the vote counter and the vote monitor Charlie use the detection particles to detect eavesdropping, if there is no eavesdropping, Bob sends S to the vote counter Charlie; at the same time, Bob sends Sent to Charlie, the vote monitor, where i = 1, 2, ..., n;
[0040] The scrutineer Charlie uses the ground state B for the particles in the particle sequence S. x ={|X0>,|X1>}={|+x>,|-x>}, and the result is set as R={R1,R2,...,R n}, if the jth particle is |+x>, then R j =0; if the jth particle is |-x>, then R j =1;
[0041] Finally, Charlie compares R and Are they equal? If so, Charlie confirms that S is Bob's aggregate signature of the voting sub-information and publishes the ballot. Otherwise, Charlie will deny Bob's signature and will not accept the voting result.
[0042] At the same time, the present invention also provides a quantum voting device based on quantum homomorphic signature.
[0043] The device provided by the present invention includes n voters, a voting management agency, a vote counter, a vote monitor, and a classical quantum fusion channel, where n is a positive integer greater than or equal to 2;
[0044] Any voter Alice i It includes a first QKD transceiver, a first quantum key server, a voting information splitter and a first quantum voting module, i=1,2,3,…,n;
[0045] The first quantum voting module includes a first quantum measurement device, a first single particle source and a first unitary transformation device;
[0046] The output end of the first QKD transceiver is connected to the input end of the first quantum key server, the output end of the first quantum key server is connected to the input end of the voting information splitter, and the output end of the voting information splitter is connected to the input end of the first quantum measurement device and the input end of the first unitary transformation device;
[0047] The voting management mechanism includes a second QKD transceiver, a second quantum key server, a quantum identity authentication module, and a second quantum voting module;
[0048] The second quantum voting module includes a GHZ entanglement source, a second quantum measurement device, a second single particle source and a second unitary transformation device;
[0049] The output end of the second QKD transceiver is connected to the input end of the second quantum key server, the output end of the second quantum key server is respectively connected to the input end of the quantum identity authentication module and the input end of the second quantum measurement device, and the output end of the second quantum measurement device is connected to the input end of the second unitary transformation device;
[0050] The vote counter includes a third QKD transceiver, a third quantum key server, and a third quantum voting module;
[0051] The third quantum voting module includes a third quantum measurement device and a third single particle source;
[0052] The output end of the third QKD transceiver is connected to the input end of the third quantum key server, and the output end of the third quantum key server is connected to the input end of the third quantum measurement device.
[0053] The scrutineer includes a fourth QKD transceiver, a fourth quantum key server, a display port and a fourth quantum voting module;
[0054] The fourth quantum voting module includes a fourth quantum measurement device;
[0055] The output end of the fourth QKD transceiver is connected to the input end of the fourth quantum key server, and the output end of the fourth quantum key server and the output end of the fourth quantum measurement device are connected to the input end of the display port;
[0056] The n voters, voting management body, vote counters and vote monitors are connected to the classical quantum fusion channel.
[0057] In some embodiments, the classical quantum fusion channel of the present invention is composed of (n+3) optical add-drop multiplexer systems connected end to end in the form of a closed loop. The n voters, voting management agencies, vote counters and vote monitors in the voting process are respectively connected to an optical add-drop multiplexer system and are located at the nodes of the classical quantum fusion channel.
[0058] Preferably, the QKD transceiver of the present invention is a device based on the BB84 protocol and performs quantum key distribution through a classical quantum fusion channel. The key finally generated can be stored in the quantum key server and can be directly called from the quantum key server when there is a key request.
[0059] In some embodiments, the quantum key server of the present invention includes a key storage and a key management distribution system.
[0060] In some embodiments, the quantum state measurement device of the present invention is a polarization controller under computer control or a polarization modulation structure composed of polarizers.
[0061] In some embodiments, the unitary transformation device of the present invention is a gate structure composed of a single quantum bit gate U that operates on a single quantum bit, and is used to perform various unitary transformations on the quantum bit of the quantum state.
[0062] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:
[0063] (1) Using quantum homomorphic signature technology, multiple voting sub-information can be aggregated and verified, breaking the original voting protocol construction mode that only targets one voting information at a time.
[0064] (2) Each link in this voting system, including the voting management agency, voters, and vote counters, has a signature on his or her own tasks, which fully guarantees the reliability of the system in actual operation.
[0065] (3) Since the voting sub-information transmitted by each voter is split from the total voting information, and Bob's blind signature technology ensures the external privacy of voter Alice.
[0066] (4) Each legal voter Alice has a unique randomly distributed voting ID as an identity identifier, and only legal voters can register and obtain ballots (particles) from the ballot management center, thus preventing voters from voting repeatedly.
[0067] (5) The vote counter Bob needs the help of the vote monitor Charlie to open and count the ballots. The presence of the vote monitor Charlie can restrict the rights of the vote counter Bob and ensure the fairness of the voting process.
[0068] (6) The transmission process of voting information adopts QKD one-time encryption method to ensure the unconditional security of the entire voting process.
[0069] (7) Different from the classical electronic voting protocol, the following aspects of the present invention ensure the unconditional security of the quantum voting system:
[0070] ① Unconditional security of key distribution. In the protocol, Charlie and Alice i Shared quantum key and the quantum key K shared by Charlie and CA C,C All are distributed using the BB84 protocol, which has been proven to be unconditionally secure.
[0071] ② Unconditional security of encryption algorithm. Voter Alice i The voting information is encrypted with a shared key using a one-time pad algorithm. This encryption algorithm E() has been proven to be unconditionally secure.
[0072] ③ Unconditional security of the transmission channel. This system builds a secure quantum channel during the system establishment phase, and uses detection particles to detect and establish a secure channel during the signature and verification process.
[0073] At the same time, by using the local measurement of the general GHZ entangled state, the instantaneous transmission of information in the quantum channel is realized. This transmission is not limited by distance and time, and will not be hindered by any obstacles, so it has unconditional security. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0074] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the principle of the quantum voting system of the present invention; Figure 1 In the equation, |Φ(j)> indicates that Bob’s quantum measurement result may be |Φ0(j)> or |Φ1(j)>.
[0075] Figure 2 This is a diagram of the quantum homomorphic signature process of the present invention; see attached Figure 2 As shown in the figure, it is a diagram of the quantum voting process of the present invention, n voters Alice i (i=1,…,n) completes the blinding and signing operations of the voting sub-information, the voting management agency CA completes the identity authentication and signing process of the blind information, the vote counter Bob completes the aggregate signature of the aggregated voting information, the vote monitor Charlie supervises the entire voting process, and finally verifies the aggregate signature and obtains the voting results.
[0076] Figure 3 It is a schematic diagram of the device of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0077] The purpose of the present invention is to solve the deficiencies in existing quantum voting systems and to provide a quantum voting system and method that is resource-saving, simple to operate, practical, efficient, and secure.
[0078] The present invention utilizes the properties of the general GHZ entangled state under local measurement. After the voting management agency CA has reviewed the qualifications of voters and distributed the ballots, voters Alice1, Alice2, ..., Alice n The voting information is blinded, and the vote counter can implement the aggregate signature of the blinded voting information without knowing the voting information of each voter. Finally, the vote monitor verifies the aggregate signature and obtains the final voting result.
[0079] In the present invention, the voter Alice i The signature of is defined as a signature, the signature of CA (voting management agency) is defined as a blind signature, and the signature of the vote monitor Charlie is defined as an aggregate signature.
[0080] Embodiment 1:
[0081] like Figure 3 As shown, the quantum voting device of this embodiment includes n voters (Alice1, Alice2, ..., Alice n ), voting management agency CA, vote counter Bob, vote monitor Charlie, and n+3 OADMs (optical add / drop multiplexer systems), n is greater than or equal to 2, where:
[0082] Voters:
[0083] Each voter Alice i (i=1,…,n;n≥2) all include a QKD transceiver, a quantum key server, a voting information splitter and a quantum voting module;
[0084] The quantum voting module includes a quantum measurement device, a single particle source and a unitary transformation device;
[0085] The output end of the QKD transceiver is connected to the input end of the quantum key server, the output end of the quantum key server is connected to the input end of the voting information splitter, and the output end of the voting information splitter is connected to the input end of the quantum measurement device and the input end of the unitary transformation device there.
[0086] Voting Management Agency:
[0087] The voting management agency CA includes a QKD transceiver, a quantum key server, a quantum identity authentication module and a quantum voting module;
[0088] The quantum voting module includes a general GHZ entanglement source, a quantum measurement device, a single particle source and a unitary transformation device;
[0089] The output end of the QKD transceiver is connected to the input end of the quantum key server at the location, the output end of the quantum key server at the location is respectively connected to the input end of the quantum identity authentication module and the input end of the quantum measurement device, and the output end of the quantum measurement device is connected to the input end of the unitary transformation device;
[0090] The unitary transformation device owned by voters and voting management agencies is a gate structure composed of a single quantum bit gate U that operates on a single quantum bit. It can perform various unitary transformations on the quantum bits of the quantum state.
[0091] Bob the vote counter:
[0092] The vote counter Bob includes a QKD transceiver, a quantum key server, and a quantum voting module;
[0093] The quantum voting module includes a quantum measurement device and a single particle source;
[0094] The output end of the QKD transceiver is connected to the input end of the quantum key server, and the output end of the quantum key server is connected to the input end of the quantum measurement device.
[0095] Charlie, the scrutineer:
[0096] The vote monitor Charlie includes a QKD transceiver, a quantum key server, a display port, and a quantum voting module;
[0097] The quantum voting module includes a quantum measurement device;
[0098] The output end of the QKD transceiver is connected to the input end of the quantum key server, and the output end of the quantum key server and the output end of the quantum measurement device are connected to the input end of the display port.
[0099] In a specific implementation, all of the above-mentioned QKD transceivers are devices based on the BB84 protocol and perform quantum key distribution through a classical quantum fusion channel. The final generated key can be stored in the quantum key server and can be directly called from the quantum key server when there is a key request.
[0100] In a further specific embodiment, all of the above-mentioned quantum key servers include a key storage and a key management and distribution system.
[0101] It is a device that uses quantum key nodes to obtain security keys for access to the quantum key distribution network. The quantum keys are directly provided to upper-level applications in real time, or temporarily stored in the storage unit of the server. When needed, they are retrieved from the storage unit to process burst application data.
[0102] In the voting device, voter Alice i When (i=1,…,n) and the vote monitor Charlie share the quantum key, the quantum key server starts the QKD transceiver. Each transceiver completes the post-processing operations such as quantum key distribution, key screening, bit error rate analysis, and confidentiality amplification based on the BB84 protocol, and finally obtains n shared keys; similarly, the shared key between the vote monitor Charlie and the ballot management agency CA can be obtained. Finally, they store the shared key in their respective key storage.
[0103] The quantum state measurement device used in the above specific implementation manner may be a polarization controller under computer control or a polarization modulation structure composed of polarizers.
[0104] n+3 OADMs:
[0105] n+3 OADMs (optical add / drop multiplexer systems) are connected end to end in a closed loop through optical fibers to form a ring-shaped classical quantum fusion channel. The voters Alice1, Alice2, ..., Alice n , the voting management agency CA, the vote counter Bob and the vote monitor Charlie are each connected to an OADM and located at the nodes of the classical quantum fusion channel, thereby realizing the transmission of classical and quantum signals between nodes.
[0106] OADM can dynamically select wavelength channels to allow other wavelength channels to pass without being affected, and use the ring link connected by optical fiber to dynamically send and receive voters Alice1, Alice2, ..., Alice n , the classical and quantum signals of the voting management agency CA, the vote counter Bob and the vote monitor Charlie and couple them into optical fibers and transmit them to the corresponding agencies.
[0107] In the operation of the device of this embodiment, voters Alice1, Alice2, ..., Alice n The respective voting sub-information is derived by the voting information splitter.
[0108] The voting management agency CA gives the voting Alice in the quantum identity authentication module i (i=1,…,n), vote counter Bob and vote monitor Charlie issue quantum key strings as quantum identity IDs, which are stored in their respective key storage devices for identity verification of the above-mentioned personnel.
[0109] The voting management agency CA prepares multiple GHZ entangled states containing n+1 particles. The voting management agency keeps the n+1th particle in each GHZ entangled state for itself, generating a particle sequence L CA , distribute the first n particles of each GHZ entangled state to each voter Alice i , forming a sequence of n particles For any sequence Before distribution, the voting management agency obtains a set of non-orthogonal particles from its single-particle source. Each particle is randomly in one of the four states |0>, |1>, |+>, |->. CA inserts these particles into The voting management agency and any voter Alice i jointly detect eavesdropping;
[0110] If there is eavesdropping, then Alice iDiscard the obtained particles and CA redistribute them; when CA and Alice i After Alice deems that there is no eavesdropping in the channel, i Charlie and Alice start their own QKD transceivers on the quantum key server i Distribute the shared quantum key with Charlie, the vote watcher The quantum key servers of the poll watchers and the voting management agency start their respective QKD transceivers to distribute the shared key K to Charlie and CA. C,C .
[0111] Voter Alice i , Bob, the vote counter, and Charlie, the vote monitor, send their identity information quantum ID to the voting management agency CA, and then the voting management agency CA uses the quantum ID stored in the key storage to determine whether the quantum ID of each party is qualified and whether Alice i Eligibility to vote. Voter Alice i Share your voting information with the shared key Perform a direct sum operation to complete the blinding operation of the voting sub-information, and encode the blinded voting sub-information on the entangled particles through the unitary transformation device. The new particle sequence output from the unitary transformation device is the particle sequence The particle in passes through Alice i After each unitary operation, the new particle sequence is Alice. i A quantum signature of her voting information. Alice i The blinded voting sub-information and quantum signature are transmitted to the vote counter Bob through the classical quantum fusion channel. Before transmitting the quantum signature particle, Alice i Alice obtains a set of non-orthogonal particles from a single-particle source, each particle is randomly in one of the four states |0>, |1>, |+> and |->. i Insert these particles into the random positions of the quantum signature particles, and then use their own quantum measurement devices to jointly detect eavesdropping with Bob. If there is eavesdropping, Bob discards the obtained particles and re-executes the voting process from (1); when Alice i If Bob believes that there is no eavesdropping in the channel, the information obtained by Bob is valid and the voting system continues to operate;
[0112] The voting management agency CA signs the voting process on its quantum voting module, that is, it uses its unitary transformation device to sign its own particle sequence L CA The unitary operation is performed, and the particle sequence output by the unitary transformation device is determined by CA according to the shared key K C,C For L CAThe unitary operation is performed on each particle in the i The voting information is obtained by CA, so the above particle sequence is the quantum blind signature obtained by CA's recognition of the quantum voting process. CA transmits the above particles to the vote counter Bob through the classical quantum fusion channel. Before transmission, CA obtains non-orthogonal particles |0>, |1>, |+>, |-> from its single particle source and inserts them into the particles to be transmitted, and jointly detects eavesdropping with Bob using their respective quantum measurement devices. If there is eavesdropping, Bob discards the previously obtained particles and re-executes the voting process from (1); when CA and Bob believe that there is no eavesdropping in the channel, the information obtained by Bob is valid and the voting system continues to run;
[0113] The vote counter Bob receives the vote from the voter Alice i After all the particle sequences of the quantum signature of the voting authority CA and the quantum blind signature of the voting management agency CA are obtained, the vote counter Bob uses the quantum measurement device and the aggregate signature algorithm in his voting module to aggregate the voting information, and transmits the aggregate signature and the encrypted voting aggregate information to the vote monitor Charlie through the classical quantum fusion channel. Before transmitting the aggregate signature particles, Bob obtains non-orthogonal particles |0>, |1>, |+>, |-> from the single-particle source and inserts them into the particles to be transmitted, and jointly detects eavesdropping with Charlie using their respective quantum measurement devices. If there is eavesdropping, Charlie discards the previously obtained particles, and Bob regenerates the aggregate signature particles; when Bob and Charlie believe that there is no eavesdropping in the channel, Charlie uses the quantum measurement device to measure the received particles to verify the aggregate information signature and announce the aggregate voting information of all n voters, that is, the final voting results.
[0114] Embodiment 2:
[0115] like Figure 1 , 2 As shown, a quantum voting system of this embodiment includes n voters Alice1, Alice2, ..., Alice n , voting management agency CA, vote counter Bob, vote monitor Charlie and n+3 OADM (optical add / drop multiplexer system). The system can implement voting through the following steps:
[0116] Step 1: System establishment
[0117] 1. Establishment and security monitoring of quantum channels
[0118] CA prepares N GHZ entangled states containing n+1 particles and expresses them as {|Φ0(1)> 0,1,...,n ,|Φ0(2)> 0,1,...,n ,…,|Φ0(j)>0,1,...,n ,…,|Φ0(N)> 0,1,...,n}, where the jth group of quantum states It can be seen that if the quantum state |Φ0(j)> 0,1,...,n If the unitary operation is performed on some particles of the quantum state |Φ0(j)> 0,1,...,n An odd number of particles performs Z-unit positive operation, then
[0119]
[0120] If for the quantum state |Φ0(j)> 0,1,...,n An even number of particles performs Z-positive operations, then
[0121]
[0122] Distribution of GHZ entangled particles. For each GHZ entangled particle group, CA retains the n+1th particle and obtains the particle sequence L CA =(P1(n+1),P2(n+1),...,P N (n+1)), distribute the first n particles of each GHZ entangled state to each voter Alice i (i=1,…,n), generate n particle sequences but Each of them (P j (1),P j (2),...,P j (n),P j (n+1)) is an entangled state (j=1,2,...,N). CA obtains a set of non-orthogonal particles from its single-particle source, each particle is randomly in one of the four states |0>, |1>, |+>, |->, and then inserts these particles into The random positions of the non-orthogonal particles are known only by CA. Finally, the n new particle sequences obtained by CA are recorded as And send Give Alice1, Alice2, …, Alice n .
[0123] Security detection of quantum channels. In order to prevent truncation and retransmission attacks or man-in-the-middle attacks, security detection of quantum channels is necessary. CA and Alice i (i=1,…,n) to detect eavesdropping. CA declares the position and basis information of the inserted non-orthogonal state particles (B Z ={|Z0>,|Z1>}={|0>,|1>} or B x={|X0>,|X1>}={|+x>,|-x>}),Alice i (i=1,…,n) from These non-orthogonal particles are selected and measured with the corresponding basis. In this way, CA can detect eavesdropping by comparing the initial state with these measurement results. If the error rate is less than the set threshold δ, the channel is considered secure and there is no eavesdropping attack.
[0124] 2. Distribution of quantum keys
[0125] In this voting system, voter Alice i When (i=1,…,n) shares the quantum key with the vote monitor Charlie, the quantum key server starts the QKD transceiver. Each transceiver completes post-processing operations such as quantum key distribution, key screening, bit error rate analysis, and confidentiality amplification based on the BB84 protocol, and finally obtains n N-bit keys. Similarly, we can get the N-bit key K between the vote monitor Charlie and the vote management agency CA C,C .
[0126] Step 2: Registration
[0127] Voter Alice i (i=1,…,n) sends her identity information to the voting management center, and the CA uses zero-knowledge quantum identity authentication to authenticate Alice i The CA checks the identity of Alice to determine whether she is eligible to vote and whether it is her first time voting. If not, the invoice is rejected. If she meets the requirements, the CA will issue a valid vote to Alice. i Register for voting and randomly give the voter a unique ballot ID. Each ballot ID is only known to the corresponding voter. After the voter successfully registers, he or she can vote.
[0128] Step 3: Voting Phase
[0129] n voters internally perform arbitrary direct and decomposition of their N bits of voting information m, so that each voter Alice i (i=1,…,n) holds N bits of voting information satisfy
[0130] Each Alice i Share an N-bit key with Charlie, the vote watcher Alice i Share your voting information with the shared key Perform a direct sum operation to complete the blinding operation of the voting sub-information, Alice i according to Perform unitary operations on the particles it holds. If the jth position of is 1, then The jth particle implements Z(σ Z ) is a unitary transformation operation; The jth position of is 0, then The jth particle of performs the unitary transformation operation of I, where j = 1, 2, ..., N. Voter Alice i The particle order of the particles in hand after unitary operation is set to Can be seen as Alice i Voting information The generated signature.
[0131] Then, Alice i Insert non-orthogonal particles into The particle sequence in is sent to the vote counter Bob, and the position and basis information of the detection particle are declared. Similar to the quantum channel security detection method in step 1, Alice i Compare the initial state and these measurement results with Bob to detect eavesdropping. If the error rate is less than the set threshold δ (generally, the appropriate threshold is estimated by information theory. It is decided by the people involved in transmitting and receiving particles), the channel is considered safe and there is no eavesdropping attack. At this time, Alice i A secure quantum channel was established with Bob, and the particle sequence after the unitary operation was transmitted to Bob. Meanwhile, Alice i The blinded voting information It is sent to the vote counter Bob through the classical quantum fusion channel.
[0132] The voter has completed the voting operation, and the two independent election agencies - the ballot management center and the counting center staff CA and Bob must follow the following steps to handle Alice i Quantum voting.
[0133] Step 4: Signature Phase
[0134] The voting management agency CA is in the voting i After the voting operation is completed, the information blind signature process is immediately carried out. CA and the vote monitor Charlie share the N-bit key K C,C , then CA uses the key K C,C For L CA All particles in perform unitary operations in this way. C,C The jth position is 1, then for L CA The jth particle implements Z(σZ ) is a unitary transformation operation; if the key K C,C The jth position of is 0, then for L CA The jth particle of CA performs the unitary transformation operation of I. The particle sequence of the particles in CA after the unitary operation is set to L′ CA , similar to the quantum channel security detection method in step 1, the vote counter Bob uses the detection particle to detect and eavesdrop, and then CA Sent to the vote counter Bob. Since CA does not know Alice i Voting information, so L′ CA It is regarded as a blind signature of the voting information by the CA.
[0135] Step 5: Voting monitoring and counting
[0136] The vote counter Bob aggregates the signature. The general GHZ entangled state is in the ground state B x ={|X0>,|X1>}={|+x>,|-x>}, the local measurement result satisfies the following properties:
[0137]
[0138]
[0139] Therefore, the vote counter Bob has a sequence of particles in his hand. and L′ CA The jth particle in the x ={|X0>,|X1>}={|+x>,|-x>} for measurement, where j=1,2,...,N. If the measured quantum state is |Φ0(j)> 0,1,...,n , then |+x> is generated; if the measured quantum state is |Φ1(j)> 0,1,...,n , then |-x> is generated, and a new particle sequence S is obtained, and S is Bob's aggregate signature of the aggregate information. Similar to the quantum channel security detection method in step 1, after the vote monitor Charlie uses the detection particle to detect and eavesdrop, Bob sends S to the vote counter Charlie. At the same time, Bob sends Sent to the vote monitor Charlie, where i = 1, 2, ..., n.
[0140] The scrutineer Charlie checks the signature: The scrutineer Charlie checks the particles in the particle sequence S with the ground state B x ={|X0>,|X1>}={|+x>,|-x>}, and the result is set as R={R1,R2,...,R n}, if the jth particle is |+x>, then R j=0; if the jth particle is |-x>, then R j = 1. Finally, Charlie compares R and Are they equal? If so, Charlie confirms that S is Bob's aggregate signature of the voting sub-information and publishes the ballot. Otherwise, Charlie will deny Bob's signature and will not accept the voting result.
[0141] The following is a derivation of the method for generating an aggregate signature using quantum homomorphic signature technology in the present invention:
[0142] Let n = 1 in equations (1) and (2). According to step 5, the GHZ entangled state is in the ground state B x ={|X0>,|X1>}={|+x>,|-x>} local measurement related properties, δ1 can be regarded as the set {|+x>,|-x>} projected onto the set {|Φ0(j)> 0,1,...,n ,|Φ1(j)> 0,1,...,n} binary operator.
[0143] At the same time, during the aggregation signature phase of vote counter Bob, when the quantum state measured by Bob is |Φ0(j)> 0,1,...,n , then |+x> is generated; if the measured quantum state is |Φ1(j)> 0,1,...,n , then |-x> is generated. The above process can be regarded as a unary operator δ2, which converts {|Φ0(j)> 0,1,...,n ,|Φ1(j)> 0,1,...,n} is back-projected to the set {|+x>,|-x>}.
[0144] This allows us to define a binary operator It is a projection from the set {|+x>,|-x>} to itself. Without loss of generality, let δ be ·, we have |+x>·|+x>=|+x>, |-x>·|-x>=|+x>, |+x>·|-x>=|-x>, |-x>·|+x>=|-x>, and obviously, the set G={|+x>,|-x>} is a group with the operation ·, then the signature verification process of the vote monitor Charlie can be regarded as the process from the group {|+x>,|-x>} to the modulo 2 addition group A bijection η of , which can be specifically defined as η(|+x>)=1,η(|-x>)=0.
[0145] From equations (1) and (2), we can see that for any two elements α and β in group G, we have So η is a group G modulo 2 addition group isomorphic mapping.
[0146] In the actual voting system, in step 5, when counting votes, Bob needs to send Alicei (i=1,…,n) voting sub-information Signature The aggregate signature is obtained through the following homomorphic signature technology Assume that each voter Alice i Voting information Each Alice i Share an N-bit key with Charlie, the vote watcher CA shares N-bit key K with the vote monitor Charlie C , C =(k CC1 ,k CC2 ,...,k CCN ), for Alice i The jth component m of the voting sub-information ij j=1,2,...,N.
[0147] At the same time, the jth group of quantum states
[0148] It can be seen that if the quantum state |Φ0(j)> 0,1,...,n If the unitary operation is performed on some particles of the quantum state |Φ0(j)> 0,1,...,n An odd number of particles performs Z-unit positive operation, then
[0149]
[0150] If for the quantum state |Φ0(j)> 0,1,...,n An even number of particles performs Z-positive operations, then
[0151]
[0152] In summary, we can derive the specific theory of homomorphic signature technology:
[0153]
[0154] in
Claims
1. A quantum voting system based on quantum homomorphic signature, characterized in that: The system includes n voters, a voting management agency, a vote counter, a vote monitor, and a classical quantum fusion channel; the n voters, the voting management agency, the vote counter, the vote monitor, and the classical quantum fusion channel are used to achieve the following functions: (1) The voting management agency prepares multiple extended GHZ entangled states containing n+1 particles. The voting management agency keeps the n+1th particle in each GHZ entangled state for itself, generating a particle sequence L CA , distribute the first n particles of each GHZ entangled state to each voter, generating a sequence of n particles For any sequence Before distribution, the voting management agency generates a set of non-orthogonal particles, each of which is randomly in one of the four states |0>, |1>, |+> and |->. The voting management agency inserts these non-orthogonal particles into The random position of the voting management agency CA and any voter Alice i Joint detection of eavesdropping, i = 1, ..., n; If there is eavesdropping, then Alice i The obtained particles are discarded and the voting management agency redistributes them; if there is no eavesdropping, Alice i Generate and distribute shared quantum keys with vote scrutineers The vote monitor and the voting management agency generate and distribute the shared key K C,C ; (2) The voting management agency issues quantum key strings as quantum identity IDs to the n voters, vote counters, and vote monitors for identity verification of the voters, vote counters, and vote monitors; Any voter Alice i , the vote counter and the vote monitor send their identity information quantum ID to the voting management agency, and then the voting management agency CA determines whether the quantum ID of each party is qualified and determines whether Alice i Whether eligible to vote, i=1,…,n; If you are not qualified or eligible to vote, the voting management agency CA will refuse to issue the ballot; If qualified and eligible to vote, the CA verifies the legal voter Alice i Register to vote and randomly assign the voter a unique ballot ID; (3) Voter Alice i Share your voting information with the shared key Perform a direct sum operation to complete the blinding operation of the voting sub-information; voter Alice i The blinded voting sub-information is encoded in its own entangled particle sequence through unitary transformation. On the new particle sequence The new particle sequence is voter Alice i The quantum signature particle, i = 1,…,n; Particle Sequence Alice i Generate a set of non-orthogonal particles, each particle is randomly in one of the four states |0>, |1>, |+> and |->, Alice i Alice inserts these non-orthogonal particles into the random positions of their respective quantum signature particles. i The blinded voting sub-information and the quantum signature particles with non-orthogonal particles are transmitted to the vote counter through the classical quantum fusion channel; at the same time, Alice i to work with the vote counters to detect wiretaps; If there is eavesdropping, the vote counter discards the obtained particles and re-executes the voting process from (1); if there is no eavesdropping, the information obtained by the vote counter is valid and the voting system continues to run; (4) The voting management agency determines the particle sequence L CA Each particle in the unitary operation is performed, and the particle order after the operation is L′ CA For voting management agency to Alice i Quantum blind signature of the voting process, i = 1,…,n; The voting management agency generates a set of non-orthogonal particles, each particle is randomly in one of the four states 0>, |1>, |+> and |->, and the voting management agency inserts these non-orthogonal particles into the particle sequence L′ CA At a random position, the voting management agency transmits the quantum blind signature with non-orthogonal particles to the vote counter through a classical quantum fusion channel, and the voting management agency and the vote counter jointly detect eavesdropping; If there is eavesdropping, the vote counter discards the previously obtained particles and re-executes the voting process from (1); if there is no eavesdropping, the information obtained by the vote counter is valid and the voting system continues to run; (5) The vote counter receives the vote from Alice i After all the particle sequences of the quantum signature of the voting authority CA and the quantum blind signature of the voting authority CA, the vote counters’ voting information is aggregated and signed, and the aggregated signature and encrypted voting aggregated information are transmitted to the vote monitors through the classical quantum fusion channel; Before transmitting the aggregate signature particle, the vote counter generates a group of non-orthogonal particles, each of which is randomly in one of the four states 0>, |1>, |+> and |->. The vote counter inserts these non-orthogonal particles into the aggregate signature particle to be transmitted, and jointly detects eavesdropping with the vote monitor using their respective quantum measurement devices; If there is eavesdropping, the vote monitor discards the previously obtained particles, and the vote counter regenerates the aggregate signature particles; when the vote counter and the vote monitor believe that there is no eavesdropping in the channel, the vote monitor uses the received particles to verify the aggregate information signature and announces the aggregate voting results of all n voters; The n voters, voting management agency, vote counters, vote monitors and classical quantum fusion channel are used to implement the following steps: Step 1: The voting management agency prepares N GHZ entangled states containing n+1 particles. CA retains the n+1th particle in each GHZ and obtains the particle sequence L CA =(P1(n+1),P2(n+1),...,P N (n+1)), distribute the first n particles of each GHZ entangled state to each voter Alice i (i=1,…,n), generate n particle sequences Before distribution, for any sequence CA generates a set of non-orthogonal particles, each of which is randomly in one of the four states |0>, |1>, |+>, |->, and then inserts these particles into The n new particle sequences obtained by CA are recorded as And send to each voter; CA and voter Alice i Together with the detection of eavesdropping, CA declares the position and basis information of the inserted non-orthogonal particles (B Z ={|Z0>,|Z1>}={|0>,|1>} or B x ={X0>,X1>}={|+x>,|-x>}),Alice i from Select these non-orthogonal particles and measure them with the corresponding basis, i = 1, ..., n; CA compares the measurement results of the non-orthogonal particles he inserted with Alice's i The measurement results of the particles at the corresponding positions are used to detect eavesdropping; if the error rate is less than the set threshold δ, the channel is considered to be secure and there is no eavesdropping attack; Step 2. Voter Alice i Share quantum key with Charlie, the vote watcher The quantum key K is shared between Charlie, the poll watcher, and CA, the voting management agency. C,C ; Step 3. Voter Alice i Send your identity information to the ballot management center, and the CA will use zero-knowledge quantum identity authentication to authenticate Alice. i The CA determines whether Alice is eligible to vote. If not, the invoice is rejected. If Alice is eligible to vote, the CA i Register to vote and randomly assign a unique ballot ID to the voter, and each ballot ID is known only to the corresponding voter; Step 4: n voters internally perform arbitrary direct and decomposition of their N bits of voting information m, so that each voter Alice i Holds N bits of voting information satisfy Voter Alice i Share your voting information with the shared key Perform a direct sum operation to complete the blinding operation of the voting sub-information. Voter Alice i according to For its possession All particles in the same way are unitary: like If the jth position of is 1, then The jth particle implements Z(σ Z )’s unitary transformation operation; like The jth position of is 0, then The j-th particle of implements the unitary transformation operation of I, where j = 1, 2, ..., N; Voter Alice i The particle order of the particles in hand after unitary operation is set to It's Alice i Voting information The generated signature; Then, Alice i Insert non-orthogonal particles into The particle sequence is sent to the vote counter Bob, and the position and basis information of the detection particles are declared; Alice i Alice compares the initial state and these measurement results with Bob to detect eavesdropping. If the error rate is less than the set threshold δ, the channel is considered secure and there is no eavesdropping attack. i The particle sequence after the unitary operation is passed to Bob Meanwhile, Alice i The blinded voting information Send it to the vote counter Bob via the classical quantum fusion channel; Step 5, CA uses the key K C,C The particle order L in the hand CA Each particle in performs the unitary operation accordingly: If the key K C,C The jth position is 1, then for L CA The jth particle implements Z(σ Z )’s unitary transformation operation; If the key K C,C The jth position of is 0, then for L CA The j-th particle of implements the unitary transformation operation of I; The particle order of the particles in CA after unitary operation is set to L′ CA CA and vote counter Bob use detection particles to eavesdrop on L′ CA Sent to vote counter Bob, L′ CA It is the CA’s blind signature on the voting information; Step 6. The vote counter Bob counts the particle sequence in his hand. and L′ CA The jth particle in the x ={|X0>,|X1>}={|+x>,|-x>} for measurement, where j=1,2,...,N; if the measured quantum state is |Φ0(j)> 0,1,...,n , then |+x> is generated; if the measured quantum state is |Φ1(j)> 0,1,...,n , then |-x> is generated, and a new particle sequence S is obtained, where S is Bob’s aggregate signature of the aggregate information; After the vote counter and the vote monitor Charlie use the detection particles to detect eavesdropping, if there is no eavesdropping, Bob sends S to the vote counter Charlie; at the same time, Bob sends Sent to Charlie, the vote monitor, where i = 1, 2, ..., n; The scrutineer Charlie uses the ground state B for the particles in the particle sequence S. x ={|X0>,|X1>}={|+x>,|-x>}, and the result is set as R={R1,R2,...,R n }, if the jth particle is |+x>, then R j =0; if the jth particle is |-x>, then R j =1; Finally, Charlie compares R and Are they equal? If so, Charlie confirms that S is Bob's aggregate signature of the voting sub-information and publishes the ballot. Otherwise, Charlie will deny Bob's signature and will not accept the voting result.
2. The quantum voting system based on quantum homomorphic signature according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The system includes n voters, a voting management agency, vote counters, vote monitors, and a classical quantum fusion channel, where n is a positive integer greater than or equal to 2; Any voter Alice i It includes a first QKD transceiver, a first quantum key server, a voting information splitter and a first quantum voting module, i=1,2,3,…,n; The first quantum voting module includes a first quantum measurement device, a first single particle source and a first unitary transformation device; The output end of the first QKD transceiver is connected to the input end of the first quantum key server, the output end of the first quantum key server is connected to the input end of the voting information splitter, and the output end of the voting information splitter is connected to the input end of the first quantum measurement device and the input end of the first unitary transformation device; The voting management mechanism includes a second QKD transceiver, a second quantum key server, a quantum identity authentication module, and a second quantum voting module; The second quantum voting module includes a GHZ entanglement source, a second quantum measurement device, a second single particle source and a second unitary transformation device; The output end of the second QKD transceiver is connected to the input end of the second quantum key server, the output end of the second quantum key server is respectively connected to the input end of the quantum identity authentication module and the input end of the second quantum measurement device, and the output end of the second quantum measurement device is connected to the input end of the second unitary transformation device; The vote counter includes a third QKD transceiver, a third quantum key server, and a third quantum voting module; The third quantum voting module includes a third quantum measurement device and a third single particle source; The output end of the third QKD transceiver is connected to the input end of the third quantum key server, and the output end of the third quantum key server is connected to the input end of the third quantum measurement device; The scrutineer includes a fourth QKD transceiver, a fourth quantum key server, a display port and a fourth quantum voting module; The fourth quantum voting module includes a fourth quantum measurement device; The output end of the fourth QKD transceiver is connected to the input end of the fourth quantum key server, and the output end of the fourth quantum key server and the output end of the fourth quantum measurement device are connected to the input end of the display port; The n voters, voting management body, vote counters and vote monitors are connected to the classical quantum fusion channel.
3. The quantum voting system based on quantum homomorphic signature according to claim 2 is characterized in that: The classical quantum fusion channel is formed by (n+3) optical add-drop multiplexer systems connected end to end in the form of a closed loop. The n voters, voting management agencies, vote counters and vote monitors in the voting process are respectively connected to an optical add-drop multiplexer system and are located at the nodes of the classical quantum fusion channel.
4. The quantum voting system based on quantum homomorphic signature according to claim 2 is characterized in that: The QKD transceiver is a device that distributes quantum keys based on the BB84 protocol through a classical quantum fusion channel. The key finally generated can be stored in the quantum key server and can be directly called from the quantum key server when there is a key request.
5. The quantum voting system based on quantum homomorphic signature according to claim 2 is characterized in that: The quantum key server includes a key storage and a key management distribution system.
6. The quantum voting system based on quantum homomorphic signature according to claim 2 is characterized in that: The quantum state measurement device is a polarization controller controlled by a computer or a polarization modulation structure composed of polarizers.
7. The quantum voting system based on quantum homomorphic signature according to claim 2 is characterized in that: The unitary transformation device is a gate structure composed of a single quantum bit gate U for operating a single quantum bit, and is used to perform various unitary transformations on the quantum bit of the quantum state.
