Fault pattern recognition method for complex aerospace systems based on correlation fault analysis

Abstract

The present invention discloses a method for identifying a fault pattern of a complex aerospace system based on correlation fault analysis, comprising the following steps: S1: identifying system-level unexpected events that affect business continuity and system safety along the on-orbit mission profile of a spacecraft, taking the spacecraft system-level unexpected events as the top events, and establishing a system-level fault tree according to a prescribed analysis method; S2: determining whether the number of fault trees is consistent with the number of unexpected events; S3: analyzing the influence from other systems / equipment, subsystems / equipment and the external environment. In the present invention, taking the system-level unexpected events as the top events, by analyzing the correlation influence of the design interface relationship such as organic, electrical, thermal, etc. with the faulty equipment or the existence of potential action forms such as material exchange, motion interference, etc., the weak links that affect the business continuity and system safety of the spacecraft are identified, and the mission risk is reduced.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of overall design of aerospace products, and in particular to a method for identifying failure modes of complex aerospace systems based on correlation failure analysis. Background Art

[0002] With the rapid development of my country's aerospace industry, especially the implementation of high-intensity development and high-density launch missions of spacecraft in recent years, it is necessary to conduct in-depth research on the technical characteristics and risk points of aerospace products. In order to avoid the failure of aerospace missions and economic losses, improve the autonomous on-orbit operation capability of spacecraft, and ensure the reliability and stability of spacecraft operation.

[0003] Complex aerospace products are usually the result of multidisciplinary and multi-professional technical achievements. There is a high degree of integration between disciplines, and the technical characteristics are highly correlated. A minor problem or abnormality in a certain part may lead to the attenuation or even failure of the overall function of the product. Inadequate risk identification and control will lead to related quality problems. In view of the shortcomings in the development process, it is necessary to further improve the development model and development procedures of aerospace products, improve the development methods, and enhance the development capabilities and levels.

[0004] In the process of aerospace product development, there is a set of scientific procedures and methods for risk identification and control, and the effectiveness of risk control measures is verified. For example, through failure mode effect analysis (FMEA), fault tree / event tree (FTA / ETA) in-depth analysis, sufficient ground development tests, etc., the relevant risk characteristics are effectively exposed and mastered, the risk points are identified in place, and the risk control measures are verified in place. However, in the process of aerospace product development, it is difficult to fully determine the FTA top event, and in the flight mission, with the dynamic changes of flight time and space, the impact of the failure is also different. In particular, complex spacecraft and their missions have the characteristics of multiple subsystems, multiple interfaces, and multiple flight modes. In the process of conducting FTA analysis, it is necessary to identify all external bottom event factors that cause failures by analyzing the relationship between the design interface of the faulty equipment such as organic, electrical, thermal, or the existence of potential forms of action such as material exchange and motion interference. As an extension and supplement to FTA, correlation failure analysis (CFTA) is to jointly complete the deductive analysis of failures.

[0005] Therefore, a method for identifying aerospace product faults based on correlation fault analysis was designed and invented. This method can cover the working modes of equipment in different flight mission segments, help to comprehensively identify the system-level fault modes of aerospace products, reduce mission risks, and has strong engineering application value. Summary of the invention

[0006] The purpose of the present invention is to solve the above problems and to propose a method for complex aerospace system fault pattern identification based on correlation fault analysis.

[0007] In order to achieve the above object, the present invention adopts the following technical solutions:

[0008] A method for complex aerospace system failure mode identification based on correlation failure analysis includes the following steps:

[0009] S1: Identify system-level unexpected events that affect business continuity and system safety along the spacecraft on-orbit mission profile, take the spacecraft system-level unexpected events as the top events, and establish a system-level fault tree according to the prescribed analysis method;

[0010] S2: Determine whether the number of fault trees is consistent with the number of undesirable events;

[0011] S3: Analyze the impact from other systems / equipment, subsystems / equipment and external environment (natural environment, induced environment), the mutual impact between systems / equipment, subsystems / equipment and external environment, including at least design interface, environment, motion interference and material exchange, etc.;

[0012] S4: Pay attention to related abnormal failures in previous development processes and on-orbit work, and conduct comparative monitoring;

[0013] S5: Comprehensively analyze the possible failures of the design interfaces between systems, subsystems, and equipment. At the same time, comprehensively analyze and identify the potential failure connections between systems, subsystems, and equipment that may affect business continuity and system security. Conduct mechanism impact analysis and analyze and identify failure modes that may affect the safe operation of systems, subsystems, and key equipment from the perspective of optics, mechanics, electricity, heat, magnetism, chemistry, and other disciplines;

[0014] S6: Identify the energy transfer and material exchange between systems and subsystems that are not required by the design. For the newly identified interconnections, analyze them according to the interfaces between each other to form a system safety bottom line list, and determine the quantitative boundaries of the safety bottom line that affect the occurrence of failure modes;

[0015] S7: Based on the probability of occurrence and recovery time of known bottom events, use availability analysis methods to calculate and rank the degree of harm of bottom events, so as to determine the priority of fault response design.

[0016] Preferably, in the steps S1 to S5, the correlation fault analysis method is combined with the fault tree analysis method to identify the troubleshooting mode, the bottom event is comprehensively identified, and the corresponding safety bottom line quantitative boundary is determined when the fault mode occurs.

[0017] Preferably, in the step S3, the mutual influence between subsystems and the external environment influence in terms of design interface, environment, motion interference and material exchange are considered respectively.

[0018] Preferably, in the steps S3 to S6, a correlation fault analysis method is used to identify the sources of dangerous events that may lead to serious consequences and provide quantitative indicators of the safety bottom line.

[0019] In summary, due to the adoption of the above technical solution, the beneficial effects of the present invention are:

[0020] This application uses system-level unexpected events as top events and analyzes the correlation effects of organic, electrical, thermal and other design interface relationships with faulty equipment or the existence of potential forms of action such as material exchange and motion interference to identify weak links that affect spacecraft business continuity and system safety and reduce mission risks. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0021] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of a method for identifying aerospace product faults based on correlation fault analysis according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown; DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0022] The following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention to clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0023] See also Figure 1 , the present invention provides a technical solution:

[0024] A method for complex aerospace system failure mode identification based on correlation failure analysis includes the following steps:

[0025] S1: Identify system-level unexpected events that affect business continuity and system safety along the spacecraft on-orbit mission profile, take the spacecraft system-level unexpected events as the top events, and establish a system-level fault tree according to the prescribed analysis method;

[0026] S2: Determine whether the number of fault trees is consistent with the number of undesirable events;

[0027] S3: Analyze the impact from other systems / equipment, subsystems / equipment and external environment (natural environment, induced environment), the mutual impact between systems / equipment, subsystems / equipment and external environment, including at least design interface, environment, motion interference and material exchange, etc. Take the damage of solar wing structure as an example to analyze the mutual impact relationship:

[0028] a. Design interface: focus on the relationship between the solar panel and other systems such as mechanics, power supply, light intensity and control program;

[0029] b. Environment: Space debris, micrometeorites, etc. may cause collision damage to the solar panel array;

[0030] c. Motion interference: The robotic arm or other large moving parts on the surface of the spacecraft may cause direct physical contact and indirect interference such as field of view blocking on the solar panels;

[0031] d. Material exchange: Due to the thruster installation layout, the thruster plume contaminates the surface of the solar array structure, or the chemical energy of the thruster is converted into the kinetic energy of the solar wing. When the energy is too large, it will cause structural damage.

[0032] S4: Pay attention to related abnormal failures in previous development processes and on-orbit work, and conduct comparative monitoring;

[0033] S5: Comprehensively analyze the possible failures of the design interfaces between systems, subsystems, and equipment. At the same time, comprehensively analyze and identify the potential failure connections between systems, subsystems, and equipment that may affect business continuity and system security. Conduct mechanism impact analysis and analyze and identify unexpected events that may affect the safe operation of systems, subsystems, and key equipment from the perspective of optics, mechanics, electricity, heat, magnetism, chemistry, and other disciplines. This includes the following dimensions:

[0034] a. Aircraft: The mechanical environment experienced during the flight phase, including the active segment vibration environment, separation shock and motion interference, which will affect the stability of the solar wing structure;

[0035] b. Electricity: S3 is used to analyze the impact of other subsystems on the solar panels in terms of power supply, communication, command, telemetry and other electrical interfaces;

[0036] c. Heat: S3 is used to analyze the impact of thermally sensitive equipment on failure modes;

[0037] d. Others: Analyze the impact that the spacecraft thruster may have on the structural failure of the solar wing through step S3, and propose quantitative requirements, including safety bottom line indicators and specific quantitative requirements;

[0038] S6: Identify the energy transfer and material exchange between systems and subsystems that are not required by the design. For the newly identified interconnections, analyze them according to the interfaces between each other to form a system safety bottom line list, and determine the quantitative boundaries of the safety bottom line that affect the occurrence of failure modes;

[0039] S7: Based on the probability of occurrence and recovery time of known bottom events, use availability analysis methods to calculate and rank the degree of harm of bottom events, so as to determine the priority of fault response design.

[0040] In steps S1 to S5, the correlation fault analysis method is combined with the fault tree analysis method to identify the troubleshooting mode, the bottom event is comprehensively identified, and the corresponding safety bottom line quantitative boundary is determined when the fault mode occurs.

[0041] In step S3, the mutual influence between subsystems and the external environmental influence in terms of design interface, environment, motion interference and material exchange are considered respectively.

[0042] In steps S3 to S6, the correlation fault analysis method is used to identify the sources of dangerous events that can lead to serious consequences and provide quantitative indicators of the safety bottom line.

[0043] The above description of the embodiments enables those skilled in the art to implement or use the present invention. Various modifications to these embodiments will be apparent to those skilled in the art, and the general principles defined herein may be implemented in other embodiments without departing from the spirit or scope of the present invention. Therefore, the present invention will not be limited to the embodiments shown herein, but will conform to the widest scope consistent with the principles and novel features disclosed herein.

Claims

1. A method for complex aerospace system fault pattern identification based on correlation fault analysis, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: S1: Identify system-level unexpected events that affect business continuity and system safety along the spacecraft on-orbit mission profile, take the spacecraft system-level unexpected events as the top events, and establish a system-level fault tree according to the prescribed analysis method; S2: Determine whether the number of fault trees is consistent with the number of undesirable events; S3: Analyze the influence from other systems / equipment, subsystems / equipment and external environment, the mutual influence between systems / equipment, subsystems / equipment and external environment, including at least design interface, environment, motion interference and material exchange; wherein the external environment is natural environment and / or induced environment; S4: Pay attention to related abnormal failures in previous development processes and on-orbit work, and conduct comparative monitoring; S5: Comprehensively analyze the possible failures of the design interfaces between systems, subsystems, and equipment. At the same time, comprehensively analyze and identify the potential failure connections between systems, subsystems, and equipment that may affect business continuity and system security. Conduct mechanism impact analysis and analyze and identify failure modes that may affect the safe operation of systems, subsystems, and key equipment from the perspectives of optics, mechanics, electricity, heat, magnetism, and chemistry. S6: Identify the energy transfer and material exchange between systems and subsystems that are not required by the design. For the newly identified interconnections, analyze them according to the interfaces between each other to form a system safety bottom line list, and determine the quantitative boundaries of the safety bottom line that affect the occurrence of failure modes; S7: Based on the probability of occurrence and recovery time of known bottom events, use availability analysis methods to calculate and rank the degree of harm of bottom events, so as to determine the priority of fault response design.

2. A method for complex aerospace system fault pattern identification based on correlation fault analysis according to claim 1, characterized in that: In the steps S1 to S5, the correlation fault analysis method is combined with the fault tree analysis method to identify the troubleshooting mode, the bottom event is comprehensively identified, and the corresponding safety bottom line quantitative boundary is determined when the fault mode occurs.

3. The method for complex aerospace system fault pattern identification based on correlation fault analysis according to claim 1 is characterized in that: In the step S3, the mutual influence between subsystems and the external environment influence in terms of design interface, environment, motion interference and material exchange are considered respectively.

4. The method for complex aerospace system fault pattern identification based on correlation fault analysis according to claim 1, characterized in that: In the steps S3 to S6, the correlation fault analysis method is used to identify the sources of dangerous events that may lead to serious consequences and provide quantitative indicators of the safety bottom line.

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