A method to counter distributed drone swarms based on navigation deception countermeasures
By generating false navigation speed signals and distributed spoofing strategies, navigation and confrontation is carried out against key drones in drone clusters, solving the problem of drone cluster countermeasures in the existing technology, achieving efficient confrontation effects and low cost a confrontation.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202111015315.X
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2021-08-31
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-15
- Estimated Expiration
- 2041-08-31
AI Technical Summary
The existing drone cluster confrontation methods need to be defeated one by one, making it difficult to effectively counter the distributed drone cluster, and the confrontation cost is relatively low.
By generating false navigation speed signals, we trick key drones in the drone cluster, use distributed spoofing strategies to achieve overall directional disconnection of the drone cluster, and only implement navigation confrontations on some key drones, and use cluster distribution to facilitate clusters. The structure achieves collective confrontation effect.
The overall directional drive away of the drone cluster is realized, and the confrontational cost ratio is improved. The navigation speed spoofing signal of false Doppler frequency is quickly taken over key drone navigation signals, avoiding the elimination of the cluster fault tolerance mechanism, and improving the The success rate of navigation deception.
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Figure CN113866795B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of countering drone clusters, and in particular to a method for countering distributed drone clusters based on navigation deception confrontation. Background Art
[0002] With the rapid development of cutting-edge technologies such as cooperative control, swarm intelligence, and self-organizing network communication technology, the R&D cost of distributed drone clusters has continued to decline, reliability has gradually improved, and working performance has continued to enhance. At the same time, the security risks brought by non-cooperative distributed drone clusters are increasing day by day, posing a major threat to important civil and military facilities such as oil fields, power stations, and missile positions. At present, the confrontation methods against drone clusters are mainly divided into hard confrontation and soft confrontation. Hard confrontation includes dense weapon interception, high-energy laser attack, high-power microwave counterattack, and curtain interception, while soft confrontation includes radio interference and data link control. When confronting drone clusters, the above methods need to counter the entire cluster in a way of breaking them one by one, which has the problem of low counter-effectiveness. In order to effectively confront drone clusters, it is necessary to study the confrontation methods for distributed drone clusters, implement navigation confrontation only on some key drones in the cluster, and use the distributed structure characteristics of the cluster to achieve the overall confrontation effect of the cluster from point to surface, effectively improving the confrontation cost-effectiveness.
[0003] In general, the core of drone swarm navigation confrontation is to detect the direction of drone swarms, identify key drones in the swarm, use navigation deception signals to take over the satellite navigation of key drones, and design confrontation strategies based on cluster distributed interaction to deceive, interfere with or destroy the perception and decision-making of the cluster, so as to achieve effective confrontation and countermeasures against drone swarms. From the current public research results at home and abroad, there is no research on methods for countering distributed drone swarms based on navigation deception confrontation. Summary of the invention
[0004] In response to the above-mentioned problems, the present invention aims to provide a method for countering distributed drone clusters based on navigation deception confrontation, which generates a false navigation speed signal to deceive the positioning information of key drones in the drone cluster, and adopts a distributed deception strategy to achieve overall directional expulsion of the drone cluster.
[0005] In order to achieve the above object, the technical solution adopted by the present invention is as follows:
[0006] The method for countering distributed drone clusters based on navigation deception confrontation is characterized by comprising the following steps:
[0007] S1: Detect and warn the direction of the drone cluster and orient the drone cluster;
[0008] S2: A multi-node clustering method based on strength constraints to determine the key drones in the drone cluster;
[0009] S3: Build a navigation spoofing signal model to simulate real satellite signals;
[0010] S4: Navigation spoofing signals invade the receiver to take over key UAV navigation signals;
[0011] S5: Use the information interaction of the drone cluster to transmit the navigation deception signal received by the key drone to the entire drone cluster;
[0012] S6: The drone cluster corrects its speed according to the received navigation spoofing signal and adjusts its movement direction under the action of the navigation spoofing signal to achieve directional expulsion of the drone cluster;
[0013] S7: Continuously monitor the movement direction of the drone cluster. If the movement direction of the drone cluster changes according to the induction of the navigation deception signal, the countermeasure process ends; otherwise, repeat steps S1-S6 to continue to counter the navigation deception of the drone cluster.
[0014] Furthermore, the specific operation of step S1 includes the following steps:
[0015] S101: The "eye pointing" system uses passive detection to obtain the direction of the drone cluster;
[0016] S102: Use the multi-beam correlation amplitude ratio method to roughly measure the direction of the UAV's incoming wave, and use the quadratic interpolation method to correct the estimation deviation caused by the fence effect;
[0017] S103: Defuzzifying the measured phase difference using the corrected angle measurement value;
[0018] S104: Use unambiguous phase difference calculation to achieve accurate estimation of the incoming wave direction of the drone cluster.
[0019] Furthermore, the specific operation of step S2 includes the following steps:
[0020] S201: With all drones in the cluster as the node set V, the connection relationship between drones as the edge set E, and the interaction strength as W, an undirected graph model G(V, E, W) of the drone cluster is constructed;
[0021] S202: Using the full connection method and relying on the Gaussian kernel function Construct the similarity matrix D = [d ij ], which is used to measure the interaction intensity between drones;
[0022] In the formula, x i and x jare any two node positions of the graph, r is the radial width parameter of the function;
[0023] S203: In the constructed undirected graph model G(V, E, W), a strength threshold T is set, and edges with interaction strength less than the threshold T are discarded to obtain a graph G′(V′, E′, W′) with strength constraints;
[0024] S204: Construct a Laplacian matrix L′ based on the metric matrix W′, convert the graph G′ into a vector representation of the nodes, and obtain a new sample set Y = {y1, y2, ..., y n};
[0025] S205: Cluster the sample set Y into clusters using a density-based clustering algorithm, and output the center nodes A = {a1, a2, ..., a k}, which is the key drone of the drone cluster.
[0026] Furthermore, the navigation deception signal model described in step S3 is: In the formula, is the navigation deception signal, i represents the number of the real satellite signal simulated by the navigation deception signal; t is the time when the navigation signal is received; A i (t) represents the amplitude of the real satellite signal; C i and D i is the L1 carrier data code signal structure parameter; f L1 Indicates the carrier frequency of the L1 carrier; Represents the ionospheric delay of the real satellite signal, which has equal and opposite effects on the carrier phase and code phase; It represents the total delay of other signals in the real satellite signal except the ionosphere. Where c is the speed of light, R i is the geometric distance from the satellite antenna to the receiver antenna, and represent satellite clock error and tropospheric error respectively.
[0027] Furthermore, the specific operation of step S4 includes the following steps:
[0028] S401: For key UAVs in the cluster, use communication suppression jammers to suppress the communication links of the UAV remote control signals and image transmission signals;
[0029] S402: Use navigation deception signals to quickly invade the receiver and take over key UAV navigation signals.
[0030] Furthermore, the communication suppression interference signal described in step S401 adopts a broadband interference signal, represented by ρ(t), which can be achieved by modulating the carrier signal with a pseudocode to achieve full coverage of a wider frequency band. The broadband interference signal model ρ(t) is expressed as ρ(t)=Γ(t)exp(j2πωt+Φ0), where Γ(t) is a pseudocode with adjustable code rate, and the code rate determines the bandwidth of the broadband interference signal; ω is the carrier frequency; Φ0 is the initial phase.
[0031] Furthermore, the specific operation of step S5 includes the following steps:
[0032] S501: Based on the navigation deception signal and the distributed local information interaction principle of the drone cluster, a distributed interactive propagation mechanism model of the deception signal is constructed;
[0033] S502: Utilize cluster information interaction to transmit the deception signal of the key drone to the entire drone cluster.
[0034] Furthermore, the distributed interactive propagation mechanism model of the deceptive signal described in step S501 is:
[0035]
[0036] Where, j = 1, 2, ..., N, N is the number of other drones in the drone cluster excluding the key drone; Ω j (t) represents the input of the navigation deception signal to UAV j, x k (t), S k (t) and h k (t) represents the speed state, error speed information and expected formation of the key UAV k respectively; Λ j is the set of all neighboring drones of drone j, w jk (t) represents the local interaction weight between key UAV k and UAV j, and They are the error state and error formation of UAV j after being affected by the navigation deception signal, and the error formation of key UAV k after being affected by the countermeasure strategy. The combination of the error speed information and the desired formation is S k (t)+h k (t).
[0037] The beneficial effects of the present invention are:
[0038] 1. The method for countering distributed drone clusters based on navigation deception confrontation in the present invention can target the distributed architecture of the drone cluster, only confront some key drones, and realize confrontation of the entire cluster through cluster distributed interaction, thereby achieving a confrontation effect of partial driving the overall situation. It solves the problem that the existing drone cluster confrontation method can only confront in real time by defeating them one by one, and it is difficult to form an effective countermeasure against the distributed drone cluster and have a high cost-effectiveness of the confrontation.
[0039] 2. In the present invention, when constructing a deception signal model, a navigation deception signal is generated by importing a real-time ephemeris. The parameters of the deception signal are highly consistent with the parameters of the real satellite navigation signal, and the power of the navigation deception signal is greater than the power of the real satellite navigation signal. The navigation signal receiver of the deceived UAV is quickly taken over and locked to the deception signal, thereby realizing rapid takeover of the navigation deception signal of the key UAV.
[0040] 3. The method for countering distributed UAV clusters based on navigation deception confrontation in the present invention uses a navigation speed deception signal with a false Doppler frequency to counter the key UAVs in the UAV cluster, and replaces the position deception method with the speed deception method. It only needs to understand the direction of the key UAV without knowing its precise position, and can avoid the cluster fault tolerance mechanism from eliminating the jump navigation signal, which can improve the success rate of navigation deception.
[0041] 4. The method for countering distributed drone clusters based on navigation deception confrontation in the present invention is aimed at drone clusters that use satellite navigation as the main positioning means. Starting from the cluster distributed architecture, the direction of the drone cluster is detected and the key drones in the cluster are identified. The navigation speed deception signal with a false Doppler frequency is used to take over the satellite navigation of the key drones in the cluster, and the navigation deception signal is propagated to the entire cluster based on the cluster distributed information interaction. The speed deception signal is used to induce the cluster to deviate from the normal movement direction, and the overall directional expulsion of the cluster is achieved. The present invention can achieve the overall directional expulsion of the drone cluster by countering some drones, effectively improving the cost-effectiveness of the confrontation. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0042] Figure 1 This is a flow chart of a method for countering distributed drone clusters based on navigation deception confrontation in the present invention;
[0043] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the working process of the "target pointing" system in the present invention;
[0044] Figure 3 It is a schematic diagram of the basic principle flow of the multi-node clustering method based on strength constraints in the present invention.
[0045] Figure 4 This is a profile diagram of the navigation deception countermeasure distributed drone cluster mission in the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0046] In order to enable those skilled in the art to better understand the technical solution of the present invention, the technical solution of the present invention is further described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and embodiments.
[0047] A method to counter distributed drone clusters based on navigation deception confrontation uses generative navigation deception signals to take over the satellite navigation of key drones in the drone cluster, trigger the drone speed correction control to change the direction of drone movement, and spread the navigation deception signal to the entire drone cluster based on the distributed local information interaction of the drone cluster, thereby changing the overall movement direction of the drone cluster and achieving directional expulsion of the cluster.
[0048] The specific operation steps are as follows Figure 1 As shown, the following steps are included:
[0049] S1: Detection and early warning of the direction of the drone cluster, using the "eye pointing" system to receive the drone cluster signal, detect the signal and estimate the parameters to achieve the orientation of the drone cluster;
[0050] Specifically, S101: The "eye pointing" system uses passive detection to obtain the direction of the drone cluster;
[0051] The "eye pointing" system, also known as the drone target positioning and indication system, has the main function of detecting drone clusters and determining their approximate direction. First, array antennas and multi-channel radio receivers are used to intercept the image transmission signals and remote control signals radiated by the drone clusters. Then, the intercepted signals are detected and parameter estimated. The single-station direction finding and multi-station network cross-positioning methods are used, combined with the pseudo-linear least squares method and Gauss-Newton iteration method, to achieve the orientation of the drone cluster; each direction finding station is mainly composed of an array antenna, a radio frequency receiver, a signal processor, etc. The working process of the "eye pointing" system is shown in the attached figure. Figure 2 shown.
[0052] S102: Use the multi-beam correlation amplitude ratio method to roughly measure the direction of the UAV's incoming wave, and use the quadratic interpolation method to correct the estimation deviation caused by the fence effect;
[0053] S103: Defuzzifying the measured phase difference using the corrected angle measurement value;
[0054] S104: Use unambiguous phase difference calculation to achieve accurate estimation of the incoming wave direction of the drone cluster.
[0055] Furthermore, S2: key UAV identification and feature extraction; in the distributed architecture of the UAV cluster, for key UAVs with many neighboring UAVs, a multi-node clustering method based on strength constraints is used to improve the selection coverage of key UAVs through clustering, and the most representative key UAVs are selected;
[0056] Specifically, the multi-node clustering method based on strength constraints can analyze the distributed architecture of the UAV cluster and identify key UAVs. The basic principle and process of this method are shown in the attached figure. Figure 3 As shown, the specific operation includes the following steps:
[0057] S201: With all drones in the cluster as the node set V, the connection relationship between drones as the edge set E, and the interaction strength as W, an undirected graph model G(V, E, W) of the drone cluster is constructed;
[0058] S202: Using the full connection method and relying on the Gaussian kernel function Construct the similarity matrix D = [d ij ], which is used to measure the interaction intensity between drones;
[0059] In the formula, x i and x j are any two node positions of the graph, r is the radial width parameter of the function;
[0060] S203: In the constructed undirected graph model G(V, E, W), a strength threshold T is set, and edges with interaction strength less than the threshold T are discarded to obtain a graph G′(V′, E′, W′) with strength constraints;
[0061] S204: Construct a Laplacian matrix L′ based on the metric matrix W′, convert the graph G′ into a vector representation of the nodes, and obtain a new sample set Y = {y1, y2, ..., y n};
[0062] S205: Cluster the sample set Y into clusters using a density-based clustering algorithm, and output the center nodes A = {a1, a2, ..., a k}, which is the key drone of the drone cluster.
[0063] Further, S3: generating navigation spoofing signals, constructing navigation spoofing signal models, accurately controlling the carrier phase of navigation spoofing signals, simulating real satellite signals, generating satellite navigation spoofing signals with false Doppler frequencies, and achieving strict consistency between the spoofing signals and real signals;
[0064] The navigation deception signal model is: In the formula, is the navigation deception signal, i represents the number of the real satellite signal simulated by the navigation deception signal; t is the time when the navigation signal is received; A i (t) represents the amplitude of the real satellite signal; C i and D i is the L1 carrier data code signal structure parameter; f L1 Indicates the carrier frequency of the L1 carrier; Represents the ionospheric delay of the real satellite signal, which has equal and opposite effects on the carrier phase and code phase; It represents the total delay of other signals in the real satellite signal except the ionosphere. Where c is the speed of light, R i is the geometric distance from the satellite antenna to the receiver antenna, and represent satellite clock error and tropospheric error respectively.
[0065] Using the spoofing signal model, the satellite constellation to be simulated can be inferred based on the receiver position, reception time and ephemeris data, and the corresponding satellite signal can be simulated using a simulator. The precise position of the satellite can then be calculated based on the ephemeris data, thereby obtaining the distance between the satellite and the receiver, calculating the propagation delay of the satellite signal to the receiver, and obtaining the signal transmission time based on the reception time. Finally, a high-order DDS is used to generate the required dynamic phase, and the spoofing signal carrier phase is precisely controlled to simulate the real signal and achieve strict consistency between the spoofing signal and the real signal.
[0066] Furthermore, S4: the navigation spoofing signal invades the receiver to take over the key UAV navigation signal;
[0067] Specifically, S401: for key UAVs in the cluster, a communication suppression jamming signal is used to suppress the communication link of the UAV remote control signal and the image transmission signal;
[0068] The communication suppression interference signal adopts a broadband interference signal, expressed as ρ(t), which can be achieved by modulating a carrier signal with a pseudo code to achieve full coverage of a wider frequency band. The broadband interference signal model ρ(t) is expressed as ρ(t)=Γ(t)exp(j2πωt+Φ0), where Γ(t) is a pseudo code with adjustable code rate, and the code rate determines the bandwidth of the broadband interference signal; ω is the carrier frequency; and Φ0 is the initial phase.
[0069] S402: Use navigation deception signals to quickly invade the receiver and take over key UAV navigation signals.
[0070] Further, S5: utilizing the information interaction of the drone cluster to transmit the navigation deception signal received by the key drone to the entire drone cluster;
[0071] Specifically, S501: based on the navigation deception signal and the distributed local information interaction principle of the drone cluster, a distributed interactive propagation mechanism model of the deception signal is constructed;
[0072] The distributed interactive propagation mechanism model of deception signals is:
[0073]
[0074] Where, j = 1, 2, ..., N, N is the number of other drones in the drone cluster excluding the key drone; Ω j (t) represents the input of the navigation deception signal to UAV j, x k (t), S k (t) and h k (t) represents the speed state, error speed information and expected formation of the key UAV k respectively; Λ j is the set of all neighboring drones of drone j, w jk (t) represents the local interaction weight between key UAV k and UAV j, and They are the error state and error formation of UAV j after being affected by the navigation deception signal, and the error formation of key UAV k after being affected by the countermeasure strategy. The combination of the error speed information and the desired formation is S k (t)+h k (t).
[0075] S502: Utilize cluster information interaction to transmit the deception signal of the key drone to the entire drone cluster.
[0076] Further, S6: the UAV cluster performs speed correction according to the received navigation deception signal. Affected by the satellite navigation deception signal, each UAV in the cluster generates a false speed error, and changes the steering control force according to the error, adjusts the movement direction under the action of the navigation deception signal, and realizes the directional expulsion of the UAV cluster;
[0077] Further, S7: verification of the effect of navigation deception countermeasure; using the "eye pointing" system to continuously monitor the movement direction of the drone cluster, if the movement direction of the drone cluster changes according to the induction of the navigation deception signal, the countermeasure process ends; otherwise, repeat steps S1-S6 to continue to conduct navigation deception countermeasure on the drone cluster.
[0078] Example:
[0079] For an incoming distributed drone swarm, since there is information interaction in the swarm, a method for countering a distributed drone swarm based on navigation deception confrontation described in the present invention is used to implement targeted countermeasures to achieve the purpose of directional expulsion.
[0080] Attached Figure 4 The navigation deception countermeasures mission profile of a distributed drone swarm is shown. The drone swarm consists of five drones, one of which is a key drone with high interaction intensity. The mission of the drone swarm is to reach the target position marked by the triangle in the figure. The purpose of countering the drone swarm is to change its direction of movement and achieve directional expulsion, thereby deviating from the target. Figure 4 It can be seen that the "eye-pointing" system is first used to detect the direction of the drone cluster, and then the key drones are identified, the real satellite signals are simulated and navigation deception signals are generated, the navigation deception signals are transmitted using the power amplifier antenna, the satellite navigation of the key drones is invaded and taken over, and then the navigation deception signals are propagated through the cluster's distributed information interaction, thereby triggering the speed correction control of the drone cluster and changing the cluster's movement direction to achieve the purpose of directional expulsion.
[0081] The above shows and describes the basic principles, main features and advantages of the present invention. It should be understood by those skilled in the art that the present invention is not limited to the above embodiments, and the above embodiments and descriptions are only for explaining the principles of the present invention. Without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention, the present invention may have various changes and improvements, which fall within the scope of the present invention to be protected. The scope of protection of the present invention is defined by the attached claims and their equivalents.
Claims
1. A method for countering distributed drone swarms based on navigation deception confrontation, characterized in that: The following steps are included: S1: Detect and warn the direction of the drone cluster and orient the drone cluster; S2: A multi-node clustering method based on strength constraints to determine the key drones in the drone cluster; S3: Build a navigation spoofing signal model to simulate real satellite signals; S4: Navigation spoofing signals invade the receiver to take over key UAV navigation signals; S5: Use the information interaction of the drone cluster to transmit the navigation deception signal received by the key drone to the entire drone cluster; S6: The drone cluster corrects its speed according to the received navigation spoofing signal and adjusts its movement direction under the action of the navigation spoofing signal to achieve directional expulsion of the drone cluster; S7: Continuously monitor the movement direction of the drone cluster. If the movement direction of the drone cluster changes according to the induction of the navigation deception signal, the countermeasure process ends; otherwise, repeat steps S1-S6 to continue to counter the navigation deception of the drone cluster.
2. The method for countering distributed drone clusters based on navigation deception confrontation according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The specific operation of step S1 includes the following steps: S101: The "target pointing" system uses passive detection to obtain the direction of the drone cluster; S102: Use the multi-beam correlation amplitude ratio method to roughly measure the direction of the UAV's incoming wave, and use the quadratic interpolation method to correct the estimation deviation caused by the fence effect; S103: Defuzzifying the measured phase difference using the corrected angle measurement value; S104: Use unambiguous phase difference calculation to achieve accurate estimation of the incoming wave direction of the drone cluster.
3. The method for countering distributed drone clusters based on navigation deception confrontation according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The specific operation of step S2 includes the following steps: S201: With all drones in the cluster as the node set V, the connection relationship between drones as the edge set E, and the interaction strength as W, an undirected graph model G(V, E, W) of the drone cluster is constructed; S202: Using the full connection method and relying on the Gaussian kernel function Construct the similarity matrix D = [d ij ], which is used to measure the interaction intensity between drones; In the formula, x i and x j are any two node positions of the graph, r is the radial width parameter of the function; S203: In the constructed undirected graph model G(V, E, W), a strength threshold T is set, and edges with interaction strength less than the threshold T are discarded to obtain a graph G′(V′, E′, W′) with strength constraints; S204: Construct a Laplacian matrix L′ based on the metric matrix W′, convert the graph G′ into a vector representation of the nodes, and obtain a new sample set Y = {y1, y2, ..., y n }; S205: Cluster the sample set Y into clusters using a density-based clustering algorithm, and output the center nodes A = {a1, a2, ..., a k }, which is the key drone of the drone cluster.
4. The method for countering distributed drone clusters based on navigation deception confrontation according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The navigation deception signal model described in step S3 is: In the formula, is the navigation deception signal, i represents the number of the real satellite signal simulated by the navigation deception signal; t is the time when the navigation signal is received; A i (t) represents the amplitude of the real satellite signal; C i and D i is the L1 carrier data code signal structure parameter; f L1 Indicates the carrier frequency of the L1 carrier; Represents the ionospheric delay of the real satellite signal, which has equal and opposite effects on the carrier phase and code phase; It represents the total delay of other signals in the real satellite signal except the ionosphere. Where c is the speed of light, R i is the geometric distance from the satellite antenna to the receiver antenna, and represent satellite clock error and tropospheric error respectively.
5. The method for countering distributed drone clusters based on navigation deception confrontation according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The specific operation of step S4 includes the following steps: S401: For key UAVs in the cluster, use communication suppression jammers to suppress the communication links of the UAV remote control signals and image transmission signals; S402: Use navigation deception signals to quickly invade the receiver and take over key UAV navigation signals.
6. The method for countering distributed drone clusters based on navigation deception confrontation according to claim 5 is characterized in that: The communication suppression interference signal described in step S401 adopts a broadband interference signal, expressed as ρ(t), which can be achieved by modulating the carrier signal with a pseudocode to achieve full coverage of a wider frequency band. The broadband interference signal model ρ(t) is expressed as ρ(t)=Γ(t)exp(j2πωt+Φ0), where Γ(t) is a pseudocode with adjustable code rate, and the code rate determines the bandwidth of the broadband interference signal; ω is the carrier frequency; Φ0 is the initial phase.
7. The method for countering distributed drone clusters based on navigation deception confrontation according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The specific operation of step S5 includes the following steps: S501: Based on the navigation deception signal and the distributed local information interaction principle of the drone cluster, a distributed interactive propagation mechanism model of the deception signal is constructed; S502: Utilize cluster information interaction to transmit the deception signal of the key drone to the entire drone cluster.
8. The method for countering distributed drone clusters based on navigation deception confrontation according to claim 7 is characterized in that: The distributed interactive propagation mechanism model of the deceptive signal described in step S501 is: Where, j = 1, 2, ..., N, N is the number of other drones in the drone cluster excluding the key drone; Ω j (t) represents the input of the navigation deception signal to UAV j, x k (t), S k (t) and h k (t) represents the speed state, error speed information and expected formation of the key UAV k respectively; Λ j is the set of all neighboring drones of drone j, w jk (t) represents the local interaction weight between key UAV k and UAV j, and They are the error state and error formation of UAV j after being affected by the navigation deception signal, and the error formation of key UAV k after being affected by the countermeasure strategy. The combination of the error speed information and the desired formation is S k (t)+h k (t).
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