A transaction privacy protection method and device

Through the BGN homomorphic encryption algorithm, the blockchain transaction information is verified by double encryption and zero-knowledge equality proof. Combined with the public key encryption of the regulatory organization, the privacy leakage and supervision problems caused by information disclosure on the blockchain are solved, and transactions are realized Privacy protection and legality verification of information.

CN115473647BActive Publication Date: 2024-11-15XIDIAN UNIV +1
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202210935368.1
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2022-08-04
Publication Date
2024-11-15
Estimated Expiration
2042-08-04

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

User information and transaction data in the existing blockchain system are public, resulting in privacy leakage and supervision difficulties. Although traditional encryption algorithms can protect privacy, they make transactions unable to be regulated.

Method used

The transaction information is double encrypted using BGN homomorphic encryption algorithm, and the first and second cipher text are generated, sent to the receiver and the blockchain, verify the legitimacy of the transaction through zero-knowledge equality, and introduce the public of the regulatory organization. The key is encrypted to ensure that transaction information can only be decrypted on the blockchain by the regulatory organization and the user's private key.

Benefits of technology

It realizes the privacy of user transaction information on the blockchain, while ensuring that transactions can be regulated, prevent illegal transactions, and maintain the normal operation of the blockchain transaction mechanism.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The present invention provides a transaction privacy protection method and device. The transaction privacy protection method generates a first ciphertext by encrypting the transaction information by using the first public key in the first public-private key pair of the receiver, and the sender encrypts the transaction information by using the second public key in the second public-private key pair of the regulatory organization to obtain the second ciphertext; the first ciphertext is sent to the receiver, and the second ciphertext is sent to the blockchain; the receiver decrypts the first ciphertext by using the first private key in the first public-private key pair to obtain the transaction information. The method can protect the privacy of user transaction information, and transactions on the blockchain can be supervised.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of blockchain technology, and in particular to a transaction privacy protection method and device. Background Art

[0002] In 2008, an electronic cryptocurrency called "Bitcoin" was proposed, and blockchain technology was born. Blockchain is essentially a distributed storage database that uses cryptography technology and has the characteristics of decentralization, immutability, security and reliability. It does not require the establishment of a credit system, which builds a basic space for the joint use of multiple different applications. Through distributed accounting storage, the transmission and storage of Internet information data is more efficient and convenient. Because of this, blockchain has solved many problems that were unsolvable in the past. Although blockchain can provide a strong foundation for the deployment of distributed applications, with the addition of smart contract technology in programmable platforms, people have gradually realized that there are some problems on blockchain, such as privacy leakage, malicious use of data, etc. In most existing blockchain systems, the information of legal organizations involved in maintaining the entire ledger of the blockchain is public, and each blockchain network node stores a complete set of data. In addition, the data on the chain is also public during the use and transmission of transactions. Anyone on the blockchain can know the information of each user, resulting in the leakage of user information on the blockchain, such as the real identity of the user, the amount between transactions, and other personal privacy data. These problems are fatal to some industries that focus on user data privacy and are unacceptable to users. Therefore, if we want to expand blockchain to a wider range of industries, we must use some technical means to protect user privacy. Through the above analysis, the problems and defects of the existing technology are: the information on the traditional blockchain is public, and anyone can see all the information on the chain, which can be easily used maliciously. After the encryption algorithm is used to encrypt the user's transaction information, the transaction on the chain cannot be supervised. Summary of the invention

[0003] The present invention provides a transaction privacy protection method and device, which can protect the privacy of user transaction information and enable transactions on the blockchain to be supervised.

[0004] In a first aspect, the present application provides a transaction privacy protection method, including: a sender uses a first public key in a first public-private key pair of a receiver to encrypt the transaction information to generate a first ciphertext, and the sender uses a second public key in a second public-private key pair of a regulatory organization to encrypt the transaction information to obtain a second ciphertext; the first ciphertext is sent to the receiver, and the second ciphertext is sent to a blockchain; the receiver uses the first private key in the first public-private key pair to decrypt the first ciphertext to obtain the transaction information.

[0005] The method further includes: the sender uses the second public key in the second public-private key pair of the regulatory organization to encrypt the sender's account information on the blockchain to obtain a third ciphertext.

[0006] The method further includes: the sender encrypts the sender's local account information using the third public key in the third public-private key pair generated by itself to obtain a fourth ciphertext.

[0007] The method further includes: the sender generates zero-knowledge equality proof evidence using the first ciphertext and the second ciphertext; and verifies the transaction information using the zero-knowledge equality proof evidence.

[0008] The step of the sender using the first ciphertext and the second ciphertext to generate zero-knowledge equality proof evidence includes: using the following formula (1) to generate a first parameter and a second parameter:

[0009]

[0010] Among them, t1 is the first parameter, t2 is the second parameter, r1, r2, r3 are random numbers, and the first public key is pk A =(n, G, G1, e, h, k), the second public key is pk B =(n′, G′, G′1, e′, h1, k1);

[0011] Use the following formula (2) to perform a hash operation on the parameter set to obtain the operation result:

[0012] c=Hash(h,k,h1,k1,c A ,c B ,t1,t2) (2);

[0013] Among them, c is the operation result, Hash represents the hash operation, and c A represents the first ciphertext, c B Represents the second ciphertext; (h, k, h1, k1, c A , c B , t1, t2) represents a parameter set;

[0014] The third parameter is calculated using the following formula (3):

[0015] s1=r1+m*c

[0016] s2=r2+a*c

[0017] s3=r3+b*c (3);

[0018] A zero-knowledge equality proof is obtained based on the first parameter, the second parameter and the third parameter.

[0019] The step of verifying the transaction information using the zero-knowledge equality proof includes: verifying the transaction information using the following formula (4):

[0020]

[0021]

[0022] The method further comprises: verifying the transaction information using the following formula (5):

[0023]

[0024] in, It is the ciphertext of the remaining information after deducting the transaction information from the local account balance. is the first ciphertext, This is the fourth ciphertext.

[0025] The method further includes: after the transaction is completed, updating the sender's local account information.

[0026] In the second aspect, the present application also provides a transaction privacy protection device, including: an encryption module, where the sender encrypts the transaction information based on the encryption module using the first public key in the first public-private key pair of the receiver to generate a first ciphertext; a sending module, used to send the first ciphertext to the receiver; and a decryption module, where the receiver decrypts the first ciphertext based on the decryption module using the first private key in the first public-private key pair to obtain the transaction information.

[0027] Beneficial effects of the present invention: the method of the present invention generates a first ciphertext by encrypting the transaction information by the sender using the first public key in the first public-private key pair of the receiver, and the sender encrypts the transaction information by using the second public key in the second public-private key pair of the regulatory organization to obtain the second ciphertext; the first ciphertext is sent to the receiver, and the second ciphertext is sent to the blockchain; the receiver decrypts the first ciphertext by using the first private key in the first public-private key pair to obtain the transaction information. The method can protect the privacy of user transaction information, and transactions on the blockchain can be supervised. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0028] Figure 1 A flowchart of an embodiment of a transaction privacy protection method of the present invention;

[0029] Figure 2 Schematic diagram of a process flow of an embodiment of a transaction privacy protection device of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0030] In order to further explain the technical means and effects adopted by the present invention to achieve the predetermined invention purpose, the present invention is described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and specific implementation methods. The aforementioned and other technical contents, features and effects of the present invention can be clearly presented in the following detailed description of the specific implementation methods in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are only used to explain the present invention and are not intended to limit the present invention. The attached drawings are only for reference and illustration purposes and are not intended to limit the technical solutions of the present invention.

[0031] In the blockchain, when users conduct transactions, they need to update the transaction information to the blockchain network. After verification and confirmation, the transaction is considered complete. The verified information is presented in plain text, and anyone can see the information on the chain. It is easy for the verifier to verify the legitimacy of the transaction. For example, the amount of the transferor decreases and the amount of the recipient increases. The amount of decrease and the amount of increase must be the same, but this also causes the leakage of user information. To solve this problem, the present application provides a transaction privacy protection method, which is described in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.

[0032] See also Figure 1 , Figure 1 This is a flow chart of the first embodiment of the transaction privacy protection method of the present invention, which specifically includes:

[0033] Step S11: The sender uses the first public key in the first public-private key pair of the receiver to encrypt the transaction information to generate a first ciphertext, and the sender uses the second public key in the second public-private key pair of the regulatory organization to encrypt the transaction information to obtain a second ciphertext.

[0034] Step S12: Send the first ciphertext to a recipient, and send the second ciphertext to a blockchain.

[0035] Step S13: The recipient uses the first private key in the first public-private key pair to decrypt the first ciphertext to obtain the transaction information.

[0036] Specifically, the first public-private key pair and the second public-private key pair are both generated by the key generation algorithm in the BGN homomorphic encryption algorithm. The public-private key pair is represented by (pk d ,sk d ), where the public key is represented by

[0037] pk d =(n d ,G d ,G 1d ,e d ,h d ,k d ), the private key is represented by sk d=q 1d , public key pk d The specific key generation process is as follows:

[0038] Input security parameter τ∈Z + , run the algorithm Get the tuple (q 1d ,q 2d ,G d ,G 1d ,e d ).q 1d ,q 2d is a large prime number, G d ,G 1d is of order n d =q 1d *q 2d Group. d :C d ×G d →G 1d is a bilinear map. Randomly select two generators k d ,u←G d , and order Then h d It's Group G d Q 1d The random generator of the order subgroup. Public key pk k =(n d ,G d ,G 1d ,e d ,h d ,k d ), private key sk d =q 1d .

[0039] After the public-private key pair is generated, the account balance of each user and the amount of the transaction can be hidden. In the blockchain transaction privacy protection algorithm, the part of the transaction information hidden is mainly divided into two categories: one is the account balance, including the account balance recorded on the blockchain and the account balance stored locally by the user, and the other is the amount transferred in the transaction. The account balance stored on the blockchain needs to be encrypted with the public key of the regulatory organization, and the account balance stored locally needs to be encrypted with the user's public key; for the transfer amount during the transaction, it needs to be encrypted twice, both using the BGN homomorphic algorithm, once using the public key of the regulatory organization, and once using the public key of the recipient.

[0040] Therefore, in step S11, for the transaction information, the sender uses the first public key in the first public-private key pair of the receiver to encrypt the transaction information to generate a first ciphertext; in order to enable the regulatory organization to monitor the transaction information, the sender uses the second public key in the second public-private key pair of the regulatory organization to encrypt the transaction information to obtain a second ciphertext.

[0041] The first ciphertext is further sent to the recipient, and the second ciphertext is sent to the blockchain. In this way, the regulatory organization on the blockchain can use the second private key in the second public-private key pair to decrypt the second ciphertext, thereby obtaining the transaction information and realizing the monitoring of the transaction information.

[0042] In step S13, the recipient may use the first private key in the first public-private key pair to decrypt the first ciphertext to obtain transaction information.

[0043] In one embodiment, considering that there may be some illegal transactions on the blockchain that will destroy the entire transaction mechanism, a regulatory mechanism is introduced while protecting user privacy. Since the information stored on the chain is encrypted using the public key of the regulatory organization, the regulatory organization can obtain all transaction information through private key decryption. When an illegal transaction occurs, the regulatory organization has the right to cancel the transaction to ensure the normal operation of the entire transaction mechanism of the blockchain.

[0044] In one embodiment, the sender uses the second public key in the second public-private key pair of the regulatory organization to encrypt the sender's account information on the blockchain to obtain a third ciphertext, so that the regulatory organization can monitor the account information.

[0045] In one embodiment, the sender uses the third public key in the third public-private key pair generated by itself to encrypt the sender's local account information to obtain a fourth ciphertext. The sender's local account information is the sender's account balance.

[0046] In account balance hiding, it is only necessary to encrypt the account balance information in the blockchain network. The specific encryption process is as follows:

[0047] Randomly select r←{0,1,……,n-1}, for user i’s account balance m i Encrypt to get the balance ciphertext information c i :

[0048]

[0049] The encryption process of account information on the blockchain is consistent with the encryption process of local account information.

[0050] In one embodiment of the present application, the transaction information needs to be verified to determine whether the transaction is legal. The transaction verification algorithm mainly includes two aspects of verification. On the one hand, it is the verification of the legality of the transaction, that is, the equality verification. In the transaction information hiding algorithm, it is mentioned that the transfer amount needs to be encrypted twice, once encrypted by the public key of the regulatory organization, and the transfer amount is recorded on the blockchain in the form of ciphertext, and once encrypted using the public key of the recipient, and the ciphertext is sent to the recipient. In order to prevent the sender from being inconsistent in the encrypted amounts twice, it is possible to verify whether the encrypted amounts are the same without revealing the amount information. On the other hand, it is equal-amount transaction verification, that is, using the homomorphic properties of the BGN homomorphic encryption algorithm to verify that the account balance is equal to the sum of the transfer amount and the remaining amount.

[0051] For equality verification, the sender generates zero-knowledge equality proof evidence using the first ciphertext and the second ciphertext; and verifies the transaction information using the zero-knowledge equality proof evidence.

[0052] Specifically, the first parameter and the second parameter are generated using the following formula (1):

[0053]

[0054] Among them, t1 is the first parameter, t2 is the second parameter, r1, r2, r3 are random numbers, and the first public key is pk A =(n, G, G1, e, h, k), the second public key is pk B =(n′, G′, G′1, e′, h1, k1);

[0055] Use the following formula (2) to perform a hash operation on the parameter set to obtain the operation result:

[0056] c=Hash(h,k,h1,k1,c A , c B , t1, t2) (2);

[0057] Among them, c is the operation result, Hash represents the hash operation, and c A represents the first ciphertext, c B Represents the second ciphertext; (h, k, h1, k1, c A , c B , t1, t2) represents a parameter set;

[0058] The third parameter is calculated using the following formula (3):

[0059] s1=r1+m*c

[0060] s2=r2+a·c

[0061] s3=r3+b*c (3);

[0062] The zero-knowledge equality proof evidence obtained based on the first parameter, the second parameter and the third parameter. In one embodiment, the zero-knowledge equality proof evidence is represented as (t1, t2, s1, s2, s3).

[0063] The transaction information is verified using the following formula (4):

[0064]

[0065] If formula (4) is true, the verification is successful and the transaction is recorded in the block; otherwise, the transaction is revoked.

[0066] For the equal-amount transaction protocol, assume that Alice's account balance is B, and she transfers value to Bob, and the remaining balance is B1, that is, B = value + B1. The three amounts are encrypted using the BGN homomorphic encryption algorithm to obtain:

[0067]

[0068] The additive homomorphic property of the BGN homomorphic encryption algorithm is used to verify whether the following formula is true. If true, the verification passes, proving that it is a legal transaction. Otherwise, the verification fails.

[0069] Specifically, the transaction information is verified using the following formula (5):

[0070]

[0071] in, It is the ciphertext of the remaining information after deducting the transaction information from the local account balance. is the first ciphertext, This is the fourth ciphertext.

[0072] When generating random numbers r3, r4, and r5, r3=r4+r5 must be satisfied.

[0073] At this point, after the equal transaction protocol proof and zero-knowledge equality proof, the transaction legitimacy can be verified. During the entire verification process, the verifier can only see the encrypted transaction information on the blockchain, and will not leak any user information. The user information on the chain is protected to a certain extent.

[0074] When a legal transaction is completed, the user information in the blockchain network needs to be updated in a timely manner, that is, the account balances of both parties need to be updated. Account balances exist in two different forms, one is the ciphertext information form encrypted by the BGN algorithm and stored in the blockchain network node, and the other is the ciphertext form encrypted by the user's public key. After a transaction is completed, the sender's account balance on the global ledger will be Updated to The receiver's account balance on the global ledger will be Updated to The sender's local balance is updated to The receiver receives the transfer amount from the sender Then update the local balance to When the two parties to a transaction have doubts about the transaction, they can use their personal digital signature to check the account balance information stored on the blockchain and compare it with their own information. If an illegal transaction occurs, the regulatory organization can expose the illegal party and cancel the transaction to ensure the normal operation of the entire blockchain operation mechanism.

[0075] In combination with the commitment protocol, the present invention proposes a transaction privacy protection algorithm based on BGN homomorphic encryption, including a transaction information hiding algorithm, a transaction information verification algorithm and a local account balance update algorithm, which can achieve the hiding and supervision of transaction information on the blockchain.

[0076] Combined with the above technical solutions, the advantages and positive effects of the present invention are as follows: the transaction information on the blockchain is encrypted by a homomorphic encryption algorithm and stored in the blockchain network in the form of ciphertext. A regulatory organization is introduced to supervise the user amount information and transfer amount information recorded on the blockchain. Except for the regulatory organization that can decrypt using a private key, anyone else can only see the information in ciphertext form in the blockchain network. Through user public key encryption, the user can obtain the amount transferred by others through decryption. The verification algorithm enables the verifier to verify the rationality and legality of the transaction without knowing the real information contained in the ciphertext, update the account balance on the ledger, and protect the user's privacy on the blockchain.

[0077] See also Figure 2 , Figure 2 The structure diagram of an embodiment of the transaction privacy protection device of the present invention specifically includes an encryption module 21, a sending module 22 and a decryption module 23. The sender encrypts the transaction information using the first public key in the first public-private key pair of the receiver based on the encryption module 21 to generate a first ciphertext; the sending module 22 is used to send the first ciphertext to the receiver and send the second ciphertext to the blockchain; the receiver decrypts the first ciphertext using the first private key in the first public-private key pair based on the decryption module 23 to obtain the transaction information.

[0078] In order to protect user information on the blockchain, this application uses the BGN homomorphic encryption algorithm to encrypt account balance information and transaction information based on the traditional model, and writes the ciphertext transaction into the blockchain. The transaction information stored in the blockchain network in ciphertext form, the verifier cannot know whether the transaction is legal. In order to enable the verifier to complete the verification, the transaction should satisfy the zero-knowledge equality proof protocol. The zero-knowledge equality proof protocol refers to the inclusion of the same plaintext information in two ciphertexts encrypted by different keys. The transaction privacy protection algorithm based on BGN homomorphic encryption requires the transaction transfer party to submit the transaction amount ciphertext encrypted by the public key of the regulatory organization to the blockchain when transferring money to others, and the transaction amount ciphertext encrypted by the public key of the transaction recipient is sent to the recipient. In summary, when transferring money to others, the transferor needs to provide the ciphertext of the transaction amount and the relevant parameters for transaction legitimacy verification. The advantages and positive effects of this invention are: the transaction information on the blockchain is encrypted by the homomorphic encryption algorithm and stored in the blockchain network in the form of ciphertext. A regulatory organization is introduced to supervise the user amount information and transfer amount information recorded on the blockchain. Except for the regulatory organization that can decrypt with a private key, anyone else can only see the information in ciphertext form in the blockchain network. Through user public key encryption, users can obtain the amount transferred by others through decryption. The verification algorithm allows the verifier to verify the legitimacy of the transaction without knowing the real information contained in the ciphertext, update the account balance on the ledger, and protect the user's privacy on the blockchain.

[0079] The above is only an implementation method of the present invention, and does not limit the patent scope of the present invention. Any equivalent structure or equivalent process transformation made by using the contents of the present invention specification and drawings, or directly or indirectly applied in other related technical fields, are also included in the patent protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A transaction privacy protection method, characterized in that: include: The sender encrypts the transaction information using the first public key in the first public-private key pair of the receiver to generate a first ciphertext, and the sender encrypts the transaction information using the second public key in the second public-private key pair of the supervisory organization to obtain a second ciphertext; Sending the first ciphertext to a recipient, and sending the second ciphertext to a blockchain; The recipient uses the first private key in the first public-private key pair to decrypt the first ciphertext to obtain the transaction information; The sender generates zero-knowledge equality proof evidence using the first ciphertext and the second ciphertext; Verifying the transaction information using the zero-knowledge equality proof evidence; The step of the sender generating zero-knowledge equality proof evidence using the first ciphertext and the second ciphertext includes: The first parameter and the second parameter are generated using the following formula (1): Among them, t1 is the first parameter, t2 is the second parameter, r1, r2, r3 are random numbers, and the first public key is pk A =(n, G, G1, e, h, k), G and G1 are two elliptic curve groups, e: G×G→G1 represents a linear mapping, h is a random generator of the q1-order subgroup of the elliptic curve group G, k is a generator of the elliptic curve group G, n=q1*q2, q1 and q2 are two large prime numbers; the second public key is pk B =(n′, G′, G′1, e′, h1, k1), G′ and G′1 are two other elliptic curve groups, e′: G′×G′→G′1 represents another linear mapping, h1 is a random generator of the q′1-order subgroup of the elliptic curve group G′, k1 is a generator of the elliptic curve group G′, n′=q′1*q′2, q′1 and q′2 are two other large prime numbers; Use the following formula (2) to perform a hash operation on the parameter set to obtain the operation result: c=Hash(h,k,h1,k1,c A ,c B ,t1,t2) (2); Among them, c is the operation result, Hash represents the hash operation, and c A represents the first ciphertext, c B represents the second ciphertext; (h, k, h1, k1, c A , c B , t1, t2) represents a parameter set; The third parameter is calculated using the following formula (3): s1=r1+m*c s2=r2+a*c s3=r3+b*c (3); Wherein, s1, s2, s3 are the three third parameters, m is the plain text of the transaction information, a, b∈{0,1,……,n-1}; A zero-knowledge equality proof is obtained based on the first parameter, the second parameter and the third parameter.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The method further comprises: The sender uses the second public key in the second public-private key pair of the regulatory organization to encrypt the sender's account information on the blockchain to obtain a third ciphertext.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The method further comprises: The sender encrypts the sender's local account information using the third public key in the third public-private key pair generated by itself to obtain a fourth ciphertext.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The step of verifying the transaction information using the zero-knowledge equality proof evidence comprises: The transaction information is verified using the following formula (4):

5. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that: The method further comprises: The transaction information is verified using the following formula (5): in, It is the ciphertext of the remaining information after deducting the transaction information from the local account balance. is the first ciphertext, is the fourth ciphertext.

6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The method further comprises: After the transaction is completed, the sender's local account information is updated.

7. A transaction privacy protection device, characterized in that: include: An encryption module, where the sender encrypts the transaction information using the first public key in the first public-private key pair of the receiver based on the encryption module to generate a first ciphertext; The sender encrypts the transaction information using the second public key in the second public-private key pair of the regulatory organization based on the encryption module to obtain a second ciphertext; A sending module, used to send the first ciphertext to a recipient, and also used to send the second ciphertext to a blockchain; a decryption module, wherein the receiver uses the first private key in the first public-private key pair to decrypt the first ciphertext based on the decryption module to obtain the transaction information; The sender also generates a zero-knowledge equality proof based on the encryption module using the first ciphertext and the second ciphertext; the receiver also verifies the transaction information based on the decryption module using the zero-knowledge equality proof; The sender further generates zero-knowledge equality proof evidence based on the encryption module using the first ciphertext and the second ciphertext, including: The first parameter and the second parameter are generated using the following formula (1): Among them, t1 is the first parameter, t2 is the second parameter, r1, r2, r3 are random numbers, and the first public key is pk A =(n, G, G1, e, h, k), G and G1 are two elliptic curve groups, e: G×G→G1 represents a linear mapping, h is a random generator of the q1-order subgroup of the elliptic curve group G, k is a generator of the elliptic curve group G, n=q1*q2, q1 and q2 are two large prime numbers; the second public key is pk B =(n′, G′, G′1, e′, h1, k1), G′ and G′1 are two other elliptic curve groups, e′: G′×G′→G′1 represents another linear mapping, h1 is a random generator of the q′1-order subgroup of the elliptic curve group G′, k1 is a generator of the elliptic curve group G′, n′=q′1*q′2, q′1 and q′2 are two other large prime numbers; Use the following formula (2) to perform a hash operation on the parameter set to obtain the operation result: c=Hash(h,k,h1,k1,c A ,c B ,t1,t2) (2); Among them, c is the operation result, Hash represents the hash operation, and c A represents the first ciphertext, c B Represents the second ciphertext; (h, k, h1, k1, c A , c B , t1, t2) represents a parameter set; The third parameter is calculated using the following formula (3): s1=r1+m*c s2=r2+a*c s3=r3+b*c (3); Wherein, s1, s2, s3 are the three third parameters, m is the plain text of the transaction information, a, b∈{0, 1, ..., n-1}; A zero-knowledge equality proof is obtained based on the first parameter, the second parameter and the third parameter.