V2G cross-domain identity authentication method and system based on quantum key
V2G cross-domain identity authentication method combined with quantum key encryption and decryption and anonymous credentials solves the security and privacy issues in V2G communications. Blockchain and fog server technology are used to achieve security of vehicle cross-domain charging and discharging communications Assure.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202411448772.1
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-10-17
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-15
- Estimated Expiration
- 2044-10-17
AI Technical Summary
In V2G communication scenarios, the traditional public key cryptography system cannot withstand the attacks of quantum computers, resulting in the inability to ensure communication security, especially when vehicles charge and discharge across domains, data confidentiality and user privacy face security threats.
The V2G cross-domain identity authentication method based on quantum key is adopted, and the quantum key encryption and decryption transmission and anonymous credentials are combined, and information interaction is used with blockchain and fog servers to ensure secure authentication and communication between the vehicle and fog servers.
Effectively resist quantum computing attacks, ensure the security and privacy of vehicle communications, reduce duplicate identity authentication, use blockchain to ensure data is not tampered with, and reduce the pressure on cloud server computing.
Smart Images

Figure CN118972847A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of vehicle networking, and specifically to a V2G cross-domain identity authentication method and system based on quantum key. Background Art
[0002] Vehicle to Grid (V2G) technology has a significant impact on the environment and energy under the current challenges faced by energy and environmental development. Electric vehicles (EV) and power grids achieve two-way energy transmission under the unified dispatch of smart grids. That is, when the grid load is low, electric vehicles absorb electricity from the grid as energy storage units, and when the grid load is high, electric vehicles can release the stored electricity back to the grid, thereby helping to balance the grid load and improve the utilization rate of grid energy.
[0003] Although V2G technology has great potential in saving energy, it still faces some challenges in practical applications. When an EV completes charging within the service range of the current charging pile, when it goes to the next charging pile for charging, the EV needs to send a message to the cloud of the next charging pile in advance to request service. In this process, a large amount of information will be transmitted, and the confidentiality and integrity of the data, user privacy and security attacks will inevitably be attacked to a certain extent. In the V2G network, the adversary can maliciously tamper with the transaction information or curb the transmission of information to obtain the owner's personal privacy, disrupt transactions, etc. Therefore, the communication between the EV and the server must be secure, and the server can provide anonymous credentials for the EV to further ensure that the owner's personal privacy information will not be violated.
[0004] At present, when EV establishes communication with some servers, it usually adopts a public key cryptographic system based on computational complexity such as integer decomposition and discrete logarithm, that is, the sender uses the receiver's public key to encrypt the message, and the receiver uses the private key to decrypt the message. The public key is a publicly shared key. Anyone can obtain the public key and use it to encrypt the message. Only the corresponding private key can decrypt the message. Because traditional computers have limited computing power, they cannot break some classical cryptographic algorithms. However, with the emergence of quantum computers, these classical cryptographic algorithms can be easily cracked, so communication security cannot be guaranteed and needs to be solved urgently. Summary of the invention
[0005] The technical problem to be solved by the present invention is: how to improve the security of communication when vehicles are performing cross-domain charging and discharging in a V2G communication scenario.
[0006] To achieve the above object, the present invention provides the following technical solutions: The invention discloses a V2G cross-domain identity authentication method based on quantum key, comprising: a registration phase and a cross-domain identity authentication phase.
[0007] Registration phase: The fog server obtains its own digital certificate DC , the vehicle obtains its own short-term anonymous credentials IOD and long-term anonymous credentials ICD .
[0008] Cross-domain identity authentication stage: When a vehicle enters the domain of another fog server from the domain where one fog server is located and needs to be charged or discharged, the vehicle and the fog server exchange information through digital certificates and anonymous credentials to complete the authentication between the vehicle and the other fog server; in the registration stage and the identity authentication stage, the vehicle and the fog server realize the encryption and decryption transmission of messages based on the pre-charged quantum key.
[0009] As a further improvement of the above solution, an initialization phase is also included before the registration phase. The specific process is as follows: Unique identifier for the vehicle configuration itself VID , the unique identifier of the fog server configuration itself RID .
[0010] The trusted authority generates corresponding public and private key pairs for the vehicle and fog server respectively and stores them in their respective devices.
[0011] The quantum secret service platform pre-injects several one-to-one corresponding quantum keys into the hardware security modules in the vehicle and fog server respectively. QSK And quantum key identification QSK tag Among them, the quantum secret service platform, vehicle and fog server can all find the corresponding quantum key based on the quantum key identifier.
[0012] The blockchain is set as a private chain, allowing only authorized users to access and operate the data on the chain; the fog server is a blockchain node and has the authority to call smart contracts.
[0013] As a further improvement of the above solution, the registration phase includes a fog server registration phase and a vehicle registration phase; wherein the specific process of the fog server registration phase is as follows: The fog server sends its unique identifier to the quantum server platform RID ; At the same time, the quantum secret service platform generates a digital certificate for the fog server DC , then concatenate the message body { H ( RID ), H ( DC )} and uploaded to the blockchain; among them, H(·) indicates a hash operation on ·.
[0014] The blockchain will receive the message body { H ( RID ), H ( DC )}Store and generate the corresponding unique identifier Txid1, and send Txid1 to the quantum secret service platform.
[0015] After receiving Txid1, the quantum secret service platform uses a quantum key QSKw Calculation Message Msg and message verification code Mac , send the message body to the fog server { Msg , Mac , QSK tagw , Txid1}; where Msg = E QSKw ( DC ); Mac = HMAC QSKw ( Msg ); E (•) represents an encryption function using · as the key; HMAC (•) represents a message authentication code generation function using · as a key generation function; QSK tagw For quantum keys QSKw The corresponding quantum key identifier.
[0016] The fog server receives the message body { Msg , Mac , QSK tagw , Txid1} and it is determined that the receiving time limit has not been exceeded, according to the received QSK tagw Find the corresponding pre-filled quantum key QSKw , by calculating the message verification code Mac’ Verification Message Msg integrity, if the message Msg Complete use of quantum key QSKw Decrypt the message to get the digital certificate DC , then the fog server calculates H ( DC )and H (Txid1) and sends the message body to the quantum key platform { H ( DC ), H (Txid1)}; whereMac’ = HMAC QSKw ( Msg ).
[0017] The quantum secret service platform receives the message body { H ( DC ), H (Txid1)} and it is determined that the receiving time limit has not been exceeded, calculate DC And the hash value of Txid1 is H’ ( DC )and H’ (Txid1); if H’ ( DC )= H ( DC ), H’ (Txid1) = H (Txid1), it means the fog server has successfully received DC and Txid1, and the fog server has completed registration.
[0018] As a further improvement of the above scheme, the specific process of the vehicle registration stage is as follows: The vehicle generates quantum random numbers through its own quantum random number generator QRNG , generate its own short-term anonymous credentials IOD , using a quantum key QSKe Calculation Message Msg ev and message verification code Mac ev , send the message body { Msg ev , Mac ev , QSK tage};in, IOD = H ( QRNG , VID ); Msg ev = E QSKe ( IOD , QRNG ); Mac ev = HMAC QSKe ( Msg ev ).
[0019] The quantum secret service platform receives the message body { Msgev , Mac ev , QSK tage} and it is determined that the receiving time limit has not been exceeded, according to the received QSK tage Find the corresponding quantum key QSKe , by calculating the message verification code Mac ev ’ Verification Message Msg ev integrity, if the message Msg ev Complete use QSKe Decrypt the message to get IOD , and then calculate the vehicle's long-term anonymity credentials ICD , and send the message body to the blockchain { H ( ICD ), H ( IOD )}; in, ICD=H ( QRNG , IOD ); Mac ev ’ = HMAC QSKe ( Msg ev ).
[0020] The blockchain will receive the message body { H ( ICD ), H ( IOD )}Store and generate the corresponding unique identifier Txid2, and send Txid2 to the quantum secret service platform.
[0021] After receiving Txid2, the quantum secret service platform uses a quantum key QSKe’ Calculation Message Msg f and message verification code Mac f , send a message body to the vehicle { Msg f , Mac f , Txid2, QSK tage’}; in, Msg f = E QSKe’ ( ICD ), Macf = HMAC QSKe’ ( Msg f ).
[0022] The vehicle receives the message body { Msg f , Mac f , Txid2, QSK tage’} and it is determined that the receiving time limit has not been exceeded, according to the received QSK tage’ Find the corresponding quantum key QSKe’ , by calculating the message verification code Mac f ’ Verification Message Msg f integrity, if the message Msg f Complete use QSKe’ Decrypt the message to get ICD , and send the message body { H ( ICD ), H (Txid2)}; where Mac f ’ = HMAC QSKe’ ( Msg f ).
[0023] The quantum secret service platform receives the message body { H ( ICD ), H (Txid2)} and it is determined that the receiving time limit has not been exceeded, calculate ICD And the hash value of Txid2 is H’ ( ICD )and H’ (Txid2); like H’ ( ICD )= H ( ICD ), H’ (Txid2) = H (Txid2), it means the vehicle has successfully received ICD and Txid2, the vehicle is now registered.
[0024] As a further improvement of the above solution, it also includes an intra-domain identity authentication stage. The specific process is as follows: The fog server broadcasts its unique identification and digital certificate to the vehicles in the domain, that is, { RID , DC}.
[0025] After receiving the digital certificate, the vehicle verifies the identity of the fog server and calculates the session key β , using a quantum key QSKv Calculation Message Msg v and message verification code Mac v , send the message body to the fog server { Msg v , Mac v , Txid2}; in, β=H ( DC , IOD , pk ), pk is the public key of the fog server; Msg v = E QSKv ( IOD , β , H ( IOD )); Mac v = HMAC QSKv ( Msg v ).
[0026] The fog server receives the message body { Msg v , Mac v , Txid2} and after determining that it has not exceeded the set receiving time limit, obtain Txid2 and send a search request to the blockchain.
[0027] After receiving the search request, if the blockchain finds the corresponding H ( IOD ), then H ( IOD ) is fed back to the fog server.
[0028] Fog server based QSK tagv Find the corresponding quantum key QSKv , and then calculate the message verification code Mac v ’ Verification Message Msg v integrity, if the messageMsg v Complete use of quantum key QSKv Decryption and acquisition IOD and H ( IOD ), then verify H ( IOD ) to confirm the legitimacy of the vehicle identity; if the vehicle identity authentication is successful, the session key is used β Calculation Message Msg u and message verification code Mac u , send a message body to the vehicle { Msg u , Mac u};in, Mac v ’ = HMAC QSKv ( Msg v ); Msg u = E β ( H ( IOD ), SCA ); Mac u = HMAC β ( Msg u ); SCA is the smart contract address.
[0029] The vehicle receives the message body { Msg u , Mac u} and after determining that the receiving time limit has not been exceeded, the message verification code is calculated Mac u ’ Verification Message Msg u integrity, if the message Msg u Complete using session key β Decrypt the message and obtain the smart contract address SCA , so far the vehicle domain identity authentication is completed; in, Mac u ’ = HMAC β ( Msg u).
[0030] As a further improvement of the above solution, the specific process of the cross-domain identity authentication stage is as follows: Vehicle Pass Session Key β Calculation Message Msg q and message authentication code Mac q , send the message body to the fog server i before the cross-domain { Msg q , Mac q}; Msg q = E β ( IOD , H ( IOD )); Mac q = HMAC β ( Msg q ).
[0031] When fog server i receives the message body { Msg q , Mac q} and after determining that the receiving time limit has not been exceeded, the message verification code is calculated Mac q ’ Verification Message Msg q integrity, if the message Msg q Complete using session key β Decrypt the message and obtain H ( IOD ) is uploaded to the blockchain; among them, Mac q ’ = HMAC β ( Msg q ).
[0032] The blockchain will receive H ( IOD ) stores and generates the corresponding unique identifier Txid3, and sends Txid3 to fog server i.
[0033] Fog server i sends the received Txid3 to the vehicle.
[0034] The vehicle uses a quantum key QSKi Calculation MessageMsg w and message verification code Mac w , sends the first message body to the fog server j after the cross-domain; the first message body is { Msg w , Mac w , Txid3, H (Txid3), QSK tagi}; Msg w = E QSKi ( IOD , QRNG , H ( IOD , QRNG )); Mac w = HMAC QSKi ( Msg w ).
[0035] After receiving the first message body and determining that it has not exceeded the set receiving time limit, the fog server j sends Txid3 in the first message body to the blockchain.
[0036] According to the received Txid3, the blockchain will store the corresponding message { H ( IOD )} is sent to fog server j.
[0037] When fog server j receives { H ( IOD )}, according to QSK tagi Find the corresponding quantum key QSKi , and then use the key QSKi Calculate the message verification code Mac w ’ To verify the message Msg w integrity, if the message Msg w Complete use QSKi Decrypt the message and obtain IOD and QRNG , check its hash value H ( IOD , QRNG )and H ( IOD ) is correct. If the hash value is correct, the authentication between the vehicle and the fog server j is completed; in, Mac w ’ = HMAC QSKi ( Msg w ).
[0038] As a further improvement of the above scheme, a power review stage is also included; the specific process of the power review stage is as follows: Fog server obtains charging information Pm and charging information Cm , send the message body to the power server { Pm , Cm , RID}; Among them, the fog server and the power server are connected by wire.
[0039] The power server receives the message body { Pm , Cm , RID} and after determining that the set receiving time limit has not been exceeded, obtain the charging information in the message body Pm and charging information Cm , and the stored content is updated accordingly, thereby completing the power review.
[0040] As a further improvement of the above scheme, after the registration phase, a revocation phase is also included. The revocation phase is used to terminate the smart contract operation for the vehicle node information that is about to leave the domain where the fog server is located. The specific process of the revocation phase is as follows: When a vehicle needs to leave the current fog server, it uses the session key β Generate Message Msg x , send the message body to the fog server { Msg x , Txid2}; where Msg x = E β ( SCA , H ( IOD )).
[0041] The fog server receives the message body { Msg x , Txid2} and after determining that the receiving time limit has not been exceeded, the session key is used β Will Msg x Decrypt and obtain the corresponding storage information of Txid2 in the blockchain. H’ ( IOD ),judge H’ ( IOD )and Msg x In H ( IOD ) are equal, if they are equal, the smart contract is terminated, otherwise the process ends.
[0042] As a further improvement to the above solution, the message sender sets the sending timestamp in the message body. T A ; The message receiver generates a receiving timestamp when receiving the message body T B , and determine whether it satisfies T B - T A ≤Δ T If yes, it is determined that the set receiving time limit has not been exceeded; Δ T is the preset time difference threshold.
[0043] The present invention also discloses a V2G cross-domain identity authentication system based on quantum key, including a trusted authorization agency, a power server, a quantum secret service platform, a blockchain, a fog server and a vehicle. The system applies the V2G cross-domain identity authentication method based on quantum key as described above.
[0044] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects: 1. The present invention uses quantum keys to encrypt communications, so that the overall communication can resist quantum computing attacks. At the same time, it adopts dynamic anonymity, that is, a combination of short-term anonymous credentials and long-term anonymous credentials to ensure the privacy of the vehicle identity during the communication process, thereby ensuring the security of vehicle communication during cross-domain charging and discharging in the V2G communication scenario, and solving the problem of repeated identity authentication.
[0045] 2. The short-term anonymous credentials of the present invention are generated by the quantum random number generated by the quantum random number generator in the vehicle and the unique identification of the vehicle, so the vehicle can replace its short-term anonymous credentials at any time, and the short-term anonymous credentials are unique, so that the adversary cannot maliciously disguise as a legitimate vehicle. The long-term anonymous credentials are generated by the quantum secret service platform and uploaded to the blockchain, ensuring that the legitimate vehicles in the communication group can be traced back at any time.
[0046] 3. The present invention uses blockchain technology to store information, and ensures the security of data by leveraging the decentralized and tamper-proof characteristics of blockchain.
[0047] 4. With the continuous increase of charging equipment, in order to reduce the computing pressure of the cloud server, the present invention uses fog servers to provide distributed services for vehicle users, edge-stores cloud server data storage and computing, and can quickly respond to vehicle request information.
[0048] 5. The present invention also sets a timestamp in the message body, determines the reliability of the message according to the received time difference, and uses a message authentication code to verify the message integrity, thereby further improving the security of identity authentication in the V2G communication scenario. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0049] Figure 1 It is a framework diagram of a quantum key-based V2G cross-domain identity authentication system in an embodiment of the present invention.
[0050] Figure 2 It is a signaling diagram of the registration phase of the fog server in an embodiment of the present invention.
[0051] Figure 3 This is a signaling diagram of the vehicle registration phase in an embodiment of the present invention.
[0052] Figure 4 This is a signaling diagram of the intra-domain identity authentication phase in an embodiment of the present invention.
[0053] Figure 5 This is a signaling diagram of the power review stage in an embodiment of the present invention.
[0054] Figure 6 This is a signaling diagram of the revocation phase in an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0055] The following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention to clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.
[0056] See also Figure 1 ,This embodiment provides a V2G cross-domain identity authentication system based on quantum key, which includes a trusted authorization agency, a power server, a quantum secret service platform, a blockchain, a fog server and a vehicle.
[0057] The V2G cross-domain authentication system can apply a quantum key-based V2G cross-domain authentication method, which can mainly include six stages, namely, initialization stage, registration stage, intra-domain authentication stage, cross-domain authentication stage, power review stage and revocation stage. It should be noted that the six stages are not strictly executed in sequence.
[0058] The definitions of symbols involved in this embodiment can be referred to in the following Table 1.
[0059] Table 1: Definition of relevant symbols ; The specific process of the initialization stage may include steps S11 to S14.
[0060] S11. Unique identifier of the vehicle configuration itself VID , the unique identifier of the fog server configuration itself RID .
[0061] S12. The trusted authority generates corresponding public and private key pairs for the vehicle and fog server respectively and stores them in their respective devices.
[0062] S13. The quantum secret service platform pre-fills several one-to-one corresponding quantum keys into the hardware security modules in the vehicle and fog server respectively QSK And quantum key identification QSK tag Among them, the quantum secret service platform, vehicle and fog server can all find the corresponding quantum key based on the quantum key identifier.
[0063] S14. Set the blockchain as a private chain, allowing only authorized users to access and operate the data on the chain; the fog server is a blockchain node and has the authority to call smart contracts.
[0064] Registration phase: The fog server obtains its own digital certificate DC , the vehicle obtains its own short-term anonymous credentials IOD and long-term anonymous credentials ICD In this embodiment, the registration phase may include a fog server registration phase and a vehicle registration phase.
[0065] See also Figure 2 ,The specific process of the registration phase of the fog server is as follows, namely steps S211 to S215.
[0066] S211. The fog server sends its unique identifier to the quantum cryptographic service platform RID ; At the same time, the quantum secret service platform generates a digital certificate for the fog server DC , then concatenate the message body { H ( RID ), H ( DC )} and uploaded to the blockchain; among them, H (·) indicates a hash operation on ·.
[0067] S212. The blockchain receives the message body {H ( RID ), H ( DC )}Store and generate the corresponding unique identifier Txid1, and send Txid1 to the quantum secret service platform.
[0068] S213. After receiving Txid1, the quantum secret service platform uses a quantum key QSKw Calculation Message Msg and message verification code Mac , send the message body to the fog server { Msg , Mac , QSK tagw , Txid1, T 1}; among them, Msg = E QSKw ( DC ); Mac = HMAC QSKw ( Msg ); T 1 is the calculation of quantum secret service platform Msg The timestamp generated when E (•) represents an encryption function using · as the key; HMAC (•) represents a message authentication code generation function using · as a key generation function; QSK tagw For quantum keys QSKw The corresponding quantum key identifier.
[0069] S214. The fog server receives the message body { Msg , Mac , QSK tagw , Txid1, T 1}, determine whether it satisfies T 1 ’ - T 1≤Δ T If it is, it means the time difference is small and reliable. Otherwise, it means the time difference is large and the fog server will not process it further. The same applies to other timestamps. QSK tagw Find the corresponding pre-filled quantum key QSKw , by calculating the message verification code Mac’ Verification Message Msg integrity, if the message Msg Complete use of quantum key QSKw Decrypt the message to get the digital certificate DCand Txid1, then the fog server calculates H ( DC )and H (Txid1) and sends the message body to the quantum key platform { H ( DC ), H (Txid1), T 2}; among them, T 1' is the fog server receives T 1 is the timestamp generated when the message body is generated, Δ T is the preset time difference threshold; Mac’ = HMAC QSKw ( Msg ); T 2 is the fog server calculation H ( DC )and H The timestamp generated when (Txid1) is generated.
[0070] It should be noted that if the message verification code Mac’ = Mac , then the message Msg Complete, the same goes for other message verification codes.
[0071] S215. The quantum secret service platform receives the message body { H ( DC ), H (Txid1), T 2}, determine whether it satisfies T 2'- T 2≤Δ T If so, calculate DC And the hash value of Txid1 is H’ ( DC )and H’ (Txid1); if H’ ( DC )= H ( DC ), H’ (Txid1) = H (Txid1), it means the fog server has successfully received DC and Txid1, and the fog server has completed registration.
[0072] See also Figure 3 The specific process of the vehicle registration stage is as follows, namely steps S221~S226.
[0073] S221. The vehicle generates quantum random numbers through its own quantum random number generator QRNG, generate its own short-term anonymous credentials IOD , using a quantum key QSKe Calculation Message Msg ev and message verification code Mac ev , send the message body { Msg ev , Mac ev , QSK tage , T 3}; among them, IOD = H ( QRNG , VID ); Msg ev = E QSKe ( IOD , QRNG ); Mac ev = HMAC QSKe ( Msg ev ); T 3 is to generate quantum random numbers QRNG The timestamp generated when
[0074] S222. The quantum secret service platform receives the message body { Msg ev , Mac ev , QSK tage , T 3}, determine whether it satisfies T 3 ’ - T 3≤Δ T If so, then according to the received QSK tage Find the corresponding quantum key QSKe , by calculating the message verification code Mac ev ’ Verification Message Msg ev integrity, if the message Msg ev Complete use QSKe Decrypt the message to get IOD , and then calculate the vehicle's long-term anonymity credentials ICD , and send the message body to the blockchain { H ( ICD ), H( IOD )};in, T 3 ’ The quantum secret service platform receives T 3. The timestamp generated when the message body is generated; ICD=H ( QRNG , IOD ); Mac ev ’ = HMAC QSKe ( Msg ev ).
[0075] S223. The blockchain receives the message body { H ( ICD ), H ( IOD )}Store and generate the corresponding unique identifier Txid2, and send Txid2 to the quantum secret service platform.
[0076] S224. After receiving Txid2, the quantum secret service platform uses a quantum key QSKe’ Calculation Message Msg f and message verification code Mac f , send a message body to the vehicle { T 4. Msg f , Mac f , Txid2, QSK tage’};in, T 4 is the quantum secret service platform computing message Msg f and message verification code Mac f The timestamp generated when Msg f = E QSKe’ ( ICD ), Mac f = HMAC QSKe’ ( Msg f ).
[0077] S225. The vehicle receives the message body { T 4. Msg f , Mac f , Txid2, QSKtage’}, determine whether it satisfies T 4 ’ - T 4≤Δ T If so, then according to the received QSK tage’ Find the corresponding quantum key QSKe’ , by calculating the message verification code Mac f ’ Verification Message Msg f integrity, if the message Msg f Complete use QSKe’ Decrypt the message to get ICD , and send the message body { H ( ICD ), H (Txid2), T 5}; among them, T 4 ’ The vehicle receives T 4 is the timestamp generated when the message body is generated; T 5 for vehicle calculation H ( ICD )and H (Txid2) timestamp generated; Mac f ’ = HMAC QSKe’ ( Msg f ).
[0078] S226. The quantum secret service platform receives the message body { H ( ICD ), H (Txid2), T 5}, determine whether it satisfies T 5 ’ - T 5≤Δ T If so, calculate ICD And the hash value of Txid2 is H’ ( ICD )and H’ (Txid2); if H’ ( ICD )= H ( ICD ), H’ (Txid2) = H (Txid2), it means the vehicle has successfully received ICDand Txid2, the vehicle is now registered; T 5 ’ The quantum secret service platform receives T 5 The timestamp when the message body was generated.
[0079] See also Figure 4 , the domain identity authentication stage, the specific process is as follows, namely steps S31~S36.
[0080] S31. The fog server broadcasts its unique identification and digital certificate to the vehicles in the domain, that is, { RID , DC}.
[0081] S32. After receiving the digital certificate, the vehicle verifies the identity of the fog server and then generates a timestamp T 6. Calculate the session key β , using a quantum key QSKv Calculation Message Msg v and message verification code Mac v , send the message body to the fog server { Msg v , Mac v , T 6, Txid2, QSK tagv};in, β=H ( DC , IOD , pk ), pk is the public key of the fog server; Msg v = E QSKv ( IOD , β , H ( IOD )); Mac v = HMAC QSKv ( Msg v ).
[0082] S33. The fog server receives the message body { Msg v , Mac v , T 6, Txid2, QSK tagv}, determine whether it satisfies T 6 ’ -T 6≤Δ T If yes, get Txid2 and send a search request to the blockchain; T 6 ’ The fog server receives T 6 The timestamp when the message body was generated.
[0083] S34. After receiving the search request, if the blockchain finds the corresponding H ( IOD ), then H ( IOD ) is fed back to the fog server.
[0084] S35. Fog server based on QSK tagv Find the corresponding quantum key QSKv , and then calculate the message verification code Mac v ’ Verification Message Msg v integrity, if the message Msg v Complete use of quantum key QSKv Decryption IOD and H ( IOD ), then verify H ( IOD ) to confirm the legitimacy of the vehicle identity; if the vehicle identity authentication is successful, the fog server generates a timestamp T 7. Using Session Keys β Calculation Message Msg u and message verification code Mac u , send a message body to the vehicle { Msg u , Mac u , T 7}; among them, Mac v ’ = HMAC QSKv ( Msg v ); Msg u = E β ( H ( IOD ), SCA ); Mac u = HMACβ ( Msg u ); SCA It is the smart contract address.
[0085] S36. The vehicle receives the message body { Msg u , Mac u , T 7}, determine whether it satisfies T 7 ’ - T 7≤Δ T If so, then the message verification code is calculated Mac u ’ Verification Message Msg u integrity, if the message Msg u Complete using session key β Decrypt the message and obtain the smart contract address SCA , so far the vehicle domain identity authentication is completed; among them, T 7 ’ The vehicle receives T 7 is the timestamp generated when the message body is generated; Mac u ’ = HMAC β ( Msg u ).
[0086] Cross-domain identity authentication stage: When a vehicle enters the domain of another fog server from the domain where one fog server is located and needs to be charged or discharged, the vehicle and the fog server exchange information through the digital certificate and the anonymous credential, thereby completing the authentication between the vehicle and the other fog server; wherein, in the registration stage and the identity authentication stage, the vehicle and the fog server realize the encryption and decryption transmission of messages based on the pre-charged quantum key.
[0087] In this embodiment, the specific process of the cross-domain identity authentication stage is as follows, namely S41 to S48.
[0088] S41. Vehicle generates timestamp T 8. Through the session key β Calculation Message Msg q and message authentication code Mac q , send the message body to the fog server i before the cross-domain { Msg q , Macq , T 8}; Msg q = E β ( IOD , H ( IOD )); Mac q = HMAC β ( Msg q ).
[0089] S42. Fog server i receives the message body { Msg q , Mac q , T 8}, determine whether it satisfies T 8 ’ - T 8≤Δ T If so, then the message verification code is calculated Mac q ’ Verification Message Msg q integrity, if the message Msg q Complete using session key β Decrypt the message and obtain H ( IOD ) is uploaded to the blockchain; among them, T 8: fog server i receives T 8 is the timestamp generated when the message body is generated; Mac q ’ = HMAC β ( Msg q ).
[0090] S43. Blockchain will receive H ( IOD ) stores and generates the corresponding unique identifier Txid3, and sends Txid3 to fog server i.
[0091] S44. Fog server i sends the received Txid3 to the vehicle.
[0092] S45. Vehicle generation timestamp T 9. Using a quantum key QSKi Calculation Message Msg w and message verification codeMac w , sends the first message body to the fog server j after the cross-domain; the first message body is { Msg w , Mac w , Txid3, H (Txid3), T 9. QSK tagi}; Msg w = E QSKi ( IOD , QRNG , H ( IOD , QRNG )); Mac w = HMAC QSKi ( Msg w ).
[0093] S46. After receiving the first message body, fog server j determines whether T 9 ’ - T 9≤Δ T If yes, then send Txid3 in the first message body to the blockchain; T 9 ’ It is the timestamp generated when the fog server receives the first message body.
[0094] S47. The blockchain stores the corresponding message { H ( IOD )} is sent to fog server j.
[0095] S48. The fog server j receives { H ( IOD )}, according to QSK tagi Find the corresponding quantum key QSKi , and then use the key QSKi Calculate the message verification code Mac w ’ To verify the message Msg w integrity, if the message Msg w Complete use QSKi Decrypt the message and obtain IOD and QRNG , check its hash valueH ( IOD , QRNG )and H ( IOD ) is correct. If the hash value is correct, the authentication between the vehicle and the fog server j is completed; Mac w ’ = HMAC QSKi ( Msg w ).
[0096] In addition, the fog server needs to frequently update the charging and billing information to the power server to prevent malicious tampering after the adversary invades, so a power review stage is required.
[0097] See also Figure 5 The specific process of the power review stage is as follows, namely steps S51~S52.
[0098] S51. Fog server generates timestamp T 10 , get charging information Pm and charging information Cm , send the message body to the power server { Pm , Cm , RID , T 10}; Among them, the fog server and the power server are connected by wire, and this communication process is considered safe in the present invention.
[0099] S52. The power server receives the message body { Pm , Cm , RID , T 10}, determine whether it satisfies T 10 ’ - T 10 ≤Δ T If yes, get the charging information in the message body Pm and charging information Cm , and the stored content is updated accordingly, thereby completing the power review.
[0100] In a communication domain, vehicle nodes often leave, so it is necessary to terminate the smart contract operation for the vehicle node information that is about to leave the domain.
[0101] See also Figure 6 The specific process of the revocation stage of the present invention is as follows, namely steps S61~S62.
[0102] S61. When the vehicle needs to leave the current fog server, a timestamp is generated T 11 , using the session key β Generate Message Msg x , send the message body to the fog server { T 11 , Msg x , Txid2}; in, Msg x = E β ( SCA , H ( IOD ), T 11 ).
[0103] S62. The fog server receives the message body { T 11 , Msg x , Txid2}, determine whether it satisfies T 11 ’ - T 11 ≤Δ T , then use the session key β Will Msg x Decrypt and obtain the corresponding storage information of Txid2 in the blockchain. H’ ( IOD ),judge H’ ( IOD )and Msg x In H ( IOD ) are equal, if they are equal, the smart contract is terminated, otherwise the process ends; among them, T 11 ’ The fog server receives T 11 The timestamp of when the message body was generated.
[0104] In summary, the vehicle in the present invention uses long-term and short-term anonymous credentials for information exchange, ensuring the security of the vehicle's own privacy information. At the same time, quantum random numbers are used to generate anonymous credentials, making the anonymous credentials more random and unable to be forged by the adversary. In addition, the present invention combines the use of quantum keys for encryption, ensuring that the communicating parties in the present invention can resist the attack of quantum computers during communication, thereby ensuring the security of communication. The present invention uses blockchain technology to store information, and ensures the security of data by virtue of the decentralized and tamper-proof characteristics of blockchain. The present invention uses fog servers to complete intra-domain and cross-domain authentication of vehicles, reducing the computing pressure of the central cloud server.
[0105] The above description is only a preferred specific implementation manner of the present invention, but the protection scope of the present invention is not limited thereto. Any technician familiar with the technical field can make equivalent replacements or changes according to the technical scheme and inventive concept of the present invention within the technical scope disclosed by the present invention, which should be covered by the protection scope of the present invention.
Claims
1. A V2G cross-domain identity authentication method based on quantum key, characterized in that: include: Registration phase: The fog server obtains its own digital certificate DC , the vehicle obtains its own short-term anonymous credentials IOD and long-term anonymous credentials ICD ; Cross-domain identity authentication stage: When a vehicle enters the domain of another fog server from the domain where one fog server is located and needs to be charged or discharged, the vehicle and the fog server exchange information through digital certificates and anonymous credentials to complete the authentication between the vehicle and the other fog server; in the registration stage and the identity authentication stage, the vehicle and the fog server realize the encryption and decryption transmission of messages based on the pre-charged quantum key.
2. The V2G cross-domain identity authentication method based on quantum key according to claim 1 is characterized in that: Before the registration phase, there is also an initialization phase, the specific process is as follows: Unique identifier for the vehicle configuration itself VID , the unique identifier of the fog server configuration itself RID ; The trusted authority generates corresponding public and private key pairs for the vehicle and fog server respectively and stores them in their respective devices; The quantum secret service platform pre-injects several one-to-one corresponding quantum keys into the hardware security modules in the vehicle and fog server respectively. QSK And quantum key identification QSK tag ; Among them, the quantum secret service platform, vehicles and fog servers can all find the corresponding quantum key according to the quantum key identifier; The blockchain is set as a private chain, allowing only authorized users to access and operate the data on the chain; the fog server is a blockchain node and has the authority to call smart contracts.
3. The V2G cross-domain identity authentication method based on quantum key according to claim 2 is characterized in that: The registration phase includes the fog server registration phase and the vehicle registration phase; wherein the specific process of the fog server registration phase is as follows: The fog server sends its unique identifier to the quantum server platform RID ; At the same time, the quantum secret service platform generates a digital certificate for the fog server DC , then concatenate the message body { H ( RID ), H ( DC )} and uploaded to the blockchain; among them, H (·) indicates hash operation on ·; The blockchain will receive the message body { H ( RID ), H ( DC )}Store and generate the corresponding unique identifier Txid1, and send Txid1 to the quantum secret service platform; After receiving Txid1, the quantum secret service platform uses a quantum key QUR Calculation Message Msg and message verification code Mac , send the message body to the fog server { Msg , Mac , QSK tagw , Txid1}; where Msg = E QSKw ( DC ); Mac = HMAC QSKw ( Msg ); E (•) represents an encryption function using · as the key; HMAC (•) represents a message authentication code generation function using · as a key generation function; QSK tagw For quantum keys QUR The corresponding quantum key identifier; The fog server receives the message body { Msg , Mac , QSK tagw , Txid1} and it is determined that the receiving time limit has not been exceeded, according to the received QSK tagw Find the corresponding pre-filled quantum key QUR , by calculating the message verification code Mac' Verification Message Msg integrity, if the message Msg Complete use of quantum key QUR Decrypt the message to get the digital certificate DC , then the fog server calculates H ( DC )and H (Txid1) and sends the message body to the quantum key platform { H ( DC ), H (Txid1)}; where Mac' = HMAC QSKw ( Msg ); The quantum secret service platform receives the message body { H ( DC ), H (Txid1)} and it is determined that the receiving time limit has not been exceeded, calculate DC And the hash value of Txid1 is H’ ( DC )and H’ (Txid1); if H’ ( DC )= H ( DC ), H’ (Txid1) = H (Txid1), it means the fog server has successfully received DC and Txid1, and the fog server has completed registration.
4. The V2G cross-domain identity authentication method based on quantum key according to claim 3 is characterized in that: The specific process of the vehicle registration stage is as follows: The vehicle generates quantum random numbers through its own quantum random number generator QRNG , generate its own short-term anonymous credentials IOD , using a quantum key QUR Calculation Message Msg ev and message verification code Mac ev , send the message body { Msg ev , Mac ev , QSK tage };in, IOD = H ( QRNG , VID ); Msg ev = E QSKe ( IOD , QRNG ); Mac ev = HMAC QSKe ( Msg ev ); The quantum secret service platform receives the message body { Msg ev , Mac ev , QSK tage } and it is determined that the receiving time limit has not been exceeded, according to the received QSK tage Find the corresponding quantum key QUR , by calculating the message verification code Mac ev ’ Verification Message Msg ev integrity, if the message Msg ev Complete use QUR Decrypt the message to get IOD , and then calculate the vehicle's long-term anonymity credential ICD , and send the message body to the blockchain { H ( ICD ), H ( IOD )}; in, ICD=H ( QRNG , IOD ); Mac ev ’ = HMAC QSKe ( Msg ev ); The blockchain will receive the message body { H ( ICD ), H ( IOD )}Store and generate the corresponding unique identifier Txid2, and send Txid2 to the quantum secret service platform; After receiving Txid2, the quantum secret service platform uses a quantum key QUR Calculation Message Msg f and message verification code Mac f , send a message body to the vehicle { Msg f , Mac f , Txid2, QSK tage’ }; in, Msg f = E QSKe’ ( ICD ), Mac f = HMAC QSKe’ ( Msg f ); The vehicle receives the message body { Msg f , Mac f , Txid2, QSK tage’ } and it is determined that the receiving time limit has not been exceeded, according to the received QSK tage’ Find the corresponding quantum key QUR , by calculating the message verification code Mac f ’ Verification Message Msg f integrity, if the message Msg f Complete use QUR Decrypt the message to get ICD , and send the message body { H ( ICD ), H (Txid2)}; where Mac f ’ = HMAC QSKe’ ( Msg f ); The quantum secret service platform receives the message body { H ( ICD ), H (Txid2)} and it is determined that the receiving time limit has not been exceeded, calculate ICD And the hash value of Txid2 is H’ ( ICD )and H’ (Txid2); if H’ ( ICD )= H ( ICD ), H’ (Txid2) = H (Txid2), it means the vehicle has successfully received ICD and Txid2, the vehicle is now registered.
5. The V2G cross-domain identity authentication method based on quantum key according to claim 4 is characterized in that: It also includes the intra-domain identity authentication phase, the specific process is as follows: The fog server broadcasts its unique identification and digital certificate to the vehicles in the domain, that is, { RID , DC }; After receiving the digital certificate, the vehicle verifies the identity of the fog server and calculates the session key β , using a quantum key QUR Calculation Message Msg v and message verification code Mac v , send the message body to the fog server { Msg v , Mac v , Txid2}; in, β=H ( DC , IOD , pk ), pk is the public key of the fog server; Msg v = E QSKv ( IOD , β , H ( IOD )); Mac v = HMAC QSKv ( Msg v ); The fog server receives the message body { Msg v , Mac v , Txid2} and after determining that the set receiving time limit has not been exceeded, obtain Txid2 and send a search request to the blockchain; After receiving the search request, if the blockchain finds the corresponding H ( IOD ), then H ( IOD ) Feedback to the fog server; Fog server based QSK tagv Find the corresponding quantum key QUR , and then calculate the message verification code Mac v ’ Verification Message Msg v integrity, if the message Msg v Complete use of quantum key QUR Decryption and acquisition IOD and H ( IOD ), then verify H ( IOD ) to confirm the legitimacy of the vehicle identity; if the vehicle identity authentication is successful, the session key is used β Calculation Message Msg u and message verification code Mac u , send a message body to the vehicle { Msg u , Mac u }; in, Mac v ’ = HMAC QSKv ( Msg v ); Msg u = E β ( H ( IOD ), SCA ); Mac u = HMAC β ( Msg u ); SCA is the smart contract address; The vehicle receives the message body { Msg u , Mac u } and after determining that the received message has not exceeded the set reception time limit, the message verification code is calculated Mac u ’ Verification Message Msg u integrity, if the message Msg u Complete using session key β Decrypt the message and obtain the smart contract address SCA , so far the vehicle domain identity authentication is completed; among them, Mac u ’ = HMAC β ( Msg u ).
6. The V2G cross-domain identity authentication method based on quantum key according to claim 5 is characterized in that: The specific process of the cross-domain identity authentication stage is as follows: Vehicle Pass Session Key β Calculation Message Msg q and message authentication code Mac q , send the message body to the fog server i before the cross-domain { Msg q , Mac q }; Msg q = E β ( IOD , H ( IOD )); Mac q = HMAC β ( Msg q ); When fog server i receives the message body { Msg q , Mac q } and after determining that the received message has not exceeded the set reception time limit, the message verification code is calculated Mac q ’ Verification Message Msg q integrity, if the message Msg q Complete using session key β Decrypt the message and obtain H ( IOD ) is uploaded to the blockchain; among them, Mac q ’ = HMAC β ( Msg q ); The blockchain will receive H ( IOD ) Store and generate the corresponding unique identifier Txid3, and send Txid3 to fog server i; Fog server i sends the received Txid3 to the vehicle; The vehicle uses a quantum key QUR Calculation Message Msg w and message verification code Mac w , sends the first message body to the fog server j after the cross-domain; the first message body is { Msg w , Mac w , Txid3, H (Txid3), QSK tagi }; Msg w = E QSKi ( IOD , QRNG , H ( IOD , QRNG )); Mac w = HMAC QSKi ( Msg w ); After receiving the first message body and determining that it has not exceeded the set receiving time limit, fog server j sends Txid3 in the first message body to the blockchain; According to the received Txid3, the blockchain will store the corresponding message { H ( IOD )} sent to fog server j; When fog server j receives { H ( IOD )}, according to QSK tagi Find the corresponding quantum key QUR , and then use the key QUR Calculate the message verification code Mac w ’ To verify the message Msg w integrity, if the message Msg w Complete use QUR Decrypt the message and obtain IOD and QRNG , check its hash value H ( IOD , QRNG )and H ( IOD ) is correct. If the hash value is correct, the authentication between the vehicle and the fog server j is completed; in, Mac w ’ = HMAC QSKi ( Msg w ).
7. The V2G cross-domain identity authentication method based on quantum key according to claim 6 is characterized in that: It also includes the power review stage; the specific process of the power review stage is as follows: Fog server obtains charging information Pm and charging information Cm , send the message body to the power server { Pm , Cm , RID }; Among them, the fog server and the power server are connected by wire; The power server receives the message body { Pm , Cm , RID } and after determining that the receiving time limit has not been exceeded, obtain the charging information in the message body Pm and charging information Cm , and the stored content is updated accordingly, thereby completing the power review.
8. The V2G cross-domain identity authentication method based on quantum key according to claim 7 is characterized in that: After the registration phase, there is also a revocation phase, which is used to terminate the smart contract operation for the vehicle node information that is about to leave the domain where the fog server is located; the specific process of the revocation phase is as follows: When a vehicle needs to leave the current fog server, it uses the session key β Generate Message Msg x , send the message body to the fog server { Msg x , Txid2}; in, Msg x = E β ( SCA , H ( IOD )); The fog server receives the message body { Msg x , Txid2} and after determining that the receiving time limit has not been exceeded, the session key is used β Will Msg x Decrypt and obtain the corresponding storage information of Txid2 in the blockchain. H’ ( IOD ),judge H’ ( IOD )and Msg x In H ( IOD ) are equal, if they are equal, the smart contract is terminated, otherwise the process ends.
9. The V2G cross-domain identity authentication method based on quantum key according to any one of claims 1 to 8, characterized in that: The message sender sets the sending timestamp in the message body. T A ; The message receiver generates a receiving timestamp when receiving the message body T B , and determine whether it satisfies T B - T A ≤Δ T If yes, it is determined that the set receiving time limit has not been exceeded; Δ T is the preset time difference threshold.
10. A V2G cross-domain identity authentication system based on quantum key, including a trusted authorization agency, a power server, a quantum secret service platform, a blockchain, a fog server and a vehicle, characterized in that: The system applies the V2G cross-domain identity authentication method based on quantum key as described in any one of claims 1 to 9.
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