Information pseudonym query method and system based on blockchain and oblivious transfer extension

Abstract

The present application relates to a kind of information anonymous tracking query method and system based on blockchain and inadvertent transmission extension, realize the data privacy transmission between query node and data node by inadvertent transmission extension, the privacy information retrieval system based on consortium blockchain, the keyword or customer ID information of the object to be queried of inquiring party hides the object to be queried, data service party provides matching query result but cannot know which specific query object corresponds to;Data does not go out and can calculate, eliminate the possibility of data caching, data leakage, data trafficking;The transmission mode on chain makes the calculation process of privacy information retrieval safe, traceable, supervisable, reaches the effect of security self-evidence;Compared with traditional privacy information retrieval based on OT, performance is higher.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application relates to the technical field of information retrieval and data processing, and in particular to an information anonymous trace query method and system based on blockchain and oblivious transfer extension. BACKGROUND

[0002] The on-chain data of the existing blockchain is publicly shared in the ledger. Although the data transparency is improved, it also brings the problem of data privacy protection. The limitation of blockchain computing capacity also restricts the further expansion of the application scenario of blockchain. The privacy and security capability of single anonymous trace query technology are difficult to quantify and evaluate. The related services are in the form of black box, which is difficult to prove security. The traditional anonymous trace query based on oblivious transfer (OT) has high computing cost and large communication volume. Therefore, there is a great need for a corresponding solution to realize a safe, verifiable and easy-to-use private information query method. SUMMARY

[0003] To solve the problems of the prior art, the present application provides an information anonymous trace query method and system based on blockchain and oblivious transfer extension, a private information retrieval system based on a consortium blockchain, a query party hides the key words or customer ID information of the queried object, and a data service party provides matching query results but cannot know which query object corresponds to the specific query object. The data does not go out and can be calculated, eliminating the possibility of data caching, data leakage and data trafficking. The transmission on the chain makes the calculation process of the private information retrieval safe, traceable and manageable, achieving the effect of security self-proving. Compared with the traditional private information retrieval based on OT, the performance is higher.

[0004] To achieve the above purpose, the technical scheme adopted by the present application includes:

[0005] An information anonymous trace query method based on blockchain and oblivious transfer extension, characterized by performing the following steps between the query node and the data node connected by the blockchain and transmitting data to each other:

[0006] S1, reading the to-be-queried data from the query node;

[0007] S2, performing first hash operation on the to-be-queried data to generate a local hash table, and generating to-be-encrypted data using the to-be-queried data, the to-be-encrypted data including to-be-queried data information and local hash table information;

[0008] S3, reading the data set from the data node;

[0009] S4, generating a first symmetric encryption key according to the data set, and transmitting the first symmetric encryption key to the query node in the form of a first matrix through oblivious transfer extension;

[0010] S5, encrypting the to-be-encrypted data using the first matrix to generate to-be-transmitted data, and transmitting the to-be-transmitted data to the data node in the form of a second matrix through the oblivious transfer extension;

[0011] S6, performing a second hash operation on the data set using the second matrix to generate a hash result, calculating a first pseudo-random function according to the hash result, and sending the first pseudo-random function to the query node;

[0012] S7, calculating a hash function using the local hash table;

[0013] S8, comparing whether the numerical values of the first pseudo-random function and the hash function are the same;

[0014] S9, repeating steps S4 to S8, and integrating the first matrix corresponding to the same numerical values of all the first pseudo-random functions and the hash functions as the query result output.

[0015] Further, the blockchain connection comprises:

[0016] The blockchain gateway is used to connect the blockchain node with the query node or the data node;

[0017] A message subscription push mechanism is used for communication between the blockchain gateways;

[0018] An intelligent contract is used to trigger the operation of the blockchain node.

[0019] Further, the hash function comprises a sha256 function.

[0020] Further, the step S6 comprises:

[0021] The first pseudo-random function is transmitted to the query node through the oblivious transfer extension using the blockchain.

[0022] Further, the step S4 comprises:

[0023] A random bit matrix is initialized, and a first bit vector is randomly selected;

[0024] The first symmetric encryption key is converted into the first matrix using the random bit matrix and the selected first bit vector.

[0025] Further, the step S5 comprises:

[0026] A second bit vector different from the first bit vector is randomly selected;

[0027] The to-be-transmitted data is converted into the second matrix using the random bit matrix and the selected second bit vector.

[0028] The present application also relates to an information trace query system based on a blockchain and an oblivious transfer extension.

[0029] a query node, configured to send data to be queried;

[0030] a data node, configured to feed back query results;

[0031] a blockchain gateway, configured to connect the blockchain node with the query node or the data node;

[0032] a blockchain node, configured to perform operations according to a smart contract.

[0033] The application also relates to a computer readable storage medium, characterized in that the storage medium stores a computer program, and the computer program is executed by a processor to implement the above method.

[0034] The application also relates to an electronic device, characterized in that the electronic device comprises a processor and a memory.

[0035] The memory is configured to store data to be queried and a data set.

[0036] The processor is configured to execute the above method by calling the data to be queried and the data set.

[0037] The application also relates to a computer program product, comprising a computer program and / or instructions, characterized in that the computer program and / or instructions are executed by a processor to implement the steps of the above method.

[0038] The application has the following beneficial effects:

[0039] The information anonymity query method and system based on blockchain and unintentional transmission, as described in this invention, is a privacy information retrieval system based on consortium blockchain. The querying party hides the keywords or customer ID information of the queried object, while the data service provider provides matching query results without knowing which specific queried object it corresponds to. Data remains within the blockchain while computation is performed, eliminating the possibility of data caching, data leakage, and data selling. The on-chain transmission method makes the privacy information retrieval computation process secure, traceable, and monitorable, achieving a self-verifying security effect. Compared to traditional OT-based privacy information retrieval, it offers higher performance. By combining Probability of Invisibility Query (PIR) technology with blockchain, the advantages of both are integrated. The self-verifying security of PIR technology eliminates obstacles to multi-party data flow, effectively protecting sensitive information from leakage during the query process while achieving end-to-end verifiability, traceability, and auditability of PIR security. Off-chain computation and on-chain transmission outsource various computational tasks that would otherwise be processed on-chain to off-chain nodes, using the blockchain as the data transmission channel for PIR between participants, thereby improving the blockchain's data processing and privacy protection capabilities. PIR performance optimization leverages research findings such as inadvertent transmission extension technology and inadvertent pseudo-random functions to improve the performance of traditional privacy set intersection. Compared to traditional OT-based privacy intersection technology, the system reduces the computational complexity of off-chain computing nodes to O(n). Simultaneously, the communication volume of PIR is compressed to a finite number of times and is not constrained by dataset size or the length of each data entry. Attached Figure Description

[0040] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the information anonymity query method based on blockchain and unintentional transmission extension of the present invention.

[0041] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the information anonymity query system based on blockchain and unintentional transmission extension of the present invention.

[0042] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the hidden query (PIR) processing flow of the present invention.

[0043] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the unintentional transfer extension (OTE) processing flow of the present invention.

[0044] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the unintentional pseudo-random function (OPRF) processing flow of the present invention.

[0045] Figure 6 A schematic diagram of the blockchain connection relationship of this invention. Detailed Implementation

[0046] To better understand the content of this invention, it will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments.

[0047] The first aspect of this invention relates to a process flow as follows: Figure 1 The method for anonymous information tracing based on blockchain and unintentional transmission, as shown, includes:

[0048] S1. Read the data to be queried from the query node;

[0049] S2. Perform a first hash operation on the data to be queried to generate a local hash table, and use the data to be queried to generate data to be encrypted, wherein the data to be encrypted includes the data to be queried information and the local hash table information;

[0050] S3. Read the dataset from the data node;

[0051] S4. Generate a first symmetric encryption key based on the dataset, and transmit the first symmetric encryption key to the query node in the form of a first matrix through unintentional transmission extension;

[0052] S5. Use the first matrix to encrypt the data to be encrypted to generate the data to be transmitted. Transmit the data to be transmitted to the data node in the form of the second matrix through unintentional transmission extension.

[0053] S6. Use the second matrix to perform a second hash operation on the dataset to generate a hash result. Calculate and generate a first pseudo-random function based on the hash result and send it to the query node via unintentional transmission using the blockchain.

[0054] S7. Use the local hash table to calculate and generate a hash function, such as the sha256 function;

[0055] S8. Compare whether the values ​​of the first pseudo-random function and the hash function are the same;

[0056] S9. Repeat steps S4 to S8 to integrate the first matrices corresponding to all the values ​​of the first pseudo-random function and the hash function into the query result output.

[0057] Specifically, such as Figure 3 The diagram shown illustrates a typical hidden query (PIR) processing flow of the present invention, which involves operators. "&" represents the AND operation. The main technologies involved in PIR calculation are Unintentional Transfer Spread (OTE), Unintentional Pseudo-Random Function (OPRF), hash algorithms, and encryption algorithms. The data service provider (the queried party) retains control of the data resources. The data requester no longer uses plaintext queries. Adding a random key to the query parameters significantly improves the security of brute-force queries compared to plaintext hashing, ensuring that only matching query results are obtained without leaving any query traces (queried object information or customer ID). The overall process consists of three steps:

[0058] a1, the queried node reads the local dataset A from the data source module (read from the database / read from the file system). The query party hashes the data (such as the pigeonhole hashing) to generate a hash table for subsequent comparison queries;

[0059] a2, OTE transmission. The query party transmits data to the queried party by column (the query party transmits the matrix Tb, Ub to the queried party, and after OTE transmission, the queried party obtains the matrix Q); specifically, there are two sub-steps, the queried party first transmits the symmetrically encrypted secret key to the query party, and then the query party transmits data to the queried party (the data has been symmetrically encrypted by the secret key);

[0060] a3, PIR based on the oblivious pseudo-random function. If the PIR matches the same result, it is a hit, otherwise it is not a hit. Specifically, to compare whether the original search data enc_A and the searched data enc_B are the same, only the of the queried party and the H(Tbi) of the query party need to be compared. Wherein H() is a hash function.

[0061] For the oblivious transmission extension, a typical processing flow is provided as shown in Figure 4 , which includes:

[0062] First step, transmit a secret key based on asymmetric encryption (the OT transmission process involves asymmetric encryption, high cost). In this stage, the queried party sends a pair of matrix form data: matrix T and matrix T is a random bit matrix, and R is a random bit vector), after OTE, the query party obtains the symmetric secret key: matrix Secret;

[0063] Second step, use the secret key to transmit a large amount of data based on symmetric encryption (the OT transmission process is symmetric encryption, low cost).

[0064] In this stage, the query party sends a pair of matrix form data containing the information to be compared: matrix Tb and matrix Ub, and after OTE, the queried party obtains matrix Q. For the calculation of the next stage.

[0065] The purpose of this is to use a small amount of "slow" (asymmetric encryption) transmission, combined with symmetric encryption, to achieve a large amount of "fast" oblivious transmission. Another advantage of this extended transmission is that the number of transmissions is fixed. The number of OT executions will not be greatly increased due to the length of the data content or the size of the data set. Because each piece of data to be transmitted is hashed into a fixed length of data, each row of the matrix is such a piece of data. Each transmission is by column, which ensures that the number of OTE executions is controllable.

[0066] Specifically, the first step, the queried party initializes a random bit matrix T and a random selection vector R. The size of T is m rows and k columns (m is the number of the queried party's data set, and k is a fixed value, such as 128). R is a one-dimensional array with a length of m. The contents of T and R are both random 0 and 1. Then, the matrix Then T and U are sent to the querying party column by column through OTE. The querying party initializes a random selection bit vector S (a one-dimensional array with a length of k). The selection bits are input into OTE one by one to obtain the matrix Secret. For the ith transmission:

[0067] When S[i] == 0, Secret[i] = Ti;

[0068] When S[i] == 1,

[0069] The above form can be written as a mathematical expression:

[0070]

[0071] And from the mathematical expression

[0072]

[0073] Holds.

[0074] The above same matrix is executed multiple times by column OTE. The number of times of transmission is related to the number of columns. The system optimizes these transmissions into one to reduce the communication time on the blockchain.

[0075] The second step, the querying party transmits the local data to the queried party column by column through OTE. The transmission content is the matrix Tb and the matrix Ub. Among them, Tb is a locally initialized random matrix, and the size of T is n rows and k1 columns (n is the number of the querying party's local data set, and k1 is a fixed number).

[0076] (r[i] is a piece of plaintext data to be compared)

[0077] The content input into OTE by the queried party is the selection vector R. After OTE, the queried party finally obtains the matrix Q. Taking the ith OT as an example,

[0078] When Ri == 0, Qi = Tb[i]

[0079] When Ri == 1,

[0080] The above form can be written as a mathematical expression:

[0081]

[0082] From the mathematical expression, we can know that

[0083]

[0084] For the encryption process, both Tb and Ub are symmetrically encrypted. The key is the matrix Secret. Specifically, in equation (1), the values on both sides of the equation are equal. The querying party encrypts the data on the right side of the equation using the symmetric key Secret As the key symmetrically encrypts the local data, the queried party decrypts the data using Ti on the left side of the equation. In this way, the effect of symmetric encryption is achieved.

[0085] That is:

[0086] (Secret[i]) encrypts Tb

[0087] encrypts Ub

[0088] The above same matrix performs multiple OTEs by column. The more columns, the more times of transmission. This paper optimizes these transmissions to once to reduce the communication time on the blockchain.

[0089] The oblivious pseudo-random function is a function that can map the original enc_A and enc_B to be compared to H(enc_A) and H(enc_B). To compare whether the original data enc_A and enc_B are the same, we only need to compare H(enc_A) and H(enc_B). The data transmission involved in the comparison process uses oblivious transmission. In the description in this paper, the data to be compared is the encrypted enc_A and enc_B. To compare whether they are equal, we only need to compare whether the queried party's and the querying party's H(Tbi) are the same. H() is a hash function such as sha256. From equation (2), the values of Tbi and on both sides of the equation are equal. When the data from the queried party and the data from the querying party are equal in a certain comparison, the calculated by the queried party is equal to the Ti calculated by the querying party, and the hit result is obtained. As shown in Figure 5 is a typical processing flow diagram of the oblivious pseudo-random function. 1.1 and 1.2 are the second step of the oblivious transmission extension (the querying party encrypts the matrix Tb, Ub using the symmetric key Secret, and the queried party obtains the matrix Q after OTE). The queried party obtains Q, calculates the value of each piece of local data enc_A[i] as follows: Then The query party is given an ordered list in this way. The query party traverses the local hash table calculated in advance, compares whether the corresponding H(Ti) appears in the list sent by the query party, and if it appears, it means At this time, the intersection is hit. Finally, all the hit intersection data is synchronized to the query party.

[0090] In the above comparison process of the query party, the data set of the query party with a size of n and the data set of the query party with a size of m need to be compared. The calculation complexity is O(n^2). But since the hash algorithm is used, the hash value of each value of the data set is calculated in advance. In the comparison, only one side of the hash table needs to be traversed, and then the position of the hash value of the new data is calculated. Directly compare the old hash value at the corresponding position with the new hash value. Through this way, the complexity of the comparison calculation can be reduced to O(n). In addition, in the system, the socket interaction of 3.1 and 3.2 is 1 time, that is, after the overall calculation is completed, it is sent to the opposite side through the socket connection based on TCP and the block chain network.

[0091] The above method is further illustrated by a specific embodiment.

[0092] Take the bank inter-bank customer blacklist query as an example:

[0093] 1) The bank query party and the inter-bank query party respectively deploy computing nodes locally, and the query party reads the user data ID (ID card number) from its own database into the local side computing node;

[0094] 2) The user data ID of the bank query party: {110114201905061111, 232321199012032222, 230222200203223333}:

[0095] The computing node of the bank query party uses the public hash function h to operate on the extracted user data to obtain the U hash table:

[0096] H(110114201905061111)

[0097] H(232321199012032222)

[0098] H(230222200203223333)

[0099] 3) The same industry queried party queried party generates a transmission key, which is pushed to the blockchain ledger through the gateway of the computing node. After the ledger is synchronized, the bank query party side computing node blockchain gateway subscribes to the same industry queried party queried party message, and the gateway will transmit the key to the bank query party computing node (all data is this transmission process). The bank query party uses the key to transmit data to the cooperative party B through OTE, and thus completes the OTE transmission part.

[0100] The same industry queried party queried party gets the data matrix Q, calculates the local data and transmits the data to bank A;

[0101] The data ID of the user of the same industry queried party queried party: {110114201905061111};

[0102] The computing node of the same industry queried party B uses the public hash function h to operate on each user data extracted to obtain enc_A[i], and calculates Finally, the V set is obtained and sent to the bank query party:

[0103] The bank query party traverses the U table, and checks whether the traversal value appears in the V set. If it appears, it hits the intersection, obtains the result U': H(110114201905061111), takes the corresponding original value 110114201905061111 as the query result, and returns the result that the customer exists in the same industry blacklist.

[0104] Another aspect of the application also relates to an information anonymous tracking query system based on blockchain and oblivious transfer extension, which has the structure as shown in Figure 2 The system comprises:

[0105] A query node for issuing data to be queried;

[0106] A data node for feeding back query results;

[0107] A blockchain gateway for connecting a blockchain node and a query node or a data node;

[0108] A blockchain node for performing operations according to a smart contract.

[0109] By using the system, the above-mentioned operation processing method can be executed and the corresponding technical effects can be achieved.

[0110] Overall, the system described in the application is divided into two parts: a privacy retrieval computing node and a blockchain system. The computing node is off-chain. It is responsible for loading the data set, performing local complex calculations of PIR, and feeding back the results. The blockchain system includes a blockchain front-end gateway (for interfacing with off-chain data) and a blockchain underlying platform (consensus module, smart contract, accounting module, node management, etc.). The computing node and the blockchain system are connected through the blockchain gateway. PIR requires repeated data communication between computing nodes that interact with each other. These communications are completed through the blockchain gateway and the blockchain. This forms a privacy set intersection system that performs complex calculations off-chain and completes data communication and data tracing on-chain. By combining privacy computing and blockchain, the advantages of both are combined, achieving a "1+1>2" effect.

[0111] Privacy computing. First, privacy computing mainly solves the problem of data privacy protection in joint computing. However, from the perspective of the entire data circulation chain, the risk of subjective malfeasance by participants, the completeness and reliability of data content, and other issues can all pose risks to data privacy and usability. Blockchain can solve the problem of data correctness on the chain, such as data that cannot be tampered with after being uploaded, traceability, and the like. It can also monitor data interactions and promptly detect and prevent abnormal collision attacks. Second, the privacy and security capabilities of data circulation technology are difficult to quantify and evaluate, and data circulation services are often presented in black box form, making it difficult to prove security and for demanders to distinguish between good and bad, hindering the development and application of the technology. However, the integration of blockchain makes the originally black-box privacy computing process transparent and visible, achieving security self-proving and enabling data sharing throughout the entire process to be verifiable, traceable, and auditable. This effectively alleviates concerns about the technology in business applications and provides explainability for regulators.

[0112] Blockchain. In-chain nodes share the ledger, making the on-chain ledger data visible across alliances. Although data transparency has improved, it has also raised privacy protection issues. Some data providers in the blockchain may not want their data to be fully disclosed, such as participant identities, transaction amounts, and sensitive business contracts. This includes not only personal information but also various business data in application scenarios. The strong encryption feature of privacy computing ensures the security of the ledger data, and intermediate data is only available to the two interacting computing nodes. Although on-chain data can be encrypted using public keys for protection, the OTE feature provides a higher level of protection for data. The same data is encrypted each time with randomness, so the encrypted value is different and difficult for both parties to crack. In addition, outsourcing privacy computing to off-chain nodes can avoid the problem of insufficient computing capacity of the blockchain.

[0113] As Figure 6The blockchain connection relationship diagram of the system is shown. Multiple interactions are required between the computing nodes, and these interactions are completed through the blockchain. The final query result (only visible to the intersection participant) is also chained. The combination of the computing node (query end, queried end) and the blockchain is completed through the blockchain gateway. Their configuration relationship is 1:1. Flexible configuration is supported, that is, the computing node can be configured for the on-chain participant who needs PIR. For the blockchain node that has no computing demand temporarily, the computing node is optional. Therefore, the communication between the computing nodes is converted into the communication between the blockchain gateways. For the two gateways, a message subscription and push mechanism can be used. Communication only needs to publish a bidirectional subscription, that is, the content of the subscription published by gateway 1 is the message of gateway 2, and the content of the subscription published by gateway 2 is the message of gateway 1. When the query end transmits data to the queried end, the query end calls the set method of the smart contract through gateway 1, stores the data into the blockchain ledger, waits for the ledger data to be synchronized to node 2, and then the related subscription message is pushed to the queried end through gateway 2 (the information interaction from the queried end to the query end is similar). Among them, the interaction mode of the computing node and the gateway is Socket communication based on TCP protocol. The blockchain gateway data is stored in the blockchain ledger through a specific smart contract.

[0114] The blockchain system structure is divided into two layers

[0115] The upper layer is the application layer, including identity management, ledger processing, transaction management and smart contract.

[0116] The lower layer is the core blockchain implementation, including member management, consensus service, distributed ledger, ordering service, P2P network, chain code service, security and encryption service, etc.

[0117] 1) Application layer perspective

[0118] Identity management: provides identity management, privacy, security and audit functions for the blockchain network, ensuring the security of platform access;

[0119] Ledger management: data reading and writing, authorized users can query ledger data using various methods;

[0120] Transaction management: submit transaction proposal, after the application program collects the transaction after endorsement, it is sent to the ordering service node through broadcast, and after ordering, a block is generated;

[0121] Smart contract: handles business logic agreed by network members, separate from the underlying ledger, achieving logic and data separation.

[0122] 2) Bottom perspective

[0123] Member management: provides services for identity management of the application layer to ensure the security of platform access;

[0124] Consensus service: responsible for the consensus management between nodes, the distributed calculation of the ledger, the storage of the ledger and the implementation of the P2P protocol function between nodes, is the core component of the blockchain, and provides the underlying support for the main function of the blockchain;

[0125] Chaincode service: the smart contract execution of the application layer needs to rely on the implementation of the underlying chaincode service. The chaincode service provides a secure execution environment for the smart contract. Ensure the safety of the execution process and the isolation of user data, and protect the privacy of user data;

[0126] Security and cryptographic service: key generation, hash operation, signature and signature verification, encryption and decryption are implemented using BCCSP (blockchain cryptographic service provider).

[0127] Event stream: throughout the other components, it provides a technical implementation for asynchronous communication between components.

[0128] The embodiment of the application also provides a computer readable storage medium capable of implementing all steps of the method in the above embodiment, and the computer readable storage medium stores a computer program, and the computer program is executed by a processor to implement all steps of the method in the above embodiment.

[0129] The embodiment of the application also provides an electronic device for executing the above method, as an implementation device of the method, the electronic device at least has a processor and a memory, in particular, the memory stores data and related computer programs required for executing the method, such as to-be-queried data and data sets, and all steps of the method are implemented by calling the data and programs in the memory by the processor, and the corresponding technical effects are obtained.

[0130] Preferably, the electronic device can include a bus architecture, the bus can include any number of interconnected buses and bridges, and the bus links various circuits including one or more processors and memories together. The bus can also link various other circuits such as peripheral devices, voltage stabilizers and power management circuits, which are well known in the art, and therefore, they will not be further described herein. The bus interface provides an interface between the bus and the receiver and transmitter. The receiver and the transmitter can be the same element, i.e. the transceiver, which provides a unit for communicating with various other systems on a transmission medium. The processor is responsible for managing the bus and general processing, and the memory can be used to store data used by the processor during operation.

[0131] Additionally, the electronic device can further include a communication module, an input unit, an audio processor, a display, a power supply, etc. The processor (or controller, operating control) employed can include a microprocessor or other processor device and / or logic device, which receives input and controls the operation of the various components of the electronic device; the memory can be one or more of a cache, a flash memory, a hard drive, a removable media, a volatile memory, a non-volatile memory, or other suitable device, which stores the above-mentioned data information, and further stores programs for executing the relevant information, and the processor can execute the programs stored in the memory to achieve information storage or processing, etc.; the input unit is used to provide input to the processor, and can be a key or touch input device, for example; the power supply is used to provide power to the electronic device; the display is used to display display objects such as images and text, and can be an LCD display, for example. The communication module is a transmitter / receiver that transmits and receives signals via an antenna. The communication module (transmitter / receiver) is coupled to the processor to provide input signals and receive output signals, which can be the same as in a conventional mobile communication terminal. Based on different communication technologies, multiple communication modules can be provided in the same electronic device, such as a cellular network module, a Bluetooth module, and / or a wireless local area network module, etc. The communication module (transmitter / receiver) is also coupled to the speaker and the microphone via the audio processor to provide audio output via the speaker and receive audio input from the microphone, thereby achieving the usual telecommunication functions. The audio processor can include any suitable buffer, decoder, amplifier, etc. In addition, the audio processor is also coupled to the central processor, so that it can record on the local machine through the microphone, and it can play the stored sound on the local machine through the speaker.

[0132] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that embodiments of the present application can be readily used as a method, a system or a computer program product. Accordingly, the present application can take the form of an entirely hardware embodiment, an entirely software embodiment or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Furthermore, the present application can take the form of a computer program product on one or more computer-usable storage media (including, but not limited to, disk storage, CD-ROMs, optical storage devices, etc.) embodying computer-readable program code.

[0133] The computer program instructions can also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing apparatus to cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer or other programmable apparatus to produce a computer-implemented process such that the instructions which execute on the computer or other programmable apparatus provide steps for implementing the functions specified in the flowchart block or blocks. Figure 1 one or more flowcharts and / or blocks Figure 1 one or more flowcharts and / or blocks

[0134] The computer program instructions can also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing apparatus to cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer or other programmable apparatus to produce a computer-implemented process such that the instructions which execute on the computer or other programmable apparatus provide steps for implementing the functions specified in the flowchart block or blocks. Figure 1 one or more flowcharts and / or blocks Figure 1 one or more flowcharts and / or blocks

[0135] The computer program instructions can also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing apparatus to cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer or other programmable apparatus to produce a computer-implemented process such that the instructions which execute on the computer or other programmable apparatus provide steps for implementing the functions specified in the flowchart block or blocks. Figure 1 one or more flowcharts and / or blocks Figure 1 one or more flowcharts and / or blocks Although preferred embodiments of the application have been described, those skilled in the art will recognize that changes and modifications can be made thereto without departing from the application and that the scope of the application is not to be understood as limited to the particular embodiments described. Although the application has been described in connection with particular embodiments thereof, it will be understood that many modifications, variations and alterations will be apparent to those skilled in the art and in the scope of the application described by the appended claims.

[0136] The above description is only preferred specific embodiments of the present application, and the protection scope of the present application is not limited thereto, and any changes or replacements within the technical scope disclosed by the present application should be covered within the protection scope of the present application. Therefore, the protection scope of the present application should be subject to the protection scope of the claims.

Claims

1. An information pseudonymity query method based on blockchain and extended with oblivious transfer, characterized in that, The following steps are performed between the query node and the data node connected by the blockchain and transmitting data to each other: S1, reading the to-be-queried data from the query node; S2, performing a first hash operation on the to-be-queried data to generate a local hash table, and generating encrypted data using the to-be-queried data, the encrypted data including to-be-queried data information and local hash table information; S3, reading the data set from the data node; S4, generating a first symmetric encryption key according to the data set, and transmitting the first symmetric encryption key to the query node in the form of a first matrix through an oblivious transfer extension; S5, encrypting the encrypted data using the first matrix to generate to-be-transmitted data, and transmitting the to-be-transmitted data to the data node in the form of a second matrix through an oblivious transfer extension; S6, performing a second hash operation on the data set using the second matrix to generate a hash result, and calculating a first pseudo-random function according to the hash result and sending it to the query node; S7, calculating a hash function using the local hash table; S8, comparing the numerical values of the first pseudo-random function and the hash function; S9, repeating steps S4 to S8, and integrating the first matrix corresponding to the same numerical values of the first pseudo-random function and the hash function as the query result output; the step S4 includes: initializing a random bit matrix and randomly selecting a first bit vector; using the random bit matrix and the selected first bit vector to convert the first symmetric encryption key into a first matrix.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein, The blockchain connection includes: connecting the blockchain node, the query node, or the data node using a blockchain gateway; using a message subscription push mechanism for communication between the blockchain gateways; triggering the blockchain node operation using a smart contract.

3. The method of claim 1, wherein, The hash function includes a sha256 function.

4. The method of claim 1, wherein, The step S6 includes: transmitting the first pseudo-random function to the query node using the blockchain through an oblivious transfer extension.

5. The method of claim 1, wherein, The step S5 includes: randomly selecting a second bit vector different from the first bit vector; using the random bit matrix and the selected second bit vector to convert the to-be-transmitted data into a second matrix.

6. An information anonymized query system extended with blockchain and oblivious transfer, characterized in that, It includes: a query node for issuing to-be-queried data; a data node for feeding back query results; a blockchain gateway for connecting the blockchain node, the query node, or the data node; a blockchain node for performing operations according to a smart contract; The system is used to implement the method of any one of claims 1 to 5.

7. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, The storage medium stores a computer program, and the computer program is executed by the processor to implement the method of any one of claims 1 to 5.

8. An electronic device, comprising: It includes a processor and a memory; The memory is used to store to-be-queried data and a data set; The processor is used to execute the method of any one of claims 1 to 5 by calling the to-be-queried data and the data set.

9. A computer program product comprising computer programs and / or instructions, characterized in that, The computer program and / or instructions are executed by the processor to implement the steps of the method of any one of claims 1 to 5.

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