An evaluation method, device, medium and electronic device for GNSS anti-spoofing ability

Abstract

The present application discloses an evaluation method, device, medium and electronic device for the anti-spoofing ability of GNSS. Among them, the method includes: replaying spoofing scenario data and non-spoofing scenario data through the vector signal generator for the GNSS receiver to receive, collecting first output data of the GNSS receiver when receiving spoofing scenario data, and collecting second output data of the GNSS receiver when receiving non-spoofing scenario data; analyzing the target dimension information of the first output data and the second output data; if the analysis result of the target dimension information is abnormal, it is determined that the anti-spoofing ability of GNSS is invalid. By adopting this technical solution, the anti-spoofing ability of GNSS can be evaluated, and the identified anomalies are compared and analyzed with the actually used spoofing scenario data. If the GNSS receiver fails to identify and filter out the spoofing scenario data and then generates output data, it is determined that the anti-spoofing ability of the GNSS receiver is invalid.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the technical field of GNSS anti-spoofing, and in particular to a method, device, medium and electronic device for evaluating the anti-spoofing ability of GNSS. Background Art

[0002] With the rapid development of technology, the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) provides users with high-precision positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) services, featuring wide coverage, all-weather, high-precision, etc.

[0003] However, the satellite navigation system is a wireless communication system. When satellite navigation signals propagate in space, they are vulnerable to various complex electromagnetic environment interferences. Moreover, satellite signals are weak signals with low signal power reaching ground receivers, making them extremely vulnerable to interference signals. When various satellite navigation receiving terminals fully trust the received satellite navigation signals, if there are interference signals in space that are difficult to distinguish from real signals, after the receiver is interfered, it will lead to a decrease in accuracy or inability to work. Even after being interfered, it may provide false navigation and timing information, and in severe cases, it may cause the paralysis of key social infrastructure. Summary of the Invention

[0004] Embodiments of this application provide a method, device, medium and electronic device for evaluating the anti-spoofing ability of GNSS. By adopting the technical solutions provided by the embodiments of this application, the anti-spoofing ability of GNSS can be evaluated. The identified anomalies are compared and analyzed with the spoofing scenario data actually used. If the GNSS receiver fails to identify and filter out the spoofing scenario data and then generates output data, it is determined that the anti-spoofing ability of the GNSS receiver is ineffective.

[0005] Embodiments of this application provide a method for evaluating the anti-spoofing ability of GNSS. The method is executed by an electronic device for evaluating the anti-spoofing ability of GNSS. The electronic device for evaluating the anti-spoofing ability of GNSS is connected to a GNSS receiver, and the GNSS receiver is connected to a vector signal generator. The vector signal generator is used to replay spoofing scenario data and non-spoofing scenario data. The method includes:

[0006] Replay spoofing scenario data and non-spoofing scenario data through the vector signal generator for the GNSS receiver to receive, and collect the first output data of the GNSS receiver when receiving spoofing scenario data, and collect the second output data of the GNSS receiver when receiving non-spoofing scenario data;

[0007] Analyze the target dimension information of the first output data and the second output data;

[0008] If the analysis result of the target dimension information indicates an anomaly, determine that the GNSS anti-spoofing ability is invalid.

[0009] Further, before replaying spoofing scenario data and non-spoofing scenario data through the vector signal generator, the method further includes:

[0010] Determine the state of the GNSS receiver, where the state includes a moving state and a stationary state;

[0011] According to the state of the GNSS receiver, determine that the vector signal generator replays spoofing scenario data and non-spoofing scenario data corresponding to the state.

[0012] Further, the spoofing scenario data and the non-spoofing scenario data are respectively composed of ranging codes and navigation message information;

[0013] The navigation message information includes a clock data block, ephemeris parameters, almanac parameters, ionospheric delay correction parameters, and satellite health status;

[0014] If the spoofing scenario data is of the time spoofing type, the ranging code or the clock data block of the spoofing scenario data and the non-spoofing scenario data is different;

[0015] If the spoofing scenario data is of the position spoofing type, the ranging code or the ephemeris parameters of the spoofing scenario data and the non-spoofing scenario data is different.

[0016] Further, the replay durations of the spoofing scenario data and the non-spoofing scenario data are the same;

[0017] Moreover, within the replay duration of the spoofing scenario data, it includes a normal period and a spoofing period;

[0018] The first output data is continuously collected within the replay duration of the vector signal generator replaying the spoofing scenario data;

[0019] The second output data is continuously collected within the replay duration of the vector signal generator replaying the non-spoofing scenario data.

[0020] Further, analyzing the target dimension information of the first output data and the second output data includes:

[0021] Calculate at least one target dimension information among the normalized power, carrier-to-noise ratio, Doppler frequency, receiver position error, receiver clock offset, and receiver clock offset rate of the first output data and the second output data to determine whether there is an abnormality in the target dimension information.

[0022] Further, if the analysis result of the target dimension information shows an abnormality, it is determined that the GNSS anti-spoofing ability is invalid, including:

[0023] If the analysis result of the target dimension information shows an abnormality, and the abnormality is consistent with the difference between the spoofing scenario data and the non-spoofing scenario data, it is determined that the GNSS anti-spoofing ability is invalid.

[0024] Further, if the analysis result of the target dimension information shows an abnormality, and the abnormality is consistent with the difference between the spoofing scenario data and the non-spoofing scenario data, it is determined that the GNSS anti-spoofing ability is invalid, including:

[0025] If the analysis result of the target dimension information shows an abnormality in the receiver clock offset and / or receiver clock offset rate, and the spoofing scenario data is of the time spoofing type, it is determined that the GNSS anti-spoofing ability is invalid

[0026] If the analysis result of the target dimension information shows an abnormality in the receiver position error, and the spoofing scenario data is of the position spoofing type, it is determined that the GNSS anti-spoofing ability is invalid.

[0027] The embodiment of the present application also provides an evaluation device for GNSS anti-spoofing ability. The device is configured in an electronic device for evaluating GNSS anti-spoofing ability. The electronic device for evaluating GNSS anti-spoofing ability is connected to a GNSS receiver, and the GNSS receiver is connected to a vector signal generator. The vector signal generator is used to replay spoofing scenario data and non-spoofing scenario data; the device includes:

[0028] An output data acquisition module, configured to replay spoofing scenario data and non-spoofing scenario data through the vector signal generator for the GNSS receiver to receive, and acquire the first output data of the GNSS receiver when receiving spoofing scenario data, and acquire the second output data of the GNSS receiver when receiving non-spoofing scenario data;

[0029] A target dimension information analysis module, configured to analyze target dimension information of the first output data and the second output data;

[0030] An evaluation module, configured to determine that the GNSS anti-spoofing ability is invalid if the analysis result of the target dimension information shows an abnormality.

[0031] An embodiment of the present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium, on which a computer program is stored, and when the program is executed by a processor, it implements the method for evaluating the GNSS anti-spoofing ability as described in the embodiment of the present application.

[0032] An embodiment of the present application also provides an electronic device, including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored on the memory and executable on the processor. When the processor executes the computer program, it implements the method for evaluating the GNSS anti-spoofing ability as described in the embodiment of the present application.

[0033] At least one of the above technical solutions adopted in the embodiments of the present application can achieve the following beneficial effects:

[0034] By proposing an evaluation scheme for GNSS anti-spoofing ability, the present invention is applicable to anti-spoofing technologies for receiver position and timing results. The present invention utilizes the spoofing scenario data in the TEXBAT dataset, uses a vector signal analyzer to replay the spoofing scenario data file, and configures all parameters related to data replay through a corresponding parameter configuration file, so that the GNSS receiver is under the condition of spoofing interference signals in a real electromagnetic environment. Through data processing and analysis software, the characteristics of the output signals of the user receiver are analyzed, so as to be able to judge and evaluate the effectiveness of the adopted GNSS anti-spoofing technology. This solution can evaluate the GNSS anti-spoofing technology, provide a basis and reference for the popularization and application of the GNSS anti-spoofing technology, and provide a guarantee for users to obtain reliable navigation and time information. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0035] The drawings described herein are used to provide a further understanding of the present application, and constitute a part of the present application. The schematic embodiments of the present application and their descriptions are used to explain the present application, and do not constitute an improper limitation to the present application. In the drawings:

[0036] Figure 1 is a flowchart of the method for evaluating the GNSS anti-spoofing ability provided in Embodiment 1 of the present invention;

[0037] Figure 2 is a schematic diagram of the evaluation of the GNSS anti-spoofing ability provided in Embodiment 1 of the present invention;

[0038] Figure 3 is a flowchart of the method for evaluating the GNSS anti-spoofing ability provided in Embodiment 2 of the present invention;

[0039] Figure 4 is a schematic structural diagram of the device for evaluating the GNSS anti-spoofing ability provided in Embodiment 3 of the present invention;

[0040] Figure 5 is a schematic structural diagram of an electronic device provided in Embodiment 5 of the present application. Detailed implementation manners

[0041] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of this application clearer, the technical solutions of this application will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the specific embodiments of this application and the corresponding drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of this application, rather than all embodiments. Based on the embodiments in this application, all other embodiments obtained by those of ordinary skill in the art without creative efforts shall fall within the scope of protection of this application.

[0042] The following details the technical solutions provided in each embodiment of this application in conjunction with the drawings.

[0043] Embodiment 1

[0044] Figure 1 is a flowchart showing the method for evaluating the GNSS anti-spoofing ability provided in Embodiment 1 of the present invention. This embodiment is applicable to the situation of identifying spoofing scenario data. This method can be executed by the GNSS anti-spoofing ability evaluation device provided in the embodiments of the present invention. This device can be implemented in software and / or hardware, and can be integrated into an electronic device for evaluating the GNSS anti-spoofing ability.

[0045] As Figure 1 shown, the method includes:

[0046] S110. Replay spoofing scenario data and non-spoofing scenario data through the vector signal generator for the GNSS receiver to receive, and collect the first output data of the GNSS receiver when receiving spoofing scenario data, and collect the second output data of the GNSS receiver when receiving non-spoofing scenario data.

[0047] Specifically, this method is executed by a GNSS anti-spoofing ability evaluation electronic device. The GNSS anti-spoofing ability evaluation electronic device is connected to the GNSS receiver, that is, it can receive the data output by the GNSS receiver. It can be understood that the output data can be data obtained by organizing the received satellite signals according to several preset formats, or a judgment result on whether there is a spoofing behavior, or the satellite data it receives can be output for external anti-spoofing devices to judge spoofing behavior.

[0048] The GNSS receiver is connected to a vector signal generator, and the vector signal generator is used to replay spoofing scenario data and non-spoofing scenario data.

[0049] In this solution, the spoofing scenario data and non-spoofing scenario data can be obtained from the records of a pre-constructed TEXBAT (Texas Spoofing Test Battery) dataset. The TEXBAT dataset can include various types of spoofing scenario data and non-spoofing scenario data. Among them, various types of spoofing scenario data can include time spoofing type, location spoofing type, etc. In this solution, the TEXBAT dataset can be played through a vector signal generator so that it can be recognized by the receiver, and the receiver uses it as a type of satellite data received. The receiver can receive multiple satellite data simultaneously and determine whether there is spoofing scenario data among them. If so, an anti-spoofing mechanism can be used for shielding processing to ensure the normal satellite timing and satellite positioning of the receiver.

[0050] Among them, the first output data of the GNSS receiver receiving spoofing scenario data can be the data obtained by performing operations according to the actual satellite data it uses after receiving the spoofing scenario data. For example, if the GNSS receiver receives three satellite data simultaneously and uses the spoofing scenario data as the satellite data, the output is the data calculated according to the spoofing scenario data. For example, the data calculated according to the spoofing scenario data can be normalized power, carrier-to-noise ratio, Doppler frequency, receiver position error, and receiver clock offset, etc. If the GNSS receiver recognizes the existence of spoofing scenario data and shields it, and uses one of the normal satellite data as the satellite data, the output is the data calculated according to the normal satellite data. The same applies to the second output data.

[0051] In this solution, using the records of the TEXBAT (Texas Spoofing Test Battery) dataset, an evaluation scheme for the anti-spoofing ability of GNSS is established. This method can be used to test the effectiveness of GNSS anti-spoofing technology, evaluate GNSS anti-spoofing technology, and provide a reference basis for the popularization and application of GNSS anti-spoofing technology.

[0052] TEXBAT (Texas Spoofing Test Battery) is a set of high-fidelity digital records of real-time static and dynamic GPS L1 C / A spoofing tests conducted by a university radio navigation laboratory. The initial TEXBAT dataset was released earlier and contains 6 datasets, and their binary file names are ds1.bin to ds6.bin. Later, two more datasets, ds7.bin and ds8.bin, were added.

[0053] Six out of these eight different spoofing scenarios use static antennas (ds1.bin - ds4.bin and ds7.bin - ds8.bin), and two use dynamic antennas (ds5.bin, ds6.bin). Here, static or dynamic refers to whether the reference antenna is static or on a moving vehicle roof. Additionally, the TEXBAT dataset also includes two non-spoofing datasets (cleanStatic.bin and cleanDynamic.bin), which can be used as reference data for real signals in other spoofing scenarios. The six static spoofing scenarios (ds1.bin - ds4.bin and ds7.bin - ds8.bin) correspond to the use of the cleanStatic.bin file, and the two dynamic spoofing scenarios (ds5.bin, ds6.bin) correspond to the use of the cleanDynamic.bin file.

[0054] Five spoofing scenarios in the TEXBAT dataset are spoofs against the receiver's timekeeping result, which can cause an offset of 2 microseconds in the receiver clock error. Two spoofing scenarios are spoofs against the receiver's position, which can cause an offset of 600 meters in the receiver's position in the ECEF coordinate system (equivalent to a timing offset of 2 microseconds).

[0055] The TEXBAT spoofing scenario dataset and the non-spoofing scenario dataset are equivalent to real satellite navigation signals and spoofed navigation signals respectively. They are both composed of ranging codes and navigation message information. The navigation message information includes clock data blocks, ephemeris parameters, almanac parameters, ionospheric delay correction parameters, satellite health status, etc. For the time spoofing case, the clock data blocks (clock error parameters) in the ranging codes or navigation message information of the spoofing dataset and the non-spoofing dataset are different. The ranging code affects the calculation of the pseudorange measurement value, and the clock error parameter affects the calculation of the on-board clock error. For the position spoofing case, the ephemeris parameters in the ranging codes or navigation message information of the spoofing dataset and the non-spoofing dataset are different. The ranging code affects the calculation of the pseudorange measurement value, and the ephemeris parameter affects the calculation of the satellite position. It should be noted that in time spoofing, if the ranging code is changed to achieve the spoofing purpose, the change amount of the ranging codes of different satellites should be the same.

[0056] Figure 2 It is a schematic diagram for evaluating the GNSS anti-spoofing ability provided by Embodiment 1 of the present invention. As Figure 2As shown, a GNSS receiver, an external clock, a Vector Signal Generator (VSG), and a GNSS anti-spoofing capability evaluation electronic device are connected together and powered on. Among them, the GNSS receiver can be a GNSS timing receiver. The external clock provides a stable and reliable 1PPS (Pulse Per Second) time signal and a 10MHz frequency signal to the GNSS timing receiver. The vector signal generator is used to replay TEXBAT spoofing scenario data and non-spoofing scenario data. The GNSS anti-spoofing capability evaluation electronic device is used to deploy data acquisition software and data processing and analysis software, and store the measurement data and analysis results of the GNSS timing receiver.

[0057] In this solution, the first output data is the data output when the GNSS receiver receives spoofing scenario data, and the second output data is the data output when the GNSS receiver receives non-spoofing scenario data.

[0058] In this solution, optionally, the replay durations of the spoofing scenario data and the non-spoofing scenario data are the same;

[0059] Moreover, within the replay duration of the spoofing scenario data, there are a normal period and a spoofing period;

[0060] The first output data is continuously collected within the replay duration of the spoofing scenario data replayed by the vector signal generator;

[0061] The second output data is continuously collected within the replay duration of the non-spoofing scenario data replayed by the vector signal generator.

[0062] Among them, each of the eight TEXBAT spoofing scenarios is approximately 7 minutes (420 seconds) long. No spoofing signals are injected in the first about 100 seconds. At this time, by acquiring real satellite navigation signals, the real navigation and positioning results are calculated, leaving time for the receiver under test to respond to the attack. That is, each spoofing scenario data and non-spoofing scenario data need to be played for about 7 minutes, and spoofing behavior starts after 100 seconds of playing the spoofing scenario data. The eight TEXBAT spoofing schemes correspond to different spoofing situations, and the corresponding TEXBAT spoofing scheme can be selected according to the applicable scenarios of GNSS anti-spoofing technology.

[0063] S120. Analyze the target dimension information of the first output data and the second output data.

[0064] Among them, after obtaining the first output data and the second output data, the two can be analyzed in terms of the target dimension information. It can be known that the target dimension information can be positioning accuracy, time accuracy, etc. The target dimension information can include information that can reflect spoofing of the GNSS receiver. For example, positioning error, clock information, and so on. In this solution, after the spoofing scenario data is sent to the GNSS receiver, the GNSS receiver needs to identify whether there is spoofing behavior. If the identification fails, it will take the spoofing scenario data as the standard, resulting in positioning deviation or time deviation. Therefore, the target dimension data can include positioning accuracy or time accuracy. Specifically, both can be included simultaneously, or which target dimension information to calculate can be determined according to the type of spoofing scenario data actually adopted.

[0065] In this solution, optionally, analyzing the target dimension information for the first output data and the second output data includes:

[0066] Calculating at least one target dimension information among the normalized power, carrier-to-noise ratio, Doppler frequency, receiver position error, receiver clock offset, and receiver clock offset rate of the first output data and the second output data to determine whether there is an abnormality in the target dimension information.

[0067] Among them, the normalized power is to normalize the power (energy). Adding a power normalization factor aims to enable the same average power to be obtained for different modulation methods (or for all mapping methods). The carrier-to-noise ratio (signal-to-noise ratio) is a standard measurement scale used to indicate the relationship between the carrier and the carrier noise, usually denoted as CNR or C / N (dB). A high carrier-to-noise ratio can provide better network reception rate, better network communication quality, and better network reliability. The Doppler frequency (Doppler shift) refers to when the mobile station moves at a constant rate in a certain direction, due to the reason of the propagation path difference, there will be changes in phase and frequency. Usually, this change is called the Doppler shift. It reveals the law of the change of the wave attributes in motion. The receiver position error is the error of the phase center of the receiver antenna relative to the center position of the survey station monument. The receiver clock offset and the receiver clock offset rate can be used to reflect the magnitude or degree of the clock offset of the receiver caused by receiving spoofed data.

[0068] Through the calculation and analysis of the above target dimension information in this solution, the performance of the GNSS anti-spoofing ability can be obtained, such as whether it can identify the existence of spoofing behavior. Thus, a more objective evaluation of the GNSS anti-spoofing ability can be carried out.

[0069] S130. If the analysis result of the target dimension information is abnormal, it is determined that the GNSS anti-spoofing ability is invalid.

[0070] In this solution, since the anti-spoofing ability is reflected in the GNSS receiver's identification and processing of spoofing scenario data. Therefore, if the data used is spoofing scenario data and non-spoofing scenario data, and after comparative analysis, if an anomaly is determined to exist, then it can be determined that the GNSS anti-spoofing ability is invalid; after comparative analysis, if no anomaly is determined to exist, then it can be determined that the GNSS anti-spoofing ability is valid because the GNSS receiver has blocked or otherwise processed the spoofing scenario data.

[0071] Specifically, the output signal collected when there is spoofing scenario data can be compared and analyzed with the result when there is no spoofing signal to check for anomalies. If an anomaly exists, it means that the anti-spoofing technology adopted cannot achieve the purpose of anti-spoofing. If there is no abnormal difference in the analysis results of the two cases, it means that the anti-spoofing technology adopted can achieve the purpose of anti-spoofing.

[0072] In another feasible technical solution, optionally, if the analysis result of the target dimension information shows an anomaly, and the anomaly is consistent with the difference between spoofing scenario data and non-spoofing scenario data, then determining that the GNSS anti-spoofing ability is invalid includes:

[0073] If the analysis result of the target dimension information shows an anomaly in the receiver clock offset and / or receiver clock offset rate, and the spoofing scenario data is of the time spoofing type, then determine that the GNSS anti-spoofing ability is invalid.

[0074] If the analysis result of the target dimension information shows an anomaly in the receiver position error, and the spoofing scenario data is of the position spoofing type, then determine that the GNSS anti-spoofing ability is invalid.

[0075] In this solution, since the type of spoofing can be of the time spoofing type or the position spoofing type, therefore, by judging whether the identified anomaly matches the type of a certain spoofing scenario data used above, the cause of the anomaly can be determined more accurately to ensure the ability to identify anomalies.

[0076] In this solution, if the analysis result of the target dimension information is abnormal, it is determined that the GNSS anti-spoofing capability is invalid. The analysis result of the target dimension information being abnormal means that the difference between the analysis results of the target dimension information of the first output data and the second output data exceeds the set threshold. Specifically, taking the receiver position error as the target dimension information, the target dimension information can be the acquisition curve obtained by the change of the receiver position error over time during the playback duration of the spoofing scenario data and the non-spoofing scenario data. Then, the curves of the receiver position errors within two playback durations can be obtained to determine whether it is normal. Here, it can be determined whether it is normal according to the jump amplitude of the curve. For example, when playing the non-spoofing scenario data, the jump amplitude is within the range of a, and when playing the spoofing scenario data, the jump amplitude is within the range of b, and b > a, and b also exceeds the normal jump amplitude, which indicates that there is an abnormality. When there is an abnormality, it means that the receiver fails to recognize the spoofing scenario data, so it is determined that the anti-spoofing capability is invalid. On the contrary, if both are within the normal jump amplitude range, it means that the receiver can recognize the spoofing scenario data and filter it, so the anti-spoofing capability is effective.

[0077] The technical solution provided in this embodiment uses the spoofing scenario data in the TEXBAT dataset, replays the spoofing scenario data file using a vector signal analyzer, and configures all parameters related to data replay through the corresponding parameter configuration file, so that the GNSS receiver is under the condition of spoofing interference signals in a real electromagnetic environment. Through the data processing and analysis software, the characteristics of the output signals of the user receiver are analyzed, so as to be able to judge and evaluate the effectiveness of the adopted GNSS anti-spoofing technology. This solution can evaluate the GNSS anti-spoofing technology, provide a basis for the popularization and application of the GNSS anti-spoofing technology, and provide a guarantee for users to obtain reliable navigation and time information.

[0078] Embodiment 2

[0079] Figure 3 is a schematic flowchart of the method for evaluating the GNSS anti-spoofing capability provided in Embodiment 2 of the present invention. As Figure 3 shown, the method includes:

[0080] S310. Determine the state of the GNSS receiver, where the state includes a moving state and a stationary state.

[0081] Among them, since the provided TEXBAT spoofing scenario data can be set according to the state type of the receiver, therefore, the state of the GNSS receiver can be preferentially identified.

[0082] S320. According to the state of the GNSS receiver, determine the vector signal generator to replay the spoofing scenario data and the non-spoofing scenario data corresponding to the state.

[0083] The above six static spoofing scenarios (ds1.bin - ds4.bin and ds7.bin - ds8.bin) correspond to using the cleanStatic.bin file, and the two dynamic spoofing scenarios (ds5.bin, ds6.bin) correspond to using the cleanDynamic.bin file. Flexible selection can be made according to the status of the GNSS receiver, thereby improving the accuracy of the evaluation results.

[0084] S330: Replay spoofing scenario data and non-spoofing scenario data through the vector signal generator for the GNSS receiver to receive, and collect the first output data of the GNSS receiver when receiving spoofing scenario data, and collect the second output data of the GNSS receiver when receiving non-spoofing scenario data.

[0085] S340: Analyze the target dimension information of the first output data and the second output data.

[0086] S350: If the analysis result of the target dimension information shows an anomaly, determine that the GNSS anti-spoofing ability is invalid.

[0087] In a feasible embodiment, optionally, the spoofing scenario data and the non-spoofing scenario data are respectively composed of ranging codes and navigation message information;

[0088] The navigation message information includes clock data blocks, ephemeris parameters, almanac parameters, ionospheric delay correction parameters, and satellite health status;

[0089] If the spoofing scenario data is of the time spoofing type, then the ranging code or the clock data block of the spoofing scenario data and the non-spoofing scenario data are different;

[0090] If the spoofing scenario data is of the position spoofing type, then the ranging code or the ephemeris parameters of the spoofing scenario data and the non-spoofing scenario data are different.

[0091] In this solution, there are two non-spoofing scenario data files for TEXBAT, namely the cleanDynamic.bin file and the cleanStatic.bin file, which are binary data files. Here, Static and Dynamic respectively correspond to whether the receiving antenna of the target receiver is in a stationary state or a moving state. Since the TEXBAT spoofing scenario dataset and the corresponding non-spoofing scenario dataset files are relatively large, about 40GB in size, they can be downloaded in advance and stored locally for convenient use.

[0092] The separate xml files attached to the binary data files of each scenario in the TEXBAT spoofing scenario and the non-spoofing scenario provide all parameters related to data replay. There are two TEXBAT non-spoofing scenario parameter configuration files, namely the cleanDynamic.xml file and the cleanStatic.xml file. Here, Static and Dynamic correspond to whether the receiving antenna of the target receiver is in a stationary state or a moving state respectively.

[0093] Based on the above embodiments, this embodiment provides a solution for identifying the motion state of a GNSS receiver to select spoofing scenario data and non-spoofing scenario data. By such a setting, the environment where the GNSS receiver actually receives interference can be simulated more accurately, so as to better evaluate the anti-spoofing ability of GNSS.

[0094] In a specific solution, the steps of the GNSS anti-spoofing technology evaluation method are as follows:

[0095] 1. Download the TEXBAT spoofing scenario dataset (ds1.bin~ds8.bin) and the corresponding non-spoofing scenario dataset. This dataset is in.bin file format, and each scenario corresponds to a separate.bin file.

[0096] There are two TEXBAT non-spoofing scenario data files, namely the cleanDynamic.bin file and the cleanStatic.bin file, which are binary data files. Here, Static and Dynamic correspond to whether the receiving antenna of the target receiver is in a stationary state or a moving state respectively. Since the TEXBAT spoofing scenario dataset and the corresponding non-spoofing scenario dataset files are relatively large, about 40GB in size, they can be downloaded in advance and stored locally for easy use.

[0097] 2. Download the parameter configuration files corresponding to the TEXBAT spoofing scenario and the non-spoofing scenario. This file format is.xml, and each scenario corresponds to a separate parameter configuration.xml file.

[0098] The separate xml files attached to the binary data files of each scenario in the TEXBAT spoofing scenario and the non-spoofing scenario provide all parameters related to data replay. There are two TEXBAT non-spoofing scenario parameter configuration files, namely the cleanDynamic.xml file and the cleanStatic.xml file. Here, Static and Dynamic correspond to whether the receiving antenna of the target receiver is in a stationary state or a moving state respectively.

[0099] 3. Develop data acquisition software and data processing and analysis software. Among them, the data acquisition software is used to collect the output data of the receiver in real time and save it locally for subsequent data processing and analysis. The data processing and analysis software is used to process and analyze the output data of the receiver, analyze the signal characteristics, and give the corresponding analysis results.

[0100] 4. Connect the GNSS receiver, external reference clock, RF signal replay system, and working computer (including data acquisition software and data processing and analysis software) together and power on the equipment.

[0101] 5. Load the downloaded TEXBAT non-spoofing scenario data file and the corresponding parameter configuration file into the RF signal replay system, complete the configuration of relevant parameters, and simulate the situation of receiving real satellite navigation signals.

[0102] 6. Collect the output signal of the GNSS receiver in this situation to obtain the measurement data of the target receiver without being spoofed. Use the data processing and analysis software to analyze the characteristics of the output signal of the GNSS receiver in this situation. Mainly analyze the changes over time of the normalized power, carrier-to-noise ratio, Doppler frequency, receiver position error, receiver clock offset, receiver clock offset rate, etc. of the receiver output signal.

[0103] 7. Load the downloaded TEXBAT spoofing scenario data file and the corresponding parameter configuration file into the RF signal replay system, complete the configuration of relevant parameters, and simulate the situation with spoofing signals in the real situation.

[0104] 8. Collect the output signal of the GNSS receiver in this spoofing situation to obtain the measurement data of the target receiver under spoofing interference. Use the data processing and analysis software to analyze the characteristics of the output signal of the GNSS receiver in this situation. Mainly analyze the changes over time of the normalized power, carrier-to-noise ratio, Doppler frequency, receiver position error, receiver clock offset, receiver clock offset rate, etc. of the receiver output signal.

[0105] 9. Compare the analysis results of Step 6 and Step 8, compare and analyze the results with and without spoofing signals, and check for any abnormalities. If there are abnormalities, it means that the anti-spoofing technology adopted cannot achieve the purpose of anti-spoofing. If there are no abnormal differences in the analysis results of the two situations, it means that the anti-spoofing technology adopted can achieve the purpose of anti-spoofing.

[0106] During the analysis process, it should be noted that each of the eight TEXBAT spoofing scenarios is approximately 7 minutes (420 seconds) long. No spoofing signals are injected in the first approximately 100 seconds. At this time, by acquiring the real satellite navigation signals, the real navigation and positioning results are calculated, leaving time for the receiver under test to respond to the attack. The eight TEXBAT spoofing schemes correspond to different spoofing situations, and the corresponding TEXBAT spoofing scheme is selected according to the applicable scenarios of GNSS anti-spoofing technology. The differences between the eight TEXBAT spoofing schemes have been elaborated in the previous text and will not be repeated here.

[0107] In a specific scheme, the following operation process can be referred to for evaluating the GNSS anti-spoofing ability.

[0108] 1. Download the TEXBAT spoofing scenario data file ds2.bin and the corresponding non-spoofing scenario data file cleanStatic.bin.

[0109] 2. Download the parameter configuration file ds2.xml corresponding to the TEXBAT spoofing scenario and the parameter configuration file cleanStatic.xml corresponding to the non-spoofing scenario.

[0110] 3. Load the downloaded TEXBAT non-spoofing scenario data file and parameter configuration file into the vector signal generator, replay the TEXBAT non-spoofing scenario, and simulate the situation of receiving real satellite signals.

[0111] 4. Start the data acquisition software in the working computer, collect the output data of the GNSS timing receiver in this situation, and save it locally to obtain the measurement data when the target receiver is not spoofed.

[0112] 5. Start the data processing and analysis software in the working computer, analyze the output data of the GNSS timing receiver in this situation, mainly analyze the changes over time of the normalized power, Doppler frequency, carrier-to-noise ratio, receiver position error, receiver clock offset, receiver clock offset rate, etc. of the receiver output signal.

[0113] 6. Load the downloaded TEXBAT spoofing scenario data file and parameter configuration file into the vector signal generator, replay the TEXBAT spoofing scenario, and simulate the situation where spoofing signals exist in the real situation.

[0114] 7. Repeat the operations in steps 4 and 5 to collect and process and analyze the output signal characteristics of the receiver in the spoofing scenario.

[0115] 8. Compare the output signal analysis results of steps 5 and 7 to check whether there are any abnormalities between the two, so as to judge the effectiveness of the anti-spoofing technology adopted.

[0116] The present invention utilizes the spoofing scenario data in the TEXBAT dataset, uses a vector signal analyzer to replay the spoofing scenario data file, configures all parameters related to data replay through the corresponding parameter configuration file, simulates the situation where the user receiver is subjected to spoofing interference signals in a real electromagnetic environment, and analyzes the output signal characteristics of the user receiver through data processing and analysis software, so as to be able to judge and evaluate the effectiveness of the adopted GNSS anti-spoofing technology. This method can evaluate the GNSS anti-spoofing technology, provide a basis for the popularization and application of the GNSS anti-spoofing technology, and provide a guarantee for users to obtain reliable navigation and time information.

[0117] Embodiment III

[0118] Figure 4 It is a schematic structural diagram of an evaluation device for GNSS anti-spoofing ability provided by Embodiment III of the present invention. As Figure 4 shown, the device includes:

[0119] An output data acquisition module 410, configured to replay spoofing scenario data and non-spoofing scenario data through the vector signal generator for the GNSS receiver to receive, and acquire first output data of the GNSS receiver when receiving spoofing scenario data, and acquire second output data of the GNSS receiver when receiving non-spoofing scenario data;

[0120] A target dimension information analysis module 420, configured to perform target dimension information analysis on the first output data and the second output data;

[0121] An evaluation module 430, configured to determine that the GNSS anti-spoofing ability is invalid if the analysis result of the target dimension information is abnormal.

[0122] This device can execute the GNSS anti-spoofing ability evaluation method provided in each of the above embodiments, and has corresponding functional modules and beneficial effects. Details are not described herein again.

[0123] Embodiment IV

[0124] The embodiment of the present application further provides a storage medium including computer-executable instructions, and the computer-executable instructions are used to execute a GNSS anti-spoofing ability evaluation method when executed by a computer processor. The method includes:

[0125] Replay spoofing scenario data and non-spoofing scenario data through the vector signal generator for the GNSS receiver to receive, and acquire first output data of the GNSS receiver when receiving spoofing scenario data, and acquire second output data of the GNSS receiver when receiving non-spoofing scenario data;

[0126] Perform target dimension information analysis on the first output data and the second output data;

[0127] If the analysis result of the target dimension information shows an anomaly, determine that the GNSS anti-spoofing ability is invalid.

[0128] Storage medium - any of various types of memory electronic devices or storage electronic devices. The term "storage medium" is intended to include: installation media such as CD-ROM, floppy disk or tape devices; computer system memory or random access memory such as DRAM, DDR RAM, SRAM, EDO RAM, Rambus RAM, etc.; non-volatile memory such as flash memory, magnetic media (such as hard disks or optical storage); registers or other similar types of memory elements, etc. The storage medium may also include other types of memory or combinations thereof. Additionally, the storage medium may be located in the computer system in which the program is executed, or may be located in a different second computer system that is connected to the computer system via a network (such as the Internet). The second computer system may provide program instructions to the computer for execution. The term "storage medium" may include two or more storage media that may reside in different locations (such as in different computer systems connected via a network). The storage medium may store program instructions (such as specifically implemented as a computer program) executable by one or more processors.

[0129] Of course, the storage medium containing computer-executable instructions provided in the embodiments of the present application is not limited to the evaluation operations of the GNSS anti-spoofing ability as described above, and may also execute relevant operations in the GNSS anti-spoofing ability evaluation method provided in any embodiment of the present application.

[0130] Embodiment Five

[0131] The embodiments of the present application provide an electronic device. Figure 5 It is a schematic structural diagram of an electronic device provided in Embodiment Five of the present application. As Figure 5 shown, this embodiment provides an electronic device 500, which includes: one or more processors 520; a storage device 510 for storing one or more programs, and when the one or more programs are run by the one or more processors 520, the one or more processors 520 implement the GNSS anti-spoofing ability evaluation method provided in the embodiments of the present application, and this method includes:

[0132] Replay spoofing scenario data and non-spoofing scenario data through the vector signal generator for the GNSS receiver to receive, and collect first output data of the GNSS receiver receiving spoofing scenario data and second output data of the GNSS receiver receiving non-spoofing scenario data;

[0133] Perform target dimension information analysis on the first output data and the second output data;

[0134] If the analysis result of the target dimension information is abnormal, determine that the GNSS anti-spoofing ability is invalid.

[0135] Figure 5 The displayed electronic device 500 is merely an example and should not impose any limitations on the functions and usage scope of the embodiments of the present application.

[0136] As Figure 5 shown, the electronic device 500 includes a processor 520, a storage device 510, an input device 530, and an output device 540; the number of processors 520 in the electronic device can be one or more, Figure 5 and one processor 520 is taken as an example; the processor 520, the storage device 510, the input device 530, and the output device 540 in the electronic device can be connected by a bus or other means, Figure 5 and taking the connection through the bus 550 as an example.

[0137] The storage device 510, as a computer-readable storage medium, can be used to store software programs, computer-executable programs, and module units, such as program instructions corresponding to the GNSS anti-spoofing ability evaluation method in the embodiments of the present application.

[0138] The storage device 510 may mainly include a storage program area and a storage data area. Among them, the storage program area can store an operating system and application programs required for at least one function; the storage data area can store data created according to the use of the terminal, etc. In addition, the storage device 510 can include a high-speed random access memory, and can also include a non-volatile memory, such as at least one magnetic disk storage device, a flash memory device, or other non-volatile solid-state storage devices. In some instances, the storage device 510 can further include a memory remotely set relative to the processor 520, and these remote memories can be connected through a network. Examples of the above networks include, but are not limited to, the Internet, an enterprise intranet, a local area network, a mobile communication network, and combinations thereof.

[0139] The input device 530 can be used to receive input digital, character information, or voice information, and generate key signal inputs related to the user settings and function controls of the electronic device. The output device 540 can include electronic devices such as a display screen and a speaker.

[0140] The electronic device provided by the embodiment of the present application can evaluate the GNSS anti-spoofing ability, compare and analyze the identified anomalies with the spoofing scenario data actually used. If the GNSS receiver fails to identify and filter out the spoofing scenario data and then generates output data, it is determined that the anti-spoofing ability of the GNSS receiver is invalid.

[0141] The evaluation device, medium and electronic device for GNSS anti-spoofing ability provided in the above embodiments can run the GNSS anti-spoofing ability evaluation method provided by any embodiment of the present application, and have the corresponding functional modules and beneficial effects for running this method. For the technical details not described in detail in the above embodiments, reference can be made to the GNSS anti-spoofing ability evaluation method provided by any embodiment of the present application.

[0142] Those skilled in the art should understand that the embodiments of the present invention can be provided as a method, a system, or a computer program product. Therefore, the present invention can take the form of a complete hardware embodiment, a complete software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Moreover, the present invention can take the form of a computer program product implemented on one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program code.

[0143] The present invention is described with reference to the flowcharts and / or block diagrams of methods, apparatuses (systems), and computer program products according to the embodiments of the present invention. It should be understood that each flow and / or block in the flowchart and / or block diagram can be implemented by computer program instructions, and the combination of the flows and / or blocks in the flowchart and / or block diagram can also be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to the processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, an embedded processor, or other programmable data processing devices to generate a machine, so that the instructions executed by the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing devices generate a device for realizing the functions specified in Figure 1 one process or multiple processes and / or blocks Figure 1 one block or multiple blocks.

[0144] These computer program instructions can also be stored in a computer-readable memory that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing device to work in a specific manner, so that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory generate a manufactured product including an instruction device, and the instruction device realizes the functions specified in Figure 1 one process or multiple processes and / or blocks Figure 1 one block or multiple blocks.

[0145] These computer program instructions can also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing device, so that a series of operation steps are executed on the computer or other programmable device to generate a computer-implemented process, and thus the instructions executed on the computer or other programmable device provide steps for implementing the functions specified in one process Figure 1 one process or multiple processes and / or blocks Figure 1 steps of the functions specified in one block or multiple blocks.

[0146] In a typical configuration, a computing device includes one or more processors (CPUs), an input / output interface, a network interface, and memory.

[0147] The memory may include non-permanent memory in the computer-readable medium, in the form of random access memory (RAM) and / or non-volatile memory such as read-only memory (ROM) or flash RAM. The memory is an example of a computer-readable medium.

[0148] Computer-readable media includes permanent and non-permanent, removable and non-removable media and can store information by any method or technology. The information can be computer-readable instructions, data structures, program modules, or other data. Examples of computer storage media include, but are not limited to, phase change memory (PRAM), static random access memory (SRAM), dynamic random access memory (DRAM), other types of random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), flash memory or other memory technologies, compact disc read-only memory (CD-ROM), digital versatile disc (DVD) or other optical storage, magnetic cassettes, magnetic tape magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices, or any other non-transmission media that can be used to store information that can be accessed by a computing device. As defined herein, computer-readable media does not include transitory media such as modulated data signals and carrier waves.

[0149] It should also be noted that the term "comprises", "comprising" or any other variation thereof is intended to cover a non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, commodity or device comprising a series of elements includes not only those elements but also other elements not expressly listed, or elements inherent to such process, method, commodity or device. Without further limitation, an element defined by the statement "comprising a..." does not exclude the presence of additional identical elements in the process, method, commodity or device comprising the element.

[0150] The above are only embodiments of the present application and are not intended to limit the present application. For those skilled in the art, various changes and modifications can be made to the present application. Any modification, equivalent replacement, improvement, etc. made within the spirit and principle of the present application shall be included within the scope of the claims of the present application.

Claims

1. An evaluation method for GNSS anti-spoofing ability, characterized in that The method is executed by a GNSS anti-spoofing capability evaluation electronic device, which is connected to a GNSS receiver, and the GNSS receiver is connected to a vector signal generator for replaying spoofing scenario data and non-spoofing scenario data. The method includes: Replaying spoofing scenario data and non-spoofing scenario data through the vector signal generator for the GNSS receiver to receive, and collecting first output data of the GNSS receiver when receiving spoofing scenario data and second output data of the GNSS receiver when receiving non-spoofing scenario data. The first output data includes the normalized power, carrier-to-noise ratio, Doppler frequency, receiver position error, receiver clock offset, and receiver clock offset rate of the receiver output signal under spoofing interference. The second output data includes the normalized power, carrier-to-noise ratio, Doppler frequency, receiver position error, receiver clock offset, and receiver clock offset rate of the receiver output signal without spoofing. Performing target dimension information analysis on the first output data and the second output data, including: analyzing the changes over time of the normalized power, carrier-to-noise ratio, Doppler frequency, receiver position error, receiver clock offset, and receiver clock offset rate of the receiver output signal in the two cases. If the analysis result of the target dimension information shows an anomaly, it is determined that the GNSS anti-spoofing capability is invalid. Wherein, the replay durations of the spoofing scenario data and the non-spoofing scenario data are the same. Moreover, within the replay duration of the spoofing scenario data, there are a normal period and a spoofing period. The first output data is continuously collected within the replay duration of the spoofing scenario data replayed by the vector signal generator. The second output data is continuously collected within the replay duration of the non-spoofing scenario data replayed by the vector signal generator. Wherein, before replaying the spoofing scenario data and the non-spoofing scenario data through the vector signal generator, the method further includes: Determining the state of the GNSS receiver, where the state includes a moving state and a stationary state. According to the state of the GNSS receiver, determining the vector signal generator to replay spoofing scenario data and non-spoofing scenario data corresponding to the state.

2. The method according to claim 1, wherein The spoofing scenario data and the non-spoofing scenario data are respectively composed of ranging codes and navigation message information. The navigation message information includes clock data blocks, ephemeris parameters, almanac parameters, ionospheric delay correction parameters, and satellite health status. If the spoofing scenario data is of the time spoofing type, then the ranging codes or the clock data blocks of the spoofing scenario data and the non-spoofing scenario data are different. If the spoofing scenario data is of the position spoofing type, then the ranging codes or the ephemeris parameters of the spoofing scenario data and the non-spoofing scenario data are different.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Performing target dimension information analysis on the first output data and the second output data includes: Calculate at least one target dimension information among the normalized power, carrier-to-noise ratio, Doppler frequency, receiver position error, receiver clock offset, and receiver clock offset rate of the first output data and the second output data, for determining whether there is an abnormality in the target dimension information.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that, If the analysis result of the target dimension information is that there is an abnormality, it is determined that the GNSS anti-spoofing ability is invalid, including: If the analysis result of the target dimension information is that there is an abnormality, and the abnormality is consistent with the difference between the spoofing scenario data and the non-spoofing scenario data, it is determined that the GNSS anti-spoofing ability is invalid.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that, If the analysis result of the target dimension information is that there is an abnormality, and the abnormality is consistent with the difference between the spoofing scenario data and the non-spoofing scenario data, it is determined that the GNSS anti-spoofing ability is invalid, including: If the analysis result of the target dimension information is that there is an abnormality in the receiver clock offset and / or receiver clock offset rate, and the spoofing scenario data is of the time spoofing type, it is determined that the GNSS anti-spoofing ability is invalid; If the analysis result of the target dimension information is that there is an abnormality in the receiver position error, and the spoofing scenario data is of the position spoofing type, it is determined that the GNSS anti-spoofing ability is invalid.

6. An evaluation device for GNSS anti-spoofing ability, characterized in that, The device is configured in a GNSS anti-spoofing ability evaluation electronic device, the GNSS anti-spoofing ability evaluation electronic device is connected to a GNSS receiver, the GNSS receiver is connected to a vector signal generator, and the vector signal generator is used to replay spoofing scenario data and non-spoofing scenario data; the device includes: An output data acquisition module, configured to replay spoofing scenario data and non-spoofing scenario data through the vector signal generator for the GNSS receiver to receive, and acquire the first output data of the GNSS receiver when receiving the spoofing scenario data, and acquire the second output data of the GNSS receiver when receiving the non-spoofing scenario data; the first output data includes the normalized power, carrier-to-noise ratio, Doppler frequency, receiver position error, receiver clock offset, and receiver clock offset rate of the receiver output signal under spoofing interference; the second output data includes the normalized power, carrier-to-noise ratio, Doppler frequency, receiver position error, receiver clock offset, and receiver clock offset rate of the receiver output signal without being spoofed; A target dimension information analysis module, configured to perform target dimension information analysis on the first output data and the second output data; including: analyzing the variation of the normalized power, carrier-to-noise ratio, Doppler frequency, receiver position error, receiver clock offset, and receiver clock offset rate of the receiver output signal over time in the two cases; An evaluation module, configured to determine that the GNSS anti-spoofing ability is invalid if the analysis result of the target dimension information is that there is an abnormality; Wherein, the replay duration of the spoofing scenario data and the non-spoofing scenario data is the same; Moreover, within the replay duration of the spoofing scenario data, it includes a normal period and a spoofing period; The first output data is continuously acquired during the replay duration of the vector signal generator replaying the spoofing scenario data; The second output data is continuously collected within the replay duration of the vector signal generator replaying non-spoofing scenario data; Wherein, the device is further configured to: Determine the state of the GNSS receiver, and the state includes a moving state and a stationary state; According to the state of the GNSS receiver, determine that the vector signal generator replays spoofing scenario data and non-spoofing scenario data corresponding to the state.

7. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that, When the program is executed by a processor, it implements the GNSS anti-spoofing ability evaluation method according to any one of claims 1-5.

8. An electronic device, comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored on the memory and executable on the processor, characterized in that, When the processor executes the computer program, it implements the GNSS anti-spoofing ability evaluation method according to any one of claims 1-5.

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