Vehicle and control method thereof

Abstract

The present invention discloses a vehicle and a control method thereof. The vehicle includes: at least one memory configured to store at least one default instruction structure key (ISK), a generated ISK, and a pin code of the vehicle; and at least one processor. The at least one default ISK may include a first default ISK and a second default ISK. The processor may generate a random number using the first default ISK, receive a second default ISK encrypted using the ISK generated based on the pin code, and when the generated random number is the same as the random number corresponding to the second default ISK, determine the generated ISK as an encryption key for encrypted communication of the vehicle.

Description

[0001] CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

[0002] This application is based on and claims the benefit of priority under 35 U.S.C. §119 from Korean Patent Application No. 10-2018-0145283 filed on November 22, 2018, in the Korean Intellectual Property Office, the entire contents of which are incorporated herein by reference. Technical Field

[0003] Embodiments of the present disclosure relate to a vehicle and a method of controlling a vehicle, and more particularly, to a vehicle capable of providing encrypted communications for entering and starting the vehicle and a method of controlling the vehicle. Background Art

[0004] Current vehicles are manufactured with various electronic control units (ECUs) for controlling entry or starting of the vehicle and electronic control devices for the drive system. At this time, a typical example of the ECU is an integrated body control unit (IBU), and the IBU can communicate with a smart key system (SMK).

[0005] On the other hand, the IBU mainly uses the controller area network (CAN) communication method as a method for communicating with the SMK. At this time, when the data to be transmitted and received is exposed to the outside, a serious problem arises in terms of security.

[0006] The disclosure of this section is to provide a background for the present invention. Applicants note that this section may contain information that was available prior to the present application. However, by providing this section, Applicants do not admit that any information contained in this section constitutes prior art. Summary of the invention

[0007] Therefore, aspects of the present invention provide a vehicle capable of providing an algorithm for preventing encrypted data transmitted and received in the vehicle from being exposed to the outside, and a method of controlling the vehicle.

[0008] Aspects of the present invention also provide a vehicle capable of controlling power consumption of electronic components using in-vehicle communication in response to a shortage of instantaneous power supply, and a method of controlling the vehicle.

[0009] Additional aspects of the disclosure will be set forth in part in the description which follows and, in part, will be obvious from the description, or may be learned by practice of the disclosure.

[0010] According to one aspect of the present disclosure, a vehicle that performs encrypted communications includes: at least one memory configured to store at least one default instruction structure key (ISK), a generated ISK, and a pin code of the vehicle; and at least one processor. The at least one default ISK may include a first default ISK and a second default ISK. The processor may generate a random number using the first default ISK, receive a second default ISK encrypted using the generated ISK generated based on the pin code, and when the generated random number is the same as the random number corresponding to the second default ISK, determine the generated ISK as an encryption key for encrypted communications of the vehicle.

[0011] The generated ISK may be generated by hashing the vehicle's pin code into a secure hash algorithm (SHA) 256.

[0012] The at least one processor may include a first processor and a second processor. The first processor may receive a number A, which is a random number generated by the second processor, generate the generated ISK based on the number A, and when the received number A is the same as the random number corresponding to the generated ISK, determine the generated ISK as a code for temporary use. The second processor may receive a number B, which is a random number generated by the first processor, generate 16 bytes based on the number B, and when the received number B is the same as the random number corresponding to the 16 bytes, determine the generated ISK as a code for encrypted communication of the vehicle.

[0013] The random number corresponding to the generated ISK may be a random number corresponding to a default ISK encrypted with the generated ISK generated based on the pin code.

[0014] 16 bytes may be a value obtained by consecutively arranging the 4 lower bytes of the number B.

[0015] When the received number A and the random number corresponding to the generated ISK are not identical, the first processor may restore the generated ISK to a previous value.

[0016] When the received number B and the random number corresponding to the 16 bytes are not identical, the second processor may restore the generated ISK to a previous value.

[0017] According to another aspect of the present disclosure, a method of controlling a vehicle may perform encrypted communication using at least one default instruction structure key (ISK), a generated ISK, and a pin code. The at least one default ISK may include a first default ISK and a second default ISK. The method includes: generating a random number using the first default ISK; receiving a second default ISK encrypted using the generated ISK generated based on the pin code; and when the generated random number is the same as a random number corresponding to the second default ISK, determining the generated ISK as an encryption key for encrypted communication of the vehicle.

[0018] The generated ISK may be generated by hashing the vehicle's pin code to a secure hash algorithm (SHA) 256.

[0019] Determining the generated ISK as a code for encrypted communication of the vehicle may include: generating a number A, which is a random number; generating the generated ISK based on the number A; when the generated number A is the same as the random number corresponding to the generated ISK, determining the generated ISK as a code for temporary use; generating a number B, which is a random number; generating 16 bytes based on the number B; and when the generated number B is the same as the random number corresponding to the 16 bytes, determining the generated ISK as a code for encrypted communication of the vehicle.

[0020] The random number corresponding to the generated ISK may be a random number corresponding to a default ISK encrypted with the generated ISK generated based on the pin code.

[0021] 16 bytes may be a value obtained by consecutively arranging the 4 lower bytes of the number B.

[0022] Determining the generated ISK as a code for temporary use may include restoring the generated ISK to a previous value when the generated number A and a random number corresponding to the generated ISK are different.

[0023] Determining the generated ISK as a code for encrypted communication of the vehicle may include restoring the generated ISK to a previous value when the generated number B and the random number corresponding to the 16 bytes are different. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0024] These and / or other aspects of the present disclosure will become more apparent and more easily understood through the following description of embodiments in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.

[0025] Figure 1 is a diagram showing a configuration of a vehicle according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0026] Figure 2 is a flowchart illustrating a method of controlling a vehicle according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;

[0027] Figure 3 and Figure 4 is used to describe in more detail Figure 2 Flowchart of a flowchart of a flowchart;

[0028] Figure 5 is a flowchart illustrating a method of controlling a vehicle according to another embodiment of the present disclosure;

[0029] Figure 6 is used to describe the Figure 5 A diagram of random numbers and commands used in the illustrated process;

[0030] Figure 7 is a flowchart illustrating a method of controlling a vehicle according to another embodiment of the present disclosure; and

[0031] Figure 8 is used to describe the Figure 7 Diagram of random numbers and commands used in the process shown. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0032] Throughout the specification, the same reference numerals refer to the same elements. Not all elements of the embodiments of the present disclosure will be described, and descriptions that are known in the art or overlap each other in the embodiments will be omitted. The terms used throughout the specification, such as "~parts", "~modules", "~members", "~blocks", etc., can be implemented with software and / or hardware, and multiple "~parts", "~modules", "~members" or "~blocks" can be implemented in a single element, or a single "~parts", "~modules", "~members" or "~blocks" may include multiple elements.

[0033] It will be understood that when an element is referred to as being “connected” to another element, it may be directly or indirectly connected to the other element, where the indirect connection includes “connection” via a wireless communication network.

[0034] In addition, when a component “includes” or “comprises” an element, unless there is a specific description to the contrary, the component may further include other elements, rather than excluding other elements.

[0035] In addition, when it is stated that a layer is 'on' another layer or substrate, the layer may be directly on the other layer or substrate, or a third layer may be disposed therebetween.

[0036] It will be understood that, although the terms first, second, third, etc. may be used herein to describe various elements, they should not be limited by these terms. These terms are only used to distinguish one element from another.

[0037] As used herein, the singular forms “a”, “an” and “the” are intended to include the plural forms as well, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise.

[0038] For ease of description, identification codes are used, but are not intended to show the order of each step. Unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, each step may be implemented in an order different from the order shown.

[0039] Before describing the specification, some terms used in the specification will be clarified.

[0040] In the specification, the encryption key is a security device provided corresponding to the vehicle identification number of the vehicle, which may be issued before and after learning according to the embodiment described below, and may be stored in a memory. For example, the vehicle identification number is a value obtained by converting the vehicle number into a pin code corresponding to a binary code, and is uniquely assigned to the vehicle and can be used as identification information of the vehicle. The encryption key may correspond to an instruction structure key (ISK), but the present disclosure is not limited thereto. The encryption key may be included in any data that can be exchanged by a processor installed in the vehicle. For example, the encryption key is an ISK, and the key length of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) may be adopted as at least one of 128 bits (16 bytes), 192 bits (24 bytes), and 256 bits (32 bytes).

[0041] Meanwhile, the encryption key may include a default ISK and a generated ISK. In an embodiment, the default ISK may indicate an ISK value determined on a basic basis when a vehicle is first produced. In an embodiment, the default ISK may refer to an ISK value before learning, and is different for each vehicle, but has the same initial value between an identity authentication unit (IAU) and an integrated body control unit (IBU) of one vehicle.

[0042] The generated ISK may indicate an ISK value generated by learning according to an embodiment described below. This corresponds to an ISK value generated by a unique generation algorithm of the IAU.

[0043] The random number may refer to data obtained by converting a default ISK or a generated ISK having a 16-byte value into an arbitrary value having 6 bytes.

[0044] Hereinafter, the operation principle and embodiments of the present disclosure will be described with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0045] Figure 1 is a diagram illustrating a configuration of an apparatus of a vehicle for providing encrypted communication according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0046] like Figure 1As shown, in an embodiment, the vehicle may include a first processor 10, a second processor 20, a lock control module 30, and an electronic key identifier 40. A first storage 11 and a second storage 21 may be connected to the first processor 10 and the second processor 20, respectively, to store data related to the generated and converted encryption.

[0047] The first processor 10 and the second processor 20 may correspond to a control device for performing encrypted communication for the vehicle. Note that each of the first processor 10 and the second processor 20 may perform the functions and operations of the IAU and IBU, and may perform the role of the other. For example, the first processor 10 may correspond to a newly added control device for controlling (door lock or door release, start or departure) a vehicle to which an entry or start system using fingerprint authentication is applied. The second processor 20 may correspond to a control device for performing communication with an electronic key system.

[0048] In an embodiment, the electronic key system may include an electronic key identifier 40 and an electronic key 41. The electronic key 41 may refer to a signal generating device that may generate frequency signals of various frequency bands to perform two-way communication with the electronic key identifier 40 provided in the vehicle. For example, the electronic key 41 may be a smart key that may control a remote key system of the vehicle.

[0049] When the driver holding the electronic key 41 is located around the vehicle, the electronic key identifier 40 can determine whether the unique ID built into the electronic key 41 matches the ID information stored in the electronic key identifier 40 to confirm whether the electronic key 41 is authenticated. Then, the electronic key identifier 40 can send a signal to the lock control module 30, allowing the locking device 31 of the vehicle to enter the unlocked state. In addition, when the electronic key identifier 40 determines that the electronic key 41 within a certain radius of the vehicle is not authenticated, the electronic key identifier 40 can send a signal to the lock control module 30, allowing the locking device 31 of the vehicle to enter the locked state.

[0050] The communication content between the first processor 10 and the second processor 20 is the authentication result of the electronic key 41 and whether the electronic key 41 is inside the vehicle. Here, when the communication content exchanged with each other is exposed to the outside in the form of original data, it is vulnerable to attacks by outsiders, thereby causing problems in the safety system of the vehicle. Therefore, in an embodiment, encrypted communication is performed using new data instead of the original data. Here, the new data may correspond to the encryption key described below.

[0051] The above encryption key can be determined through a learning process between the first processor 10 and the second processor 20 so as to be used for encrypted communication of the vehicle. In addition, the first processor 10 can send the result of authentication success or failure as encrypted data to the second processor 20, and the second processor 20 can send the search result of the electronic key 41 in the vehicle as encrypted data to the first processor 10. However, it should be noted that the above process does not necessarily involve signal transmission for the response of the first processor 10.

[0052] In an embodiment, the vehicle may be provided with a memory storing an algorithm for controlling the operation of components in the vehicle or data on a program implementing the algorithm, and a processor using the data stored in the memory to perform the above-mentioned operations. The memory and the processor may be implemented in separate chips. Alternatively, the memory and the processor may be implemented in a single chip.

[0053] The first storage 11 and the second storage 21 may be memories implemented as a separate chip from the processor, and may be implemented as a single chip with the processor.

[0054] The electronic components can communicate with each other through the vehicle communication network NT. For example, the electronic components can send and receive data through Ethernet, Media Oriented Systems Transport (MOST), Flexray, Controller Area Network (CAN), Local Interconnect Network (LIN), etc.

[0055] Figure 2 is a flowchart showing a method of controlling a vehicle according to an embodiment of the present disclosure, Figure 3 and Figure 4 is used to describe in more detail Figure 2 However, it should be understood that these are examples and some operations may be added or omitted if necessary.

[0056] The IAU 10 may generate an ISK using a pin code stored in the vehicle. The generated ISK may be a default ISK, and the IAU 10 and the IBU 20 may initially retain the same default ISK. Here, the ISK may refer to a key value for performing encryption and decryption processes according to AES 128, which is an encryption standard method. In an embodiment, the pin code may also refer to an arrangement of letters and numbers input to the vehicle by the manufacturer when the vehicle is initially produced.

[0057] The IAU 10 may receive a command for starting learning from a diagnostic device (e.g., an on-board diagnostic (OBD) module) of the vehicle, and request the IBU 20 to start learning. In an embodiment, the IBU 20 may generate a random number using a default ISK (201). For example, the generated random number may be number A, and may be 6-byte encrypted data. Next, the IBU 20 may send the generated number A to the IAU 10 (202).

[0058] The IAU 10 may generate a generated ISK by hashing the pin code (203), and encrypt the generated ISK to generate a default ISK (204). Here, the generated default ISK may be the same as or different from the default ISK initially held. Then, the generated default ISK may be sent to the IBU 20 (205).

[0059] When receiving the generated default ISK, the IBU 20 may determine whether the number A transmitted to the IAU 10 is the same as the random number received from the IAU 10 (206). The IBU 20 may determine whether the received random number is the same as the number A transmitted to the IAU 10 by performing a decryption process. In an embodiment, the random number received from the IAU 10 may be encrypted data obtained by converting the generated default ISK into 6 bytes.

[0060] refer to Figure 3 When the number A transmitted to the IAU 10 and the random number received from the IAU 10 are identical (301), the IBU 20 may temporarily store the generated ISK and use the generated ISK as data for determining the encryption key in the next process (302). Thus, the learning process for determining the encryption key may continue.

[0061] Alternatively, when the number A transmitted to the IAU 10 is different from the random number received from the IAU (301), the IBU 20 may terminate the learning for confirming the encryption key and restore all newly generated ISK values ​​to the initial values ​​in the above process (303).

[0062] In the above, the process of predetermining the ISK for encryption keys has been described. On the other hand, the process of deterministically determining the ISK for encryption keys is described below.

[0063] The IAU 10 generates a random number using the generated ISK provided at the IBU 20 (208). Here, the generated random number may be a number B, and may be 6-byte encrypted data. Next, the IAU 10 may transmit the generated number B to the IBU 20 (209).

[0064] The IBU 20 may encrypt 16 bytes to generate a generated ISK (210). In addition, the IBU 20 may generate a generated ISK by encrypting the number B and 16 bytes (e.g., a string of 16 bytes). Next, the IBU 20 may send the generated ISK generated in this process to the IAU 10 (211). Here, the 16 bytes may correspond to a value in which 4 lower bytes of a random number (6 bytes) are continuously arranged.

[0065] When receiving the generated ISK, the IAU 10 may determine whether the number B transmitted to the IBU 20 is the same as the random number received from the IBU 20 (212). The IAU 10 may determine whether the number B transmitted to the IBU 20 is equal to the received random number received from the IBU 20 by performing a decryption process. Here, the random number received from the IBU 20 may be encrypted data obtained by converting the generated ISK into 6 bytes.

[0066] Next, refer to Figure 4 When the number B transmitted to the IBU 20 and the random number received from the IBU 20 are identical (401), the IAU 10 may terminate the learning for determining the encryption key and determine the generated ISK as the encryption key (402).

[0067] Otherwise, when the number B sent to the IBU 20 is different from the random number received from the IBU 20 (401), the IBU 20 may terminate the learning for confirming the encryption key and restore all newly generated ISK values ​​to the initial values ​​in the above process (403).

[0068] According to an embodiment, one or more processors may generate a random number using a first default ISK and receive a second default ISK encrypted with the generated ISK generated based on the pin code. When the generated random number and the random number corresponding to the second default ISK are the same, the processor may determine the generated ISK as an encryption key for encrypted communications of the vehicle. In an embodiment, there will be a first default ISK and a second default ISK, which may mean that the default ISK values ​​in each of the IAU 10 and the IBU 20 are independent of each other.

[0069] According to another embodiment, the vehicle may include a first processor 10 and a second processor 20. Here, the first processor 10 may correspond to the IAU 10, and the second processor 20 may correspond to the IBU 20. In an embodiment, the first processor 10 may receive a number A which is a random number generated by the second processor 20, and generate a generated ISK based on the number A. When the received number A and the random number corresponding to the generated ISK are the same, the first processor 10 may determine a code for temporarily using the generated ISK. The second processor 20 may receive a number B which is a random number generated by the first processor 10, and generate 16 bytes based on the number B. When the received number B and the random number corresponding to the 16 bytes are the same, the second processor 20 may determine the generated ISK as a code for encrypted communication of the vehicle, and use the code as an encryption key defined by the last generated ISK. According to an embodiment, by introducing a new authenticator, an encryption key with enhanced security may be used for encrypted communication of the vehicle.

[0070] In the above, there has been described a method of learning an encryption key between the IAU 10 and the IBU 20. Hereinafter, a learning process related to the above-mentioned encryption data is performed, and a method of transmitting encryption data through the IAU 10 and the IBU 20 will be described in detail.

[0071] Figure 5 is a flow chart for describing a process of transmitting encrypted data by the IAU 10. However, it should be understood that this is an example and some operations may be added or omitted if necessary.

[0072] The IAU 10 may receive an authentication result of the locking device 31 from the locking control module 30 (501). For example, the authentication result is whether the door locking or door releasing of the vehicle has been performed or whether the power of the vehicle has been operated. Here, the ISK of the IAU 10 may be a value generated in the above-mentioned encryption key learning process.

[0073] Next, the IAU 10 may inform the IBU 20 that the encrypted data exists in a common data format (502), and in response, the IBU 20 may generate a random number (503), and receive the command and the random number (504). Figure 6 , the key structure of SMKmsg03601 can be confirmed as an example of the general data sent. Here, the command is a request value, and the random number can indicate an arbitrary random value.

[0074] The IAU 10 may encrypt the received command and random number (505), and send the encrypted data to the IBU 20 (506). Figure 6, the key structure of IAUMsg04 602 and IAUMsg05 603 may be confirmed as an example of decrypted data. Here, Result is the result value of the request, and Recv Random may indicate the random value received at the time of the request.

[0075] Finally, upon receiving the encrypted data, the IBU 20 may decrypt IAUMsg04 602 and IAUMsg05 603 and confirm whether the sent random number and the received random number are the same. In an embodiment, when it is determined that they are the same, the transmission is terminated. When it is determined that they are not the same, the request signal may be regenerated.

[0076] Figure 7 is a flow chart for describing a process of sending encrypted data by the IBU 20. However, it should be understood that this is an example and some operations may be added or omitted if necessary.

[0077] When the IAU 10 receives the encrypted data from the IBU 20, the IAU 10 may send a command and a random number to the IBU 20 (701). Figure 8 , the key structure of IAUmsg00 801 can be confirmed as an example of data sent by IAU 10.

[0078] The IBU 20 may encrypt the received command and random number (702), and transmit the encrypted random number (703). For example, the IBU 20 may transmit encrypted data based on the command and random number received from the IAU 10. Figure 8 , the key structure of SMKmsg05 802 and SMKmsg06 803 may be confirmed as an example of decrypted data. Here, Result is the result value of the request, and Random may indicate a random value received at the time of the request.

[0079] Finally, upon receiving the encrypted data, the IAU 10 may decrypt SMKmsg05 802 and SMKmsg06 803 and confirm whether the sent random number and the received random number are the same. In an embodiment, when it is determined that they are the same, the transmission is terminated. When it is determined that they are not the same, the request signal may be regenerated.

[0080] According to aspects of the present disclosure as described above, since a process of authenticating encrypted data is added through a newly introduced IAU and algorithm, the stability of a vehicle safety system may be enhanced.

[0081] At the same time, the disclosed embodiments may be implemented in the form of a recording medium storing instructions executable by a computer. The instructions may be stored in the form of program code, and when executed by a processor, the instructions may generate a program module to perform the operations of the disclosed embodiments. The recording medium may be implemented as a computer-readable recording medium.

[0082] The computer-readable recording medium may include all kinds of recording media storing commands that can be interpreted by a computer. For example, the computer-readable recording medium may be a ROM, RAM, a magnetic tape, a magnetic disk, a flash memory, an optical data storage device, etc.

[0083] The logic blocks, modules or units described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein may be implemented or executed by a computing device having at least one processor, at least one memory and at least one communication interface. The elements of the methods, processes or algorithms described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein may be directly embodied in hardware, in a software module executed by at least one processor, or in a combination of the two. Computer executable instructions for implementing the methods, processes or algorithms described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein may be stored in a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium.

[0084] So far, the embodiments and examples of the present disclosure have been described with reference to the accompanying drawings. It will be apparent to those skilled in the art that the present disclosure can be practiced in other forms than the above embodiments without changing the technical ideas or basic features of the present disclosure. The above embodiments are only examples and should not be interpreted in a limited sense.

Claims

1. A vehicle, include: at least one memory configured to store at least one default instruction structure key (ISK), a generated instruction structure key (ISK), and a pin code of the vehicle; and at least one processor, wherein the at least one default instruction structure key comprises a first default instruction structure key and a second default instruction structure key, and Wherein, the at least one processor is configured to: Generate a random number using the first default instruction structure key; receiving the second default instruction structure key encrypted with the generated instruction structure key, wherein the generated instruction structure key is generated based on the pin code; and When the generated random number is identical to the random number corresponding to the second default instruction structure key, the generated instruction structure key is determined as an encryption key for encrypted communication of the vehicle.

2. The vehicle according to claim 1, in, The generated command structure key is configured to be generated by hashing the pin code of the vehicle to a secure hash algorithm (SHA) 256.

3. The vehicle according to claim 1, in, The at least one processor includes a first processor and a second processor, Wherein, the first processor is configured as follows: receiving a number A, wherein the number A is a random number generated by the second processor; generating said generated instruction structure key based on said number A; and When the received number A is identical to the random number corresponding to the generated instruction structure key, the generated instruction structure key is determined as a code for temporary use, and Wherein, the second processor is configured as: receiving a number B, wherein the number B is a random number generated by the first processor; Generate 16 bytes based on the number B; and When the received number B is identical to the random number corresponding to the 16 bytes, the generated instruction structure key is determined as a code for encrypted communication of the vehicle.

4. The vehicle according to claim 3, in, The random number corresponding to the generated instruction structure key is a random number corresponding to the default instruction structure key encrypted using the generated instruction structure key generated based on the pin code.

5. The vehicle according to claim 3, in, The 16 bytes are a value obtained by successively arranging the 4 lower-order bytes of the number B.

6. The vehicle according to claim 3, in, When the received number A is not identical to the random number corresponding to the generated instruction structure key, the first processor is configured to restore the generated instruction structure key to a previous value.

7. The vehicle according to claim 3, in, When the received number B is not identical to the random number corresponding to the 16 bytes, the second processor is configured to restore the generated instruction structure key to a previous value.

8. A method of controlling a vehicle, the vehicle performing encrypted communication using at least one default instruction structure key (ISK), a generated instruction structure key and a pin code, the method include: wherein the at least one default instruction structure key comprises a first default instruction structure key and a second default instruction structure key, and Generate a random number using the first default instruction structure key; receiving the second default instruction structure key encrypted with the generated instruction structure key, wherein the generated instruction structure key is generated based on the pin code; and When the generated random number is identical to the random number corresponding to the second default instruction structure key, the generated instruction structure key is determined as an encryption key for encrypted communication of the vehicle.

9. The method according to claim 8, in, The generated command structure key is configured to be generated by hashing the pin code of the vehicle to a secure hash algorithm (SHA) 256.

10. The method according to claim 8, in, Determining the generated instruction structure key as a code for encrypted communication of the vehicle includes: Generate a number A as a random number; generating the generated instruction structure key based on the number A; When the generated number A is the same as the random number corresponding to the generated instruction structure key, determining the generated instruction structure key as a code for temporary use; Generate a number B as a random number; Generate 16 bytes based on the number B; and When the generated number B is identical to the random number corresponding to the 16 bytes, the generated instruction structure key is determined as a code for encrypted communication of the vehicle.

11. The method according to claim 10, in, The random number corresponding to the generated instruction structure key is a random number corresponding to the default instruction structure key encrypted using the generated instruction structure key generated based on the pin code.

12. The method according to claim 10, in, The 16 bytes are a value obtained by successively arranging the 4 lower-order bytes of the number B.

13. The method according to claim 10, in, Determining the generated instruction structure key as a code for temporary use comprises: When the generated number A is not the same as the random number corresponding to the generated instruction structure key, the generated instruction structure key is restored to a previous value.

14. The method according to claim 10, in, Determining the generated instruction structure key as a code for encrypted communication of the vehicle includes: When the generated number B is different from the random number corresponding to the 16 bytes, the generated instruction structure key is restored to a previous value.

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