A dynamic key security hosting authentication method based on a sunway platform
By adopting a dynamic key secure escrow authentication method based on the Shenwei platform, the problem of independent security and controllability of traditional authentication schemes on x86 or ARM architectures is solved. Dynamic key secure escrow based on the Shenwei platform is realized, which improves the security and flexibility of the system, prevents illegal acquisition and collusion, and enhances independent controllability.
Patent Information
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- CLP KESHENTAI INFORMATION TECH CO LTD
- Filing Date
- 2023-07-21
- Publication Date
- 2026-04-28
AI Technical Summary
Traditional encryption signature authentication schemes cannot meet the security requirements of large-scale distributed, multi-application cluster service deployments, especially on servers based on x86 or ARM architectures. They are difficult to achieve independent security and control, are vulnerable to illegal penetration and forgery, and cannot build a practical key security authentication scheme.
The method adopts a dynamic key security escrow authentication method based on the Shenwei platform. It generates public and private keys jointly by the key management center and the server, introduces a weight mechanism, dynamically selects core escrow agents, and uses elliptic curve algorithm and random number generation mechanism to construct polynomial and mask keys to realize dynamic key escrow and reconstruction, preventing illegal acquisition and collusion.
It improves the security and reliability of the system, prevents unauthorized access and collusion with low-level agents, realizes the flexibility and forward security of identity authentication, reduces dependence on the key management center, and enhances the system's autonomy and controllability.
Smart Images
Figure CN116781261B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This invention relates to the field of data security technology, and specifically to a dynamic key secure escrow authentication method based on the Shenwei platform. Background Technology
[0002] With the increasing sophistication of security technologies and requirements, designing a secure key authentication scheme is crucial for data communication and system development. Due to the inherent insecurity of computer devices, traditional encryption and signature authentication schemes are no longer adequate for the security application needs of modern large-scale distributed, multi-application cluster service deployments, which require authentication, dynamic hosting, and legitimate oversight.
[0003] Furthermore, since most server products on the market are based on x86 or ARM architectures, they cannot achieve independent security and control at the server level from the chip level. This makes it difficult to build practical and feasible key security authentication schemes in security-critical areas such as finance, leaving them vulnerable to illegal infiltration and forgery. Once breached, this can lead to unauthorized use of application systems or other incalculable losses.
[0004] The Shenwei CPU chip is an independently controllable chip based on the SW64 instruction set architecture. Domestic hardware platforms based on the Shenwei platform can effectively improve system reliability and security from the chip level. Based on the security suite and the security algorithms of the new generation core, the Shenwei platform can quickly generate truly random numbers and call national cryptographic algorithms to complete the generation and calculation of password parameters. Summary of the Invention
[0005] The purpose of this invention is to provide a dynamic key security escrow authentication method based on the Shenwei platform. Through dynamic key escrow, especially the introduction of a weight mechanism, this invention can ensure the participation of core business services or core agents, and prevent illegal random acquisition and collusion by low-level agents.
[0006] To address the aforementioned technical problems, this invention provides a dynamic key security escrow authentication method based on the Shenwei platform, comprising: key management center initialization, server initialization, system business master key generation and escrow, and recovery of the escrow key;
[0007] The generation and hosting of the system's business master key specifically includes the following steps:
[0008] 1) The system scheduling server DS calls the key identifier application process to generate the business master key, which is used to encrypt the session key; in order to ensure the participation of the core managed agent set, DS dynamically and secretly selects the core managed agent joint construction identifier I'=IDS||I1||…||In according to the managed agent weight. Once the joint agent identity and its permissions change, the key security managed reconstruction mechanism is triggered to regenerate the master key.
[0009] 2) Based on the weights and n of the selected managed agent set, DS selects a security threshold k and constructs a (k-1)th degree polynomial using a random number generator: Where F(0) = S, A0 = a0G;
[0010] 3) DS uses identity identifiers I1, I2, ... I i ,……,I n Calculate the escrow subkeys x1, x2, ..., x i ,……,x n and sets Where the weight value w of the managed agent i is not 1,
[0011] 4) DS will manage the subkey x i The data is transmitted to the custodian using the custodian's public key;
[0012] 5) The custodian utilizes a publicly available set of parameters. calculate Verify X i =x i If G is valid, the subkey custody is completed and stored securely; otherwise, it is considered that DS has not honestly custodied the key or that it has been tampered with, custody is refused and a warning is issued.
[0013] Preferably, the initialization of the key management center specifically includes: the key management center server KMC based on the selected prime domain F P Elliptic curve E(F) P Using the generated random integer vector r ij Construct a private key matrix SSK, and calculate and publish its corresponding public key matrix PSK.
[0014] Preferably, the server initialization includes: the Shenwei server starts and performs a self-check, checks whether the server has applied for a key identifier, if it has applied for one, it proceeds to the business system process; otherwise, it initiates a key identifier application and, together with KMC, calculates the private key and public key using the identity identifier.
[0015] Preferably, the server initialization specifically includes the following steps:
[0016] 1) Server si uses a random number generator to generate r si ∈[1,n-2], calculate R si =[r si G followed by the identifier I i That is, length len si Passed to the Key Management Center (KMC);
[0017] 2) KMC randomly generates r kmc Calculate R kmc =[r kmc After G, a joint masking key R is generated. i =R si +R kmc HMAC Ri (I i ) and perform row mapping with the private key matrix SSK to obtain s si kmc Calculate and publish (y) si ,R i ,I i ), destroy s si kmc ; where: y si =s si kmc +[r kmc ]R si HMAC Ri (I i It is a message authentication code based on SM3 hash operations;
[0018] 3) Servers i Utilize(y si ,R i ,I i Calculate and save R kmc =R i -R si and private key s si =y si -[r si ]R kmc +r si (s si ≠0), destroy r si ;
[0019] 4) Servers i Using the received joint masking key R i Calculate HMAC Ri (I i ) and perform row mapping with the public key matrix PSK to obtain P si kmc Finally, we get s i The public key is P si =P si kmc +R si .
[0020] Preferably, the recovery of the escrow key specifically includes the following steps:
[0021] 1) After verifying the validity and timeliness of the authorization certificate, the managed agent randomly generates b. i,calculate g i =X i P si ,m i =b i P si -x i P si , will (c i ,m i ,r i ,g i ,I i T) Announces and activates the automatic destruction security mechanism to destroy b i ;in This is a hash function with a key. It is a symmetric encryption algorithm;
[0022] 2) RE is calculated within the safe time frame.
[0023]
[0024] After that, decrypt c i Get x i Then, verify r i If the conditions are met, it is assumed that the managed agent has honestly presented the managed subkey and destroyed the transmitted parameters; otherwise, the process ends and a warning is issued.
[0025] 3) The RE uses the acquired subkey share to verify the threshold value, constructs the Lagrange interpolation polynomial, and recovers the escrow key S;
[0026] 4) The RE uses the managed key S to recover the session key and monitor the messages.
[0027] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:
[0028] This invention discloses a dynamic key security escrow authentication method based on the Shenwei platform, which addresses the problems of traditional key security authentication mechanisms failing to achieve identity authentication and over-reliance on key management centers during system development and modification. Through dynamic key escrow, particularly the introduction of a weighted mechanism, the participation of core business services or core agents can be guaranteed, preventing unauthorized random acquisition and collusion by lower-level agents. Attached Figure Description
[0029] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating the server initialization process of the dynamic key secure hosting authentication method based on the Shenwei platform according to the present invention.
[0030] Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating the server key identifier application process for the dynamic key security hosting and authentication method based on the Shenwei platform according to the present invention.
[0031] Figure 3 This is a flowchart illustrating the system business master key generation and hosting process of the dynamic key security escrow authentication method based on the Shenwei platform according to the present invention.
[0032] Figure 4 This is a flowchart illustrating the system business master key recovery process of the dynamic key security escrow authentication method based on the Shenwei platform according to the present invention. Detailed Implementation
[0033] The present invention will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments. The advantages and features of the present invention will become clearer from the following description. It should be noted that the drawings are all in a very simplified form and use non-precise proportions, and are only used to facilitate and clarify the illustration of the embodiments of the present invention.
[0034] like Figure 1-4 As shown, this embodiment of the invention provides a technical solution for a dynamic key security escrow authentication method based on the Shenwei platform, which mainly includes the following parts:
[0035] I. The key mainly includes the following settings:
[0036] 1) Key Identifier: A set of asymmetric keys calculated using identity identifiers based on elliptic curves, including a private key and a public key, used for encryption and signing. Each server device has one set, which corresponds to an identity identifier.
[0037] 2) Business Master Key: Also known as the managed key, it is a key calculated using federated identity based on elliptic curves. It is used to encrypt and store session keys throughout its lifecycle. It is distributed and stored by a managed agent, used in memory, and lost when power is off.
[0038] 3) Session key: a symmetric key used to encrypt interactive information, one key per message.
[0039] 4) Custodial Subkey: When the business master key is distributed and custodied, the subkey share is calculated based on the identity of the custodial agent. If a certain threshold is met, the business master key can be recovered.
[0040] 5) Joint masking key: Calculated and published jointly by the key management center and the server, cracking it requires solving the discrete logarithm problem on an elliptic curve.
[0041] II. System Initialization:
[0042] (1) Key Management Center Initialization:
[0043] Key Management Center Server (KMC) based on selected prime domain F P Elliptic curve E(F) P Using the generated random integer vector r ijConstruct a private key matrix SSK, and calculate and publish its corresponding public key matrix PSK;
[0044] (2) Server initialization:
[0045] The Shenwei server starts and performs a self-check, checking whether the server has applied for a key identifier. If it has, it proceeds to the business system process; otherwise, it initiates a key identifier application and, in conjunction with KMC, calculates the private and public keys using the identity identifier. The specific steps are described below:
[0046] 1) Server si uses a random number generator to generate r si ∈[1,n-2], calculate R si =[r si G followed by the identifier I i (length len) si (Passed to the Key Management Center (KMC);)
[0047] 2) KMC randomly generates r kmc Calculate R kmc =[r kmc After G, a joint masking key R is generated. i =R si +R kmc HMAC Ri (I i ) and perform row mapping with the private key matrix SSK to obtain s si kmc Calculate and publish (y) si ,R i ,I i ), destroy s si kmc .
[0048] Where: y si =s si kmc +[r kmc ]R si HMAC Ri (I i It is a message authentication code based on SM3 hash operations;
[0049] 3) Servers i Utilize(y si ,R i ,I i Calculate and save R kmc =R i -R si and private key s si =y si -[r si ]R kmc +r si (ssi ≠0), destroy r si ;
[0050] 4) Servers i Using the received joint masking key R i Calculate HMAC Ri (I i ) and perform row mapping with the public key matrix PSK to obtain P si kmc Finally, we obtain s. i The public key is P si =P si kmc +R si .
[0051] Because the key pairs are generated jointly by the server and the key management center using their identities, absolute trust in the server or KMC is effectively prevented, ensuring a one-to-one correspondence between the managed key and the identity, preventing identity forgery, and effectively improving security. Secondly, since the server's public key is calculated independently, the computation and transmission overhead of the KMC are reduced.
[0052] During the process of KMC and the server jointly generating keys, the key exchanged is a mask key. An attacker would need to crack the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem to do so, which is in fact impossible, thus effectively ensuring security.
[0053] III. Secure Key Custody:
[0054] (1) System business master key generation and custody:
[0055] ① The system scheduling server (DS) initiates a key identifier application process to generate a business master key, which is used to encrypt session keys. To ensure the participation of the core managed agent set, DS dynamically and secretly selects core managed agents based on their weights to jointly construct the identifier I. ’ =I DS ||I1||…||I n Once the identity and permissions of the joint agent change, the key security escrow reconstruction mechanism is triggered to regenerate the master key;
[0056] ②DS selects a security threshold k based on the weights and n of the chosen managed agent set, and constructs a (k-1)th degree polynomial using a random number generator: Where F(0) = S, A0 = a0G;
[0057] ③DS uses identity identifiers I1, I2, ... I i ,……,I n Calculate the escrow subkeys x1, x2, ..., x i ,……,x n and sets Where the weight value w of the managed agent i is not 1,
[0058] ④DS will manage the subkey x i The data is transmitted to the custodian using the custodian's public key;
[0059] ⑤ The custodian uses the publicly available set of parameters calculate Verify X i =x i If G is valid, the subkey custody is completed and stored securely; otherwise, it is considered that DS has not honestly custodied the key or that it has been tampered with, custody is refused and a warning is issued.
[0060] The generation of the business master key can reuse the key identifier application process. The master key can be generated simply by secretly storing the selected joint agent identity, without any corresponding public key calculation or leakage. It has high reusability, and the joint agent identity can be flexibly selected according to needs, making the scheme flexible and anti-collusion, and has a certain degree of forward security.
[0061] The introduction of a weighted mechanism allows the system to allocate weights based on business importance and designate the participation of core managed agents, effectively preventing collusion among low-weight agents and improving security. For managed agents with higher weights, the system can delegate the management of subkeys to other trusted agents such as KMC according to the system scheduling protocol, enhancing the practicality and flexibility of the solution.
[0062] A joint construction identifier I was introduced during the key distribution phase. ’ The calculation effectively improves the correlation between the escrow key and the escrow agent, preventing business services from being compromised and repudiation, thus ensuring security.
[0063] Without loss of generality, a reliable regulatory service (RE), upon obtaining regulatory authorization, selects any minimum eligible subset F from the set of managed agents based on the threshold values in the authorization information. i The monitored information and authorization certificate are sent to the managed agents in the subset, and the following operations are performed to complete the recovery of the managed key, specifically including the following steps:
[0064] ① After verifying the validity and timeliness of the authorization certificate, the managed agent randomly generates b. i ,calculate g i =X i P si m i =b i P si -x i Psi , will (c i ,m i ,r i ,g i ,I i T) Announces and activates the automatic destruction security mechanism to destroy b i ;in This is a hash function with a key. It is a symmetric encryption algorithm;
[0065] ②RE is calculated within the safe time frame.
[0066] After that, decrypt c i Get x i Then, verify r i Does it meet the requirements? If it does, it is assumed that the managed agent has honestly presented the managed subkey and destroyed the transmitted parameters; otherwise, the process ends and a warning is issued.
[0067] ③RE uses the acquired subkey share to verify the threshold value, constructs a Lagrange interpolation polynomial, and recovers the escrow key S;
[0068] ④RE uses the managed key S to recover the session key and monitor messages;
[0069] The escrow subkey is calculated by the oversight service and is not directly transmitted, especially the random parameter b. i The introduction of an automatic destruction security mechanism effectively prevents the possibility of subkeys being compromised within the security time limit.
[0070] The business system administrator can dynamically update the server key identifier simply by re-executing the key identifier application process as needed. Since both the public and private keys are generated by calculating random parameters selected by each individual, even if the identity identifier is the same, the same key identifier will not be generated. Even if a member's key is leaked, it will not affect the key identifiers of other members and the previous key cannot be recovered, thus providing a certain degree of forward security.
[0071] Business system administrators only need to adjust the weight value of the core federated managed agent to achieve dynamic updates of the managed key, preventing situations where the core agent weight and the managed key level do not match, and eliminating permission forgery; for the addition of non-core agents, only I... n+1 Calculate and publish the escrow subkey Simply gather them together.
[0072] IV. Security Mechanism Setup:
[0073] 1) Early warning mechanism: Real-time early warning will be issued for dangerous behaviors such as failure of verification operations as set in the plan, and relevant safety mechanisms will be triggered according to the plan;
[0074] 2) Key Security Custody Reconstruction Mechanism: A security mechanism in place to ensure the secure custody of keys in the event of an early warning during the custody process;
[0075] 3) Automatic destruction security mechanism: Triggered when a timeout or other warning occurs during the reconstruction process, the published parameter information is deleted to ensure safe recovery within the lifecycle.
[0076] The above description is merely a description of preferred embodiments of the present invention and is not intended to limit the scope of the present invention in any way. Any changes or modifications made by those skilled in the art based on the above disclosure shall fall within the protection scope of the claims.
Claims
1. A dynamic key secure escrow authentication method based on the Shenwei platform, characterized in that, include: Key management center initialization, server initialization, generation and hosting of system business master key, and recovery of hosted key; The generation and hosting of the system's business master key specifically includes the following steps: The system scheduling server DS calls the key identifier application process to generate a business master key, which is used to encrypt the session key. To ensure the participation of the core managed agent set, DS dynamically and secretly selects the core managed agent joint construction identifier I'=IDS||I1||…||In according to the managed agent weight. Once the joint agent identity and its permissions change, the key security managed reconstruction mechanism is triggered to regenerate the master key. DS selects a security threshold k based on the weights and n of the chosen managed agent set, and constructs a (k-1)th degree polynomial using a random number generator: F(x) = Where F(0) = S, A0 = a0G; DS uses identity identifiers I1, I2, ... I i ,……,I n Calculate the escrow subkeys x1, x2, ..., x i ,……,x n and sets Where, when the weight value w of the managed agent i is not 1, ; DS will manage the subkey The data is transmitted to the custodian using the custodian's public key; The custodian utilizes a publicly available set of parameters. calculate ,verify If G is valid, the subkey custody is completed and stored securely; otherwise, it is considered that DS has not honestly custodied the key or that it has been tampered with, custody is refused and a warning is issued. The server initialization includes: Shenwei server starts up and performs self-check, checks whether the server has applied for a key identifier, if it has applied for one, it proceeds to the business system process, otherwise it initiates a key identifier application, and calculates the private key and public key in conjunction with KMC using the identity identifier. The server initialization process specifically includes the following steps: Server si generates r using a random number generator. si ∈[1,n-2], calculate R si =[r si G followed by the identifier I i That is, length len si Passed to the Key Management Center (KMC); KMC randomly generates r kmc Calculate R kmc =[r kmc After G, a joint masking key R is generated. i =R si +R kmc HMAC Ri (I i ) and perform row mapping with the private key matrix SSK to obtain s si kmc Calculate and publish (y si ,R i ,I i ), destroy s si kmc ; where: y si =s si kmc +[r kmc ]R si HMAC Ri (I i It is a message authentication code based on SM3 hash operations; servers i Utilize(y si ,R i ,I i Calculate and save R kmc =R i -R si and private key s si =y si -[r si ]R kmc +r si (s) si ≠0), destroy r si ; servers i Using the received joint masking key R i Calculate HMAC Ri (I i ) and perform row mapping with the public key matrix PSK to obtain P si kmc Finally, we get s i The public key is P si =P si kmc +R si .
2. The dynamic key secure escrow authentication method based on the Shenwei platform as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The initialization of the key management center specifically includes: the key management center server KMC based on the selected prime domain F. P Elliptic curve E(F) P Using the generated random integer vector r ij Construct a private key matrix SSK, and calculate and publish its corresponding public key matrix PSK.
3. The dynamic key secure escrow authentication method based on the Shenwei platform as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The recovery of the escrow key specifically includes the following steps: After verifying the validity and expiration of the authorization certificate, the managed agent randomly generates b. i ,calculate , , , , , will (c i ,m i ,r i ,g i ,I i (T) Announce and activate the automatic destruction security mechanism to destroy b i ;in This is a hash function with a key. It is a symmetric encryption algorithm; RE is calculated within the safe timeframe. Then, decrypt Get x i Then, verify r i If the conditions are met, it is assumed that the managed agent has honestly presented the managed subkey and destroyed the transmitted parameters; otherwise, the process ends and a warning is issued. RE uses the acquired subkey share to verify the threshold value, constructs a Lagrange interpolation polynomial, and recovers the escrow key S; RE uses the managed key S to recover the session key and monitor messages.