Message signature aggregation verification method and system in vehicle-mounted self-organizing network

Abstract

The present invention relates to information security technology, and discloses a message signature aggregation verification method in a vehicle-mounted self-organizing network, including: a key generation center generates system parameters and distributes them to a tracking agency and a motor vehicle driving management office; the motor vehicle driving management office generates a management office key; the tracking agency generates a tracking agency key and synthesizes system public parameters; the vehicle-mounted unit receives the system public parameters to generate a vehicle private key and a vehicle public key, and generates multiple pseudo identities, and uses the key generation center to generate a pseudo identity partial key; the tracking agency encrypts the pseudo identity and sends the pseudo identity encryption result to the vehicle-mounted unit; the vehicle-mounted unit generates a pseudo identity complete key, and generates a vehicle road condition information and a message signature combination; the roadside unit verifies whether the message signature combination is all valid. The present invention also relates to a system of a message signature aggregation verification method in a vehicle-mounted self-organizing network. The present invention can improve the security of message signature aggregation verification.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of information security technology, and in particular to a message signature aggregation verification method and system in a vehicle-mounted self-organizing network. Background Art

[0002] The message signature aggregation verification scheme in the vehicle-mounted self-organizing network can be divided into two categories, one using bilinear mapping and the other not using bilinear mapping. Signature aggregation verification can aggregate multiple signatures for verification, thereby achieving the purpose of improving verification efficiency. Aggregate multiple signatures for verification. If all signatures are valid signatures, the verification passes; if there are one or more invalid signatures among these aggregated signatures, the verification fails, and then the invalid signature identification method is used to identify the invalid signatures.

[0003] In the aggregate verification scheme using bilinear mapping (aggregate verification scheme based on pairing), each verification requires a complex pairing operation, which takes a long time. After using signature aggregate verification, the number of pairing operations is only reduced, and the pairing operation that takes a long time is still required. In the aggregate verification scheme that does not need to use bilinear mapping (aggregate verification scheme not based on pairing), no pairing operation is required during signature verification, which greatly improves the efficiency of verification. For example, in most aggregate verification schemes that do not need to use bilinear mapping, a single signature verification requires multiple elliptic curve scalar multiplications, and n signature aggregate verification requires about 2n elliptic curve scalar multiplications and 2n elliptic curve small scalar multiplications. However, this method does not put the elliptic curve point into the parameters of the hash function when generating the signature calculation. The attacker can modify the elliptic curve point to make the forged signature pass the verification. This security problem only needs to be solved by putting the elliptic curve point into the parameters of the hash function for calculation. However, in addition to this, this method also has a large security problem when generating the vehicle public key. For example, the elliptic curve point can be modified in a targeted manner so that the forged private key can pass the verification. In addition, most of the trusted agencies in the current aggregate verification schemes that do not require the use of bilinear mapping have the ability to forge vehicle signatures, and the forged signatures will not be discovered. The trusted agencies cannot be effectively supervised, resulting in low security of message signature verification. Summary of the invention

[0004] The present invention provides a message signature aggregation verification method and system in a vehicle-mounted self-organizing network, which can improve the security of message signature aggregation verification.

[0005] To achieve the above object, the present invention provides a message signature aggregation verification method in a vehicle-mounted ad hoc network, comprising:

[0006] Initialize the key generation center and generate system parameters, and distribute system parameters of the system parameters to the tracking agency and the motor vehicle driving management office;

[0007] The motor vehicle driving management office receives the system partial parameters and generates a management office key, and distributes a management office public key in the management office key to the tracking structure, wherein the management office key includes a management office private key and a management office public key;

[0008] The tracking agency receives the partial system parameters and the public key of the management office to generate a tracking agency public key and a tracking agency private key, synthesizes system public parameters based on the partial system parameters, the tracking agency public key and the public key of the management office, and distributes the system public parameters to the on-board unit and the roadside unit;

[0009] The on-board unit receives the system public parameters and generates a vehicle private key and a vehicle public key, and generates a plurality of pseudo identities, after the plurality of pseudo identities pass the validity verification of the tracking mechanism, generates a pseudo identity partial key by using a key generation center, and returns the pseudo identity partial key to the tracking mechanism;

[0010] After receiving the pseudo-identity partial key, the tracking mechanism encrypts the pseudo-identity using the communication public key and the tracking mechanism private key to obtain a pseudo-identity encryption result, and sends the pseudo-identity encryption result to the vehicle-mounted unit;

[0011] The onboard unit receives the pseudo-identity encryption result to generate a pseudo-identity complete key, generates and sends a combination of vehicle road condition information and a message signature to the roadside unit;

[0012] The roadside unit receives the vehicle traffic information and the message signature combination, and verifies whether the message signature combination is valid by using a signature aggregation verification algorithm. If the message signature combination is valid, the vehicle traffic information and the message signature combination are aggregated and sent to the application server.

[0013] After receiving the vehicle traffic condition information, the application server verifies whether the vehicle traffic condition information is false traffic condition information. If the vehicle traffic condition information is false traffic condition information, the application server tracks the real vehicle information corresponding to the false traffic condition information and punishes the real vehicle information corresponding to the false traffic condition information.

[0014] Optionally, before the vehicle-mounted unit generates multiple pseudo identities, the method further includes: generating a public key certificate of the vehicle.

[0015] Optionally, generating a public key certificate of the vehicle includes:

[0016] The on-board unit receives the system public parameters and generates a vehicle private key and a vehicle public key, and uses the vehicle private key and the management office public key to encrypt the vehicle real information to obtain the encrypted vehicle real information. The on-board unit sends the encrypted vehicle real information and the vehicle public key to the motor vehicle driving management office and applies for a vehicle public key certificate;

[0017] The motor vehicle driving management office receives the encrypted vehicle real information and the vehicle public key, and uses the management office private key and the vehicle public key to decrypt the encrypted vehicle real information to obtain the decrypted vehicle real information. The motor vehicle driving management office verifies the legitimacy of the decrypted real information and issues a public key certificate for the vehicle public key.

[0018] Optionally, the initializing the key generation center and generating system parameters includes:

[0019] The key generation center selects an elliptic curve additive cyclic group G of order q, where q is a prime number and q>2 λ , λ is the safety factor, and the generator of the elliptic curve additive cyclic group G is P;

[0020] The key generation center is selected to map to the q-order integer additive cyclic group A preset number of hash functions;

[0021] The key generation center selects a preset number of elliptic curve points on the elliptic curve additive cyclic group G as an encryption function of the key generation center and a decryption function of the key generation center;

[0022] The key generation center randomly selects a positive integer As the private key of the key generation center, and calculate the elliptic curve point corresponding to k on G as the public key of the key generation center;

[0023] The system parameters are obtained by summarizing the q-order elliptic curve additive cyclic group G, the generator of G, the preset number of hash functions, the encryption function, the decryption function and the public key of a key generation center.

[0024] Optionally, the onboard unit receives the system public parameters and generates a vehicle private key and a vehicle public key, and generates multiple pseudo identities, including:

[0025] The on-board unit randomly selects n positive integers Calculate a j The corresponding elliptic curve point on G is used as the first component of the pseudo-identity NID j，1 =a j ·P;

[0026] Generate a pseudo-identity with a validity period T according to the preset rulesj As the second component of a pseudo-identity;

[0027] Using hash function to calculate {U i , NID j，1 , T j} 2，j =H2(U i , NID j，1 , T j ), using the private key u of the onboard unit i Sign the hash value X j =a j +u i h 2，j and use the a j and the tracking authority public key T pub The encrypted signature value and the public key of the on-board unit {X j , U i} as the third component of the pseudo-identity

[0028] Summarize the first component, the second component and the third component of the pseudo identity to obtain the complete pseudo identity NID j ={NID j，1 , T j , NID j，3}.

[0029] Optionally, the vehicle-mounted unit receives the pseudo-identity encryption result to generate a pseudo-identity integrity key, including:

[0030] The vehicle-mounted unit decrypts the pseudo-identity encryption result to obtain the first components of the plurality of pseudo-identities and the pseudo-identity partial private keys and the pseudo-identity complete public keys corresponding to the plurality of pseudo-identities;

[0031] Generate a complete private key using the vehicle private key and the pseudo-identity partial private keys corresponding to the multiple pseudo-identities;

[0032] Matching the complete pseudo identities corresponding to the first components of the multiple pseudo identities from the complete pseudo identity public key library, and matching the signature keys of the multiple pseudo identities from the signature key library corresponding to the complete pseudo identities;

[0033] The complete private key, the pseudo-identity complete public key and the signature key are aggregated to obtain the pseudo-identity complete key.

[0034] Optionally, the roadside unit verifies whether the message signature combinations are all valid using a signature aggregation verification algorithm, including:

[0035] The roadside unit receives the vehicle traffic condition information and the message signature combination, and verifies one by one whether the pseudo-identity validity period in the message signature combination and the vehicle traffic condition information generation time in the vehicle traffic condition information are both valid;

[0036] If there is an invalid item in either of the two, the combination of vehicle road condition information and message signature is discarded;

[0037] If both are valid, determine whether the vehicle is a special vehicle;

[0038] When the vehicle is a special vehicle, a single signature verification algorithm is used to verify the message signature combination. If the single signature verification is invalid, the vehicle road condition information and the message signature combination are discarded. If the single signature verification is valid, the vehicle road condition information and the message signature combination are sent to the application server;

[0039] When the vehicle is not a special vehicle, a signature aggregation verification algorithm is used to verify whether the vehicle road condition information and the message signature combination signature are both valid. If the signature aggregation verification is valid, the vehicle road condition information and the message signature combination are sent to the application server.

[0040] In order to solve the above problems, the present invention also provides a system based on the message signature aggregation verification method in the vehicle-mounted self-organizing network, including a trusted agency, an application server, a motor vehicle driving management office, a vehicle-mounted unit and a roadside unit, wherein the trusted agency includes a key generation center and a tracking agency.

[0041] Optionally, a key generation center in the trusted institution generates partial system parameters, and a tracking agency in the trusted institution generates public system parameters.

[0042] Optionally, in the trusted institution, the key generation center and the tracking institution communicate bidirectionally, the application server and the vehicle-mounted unit both communicate bidirectionally with the trusted institution, the roadside unit unidirectionally receives communication information transmitted from the trusted institution and the vehicle-mounted unit, the application server unidirectionally receives information transmitted from the roadside unit, and the trusted institution and the vehicle-mounted unit both communicate bidirectionally with the motor vehicle driving management office.

[0043] The embodiment of the present invention forms a secure trusted organization through a key generation center and a tracking organization, and completes the generation and distribution of system parameters and the verification of pseudo-identities and encryption of identities through the trusted organization, which can effectively intercept the risk of the user's complete private key being forged. In addition, the on-board unit receives the system public parameters and generates a vehicle private key and a vehicle public key, and generates multiple pseudo-identities. After generating multiple pseudo-identities and verifying their validity, the vehicle can protect its real identity information to a certain extent and improve security. In addition, the on-board unit can also generate a pseudo-identity complete key, vehicle road condition information and message signature combination. Using the pseudo-identity complete key and message signature combination, when the trusted organization forges a pseudo-identity, the real vehicle signature in the message signature combination can be used to identify the forgery behavior of the trusted organization, thereby ensuring the security of the message signature verification. In addition, through the signature aggregation verification algorithm of the roadside unit and the false road condition information identification of the application server, the spread of false vehicle road condition information can be effectively identified and prevented. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0044] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of a flow chart of a message signature aggregation verification method in a vehicle-mounted ad hoc network provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0045] Figure 2 A system diagram of a message signature aggregation verification method in a vehicle-mounted ad hoc network provided by an embodiment of the present invention.

[0046] The realization of the purpose, functional features and advantages of the present invention will be further explained in conjunction with embodiments and with reference to the accompanying drawings. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0047] It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are only used to explain the present invention, and are not used to limit the present invention.

[0048] An embodiment of the present application provides a message signature aggregation verification method in a vehicle-mounted self-organizing network.

[0049] 1. Terminology:

[0050]

[0051] 2. Parameter Description

[0052]

[0053]

[0054]

[0055] Reference Figure 1FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a method for verifying message signature aggregation in a vehicle-mounted ad hoc network according to an embodiment of the present invention. In this embodiment, the method for verifying message signature aggregation in a vehicle-mounted ad hoc network includes:

[0056] S1. Initialize the key generation center and generate system parameters, and distribute the system part parameters of the system parameters to the tracking agency and the motor vehicle driving management office.

[0057] In the embodiment of the present invention, the Key Generation Center (KGC) is a centralized entity responsible for generating and managing keys.

[0058] In the embodiment of the present invention, the tracking mechanism refers to a mechanism for tracking vehicle activities and behaviors.

[0059] In the embodiment of the present invention, the motor vehicle driving management office refers to an organization that examines and inspects vehicles.

[0060] As an embodiment of the present invention, the initializing the key generation center and generating system parameters includes:

[0061] The key generation center selects an elliptic curve additive cyclic group G of order q, where q is a prime number and q>2 λ , λ is the safety factor, and the generator of the elliptic curve additive cyclic group G is P;

[0062] The key generation center is selected to map to the q-order integer additive cyclic group A preset number of hash functions;

[0063] The key generation center selects a preset number of elliptic curve points on the elliptic curve additive cyclic group G as an encryption function of the key generation center and a decryption function of the key generation center;

[0064] The key generation center randomly selects a positive integer As the private key of the key generation center, and calculate the elliptic curve point corresponding to k on G as the public key of the key generation center, where the public key K of the key generation center pub The following formula is used for calculation: K pub = k·P;

[0065] The system parameters are obtained by summarizing the q-order elliptic curve additive cyclic group G, the generator of G, the preset number of hash functions, the encryption function, the decryption function and the public key of a key generation center.

[0066] Exemplarily, the key generation center is selected to map to the q-order integer additive cyclic group The preset number of hash functions can use 4 hash functions as follows:

[0067] Exemplarily, the key generation center distributes the system part parameters in the system parameters to the tracking agency and the motor vehicle driving management office according to the following expression: part = {q, G, P, K pub , H1, H2, H3, H4, E key (·), D key (·)}.

[0068] S2. The motor vehicle driving management office receives part of the system parameters and generates a management office key, and distributes the management office public key in the management office key to the tracking structure, wherein the management office key includes a management office private key and a management office public key.

[0069] As an embodiment of the present invention, the motor vehicle driving management office receives the system partial parameters and generates a management office key, the steps are as follows: after the motor vehicle driving management office receives the system partial parameters part, randomly selects a positive integer As the private key of the motor vehicle driving management office, and calculate the elliptic curve point corresponding to d on G as the public key D of the motor vehicle driving management office pub =d·P, the management office private key and the management office public key are aggregated to obtain the management office key.

[0070] S3. The tracking agency receives the partial system parameters and the management office public key to generate a tracking agency public key and a tracking agency private key, and synthesizes system public parameters based on the partial system parameters, the tracking agency public key and the management office public key, and distributes the system public parameters to the vehicle-mounted unit and the roadside unit.

[0071] As an embodiment of the present invention, the tracking agency receives the system part parameters and the public key of the management office to generate the tracking agency public key and the tracking agency private key, the steps are as follows: the tracking agency receives the system part parameters part and the public key D of the motor vehicle driving management office pub Then, randomly select a positive integer As the private key of the tracking agency, and calculate the elliptic curve point corresponding to r on G as the public key T of the tracking agency pub =r·P.

[0072] As an embodiment of the present invention, the system common parameters are as follows: params = {q, G, P, K pub , D pub , T pub , H1, H2, H3, H4, E key (·), D key (·)}.

[0073] In the embodiments of the present invention, the on-board unit refers to a communication device or module installed on a vehicle. These devices allow the vehicle to exchange data and communicate with other vehicles, roadside facilities, cloud servers and other communication nodes.

[0074] In the embodiment of the present invention, the roadside unit refers to a communication device installed beside the road or on a traffic facility. These devices are used to exchange data and communicate with vehicles, other roadside units, traffic management systems and other communication nodes.

[0075] S4. The on-board unit receives the system public parameters and generates a vehicle private key and a vehicle public key, and generates multiple pseudo-identities. After the multiple pseudo-identities pass the validity verification of the tracking organization, a pseudo-identity partial key is generated by a key generation center, and the pseudo-identity partial key is returned to the tracking organization.

[0076] In the embodiment of the present invention, the pseudo identity refers to an identity generated to protect the privacy and safety of the vehicle, and the real identity refers to the real identity information corresponding to the pseudo identity vehicle. The second part of the pseudo identity is the real identity of the vehicle encrypted using the public key of the tracking agency, and only the tracking agency can use its own private key to decrypt and obtain the real identity corresponding to the pseudo identity.

[0077] In the embodiment of the present invention, before generating the multiple pseudo identities, the process further includes: generating a public key certificate of the vehicle.

[0078] Furthermore, generating a public key certificate of the vehicle includes:

[0079] The on-board unit receives the system public parameters and generates a vehicle private key and a vehicle public key, and uses the vehicle private key and the management office public key to encrypt the vehicle real information to obtain the encrypted vehicle real information. The on-board unit sends the encrypted vehicle real information and the vehicle public key to the motor vehicle driving management office and applies for a vehicle public key certificate;

[0080] The motor vehicle driving management office receives the encrypted vehicle real information and the vehicle public key, and uses the management office private key and the vehicle public key to decrypt the encrypted vehicle real information to obtain the decrypted vehicle real information. The motor vehicle driving management office verifies the legitimacy of the decrypted real information and issues a public key certificate for the vehicle public key.

[0081] In an embodiment of the present invention, the public key certificate is a long-term certificate used to verify the true identity information of the vehicle, such as verifying that it is operated by the owner himself (offline verification or secure facial recognition technology, etc.), and retaining necessary information to prevent the owner from denying it. This public key certificate does not need to be replaced frequently.

[0082] Exemplarily, the public key certificate of the vehicle may be generated by the following steps:

[0083] 401: Vehicle V i The on-board unit randomly selects a positive integer As the vehicle private key, and calculate u i The corresponding elliptic curve point on G is the vehicle V i The vehicle public key U i =u i ·P.

[0084] 402: Vehicle V i The vehicle unit uses the vehicle private key u i and the public key D of the Motor Vehicle Driving Administration pub Encrypted vehicle real information RID i ,Right now

[0085] 403: Vehicle V i The vehicle-mounted unit sends the vehicle public key and the encrypted vehicle real information {U i , C 1，i}Send to the Motor Vehicle Driving Administration to apply for a certificate.

[0086] 404: The Motor Vehicle Driving Management Office received a vehicle V i The public key and encrypted vehicle real information {U i , C 1，i}, use the vehicle private key d and the received vehicle public key U i Decryption C 1，i Get vehicle V i Real vehicle information The Motor Vehicle Driving Management Office verifies the real identity information RID in a secure way i After the operation is valid and is performed by the owner himself (offline verification or secure facial recognition technology, etc., and necessary information is retained to prevent the owner from denying), the vehicle V i The public key U i Issue a public key certificate.

[0087] 405: The Motor Vehicle Driving Management Office randomly selects a positive integer And calculate f i The corresponding elliptic curve point F on G i =f i ·P, f i and F i Will be used to generate certificates.

[0088] 406: The Motor Vehicle Driving Management Office uses the first hash function to calculate {D pub , U i , Fi , VPC i} 1，i =H1(D pub , U i , F i , VPC i ), where VPC i is the validity period of the certificate (the validity period of the certificate is long, and the vehicle does not need to change the certificate frequently), and then use the management office private key d to h 1，i Sign W i =f i +dh 1，i , generate vehicle V i Public key certificate CER i = {U i , VPC i , W i , F i}, and the necessary information {U i , CER i , RID i}Save to the database.

[0089] 407: The Motor Vehicle Driving Management Office uses the management office private key d and the vehicle V i The public key U i Generate a public key certificate CER i Encryption And the encrypted public key certificate C 2，i Send to vehicle V i .

[0090] 408: Vehicle V i The vehicle-mounted unit receives the encrypted public key certificate C 2，i Then, use the vehicle unit private key u i and the public key D of the Motor Vehicle Driving Administration pub Decrypt to get the public key certificate Then use the first hash function to calculate {D pub , U i , F i , VPC i}'s hash value h 1，i =H1(D pub , U i , F i , VPC i ), by verifying the equation Whether the public key certificate is valid is verified by checking whether the public key certificate is valid. If it is valid, the public key certificate is saved in a safe place. If it is invalid, return to step 401 to regenerate the vehicle private key and the vehicle public key and then generate the public key certificate.

[0091] As an embodiment of the present invention, the vehicle-mounted unit receives the system public parameters and generates a vehicle private key and a vehicle public key, and generates multiple pseudo identities, including:

[0092] The on-board unit randomly selects n positive integers Calculate a j The corresponding elliptic curve point on G is used as the first component of the pseudo-identity NID j，1 =a j ·P;

[0093] Generate a pseudo-identity with a validity period T according to the preset rules j As the second component of a pseudo-identity;

[0094] Using hash function to calculate {U i , NID j，1 , T j} 2，j =H2(U i , NID j，1 , T j ), using the private key u of the onboard unit i Sign the hash value X j =a j +u i h 2，j and use the a j and the tracking authority public key T pub The encrypted signature value and the public key of the on-board unit {X j , U i} as the third component of the pseudo-identity

[0095] Summarize the first component, the second component and the third component of the pseudo identity to obtain the complete pseudo identity NID j ={NiD j，1 , T j ,NiD j，3}.

[0096] Exemplarily, the generation of multiple pseudo identities may be performed by the following steps:

[0097] 501: The on-board unit of vehicle Vi generates a preset number (assuming n) of pseudo identities. The on-board unit randomly selects n positive integers Perform the following operations to generate n pseudo identities. Calculate a j The corresponding elliptic curve point on G is used as the first part of the pseudo identity NID j，1 =a j P; Generate a pseudo-identity with a validity period T according to the preset rules jAs the second part of the pseudo-identity; using the second hash function to calculate {U i , NID j，1 , T j}'s hash value h 2，j =H2(U i , NID j，1 , T j ), use your own private key u i Sign the hash value X j =a j +u i h 2，j , then use a j and the public key T of the tracking agency pub Encrypt the signature value and your own public key {X j , U i} as the third part of the pseudo-identity Generate a complete pseudo identity NID j ={NID j，1 , T j , NID j，3}. j The signature key is used to generate pseudo-identities and sign messages;

[0098] 502. Vehicle V i The on-board unit randomly selects a positive integer As the communication private key, calculate b i The corresponding elliptic curve point B on G i =b i P is used as the public key for communication; the private key b is used for communication i and the public key T of the tracking agency pub For the generated multiple pseudo identities {NID j |j∈[1,n]} and vehicle public key certificate CER i Encryption Vehicle V i The on-board unit will encrypt the ciphertext C 3，i and B i Sent together to the tracking agency.

[0099] Exemplarily, the plurality of pseudo-identities are verified for validity by the tracking mechanism, wherein the validity verification adopts the following steps:

[0100] 601: Tracking agency receives V i Sent ciphertext C 3，i and the communication public key B i Then, use the tracking agency private key r and the communication public key B i Decrypted to get V iCertificates and multiple pseudo-identities

[0101] 602: The tracking agency performs the following operations to check the certificate CER i The tracking mechanism uses the first hash function to calculate {D pub , U i , F i , VPC i} 1，i =H1(D pub , U i , F i , VPC i ), and by equation Is it established to verify the certificate CER i Is it valid? If it is invalid, exit; if it is valid, continue. The meaning of the expression is whether it is equal to.

[0102] 603: The tracking agency performs the following operations to check the validity of multiple pseudo-identities. The tracking agency checks the validity period T of the second part of each pseudo-identity j Does it meet the requirements? If it does, continue, otherwise exit; then use your own private key r and the first part of the pseudo identity NID j，1 Decrypt the third part of the pseudo-identity NID separately j，3 Get the signature value and vehicle V i The public key Then use the second hash function to calculate {U i , NID j，1 , T j} part of the hash value h 2，j =H2(U i , NID j，1 , T j ) ; then verify the equation Verify whether these pseudo identities are valid. If invalid, exit; if valid, continue.

[0103] 604: The tracking agency passes the vehicle V through a safe channel i The public key U i and multiple pseudo-identities {NID j |j∈[1,n]} is sent to the key generation center.

[0104] Exemplarily, the method of using a key generation center to generate a pseudo identity partial key adopts the following steps:

[0105] 701: The key generation center receives the vehicle V sent by the tracking agency i The public key Ui and multiple pseudo-identities {NID j |j∈[1,n]}, randomly select n positive integers Perform the following operations to generate a complete public key and a partial private key for each pseudo identity. Calculate s j The corresponding elliptic curve point S on G j =s j P is used as a partial public key, and the partial public key S j and the vehicle's public key U i Add together to get the complete public key PK of the pseudo identity j =S j +U i ; Use the third hash function to calculate {NID j , K pub , PK j} 3，j =H3(NID j , K pub , PK j ), and use your own private key k to hash the value h 3，j Sign and generate partial private key ppk of pseudo identity j =s j +kh 3，j .

[0106] 702: The key generation center generates the first component NID of the plurality of pseudo identities j，1 and the corresponding complete public key and partial private key {(NID j，1 , PK j ,ppk j )|j∈[1,n]} is sent to the tracking agency through a secure channel.

[0107] S5. After receiving the pseudo-identity partial key, the tracking agency encrypts the pseudo-identity using the communication public key and the tracking agency private key to obtain a pseudo-identity encryption result, and sends the pseudo-identity encryption result to the on-board unit.

[0108] In the embodiment of the present invention, the pseudo-identity encryption is performed using the communication public key and the tracking mechanism private key to obtain a pseudo-identity encryption result, and the pseudo-identity encryption result is sent to the vehicle-mounted unit, and the steps are as follows:

[0109] 801: The tracking agency receives the first part of multiple pseudo-identities and their corresponding complete public keys and partial private keys {(NID j，1 , PK j ,ppk j )|j∈[1,n]}, use the tracking agency private key r and the communication public key B iThe first part of multiple pseudo identities and their corresponding complete public keys and partial private keys {(NID j，1 , PK j ,ppk j )|j∈[1,n]} is encrypted

[0110] 802: The tracking agency encrypts the encrypted pseudo-identity result C 4，i Send to V i The vehicle-mounted unit.

[0111] In the embodiment of the present invention, the preset communication private key refers to the private key used for secure communication between the vehicle i and the tracking agency when applying for a pseudo-identity partial key.

[0112] S6. The onboard unit receives the pseudo-identity encryption result to generate a pseudo-identity complete key, and generates and sends a combination of vehicle road condition information and a message signature to the roadside unit.

[0113] As an embodiment of the present invention, the vehicle-mounted unit receives the pseudo-identity encryption result to generate a pseudo-identity complete key, including:

[0114] The vehicle-mounted unit decrypts the pseudo-identity encryption result to obtain the first components of the plurality of pseudo-identities and the pseudo-identity partial private keys and the pseudo-identity complete public keys corresponding to the plurality of pseudo-identities;

[0115] Generate a complete private key using the vehicle private key and the pseudo-identity partial private keys corresponding to the multiple pseudo-identities;

[0116] Matching the complete pseudo identities corresponding to the first components of the multiple pseudo identities from the complete pseudo identity public key library, and matching the signature keys of the multiple pseudo identities from the signature key library corresponding to the complete pseudo identities;

[0117] The complete private key, the complete pseudo-identity public key and the signature key are aggregated to obtain the pseudo-identity complete key.

[0118] Exemplarily, the onboard unit receives the pseudo-identity encryption result to generate a pseudo-identity complete key, and the generation is performed by the following steps:

[0119] 901: Vehicle V i The on-board unit receives C 4,i Then, use the communication private key b i and the public key T of the tracking agency pub Decryption obtains the first component of multiple pseudo-identities and their corresponding complete public keys and partial private keys

[0120] 902: Vehicle V iThe vehicle-mounted unit performs the following operations on the first component of each pseudo-identity and its corresponding complete public key and partial private key, respectively, to synthesize a complete pseudo-identity and its corresponding complete private key, complete public key and signature key. i The vehicle unit will send its own private key u i and the partial private key ppk of the pseudo identity j Add together to generate the complete private key pk of the pseudo identity j =u i +ppk j ; and match the corresponding complete pseudo identity and signature key of the current pseudo identity from the complete pseudo identity and its corresponding signature key temporarily saved in step S5, synthesize the complete pseudo identity and its corresponding complete private key, complete public key and signature key {NID j , pk j , PK j , a j}.

[0121] 903: Vehicle V i The on-board unit uses the third hash function to calculate {NID j , K pub , PK j} 3，j =H3(NID j , K pub , PK j ), and verify the equation Whether it is established is used to verify whether the keys of these multiple pseudo-identities are valid. If it is valid, proceed to the next step. If it is invalid, re-obtain the pseudo-identity and partial keys.

[0122] 904: V i The vehicle-mounted unit will obtain multiple pseudo identities and their corresponding complete private keys, complete public keys and signature keys {(NID j , pk j , PK j , a j )|j∈[1,n]} is added to the secure pseudo identity and key library for storage. i The vehicle-mounted unit periodically checks the pseudo-identity with the pseudo-identity T in the key library. j The validity of the pseudo-identities is improved by cleaning up the pseudo-identities whose validity period is less than the set threshold, and re-obtaining multiple pseudo-identities and keys when the balance is insufficient.

[0123] As an embodiment of the present invention, the generating of the vehicle road condition information and the message signature combination and sending them to the roadside unit includes:

[0124] 1001: Vehicle V i The vehicle-mounted unit generates road condition information M jThen, an unused pseudo identity and key {NID j , pk j , PK j , a j}.

[0125] 1002: Vehicle V i The on-board unit uses the fourth hash function to calculate {M j , NID j , PK j , t j}'s hash value h 4，j =H4(M j , NID j , PK j , t j ), where t j is the current timestamp and uses the private key pk of the chosen pseudo identity j Sign the above hash value and calculate the partial message signature Y j =a j +pk j h 4，j .

[0126] 1003: Vehicle V i The on-board unit generates a message signature δ j =(Y j , t j ), V i Combine traffic information and message signature SM j ={M j , NID j , PK j , δ j}Broadcast to nearby vehicles and roadside units.

[0127] S7. The roadside unit receives the vehicle traffic information and the message signature combination, and uses a signature aggregation verification algorithm to verify whether the message signature combination is valid. When the message signature combination is valid, the vehicle traffic information and the message signature combination are aggregated and sent to the application server.

[0128] As an embodiment of the present invention, the roadside unit verifies whether the message signature combinations are all valid using a signature aggregation verification algorithm, including:

[0129] The roadside unit receives the vehicle traffic condition information and the message signature combination, and verifies one by one whether the pseudo-identity validity period in the message signature combination and the vehicle traffic condition information generation time in the vehicle traffic condition information are both valid;

[0130] If there is an invalid item in either of the two, the combination of vehicle road condition information and message signature is discarded;

[0131] If both are valid, determine whether the vehicle is a special vehicle;

[0132] When the vehicle is a special vehicle, a single signature verification algorithm is used to verify the message signature combination. If the single signature verification is invalid, the vehicle road condition information and the message signature combination are discarded. If the single signature verification is valid, the vehicle road condition information and the message signature combination are sent to the application server;

[0133] When the vehicle is not a special vehicle, a signature aggregation verification algorithm is used to verify whether the vehicle road condition information and the message signature combination signature are both valid. If the signature aggregation verification is valid, the vehicle road condition information and the message signature combination are sent to the application server.

[0134] In the embodiment of the present invention, the special vehicles include fire trucks, ambulances, police cars, etc.

[0135] Exemplarily, the roadside unit verifies whether the message signature combinations are all valid using a signature aggregation verification algorithm, and performs verification using the following steps:

[0136] 1101: The roadside unit receives the road condition information and signature combination SM j After that, verify T one by one i and t i Is it valid. If there is an invalid item in the two, the traffic information and signature combination are discarded; if both are valid, check whether the message is sent by a special vehicle (fire truck, ambulance, police car, etc.). If so, use a single signature verification algorithm to verify the signature, otherwise keep the signature and wait for the next step of signature aggregation verification. If the single signature verification is invalid, the traffic information and signature combination are discarded. If the verification is valid, the traffic information and signature combination are immediately sent to the application server through a secure channel.

[0137] The single signature verification algorithm is as follows: the roadside unit first uses the third hash function to calculate {NID j , K pub , PK j} 3，j =H3(NID j , K pub , PK j ), using the fourth hash function to calculate {M j , NID j , PK j , t j} 4，j =H4(M j , NIDj , PK j , t j ), and then verify the equation Is it true to verify whether the signature is valid?

[0138] 1102: The roadside unit receives a batch of T i and t i After valid traffic information and signatures are combined, a signature aggregation verification algorithm is used to verify whether all signatures are valid. If they are all valid, the traffic information and signature combinations are directly summarized and sent to the application server through a secure channel.

[0139] The signature aggregation verification algorithm is as follows: Assuming m signatures are input, an m-dimensional vector Z = {z1, z2, ..., z m}, where z j ∈[1,2 L ], j∈[1, m], L is a small positive integer. For each signature, use the third hash function to calculate {NID j , K pub , PK j}'s hash value h 3，j =H3(NID j , K pub , PK j ), using the fourth hash function to calculate {M j , NID j , PK j , t j}'s hash value h 4，j =H4(M j , NID j , PK j , t j ). Then by verifying the equation Whether it is established can be used to verify whether these m signatures are all valid.

[0140] 1103: After the roadside unit aggregation verification fails, the invalid signature identification algorithm is called to identify the invalid signatures, and then the message and signature combination corresponding to the remaining valid signatures are aggregated and sent to the application server through a secure channel.

[0141] S8. After receiving the vehicle traffic condition information, the application server verifies whether the vehicle traffic condition information is false traffic condition information. If the vehicle traffic condition information is false traffic condition information, the application server tracks the real vehicle information corresponding to the false traffic condition information and punishes the real vehicle information corresponding to the false traffic condition information.

[0142] Exemplarily, after receiving the vehicle traffic condition information, the application server verifies whether the vehicle traffic condition information is false traffic condition information by using the following steps:

[0143] 1201: After receiving the aggregated traffic information from the roadside unit, if the application server finds any forged traffic information, it will replace the first part of the pseudo-identity NID j，1 The decryption key is sent to the tracking agency through a secure channel.

[0144] 1202: The tracking agency receives the first part of the pseudo-identity NID j，1 Then, use your own private key r and the first part of the pseudo identity NID j，1 Calculate the corresponding decryption key DK j = r·NID j，1 and sends the decryption key to the application server through a secure channel.

[0145] 1203: The application server receives the decryption key DK j Then, decrypt the third part of the pseudo-identity to obtain the corresponding signature value of the pseudo-identity and the vehicle V i The public key Then use the second hash function to calculate {U i , NID j，1 , T j}'s hash value h 2，j =H2(U i , NID j，1 , T j ), by verifying the equation Is it true to determine whether the pseudo identity is from the vehicle V i The public key U i Signature generation. If not, the pseudo-identity has no U i The signature is forged by the tracking agency or the key generation center. The responsibility for forging the road condition information shall be borne by the tracking agency or the key generation center; if established, continue.

[0146] 1204: The application server uses the vehicle public key U i Obtain all the vehicle information including the public key certificate from the vehicle management office. If the vehicle information is not obtained, the vehicle public key U does not exist. i The fake identity and road condition information are forged by the tracking agency or the key generation center. The responsibility for forging the road condition information shall be borne by the tracking agency or the key generation center; if the public key and vehicle information are obtained, continue.

[0147] 1205: After obtaining the public key certificate and vehicle information, use the first hash function to calculate {D pub , U i , F i, VPC i} 1，i =H1(D pub , U i , F i , VPC i ), by verifying the equation Whether it is established is to verify whether the public key certificate is valid. If it is invalid, the public key certificate is forged, and the fake identity and road condition information are forged by the tracking agency or the key generation center. The responsibility for forging road condition information shall be borne by the tracking agency or the key generation center. If it is valid, the fake identity NID can be determined j is the vehicle V i Generated, the road condition information is vehicle V i Forged, the responsibility lies with the vehicle V i The owner bears the responsibility.

[0148] Furthermore, the application server can randomly extract pseudo-identities that are all valid in the step where the roadside unit uses the signature aggregation verification algorithm to verify whether the message signature combinations are all valid, obtain the decryption key from the tracking agency, and verify after decryption whether the pseudo-identity is forged by the tracking agency or the key generation center, thereby supervising the behavior of the tracking agency and the key generation center.

[0149] The embodiment of the present invention forms a secure trusted organization through a key generation center and a tracking organization, and completes the generation and distribution of system parameters and the verification of pseudo-identities and encryption of identities through the trusted organization, which can effectively intercept the risk of the user's complete private key being forged. In addition, the on-board unit receives the system public parameters and generates a vehicle private key and a vehicle public key, and generates multiple pseudo-identities. After generating multiple pseudo-identities and verifying their validity, the vehicle can protect its real identity information to a certain extent and improve security. In addition, the on-board unit can also generate a pseudo-identity complete key, vehicle road condition information and message signature combination. Using the pseudo-identity complete key and message signature combination, when the trusted organization forges a pseudo-identity, the real vehicle signature in the message signature combination can be used to identify the forgery behavior of the trusted organization, thereby ensuring the security of the message signature verification. In addition, through the signature aggregation verification algorithm of the roadside unit and the false road condition information identification of the application server, the spread of false vehicle road condition information can be effectively identified and prevented.

[0150] like Figure 2 FIG. 1 is a system diagram of a message signature aggregation verification method in a vehicle-mounted self-organizing network provided by an embodiment of the present invention. In this embodiment, a system based on the message signature aggregation verification method in a vehicle-mounted self-organizing network includes a trusted institution, an application server, a motor vehicle driving management office, a vehicle-mounted unit, and a roadside unit, wherein the trusted institution includes a key generation center and a tracking institution.

[0151] As an embodiment of the present invention, the key generation center in the trusted institution generates partial system parameters, and the tracking agency in the trusted institution generates public system parameters.

[0152] As an embodiment of the present invention, in the trusted institution, the key generation center and the tracking institution communicate bidirectionally, the application server and the vehicle-mounted unit both communicate bidirectionally with the trusted institution, the roadside unit unidirectionally receives communication information transmitted from the trusted institution and the vehicle-mounted unit, the application server unidirectionally receives information transmitted from the roadside unit, and the trusted institution and the vehicle-mounted unit both communicate bidirectionally with the motor vehicle driving management office.

[0153] It is obvious to those skilled in the art that the present invention is not limited to the details of the above exemplary embodiments, and that the present invention can be implemented in other specific forms without departing from the spirit or essential characteristics of the present invention.

[0154] Therefore, no matter from which point of view, the embodiments should be regarded as illustrative and non-restrictive, and the scope of the present invention is limited by the appended claims rather than the above description, so it is intended that all changes falling within the meaning and scope of the equivalent elements of the claims are included in the present invention. Any attached figure mark in the claims should not be regarded as limiting the claims involved.

[0155] The blockchain referred to in this invention is a new application mode of computer technologies such as distributed data storage, peer-to-peer transmission, consensus mechanism, encryption algorithm, etc. Blockchain is essentially a decentralized database, a string of data blocks generated by cryptographic methods. Each data block contains a batch of network transaction information, which is used to verify the validity of its information (anti-counterfeiting) and generate the next block. Blockchain can include the underlying blockchain platform, platform product service layer, and application service layer.

[0156] The embodiments of the present application can acquire and process relevant data based on artificial intelligence technology. Among them, artificial intelligence (AI) is the theory, method, technology and application system that uses digital computers or machines controlled by digital computers to simulate, extend and expand human intelligence, perceive the environment, acquire knowledge and use knowledge to obtain the best results.

[0157] In addition, it is clear that the word "comprising" does not exclude other units or steps, and the singular does not exclude the plural. Multiple units or devices stated in the system claim can also be implemented by one unit or device through software or hardware. The words first, second, etc. are used to indicate names, and do not indicate any particular order.

[0158] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solution of the present invention rather than to limit it. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the preferred embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that the technical solution of the present invention can be modified or replaced by equivalents without departing from the spirit and scope of the technical solution of the present invention.

Claims

1. A message signature aggregation verification method in a vehicle-mounted ad hoc network, characterized in that: The method comprises: Initialize the key generation center and generate system parameters, and distribute system parameters of the system parameters to the tracking agency and the motor vehicle driving management office; The motor vehicle driving management office receives the system partial parameters and generates a management office key, and distributes a management office public key in the management office key to the tracking structure, wherein the management office key includes a management office private key and a management office public key; The tracking agency receives the partial system parameters and the public key of the management office to generate a tracking agency public key and a tracking agency private key, synthesizes system public parameters based on the partial system parameters, the tracking agency public key and the public key of the management office, and distributes the system public parameters to the on-board unit and the roadside unit; The vehicle-mounted unit receives the system public parameters and generates a vehicle private key and a vehicle public key, and generates a plurality of pseudo identities, wherein the vehicle-mounted unit receives the system public parameters and generates a vehicle private key and a vehicle public key, and generates a plurality of pseudo identities, including: the vehicle-mounted unit randomly selects n positive integers Calculate a j The corresponding elliptic curve point on G is used as the first component of the pseudo-identity NID j，1 =a j P; Generate a pseudo-identity with a validity period T according to preset rules j As the second component of the pseudo-identity; using the hash function to calculate {U i , NID j，1 , T j } 2，j =H2(U i , NID j，1 , T j ), using the vehicle private key u i Sign the hash value X j =a j +u i h 2，j and use the a j and the tracking authority public key T pub The encrypted signature value and the vehicle public key {X j , U i } as the third component of the pseudo-identity Summarize the first component, the second component and the third component of the pseudo identity to obtain the complete pseudo identity NID j ={NID j，1 , T j , NID j，3 }, after the plurality of pseudo-identities pass the validity verification of the tracking agency, after using the key generation center to generate a pseudo-identity partial key, the pseudo-identity partial key is returned to the tracking agency; After receiving the pseudo-identity partial key, the tracking mechanism encrypts the pseudo-identity using the communication public key and the tracking mechanism private key to obtain a pseudo-identity encryption result, and sends the pseudo-identity encryption result to the vehicle-mounted unit; The onboard unit receives the pseudo-identity encryption result to generate a pseudo-identity complete key, generates and sends a combination of vehicle road condition information and a message signature to the roadside unit; The roadside unit receives the vehicle traffic information and the message signature combination, and verifies whether the message signature combination is valid by using a signature aggregation verification algorithm. If the message signature combination is valid, the vehicle traffic information and the message signature combination are aggregated and sent to the application server. After receiving the vehicle traffic condition information, the application server verifies whether the vehicle traffic condition information is false traffic condition information. If the vehicle traffic condition information is false traffic condition information, the application server tracks the real vehicle information corresponding to the false traffic condition information and punishes the real vehicle information corresponding to the false traffic condition information.

2. The message signature aggregation verification method in a vehicle-mounted ad hoc network as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that: Before the vehicle-mounted unit generates a plurality of pseudo identities, the method further includes: generating a public key certificate of the vehicle.

3. The message signature aggregation verification method in a vehicle-mounted ad hoc network as claimed in claim 2, characterized in that: The generating of the vehicle's public key certificate comprises: The on-board unit receives the system public parameters and generates a vehicle private key and a vehicle public key, and uses the vehicle private key and the management office public key to encrypt the vehicle real information to obtain the encrypted vehicle real information. The on-board unit sends the encrypted vehicle real information and the vehicle public key to the motor vehicle driving management office and applies for a vehicle public key certificate; The motor vehicle driving management office receives the encrypted vehicle real information and the vehicle public key, and uses the management office private key and the vehicle public key to decrypt the encrypted vehicle real information to obtain the decrypted vehicle real information. The motor vehicle driving management office verifies the legitimacy of the decrypted real information and issues a public key certificate for the vehicle public key.

4. The message signature aggregation verification method in a vehicle-mounted ad hoc network as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that: The initializing the key generation center and generating system parameters includes: The key generation center selects an elliptic curve additive cyclic group G of order q, where q is a prime number and q>2 λ , λ is the safety factor, and the generator of the elliptic curve additive cyclic group G is P; The key generation center is selected to map to the q-order integer additive cyclic group A preset number of hash functions; The key generation center selects a preset number of elliptic curve points on the elliptic curve additive cyclic group G as an encryption function of the key generation center and a decryption function of the key generation center; The key generation center randomly selects a positive integer As the private key of the key generation center, and calculate the elliptic curve point corresponding to k on G as the public key of the key generation center; The system parameters are obtained by summarizing the q-order elliptic curve additive cyclic group G, the generator of G, the preset number of hash functions, the encryption function, the decryption function and the public key of a key generation center.

5. The message signature aggregation verification method in a vehicle-mounted ad hoc network as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that: The vehicle-mounted unit receives the pseudo-identity encryption result to generate a pseudo-identity integrity key, including: The vehicle-mounted unit decrypts the pseudo-identity encryption result to obtain the first components of the plurality of pseudo-identities and the pseudo-identity partial private keys and the pseudo-identity complete public keys corresponding to the plurality of pseudo-identities; Generate a complete private key using the vehicle private key and the pseudo-identity partial private keys corresponding to the multiple pseudo-identities; Matching the complete pseudo identities corresponding to the first components of the multiple pseudo identities from the complete pseudo identity public key library, and matching the signature keys of the multiple pseudo identities from the signature key library corresponding to the complete pseudo identities; The complete private key, the pseudo-identity complete public key and the signature key are aggregated to obtain the pseudo-identity complete key.

6. The message signature aggregation verification method in a vehicle-mounted ad hoc network as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that: The roadside unit verifies whether the message signature combinations are all valid using a signature aggregation verification algorithm, including: The roadside unit receives the vehicle traffic condition information and the message signature combination, and verifies one by one whether the pseudo-identity validity period in the message signature combination and the vehicle traffic condition information generation time in the vehicle traffic condition information are both valid; If there is an invalid item in either of the two, the combination of vehicle road condition information and message signature is discarded; If both are valid, determine whether the vehicle is a special vehicle; When the vehicle is a special vehicle, a single signature verification algorithm is used to verify the message signature combination. If the single signature verification is invalid, the vehicle road condition information and the message signature combination are discarded. If the single signature verification is valid, the vehicle road condition information and the message signature combination are sent to the application server; When the vehicle is not a special vehicle, a signature aggregation verification algorithm is used to verify whether the vehicle road condition information and the message signature combination signature are both valid. If the signature aggregation verification is valid, the vehicle road condition information and the message signature combination are sent to the application server.

7. A system based on the message signature aggregation verification method in a vehicle-mounted ad hoc network as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 6, characterized in that: It includes a trusted institution, an application server, a motor vehicle driving management office, a vehicle-mounted unit and a roadside unit, wherein the trusted institution includes a key generation center and a tracking institution.

8. The system of the message signature aggregation verification method in the vehicle-mounted ad hoc network as claimed in claim 7, characterized in that: The key generation center in the trusted institution generates partial system parameters, and the tracking agency in the trusted institution generates public system parameters.

9. The system of the message signature aggregation verification method in the vehicle-mounted ad hoc network as claimed in claim 7, characterized in that: The key generation center and the tracking agency in the trusted institution communicate bidirectionally, the application server and the on-board unit both communicate bidirectionally with the trusted institution, the roadside unit unidirectionally receives communication information transmitted from the trusted institution and the on-board unit, the application server unidirectionally receives information transmitted from the roadside unit, and the trusted institution and the on-board unit both communicate bidirectionally with the motor vehicle driving management office.

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