Anti-stress electronic voting method based on public verifiable secret sharing
Through publicly verifiable secret sharing technology, the risk problem of relying on third parties in the existing technology is solved, and the effect of anti-compression and efficient vote counting in electronic voting is achieved, ensuring the security of voting and the accuracy of vote counting.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202410918600.X
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-07-10
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-12
AI Technical Summary
The existing anti-depression electronic voting program has the risk of relying on trusted third parties and cannot achieve publicly verifiable and efficient vote counting without relying on third parties.
Using an anti-depression electronic voting method based on publicly verifiable secret sharing, ensuring voters can exercise freely and confidentially under coercion by generating share leader keys, candidate codes, voting, revoting, filtering false shares and verifying votes Voting rights and ensure the authenticity of votes and the accuracy of counting through non-interactive zero-knowledge proof and aggregation shared vector verification.
It achieves the effect of anti-coercion, publicly verifiable and efficient vote counting without relying on trusted third parties, reducing the risk of malicious manipulation by third parties, and ensuring the security of voting and the accuracy of vote counting.
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Figure CN118940287A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention belongs to the field of electronic voting, and in particular relates to an electronic voting method that is publicly verifiable and resistant to coercion. Background Art
[0002] Electronic voting technology uses computers and the Internet to perform voting and counting tasks. Compared with traditional paper voting, it significantly improves voting efficiency, reduces human errors and fraud, enhances the fairness and transparency of voting, and can adapt to a variety of voting scenarios and needs. With the continuous development of electronic voting technology, the threats it faces are also increasing, including cyber attacks, identity forgery, vote buying and coercion. Among these threats, anti-coercion has become a key indicator for evaluating the security of electronic voting systems. It requires that even if voters are coerced, they can exercise their voting rights freely and confidentially, and prevent malicious voting equipment from tampering with voting results. Although traditional voting systems also have problems with coercion and vote buying, this threat is more serious in Internet voting because attackers can exert influence and control on a large scale.
[0003] Existing anti-coercion voting schemes are mainly divided into two categories: one is a scheme based on fake credentials, which provides voters with a unique and confidential real credential. Voters use the real credential to vote when they are not coerced. Once they are coerced, they create a fake credential to submit the coerced ballot. This scheme is designed to make it impossible for the coercer to distinguish whether the voter voted with a real credential or a fake credential, and to delete the ballots cast with fake credentials during the counting stage. However, schemes based on fake credentials have some defects: first, voters need to store real voting credentials on their devices; second, the system cannot provide feedback to voters whether they used the correct credentials to vote, resulting in voters being unable to confirm whether their votes were counted correctly; finally, voters need to be able to lie convincingly when coerced, which is difficult to do.
[0004] Another type of scheme is an anti-coercion scheme based on re-voting. When voters are coerced, they first vote according to the coercer's request, then re-vote the candidate of their choice, and filter the votes cast under coercion in the final counting stage, and only count the latest votes cast by voters according to their own wishes. This method avoids the shortcomings of the fake voucher scheme. Since the virtual ballots generated during the re-voting need to be shuffled and filtered by a third party, there is a risk of malicious manipulation of ballot filtering by a third party, resulting in the final generated ballot list not being able to accurately reflect the voters' true voting intentions, affecting the accuracy of the counting results.
[0005] In the field of electronic voting technology, one of the technical issues that urgently needs to be solved is to provide a voting method that is both resistant to coercion and publicly verifiable, and does not rely on any trusted third party, thereby reducing the risk of malicious manipulation of ballot filtering by third parties. Summary of the invention
[0006] The technical problem to be solved by the present invention is to overcome the shortcomings of the above-mentioned prior art and provide an anti-coercion electronic voting method based on publicly verifiable secret sharing that is anti-coercion, publicly verifiable, and has efficient vote counting.
[0007] The technical solution adopted to solve the above technical problems consists of the following steps:
[0008] (1) System initialization
[0009] 1) Generate a share leader key
[0010] The voting administrator sets the security parameter κ for the system, and the value of κ is 1 256 , determine the modulus N according to the following formula:
[0011] N=p×q
[0012] Among them, prime numbers p and q are randomly selected, and the q-order cyclic multiplication groups G1 and G2 are generated by the group generation method. T , is the group of integers modulo q, e is G1×G2→G T A bilinear map of is determined by the following formula
[0013]
[0014] in, Denotes that the voting administrator randomly selects a large prime number e for each share leader s and an integer k such that e s can divide (q-1), and e s The minimum length is 160 bits.
[0015] Randomly select a private key sk for each share leader l i , where 1<sk i <e s , e s The value must be at least 2 192 -2 64 -1.
[0016] Determine the public key pk of the share leader l as follows i :
[0017]
[0018] Among them, i represents the number of the share leader, and mod represents the remainder operation.
[0019] 2) Candidate Coding
[0020] The candidates are (C1,C2,...,C m ), the voters are (V1,V2,...,V n ), m represents the number of candidates, n represents the number of voters, m and n are finite positive integers, and the voting administrator encodes the candidates and determines the binary encoding bit λ of each candidate as follows:
[0021]
[0022] Determine the code EC for each candidate as follows z :
[0023]
[0024] Among them, z represents the candidate's serial number, z∈[1,m], j is the bit index in the binary code, j∈[1,λ].
[0025] EC z Convert to decimal and post on the bulletin board.
[0026] (2) Voting
[0027] Each voter generates a voter polynomial f based on the candidate decimal code posted on the bulletin board i (x):
[0028]
[0029] Among them, v i represents the voter's vote, which is the decimal representation of the candidate's choice, hidden in the polynomial f i In (x), a1 (i) ,a2 (i) ,...a t (i) is the coefficient of the polynomial, which takes a finite positive integer. t represents the degree of x in the polynomial. Voters’ ballots and polynomials are kept secret and not disclosed to the public.
[0030] There are y share leaders l, and voters generate y shares s according to the number of share leaders l. ij , i represents the voter’s serial number, i∈[1,n], j represents the serial number of the share leader l, j∈[1,y], and y is a finite positive integer.
[0031] Determine the share l given by the i-th voter to the j-th leader by the following formula: j Generated shares ij :
[0032] s ij =f i (j)
[0033] Among them, f i (j) represents the polynomial f i In (x), x is the value of j.
[0034] Will s ij Sent to the jth share leader l j .
[0035] (3) Generate Share
[0036] Each share leader l j After receiving the shares sent by voters, determine your total share s according to the following formula j :
[0037]
[0038] Each share leader l j To your own share j Calculate the commitment vector V j 、The ciphertext vector c j , non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of the corresponding share π j as follows:
[0039]
[0040] Among them, NIZKPK represents the j Non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of .
[0041] The secret sharing vector group (V j ,c j ,π j ) is sent to the total leader L of shares.
[0042] (4) Re-vote
[0043] When voters are coerced, a polynomial f containing false votes is generated i ′(x):
[0044] f i ′(x)=v i ′+a1 (i) x+a2 (i) x 2 +...+a t (i) x t
[0045] Among them, v i ′ represents the vote cast by the coercer, and the encrypted ballot index γ is determined by the following formula i .
[0046]
[0047] Among them, m i Indicates the ballot index. Each time a vote is conducted, the ballot index m i Add 1.
[0048] Will γ i Sent to share leader l j .
[0049] Determine the false share s generated by the i-th voter to the j-th share leader by the following formula: ij ′:
[0050] s ij ′=f i ′(j)
[0051] Among them, f i ′(j) represents the polynomial f i ′(x) where x is the value of j, and s ij ′Sent to share leader l j .
[0052] Voters again generate a polynomial f containing their true voting choices i (x):
[0053] f i (x) = v i +a1 (i) x+a2 (i) x 2 +...+a t (i) x t
[0054] Among them, v i It represents the votes cast by the coercer. The encrypted ballot index γ during the re-voting is determined by the following formula i .
[0055]
[0056] Among them, m i Indicates the ballot index. Each time a vote is conducted, the ballot index m i Add 1.
[0057] Index the encrypted votes γ i Sent to share leader l j .
[0058] Determine the actual share s generated by the i-th voter to the j-th share leader by the following formula: ij :
[0059] s ij =f i(j)
[0060] Among them, f i (j) represents the polynomial f i In (x), x is the value of j.
[0061] The real share ij Sent to share leader l j .
[0062] Every time a voter is coerced, a false share s can be generated to satisfy the coercer's requirements ij ′ and the true share of voters expressing their voting intentions s ij , achieving deniability.
[0063] (5) Filter out fake shares
[0064] Each share leader l j Encrypted ballot index with own key pair γ i Decrypt to get the index form of the ballot index
[0065]
[0066] The share corresponding to the largest vote index is the real share that expresses the voter's voting intention. The share leader l j Filter out the fake shares to get the real share list, and then calculate the sum of the sub-shares to get the total share s j .
[0067]
[0068] Each share leader l j To your own share j Calculate the commitment vector V j 、The ciphertext vector c j , non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of the corresponding share π j as follows:
[0069]
[0070] Among them, NIZKPK represents the j Non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of .
[0071] The publicly verifiable secret shared vector group (V j ,c j ,π j ) is sent to the total leader L of shares.
[0072] (6) Verify the ballot
[0073] The total leader L is selected from the share leaders l in a round-robin manner. After receiving the secret sharing vector group (V j ,c j ,π j ), first verify the secret shared vector group (V j ,c j ,π j ) and check the following conditions.
[0074] 1) Check the commitment vectors of all share leaders
[0075] Combine y shares into a share set C:
[0076] C={s1,s2,...,s y}
[0077] The dual code C whose inner product with the share set C is 0 is determined by the following formula ⊥ .
[0078] C ⊥ ={u1×h(1),u2×h(2),...,uy×h(y)}
[0079] Where h(y) represents a polynomial of degree yt, with coefficients u1,u2,...,u y Any item in u i Determined by the following formula:
[0080]
[0081] Check the commitment vector V as follows j is a valid (y,t) share.
[0082]
[0083] Among them, c i ⊥ It is C ⊥ The elements in the collection, is the identity element of the G2 group.
[0084] 2) Check the ciphertext shares of all share leaders
[0085] Check the ciphertext shares c of all share leaders as follows j correct:
[0086] e(pk i ,v i )=e(c i ,g2)
[0087] Among them, e(pk i ,vi ) and e(c i ,g2) are all exponential parts of sk i s i The bilinear mapping of
[0088] 3) Check that all non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs are valid
[0089] After verification, the total leader L will receive the t+1 secret sharing vector groups (V j ,c j ,π j ) is aggregated into a secret sharing vector (V,c,π);
[0090] V=V1+V2+…+V t+1
[0091] c=c1+c2+...+c t+1
[0092] π=π1+π2+...+π t+1
[0093] The share leader L sends the certificate and the aggregated secret sharing vector (V, c, π) to the share leader l, which means that the correctness of the share of the share leader l has been verified. After receiving the certificate and the aggregated secret sharing vector (V, c, π), the share leader l verifies the correctness of the aggregated secret sharing vector (V, c, π) to ensure the legitimacy of the share leader L. After the verification is passed, the share leader l will send the share s j and certificates are posted on the notice board.
[0094] (7) Counting of votes
[0095] The total leader L receives the certificate and share s published by the leader l on the bulletin board. j After that, verify the share through the certificate j The source of the verification receives its share s j , after receiving t s j After that, the set S is formed:
[0096] S={s1,s2,...,s t}
[0097] According to Lagrange interpolation, the final counting result B is reconstructed:
[0098]
[0099] Among them, w i represents Lagrange interpolation.
[0100] The counting result B is posted on the bulletin board, which is the decimal code of all candidates, converted into binary form. According to the binary conversion rules, the total number of votes for each candidate is determined. Anyone can calculate the counting result and verify the correctness of the counting result.
[0101] In the step (1) of system initialization of the present invention, the κ is a safety parameter, and the value of κ is 1. 256 ; The p and q are two large prime numbers that meet the security requirements, and q can divide p-1; the value of the large prime number p is 2 521 +887, the value of the large prime number q is 2 521 +2001, large prime number e s The value of is 2 192 -2 64 -1.
[0102] In the voting of step (2) of the present invention, the number y of the share leaders l is in the range of (1,n], and the number n of voters is at least 10.
[0103] In the voting of step (2) of the present invention, the voter polynomial f i (x) t The number of times t is the threshold of secret sharing, and the value of t ranges from y / 3 to y.
[0104] In the voting of step (2) of the present invention, the value of the number y of share leaders is 6.
[0105] Since the present invention adopts an effective anti-coercion voting, when voters are coerced, they can re-vote without the coercer noticing, which effectively solves the security problem of coerced voting. By adopting publicly verifiable secret sharing, the trust of three parties is dispersed to multiple participants, reducing the reliance on a single trusted entity in the re-voting process, and solving the problem of excessive trust requirements for third parties. Publicly verifiable and efficient vote counting is achieved, and any participant, including voters, can calculate the final counting results and verify the accuracy of the counting results. The use of publicly verifiable secret sharing solves the interruption problem. Even if some voters give up voting, the final counting results can still be calculated, which effectively solves the continuity of the voting scheme. The present invention has the advantages of anti-coercion, public verifiability, and efficient vote counting. It provides a new technical solution for anti-coercion voting schemes and can be applied in various electronic voting scenarios. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0106] Figure 1 This is a flow chart of Example 1 of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0107] The present invention is further described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and examples, but the present invention is not limited to the following embodiments.
[0108] Example 1
[0109] The method for resisting coercion electronic voting based on publicly verifiable secret sharing of this embodiment consists of the following steps (see Figure 1 ):
[0110] (1) System initialization
[0111] 1) Generate a share leader key
[0112] The voting administrator sets the security parameter κ for the system, and the value of κ is 1 256 , determine the modulus N according to the following formula:
[0113] N=p×q
[0114] The prime numbers p and q are randomly selected. p and q are two large prime numbers that meet the security requirements, and q can divide p-1. The value of the large prime number p in this embodiment is 2 521 +887, the value of the large prime number q is 2 521 +2001, large prime number e s The value of is 2 192 -2 64 -1. Use the group generation method to generate q-order cyclic multiplication groups G1 and G2, and the cyclic multiplication group G T , is the group of integers modulo q, e is G1×G2→G T A bilinear map of is determined by the following formula
[0115] in, Denotes that the voting administrator randomly selects a large prime number e for each share leader s and an integer k such that e s can divide (q-1), and e s The minimum length is 160 bits. s The length is 160 bits.
[0116] Randomly select a private key sk for each share leader l i , where 1<sk i <e s , e s The value must be at least 2 192 -2 64 -1, e in this embodiment s The value is 2 192 -2 64 -1.
[0117] Determine the public key pk of the share leader l as follows i :
[0118]
[0119] Among them, i represents the number of the share leader, and mod represents the remainder operation.
[0120] 2) Candidate Coding
[0121] The candidates are (C1, C2, …, C m ), the voters are (V1,V2,...,V n ), m represents the number of candidates, n represents the number of voters, m and n are finite positive integers, and the specific values of m and n should be determined according to the specific circumstances of the election process. The voting administrator encodes the candidates and determines the binary encoding bit λ of each candidate according to the following formula:
[0122]
[0123] Determine the code EC for each candidate as follows z :
[0124]
[0125] Among them, z represents the serial number of the candidate, z∈[1,m], the value of z is determined according to the actual situation of the candidate during the election, and j is the bit index in the binary code, j∈[1,λ].
[0126] EC z Convert to decimal and post on the bulletin board.
[0127] (2) Voting
[0128] Each voter generates a voter polynomial f based on the candidate decimal code posted on the bulletin board i (x):
[0129] f i (x) = v i +a1 (i) x+a2 (i) x 2 +...+a t (i) x t
[0130] Among them, v i represents the voter's vote, which is the decimal representation of the candidate's choice, hidden in the polynomial f i In (x), a1 (i) ,a2 (i) ,...at (i) is the polynomial coefficient, which takes a finite positive integer value. t represents the polynomial f i In (x), x is the number of times, t is the threshold of secret sharing, and the value of t is y / 3~y. In this embodiment, the value of t is y / 2. The voter's ballot and polynomial are kept secret and not disclosed to the public.
[0131] There are y share leaders l, and voters generate y shares s according to the number of share leaders l. ij , i represents the serial number of the voter, i∈[1,n], j represents the serial number of the share leader l, j∈[1,y], y is a finite positive integer, and the value of the number y of the share leaders l in this embodiment is 6. The value range of the number y of the share leaders l in this embodiment is (1,n], and the value of the number of voters n is at least 10. The specific values of the share leaders l and the number of voters n should be determined according to the specific circumstances of the election.
[0132] Determine the share l given by the i-th voter to the j-th leader by the following formula: j Generated shares ij :
[0133] s ij =f i (j)
[0134] Among them, f i (j) represents the polynomial f i In (x), x is the value of j.
[0135] Will s ij Sent to the jth share leader l j .
[0136] Since the present invention adopts an effective anti-coercion voting, when voters are coerced, they can re-vote without the coercer being aware of it, which effectively solves the security problem of coerced voting.
[0137] (3) Generate Share
[0138] Each share leader l j After receiving the shares sent by voters, determine your total share s according to the following formula j :
[0139]
[0140] Each share leader l j To your own share j Calculate the commitment vector V j 、The ciphertext vector c j , non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of the corresponding share π j as follows:
[0141]
[0142] Among them, NIZKPK represents the j Non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of .
[0143] The secret sharing vector group (V j ,c j ,π j ) is sent to the total leader L of shares.
[0144] (4) Re-vote
[0145] When voters are coerced, a polynomial f containing false votes is generated i ′(x):
[0146] f i ′(x)=v i ′+a1 (i) x+a2 (i) x 2 +...+a t (i) x t
[0147] Among them, v i ′ represents the vote cast by the coercer, and the encrypted ballot index γ is determined by the following formula i :
[0148]
[0149] Among them, m i Indicates the ballot index. Each time a vote is conducted, the ballot index m i Add 1.
[0150] Will γ i Sent to share leader l j .
[0151] Determine the false share s generated by the i-th voter to the j-th share leader by the following formula: ij ′:
[0152] s ij ′=f i ′(j)
[0153] Among them, f i ′(j) represents the polynomial f i ′(x) where x is the value of j, and s ij ′Sent to share leader l j .
[0154] Voters again generate a polynomial f containing their true voting choices i (x):
[0155] f i (x) = v i +a1 (i) x+a2 (i) x 2 +...+a t (i) x t
[0156] Among them, v i Represents the votes cast by the coercer. The encrypted ballot index γ for re-voting is determined by the following formula i :
[0157]
[0158] Among them, m i Indicates the ballot index. Each time a vote is conducted, the ballot index m i Add 1.
[0159] Index the encrypted votes γ i Sent to share leader l j .
[0160] Determine the actual share s generated by the i-th voter to the j-th share leader by the following formula: ij :
[0161] s ij =f i (j)
[0162] Among them, f i (j) represents the polynomial f i In (x), x is the value of j.
[0163] The real share ij Sent to share leader l j .
[0164] Every time a voter is coerced, a false share s can be generated to satisfy the coercer's requirements ij ′ and the true share of voters expressing their voting intentions s ij , achieving deniability.
[0165] (5) Filter out fake shares
[0166] Each share leader l j Encrypted ballot index with own key pair γ i Decrypt to get the index form of the ballot index
[0167]
[0168] The share corresponding to the largest vote index is the real share that expresses the voter's voting intention. The share leader l j Filter out the fake shares to get the real share list, and then calculate the sum of the sub-shares to get the total share s j :
[0169]
[0170] Each share leader l j To your own share j Calculate the commitment vector V j 、The ciphertext vector c j , non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of the corresponding share π j as follows:
[0171]
[0172]
[0173] Among them, NIZKPK represents the j Non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of .
[0174] The publicly verifiable secret shared vector group (V j ,c j ,π j ) is sent to the total leader L of shares.
[0175] (6) Verify the ballot
[0176] The total leader L is selected from the share leaders l in a round-robin manner. After receiving the secret sharing vector group (V j ,c j ,π j ), first verify the secret shared vector group (V j ,c j ,π j ) and check the following conditions.
[0177] 1) Check the commitment vectors of all share leaders
[0178] Combine y shares into a share set C:
[0179] C={s1,s2,…,s y}
[0180] The dual code C whose inner product with the share set C is 0 is determined by the following formula ⊥ :
[0181] C⊥ ={u1×h(1),u2×h(2),…,u y ×h(y)}
[0182] Where h(y) represents a polynomial of degree yt, with coefficients u1,u2,...,u y Any item in u i Determined by the following formula.
[0183]
[0184] Check the commitment vector V as follows j is a valid (y,t) share:
[0185]
[0186] Among them, c i ⊥ It is C ⊥ The elements in the collection, is the identity element of the G2 group;
[0187] 2) Check the ciphertext shares of all share leaders
[0188] Check the ciphertext shares c of all share leaders as follows j correct:
[0189] e(pk i ,v i )=e(c i ,g2)
[0190] Among them, e(pk i ,v i ) and e( c i,g2) are all exponential parts of sk i s i The bilinear mapping of
[0191] 3) Check that all non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs are valid
[0192] After verification, the total leader L will receive the t+1 secret sharing vector groups (V j ,c j ,π j ) is aggregated into a secret shared vector (V,c,π):
[0193] V=V1+V2+...+V t+1
[0194] c=c1+c2+...+c t+1
[0195] π=π1+π2+...+π t+1
[0196] The share leader L sends the certificate and the aggregated secret sharing vector (V, c, π) to the share leader l, which means that the correctness of the share of the share leader l has been verified. After receiving the certificate and the aggregated secret sharing vector (V, c, π), the share leader l verifies the correctness of the aggregated secret sharing vector (V, c, π) to ensure the legitimacy of the share leader L. After the verification is passed, the share leader l will send the share s j and certificates are posted on the notice board.
[0197] Since the present invention adopts publicly verifiable secret sharing, the trust of three parties is dispersed to multiple participants, reducing the reliance on a single trusted entity during the re-voting process, and solving the problem of excessive trust requirements for third parties. Publicly verifiable and efficient vote counting is achieved, and any participant, including voters, can calculate the final counting results and verify the accuracy of the counting results. The use of publicly verifiable secret sharing solves the problem of interruption. Even if some voters give up voting, the final counting results can still be calculated, effectively solving the continuity of the voting plan.
[0198] (7) Counting of votes
[0199] The total leader L receives the certificate and share s published by the leader l on the bulletin board. j After that, verify the share through the certificate j The source of the verification receives its share s j , after receiving t s j After that, the set S is formed:
[0200] S={s1,s2,...,s t}
[0201] According to Lagrange interpolation, the final counting result B is reconstructed:
[0202]
[0203]
[0204] Among them, w i represents Lagrange interpolation.
[0205] The counting result B is posted on the bulletin board, which is the decimal code of all candidates, converted into binary form. According to the binary conversion rules, the total number of votes for each candidate is determined. Anyone can calculate the counting result and verify the correctness of the counting result.
[0206] Completed a coercion-resistant electronic voting method based on publicly verifiable secret sharing.
[0207] Example 2
[0208] The anti-coercion electronic voting method based on publicly verifiable secret sharing of this embodiment consists of the following steps:
[0209] (1) System initialization
[0210] This step is the same as in Example 1.
[0211] (2) Voting
[0212] Each voter generates a voter polynomial f based on the candidate decimal code posted on the bulletin board i (x):
[0213] f i (x) = v i +a1 (i) x+a2 (i) x 2 +...+a t (i) x t
[0214] Among them, v i represents the voter's vote, which is the decimal representation of the candidate's choice, hidden in the polynomial f i In (x), a1 (i) ,a2(i ) ,...a t (i) is the polynomial coefficient, which takes a finite positive integer value. t represents the polynomial f i In (x), x is the number of times, t is the threshold of secret sharing, and the value of t is y / 3~y. In this embodiment, the value of t is y / 3. The voter's ballot and polynomial are kept secret and not disclosed to the public.
[0215] There are y share leaders l, and voters generate y shares s according to the number of share leaders l. ij , i represents the serial number of the voter, i∈[1,n], j represents the serial number of the share leader l, j∈[1,y], y is a finite positive integer, and the value of the number of share leaders y in this embodiment is 6. The value range of the number of share leaders l in this embodiment is (1,n], and the value of the number of voters n is at least 10. The specific values of the share leaders l and the number of voters n should be determined according to the specific circumstances of the election.
[0216] The other steps of this step are the same as those in Example 1.
[0217] The other steps are the same as those in Example 1.
[0218] Completed a coercion-resistant electronic voting method based on publicly verifiable secret sharing.
[0219] Example 3
[0220] The anti-coercion electronic voting method based on publicly verifiable secret sharing of this embodiment consists of the following steps:
[0221] (1) System initialization
[0222] This step is the same as in Example 1.
[0223] (2) Voting
[0224] Each voter generates a voter polynomial f based on the candidate decimal code posted on the bulletin board i (x):
[0225] f i (x) = v i +a1 (i) x+a2 (i) x 2 +...+a t (i) x t
[0226] Among them, v i represents the voter's vote, which is the decimal representation of the candidate's choice, hidden in the polynomial f i In (x), a1 (i) ,a2 (i) ,...a t (i) is the polynomial coefficient, which takes a finite positive integer value. t represents the polynomial f i In (x), x is the number of times, t is the threshold of secret sharing, and the value of t is y / 3~y. In this embodiment, the value of t is y. The voter's ballot and polynomial are kept secret and not disclosed to the public.
[0227] There are y share leaders l, and voters generate y shares s according to the number of share leaders l. ij , i represents the serial number of the voter, i∈[1,n], j represents the serial number of the share leader l, j∈[1,y], y is a finite positive integer, and the value of the number of share leaders y in this embodiment is 6. The value range of the number of share leaders l in this embodiment is (1,n], and the value of the number of voters n is at least 10. The specific values of the share leaders l and the number of voters n should be determined according to the specific circumstances of the election.
[0228] The other steps of this step are the same as those in Example 1.
[0229] The other steps are the same as those in Example 1.
[0230] Completed a coercion-resistant electronic voting method based on publicly verifiable secret sharing.
[0231] Example 4
[0232] In the above embodiments 1 to 3, the anti-coercion electronic voting method based on publicly verifiable secret sharing of this embodiment consists of the following steps:
[0233] (1) System initialization
[0234] 1) Generate a share leader key
[0235] The voting administrator sets the security parameter κ for the system, and the value of κ is 1 256 , determine the modulus N according to the following formula:
[0236] N=p×q
[0237] The prime numbers p and q are randomly selected. p and q are two large prime numbers that meet the security requirements, and q can divide p-1. The value of the large prime number p in this embodiment is 2 521 +887, the value of the large prime number q is 2 521 +2001, large prime number e s The value of is 2 192 -2 64 -1. Use the group generation method to generate q-order cyclic multiplication groups G1 and G2, and the cyclic multiplication group G T , is the group of integers modulo q, e is G1×G2→G T A bilinear map of is determined by the following formula
[0238] in, Denotes that the voting administrator randomly selects a large prime number e for each share leader s and an integer k such that e s can divide (q-1), and e s The minimum length is 160 bits. s The length is 248 bits.
[0239] Randomly select a private key sk for each share leader l i , where 1<sk i <e s , e s The value must be at least 2 192 -2 64 -1, e in this embodiment s The value is 2 231 +2 16 +1.
[0240] Determine the public key pk of the share leader l as follows i :
[0241]
[0242] Among them, i represents the number of the share leader, and mod represents the remainder operation.
[0243] 2) Candidate Coding
[0244] This step is the same as in Example 1.
[0245] The other steps are the same as those in the corresponding embodiment.
[0246] Completed a coercion-resistant electronic voting method based on publicly verifiable secret sharing.
Claims
1. A method for electronic voting that is resistant to coercion based on publicly verifiable secret sharing, characterized in that It consists of the following steps: (1) System initialization 1) Generate a share leader key The voting administrator sets the security parameter κ for the system, and the value of κ is 1 256 , determine the modulus N according to the following formula: N=p×q Among them, prime numbers p and q are randomly selected, and the q-order cyclic multiplication groups G1 and G2 are generated by the group generation method. T , is the group of integers modulo q, e is G1×G2→G T A bilinear map of is determined by the following formula in, Denotes that the voting administrator randomly selects a large prime number e for each share leader s and an integer k such that e s can divide (q-1), and e s The minimum length is 160 bits; Randomly select a private key sk for each share leader l i , where 1<sk i <e s , e s The value must be at least 2 192 -2 64 -1; Determine the public key pk of the share leader l as follows i : Among them, i represents the number of the share leader, and mod represents the modulus operation; 2) Candidate Coding The candidates are (C1, C2,, C m ), the voters are (V1,V2,,V n ), m represents the number of candidates, n represents the number of voters, m and n are finite positive integers, and the voting administrator encodes the candidates and determines the binary encoding bit λ of each candidate as follows: Determine the code EC for each candidate as follows z : Where z represents the candidate’s serial number, z∈[1,m], j is the bit index in the binary code, j∈[1,λ]; EC z Convert to decimal and post on the bulletin board; (2) Voting Each voter generates a voter polynomial f based on the candidate decimal code posted on the bulletin board i (x): f i (x)=v i +a1 (i) x+a2 (i) x 2 +…+a t (i) x t Among them, v i represents the voter's vote, which is the decimal representation of the candidate's choice, hidden in the polynomial f i In (x), a1 (i) ,a2 (i) ,a t (i) is the coefficient of the polynomial, which is a finite positive integer. t represents the degree of x in the polynomial. The voter's ballot and the polynomial are kept secret and not disclosed to the public. There are y share leaders l, and voters generate y shares s according to the number of share leaders l. ij , i represents the voter’s serial number, i∈[1,n], j represents the serial number of the share leader l, j∈[1,y], y is a finite positive integer; Determine the share l given by the i-th voter to the j-th leader by the following formula: j Generated shares ij : s ij =f i (j) Among them, f i (j) represents the polynomial f i (x) where x is the value of j; Will s ij Sent to the jth share leader l j ; (3) Generate Share Each share leader l j After receiving the shares sent by voters, determine your total share s according to the following formula j : Each share leader l j To your own share j Calculate the commitment vector V j 、The ciphertext vector c j , non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of the corresponding share π j as follows: Among them, NIZKPK represents the j Non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of The secret sharing vector group (V j ,c j ,π j ) is sent to the total leader L; (4) Re-vote When voters are coerced, a polynomial f containing false votes is generated i ′(x): f i ′(x)=v i ′+a1 (i) x+a2 (i) x 2 +…+a t (i) x t Among them, v i ′ represents the vote cast by the coercer, and the encrypted ballot index γ is determined by the following formula i : Among them, m i Indicates the ballot index. Each time a vote is conducted, the ballot index m i Add 1; Will γ i Sent to share leader l j ; Determine the false share s generated by the i-th voter to the j-th share leader by the following formula: ij ′: s ij ′=f i ′(j) Among them, f i ′(j) represents the polynomial f i ′(x) where x is the value of j, and s ij ′Sent to share leader l j ; Voters again generate a polynomial f containing their true voting choices i (x): f i (x)=v i +a1 (i) x+a2 (i) x 2 +…+a t (i) x t Among them, v i It represents the votes cast by the coercer. The encrypted ballot index γ during the re-voting is determined by the following formula i : Among them, m i Indicates the ballot index. Each time a vote is conducted, the ballot index m i Add 1; Index the encrypted votes γ i Sent to share leader l j ; Determine the actual share s generated by the i-th voter to the j-th share leader by the following formula: ij : s ij =f i (j) Among them, f i (j) represents the polynomial f i (x) where x is the value of j; The real share ij Sent to share leader l j ; Every time a voter is coerced, a false share s can be generated to satisfy the coercer's requirements ij ′ and the true share of voters expressing their voting intentions s ij , achieving deniability; (5) Filter out fake shares Each share leader l j Encrypted ballot index with own key pair γ i Decrypt to get the index form of the ballot index The share corresponding to the largest vote index is the real share that expresses the voter's voting intention. The share leader l j Filter out the fake shares to get the real share list, and then calculate the sum of the sub-shares to get the total share s j : Each share leader l j To your own share j Calculate the commitment vector V j 、The ciphertext vector c j , non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of the corresponding share π j as follows: Among them, NIZKPK represents the j Non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of The publicly verifiable secret shared vector group (V j ,c j ,π j ) is sent to the total leader L; (6) Verify the ballot The total leader L is selected from the share leaders l in a round-robin manner. After receiving the secret sharing vector group (V j ,c j ,π j ), first verify the secret shared vector group (V j ,c j ,π j ) and check the following conditions: 1) Check the commitment vectors of all share leaders Combine y shares into a share set C: C={s1,s2,…,s y } The dual code C whose inner product with the share set C is 0 is determined by the following formula ⊥ : C ⊥ ={u1×h(1),u2×h(2),…,u y ×h(y)} Where h(y) represents a polynomial of degree yt, with coefficients u1,u2,…,u y Any item in u i Determined by the following formula: Check the commitment vector V as follows j is a valid (y,t) share: Among them, c i ⊥ It is C ⊥ The elements in the collection, is the identity element of the G2 group; 2) Check the ciphertext shares of all share leaders Check the ciphertext shares c of all share leaders as follows j correct: e(pk i ,v i )=e(c i ,g2) Among them, e(pk i ,v i ) and e( c i,g2) are all exponential parts sk i s i The bilinear mapping of 3) Check that all non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs are valid After verification, the total leader L will receive the t+1 secret sharing vector groups (V j ,c j ,π j ) is aggregated into a secret shared vector (V,c,π): V=V1+V2+…+V t+1 c=c1+c2+…+c t+1 π=π1+π2+…+π t+1 The share leader L sends the certificate and the aggregated secret sharing vector (V, c, π) to the share leader l, which means that the correctness of the share of the share leader l has been verified. After receiving the certificate and the aggregated secret sharing vector (V, c, π), the share leader l verifies the correctness of the aggregated secret sharing vector (V, c, π) to ensure the legitimacy of the share leader L. After the verification is passed, the share leader l will send the share s j and certificates are posted on the notice board; (7) Counting of votes The total leader L receives the certificate and share s published by the leader l on the bulletin board. j After that, verify the share through the certificate j The source of the verification receives its share s j , after receiving t s j After that, the set S is formed: S={s1,s2,,s t } According to Lagrange interpolation, the final counting result B is reconstructed: Among them, w i Represents Lagrange interpolation; the counting result B is posted on the bulletin board, which is the decimal code of all candidates, converted into binary form, and the total number of votes for each candidate is determined according to the binary conversion rules. Anyone can calculate the counting result and verify the correctness of the counting result.
2. The method for resisting coercion of electronic voting based on publicly verifiable secret sharing according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step (1) system initialization, the κ is a safety parameter, and the value of κ is 1. 256 ; The p and q are two large prime numbers that meet the security requirements, and q can divide p-1; the value of the large prime number p is 2 521 +887, the value of the large prime number q is 2 521 +2001, large prime number e s The value of is 2 192 -2 64 -1.
3. The method for resisting coercion of electronic voting based on publicly verifiable secret sharing according to claim 1, characterized in that: In the voting of step (2), the number y of the share leaders l is in the range of (1,n], and the number n of voters is at least 10.
4. The method for resisting coercion of electronic voting based on publicly verifiable secret sharing according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step (2) voting, the voter polynomial f i (x) t The number of times t is the threshold of secret sharing, and the value of t ranges from y / 3 to y.
5. The method for resisting coercion of electronic voting based on publicly verifiable secret sharing according to claim 1 or 3, characterized in that: In the voting in step (2), the number y of the share leaders is 6.
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CN119853901A
