System and method for signing a boot information file and interlocking a host computing system
Through the manageability controller of the computing system, the startup information file is signed and interlocked with the firmware engine, which solves the problem that secure boot cannot ensure that the computing system and signature files are interlocked, prevents the hard drive from being illegally used, and simplifies the database and information files The update process achieves higher security and ease of use.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202111243120.0
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2021-04-13
- Filing Date
- 2021-10-25
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-22
- Estimated Expiration
- 2041-10-25
AI Technical Summary
Existing secure boot technology cannot ensure that the computing system is interlocked with the boot information file with a proven signature, resulting in the hard drive being removed and may be used in other computing systems, introducing spyware or root program viruses, and updating the boot database and information file The process is more complicated than the ability of ordinary administrators.
The startup information file is signed through the manageability controller of the computing system, the signed startup information file is generated, and the firmware engine's startup database is interlocked, and hash data pairs are stored in non-volatile Files in the sexual storage drive are attached to generate attached startup information files to ensure that the computing system can only start with trusted signature files.
Even if the hard drive is removed, other computing systems cannot start with signed boot information files, preventing spyware or viruses from intrusion, and simplifying the process of launching databases and information files, making it possible to be done by ordinary administrators.
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Figure CN115203678B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present disclosure relates generally to computing systems. Background Art
[0002] A data center may have a computing system for executing one or more workloads (application software) of a customer. Whenever a computing system in a data center is started / restarted, various initialization procedures and tests (secure boot tests) may have to be performed before the computing system can be used to run an operating system (OS) and application software on the OS. In order to ensure the integrity of the computing system software (i.e., boot time software) before loading the OS, it may be necessary to safely boot the computing system. Therefore, secure boot can enable the trusted authorization signature of the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) of the boot time software to be maintained in the boot database of the firmware engine to ensure that the computing system is booted using software with an authorized signature. Therefore, when the computing system starts (start / boot), the firmware engine checks the signature of the software listed in the boot information file against the authorized signature in the boot database, and if the signature is verified, the firmware engine provides control to the boot information file to allow the computing system to be started. Summary of the invention
[0003] According to one aspect of the present disclosure, a method for a host computing system includes: receiving, by a manageability controller of the host computing system, a boot information file of the host computing system from a processor of a computing device; signing, by the manageability controller, the boot information file with hash data of a unique identifier to generate a signed boot information file; transmitting, by the manageability controller, the signed boot information file to the processor; in response to the processor successfully downloading the signed boot information file, updating, by the manageability controller, a boot database stored in a non-volatile random access memory of a firmware engine of the host computing system with thumbprint data of the signed boot information file to interlock the host computing system with the signed boot information file; and generating, by the manageability controller, an appended boot information file by appending the boot information file stored in a non-volatile storage drive of the host computing system using the hash data of the unique identifier, wherein the appended boot information file and the signed boot information file are similar files.
[0004] According to another aspect of the present disclosure, a manageability controller of a host computing system includes: a machine-readable medium storing program instructions; and a processing resource operably coupled to the machine-readable medium, wherein the processing resource executes the program instructions to perform the following operations: receiving a boot information file of the host computing system from a processor of a computing device; signing the boot information file with hash data of a unique identifier to generate a signed boot information file; transmitting the signed boot information file to the processor; in response to the processor successfully downloading the signed boot information file, updating a boot database stored in a non-volatile random access memory of a firmware engine of the host computing system with thumbprint data of the signed boot information file to interlock the host computing system with the signed boot information file; and generating an attached boot information file by attaching the boot information file stored in a non-volatile storage drive of the host computing system using the hash data of the unique identifier, wherein the attached boot information file and the signed boot information file are similar files.
[0005] According to another aspect of the present disclosure, a non-transitory machine-readable medium stores instructions executable by a manageability controller of a host computing system, wherein the instructions include: a first instruction for receiving a boot information file of the host computing system from a processor of a computing device, wherein the processor is separate from the manageability controller; a second instruction for signing the boot information file with hash data of a unique identifier to generate a signed boot information file; a third instruction for transmitting the signed boot information file to the processor; a fourth instruction for updating a boot database stored in a non-volatile random access memory of a firmware engine of the host computing system with thumbprint data of the signed boot information file in response to the processor successfully downloading the signed boot information file to interlock the host computing system with the signed boot information file; and a fifth instruction for generating an appended boot information file by appending the boot information file stored in a non-volatile storage drive of the host computing system using the hash data of the unique identifier, wherein the appended boot information file and the signed boot information file are similar files. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0006] Various examples will be described below with reference to the following drawings.
[0007] Figure 1 is a block diagram depicting a host computing system with a manageability controller, a processor, and a firmware engine according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
[0008] Figure 2 is a block diagram depicting a manageability controller having processing resources operably coupled to a machine-readable medium storing executable program instructions according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
[0009] Figure 3 is a block diagram depicting processing resources and machine-readable media encoded with example instructions executable by a manageability controller to sign a boot information file and interlock the signed boot information file with a host computing system in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure.
[0010] Figure 4 is a flow chart depicting a method of signing a boot information file and interlocking it with a host computing system according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
[0011] Figure 5 is a flow chart depicting a method of booting a host computing system according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
[0012] In all drawings, the same reference numerals may represent similar but not necessarily identical elements. The index number "N" attached to some reference numerals may be understood to indicate only a plurality, and may not necessarily represent the same quantity for each reference numeral with such an index number "N". In addition, in the case where reference numerals are mentioned with index numbers elsewhere herein, the use of such reference numerals without index numbers may collectively or individually refer to the corresponding plurality of elements. In another example, index numbers "I", "M", etc. may be used instead of index number N. The drawings are not necessarily proportional, and the sizes of some parts may be enlarged to more clearly illustrate the examples shown. In addition, the drawings provide examples and / or embodiments consistent with the description; however, the description is not limited to the examples and / or embodiments provided in the drawings. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0013] The following detailed description refers to the accompanying drawings. Where possible, the same reference numerals are used in the drawings and in the following description to refer to the same or similar parts. However, it should be clearly understood that the drawings are only for the purpose of illustration and description. Although several examples are described in this document, modifications, adaptations and other embodiments are possible. Therefore, the following specific embodiments do not limit the disclosed examples. On the contrary, the correct scope of the disclosed examples can be defined by the appended claims.
[0014] The terms used herein are only used for the purpose of describing examples, and are not intended to be restrictive. As used herein, the singular forms "a", "an" and "the" are intended to also include plural forms, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. As used herein, the term "multiple" is defined as two or more than two. The term "another" as used herein is defined as at least the second or more. As used herein, unless otherwise indicated, the term "coupled" is defined as connected, whether directly connected without any intervening element or indirectly connected by means of at least one intervening element. Two elements can be mechanically coupled, electrically coupled, or linked by communication channels, paths, networks or system communications. The term "and / or" used herein refers to and encompasses any and all possible combinations of one or more items in the associated enumerated items. It should also be understood that although the terms first, second, third, etc. can be used to describe various elements in this article, these elements should not be limited by these terms, because these terms are only used to distinguish one element from another element, unless otherwise indicated or the context indicates otherwise. As used herein, the term "includes" means including but not limited to, and the term "including" means including but not limited to. The term "based on" means "based at least in part on".
[0015] As used herein, the term "manageability controller" is a dedicated service processor for monitoring the physical state of a host computing system using one or more sensors. A manageability controller may communicate with an administrator or user via a connection (eg, a network connection).
[0016] As used herein, the term "host computing system" may refer to a server system deployed in a data center environment for executing one or more workloads of a customer. A host computing system may also refer to a storage system deployed in a data center environment for storing customer data. The term "computing device" may refer to a host computing system or an external computing system. As used herein, the term "external computing system" may refer to a server system used for security management of a host computing system. As used herein, the term "workload" may refer to application software running on a host computing system and having multiple users who connect to the host computing system to interact with the application software to receive the expected services.
[0017] As used herein, the term "boot information file" may refer to a firmware engine of a host computing system that senses an operating system (OS) loader file or a bootable file. The boot information file loads and starts boot time tasks and processes belonging to the OS of the host computing system. As used herein, the term "firmware engine" may refer to a combination of hardware programs and software programs or an instruction set programmed on hardware for starting a host computing system. Examples of firmware engines may include a basic input and output system (BIOS) or a unified extensible firmware interface (UEFI) stored on a memory chip for execution by a processor. The firmware engine may verify the signature in the boot information file before passing control to the boot information file to load the OS in the host computing system or start the boot time tasks and processes of the OS.
[0018] As used herein, the term "hash data" may refer to a string that is specific to or bound to a hardware resource of a host computing system. The hash data is generated according to an algorithm using a unique identifier of a manageability controller. The term "unique identifier" may refer to a private key corresponding to a manageability controller. As used herein, the term "private key" may refer to a unique alphanumeric string corresponding to a manageability controller. As used herein, the term "signed boot information file" or "attached boot information file" may refer to a boot information file having hash data that has been attached to the body of the boot information file. The hash data may be used to interlock the attached or signed boot information file with the host computing system for subsequent booting. As used herein, the term "boot database" may refer to an internal file or data set of a firmware engine having a list of authorized / trusted keys for boot-time software. The key list may include: i) a public authorized signature of the software that is trusted by the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and / or ii) thumbprint data of the signed boot information file. As used herein, the term "thumbprint data" may refer to a public key or identifier representing a signed boot information file or attached boot information. As used herein, the term "similar files" may refer to files that have the same public key or identifier in order to identify or recognize the files.
[0019] As used herein, the term "predetermined link" may refer to a path to access a boot information file in a non-volatile storage drive of a computing system. As used herein, the term "customer signature" may refer to a customer's private key. As used herein, the term "multiple parameters" may correspond to different kinds / types of authorized software (boot time software) and their properties that may be used to boot a host computing system, such as the kind and version of an operating system, the kind and version of security software, etc.
[0020] For the purpose of explaining this disclosure, reference is made to Figures 1 to 5Certain examples are described with reference to the components illustrated in the figure. However, the functionality of the components illustrated may overlap and may exist in a fewer or greater number of elements and components. In addition, all or part of the functionality of the components illustrated may be co-existing or distributed in several geographically dispersed locations. Furthermore, the disclosed examples may be implemented in a variety of environments and are not limited to the examples illustrated. Further, in conjunction with Figure 1 as well as Figures 4 to 5 The described operation sequence is an example and is not intended to be limiting. Additional or fewer operations or combinations of operations may be used or changed without departing from the scope of the disclosed examples. Therefore, the present disclosure merely describes examples of implementations, and many changes and modifications may be made to the described examples. Such modifications and variations are intended to be included within the scope of the present disclosure and are protected by the appended claims.
[0021] Host computing systems, such as server systems, typically provide functionality known as "secure boot," which ensures that only software with authorized signatures trusted by the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) (boot-time software) is used to boot the host computing system. Thus, when the host computing system boots, the host computing system's firmware engine may verify the software signatures listed in the host computing system's boot information file against the authorized signatures of the software stored in the firmware engine's boot database. In such an example, if the signatures are verified, the firmware engine may provide control of the boot information file to allow the host computing system to boot or load an operating system for the host computing system.
[0022] However, secure boot does not ensure that the host computing system is interlocked with the boot information file with a verified signature. In other words, secure boot does not provide the following features: by using the boot information file with a verified signature of the host computing system to restrict the startup of any other computing system. For example, if the host computing system is damaged in the hands of an unauthorized user, the hard drive of the host computing system with the boot information file can be removed and used in other computing systems to boot the other computing systems and install spyware or rootkits in the removed hard drive. In such an example, the removed hard drive (or damaged hard drive) can be restored in the host computing system. Thus, by secretly transmitting data from the damaged hard drive, unauthorized users can obtain secret information about the host computing system activities (e.g., activities related to workloads running / executed in the host computing system).
[0023] In order to solve such problems in secure boot, the public authorization signatures of all software can be cleared from the boot database, and the authorization signatures of selected software can be added to the boot database. Further, the boot information file of the host computing system can be updated with a list of selected software, and the authorization signatures of the selected software are added to the boot database. However, the above-mentioned features of secure boot may not ensure that the boot information file with the list of selected software is interlocked with the host computing system. For example, the firmware engine of any other computing system with the authorization signature of the selected software in its boot database can also confirm the list of selected software in the boot information file of the host computing system. Therefore, it is allowed to use the boot information file of the host computing system to start other computing systems. Therefore, interlocking the boot information file with the host computing system may require the construction of a unified extensible firmware interface (UEFI) binary file and the use of customized vendor tools to update the boot database and the boot information file. This process may be beyond the capabilities of ordinary administrators / users. Further, unauthorized users who understand the construction of UEFI binary files and access to customized vendor tools can still bypass interlocks (if any) and introduce spyware or root program virus packages into the hard drive removed from the host computing system.
[0024] A feasible technical solution to the above problem may include first signing a boot information file by at least one hardware resource such as a manageability controller of a host computing system to generate a signed boot information file. Further, the technical solution includes appending a signature of a manageability controller to a boot information file stored in a non-volatile storage drive such as a hard disk drive of the host computing system. Subsequently, the technical solution includes updating a boot database in a firmware engine of the host computing system with thumbprint data of the signed or appended boot information file. Thus, the host computing system can be interlocked with the signed or appended boot information file for boot purposes. In such an example, even if the host computing system is damaged (i.e., the hard disk drive is removed from the host computing system and used in other computing systems), the other computing systems may not be able to use the signed or appended boot information file for booting. Because the firmware engines of the other computing systems may not be able to verify the signature of the appended or signed boot information file in the removed hard disk drive, this is because the manageability controller of the host computing system (used to sign the boot information file) is different from the manageability controller of the other computing systems. Further, the host computing system may not be able to use the boot information file stored in other hard disk drives (i.e., the replaced hard disk drives) for booting. Because the firmware engine of the host computing system may not be able to locate the signed or appended boot information file in other hard disk drives (i.e., based on the thumbprint data stored in the boot database) to verify the signature of the signed or appended boot information file for booting.
[0025] In one or more examples, the manageability controller can sign the boot information file by using hash data of a unique identifier belonging to the manageability controller. The unique identifier can be a private key stored in a trusted platform module of the manageability controller corresponding to the manageability controller. In other words, the unique identifier is a unique key specific to each manageability controller. Therefore, the signed boot information file of the host computing system cannot be used to start other computing systems. In some examples, the trusted platform module is a secure storage sector of the manageability controller, and other hardware resources of the host computing system cannot access the storage sector. In one or more examples, before signing the boot information file with the hash data, the unique identifier can be hashed using algorithms such as secure hash algorithm (SHA)-256, SHA-512, etc.
[0026] In some examples, upon subsequently booting the host computing system, the firmware engine may access a signed or appended boot information file stored in a non-volatile storage drive of the host computing system based on the thumbprint data updated in the boot database. Subsequently, the firmware engine may verify the hash data in the signed or appended boot information file using the public key of the manageability controller. Thus, the firmware engine may allow a processor of the host computing system to load an operating system of the host computing system using the boot information file in response to successfully verifying the signed boot information file. In such an example, before updating the boot database with the thumbprint data of the signed boot information file, the manageability controller may clear pre-existing boot data in the boot database into a clear boot database of the firmware engine.
[0027] Therefore, the present disclosure describes an example implementation of a system and method for signing a boot information file by a manageability controller of a host computing system and interlocking the host computing system with the signed boot information file for starting the host computing system. In some examples, the boot information file may include one of a boot loader file or an operating system (OS) kernel file of the host computing system. The manageability controller receives the boot information file from a processor of a computing device. In some examples, the boot information file is a customized boot information file for running one or more workloads on the host computing system, and the computing device is the host computing system or an external computing system. The manageability controller may sign the boot information file with hash data of a unique identifier to generate a signed boot information file, and the signed boot information file may be transmitted to the processor. Further, the manageability controller may update a boot database in a firmware engine of the host computing system with thumbprint data of the signed boot information file in response to the processor successfully downloading the signed boot information file, so as to interlock the host computing system with the signed boot information file.
[0028] Figure 1An example environment 100 is illustrated, such as a data center environment, in which a host computing system 102 may be deployed to run or execute one or more workloads (i.e., application software) of a client to provide services to connected users. In addition, the example environment 100 may have an external computing system 104, which is operably coupled to the host computing system 102 via a network 106 for securely managing one or more workloads running in the host computing system 102. In some examples, the network 106 may be a TCP / IP (Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol) network, which is a set of communication protocols for interconnecting network devices on the Internet. In one or more examples, the environment 100 may be implemented as an enterprise system or a consumer system or an industrial system, which facilitates the execution or operation of one or more workloads of a client to provide the intended service to the connected user, and facilitates the protection of one or more workloads from security vulnerabilities in parallel.
[0029] In some examples, host computing system 102 can be a server system that contains sensitive data belonging to one or more workloads and is connected to TCP / IP network 106 (including the Internet). In some other examples, host computing system 102 can be a storage system, etc. Similarly, external computing system 104 can be a server system configured to manage one or more workloads running on host computing system 102. In one or more examples, each of host computing system 102 and external computing system 104 can be managed and / or controlled by an administrator 108 of example environment 100.
[0030] In some examples, the host computing system 102 may include a processor 110 (first processor), a memory 112 (first memory), a non-volatile storage driver 114 (first driver), a manageability controller 116, and a firmware engine 118. The processor 110 may be a physical processor, such as a central processing unit (CPU), which may execute program instructions of one or more workloads running in the host computing system 102 by performing arithmetic operations, logical operations, control operations, and input / output (I / O) operations specified by the program instructions. For example, the processor 110 may be operably coupled to the memory 112 and the non-volatile storage driver 114 so as to load program instructions stored in the non-volatile storage driver 114 into the memory 112 and execute software of the host computing system 102, such as an operating system (OS) and one or more workloads running on the OS. It may be noted herein that the OS may perform all basic tasks, such as file management, memory management, process management, handling input and output, and controlling peripheral devices such as printers, modems, etc. One or more workloads may be production workloads, development workloads, or test workloads, depending on customer requirements. Each of the one or more workloads may contain sensitive information or data that is proprietary to the customer. In some examples, production workloads may include automated teller machine (ATM) application software, payroll application software, and the like. Similarly, development workloads may include the implementation of a set of processes and the programming of tools to create new applications or software products. Further, test workloads may include the implementation of another set of processes and the testing of tools to test new applications or software products. In one or more examples, the processor 110 may also be operably coupled to a manageability controller 116 and a firmware engine 118 of the host computing system 102.
[0031] The memory 112 is a volatile storage device, such as a random access memory, which is used as an internal memory of the processor 110. Generally speaking, when the host computing system 102 is turned on or operated, the memory 112 can allow the processor 110 to read or store i) data, ii) program instructions, and / or iii) program results. For example, when the host computing system 102 is started / restarted or operated, the OS and one or more workloads running on the OS are loaded from the non-volatile storage drive 114 into the memory 112, wherein the processor 110 can utilize such data loaded into the memory 112 to perform the required tasks.
[0032] The non-volatile storage drive 114 may be a hard disk drive, a solid state drive, etc. In one or more examples, the non-volatile storage drive 114 may include multiple partitions 126 to store files of the host computing system 102 in a primary partition 126A and to store files or data of a user in an extended partition 126B. For example, the primary partition 126A may be used to store a boot information file 128. In one or more examples, the boot information file 128 may be one of a boot loader file or an OS kernel file. It may be noted herein that the boot loader file may be a special OS software stored in the first block or sector of the primary partition 126A or in a specific partition of the non-volatile storage drive 114. In such an example, during the booting of the host computing system 102, a boot loader file such as GRUB may be loaded from the non-volatile storage drive 114 into the memory 112. Similarly, the OS kernel file is a software program that forms a core part of the OS and is stored in the non-volatile storage drive 114 to facilitate interaction between hardware components and software components of the host computing system 102.
[0033] The manageability controller 116 may be a dedicated service processor for monitoring the physical state of the host computing system 102 using one or more sensors (not shown). The manageability controller 116 may communicate with the administrator 108 or a user via the network 106. In some examples, the manageability controller 116 is a baseboard management controller (BMC) embedded within a circuit board (e.g., a motherboard) of the host computing system 102 to be monitored. In such examples, the circuit board may also carry the processor 110. In some examples, the manageability controller 116 may be another processor separate from the processor 110 configured to execute the OS of the host computing system 102. The manageability controller 116 may help the administrator 108 remotely monitor the host computing system 102 and other hardware devices connected to the host computing system 102. The manageability controller 116 may have its own Internet Protocol (IP) address, which may be accessed through a secure web console or a command line interface. Further, the manageability controller 116 may have its own memory (machine-readable medium) and processing resources coupled to the memory, and may execute one or more program instructions stored in the memory to monitor the host computing system 102, adjust the hardware resources of the host computing system 102, and interact with the external computing system 104. The manageability controller 116 may be powered by an auxiliary power rail (not shown) even when the host computing system 102 is turned off. Thus, the external computing system 104 is enabled to establish a secure connection with the manageability controller 116 at any time and maintain continuous interaction with the manageability controller 116 throughout the life cycle of the host computing system 102. In some examples, the manageability controller 116 has a unique identifier that may be generated when the host computing system 102 is first turned on using the customer's credentials or using the customer's signature. In some examples, the unique key is a private key of the manageability controller 116 having a unique alphanumeric string. In some examples, the unique key is stored in a trusted platform module (TPM) 130 of the manageability controller 116. TPM 130 is a secure storage sector of the manageability controller that is inaccessible to other hardware resources of host computing system 102 as well as administrator 108 or any other user.
[0034] The firmware engine 118 may be a chipset having executable program instructions embedded in the chipset to perform initialization of hardware resources of the host computing system 102 during startup (or restart) and provide runtime services to one or more workloads of the host computing system 102. In some examples, the one or more workloads may be application software running on an OS. In some examples, the firmware engine 118 may include a unified extensible firmware interface (UEFI) or a basic input output system (BIOS). In some examples, the firmware engine 118 may include a boot database 132 and a clear boot database 134 stored in a non-volatile random access memory 136 of the firmware engine 118. The boot database 132 may refer to an internal file or data set of the firmware engine 118. The boot database 132 may store i) an authorized signature of the selected software trusted by the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and / or ii) thumbprint data of the signed boot information file. Similarly, the clear boot database 134 may also refer to an internal file or data set of the firmware engine 118. The clean boot database 134 may store the authorized signatures of all public software that is trusted by the OEM and is not included in the software (boot time) list in the boot information file 128 .
[0035] The external computing system 104 may include a processor 120 (second processor), a memory 122 (second memory), and a non-volatile storage drive 124 (second drive). In some examples, the processor 120, the memory 122, and the non-volatile storage drive 124 may be substantially similar to the first processor 110, the first memory 112, and the first non-volatile storage drive 114 of the host computing system 102. The external computing system 104 may be operably coupled to the manageability controller 116 and the non-volatile storage drive 114 of the host computing system 102 via the network 106. In some examples, the administrator 108 may use a web console or a command line interface (not shown) in the external computing system 104 to establish communication with the manageability controller 116. In some other examples, the administrator 108 may use a web console or a command line interface in the host computing system 102 to establish communication with the manageability controller 116.
[0036] In one or more examples, the administrator 108 may initially set up the host computing system 102 to run one or more workloads on the host computing system 102. Thus, the administrator 108 may customize (or locally build) an original boot information file 128 (also referred to as a boot information file) based on the requirements of the one or more workloads. In some examples, the administrator 108 may use the external computing system 104 to customize the original boot information file 128. In one or more examples, the original boot information file 128 may include a plurality of parameters corresponding to different kinds / types of authorized software (boot time software) and its attributes trusted by the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) for booting the host computing system 102. For example, the plurality of parameters may include different kinds of OS and its versions, different types of security software and its versions, etc. In such an example, the administrator 108 may customize the original boot information file 128 by updating the plurality of parameters. For example, the administrator 108 may retain only some of the plurality of parameters from the original boot information file 128 (or disable the remaining parameters). In some examples, the administrator 108 can select an OS with a specific version from different kinds of OS and its versions from the original boot information file 128, and select a security software with a specific version from different kinds of security software and its versions to form a customized boot information file 128A. In some other examples, the administrator 108 can receive a customized boot information file 128A from a supplier. The selected OS and security software in the customized boot information file 128A can have a signature trusted by the OEM from its corresponding manufacturer. In addition, the administrator 108 can include the signature of the customer in the customized boot information file 128A to prove that the customization of the original boot information file 128 is based on the customer's requirements. In some examples, the customer signature and the signature of the corresponding manufacturer of the software can be the private keys (or certificates) of the customer and the manufacturer, respectively. In some examples, the customized boot information file 128A can be used to run a workload, such as "automatic teller machine (ATM) application software" on the host computing system 102. Administrator 108 may then install customized boot information file 128A in primary partition 126A of non-volatile storage drive 114 of host computing system 102 via network 106 or through other bootable devices such as a “flash drive” (not shown) inserted into host computing system 102 .
[0037] In one or more examples, customized boot information file 128A may then be signed by manageability controller 116 to generate signed boot information file 128B and / or appended boot information file 128C. In such examples, signed boot information file 128B or appended boot information file 128C may be used to interlock with host computing system 102 as discussed herein.
[0038] In some examples, the manageability controller 116 of the host computing system 102 may receive the customized boot information file 128A from the first processor 110 of the host computing system 102 or from the second processor 120 of the external computing system 104. In other words, the administrator 108 may use the host computing system 102 or the external computing system 104 to provide the customized boot information file 128A to the manageability controller 116. For example, the administrator 108 may first authenticate to the manageability controller 116 using the login credentials of the administrator 108. Subsequently, the administrator 108 may use a web console or a command line interface of the host computing system 102 or the external computing system 104 to establish a secure connection with the manageability controller 116. After authenticating and establishing a secure connection with the manageability controller 116, the administrator 108 may publish a predetermined link to the non-volatile storage drive 114 of the host computing system 102 to share the customized boot information file 128A with the manageability controller 116. In such an example, manageability controller 116 may access a predetermined link to receive customized boot information file 128A from non-volatile storage driver 114 of host computing system 102 .
[0039] In some other examples, the administrator 108 may directly use a web console or command line interface of the host computing system 102 or the external computing system 104 to establish a connection with the manageability controller 116. After establishing the connection with the manageability controller 116, the administrator 108 may publish a predetermined link to the non-volatile storage drive 114 of the host computing system 102 to share the customized boot information file 128A with the manageability controller 116. In such an example, the manageability controller 116 may first verify the customer signature in the customized boot information file 128A. After successfully verifying the customer signature in the customized boot information file 128A, the manageability controller 116 may receive the customized boot information file 128A from the non-volatile storage drive 114. In one or more examples, manageability controller 116 may verify customized boot information file 128A using the customer's public key, and if the customer signature in customized boot information file 128A is verified, manageability controller 116 may access a predetermined link to receive customized boot information file 128A from non-volatile storage drive 114. In some examples, manageability controller 116 may receive customized boot information file 128A in the form of a binary file.
[0040] Further, the manageability controller 116 signs the customized startup information file 128A with the hash data of the unique identifier to generate the signed startup information file 128B. For example, the manageability controller 116 may first access the trusted platform module 130 to obtain the unique identifier. In some examples, the unique identifier is a private key of the manageability controller 116. In one or more examples, the private key may include an alphanumeric string dedicated to the manageability controller 116. The administrator 108 or any other hardware resource of the user or host computing system 102 may not be able to access the private key. Subsequently, the manageability controller 116 may use algorithms such as secure hash algorithms (SHA)-256, SHA-512, etc. to generate hash data from the unique identifier. In some examples, the hash data may be a string. Subsequently, the manageability controller 116 may use the hash data to sign the customized startup information file 128A and generate the signed startup information file 128B. In one or more examples, signing customized boot information file 128A may mean appending hash data of a unique identifier in customized boot information file 128A received by manageability controller 116 to generate signed boot information file 128B. In some examples, signed boot information file 128B may be identified by a public key or identifier. In one or more examples, the public key or identifier may be known thumbprint data 128D, which may include words, numbers, letters, symbols, or any combination thereof.
[0041] The manageability controller 116 may then transmit the signed boot information file 128B to the first processor 110 or the second processor 120. For example, the manageability controller 116 may provide a hard link to the administrator 108 for downloading the signed boot information file 128B. In some examples, the first processor 110 may temporarily download the signed boot information file 128B to the non-volatile storage drive 114. In some other examples, the second processor 120 may temporarily download the signed boot information file 128B to the non-volatile storage drive 124. In such examples, if necessary, the administrator 108 may then transmit the signed boot information file 128B to a secure drive (not shown) for future use. In one or more examples, after successfully downloading the signed boot information file 128B, the manageability controller 116 may receive a confirmation from the first processor 110 or the second processor 120. In such an example, the manageability controller 116 may then establish communication with the firmware engine 118 of the host computing system 102 using an industry standard communication protocol such as an Inter-Integrated Circuit (I2C) protocol, a System Management Bus (SMBus), etc. After establishing communication with the firmware engine 118, the manageability controller 116 may access the boot database 132 and clear the pre-existing boot data in the boot database 132 into the clear boot database 134. In some examples, clearing the pre-existing data from the boot database 132 includes clearing the OEM-trusted public authorized signatures of all software (boot time software) into the clear boot database 134. The manageability controller 116 may then update the boot database 132 with the thumbprint data 128D of the signed boot information file 128B. In some examples, the thumbprint data 128D may have a public key or identifier of the signed boot information file 128B to identify or recognize the signed boot information file 128B.
[0042] Subsequently, the manageability controller 116 can access the non-volatile storage drive 114 of the host computing system 102 by using a predetermined link. The manageability controller 116 can then generate an attached startup information file 128C by attaching the customized startup information file 128A using the hash data of the unique identifier to update the customized startup information file 128A stored in the non-volatile memory 114. After updating the customized startup information file 128B with the hash data of the unique identifier or attaching it, the customized startup information file 128B may no longer exist. In one or more examples, the attached startup information file 128C and the signed startup information file 128B are similar files. In other words, the attached startup information file 128C and the signed startup information file 128B can have the same public key or identifier, and can have the same content in the entire body of these two files 128B, 128C so as to identify or recognize the file. For example, if the public key of the signed startup information file is "1234ABCD", the attached startup information file may also have the same public key, such as "1234ABCD". Further, the thumbprint data 128D stored in the startup database 132 may also have the same public key, such as "1234ABCD".
[0043] In some examples, if the non-volatile storage 114 of the host computing system 102 is damaged or has a bad bootable sector in the primary partition 126A of the non-volatile storage 114. The attached boot information file 128C stored in the non-volatile storage drive 114 may become inaccessible for booting the host computing system 102. In such an example, the administrator 108 may replace the non-volatile storage drive 114 with a new non-volatile storage drive (not shown) and store the signed boot information file 128B (which is stored in the secure drive) in the primary partition of the new non-volatile storage drive. Therefore, the signed boot information file 128B stored in the new non-volatile storage drive may also have the same public key as the public key of the attached boot information file 128C. Thus, the firmware engine 118 is allowed to identify the signed boot information file 128B stored in the new non-volatile storage drive using the thumbprint data 128D, and allow the host computing system 102 to boot using the new (replaced) non-volatile storage disk with the signed boot information file 128B.
[0044] In some other examples, it may be necessary to update the original boot information file 128 or the customized boot information file 128A at times, depending on the requirements of the workload. For example, it may be necessary to update the version of the security software to address some new vulnerabilities identified in the security software listed in the original boot information file 128 or the customized boot information file 128A or the signed boot information file 128B. In such an example, the administrator 108 can update the customized boot information file 128A or the multiple parameters discussed above in the original boot information file 128 to generate a new customized boot information file. Further, the administrator 108 can instruct the first processor 110 or the second processor 120 to repeat the steps discussed herein for signing the new customized boot information file. For example, the manageability controller 116 can generate a new signed boot information file when receiving the new boot information file. Subsequently, the manageability controller 116 can transmit the newly signed boot information file to the first processor 110 or the second processor 120 to download the newly signed boot information file. In such an example, after the first processor 110 or the second processor 120 successfully downloads the newly signed boot information file, the manageability controller 116 may record the new thumb fingerprint data corresponding to the newly signed boot information file in the boot database 132 of the firmware engine 118. Further, the manageability controller 116 may clear the existing thumb fingerprint data to the clear boot database 134. Subsequently, the manageability controller 116 may append the original boot information file 128 in the non-volatile storage 114 with the hash data of the unique identifier to generate a new appended boot information file. In such an example, the signed boot information file 128B or the appended boot information file 128C originally signed by the manageability controller 116 may be replaced by the newly signed boot information file or the newly appended boot information file.
[0045] In one or more examples, the manageability controller 116 and the firmware engine 118 may be able to interlock the appended boot information file 128C (or the signed boot information file 128B) with the host computing system 102. Because the appended boot information file 128C stored in the non-volatile storage drive 114 of the host computing system 102 has hash data of the unique identifier of the manageability controller 116. And the boot database 132 in the firmware engine 118 of the host computing system 102 has the thumbprint data 128D of the appended boot information file 128C. Therefore, the manageability controller 116 and the firmware engine 118 may be able to interlock the host computing system 102 with the appended boot information file 128C in order to boot the host computing system 102, as discussed below.
[0046] In some examples, upon subsequently booting / restarting the host computing system 102, the firmware engine 118 may initially perform a power-on self-test (POST) on the hardware resources of the host computing system 102. When the POST process completes successfully, the firmware engine 118 may look up a boot information file 128 of the host computing system 102 to provide controls to load an operating system (OS) of the host computing system 102. For example, the firmware engine 118 may check the boot database 132 to determine the boot information file 128 that is bound / interlocked with the host computing system 102. In such an example, the firmware engine 118 may obtain the thumbprint data 128D stored in the boot database 132 to locate the signed boot information file 128B or the appended boot information file 128C in one or more bootable storage media of the host computing system 102. In such an example, the firmware engine 118 may first search for a boot information file 128 having the thumbprint data 128D in a removable storage medium such as a compact disk (CD) or a universal serial bus (USB) stick (according to a boot sequence) and then in a fixed storage medium such as the non-volatile storage drive 114. As discussed herein, the firmware engine 118 may use the public key or identifier detailed in the thumbprint data 128D to search the removable or fixed storage medium to locate the appended boot information file 128C. Accordingly, the firmware engine 118 may discover that the appended boot information file 128C stored in the primary partition 126A in the non-volatile storage drive 114 has the public key or identifier of the thumbprint data 128D.
[0047] In some examples, if the firmware engine 118 cannot locate the appended boot information file 128C with the public key or identifier, the firmware engine 118 returns an error message to the administrator 108. In some examples, if the firmware engine 118 is able to locate the appended boot information file 128C with the public key or identifier, the firmware engine 118 can access the public key of the manageability controller 116 to verify the signature (i.e., the hash data of the unique identifier appended in the appended boot information file 128C). In some examples, after successfully verifying the signature, the firmware engine 118 can provide control to the processor 110 of the host computing system 102 to allow the processor 110 to load the OS of the host computing system 102 using the appended boot information file 128C.
[0048] Figure 2 2 is a block diagram of a manageability controller 216 including a processing resource 250 and a machine-readable medium 252 storing executable program instructions. It should be noted herein that Figure 2 The manageability controller 216 mentioned in Figure 1In some examples, the processing resource 250 may be operably coupled to the machine-readable medium 252. The processing resource 250 may be a physical processor. In some examples, the physical processor may be a processor adapted to execute commands related to Figure 1 In some examples, the machine-readable medium 252 is non-transitory and may alternatively be referred to as non-transitory machine-readable medium. The processing resource 250 executes one or more program instructions to perform Figure 1 One or more of the features described in .
[0049] The processing resource 250 can execute program instructions to receive a boot information file of a host computing system from a processor of a computing device. In some examples, the boot information file is at least one of a boot loader file or an operating system kernel file. In one or more examples, the boot information file is a customized boot information file, and the computing device is a host computing system or an external computing system. In some examples, receiving the boot information file can include executing program instructions to establish a secure connection between the processor of the computing device and the processing resource 250 of the manageability controller, and publishing a predetermined link to a non-volatile storage drive of the host computing system to share the boot information file with the manageability controller. Further, receiving the boot information file can include executing program instructions to access a predetermined link to receive the boot information file from the non-volatile storage drive of the host computing system.
[0050] In some other examples, receiving the boot information file may include executing program instructions to establish a connection between processing resource 250 and a processor of the computing device, and issuing a predetermined link to a non-volatile storage drive of the host computing system to share the boot information file with the manageability controller. Further, receiving the boot information file may include: executing program instructions to access the predetermined link to verify the customer signature in the boot information file, and after successfully verifying the customer signature in the boot information file, receiving the boot information file from the non-volatile storage drive of the host computing system.
[0051] Further, the processing resource 250 may then execute one or more program instructions to sign the boot information file with the hash data of the unique identifier and generate a signed boot information file. In some examples, the unique identifier may be a private key stored in a trusted platform module of the manageability controller corresponding to the manageability controller. The unique identifier may be hashed using an algorithm such as a secure hash algorithm (SHA)-256, SHA-512, etc. to generate the hash data.
[0052] Processing resource 250 may further execute one or more program instructions to transmit the signed boot information file to a processor of the computing device.In some examples, the manageability controller may provide a hard link to the processor for downloading the signed boot information file.
[0053] Further, processing resource 250 can execute one or more program instructions to, in response to the processor successfully downloading the signed boot information file, update a boot database stored in a non-volatile random access memory of a firmware engine of the host computing system with the thumbprint data of the signed boot information file to interlock the host computing system with the signed boot information file. In some examples, the thumbprint data can have a public key or identifier of the signed boot information file to identify or recognize the signed boot information file.
[0054] Figure 3 3 is a block diagram 300 depicting a processing resource 350 and a machine-readable medium 352 encoded with example instructions executable by a manageability controller to sign a boot information file and interlock it with a host computing system. It should be noted herein that Figure 3 The manageability controllers mentioned in Figure 1 to Figure 2 The machine-readable medium 352 is non-transitory and may alternatively be referred to as non-transitory machine-readable medium. In some examples, the machine-readable medium 352 may be accessed by the processing resource 350. In some examples, the machine-readable medium 352 stores information such as Figure 1 to Figure 2 The machine-readable medium 352 may be encoded with example first instructions 302, second instructions 304, third instructions 306, and fourth instructions 308, respectively.
[0055] The first instruction 302, when executed by the processing resource 350, may implement the following aspects: receiving a boot information file of a host computing system from a processor of a computing device, wherein the processor is separate from a manageability controller. In some examples, the boot information file is at least one of a boot loader file or an operating system kernel file. Similarly, the boot information file may be a customized boot information file having a plurality of parameters configured for running one or more workloads in the host computing system. The step of receiving the boot information file of the host computing system is in Figure 1 Described in detail in .
[0056] The second instruction 304, when executed by the processing resource 350, may implement the following aspects: signing the boot information file with hash data of the unique identifier to generate a signed boot information file. In some examples, the unique identifier may be a private key corresponding to the manageability controller and stored in a trusted platform module of the manageability controller. The unique identifier may be hashed using an algorithm such as a secure hash algorithm (SHA)-256, SHA-512, etc. to generate the hash data. The step of signing the boot information file is in Figure 1 Described in detail in .
[0057] The third instruction 306, when executed by the processing resource 350, may implement the following aspects: transmitting the signed boot information file to the processor. In some examples, the manageability controller may provide a hard link to the processor for downloading the signed boot information file. The step of transmitting the signed boot information file is Figure 1 Described in detail in .
[0058] Fourth instruction 308, when executed by processing resource 350, may implement the following aspects: in response to the processor successfully downloading the signed boot information file, update the boot database stored in the non-volatile random access memory of the firmware engine of the host computing system with the thumbprint data of the signed boot information file to interlock the host computing system with the signed boot information file. In some examples, the thumbprint data may have a public key or identifier of the signed boot information file to identify or recognize the signed boot information file. The step of updating the boot database is in Figure 1 Described in detail in .
[0059] In some examples, machine-readable medium 352 may be encoded with example fifth and sixth instructions. For example, the fifth instruction, when executed by processing resource 350, may implement the following aspects: generating an appended boot information file by appending a boot information file stored in a non-volatile storage drive of a host computing system using hash data of a unique identifier. In one or more examples, the appended boot information file and the signed boot information file are similar files. The step of appending the boot database in the non-volatile storage drive of the host computing system is in Figure 1 Similarly, the sixth instruction, when executed by the processing resource 350, may implement the following aspects: upon receiving an updated boot information file from the processor, repeat the second instruction of signing the boot information file, the third instruction of transmitting the signed boot information file, the fourth instruction of updating the boot database in the firmware engine, and the fifth instruction of appending the boot information file in the non-volatile memory. The steps of repeating the second instruction, the third instruction, the fourth instruction, and the fifth instruction are described in detail in FIG. Figure 1Described in detail in .
[0060] Figure 4 4 is a flowchart depicting a method 400 for signing a boot information file and interlocking it with a host computing system according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. It should be noted herein that the method 400 is combined with Figure 1 In one or more examples, the various steps discussed herein in method 400 are performed by a manageability controller.
[0061] The method 400 starts at block 402 and continues to block 404. At block 404, the method 400 includes customizing a boot information file of a host computing system by using a processor of a computing device, such as Figure 1 In one or more examples, an administrator of a computing device may update a boot information file (also referred to as an original boot information file) having multiple parameters configured for running one or more workloads in a host computing system. For example, the administrator may retain only some of the multiple parameters (or disable the remaining parameters) from the original boot information file in order to customize the original boot information file and generate a customized boot information file. In some examples, the original boot information file is at least one of a boot loader file or an operating system kernel file, and the computing device is a host computing system or an external computing system. Method 400 continues to block 406.
[0062] At block 406, method 400 includes receiving a customized boot information file of a host computing system from a processor of a computing device, such as Figure 1 In one or more examples, a manageability controller of a host computing system can be configured to receive a customized boot information file from a processor of a computing device. In some examples, receiving the customized boot information file can include the processor performing the following operations: i) establishing a secure connection with the manageability controller, and ii) publishing a predetermined link to a non-volatile storage drive of the host computing system to share the boot information file with the manageability controller. Further, receiving the customized boot information file can include the manageability controller performing the following operations: iii) accessing a predetermined link to receive the boot information file from the non-volatile storage drive of the host computing system.
[0063] In some other examples, receiving the boot information file may include the processor performing the following operations: i) establishing a secure connection with the manageability controller, and ii) issuing a predetermined link to a non-volatile storage driver of the host computing system to share the boot information file with the manageability controller. Further, receiving the boot information file may include the manageability controller performing the following operations: iii) accessing the predetermined link to verify the customer signature in the boot information file, and after successfully verifying the customer signature in the boot information file, receiving the boot information file from the non-volatile storage driver of the host computing system. Method 400 continues to block 408.
[0064] At block 408, method 400 includes signing the customized boot information file with hash data of the unique identifier to generate a signed boot information file, such as Figure 1 In one or more examples, a manageability controller of the host computing system may sign the customized boot information file with the hash data. In some examples, the unique identifier may be a private key corresponding to the manageability controller stored in a trusted platform module of the manageability controller. The unique identifier is hashed using an algorithm such as a secure hash algorithm (SHA)-256, SHA-512, etc. to generate the hash data. Method 400 continues to block 410.
[0065] At block 410, method 400 includes transmitting the signed boot information file to a processor, such as Figure 1 In one or more examples, the manageability controller can transmit the signed boot information file for the processor to download the signed boot information file. In some examples, the manageability controller can provide a hard link to the processor for download purposes. Method 400 moves to block 412.
[0066] At block 412, method 400 includes determining whether the signed boot information file is downloaded by the processor of the computing device. In one or more examples, the manageability controller can receive a confirmation from the processor regarding the status of the download of the boot information file from the processor. Therefore, at block 412, if the manageability controller determines that the processor is able to download the signed boot information file, i.e., "yes" at block 412, method 400 moves to block 414.
[0067] At block 414, method 400 includes clearing pre-existing boot data from a boot database stored in a non-volatile random access memory of a firmware engine in a host computing system, such as Figure 1In some examples, clearing pre-existing data from the boot database includes clearing the OEM-trusted public authorization signatures of all software (boot time software) into a clear boot database stored in the non-volatile random access memory of the firmware engine. Method 400 continues to block 416.
[0068] At block 416, method 400 includes updating a boot database in the firmware engine with the thumbprint data of the signed boot information file to interlock the host computing system with the signed boot information file. In one or more examples, the manageability controller can update the boot database in the firmware engine. In some examples, the thumbprint data can have a public key or identifier of the signed boot information file to identify or recognize the signed boot information file by the firmware engine during a subsequent boot of the host computing system. Method 400 continues to block 418.
[0069] At frame 418, method 400 includes generating an attached startup information file by attaching the startup information file stored in the non-volatile storage drive of the host computing system using hash data of the unique identifier. In one or more examples, the manageability controller can attach the customized startup information file stored in the non-volatile storage drive. In one or more examples, the attached startup information file and the signed startup information file are similar files. For example, the attached startup information file and the signed startup information file can have the same public key or identifier, and can have the same content in the entire body of the two files. Method 400 ends at frame 420.
[0070] Referring back to the other function at block 412 , if the manageability controller determines that the processor of the computing device has not downloaded a signed boot information file, ie, “no” at block 412 , the method 400 ends at block 420 .
[0071] Figure 5 is a flowchart depicting a method 500 for starting a host computing system according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. It should be noted herein that the method 500 is combined with Figure 1 In one or more examples, the various steps discussed herein in method 500 are performed by a firmware engine.
[0072] Method 500 starts at block 502 and continues to block 504. At block 504, method 500 includes accessing a boot database stored in a non-volatile random access memory of a firmware engine to obtain thumbprint data of a signed boot information file. In some examples, the thumbprint data may refer to a public key or identifier representing a signed boot information file or an attached boot information file. Method 500 moves to block 506.
[0073] At block 506, method 500 includes determining whether the host computing system has a boot information file that matches the thumb fingerprint data. For example, method 500 includes searching a boot sector in a non-volatile storage drive of the host computing system to find a boot information file that has thumb fingerprint data that matches the thumb fingerprint data of the signed boot information file. Thus, at block 506, if the firmware engine finds that the attached boot information file has thumb fingerprint data that matches the thumb fingerprint data of the signed boot information file, i.e., "yes" at block 506, method 500 moves to block 508.
[0074] At block 508, method 500 further includes accessing an appended boot information file stored in a boot sector of a non-volatile storage drive of the host computing system based on the thumbprint data stored in the boot database to obtain hash data of a unique identifier appended to the appended boot information file. In some examples, the hash data of the unique identifier may be appended to the end of the appended boot information file. Method 500 moves to block 510.
[0075] At block 510, method 500 includes verifying hash data of a unique identifier in an attached boot information file by using a public key of a manageability controller. In some examples, the firmware engine may obtain a public key of the manageability controller stored in a non-volatile random access memory of the firmware engine. In such an example, the firmware engine may decrypt the hash data using the public key to determine the validity of the hash data obtained from the attached boot information file. Thus, at block 510, if the firmware engine finds that the hash data obtained from the attached boot information file has a valid signature, i.e., "yes" at block 510, method 500 moves to block 512.
[0076] At block 512, method 500 includes allowing a processor of the host computing system to load an operating system of the host computing system using the attached startup information file. In other words, after successfully validating the hash data obtained from the attached startup information file, the firmware engine can provide control to the startup information file to allow the host computing system to be booted or the operating system of the host computing system to be loaded. Method 500 ends at block 514.
[0077] Referring back to another function at block 506, if the firmware engine determines that the boot sector in the non-volatile storage drive of the host computing system does not include a boot information file that matches the thumbprint data of the signed boot information file, i.e., "No" at block 506, the method 500 ends at block 514. In other words, if the firmware engine cannot locate / find a boot information file that has a public key or identifier that matches the signed boot information file, the firmware engine returns an error message to the administrator of the host computing system.
[0078] Similarly, referring back to another function at block 510, if the firmware engine determines that the hash data obtained from the appended boot information file does not have a valid signature for the manageability controller of the host computing system, i.e., "No" at block 510, the method 500 ends at block 514. In other words, if the firmware engine cannot verify the signature, the firmware engine returns an error message to the administrator of the host computing system.
[0079] Various features as shown in the examples described herein may be implemented to prevent intentional or unintentional disk replacement unlocking, where an accidentally signed or out-of-date and vulnerable boot information file may be introduced to the host computing system disrupting the boot process. The host computing system may only sign and install the boot information file with a unique identifier of the manageability controller of the host computing system.
[0080] In the foregoing description, many details are set forth to provide an understanding of the subject matter disclosed herein. However, embodiments may be practiced without some or all of these details. Other embodiments may include modifications, combinations, and variations of the details discussed above. The appended claims are intended to cover such modifications and variations.
Claims
1. A method for a host computing system, the method comprising: Receiving, by a manageability controller of the host computing system, a boot information file of the host computing system from a processor of a computing device; The manageability controller signs the startup information file using hash data of the unique identifier to generate a signed startup information file; The manageability controller transmits the signed startup information file to the processor; in response to the processor successfully downloading the signed boot information file, updating, by the manageability controller, a boot database stored in a non-volatile random access memory of a firmware engine of the host computing system with thumbprint data of the signed boot information file to interlock the host computing system with the signed boot information file; as well as An appended boot information file is generated by the manageability controller by appending the boot information file stored in the non-volatile storage drive of the host computing system using hash data of the unique identifier, wherein the appended boot information file and the signed boot information file are similar files.
2. The method of claim 1 further comprises, after receiving an updated boot information file from the processor, repeating the steps of signing the boot information file, transmitting the signed boot information file, updating the boot database in the firmware engine, and appending, by the manageability controller, the boot information file stored in the non-volatile storage drive.
3. The method of claim 1 , further comprising upon subsequently starting the host computing system: accessing, by the firmware engine, the appended boot information file stored in a non-volatile storage drive of the host computing system based on the thumbprint data stored in the boot database; verifying, by the firmware engine, a hash of the unique identifier in the appended boot information file using a public key of the manageability controller; as well as In response to the validation being successful, the processor is enabled by the firmware engine to load an operating system of the host computing system using the boot information file.
4. The method of claim 1, wherein: Receiving the startup information file includes: establishing, by the processor, a secure connection with the manageability controller; issuing, by the processor, a predetermined link to a non-volatile storage drive of the host computing system to share the boot information file with the manageability controller; and The predetermined link is accessed by the manageability controller to receive the boot information file from a non-volatile storage drive of the host computing system.
5. The method of claim 1, wherein: Receiving the startup information file includes: establishing, by the processor, a connection with the manageability controller; issuing, by the processor, a predetermined link to a non-volatile storage drive of the host computing system to share the boot information file with the manageability controller; and The predetermined link is accessed by the manageability controller to verify the customer signature in the boot information file, and the boot information file is received from a non-volatile storage drive of the host computing system after successfully verifying the customer signature in the boot information file.
6. The method of claim 1, wherein: The boot information file is a customized boot information file having a plurality of parameters configured for running one or more workloads in the host computing system.
7. The method of claim 1, wherein: The boot information file includes at least one of a boot loader file or an operating system (OS) kernel file of the host computing system.
8. The method of claim 1, wherein: The unique identifier is a private key corresponding to the manageability controller stored in a trusted platform module of the manageability controller.
9. The method of claim 1 , further comprising, in response to the processor successfully downloading the signed boot information file, clearing, by the manageability controller, pre-existing boot data in the boot database into a clear boot database stored in a non-volatile random access memory of the firmware engine before updating the boot database with the thumbprint data of the signed boot information file.
10. A manageability controller for a host computing system, the manageability controller comprising: a machine-readable medium storing program instructions; as well as A processing resource operably coupled to the machine-readable medium, wherein the processing resource executes the program instructions to perform the following operations: receiving a boot information file of the host computing system from a processor of a computing device; Signing the startup information file using hash data of the unique identifier to generate a signed startup information file; transmitting the signed startup information file to the processor; in response to the processor successfully downloading the signed boot information file, updating a boot database stored in a non-volatile random access memory of a firmware engine of the host computing system with thumbprint data of the signed boot information file to interlock the host computing system with the signed boot information file; and An appended startup information file is generated by appending the startup information file stored in a non-volatile storage drive of the host computing system using hash data of the unique identifier, wherein the appended startup information file and the signed startup information file are similar files.
11. The manageability controller of claim 10, wherein: The processing resource further executes the program instructions to repeat the steps of signing the boot information file, transmitting the signed boot information file, updating the boot database in the firmware engine, and appending, by the manageability controller, the boot information file stored in the non-volatile storage drive after receiving the updated boot information file from the processor.
12. The manageability controller of claim 10, wherein: The boot information file is a customized boot information file having a plurality of parameters configured for running one or more workloads in the host computing system.
13. The manageability controller of claim 10, wherein: The boot information file includes at least one of a boot loader file or an operating system (OS) kernel file of the host computing system.
14. The manageability controller of claim 10, wherein: The unique identifier is a private key corresponding to the manageability controller stored in a trusted platform module of the manageability controller.
15. The manageability controller of claim 10 , further comprising the program instructions to: in response to the processor successfully downloading the signed boot information file, clear pre-existing boot data in the boot database into a clear boot database before updating the boot database with the thumbprint data of the signed boot information file, the clear boot database being stored in the non-volatile random access memory of the firmware engine.
16. A non-transitory machine-readable medium storing instructions executable by a manageability controller of a host computing system, wherein: The instructions include: first instructions for receiving a boot information file of the host computing system from a processor of a computing device, wherein the processor is separate from the manageability controller; A second instruction is used to sign the startup information file with hash data of the unique identifier to generate a signed startup information file; A third instruction is used to transmit the signed startup information file to the processor; fourth instructions for, in response to the processor successfully downloading the signed boot information file, updating a boot database stored in a non-volatile random access memory of a firmware engine of the host computing system with thumbprint data of the signed boot information file to interlock the host computing system with the signed boot information file; and A fifth instruction is used to generate an appended startup information file by appending the startup information file stored in the non-volatile storage drive of the host computing system using hash data of the unique identifier, wherein the appended startup information file and the signed startup information file are similar files.
17. The non-transitory machine-readable medium of claim 16, wherein: The instructions further include a sixth instruction, which is used to repeat the second instruction for signing the startup information file, the third instruction for transmitting the startup information file, the fourth instruction for updating the startup information file, and the fifth instruction for appending the startup information file in the non-volatile storage drive after receiving the updated startup information file from the processor.
18. The non-transitory machine-readable medium of claim 16, wherein: The boot information file is a customized boot information file having a plurality of parameters configured for running one or more workloads in the host computing system.
19. The non-transitory machine-readable medium of claim 16, wherein: The unique identifier is a private key corresponding to the manageability controller stored in a trusted platform module of the manageability controller.
20. The non-transitory machine-readable medium of claim 16, the instructions further comprising a seventh instruction for, in response to the processor successfully downloading the signed boot information file, clearing pre-existing boot data in the boot database into a clear boot database before updating the boot database with the thumbprint data of the signed boot information file, the clear boot database being stored in a non-volatile random access memory of the firmware engine.
