Network anti-reconnaissance method based on JavaScript user fingerprints

Through the network anti-reconnaissance method based on the fingerprint of JavaScript users, network reconnaissance attacks conducted using proxy IP are identified and blocked, which solves the problem that traditional technology is difficult to identify and intercept such attacks, and achieves high accuracy and high security network protection.

CN118944954APending Publication Date: 2024-11-12E SURFING VIDEO MEDIA CO LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202411174388.7
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-08-26
Publication Date
2024-11-12

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Traditional technology is difficult to effectively identify and intercept network reconnaissance attacks conducted using proxy IP, frequent IP replacement, etc., resulting in device performance overload and security policy failure.

Method used

Using a network anti-reconnaissance method based on JavaScript user fingerprint, it uses real-time monitoring of network data traffic, sets detection thresholds, uses FingerprintJS method to generate a unique fingerprint, and associate it with a legal IP address to realize the identification and blocking of suspicious user identity, ensuring that even the attacker is attacked. Changing the IP can also identify its identity.

Benefits of technology

It improves identification accuracy and security, reduces the false alarm rate, and can effectively deal with frequent IP replacement and instant IP reconnaissance activities to ensure network security.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The invention relates to the technical field of network security, and provides a network anti-reconnaissance method based on JavaScript user fingerprints, which comprises the following steps: S1, monitoring network data traffic in real time, and focusing on user data with abnormal access traffic; s2, a first detection threshold value theta 1 is set, the network full-flow detection device is combined to study and judge whether the user access behavior accords with the characteristics of the network reconnaissance behavior, and abnormal behavior characteristic flow comprises scanning, vulnerability attacks, malicious behaviors and the like, S2, a first detection threshold value theta 1 is set, and the network full-flow detection device is combined to study and judge the abnormal behavior characteristic flow carried in the S1 in the user access flow, and if a set first threshold value theta 1 is exceeded in the reconnaissance window period T1, namely f1 frequency cardinal number = [(T1 suspicious traffic number L1) / (reconnaissance window period T1)] > = a first detection threshold value theta 1, the user is suspected to be a suspicious user. According to the method, the false alarm rate can be effectively reduced, and the accuracy of network reconnaissance behavior judgment is improved.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of network security, and in particular to a network anti-reconnaissance method based on JavaScript user fingerprint. Background Art

[0002] With the popularization of the Internet, the Internet has facilitated people's lives and enriched people's communication. At the same time, network attacks have also emerged in an endless stream. In the process of Internet interaction, IP addresses are the main transmission channel and are often used to identify and track important information about user behavior. However, this information is sometimes used maliciously, such as frequently changing proxy IPs, dialing IPs in seconds, etc. to carry out malicious network attacks.

[0003] Attackers often use proxy IPs and frequently change IPs to conduct network reconnaissance attacks in order to evade network supervision and technical prevention. However, traditional technical solutions mainly use security protection measures such as automatic IP address blocking, setting security protection thresholds, and keyword filtering. These methods are indeed effective in the short term, but they are not a long-term solution. Reconnaissance attackers also use other means to bypass these security policies; for example, second-dial IP is one means. This reconnaissance attack method is difficult to intercept and it is difficult to distinguish between users and network reconnaissance. Often, an IP is changed every time an attack is carried out. The device constantly triggers automatic IP blocking, causing the device performance to overload and the business to be affected. Secondly, with the support of second-dial technology, the blocking strategy set by the user will be "invalid". Therefore, it is necessary to study an efficient and accurate method to resist network reconnaissance. Summary of the invention

[0004] In view of the above problems, the present invention provides a network anti-reconnaissance method based on JavaScript user fingerprint, which can effectively prevent attackers from using proxy IP, frequent IP changes and other means to conduct network reconnaissance, thereby ensuring network security.

[0005] To solve the above problems, the technical solution adopted by the present invention is:

[0006] A network anti-reconnaissance method based on JavaScript user fingerprint includes the following steps:

[0007] S1, real-time monitoring of network data traffic, focusing on user data with abnormal access traffic; combined with network full-flow detection equipment to determine whether the user's access behavior meets the characteristics of network reconnaissance behavior. Abnormal behavior characteristic traffic includes scanning, vulnerability attacks, malicious behavior, etc.

[0008] S2, set the first detection threshold θ1, combine the network full flow detection equipment to judge and detect the user's access flow carrying the abnormal behavior characteristic flow in S1, and exceed the set first threshold θ1 within the reconnaissance window period T1, that is, f1 frequency base = [(suspicious flow number L1 within T1) / (reconnaissance window period T1)] ≥ first detection threshold θ1, that is, it is suspected to be a suspicious user,

[0009] S3: For suspicious users, the detection and collection module sends the FingerprintJS method to the browser to extract the suspicious user's JavaScript fingerprint information. After the collection is completed, the collected information is sent back to the server.

[0010] S4, encryption operation generates a unique fingerprint, and the suspicious user's fingerprint is stored in a separate verification area, isolated, and associated with the "legal" IP address to achieve suspicious user identity fingerprint-IP binding. If the packet is received again, it is compared. If it meets the pre-stored suspicious user identity fingerprint-IP binding, step S5 is executed; if it does not meet the pre-stored suspicious user identity fingerprint-IP binding, step S3 is executed.

[0011] S5, set the second detection threshold θ2. When the suspicious user sends a network request for access again, the identity fingerprint and the request will be sent to the server. If the second threshold θ2 is exceeded within the reconnaissance window period T2, f2 frequency base = [(suspicious traffic number L2 within T2) / (reconnaissance window period T2)] ≥ second detection threshold θ2, and it meets the pre-stored suspicious user identity fingerprint-IP binding, then the suspicious user identity becomes a network reconnaissance person, and the full flow device will automatically block the application layer security device, where T2≤T1. Secondary detection and secondary judgment are performed here. The network reconnaissance traffic is reconnaissanceed through two security thresholds. The f2 frequency base and the f1 frequency base in S2 are important reference bases. The main purpose of the f2 frequency base is to increase accuracy and authenticity.

[0012] S6. If the network spy changes the IP, the user fingerprint information in the verification area will not change. The server will still compare it with the existing user identity fingerprint information. Even if the attacker changes the IP, the attacker's identity can still be identified. If it hits, it means that the suspicious user who visited this time has visited the system before, and is still the previous network spy. The system will be blocked and the cycle will repeat.

[0013] Preferably, in step S1, a traffic monitoring module is used to monitor network data traffic in real time, focusing on user data with abnormal access traffic; and combined with network full traffic detection equipment for analysis and judgment.

[0014] Preferably, in step S3, the detection and collection module generates a unique JavaScript user fingerprint using the FingerprintJS method, and the fingerprint can represent the user's browser information, device information, etc.

[0015] Preferably, in step S3, the server is equipped with a built-in fingerprint verification module for verifying the suspicious user's fingerprint and whether the user's fingerprint matches the pre-stored suspicious fingerprint; if they match, it is the scout; if not, it is regenerated and stored.

[0016] Preferably, in step S4, the fingerprint-IP address of the suspicious user is recorded in a fingerprint-IP address maintenance module, and an association table is maintained to further confirm whether the suspicious user is a scout.

[0017] Preferably, in steps S2 and S5, the first detection threshold and the second detection threshold are detected and analyzed by a threshold detection module.

[0018] Preferably, in step S6, a linkage execution module is used to link security devices such as WAF to perform precise blocking and blocking to prevent scout attacks, malicious second dialing and other behaviors.

[0019] The beneficial effects of the present invention are:

[0020] 1. High accuracy and low false alarm rate: Through the first detection threshold and the second detection threshold, the false alarm rate is reduced and the accuracy is improved.

[0021] 2. Strong response capability: By extracting JavaScript fingerprint information and device information from the user's browser, a unique fingerprint is generated to effectively identify the identity of the network spy user; it is associated with the pre-stored legitimate IP address to respond to situations such as frequent IP changes and second-dial IP spying.

[0022] 3. High security: Encryption technology is used to ensure the security of data transmission of suspicious user fingerprints and legitimate IP addresses. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0023] Figure 1 It is a framework diagram of the present invention;

[0024] Figure 2 It is a flow chart of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0025] The following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention to clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0026] In the description of the present invention, it should be understood that the terms "center", "longitudinal", "lateral", "length", "width", "thickness", "up", "down", "front", "back", "left", "right", "vertical", "horizontal", "top", "bottom", "inside", "outside", "clockwise", "counterclockwise" and the like indicate orientations or positional relationships based on the orientations or positional relationships shown in the accompanying drawings, and are only for the convenience of describing the present invention and simplifying the description, and do not indicate or imply that the referred device or element must have a specific orientation, be constructed and operated in a specific orientation, and therefore should not be understood as limiting the present invention.

[0027] In addition, the terms "first" and "second" are only used for descriptive purposes and cannot be understood as indicating or implying relative importance or implicitly indicating the number of technical features indicated. Therefore, the features defined as "first" and "second" may explicitly or implicitly include one or more of the features. In the description of the present invention, "multiple" means two or more, unless otherwise clearly and specifically defined. In addition, the terms "installed", "connected" and "connected" should be understood in a broad sense, for example, it can be a fixed connection, a detachable connection, or an integral connection; it can be a mechanical connection or an electrical connection; it can be a direct connection, or it can be indirectly connected through an intermediate medium, or it can be the internal connection of two components. For those of ordinary skill in the art, the specific meanings of the above terms in the present invention can be understood according to specific circumstances.

[0028] Reference Figure 1-2 , a network anti-reconnaissance method based on JavaScript user fingerprint, comprising the following steps:

[0029] S1, real-time monitoring of network data traffic, focusing on user data with abnormal access traffic; combined with network full-flow detection equipment to determine whether the user's access behavior meets the characteristics of network reconnaissance behavior. Abnormal behavior characteristic traffic includes scanning, vulnerability attacks, malicious behavior, etc.

[0030] S2, set the first detection threshold θ1, combine the network full flow detection equipment to judge and detect the user's access flow carrying the abnormal behavior characteristic flow in S1, and exceed the set first threshold θ1 within the reconnaissance window period T1, that is, f1 frequency base = [(suspicious flow number L1 within T1) / (reconnaissance window period T1)] ≥ first detection threshold θ1, that is, it is suspected to be a suspicious user,

[0031] S3: For suspicious users, the detection and collection module sends the FingerprintJS method to the browser to extract the suspicious user's JavaScript fingerprint information. After the collection is completed, the collected information is sent back to the server.

[0032] S4, encryption operation generates a unique fingerprint, and the suspicious user's fingerprint is stored in a separate verification area, isolated, and associated with the "legal" IP address to achieve suspicious user identity fingerprint-IP binding. If the packet is received again, it is compared. If it meets the pre-stored suspicious user identity fingerprint-IP binding, step S5 is executed; if it does not meet the pre-stored suspicious user identity fingerprint-IP binding, step S3 is executed.

[0033] S5, set the second detection threshold θ2. When the suspicious user sends a network request for access again, the identity fingerprint and the request will be sent to the server. If the second threshold θ2 is exceeded within the reconnaissance window period T2, f2 frequency base = [(suspicious traffic number L2 within T2) / (reconnaissance window period T2)] ≥ second detection threshold θ2, and it meets the pre-stored suspicious user identity fingerprint-IP binding, then the suspicious user identity becomes a network reconnaissance person, and the full flow device will automatically block the application layer security device, where T2≤T1. Secondary detection and secondary judgment are performed here. The network reconnaissance traffic is reconnaissanceed through two security thresholds. The f2 frequency base and the f1 frequency base in S2 are important reference bases. The main purpose of the f2 frequency base is to increase accuracy and authenticity.

[0034] S6. If the network spy changes the IP, the user fingerprint information in the verification area will not change. The server will still compare it with the existing user identity fingerprint information. Even if the attacker changes the IP, the attacker's identity can still be identified. If it hits, it means that the suspicious user who visited this time has visited the system before, and is still the previous network spy. The system will be blocked and the cycle will repeat.

[0035] Furthermore, in step S1, a traffic monitoring module is used to monitor network data traffic in real time, focusing on user data with abnormal access traffic; combined with network full traffic detection equipment for analysis and judgment.

[0036] Furthermore, in step S3, the detection and collection module generates a unique JavaScript user fingerprint using the FingerprintJS method, and the fingerprint can represent the user's browser information, device information, etc.

[0037] Furthermore, in step S3, the server has a built-in fingerprint verification module for verifying the suspicious user's fingerprint and whether the user's fingerprint matches the pre-stored suspicious fingerprint; if they match, it is the scout; if not, it is regenerated and stored.

[0038] Furthermore, in step S4, the fingerprint-IP address of the suspicious user is recorded in a fingerprint-IP address maintenance module, and an association table is maintained to further confirm whether the suspicious user is a scout.

[0039] Furthermore, in steps S2 and S5, the first detection threshold and the second detection threshold are detected and analyzed by the threshold detection module.

[0040] Furthermore, in step S6, the linkage execution module is used to link the security devices such as WAF to perform precise blocking and blocking to prevent scout attacks, malicious second dialing and other behaviors.

[0041] In summary, an innovative and effective solution is provided to deal with the problem of attackers frequently changing IPs in network reconnaissance attacks. The method mainly includes the following steps: First, the network data traffic is monitored in real time through the traffic monitoring module, focusing on the user data with abnormal access traffic, and combined with the network full traffic detection equipment to determine whether the user access behavior conforms to the characteristics of network reconnaissance behavior, such as scanning, vulnerability attacks, malicious behavior, etc. Next, the first detection threshold is set. If the user access traffic carries abnormal behavior characteristic traffic within the reconnaissance window period T1 and exceeds the threshold, it is suspected that the user is a suspicious user. For suspicious users, the detection and collection module will send the FingerprintJS method to the browser, extract the suspicious user JavaScript fingerprint information and send it back to the server. Then, the server performs encryption calculations to generate a unique fingerprint, stores it in a separate verification area, and associates it with a "legal" IP address. If the packet is received again and is compared with the pre-stored suspicious user identity fingerprint-IP binding, the second detection threshold is set. When the suspicious user sends a network request to access again, if it exceeds the second threshold within the reconnaissance window period T2 and meets the fingerprint-IP binding, the suspicious user's identity becomes a network reconnaissance device, and the full-flow device will automatically block the application layer security device. If the network reconnaissance device changes its IP, the server will compare it with the existing user identity fingerprint information, identify its attacker identity and block it in a loop.

[0042] This method has a significant effect. On the one hand, it has high accuracy and low false alarm rate. Through the analysis of the first detection and second detection thresholds, the false alarm rate can be effectively reduced and the accuracy of the judgment of network reconnaissance behavior can be improved. On the other hand, it has strong response capabilities. The FingerprintJS method is used to generate a unique JavaScript user fingerprint, which can represent the user's browser information, device information, etc., and combined with the association with the pre-stored legal IP address, it can effectively deal with frequent IP changes, second-dial IP reconnaissance and other situations. In addition, it has high security. The use of encryption technology ensures the security of data transmission of suspicious user fingerprints and legal IP addresses, provides a strong guarantee for network security, effectively prevents attackers from using proxy IPs, frequent IP changes and other means to conduct network reconnaissance, and effectively protects network security and system asset security.

[0043] The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the present invention. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc. made within the spirit and principle of the present invention should be included in the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A network anti-reconnaissance method based on JavaScript user fingerprint, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: S1, real-time monitoring of network data traffic, focusing on user data with abnormal access traffic; combined with network full-flow detection equipment, determine whether the user's access behavior meets the characteristics of network reconnaissance behavior. Abnormal behavior characteristic traffic includes scanning, vulnerability attacks, malicious behavior, etc.; S2, set the first detection threshold θ1, combine the network full flow detection equipment to judge and detect the user's access flow carrying the abnormal behavior characteristic flow in S1, and exceed the set first threshold θ1 within the reconnaissance window period T1, that is, f1 frequency base = [(suspicious flow number L1 within T1) / (reconnaissance window period T1)] ≥ first detection threshold θ1, that is, it is suspected to be a suspicious user; S3: For suspicious users, the detection and collection module sends the FingerprintJS method to the browser to extract the JavaScript fingerprint information of the suspicious user. After the collection is completed, the collected information is sent back to the server. S4, encryption operation generates a unique fingerprint, stores the suspicious user's fingerprint in a separate verification area, isolates it, and associates it with the "legal" IP address to achieve suspicious user identity fingerprint-IP binding. If the packet is received again, it is compared. If it meets the pre-stored suspicious user identity fingerprint-IP binding, execute step S5; if it does not meet the pre-stored suspicious user identity fingerprint-IP binding, execute step S3; S5, set the second detection threshold θ2. When the suspicious user sends a network request for access again, the identity fingerprint and the request will be sent to the server together. If the second threshold θ2 is exceeded within the reconnaissance window period T2, f2 frequency base = [(suspicious traffic number L2 within T2) / (reconnaissance window period T2)] ≥ second detection threshold θ2, and it meets the pre-stored suspicious user identity fingerprint-IP binding, then the suspicious user identity becomes a network reconnaissance person, and the full flow device will automatically block the application layer security device in conjunction with T2≤T1. Secondary detection and secondary judgment are performed here. The network reconnaissance traffic is reconnaissanceed through two security thresholds. The f2 frequency base and the f1 frequency base in S2 are important reference bases. The main purpose of the f2 frequency base is to increase accuracy and authenticity. S6. If the network spy changes the IP, the user fingerprint information in the verification area will not change. The server will still compare it with the existing user identity fingerprint information. Even if the attacker changes the IP, the attacker's identity can still be identified. If it hits, it means that the suspicious user who visited this time has visited the system before, and is still the previous network spy. The system will be blocked and the cycle will repeat.

2. According to claim 1, a network anti-reconnaissance method based on JavaScript user fingerprint is characterized in that: In step S1, a traffic monitoring module is used to monitor network data traffic in real time, focusing on user data with abnormal access traffic; combined with network full-traffic detection equipment for analysis and judgment.

3. According to the method of network anti-reconnaissance based on JavaScript user fingerprints in claim 1, it is characterized in that: In step S3, the detection and collection module generates a unique JavaScript user fingerprint using the FingerprintJS method, which can represent the user's browser information, device information, etc.

4. According to the method of claim 1, the method is characterized in that: In step S3, the server has a built-in fingerprint verification module for verifying the suspicious user's fingerprint and whether the user's fingerprint matches the pre-stored suspicious fingerprint; if they match, it is the scout; if not, it is regenerated and stored.

5. The network anti-reconnaissance method based on JavaScript user fingerprint according to claim 1 is characterized in that: In step S4, the fingerprint-IP address of the suspicious user is recorded in a fingerprint-IP address maintenance module, and a correlation table is maintained to further confirm whether the suspicious user is a scout.

6. A network anti-reconnaissance method based on JavaScript user fingerprint according to claim 1, characterized in that: In steps S2 and S5, the first detection threshold and the second detection threshold are detected and analyzed by the threshold detection module.

7. A network anti-reconnaissance method based on JavaScript user fingerprint according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step S6, the linkage execution module is used to link the WAF and other security devices to perform precise blocking and blocking to prevent scout attacks, malicious second dialing and other behaviors.