Vehicle networking communication method and system based on hierarchical structure and asymmetric key pool

By adopting a hierarchical structure and an elliptic curve algorithm of asymmetric key pool in the Internet of Vehicles, the problems of insufficient security and low update efficiency in the prior art are solved, and efficient and secure key management and Anonymous vehicle demand.

CN115037432BActive Publication Date: 2024-11-12NANJING RUPAN QUANTUM TECH CO LTD +1
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202110194053.1
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2021-02-20
Publication Date
2024-11-12
Estimated Expiration
2041-02-20

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In the existing quantum-resistant vehicle network communication system, the key pool is insufficient in security, the group-type symmetric key pool is easily cracked, and the key update efficiency is low, which cannot meet the anonymity needs of vehicles.

Method used

Using a communication method based on hierarchical structure and asymmetric key pool, third-party trust institutions, roadside units and vehicle-mounted units each have key pools and security chips, and calculate the communication keys through elliptic curve algorithms to achieve a safe and efficient key. Manage and update.

Benefits of technology

It improves the quantum computing capability of the Internet of Vehicles system, prevents the key pool from being cracked, reduces the communication load for key updates, and meets the anonymity needs of vehicles.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Patent Text Reader

Abstract

In the Internet of Vehicles system of this patent, each member uses the chip key in the security chip and the hierarchical key pool belonging to different roles, which can not only meet the needs of anti-quantum computing, but also because the enemy cannot obtain the chip key, there is no possibility of being disassembled from the key pool after being captured and the communication key being cracked; in addition, if key update is required, this patent does not need to transmit a large number of new keys, the communication efficiency is high, and a large amount of bandwidth and computing resources of the Internet of Vehicles are saved; in addition, the user's real ID is not disclosed, only the non-fixed node number is disclosed, and the enemy cannot infer the user's real identity and behavioral characteristics based on the node number, so it is not easy for the enemy to track the identity and behavior information, which can meet the vehicle's anonymity requirements in the Internet of Vehicles.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of quantum-resistant computing, and in particular to a vehicle networking communication method and system based on a hierarchical structure and an asymmetric key pool. Background Art

[0002] Vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) is a mobile network that uses wireless LAN technology, with vehicles and roadside units as network nodes, to provide communication services between vehicles and vehicles (V2V) and vehicles and roadside units (V2R). VANET is an application of wireless mesh network, which combines the advantages of wireless LAN and ad hoc network. It is a large-capacity, high-speed and wide-coverage network. At the same time, the hierarchical topology of wireless mesh network can provide reliable transmission, good scalability and low initial investment, and is an ideal solution for wireless broadband access.

[0003] Most of the existing quantum computing-resistant Internet of Vehicles communication systems are based on a one-to-one authentication method for a single object, but for point-to-multipoint data transmission, groups are formed according to certain principles. In the existing quantum computing-resistant Internet of Vehicles communication system, when a new terminal is connected to the group, if the existing one-to-one authentication method is adopted, it will not only increase network signaling and cause network congestion, but also occupy a large amount of network resources. Therefore, the existing one-to-one network authentication system is no longer applicable. In this case, in order to reduce the consumption of authentication resources and reduce network congestion, a corresponding group authentication mechanism is required. The existing group communication system uses a group key pool to realize group communication by using the symmetric key stored in the group-type symmetric key pool. If a member is attacked, the confidential communication of the entire group is threatened. In the existing quantum computing-resistant Internet of Vehicles communication system, updating the key pool often requires the participation of the issuing center. Due to the large amount of data transmitted, there is a certain threat to security.

[0004] Based on the above analysis, the prior art has the following defects:

[0005] 1. In the prior art, the number of keys for each member in the Internet of Vehicles system is insufficient, and the security is insufficient for the needs of anti-quantum computing. Although the existing anti-quantum computing Internet of Vehicles system based on the key pool is highly secure, the key pool cannot be stored in a highly secure security chip due to its large capacity, and there is a possibility of being captured and disassembled and cracked; and the group-type symmetric key pool is shared by all members in the group. Once cracked, the security of the group communication is threatened; in addition, if security needs to be maintained, key updates are required, and the update of the key pool requires the transmission of a large number of new keys, which reduces communication efficiency;

[0006] 2. In existing group communications, user IDs are fixed and can be easily tracked by the enemy, which cannot meet the anonymity requirements of vehicles in the Internet of Vehicles. Summary of the invention

[0007] In view of the problems in the related art, the present invention proposes a communication method and system based on a hierarchical structure and an asymmetric key pool to overcome the above technical problems existing in the existing related art.

[0008] To this end, the specific technical solution adopted by the present invention is as follows:

[0009] A vehicle network communication system based on a hierarchical structure and an asymmetric key pool, characterized in that the highest-level node is a third-party trust institution, the next-level node is a roadside unit, and the next-level node is an on-board unit. Each layer of nodes has a key pool and a security chip. The security chip stores a chip key. The third-party trust institution key pool stores a private key pool composed of true random numbers and its corresponding public key pool set. The roadside unit key pool stores its own private key pool and its corresponding public key pool. It can save multiple key pools corresponding to multiple times for communicating with the on-board unit key pool corresponding to different times. The on-board unit key pool stores its own private key pool and its corresponding public key pool. The identity information of the third-party trust agency and the roadside unit is bound to the entity. The serial number in the identity information is generally not changed, and the binding relationship can be made public; however, the identity information of the vehicle unit is not bound to the entity, and its real identity information is stored in the security chip. The on-board unit can update its identity information, but its real identity information will not change; each layer of the key pool is evenly divided into multiple sub-key pools, and the sub-key pool contains sub-public keys and sub-private keys; the sub-public key can be calculated through the sub-private key, and the sub-private key can be obtained through the identity information of this layer based on the elliptic curve algorithm, and the identity information carries a timestamp.

[0010] A vehicle networking communication method based on a hierarchical structure and an asymmetric key pool is implemented in the above system, and communication occurs between superiors and subordinates, including the following steps: a sending end sends a message and generates a first timestamp, encrypts the message with a first session key to generate a first ciphertext, and sends the first ciphertext, a first message authentication code and a first timestamp to a receiving end;

[0011] The receiving end receives the first ciphertext, the first message authentication code and the first timestamp, verifies the first message authentication code, and after the verification is passed, decrypts the first ciphertext using the first session key to obtain the message.

[0012] Optionally, direct communication between the superior and the subordinate occurs, the superior calculates a pointer function in the security chip through the first timestamp, calculates a private key of the superior through the pointer function, uses the chip key of the superior as the public key of the subordinate, calculates a communication key according to the private key of the superior and the public key of the subordinate, and calculates a first session key according to the communication key and the first timestamp;

[0013] The subordinate calculates a pointer function through the first timestamp in the security chip, calculates the public key of the superior through the pointer function, takes the X coordinate of the chip key of the subordinate on the elliptic curve as the private key of the subordinate, directly calculates the communication key based on the elliptic curve algorithm according to the public key of the superior and the private key of the subordinate, and calculates the first session key according to the communication key and the first timestamp.

[0014] Preferably, a group communication occurs between a local superior and a subordinate, the superior calculates a pointer function in a security chip through a first timestamp, calculates a private key of the superior through the pointer function, uses the chip key of the superior as a public key of the subordinate, calculates a communication key according to the private key of the superior and the public key of the subordinate, and calculates a first session key according to the communication key and the first timestamp;

[0015] The subordinate calculates the pointer function through the first timestamp in the security chip, calculates the third message verification code based on the subordinate identity information, the second key timestamp when the calculation occurs, and the X coordinate of the chip key of the superior on the elliptic curve, calculates the combination of the pointer function selection result and the third message verification code based on the elliptic curve algorithm to obtain the public key of the superior, uses the X coordinate of the chip key of the subordinate on the elliptic curve as the private key of the subordinate, calculates the communication key based on the elliptic curve algorithm according to the public key of the superior and the private key of the subordinate, and calculates the first session key according to the communication key and the first timestamp.

[0016] Optionally, in a local group communication between peers, a pointer function is calculated in the security chip through the first timestamp to obtain a fourth message verification code using its own identity information, the third key timestamp when the calculation occurs, and the X coordinate on the elliptic curve of the chip key of the upper level. Based on the elliptic curve algorithm, a combination of the pointer function selection result and the fourth message verification code is calculated to obtain its own public key, and the X coordinate on the elliptic curve of the chip key of the lower level is used as its own private key. The first communication key is calculated based on its own private key and its own public key, and the first session key is calculated based on the communication key and the first timestamp.

[0017] The on-board unit roams from the fourth key timestamp to the fifth key timestamp, which occurs when the local roadside unit communicates with the foreign on-board unit. The on-board unit sends a second message, which includes the real identity information of the on-board unit, and calculates a pointer function in the security chip through the second timestamp, calculates a first public key through the second timestamp and the pointer function, calculates the chip key of the roadside unit by using the X coordinate on the elliptic curve of the chip key of the on-board unit, uses the X coordinate on the elliptic curve of the chip key of the roadside unit as the first private key, calculates a communication key according to the first private key and the first public key, and calculates a first session key according to the communication key and the second timestamp;

[0018] After receiving the second message, the roadside unit analyzes and finds that the second message comes from an external vehicle-mounted unit, and directly forwards the message to a third-party trusted institution;

[0019] The third-party trusted institution calculates the pointer function through the second timestamp in the security chip, calculates the identity information of the vehicle-mounted unit, the fifth key timestamp when the calculation occurs, and the X coordinate of the chip key of the roadside unit on the elliptic curve to obtain a fourth message verification code, calculates the combination of the pointer function selection result and the fourth message verification code based on the elliptic curve algorithm to obtain a second private key, uses the chip key of the third-party trusted institution as the second public key, calculates the communication key based on the elliptic curve algorithm according to the obtained second public key and the second private key, and calculates the first session key according to the communication key and the second timestamp; decrypts the first ciphertext through the first session key to obtain the decrypted message, obtains the real identity information of the vehicle-mounted unit from the second message and records it;

[0020] The third-party trusted institution announces the change of the roadside unit described in the on-board unit and sends a third message, the third message includes the change information, signs the third message, and forms the second ciphertext with the third message and the signature. The third-party trusted institution calculates the pointer function through the third timestamp in the security chip and calculates the second session key according to the method of calculating the first session key; encrypts the second ciphertext with the second session key to obtain the third ciphertext, forms the fourth ciphertext with the third ciphertext, the new identity information of the on-board unit and the third timestamp, and encrypts the fourth ciphertext according to the above method and sends it to the roadside unit;

[0021] After receiving the encrypted fourth ciphertext, the roadside unit parses the message according to the above method to obtain the fourth ciphertext, sends the third ciphertext and the third timestamp therein to the vehicle-mounted unit, and retains the new identity information of the vehicle-mounted unit locally;

[0022] After receiving the third ciphertext and the third timestamp, the on-board unit calculates the pointer function through the third timestamp in the security chip, and calculates the second session key according to the method of calculating the first session key; uses the second session key to decrypt the third ciphertext to obtain the second message, and then verifies the signature. After the verification is successful, the on-board unit updates its own identity information and confirms the new superior roadside unit, and updates the key pool; sends the message of the updated identity information to the superior roadside unit; after receiving the message, the superior roadside unit compares the updated identity information of the on-board unit contained in the message with the new identity information of the on-board unit stored locally, and if they are equal, it is confirmed that it is a subordinate on-board unit.

[0023] Optionally, the updated key pool is sent to the security chip, including the following steps: performing a combination operation on the identity information and the first key timestamp corresponding to the update of the segment key to obtain a second message authentication code, combining the result of the second message authentication code calculation based on the elliptic curve algorithm with the original segment key to obtain a new segment key, processing all segment keys in this way, and combining all updated segment keys into a new key pool.

[0024] Preferably, the roadside bill update key pool also needs to first use its own chip key to calculate the chip key of the third-party trusted institution.

[0025] The beneficial effects of the invention are:

[0026] 1. In this patent, each member of the Internet of Vehicles system uses the chip key in the security chip and the hierarchical key pool belonging to different roles, which can not only meet the requirements of anti-quantum computing, but also because the enemy cannot obtain the chip key, there is no possibility of being captured and disassembled from the key pool and cracking the communication key; in addition, if key update is required, this patent does not need to transmit a large number of new keys, the communication efficiency is high, and a large amount of bandwidth and computing resources of the Internet of Vehicles are saved;

[0027] 2. In this patent, the user's real ID is not disclosed, only the non-fixed node number is disclosed. The enemy cannot infer the user's real identity and behavioral characteristics based on the node number. Therefore, it is not easy for the enemy to track the identity and behavior information, which can meet the anonymity requirements of vehicles in the Internet of Vehicles. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0028] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings required for use in the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative work.

[0029] Figure 1 is a system structure diagram of a vehicle-mounted ad hoc network (VANET) in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0030] Figure 2 It is a hierarchical structure diagram in an embodiment of the present invention.

[0031] Figure 3 This is a system structure diagram of the present invention in the vehicle networking scenario. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0032] To further illustrate each embodiment, the present invention provides drawings, which are part of the disclosure of the present invention and are mainly used to illustrate the embodiments and can be used in conjunction with the relevant descriptions in the specification to explain the operating principles of the embodiments. With reference to these contents, ordinary technicians in the field should be able to understand other possible implementations and advantages of the present invention. The components in the figures are not drawn to scale, and similar component symbols are generally used to represent similar components.

[0033] It should be understood that, where technically feasible, the technical features listed above for different embodiments can be combined with each other to form other embodiments within the scope of the present invention. In addition, the specific examples and embodiments described in the present invention are non-limiting, and the structures, steps, and sequences described above can be modified accordingly without departing from the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0034] The VANET is generally composed of three parts, such as Figure 1 As shown: a third-party trust authority (TA), a roadside unit (RSU) and an on-board unit (OBU). TA is a recognized third-party trust authority used for registration of vehicles and roadside infrastructure, generation of public parameters, distribution of keys, etc. Only TA can reveal the true identity of the node. RSU is an infrastructure built on the roadside, used to provide network access services for vehicle nodes. OBU is a communication unit mounted on the vehicle, usually integrating embedded systems, anti-tampering security modules, and global navigation and positioning systems. The communication between V2V (vehicle to vehicle) and V2R (vehicle to roadside unit) uses a short-range wireless communication protocol, and the communication range between RSU and OBU is 300m. TA and RSU are connected by a wired network, which usually has high security and sufficient bandwidth.

[0035] The Internet of Vehicles system includes multiple OBUs, multiple RSUs and TAs. Figure 2 As shown, the vehicle networking system based on the hierarchical asymmetric key pool of the present invention includes a layer 0 node, a layer 1 node, and a layer 2 node. In the current vehicle networking scenario, the distribution of each node is as follows Figure 3 As shown, the node at layer 0 is TA, the node at layer 1 is RSU, and the node at layer 2 is OBU. All member nodes have IDs, and the IDs contain the layer number of the ID. The smaller the layer number, the better the security protection measures, and the less likely it is to be captured by the enemy. And the ID can have a timestamp TS. Let the i-th node at layer 1 be ID i(TS) , set ID i The leaf node below, i.e. the jth node in the second layer, has ID ij(TS) , for example ID i(20200731) and ID ij(20200731), where the subscript (20200731) indicates the timestamp, and the IDs of other nodes are similar. It should be noted that this patent only emphasizes that the ID carries the attribute of the timestamp, which is not necessarily displayed when the ID is used. For example, when the current time is agreed to be taken, the timestamp can be omitted.

[0036] In the present invention, each layer of nodes has a key pool. The 0th layer key pool is the TA key pool, which is a private key pool composed of true random numbers and its corresponding public key pool set; the 1st layer key pool is the RSU key pool, which is the private key pool of each RSU and its corresponding public key pool. It can store multiple key pools corresponding to multiple times and is used to communicate with the OBU key pool corresponding to different times, wherein the 0th layer public key pool set is the set of public key pools of all 1st layer members; the 2nd layer key pool is the OBU key pool, which is the respective public key pool. Each layer stores a security chip such as TPM / TCM, which has an anti-disassembly function and the internal information cannot be obtained. The corresponding chip keys are KR stored in the security chip, namely KR0 of the 0th layer, KR1 of the 1st layer and KR2 of the 2nd layer, where KR1=KR 2x *P and KR0 = KR 1x *P, parameter KR 1x and KR 2x represents the x-coordinate of elliptic curve points KR1 and KR2, and P is the elliptic curve algorithm parameter. The public key of TA is also stored in the security chip of all members, which is used to verify TA's signature.

[0037] The IDs of TA and RSU are real IDs, that is, the ID and the entity are bound to each other, the serial number in the ID is generally not changed, and the binding relationship can be made public; but the ID of the vehicle OBU is a pseudonym, that is, the ID and the entity are not bound to each other, its real identity is TID and is stored in a security chip. The vehicle OBU often needs to update the pseudonym, but its TID will not change.

[0038] Divide the key pools of each layer into multiple key segments evenly. Let the public key of the 0th layer public key pool at position Pos be K0, and its corresponding private key be SK0, and K0 = SK0*P. i The key corresponding to the key pool is K i and SK i , among which SK i =SK0+MAC(ID i ||TS,KR 0x ) and K i =SK i *P; ID of the same position ij The key corresponding to the key pool is K ij , among which SK ij =SK i +MAC(IDij ||TS,KR 1x ) and K ij =SK ij *P, where TS is the timestamp. Since the enemy cannot obtain the chip keys of each layer, there is: Even if the enemy obtains SK ij It is also impossible to deduce SK i , even if the enemy obtains SK i SK0 cannot be derived either.

[0039] The implementation principle of the present invention is described in detail below through specific implementation methods.

[0040] Example 1: TA and RSU communication

[0041] Case 1.1: Tier 0 A with Tier 1 ID i communication

[0042] Assume that the TA of layer 0 is A and the ID of layer 1 is i The message that A wants to send is NTF, and a timestamp TNTF is generated for the message. A calculates the pointer Pos = FPK (TNTF), selects a private key and calculates SK i As A's private key, KR0 is used as B's public key, according to KTG = SK i *KR0 calculates the communication key KTG, and then according to KSG=MAC(TNTF,KTG), uses KSG to encrypt the message NTF to obtain {NTF}KSG, and sends the ciphertext {NTF}KSG together with the timestamp TNTF and the message authentication code to B. MAC is a session key generation function, such as a message authentication code function. All calculations to generate KTG occur in the security chip, so the chip key can be guaranteed not to be leaked.

[0043] B receives the ciphertext {NTF}KSG, timestamp TNTF, and message authentication code. Based on TNTF, the pointer is calculated and a K is selected. i As A's public key, KR 1x As B's private key, according to KTGB = KR 1x *K i Calculate the communication key KTGB, where KTGB = KR 1x *K i =KR 1x *SK i *P=SK i *KR 1x *P=SK i*KR0=KTG, so we can get KTGB=KTG. According to the formula KSG=MAC(TNTF,KTG)=MAC(TNTF,KTGB), we can calculate KSG, use KSG to verify the message authentication code, and decrypt {NTF}KSG to get the message NTF.

[0044] Case 1.2: Tier 1 ID i Communicate with Tier 0A

[0045] Assume that the message to be sent by group member B is NTF, and a timestamp TNTF is generated for the message. B calculates the key KSG according to the method in case 1.1, and uses KSG to encrypt NTF to obtain {NTF}KSG. The ciphertext {NTF}KSG is sent to A together with TNTF and the message authentication code.

[0046] After A receives {NTF}KSG and TNTF, it calculates the key KSG according to the method in situation 1.1 and uses KSG to verify the message authentication code, decrypts {NTF}KSG and obtains the message NTF.

[0047] Case 1.3: Tier 1 ID i Update the key pool

[0048] According to K i =SK i *P=[SK0+MAC(ID i ||TSold,KR 0x )]*P=K0+MAC(ID i ||TSold, KR 0x )*P, so there is a new K i That is, K′ i Calculation method of K′ i =K0+MAC(ID i ||TS,KR 0x )*P=K i -MAC(ID i ||TSold, KR 0x )*P+MAC(ID i ||TS, KR 0x )*P. TSold is K i The corresponding timestamp, TS is K′ i The corresponding timestamp.

[0049] Layer 0 A is based on the above K′ i The calculation method can be used to calculate the new K i That is, K′ i , process all segment keys in this way to update the ID stored by A iThe key pool.

[0050] Tier 1 ID i It is necessary to first use its own chip key to calculate A's chip key, and then obtain a new key pool according to the above calculation method.

[0051] All calculations for updating the key pool occur in the security chip, thus ensuring that the chip key is not leaked.

[0052] Example 2: RSU communicates with local OBU

[0053] Let RSU be the first layer ID i , OBU is the layer 2 ID ij .

[0054] Case 2.1: Tier 1 ID i With Layer 2 ID ij Private Communications

[0055] Assumption ID i The message to be sent is NTF, and a timestamp TNTF is generated for the message. i Calculate the pointer Pos = FPK (TNTF), select a private key and calculate SK ij As ID i The private key of ij The public key of ij *KR1 calculates the communication key KTG, and then according to KSG=MAC(TNTF, KTG), uses KSG to encrypt the message NTF to obtain {NTF}KSG, and sends the ciphertext {NTF}KSG together with the timestamp TNTF and the message authentication code to ID ij MAC is a session key generation function, such as a message authentication code function. All calculations to generate KTG occur in the security chip, so the chip key can be guaranteed not to be leaked.

[0056] ID ij Receive the ciphertext {NTF}KSG, timestamp TNTF, and message authentication code. Calculate the pointer based on TNTF and select a K ij As ID i The public key of KR 2x As B's private key, according to KTGB = KR 2x *K ij Calculate the communication key KTGB, where KTGB = KR 2x *K ij =KR 2x *SK ij *P=SK ij *KR 2x *P=SKij *KR1=KTG, so we can get KTGB=KTG. According to the formula KSG=MAC(TNTF,KTG)=MAC(TNTF,KTGB), we can calculate KSG, use KSG to verify the message authentication code, and decrypt {NTF}KSG to get the message NTF.

[0057] Case 2.2: Layer 2 ID ij With Tier 1 ID i communication

[0058] Assumption ID i The message to be sent is NTF, and a timestamp TNTF is generated for the message. ij Calculate the key KSG according to the method in step 2.1, encrypt NTF with KSG to get {NTF}KSG, and send {NTF}KSG together with TNTF and the message authentication code to ID i .

[0059] ID i After receiving the message, the key KSG is calculated according to the method in step 2.1, and the message authentication code is verified with KSG, and {NTF}KSG is decrypted to obtain the message NTF.

[0060] Case 2.3: Tier 1 ID i Send group message to Tier 2 ID ij and other group members

[0061] Assumption ID i The message to be sent is NTF, and a timestamp TNTF is generated for the message. i Calculate the pointer Pos = FPK (TNTF) and select an SK i As ID i The private key of ij The public key of the subordinate member is KTG=SK i *KR1 calculates the communication key KTG, and then according to KSG=MAC(TNTF,KTG), uses KSG to encrypt the message NTF to obtain {NTF}KSG, and sends the ciphertext {NTF}KSG together with the timestamp TNTF and the message authentication code to ID ij etc. MAC is a session key generation function, such as a message authentication code function.

[0062] ID ij When the subordinate member receives the ciphertext {NTF}KSG, timestamp TNTF, and message authentication code, calculate the pointer Pos = FPK (TNTF) and select a K ij And calculate {K ij -MAC(IDij ||TS,KR 1x )*P} is SK i *P and use it as ID i The public key of KR 2x As ID ij The private key of the subordinate member is KTGB=KR 2x *{K ij -MAC(ID ij ||TS,KR 1x )*P} calculates the communication key KTGB, where KTGB=KR 2x *{K ij -MAC(ID ij ||TS,KR 1x )*P}=KR 2x *SK i *P=SK i *KR 2x *P=SK i *KR1=KTG, so we can get KTGB=KTG. According to the formula KSG=MAC(TNTF,KTG)=MAC(TNTF,KTGB), we can calculate KSG, use KSG to verify the message authentication code, and decrypt {NTF}KSG to get the message NTF.

[0063] Case 2.4: Layer 2 ID ij Send group messages to other group members on the same level

[0064] Assumption ID ij The message to be sent is NTF, and a timestamp TNTF is generated for the message. ij Calculate the pointer Pos = FPK (TNTF) and select a K ij And calculate {K ij -MAC(ID ij ||TS,KR 1x )*P} is SK i *P is used as the private key, KR 2x As the public key, according to KTG = KR 2x *{K ij -MAC(ID ij ||TS,KR 1x )*P} calculates the communication key KTG. Since the above calculations are all completed in the security chip, SK will not be leaked i*P. Then, according to KSG=MAC(TNTF,KTG), KSG is used to encrypt the message NTF to obtain {NTF}KSG, and the ciphertext {NTF}KSG is sent together with the timestamp TNTF and the message authentication code to other group members at the same layer. MAC is a session key generation function, such as a message authentication code function.

[0065] ID ij Other group members at the same level receive the ciphertext {NTF}KSG and the timestamp TNTF and the message authentication code. Assume that these members are ID iJ , J≠j. ID iJ Calculate the pointer Pos = FPK (TNTF) and select a K iJ And calculate {K iJ -MAC(ID iJ ||TS,KR 1x )*P} is SK i *P, and use it as the public key, KR 2x As the private key, according to KTGB = KR 2x *{K iJ -MAC(ID iJ ||TS,KR 1x )*P} calculates the communication key KTGB. Since the above calculations are all completed in the security chip, SK will not be leaked i *P. Where KTGB=KR 2x *{K iJ -MAC(ID iJ ||TS,KR 1x )*P}=KR 2x *SK i *P=KTG, so we can get KTGB=KTG. According to the formula KSG=MAC(TNTF,KTG)=MAC(TNTF,KTGB), we can calculate KSG, use KSG to verify the message authentication code, and decrypt {NTF}KSG to get the message NTF.

[0066] Example 3: RSU communicates with an external OBU

[0067] Existing ID ij From ID i (key timestamp is TSold) roams to ID I (The key timestamp is TS).

[0068] Set this event as NTF roamer , the time is TNTF roamer , NTF roamer Contains the vehicle's TID. ij Calculate the pointer Pos TNTF=FPK(TNTF roamer ), select a K ij As the public key, take KR 2x And calculate KR1 = KR 2x *P, and then get KR 1x And as the private key, according to KTGB = KR 1x *K ij The communication key KTGB is calculated. MAC calculation is performed on KTGB to obtain KSG, and the message is encrypted with KSG to obtain {NTF roamer}KSG, {NTF roamer KSG and TNTF roamer , and the message authentication code is sent to the ID I .

[0069] ID I After receiving the message, I analyzed it and found that it came from the roaming user ID ij The message is forwarded directly to the 0th layer TA, i.e. A.

[0070] A calculates the pointer Pos TNTF =FPK(TNTF roamer ), select a private key and calculate SK i , then according to the formula SK ij =SK i +MAC(ID ij ||TS,KR 1x ) Calculate SK ij , SK ij As the private key, take KR0 as the public key, according to KTG = SK ij *KR0 calculates the communication key KTGB. Where KTG=SK ij *KR0=SK ij *KR 1x *P=KR 1x *SK ij *P=KR 1x *K ij = KTGB, so we can perform MAC calculation on KTGB to get KSG, and use KSG to verify the message authentication code and decrypt {NTF roamer}KSG got the news NTF roamer After A acknowledges the event, he obtains the vehicle's TID from the decrypted message and records the event.

[0071] A announced that ID ij The parent node is changed to ID I , and the ID ij Change to ID IJ News from RET ij. ij Sign and get SIG ij , RET ij ||SIG ij As message RET roamer , time is TRET roamer . A calculates the pointer Pos TRET =FPK(TRET roamer ) and select the corresponding private key, calculate the key KSG′ according to the method of calculating the key KSG above, and use it to encrypt RET roamer Get {RET roamer}KSG′. Follow the method in step 1.1 to convert the message {RET roamer}KSG′||TRET roamer ||ID IJ Encrypted and sent to ID I .

[0072] ID I After receiving the message, decrypt it according to the method in step 1.1 and get {RET roamer}KSG′||TRET roamer ||ID IJ . ID I ID IJ Save it locally for later verification. roamer}KSG′ and TRET roamer Send to ID ij .

[0073] ID ij After receiving the message, calculate the pointer Pos TRET =FPK(TRET roamer ), calculate the key KSG′ according to the method of calculating the key KSG above, and use it to decrypt {RET roamer}KSG′ gets RET roamer , namely RET ij ||SIG ij Then the signature SIG ij Verify and after success, ID ij Change your own ID to ID IJ , and with ID I For each key segment in the key pool, perform key replacement: take out a key segment K from the key pool ij Input to the security chip; according to K ij =SK ij *P=[SK i +MAC(ID ij ||TSold,KR 1x)]*P=K i +MAC(ID ij ||TSold,KR 1x )*P, TSold is the timestamp of the last key replacement, first get KR according to KR2 1x , then for K ij Subtract MAC(ID ij ||TSold, KR 1x )*P gets K i According to K i =SK i *P=[SK0+MAC(ID i ||TSold,KR 0x )]*P=K0+MAC(ID i ||TSold, KR 0x )*P, first according to KR 1x Get KR 0x , then for K i Subtract MAC(ID i ||TSold,KR 0x )*P to get K0; add MAC(ID I ||TS, KR 0x )*P gets K I ; for K I Add MAC(ID IJ ||TS, KR 1x )*P gets K IJ ; K IJ The output security chip becomes a key of the key pool. Similarly, after all keys are replaced, the ID ij Successfully updated to ID IJ The message is sent to ID according to the method in step 2.2 I , the message contains ID IJ .

[0074] ID I After receiving the message, the received ID IJ With the ID saved locally IJ Compare and confirm ID if they are equal IJ It is the new subordinate node of the team.

[0075] Example 4: Communication of OBU ID Change

[0076] To maintain the security of the OBU's identity, the OBU needs to change its ID without changing the RSU. This situation is a special case of Example 3 and can be completed with reference to Example 3. The TA has all the records of the OBU's ID change for subsequent auditing.

[0077] The technical features of the above-described embodiments may be arbitrarily combined. To make the description concise, not all possible combinations of the technical features in the above-described embodiments are described. However, as long as there is no contradiction in the combination of these technical features, they should be considered to be within the scope of this specification.

[0078] The above-mentioned embodiments only express several implementation methods of the present invention, and the descriptions thereof are relatively specific and detailed, but they cannot be understood as limiting the scope of the invention patent. It should be pointed out that, for ordinary technicians in this field, several variations and improvements can be made without departing from the concept of the present invention, and these all belong to the protection scope of the present invention. Therefore, the protection scope of the patent of the present invention shall be subject to the attached claims.

Claims

1. A vehicle networking communication system based on a hierarchical structure and an asymmetric key pool, characterized in that: The highest-level node is a third-party trust agency, the next-level node is a roadside unit, and the next-level node is an on-board unit. Each level of node has a key pool and a security chip. The security chip stores chip keys. The third-party trust agency key pool stores a private key pool composed of true random numbers and its corresponding public key pool set. The roadside unit key pool stores its own private key pool and its corresponding public key pool. It can save multiple key pools corresponding to multiple times, where one time corresponds to a key pool, which is used to communicate with the on-board unit key pool corresponding to different times. The on-board unit key pool stores its own public key pool. The identity information of the third-party trust agency and the roadside unit is bound to the entity, the serial number in the identity information is not changed, and the binding relationship is public; however, the identity information of the on-board unit is not bound to the entity, and its real identity information is stored in the security chip. The on-board unit can update its identity information, but its real identity information will not change; each layer of the key pool is evenly divided into multiple sub-key pools, each of which contains sub-public keys and / or sub-private keys; the sub-public key can be calculated from the sub-private key, and the sub-private key can be obtained from the identity information of this layer based on the elliptic curve algorithm, and the identity information carries a timestamp.

2. A vehicle network communication method based on a hierarchical structure and an asymmetric key pool, characterized in that: The method implemented in the system of claim 1, in which communication occurs between superiors and subordinates, comprises the following steps: a sending end sends a message and generates a first timestamp, encrypts the message with a first session key to generate a first ciphertext, and sends the first ciphertext, a first message authentication code, and a first timestamp to a receiving end; The receiving end receives the first ciphertext, the first message authentication code and the first timestamp, verifies the first message authentication code, and after the verification is passed, decrypts the first ciphertext using the first session key to obtain the message.

3. The vehicle networking communication method based on hierarchical structure and asymmetric key pool according to claim 2, characterized in that: Occurs in direct communication between the superior and the subordinate, the superior calculates the pointer function in the security chip through the first timestamp, calculates the superior's private key through the pointer function, uses the superior's chip key as the subordinate's public key, calculates the communication key based on the superior's private key and the subordinate's public key, and calculates the first session key based on the communication key and the first timestamp; The subordinate calculates a pointer function through the first timestamp in the security chip, calculates the public key of the superior through the pointer function, takes the X coordinate of the chip key of the subordinate on the elliptic curve as the private key of the subordinate, directly calculates the communication key based on the elliptic curve algorithm according to the public key of the superior and the private key of the subordinate, and calculates the first session key according to the communication key and the first timestamp.

4. The vehicle networking communication method based on hierarchical structure and asymmetric key pool according to claim 2, characterized in that: It occurs in the local group communication between the superior and the subordinate. The superior calculates the pointer function through the first timestamp in the security chip, and calculates the superior's private key, taking the chip key of the superior as the public key of the subordinate, calculating the communication key according to the private key of the superior and the public key of the subordinate, and calculating the first session key according to the communication key and the first timestamp; The subordinate calculates the pointer function through the first timestamp in the security chip, calculates the third message verification code based on the subordinate identity information, the second key timestamp when the calculation occurs, and the X coordinate of the chip key of the superior on the elliptic curve, calculates the combination of the pointer function selection result and the third message verification code based on the elliptic curve algorithm to obtain the public key of the superior, uses the X coordinate of the chip key of the subordinate on the elliptic curve as the private key of the subordinate, calculates the communication key based on the elliptic curve algorithm according to the public key of the superior and the private key of the subordinate, and calculates the first session key according to the communication key and the first timestamp.

5. The vehicle networking communication method based on hierarchical structure and asymmetric key pool according to claim 2, characterized in that: In the local peer group communication, the pointer function is calculated by the first timestamp in the security chip, and the fourth message verification code is calculated based on the identity information, the third key timestamp when the calculation occurs, and the X coordinate on the elliptic curve of the chip key of the upper level. The combination of the pointer function selection result and the fourth message verification code is calculated based on the elliptic curve algorithm to obtain its own public key, and the X coordinate on the elliptic curve of the chip key of the lower level is used as its own private key. The first communication key is calculated according to its own private key and its own public key, and the first session key is calculated according to the communication key and the first timestamp.

6. The vehicle networking communication method based on hierarchical structure and asymmetric key pool according to claim 3, characterized in that: The on-board unit roams from the fourth key timestamp to the fifth key timestamp, which occurs when the local roadside unit communicates with the foreign on-board unit. The on-board unit sends a second message, which contains the real identity information of the on-board unit, and calculates the pointer function through the second timestamp in the security chip, calculates the first public key through the second timestamp and the pointer function, calculates the chip key of the roadside unit using the X coordinate on the elliptic curve of the chip key of the on-board unit, uses the X coordinate on the elliptic curve of the chip key of the roadside unit as the first private key, calculates the communication key according to the first private key and the first public key, and calculates the first session key according to the communication key and the second timestamp; wherein, for each key segment of the key pool, key replacement is performed, the fourth key timestamp is the timestamp corresponding to the replacement of the third key segment, and the fifth key timestamp is the timestamp corresponding to the replacement of the fourth key segment; the second timestamp is the timestamp generated when the on-board unit sends the second message; After receiving the second message, the roadside unit analyzes and finds that the second message comes from an external vehicle-mounted unit, and directly forwards the message to a third-party trusted institution; The third-party trusted institution calculates the pointer function through the second timestamp in the security chip, calculates the identity information of the vehicle-mounted unit, the fifth key timestamp when the calculation occurs, and the X coordinate of the chip key of the roadside unit on the elliptic curve to obtain a fourth message verification code, calculates the combination of the pointer function selection result and the fourth message verification code based on the elliptic curve algorithm to obtain a second private key, uses the chip key of the third-party trusted institution as the second public key, calculates the communication key based on the elliptic curve algorithm according to the obtained second public key and the second private key, and calculates the first session key according to the communication key and the second timestamp; decrypts the first ciphertext through the first session key to obtain the decrypted message, obtains the real identity information of the vehicle-mounted unit from the second message and records it; The third-party trusted institution announces the change of the roadside unit of the vehicle-mounted unit and sends a third message, which contains the change information, signs the third message, and combines the third message and the signature into a second ciphertext. The third-party trusted institution calculates the pointer function through the third timestamp in the security chip, and calculates the second session key according to the method of calculating the first session key; encrypts the second ciphertext with the second session key to obtain the third ciphertext, combines the third ciphertext, the new identity information of the vehicle-mounted unit and the third timestamp into a fourth ciphertext, and calculates the third session key according to the method of superior direct communication shown in claim 3, encrypts the fourth ciphertext with the third session key, and encrypts the fourth ciphertext and sends it to the roadside unit; wherein the third timestamp is the timestamp generated when the vehicle-mounted unit sends the third message; After receiving the encrypted fourth ciphertext, the roadside unit calculates the third session key according to the method of lower-level direct communication as shown in claim 3, parses the fourth ciphertext using the third session key, parses the message to obtain the fourth ciphertext, sends the third ciphertext and the third timestamp therein to the vehicle-mounted unit, and retains the new identity information of the vehicle-mounted unit locally; After receiving the third ciphertext and the third timestamp, the on-board unit calculates the pointer function through the third timestamp in the security chip, and calculates the second session key according to the method of calculating the first session key; uses the second session key to decrypt the third ciphertext to obtain the second message, and then verifies the signature. After the verification is successful, the on-board unit updates its own identity information and confirms the new superior roadside unit, and updates the key pool; sends the message of the updated identity information to the superior roadside unit; after receiving the message, the superior roadside unit compares the updated identity information of the on-board unit contained in the message with the new identity information of the on-board unit stored locally, and if they are equal, it is confirmed that it is a subordinate on-board unit.

7. The vehicle networking communication method based on a hierarchical structure and an asymmetric key pool according to any one of claims 2 to 6, characterized in that: The updated key pool is sent to the security chip, and includes the following steps: performing a combination operation on the identity information and the key timestamp corresponding to the update of the segment key to obtain a second message authentication code, combining the result of the second message authentication code calculation based on the elliptic curve algorithm with the original segment key to obtain a new segment key, processing all the new segment keys, and combining all the new segment keys after the update into a new key pool; wherein the original segment key represents the segment key before the key pool is segmented and not updated.

8. The vehicle networking communication method based on a hierarchical structure and an asymmetric key pool according to claim 7, characterized in that: To update the key pool of a roadside order, you need to first use your own chip key to calculate the chip key of a third-party trusted institution.