A privacy protection method and system based on non-interactive zero-knowledge proof

By using non-interactive zero-knowledge proof and verification code verification between the verifier and the public server, the key leakage and information leakage caused by third-party attacks in the prior art are solved, and efficient privacy protection and security protection are achieved , ensuring the security and privacy of user identity information.

CN118839377BActive Publication Date: 2024-12-03CHENGDU QIZHI INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OPERATION CO LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202411265634.X
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-09-10
Publication Date
2024-12-03
Estimated Expiration
2044-09-10

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In the existing zero-knowledge proof method based on distributed identity identification, a trusted third party needs to perform identity proof. When a third party is attacked or committed evil, it will lead to key leakage and information leakage, and there will be replay vulnerabilities, which will not be able to effectively protect users. privacy and security.

Method used

Using a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof method, dynamically generate verification codes through public keys and timestamps, deploy the identity scope of the proofor and its fault-tolerant verification code between the verifier and the public server. The verifier and the public server are used to dynamically generate verification codes. Jointly verify the evidence and verification code to ensure the authenticity and security of the proofreader's identity.

Benefits of technology

It realizes that sensitive information is not leaked during the verification process, improves the security and privacy of the system, prevents attackers from obtaining valuable information, and ensures the security and privacy of user identity information.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The present invention discloses a privacy protection method and system based on non-interactive zero-knowledge proof, which belongs to the field of privacy protection technology. In the present invention, the user sends a public key and an interactive public key to a verifier, and the user calculates the public key based on the administrator's public key and his own interactive private key. The administrator calculates the public key based on the interactive public key, and calculates a verification code that changes over time according to the public key and the timestamp. During the identity authentication process, the user only needs to put the content of the verification code into the evidence generator, calculate the real-time evidence and send it to the verifier to confirm whether the identity meets a certain interval range and prove that the user has a real private key, thereby realizing identity authentication. This method can be performed without relying on both parties to provide any useful information, and in the case of node rebellion, no useful information can be disclosed. This method not only protects the privacy of the participants, but also ensures the security of the verification process, and avoids the leakage and tampering of sensitive information.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the technical field of privacy protection, and specifically relates to a privacy protection method and system based on non-interactive zero-knowledge proof. Background Art

[0002] Zero-knowledge proof means that a user can convince the verifier that a certain statement is correct without providing any useful information to the verifier. Zero-knowledge proof is essentially a protocol involving two or more parties, that is, a series of steps required for two or more parties to complete a task.

[0003] In an existing zero-knowledge proof method based on distributed identity identification, the verification terminal sends a verification request to the proof terminal; receives the verifiable statement, proof document, hash value and signature of the verifiable statement returned by the proof terminal, the hash value and signature of the verifiable statement are sent to the proof terminal by the trusted third-party terminal, and the proof document is generated by the proof terminal based on the verifiable statement and proof key disclosed by the trusted third-party terminal; the hash value and signature are verified according to the verification public key, which is obtained from the trusted third-party terminal; if the hash value and signature of the verifiable statement are verified, the proof document is verified according to the verification program, and the verification result is sent to the proof terminal, which is generated according to the verification key obtained from the trusted third-party terminal. Zero-knowledge proof can be used to verify the information of the verifiable statement corresponding to the distributed identity identification.

[0004] In this method, a trusted third party is required to prove the identity. When the third party is attacked or acts maliciously, the key will be leaked, which will lead to information leakage. On the other hand, since the third party will return a statement and the corresponding hash value and signature when interacting with the third party for the first time, the subsequent proof process only needs to be completed by the proving terminal and the verification terminal, which means that the signature and hash value will not change within a period of time. If the verifier acts maliciously and intercepts the other party's identity document, it will cause a replay vulnerability. Summary of the invention

[0005] In view of the above-mentioned deficiencies in the prior art, the privacy protection method and system based on non-interactive zero-knowledge proof provided by the present invention solve problems such as information abuse, multi-party consensus, security assurance, and user identity information protection, ensuring that the privacy and security of users are fully protected in various situations.

[0006] In order to achieve the above-mentioned invention object, the technical solution adopted by the present invention is: a privacy protection method based on non-interactive zero-knowledge proof, comprising the following steps:

[0007] S1. Privacy protection initialization: dynamically generate verification codes based on public keys and timestamps; and deploy the identity range of the prover and its corresponding fault-tolerant verification codes between the verifier and the public service end;

[0008] S2. Verification request sending: The prover sends a verification request to the public service end and submits evidence and verification code;

[0009] S3. Evidence verification: Submit the evidence and verification code to the verifier through the public service terminal, and the verifier verifies the evidence to determine whether the evidence has been verified;

[0010] If yes, then proceed to step S4;

[0011] If not, the verification is returned as unsuccessful and the verification process ends;

[0012] S4, verification code verification: the public service end determines whether the verification code submitted by the prover is within the fault-tolerant verification code range of the verifier;

[0013] If yes, it confirms that the verifier possesses the real prover’s private key and the prover’s identity authentication is successful;

[0014] If not, the verification is returned as failed and the verification process ends.

[0015] Furthermore, in step S1, the method for generating the verification code is specifically as follows:

[0016] S11. The verifier sends the verification public key to the public service end ;in, Indicates verification of the private key. Represents the generator of elliptic curve;

[0017] S12. The prover sends the proof public key to the verifier , and request the public service end to query and verify the public key ;in, Represents the prover private key;

[0018] S13, the prover and the verifier use the vector-to-scalar function to convert Convert to get the real interactive key , and then form a public key ;in, Represents a vector-to-scalar function;

[0019] S14. Public key based and the prover's private key , and combined with the timestamp , dynamically calculate verification code ; Among them, Hash() represents the hash function, Represents the exchange public key.

[0020] Furthermore, in step S13, the public key The prover's public key and verify the private key , or exchange private keys and the administrator's public key Calculation generation.

[0021] Furthermore, in step S1, based on the identity range of the certifier confirmed by the information acquirer and the verifier, a fault-tolerant verification code corresponding to the identity range is deployed between the verifier and the public service end. , which is expressed as:

[0022] ;

[0023] In the formula, Middle and upper bid n represents the prover's own fault tolerance space, subscript a Indicates the generated verification code index, corresponding to different prover verification codes.

[0024] Furthermore, the step S13 also includes deploying several false interaction keys , each of the false interactive keys has a corresponding false verification code C.

[0025] Furthermore, in step S2, submitting evidence is represented as:

[0026] .

[0027] In the formula, Z Submit evidence, represents the prover's private key, represents the interaction key, Indicates a verification code.

[0028] Furthermore, in step S3, the method for verifying the evidence is:

[0029] After the verifier calculates the vector of the evidence, Is it established? If so, the evidence verification passes; otherwise, it fails.

[0030] Furthermore, in step S4, the method for performing verification code verification is specifically as follows:

[0031] After hashing the verification code C submitted by the prover and the fault-tolerant verification code of the verifier one by one, it is determined whether they have the same hash value; if so, the verification is successful; otherwise, the verification fails.

[0032] A privacy protection system, comprising:

[0033] An initialization module, used to dynamically generate verification codes based on public keys and timestamps; and deploy corresponding fault-tolerant verification codes according to identity ranges;

[0034] The verification request module is used to send a verification request to the public service end and submit the prover's evidence and verification code;

[0035] The verification module is used to authenticate the evidence and verification code submitted by the prover based on the generated verification code and fault-tolerant verification code.

[0036] Further, the verification module includes an evidence verification unit and a verification code verification unit;

[0037] The evidence verification unit is deployed on the verifier end and is used to perform vector calculation on the evidence received by the public service end, and When established, the evidence is verified;

[0038] The verification code verification unit is deployed at the public service end, and is used to verify whether the verification code submitted by the prover is within the deployment fault-tolerant verification code range, and if it is judged to be yes, the verification code verification is passed.

[0039] The beneficial effects of the present invention are:

[0040] (1) In the present invention, privacy protection is performed by means of zero-knowledge proof. The verifier can confirm the identity or a certain attribute of the verified party without obtaining the specific value of the attribute, thereby ensuring that sensitive information (such as passwords, keys, etc.) will not be leaked during the verification process. The prover only needs to provide sufficient information to prove the authenticity of his or her identity without revealing any actual data, which has the advantage of privacy protection. At the same time, since actual sensitive information is not transmitted during the verification process, even if the communication is intercepted or tampered with, the attacker cannot obtain valuable information, which greatly improves the security of the system.

[0041] (2) The method of the present invention uses public key and digital encryption technology in the identity authentication process to ensure the secure transmission and authenticity verification of information; among them, public key encryption allows the authenticator to encrypt a random challenge and send it to the authenticated party. The authenticated party uses its private key to decrypt and respond to the challenge, and the authenticator uses the authenticated party's public key to verify the correctness of the response. During the entire process, the authenticated party's private key is never exposed, ensuring privacy; at the same time, an anonymous credential system is used to verify the user's specific attributes without revealing the user's identity. During the attribute verification process, the user can hold anonymous credentials issued by a trusted third party. These credentials prove that the user has certain attributes (such as age, membership, etc.). The authenticator can verify the authenticity of these credentials without knowing the user's specific identity information. This method ensures privacy protection during the verification process and achieves the purpose of identity authentication. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0042] Figure 1 Flowchart of the privacy protection method based on non-interactive zero-knowledge proof provided by the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0043] The specific implementation modes of the present invention are described below so that those skilled in the art can understand the present invention. However, it should be clear that the present invention is not limited to the scope of the specific implementation modes. For those of ordinary skill in the art, as long as various changes are within the spirit and scope of the present invention as defined and determined by the attached claims, these changes are obvious, and all inventions and creations utilizing the concept of the present invention are protected.

[0044] The embodiment of the present invention provides a privacy protection method based on non-interactive zero-knowledge proof, such as Figure 1 As shown, the following steps are included:

[0045] S1. Privacy protection initialization: dynamically generate verification codes based on public keys and timestamps; and deploy the identity range of the prover and its corresponding fault-tolerant verification codes between the verifier and the public service end;

[0046] S2. Verification request sending: The prover sends a verification request to the public service end and submits evidence and verification code;

[0047] S3. Evidence verification: Submit the evidence and verification code to the verifier through the public service terminal, and the verifier verifies the evidence to determine whether the evidence has been verified;

[0048] If yes, then proceed to step S4;

[0049] If not, the verification is returned as unsuccessful and the verification process ends;

[0050] S4, verification code verification: the public service end determines whether the verification code submitted by the prover is within the fault-tolerant verification code range of the verifier;

[0051] If yes, it confirms that the verifier possesses the real prover’s private key and the prover’s identity authentication is successful;

[0052] If not, the verification is returned as unsuccessful and the verification process ends;

[0053] In an embodiment of the present invention, four identity terminals are involved in the privacy protection process based on non-interactive zero-knowledge proof, namely, information acquirer, verifier, prover and public service terminal; wherein the information acquirer refers to a third party who needs to determine whether the prover is within the identity scope, the verifier is the administrator of the system, the prover is the user who needs to prove his identity, and the public service terminal refers to the service terminal provided on behalf of the system, which is used to provide specific business services.

[0054] In step S1 of the embodiment of the present invention, the method for generating a verification code is specifically as follows:

[0055] S11. The verifier sends the verification public key to the public service end ;in, Indicates verification of the private key. Represents the generator of elliptic curve;

[0056] Exemplarily, the verification public key By verifying the private key Perform vector calculation to obtain; verify the private key The administrator's verification private key can be changed each time verification is performed, and multiple verification private keys can be deployed to facilitate identity concealment;

[0057] S12. The prover sends the proof public key to the verifier , and request the public service end to query and verify the public key ;in, Represents the prover private key;

[0058] For example, the public key By the prover's private key Perform vector calculation to obtain the prover's private key The private key used by the prover during the identity authentication process to generate evidence related to his / her identity. This private key is unique to the prover and needs to be kept confidential during the identity authentication process.

[0059] S13, the prover and the verifier use the vector-to-scalar function to convert Convert to get the real interactive key , and then form a public key ;in, Represents a vector-to-scalar function;

[0060] For example, the prover and the verifier use the same vector-to-scalar function Perform conversion to obtain the real interactive key;

[0061] In step S13 of this embodiment, the public key The prover's public key and verify the private key , or exchange private keys and the administrator's public key Calculate and generate the public key here Used to interact with the validator and plays a key role in verifying the prover's identity.

[0062] S14. Public key based and the prover's private key , and combined with the timestamp , dynamically calculate verification code ; Among them, Hash() represents the hash function, Represents the exchange public key.

[0063] The verification code in this embodiment is the public key used by the prover and the real private key Calculates a time-varying hash value.

[0064] In step S1 of the embodiment of the present invention, based on the identity range of the certifier confirmed by the information acquirer and the verifier, a fault-tolerant verification code corresponding to the identity range is deployed between the verifier and the public service end. , which is expressed as:

[0065] ;

[0066] In the formula, Middle and upper bid n represents the prover's own fault tolerance space, subscript a Indicates the generated verification code index, corresponding to different prover verification codes.

[0067] In step S13 of this embodiment, several fake interactive keys are deployed. , each of the false interactive keys has a corresponding false verification code C, thereby preventing attacks.

[0068] In step S2 of the embodiment of the present invention, the evidence Z is composed of the real private key and interaction key Calculated with the verification code C, in this embodiment, only basic scalar calculation is required. Based on this, in this embodiment, the submission evidence is expressed as:

[0069] .

[0070] In the formula, Z Submit evidence, represents the prover's private key, represents the interaction key, Indicates a verification code.

[0071] In step S3 of the embodiment of the present invention, the method for verifying the evidence is:

[0072] After the verifier calculates the vector of the evidence, Is it established? If so, the evidence verification passes; otherwise, it fails.

[0073] In step S4 of this embodiment, the method for performing verification code verification is specifically as follows:

[0074] After hashing the verification code C submitted by the prover and the fault-tolerant verification code of the verifier one by one, it is determined whether they have the same hash value; if so, the verification is successful; otherwise, the verification fails.

[0075] Specifically, in this embodiment, the public service end processes the verification code C submitted by the prover and the verification code After hashing, we verify that the two have the same hash value. , and then it can be determined that the verifier has the real prover private key, that is, the prover identity authentication is successful.

[0076] In the embodiment of the present invention, in the above-mentioned prover identity verification process, the Schnorr protocol is used to ensure the integrity, correctness and zero-knowledge of information. The Schnorr protocol is a cryptographic protocol with the following characteristics:

[0077] Information integrity: The Schnorr protocol uses digital signature technology to ensure the integrity of information during transmission. During each communication, the information will be accompanied by a signature, and any tampering with the information will cause the signature verification to fail, thus ensuring that the information has not been modified.

[0078] Information Correctness: In the Schnorr protocol, the generation and verification process of the signature depends on the signer's private key and the verifier's public key. Only those with the correct private key can generate a valid signature, and the verifier can confirm the correctness of the signature through the public key to ensure the authenticity of the information.

[0079] Zero-knowledge: The Schnorr protocol has the feature of zero-knowledge proof, which means that when proving the authenticity of certain information, there is no need to disclose the specific content of the information. This ensures the correctness of the information while protecting the privacy of the information. For example, a user can prove that he has a secret (such as a password) without revealing the actual content of the password.

[0080] Communication security: Through the Schnorr protocol, both parties can exchange information securely without leaking additional information. The protocol ensures that the content of the communication will not be tampered with, and even if the attacker intercepts the communication data, it cannot be effectively tampered with or forged.

[0081] In an embodiment of the present invention, a corresponding privacy protection system is provided based on the above privacy protection method, including:

[0082] An initialization module, used to dynamically generate verification codes based on public keys and timestamps; and deploy corresponding fault-tolerant verification codes according to identity ranges;

[0083] The verification request module is used to send a verification request to the public service end and submit the prover's evidence and verification code;

[0084] The verification module is used to authenticate the evidence and verification code submitted by the prover based on the generated verification code and fault-tolerant verification code.

[0085] In this embodiment, in the initialization module, the interactive public key of the prover is mainly based on and verify the private key , or exchange private keys and the administrator's public key Calculate and generate the public key, and then dynamically generate the verification code in combination with the timestamp. The specific implementation process is as follows:

[0086] The verifier sends the verification public key to the public service end ;in, Indicates verification of the private key. Represents the generator of elliptic curve;

[0087] The prover sends the proof public key to the verifier , and request the public service end to query and verify the public key ;in, Represents the prover private key;

[0088] The prover and verifier use the vector-to-scalar function to convert Convert to get the real interactive key , and then form a public key ;in, Represents a vector-to-scalar function;

[0089] Public key based and the prover's private key , and combined with the timestamp , dynamically calculate verification code ; Among them, Hash() represents the hash function, Represents the exchange public key.

[0090] The verification module in this embodiment includes an evidence verification unit and a verification code verification unit;

[0091] The evidence verification unit is deployed on the verifier end and is used to perform vector calculation on the evidence received by the public service end, and When established, the evidence is verified;

[0092] The verification code verification unit is deployed at the public service end, and is used to verify whether the verification code submitted by the prover is within the deployment fault-tolerant verification code range, and if it is judged to be yes, the verification code verification is passed.

[0093] Specifically, in this embodiment, the public service end processes the verification code C submitted by the prover and the verification code After hashing, we verify that the two have the same hash value. , and then it can be determined that the verifier has the real prover private key, that is, the prover identity authentication is successful.

[0094] In the privacy protection system provided by this embodiment, the identity authentication process of the prover does not rely on any useful information provided by both parties. Through technical means such as zero-knowledge proof, public key encryption and digital signature, anonymous credentials, etc., the verification process can be carried out without relying on any useful information provided by both parties. At the same time, in the case of node rebellion, no useful information can be disclosed. This method not only protects the privacy of the participants, but also ensures the security of the verification process, avoiding the leakage and tampering of sensitive information. In this way, both parties do not need to worry about sensitive information being exposed during the verification process, thereby achieving a high degree of privacy protection and security.

[0095] The present invention uses specific embodiments to illustrate the principles and implementation methods of the present invention. The description of the above embodiments is only used to help understand the method of the present invention and its core idea. At the same time, for those skilled in the art, according to the idea of ​​the present invention, there will be changes in the specific implementation methods and application scope. In summary, the content of this specification should not be understood as a limitation on the present invention.

[0096] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the embodiments described herein are intended to help readers understand the principles of the present invention, and should be understood that the protection scope of the present invention is not limited to such specific statements and embodiments. Those skilled in the art can make various other specific variations and combinations that do not deviate from the essence of the present invention based on the technical revelations disclosed by the present invention, and these variations and combinations are still within the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A privacy protection method based on non-interactive zero-knowledge proof, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: S1. Privacy protection initialization: dynamically generate verification codes based on public keys and timestamps; and deploy the identity range of the prover and its corresponding fault-tolerant verification codes between the verifier and the public service end; S2. Verification request sending: The prover sends a verification request to the public service end and submits evidence and verification code; S3. Evidence verification: Submit the evidence and verification code to the verifier through the public service terminal, and the verifier verifies the evidence to determine whether the evidence has been verified; If yes, then proceed to step S4; If not, the verification is returned as unsuccessful and the verification process ends; S4, verification code verification: the public service end determines whether the verification code submitted by the prover is within the fault-tolerant verification code range of the verifier; If yes, it confirms that the verifier possesses the real prover’s private key and the prover’s identity authentication is successful; If not, the verification is returned as unsuccessful and the verification process ends; The specific method for generating a verification code is: S11. The verifier sends the verification public key δG to the public service end; where δ represents the verification private key and G represents the generator of the elliptic curve; S12, the prover sends the proof public key γG to the verifier, and requests the public service end to query the verification public key δG; where γ represents the prover private key; S13, the prover and the verifier use the vector-to-scalar function to convert γδG to obtain the real interactive key μ=F(γδG), and then form the public key μδG; where F(·) represents the vector-to-scalar function; S14. Based on the public key μδG and the prover's private key γ, and in combination with the timestamp timesatamp, dynamically calculate the verification code C = [Hash(F(μG), timesatamp / 5)]; wherein Hash() represents a hash function, and μG represents an interactive public key; The public key μδG is generated by calculating the prover's interactive public key μG and the verification private key δ, or the interactive private key μ and the administrator's public key δG.

2. The privacy protection method based on non-interactive zero-knowledge proof according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step S1, based on the identity range of the certifier confirmed by the information acquirer and the verifier, a fault-tolerant verification code corresponding to the identity range is deployed between the verifier and the public service end. It is expressed as: C a n =[Hash(F(μG),timesatamp / 5(±1))]; In the formula, C a n The superscript n represents the prover’s own fault-tolerant space, and the subscript a represents the generated verification code index, corresponding to the verification codes of different provers.

3. The privacy protection method based on non-interactive zero-knowledge proof according to claim 1, characterized in that: The step S13 also includes deploying a number of false interaction keys μ, each of which has a corresponding false verification code C.

4. The privacy protection method based on non-interactive zero-knowledge proof according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step S2, submitting evidence is represented by: Z=γ+μC In the formula, Z represents the submitted evidence, γ represents the prover's private key, μ represents the interactive key, and C represents the verification code.

5. The privacy protection method based on non-interactive zero-knowledge proof according to claim 4, characterized in that: In step S3, the method for verifying the evidence is: After the verifier performs vector calculation on the evidence, it is determined whether ZG=γG+CμG holds; if so, the evidence verification passes; otherwise, it fails.

6. The privacy protection method based on non-interactive zero-knowledge proof according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step S4, the method for performing verification code verification is specifically as follows: After hashing the verification code C submitted by the prover and the fault-tolerant verification code of the verifier one by one, it is determined whether they have the same hash value; if so, the verification is successful; otherwise, the verification fails.

7. A privacy protection system based on a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof privacy protection method, applying the privacy protection method based on a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof according to any one of claims 1 to 6, characterized in that: include: An initialization module, used to dynamically generate a verification code based on a public key and a timestamp; And deploy corresponding fault-tolerant verification codes according to the identity scope; The verification request module is used to send a verification request to the public service end and submit the prover's evidence and verification code; The verification module is used to authenticate the evidence and verification code submitted by the prover based on the generated verification code and fault-tolerant verification code.

8. The privacy protection system according to claim 7, characterized in that: The verification module includes an evidence verification unit and a verification code verification unit; The evidence verification unit is deployed on the verifier end, and is used to perform vector calculation on the evidence received by the public service end, and when ZG=γG+CμG is established, the evidence verification is passed; The verification code verification unit is deployed at the public service end, and is used to verify whether the verification code submitted by the prover is within the deployment fault-tolerant verification code range, and if it is judged to be yes, the verification code verification is passed.