Attribute-based purifiable signature method and system with server-assisted verification
By introducing server-assisted verification and purifiers into IoT devices, the problem of high computing and communication overhead in IoT devices is solved, and efficient signature verification and data privacy protection is achieved, which is suitable for security authentication of IoT devices.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202210755230.3
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2022-06-29
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-26
- Estimated Expiration
- 2042-06-29
AI Technical Summary
Attribute-based signatures are too expensive in IoT devices due to the increase in the number of user attributes, and may contain sensitive data, which is difficult to effectively use in access control and security authentication.
The attribute-based purified signature method with server-assisted verification is adopted, and by introducing semi-trusted purifier and server-assisted technologies, fixed signature length, hidden sensitive signature information, and reduced computing overhead during the verification phase.
It realizes signature verification of anonymity, invariance and non-forgery, while reducing the computing overhead of signers and verifiers, protecting the privacy of signed data, and is suitable for IoT devices with limited computing and communication resources.
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Figure CN115174105B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of data desensitization and resource-constrained device use security, and in particular to an attribute-based purifiable signature method and system with server-assisted verification. Background Art
[0002] Internet of Things (IoT) devices improve people's lives and promote social development. These devices collect and generate a large amount of data for management and analysis, and therefore inevitably face access control and security authentication issues. Attribute-based signature (ABS), the signer uses a set of attributes to sign the message, and the signature does not reveal the identity of the user. Therefore, ABS signature is a cryptographic technology for data verification and anonymous access control. However, the signed message may contain sensitive data that cannot be made public and needs to be deleted or replaced (i.e., desensitized). In addition, the signature length grows linearly with the number of user attributes, so this is not suitable for IoT devices with limited computational and communication overheads.
[0003] In order to solve the above problems, the present invention proposes a new ABS scheme with fixed signature length and introduces a purifier to modify the specified signature sensitive data, wherein the purifier is a semi-trusted third party designated by the signer. In addition, in order to reduce the computational overhead of the pairing operation in the verification phase, a server-assisted technology is introduced to perform the pairing operation. Summary of the invention
[0004] The present invention proposes an attribute-based purifiable signature method and system with server-assisted verification, which provides anonymity, immutability and unforgeability; in addition, the method proposed by the present invention also desensitizes sensitive data and reduces the computational overhead of the signer and the verifier.
[0005] The present invention adopts the following technical solutions.
[0006] An attribute-based sanitizable signature system with server-assisted verification, the system is used to hide sensitive signature information when verifying the authenticity of a message, including an attribute authorization end, a server, a sanitization end, a signing end, and a verification end;
[0007] The attribute authorization end is used to generate the system master key msk and public parameter params, and also generates the private key sk required by the signature end according to the system master key msk, public parameter params and signature end attribute ω ω ;
[0008] The signing end is based on the access policy Γ, the public parameter params, the message M to be sent and the private key sk provided by the attribute authorization end. ω , generate the purified private key spk and signature δ; the private key sk ω, purify the private key spk and signature and provide them to the user who needs to send the message;
[0009] Before sending a message, the user first provides the signed message and related purification settings to the purification end;
[0010] The purification end is based on the parameters params allowed to be disclosed, the message M, and the index set I allowed to be purified. s , purify the private key spk to calculate the purified signature δ';
[0011] The verification end calculates the conversion signature based on the public parameters params, the conversion key tk, the message M, and the purified signature δ' and intermediate signature Also based on public parameters params, intermediate signature Access policy Γ and conversion key tk to verify the validity of the purified signature;
[0012] The verification end includes public parameters params, conversion signature Calculate intermediate signature Servers;
[0013] Once the verification end has verified the purified signature, the purified message and purified signature received by the user can be sent externally.
[0014] The workflow of the purifiable signature method includes the following methods;
[0015] Method A1: The signing end sends an attribute set to the attribute authorization party to request an attribute private key. The attribute authorization party verifies whether the signing end attributes meet the access policy. If they meet the access policy, the attribute authorization party will generate an attribute private key and send it to the signing end user through a secure channel.
[0016] Method A2: After receiving the attribute private key, the user signs the message before sending it; then randomly selects a private key from Z from the public parameters. p The number of cluster sets is used as the purification private key of the purification end and an index set I of the allowed modification range is selected s , sent to the purification end through a secure channel;
[0017] Method A3: The purification end receives the signature, purifies the private key and index set I s Finally, the relevant equation is used to verify whether the signature comes from the signing end user. If the equation is true, the purification end accepts the purified signature and generates a purified signature through the received purified private key and index set;
[0018] Method A4: The purification end sends the purification signature to the verification end through a public channel, and the verification end receives the signature;
[0019] Method A5: In order to reduce the expensive computational overhead of pairing operations during the verification phase, the verifier randomly selects a secret value as the conversion key, calculates the purified signature to generate the conversion signature, and then sends it to the verifier's server;
[0020] Method A6: After receiving the converted signature, the server runs the auxiliary verification algorithm to generate an intermediate signature and returns it to the verification end;
[0021] Method A7: After receiving the intermediate signature, the verification end first calculates the partial signature using the selected conversion key, and then verifies whether the calculation result is equal to the intermediate signature returned by the server. If the equality holds, the verification end determines that the purified signature is valid, and the purified message and purified signature received by the user can be used for external transmission. Otherwise, the verification end determines that the purified signature is invalid, and prohibits the purified message and purified signature received by the user from being sent externally.
[0022] In method A1, the following steps are included:
[0023] Step S1: The attribute authorization end inputs the security parameter λ and outputs the system master key msk and public parameter params;
[0024] Step S2: The attribute authorization end inputs msk, params, access policy Γ and signature end attribute ω, and outputs the private key sk ω ;
[0025] In step A2 to step A3, the following steps are included:
[0026] Step S3: The user at the signing end inputs the private key sk to the signing end ω , public parameters params, access policy Γ, message M, the signing end outputs the private key spk of the purification end to the purification end, and the set of purifiable message indexes I s and signature(M,δ);
[0027] Step S4: The purification end inputs public parameters params, purified private key spk, signature (M, δ) and set I s , output the purified signature (M',δ') to the verification end;
[0028] In step A5, the following steps are included:
[0029] Step S5: The verification end inputs the public parameter params, the conversion key tk, the message M', the purified signature δ', and outputs the converted signature to the verification end server
[0030] Step S6: The verification server inputs the public parameter params and converts the signature Output intermediate signature
[0031] Step S7: The verification end inputs public parameters params and intermediate signature Access policy Γ, transform key tk, output 1 if the signature is valid, otherwise output 0.
[0032] The step S1 specifically includes the following steps:
[0033] Step S11: Let G1 and G2 be p-order multiplication groups, g is the generator of G1, and the attribute authorization end randomly selects a∈Z p , calculate g1 = g a , where Z p ={0,1,2,…,p-1};
[0034] Step S12: The attribute authorization terminal randomly selects g2,u',u1,…,u n ,k0,k1…,k l+d-1 ∈G1 and calculate Z = e(g1,g2), where the master key MK = a,
[0035] The public parameters are expressed as:
[0036] params=(p,G1,G2,e,g,g1,g2,u',u1,…,u n ,k0,k1…,k l+d-1, Z) Formula 1;
[0037] The step S2 specifically includes the following steps:
[0038] Step S21: For the attribute authorization end, randomly select a d-1 polynomial q(x), where q(0) = a; then randomly select an attribute universe U, where |U| = l, and randomly select a set Ω = {l+1, l+2, ..., l+d-1} containing d-1 virtual attributes;
[0039] Step S22: For each i∈ω∪Ω, the attribute authorization end randomly selects r i ∈Z p ,calculate The user's private key is expressed as
[0040]
[0041] In step S3, the calculation of the user signature specifically includes the following steps:
[0042] Step S31: The user has the private key sk for the signature end attribute ω ω To generate the message M = (m1m2…m n )∈{0,1} nThe signature of * , where ω * There are at least k attributes; the user randomly selects a set containing k elements and a set of dk elements Let S = ω'∪Ω', where Ω' = {l+1,l+2,…,l+dk}. The user randomly selects r,s∈Z p And calculate As the purifier private key spk and the index set I allowed to purify s Send it to the purifier, and then calculate the signature. The formula is:
[0043]
[0044]
[0045] δ3=g r Formula 5;
[0046] Step S32: The user outputs a signature δ=(δ1, δ2, δ3, M).
[0047] The step S4 specifically comprises the following steps:
[0048] Step S41: The purification end receives the signature δ, I s And the purifier private key spk, verify whether the equation is true, the equation is:
[0049]
[0050] If the equality holds, the signature is valid;
[0051] Step S42: I1={i∈I:m i =0,m′ i =1},I2={i∈I:m i =1,m′ i =0}; random selection of purification end And calculate
[0052]
[0053] Step S43: The purification end outputs the signature, the formula is
[0054] δ'=(δ'1, δ'2, δ'3, M') Formula 8.
[0055] The step S5 specifically comprises the following steps:
[0056] Step S51: After receiving the signature δ', the verifier randomly selects t∈Z pAs the conversion key tk, calculate the conversion signature, the formula is
[0057]
[0058] Step S52: The verification end sends the conversion signature To the server.
[0059] The step S6 specifically comprises the following steps:
[0060] Step S61: The server receives the conversion signature Calculate the intermediate signature, the formula is
[0061] Then send it to the verification end;
[0062] Step S62: The server sends the conversion signature To the verification end.
[0063] The step S7 specifically includes the following steps:
[0064] Step S71: The verification end obtains the intermediate signature from the server end And calculate, the formula is
[0065] Step S72: Verification end verifies equation Is it true? The signature is valid, otherwise, the verification end rejects the signature.
[0066] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:
[0067] The present invention is based on the attribute-based signature design. The user's private key is associated with a set of attributes. The access policy is embedded in the signature. If the attribute satisfies the access policy, the user can generate a valid signature. Sometimes, the signature data contains sensitive data. In order to protect the privacy of the signature data, the signer specifies a semi-trusted purification end to hide or delete the sensitive part of the information. The purifier generates a purified signature and sends it to the verification end. The verification end makes sure that a specific signature is created by a group of possible users, and the attributes of these users match the access policy, so as not to disclose the identity information of the signer. Therefore, the proposed method and system have strong practicality and broad application prospects in data authentication and privacy protection access control. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0068] The present invention is further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments:
[0069] Attached Figure 1 It is a schematic block diagram of the system principle of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0070] As shown in the figure, an attribute-based sanitizable signature system with server-assisted verification, the system is used to hide sensitive signature information when verifying the reliability of a message, including an attribute authorization end, a server, a sanitization end, a signing end, and a verification end;
[0071] The attribute authorization end is used to generate the system master key msk and public parameter params, and also generates the private key sk required by the signature end according to the system master key msk, public parameter params and signature end attribute ω ω ;
[0072] The signing end is based on the access policy Γ, the public parameter params, the message M to be sent and the private key sk provided by the attribute authorization end. ω , generate the purified private key spk and signature δ; the private key sk ω , purify the private key spk and signature and provide them to the user who needs to send the message;
[0073] Before sending a message, the user first provides the signed message and related purification settings to the purification end;
[0074] The purification end is based on the parameters params allowed to be disclosed, the message M, and the index set I allowed to be purified. s , purify the private key spk to calculate the purified signature δ';
[0075] The verification end calculates the conversion signature based on the public parameters params, the conversion key tk, the message M, and the purified signature δ' and intermediate signature Also based on public parameters params, intermediate signature Access policy Γ and conversion key tk to verify the validity of the purified signature;
[0076] The verification end includes public parameters params, conversion signature Calculate intermediate signature Servers;
[0077] Once the verification end has verified the purified signature, the purified message and purified signature received by the user can be sent externally.
[0078] The workflow of the purifiable signature method includes the following methods;
[0079] Method A1: The signing end sends an attribute set to the attribute authorization party to request an attribute private key. The attribute authorization party verifies whether the signing end attributes meet the access policy. If they meet the access policy, the attribute authorization party will generate an attribute private key and send it to the signing end user through a secure channel.
[0080] Method A2: After receiving the attribute private key, the user signs the message before sending it; then randomly selects a private key from Z from the public parameters. p The number of cluster sets is used as the purification private key of the purification end and an index set I of the allowed modification range is selected s , sent to the purification end through a secure channel;
[0081] Method A3: The purification end receives the signature, purifies the private key and index set I s Finally, the relevant equation is used to verify whether the signature comes from the signing end user. If the equation is true, the purification end accepts the purified signature and generates a purified signature through the received purified private key and index set;
[0082] Method A4: The purification end sends the purification signature to the verification end through a public channel, and the verification end receives the signature;
[0083] Method A5: In order to reduce the expensive computational overhead of pairing operations during the verification phase, the verifier randomly selects a secret value as the conversion key, calculates the purified signature to generate the conversion signature, and then sends it to the verifier's server;
[0084] Method A6: After receiving the converted signature, the server runs the auxiliary verification algorithm to generate an intermediate signature and returns it to the verification end;
[0085] Method A7: After receiving the intermediate signature, the verification end first calculates the partial signature using the selected conversion key, and then verifies whether the calculation result is equal to the intermediate signature returned by the server. If the equality holds, the verification end determines that the purified signature is valid, and the purified message and purified signature received by the user can be used for external transmission. Otherwise, the verification end determines that the purified signature is invalid, and prohibits the purified message and purified signature received by the user from being sent externally.
[0086] In method A1, the following steps are included:
[0087] Step S1: The attribute authorization end inputs the security parameter λ and outputs the system master key msk and public parameter params;
[0088] Step S2: The attribute authorization end inputs msk, params, access policy Γ and signature end attribute ω, and outputs the private key sk ω ;
[0089] In step A2 to step A3, the following steps are included:
[0090] Step S3: The user at the signing end inputs the private key sk to the signing end ω , public parameters params, access policy Γ, message M, the signing end outputs the private key spk of the purification end to the purification end, and the set of purifiable message indexes I sand signature(M,δ);
[0091] Step S4: The purification end inputs public parameters params, purified private key spk, signature (M, δ) and set I s , output the purified signature (M',δ') to the verification end;
[0092] In step A5, the following steps are included:
[0093] Step S5: The verification end inputs the public parameter params, the conversion key tk, the message M', the purified signature δ', and outputs the converted signature to the verification end server
[0094] Step S6: The verification server inputs the public parameter params and converts the signature Output intermediate signature
[0095] Step S7: The verification end inputs public parameters params and intermediate signature Access policy Γ, transform key tk, output 1 if the signature is valid, otherwise output 0.
[0096] The step S1 specifically includes the following steps:
[0097] Step S11: Let G1 and G2 be p-order multiplication groups, g is the generator of G1, and the attribute authorization end randomly selects a∈Z p , calculate g1 = g a , where Z p ={0,1,2,…,p-1};
[0098] Step S12: The attribute authorization terminal randomly selects g2,u',u1,…,u n ,k0,k1…,k l+d-1 ∈G1 and calculate Z = e(g1,g2), where the master key MK = a,
[0099] The public parameters are expressed as:
[0100] params=(p,G1,G2,e,g,g1,g2,u',u1,…,u n ,k0,k1…,k l+d-1 ,Z) Formula 1;
[0101] The step S2 specifically includes the following steps:
[0102] Step S21: For the attribute authorization end, randomly select a d-1 polynomial q(x), where q(0) = a; then randomly select an attribute universe U, where |U| = l, and randomly select a set Ω = {l+1, l+2, ..., l+d-1} containing d-1 virtual attributes;
[0103] Step S22: For each i∈ω∪Ω, the attribute authorization end randomly selects r i ∈Z p ,calculate The user's private key is expressed as
[0104]
[0105] In step S3, the calculation of the user signature specifically includes the following steps:
[0106] Step S31: The user has the private key sk for the signature end attribute ω ω To generate the message M = (m1m2…m n )∈{0,1} n The signature of * , where ω * There are at least k attributes; the user randomly selects a set containing k elements and a set of dk elements Let S = ω'∪Ω', where Ω' = {l+1,l+2,…,l+dk}. The user randomly selects r,s∈Z p And calculate As the purifier private key spk and the index set I allowed to purify s Send it to the purifier, and then calculate the signature. The formula is:
[0107]
[0108]
[0109] δ3=g r Formula 5;
[0110] Step S32: The user outputs a signature δ=(δ1, δ2, δ3, M).
[0111] The step S4 specifically comprises the following steps:
[0112] Step S41: The purification end receives the signature δ, I s And the purifier private key spk, verify whether the equation is true, the equation is:
[0113]
[0114] If the equality holds, the signature is valid;
[0115] Step S42: I1={i∈I:m i =0,m′ i =1},I2={i∈I:m i =1,m′ i =0}; random selection of purification end And calculate
[0116]
[0117] Step S43: The purification end outputs the signature, the formula is
[0118] δ'=(δ'1, δ'2, δ'3, M') Formula 8.
[0119] The step S5 specifically comprises the following steps:
[0120] Step S51: After receiving the signature δ', the verifier randomly selects t∈Z p As the conversion key tk, calculate the conversion signature, the formula is
[0121]
[0122] Step S52: The verification end sends the conversion signature To the server.
[0123] The step S6 specifically comprises the following steps:
[0124] Step S61: The server receives the conversion signature Calculate the intermediate signature, the formula is
[0125] Then send it to the verification end;
[0126] Step S62: The server sends the conversion signature To the verification end.
[0127] The step S7 specifically includes the following steps:
[0128] Step S71: The verification end obtains the intermediate signature from the server end And calculate, the formula is
[0129] Step S72: Verification end verifies equation Is it true? The signature is valid, otherwise, the verification end rejects the signature.
[0130] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the embodiments of the present application may be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Therefore, the present application may adopt the form of a complete hardware embodiment, a complete software embodiment, or an embodiment in combination with software and hardware. Moreover, the present application may adopt the form of a computer program product implemented in one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) that include computer-usable program code.
[0131] The present application is described with reference to the flowcharts and / or block diagrams of the methods, devices (systems), and computer program products according to the embodiments of the present application. It should be understood that each process and / or box in the flowchart and / or block diagram, as well as the combination of the processes and / or boxes in the flowchart and / or block diagram, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, an embedded processor, or other programmable data processing device to generate a machine, so that the instructions executed by the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing device generate instructions for implementing the processes in the flowchart and / or block diagram. Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A device that provides the functions specified in a block or multiple blocks.
[0132] These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable memory capable of directing a computer or other programmable data processing device to operate in a specific manner, so that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory produce an article of manufacture comprising an instruction device, which implements the process Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A function specified in one or more boxes.
[0133] These computer program instructions can also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing device so that a series of operating steps are executed on the computer or other programmable device to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby providing instructions for implementing the process. Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The steps for the functions specified in one or more boxes.
[0134] The above is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention, and does not limit the present invention in other forms. Any technician familiar with the profession may use the above disclosed technical content to change or modify it into an equivalent embodiment with equivalent changes. However, any simple modification, equivalent change and modification made to the above embodiment according to the technical essence of the present invention without departing from the technical solution of the present invention still belongs to the protection scope of the technical solution of the present invention.
Claims
1. A sanitizable attribute-based signature system with server-assisted verification, characterized in that: The system is used to hide sensitive signature information when verifying the reliability of a message, and includes an attribute authorization end, a server, a purification end, a signing end, and a verification end; The attribute authorization end is used to generate the system master key msk and public parameter params, and also generates the private key sk required by the signature end according to the system master key msk, public parameter params and signature end attribute ω ω ; The signing end is based on the access policy Γ, the public parameter params, the message M to be sent and the private key sk provided by the attribute authorization end. ω , generate the purified private key spk and signature δ; the private key sk ω , purify the private key spk and signature and provide them to the user who needs to send the message; Before sending a message, the user first provides the signed message and related purification settings to the purification end; The purification end is based on the parameters params allowed to be disclosed, the message M, and the index set I allowed to be purified. s , purify the private key spk to calculate the purified signature δ'; The verification end calculates the conversion signature based on the public parameters params, the conversion key tk, the message M, and the purified signature δ' and intermediate signature Also based on public parameters params, intermediate signature Access policy Γ and conversion key tk to verify the validity of the purified signature; The verification end includes public parameters params, conversion signature Calculate intermediate signature Servers; When the verification end passes the verification of the purified signature, the purified message and purified signature received by the user can be sent externally; The workflow of the purifiable signature method includes the following methods; Method A1: The signing end sends an attribute set to the attribute authorization party to request an attribute private key. The attribute authorization party verifies whether the signing end attributes meet the access policy. If they meet the access policy, the attribute authorization party will generate an attribute private key and send it to the signing end user through a secure channel. Method A2: After receiving the attribute private key, the user signs the message before sending it; then randomly selects a private key from Z from the public parameters. p The number of cluster sets is used as the purification private key of the purification end and an index set I of the allowed modification range is selected s , sent to the purification end through a secure channel; Method A3: The purification end receives the signature, purifies the private key and index set I s Finally, the relevant equation is used to verify whether the signature comes from the signing end user. If the equation is true, the purification end accepts the purified signature and generates a purified signature through the received purified private key and index set; Method A4: The purification end sends the purification signature to the verification end through a public channel, and the verification end receives the signature; Method A5: In order to reduce the expensive computational overhead of pairing operations during the verification phase, the verifier randomly selects a secret value as the conversion key, calculates the purified signature to generate the conversion signature, and then sends it to the verifier's server; Method A6: After receiving the converted signature, the server runs the auxiliary verification algorithm to generate an intermediate signature and returns it to the verification end; Method A7: After receiving the intermediate signature, the verification end first calculates the partial signature using the selected conversion key, and then verifies whether the calculation result is equal to the intermediate signature returned by the server. If the equality holds, the verification end determines that the purified signature is valid, and the purified message and purified signature received by the user can be used for external transmission. Otherwise, the verification end determines that the purified signature is invalid, and prohibits the purified message and purified signature received by the user from being sent externally.
2. The attribute-based sanitizable signature system with server-assisted verification according to claim 1, characterized in that: In method A1, the following steps are included: Step S1: The attribute authorization end inputs the security parameter λ and outputs the system master key msk and public parameter params; Step S2: The attribute authorization end inputs msk, params, access policy Γ and signature end attribute ω, and outputs the private key sk ω ; In step A2 to step A3, The steps include: Step S3: The user at the signing end inputs the private key sk to the signing end ω , public parameters params, access policy Γ, message M, the signing end outputs the private key spk of the purification end to the purification end, and the set of purifiable message indexes I s and signature(M,δ); Step S4: The purification end inputs public parameters params, purified private key spk, signature (M, δ) and set I s , output the purified signature (M',δ') to the verification end; In step A5, The steps include: Step S5: The verification end inputs the public parameter params, the conversion key tk, the message M', the purified signature δ', and outputs the converted signature to the verification end server Step S6: The verification server inputs the public parameter params and converts the signature Output intermediate signature Step S7: The verification end inputs public parameters params and intermediate signature Access policy Γ, transform key tk, output 1 if the signature is valid, otherwise output 0.
3. The attribute-based sanitizable signature system with server-assisted verification according to claim 2, characterized in that: The step S1 specifically includes the following steps: Step S11: Let G1 and G2 be p-order multiplication groups, g is the generator of G1, and the attribute authorization end randomly selects a∈Z p , calculate g1 = g a , where Z p ={0,1,2,…,p-1}; Step S12: The attribute authorization terminal randomly selects g2,u',u1,…,u n ,k0,k1…,k l+d-1 ∈G1 and calculate Z = e(g1,g2), where the master key MK = a, The public parameters are expressed as: params=(p,G1,G2,e,g,g1,g2,u',u1,…,u n ,k0,k1…,k l+d-1 ,Z) Formula 1; The step S2 specifically includes the following steps: Step S21: For the attribute authorization end, randomly select a d-1 polynomial q(x), where q(0) = a; then randomly select an attribute universe U, where |U| = l, and randomly select a set Ω = {l+1, l+2, ..., l+d-1} containing d-1 virtual attributes; Step S22: For each i∈ω∪Ω, the attribute authorization end randomly selects r i ∈Z p ,calculate The user's private key is expressed as 4. The attribute-based sanitizable signature system with server-assisted verification according to claim 2, characterized in that: In step S3, the calculation of the user signature specifically includes the following steps: Step S31: The user has the private key sk for the signature end attribute ω ω To generate the message M = (m1m2…m n )∈{0,1} n The signature of * , where ω * There are at least k attributes; the user randomly selects a set containing k elements and a set of dk elements Let S = ω'∪Ω', where Ω' = {l+1,l+2,…,l+dk}; the user randomly selects r,s∈Z p And calculate As the purifier private key spk and the index set I allowed to purify s Send it to the purifier, and then calculate the signature. The formula is: δ3=g r Formula 5; Step S32: The user outputs a signature δ=(δ1, δ2, δ3, M).
5. The attribute-based sanitizable signature system with server-assisted verification according to claim 2, characterized in that: The step S4 specifically comprises the following steps: Step S41: The purification end receives the signature δ, I s And the purifier private key spk, verify whether the equation is true, the equation is: If the equality holds, the signature is valid; Step S42: I1={i∈I:m i =0,m i '=1},I2={i∈I:m i =1,m i '=0}; The purification end randomly selects And calculate Step S43: The purification end outputs the signature, the formula is δ'=(δ'1, δ'2, δ'3, M') Formula 8.
6. The attribute-based sanitizable signature system with server-assisted verification according to claim 2, characterized in that: The step S5 specifically comprises the following steps: Step S51: After receiving the signature δ', the verifier randomly selects t∈Z p As the conversion key tk, calculate the conversion signature, the formula is Step S52: The verification end sends the conversion signature To the server.
7. The attribute-based sanitizable signature system with server-assisted verification according to claim 2, characterized in that: The step S6 specifically comprises the following steps: Step S61: The server receives the conversion signature Calculate the intermediate signature, the formula is Then send it to the verification end; Step S62: The server sends the conversion signature To the verification end.
8. The attribute-based sanitizable signature system with server-assisted verification according to claim 2, characterized in that: The step S7 specifically includes the following steps: Step S71: The verification end obtains the intermediate signature from the server end And calculate, the formula is Step S72: Verification end verifies equation Is it established? The signature is valid, otherwise, the verification end rejects the signature.
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