Encrypted search method for privacy protection of authorization information
Through inadvertent transmission methods and hash operation, the search permissions of users and data owners are synchronized, and the problem of privacy leakage and inefficient retrieval in database retrieval is solved, and efficient privacy protection and secure retrieval in multi-user scenarios are achieved.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202411183031.5
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-08-27
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-26
AI Technical Summary
The prior art is difficult to effectively protect user privacy during database retrieval, resulting in privacy leakage. In multi-user scenarios, the retrieval efficiency is low, the key generation and transmission cost is high, and it is difficult to apply to actual data online services.
The inadvertent transmission method is used to synchronize the query keywords and authorization keywords between the user and the data owner, determine the user's retrieval rights through hash value and matrix operations, and query the encrypted data on the server side using the encryption query token, which optimizes multiple Retrieval efficiency and security in user scenarios.
It realizes privacy protection in multi-user scenarios, improves the overall efficiency of the search process, and ensures the privacy of user permissions and the security of search results.
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Figure CN119025577A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention belongs to the technical field of privacy computing and information retrieval, and relates to an encrypted search method for privacy protection of authorized information. Background Art
[0002] In the context of the rapid development of big data technology and the great importance attached to the value of data application, with the introduction of relevant laws and regulations such as the "Personal Information Protection Law of the People's Republic of China", the data privacy issues of enterprises and individuals have become the research focus of data security utilization. Databases are still the main carrier of data storage, and conditional retrieval and batch extraction of databases are still the primary links in data integration and shared utilization. However, in the process of data retrieval and extraction, the conditions of retrieval and extraction will enable the data owner to know and infer the retrieval intention and data application direction, resulting in the privacy leakage of the data requester. At the same time, the integrity of the data provided by the owner is difficult to be verified by the data requester under the condition of privacy security, resulting in the inability to achieve mutual trust between two or more parties in the actual data circulation scenario, and achieve the purpose of data sharing application.
[0003] With the development of data security technology, privacy computing technology has been widely used in data sharing for the purpose of ensuring the safe circulation and calculation of data. Among them, the privacy data set intersection operation method based on oblivious transmission technology has played a key role in scenarios such as secure multi-party computing and privacy data retrieval. However, the existing technology is still insufficient in how to apply related technologies to the traditional database retrieval field. This patent proposes a database retrieval method with privacy protection capabilities by applying privacy intersection technology in data retrieval scenarios using databases as storage facilities.
[0004] The oblivious cross tags (OXT) technology proposed by Cash et al. is the first multi-keyword joint query protocol for document query and retrieval needs in single-user retrieval and single-user writing scenarios. By setting an encrypted keyword index table, cross-index table, and user-side query token on the server side, and counting the frequency of keywords in the data set to be queried, the retrieval response capability under the multi-keyword joint query needs is improved, and the security and efficiency of multi-keyword joint retrieval under the adaptive adversarial model are achieved. This protocol is mainly suitable for Boolean retrieval and document retrieval access needs under a single-read and single-write framework. In actual applications, it is mainly based on the needs of multi-user reading and single-user writing. The cost of providing each user with an independent data retrieval service environment is high, and it cannot meet the needs of encrypted retrieval of multi-user data.
[0005] Faber et al. proposed a searchable encryption protocol that supports multi-person retrieval, and the protocol supports multiple data retrieval schemes such as numerical range retrieval, substring retrieval, and wildcard retrieval. In this technical solution, the use limitation of single-user reading is mainly broken through the method of inadvertent pseudo-random function and homomorphic signature. The inadvertent pseudo-random function and homomorphic signature adopted by this method can achieve secure access in a multi-reading user environment, but the transmission efficiency between the client and the server during the communication process is still low.
[0006] In summary, the existing security technologies for database information retrieval are mainly implemented by encrypting the database storage information and retrieval requests and comparing the ciphertext. Or the intersection operation between the data in the database and the retrieval request is implemented by using methods such as random polynomials and random pseudo-random number construction. However, the above methods have the following shortcomings: high cost of batch encryption or calculation of stored data, complex data retrieval process after encryption, multiple key generation and transmission under large-scale data retrieval requirements, etc., which makes it difficult to apply related technologies and solutions in the actual data online service link.
[0007] In the scenario of multi-field data retrieval, the existing technical solutions do not provide targeted technical implementation methods. They mainly complete data comparison and retrieval by combining and splicing data items to form multi-field data into a single field, resulting in low data retrieval efficiency. Summary of the invention
[0008] In view of the problems existing in the prior art, the purpose of the present invention is to provide an encrypted search method for privacy protection of authorization information. The oblivious transmission method is used to provide a privacy protection mechanism for the user's permission synchronization process to avoid the leakage of privacy information during the permission synchronization process; the present invention can improve the overall efficiency of the request synchronization and retrieval result synchronization process by using a multi-user oblivious transmission method on the basis of ensuring security.
[0009] The technical solution of the present invention is:
[0010] An encrypted search method for privacy protection of authorization information, the steps comprising:
[0011] 1) The user terminal and the data owner use the oblivious transfer method to find the intersection of the user's required query keyword list W and the authorized searchable keyword list G, so that the data owner and the user terminal can simultaneously obtain the keyword set that the user terminal needs to query and has been authorized;
[0012] 2) The user terminal requests a key from the data owner and sends it to the server by constructing an encrypted query token. The server queries the corresponding encrypted document identifier set from the encrypted data storage database through the search keyword in the encrypted query token; the encrypted data storage database stores an encrypted index formed by the encrypted document identifier and the encrypted query keyword;
[0013] 3) The server sends the retrieved encrypted document identifier set to the client.
[0014] Furthermore, the method for synchronizing the user's search keyword list and the authorized searchable keyword list between the user terminal and the data owner using the oblivious transfer method is as follows:
[0015] 11) The query keyword list required by the user side calculation W = (w1, w2, ..., w l )’s hash value, generates a vector S with a length of l and sends the length l to the data owner; where w i is the i-th query keyword, and the i-th component in vector S is s i ,s i ∈{0,1} * , i = 1 ~ 1;
[0016] 12) The data owner sets the authorized search keyword for the client and calculates its hash value;
[0017] 13) The data owner generates a search keyword permission list G of the user terminal according to the authorized search keywords of the user terminal = (g1, g2, g3..., g m ), g i ∈{0,1} * , and generate a matrix T of size m×l 0 , the matrix T 0 The elements in are all randomly generated; is the matrix T 0 The row vector of the vth row in is the matrix T 0 The column vector of the uth column in g i Authorize the data owner to retrieve the i-th keyword in the keyword list, g i =1 means that the data owner authorizes the ith keyword in the retrieval keyword list to be authorized to the client, g i =0 means that the i-th keyword in the authorized retrieval keyword list of the data owner is not authorized to the client;
[0018] 14) The data owner uses the matrix T 0 , based on the hash value of the search keyword permission list G authorized by the user Calculate the matrix T 1 Among them, record is the matrix T 1 The row vector of the vth row in is the matrix T 1 The column vector of the uth column, key C is the symmetric encryption key shared by the data owner and the user, and key C is used to encrypt g v After encryption, the authority data C(g v );
[0019] 15) The user and the data owner perform 1 inadvertent transmissions; in each inadvertent transmission, the data owner As the selected vector, the user end selects vector S as the selection vector, and each time after an oblivious transmission, the user end obtains a vector of length m;
[0020] 16) The user terminal forms a matrix Q based on the received l vectors of length m, where the vth column vector of the matrix Q is denoted as q v , the uth row vector is denoted as q u ;
[0021] 17) The user side calculates in, g j To retrieve the jth element in the keyword authority list G, w j is the jth keyword in the query keyword list W;
[0022] 18) When querying the vth keyword w in the keyword list W v =g v When If F(w v ) value is 1, the client has the keyword w v Otherwise, there is no search permission for this keyword. v To retrieve the vth element in the keyword authority list G;
[0023] 19) According to the calculation result of step 18), a set of keywords that the user needs to query and has been authorized is obtained.
[0024] Furthermore, the data owner uses the cuckoo hash method to calculate the hash value of the authorized search keyword of the user terminal, and the user terminal uses the simple hash method to calculate the required query keyword list W = (w1, w2, ..., w l )'s hash value; the data owner and the user terminal have the same hash function set H.
[0025] Furthermore, in the cuckoo hash method, when a hash conflict occurs in the data, the hash functions in the hash function set H are executed sequentially; in the simple hash method, each hash function in the hash function set H is executed for each item of data.
[0026] Furthermore, the method for constructing an encrypted query token is:
[0027] 21) The data owner publishes a document count list Cnt of all searchable keywords; the document count list Cnt includes multiple key-value pairs, where the keyword is the key and the number of documents containing the keyword is the key value;
[0028] 22) The data owner generates the key K T , K X , K Y , K Z ; Among them, the key K is generated according to the security parameter λ T ∈(0,1) λ , K X , K Y , K Z for The random number selected above;
[0029] 23) The user requests the data owner to retrieve the key K X , K Z ;
[0030] 24) The user terminal sets the keyword with the lowest number of associated documents to w1, and i The number of associated documents for each search keyword using the search key K X , K Z Generates an encrypted query token.
[0031] Furthermore, an asymmetric encryption method is used between the server and the client. The server uses a public key to encrypt the file index after the data owner uploads the index information of the file to be retrieved. The server sends the retrieved encrypted file index back to the client; the client uses a private key between it and the server to decrypt the index and request relevant documents from the data owner.
[0032] The advantages of the present invention are as follows:
[0033] This method uses the oblivious transfer method to optimize the retrievable encryption method in a multi-user scenario, so that during the synchronization of user permissions, the privacy of user retrieval permissions is protected, while the overall efficiency of the retrieval process is improved. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0034] Figure 1 It is a flow chart of the method of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0035] The present invention is further described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. The examples given are only used to explain the present invention but not to limit the scope of the present invention.
[0036] Figure 1 It is a flow chart of the technical method implemented by the present invention, and the technical method comprises the following steps:
[0037] (1) The user and the data owner use the oblivious transfer method to find the intersection of the user's required query keyword list W and the authorized searchable keyword list G, so that the data owner and the user can simultaneously obtain the keyword set that the user needs to query and has been authorized, complete the information synchronization operation of the search keyword and the authorized searchable keyword, and improve the synchronization efficiency in the case of multiple query search keywords;
[0038] (2) The user requests a key from the data owner and constructs an encrypted query token and sends it to the server. The server can securely retrieve the required query data through the encrypted query token.
[0039] (3) The encrypted index information consisting of the encrypted document identifier and the encrypted query keyword is stored in the encrypted data storage database of the server. After the server receives the query token, the encrypted index is searched for the corresponding encrypted document identifier set according to the search keyword in the token;
[0040] (4) The server sends the retrieved encrypted document identifier set to the client.
[0041] Step 1 includes the following steps:
[0042] Step 1.1: Assume that the query keyword list required by the user is W = (w1, w2, ..., w l ) whose length is l, where w i is the query keyword, i=1~l, and the user terminal generates a vector S with a length of l, where s i is the i-th component in vector S, and s i ∈{0,1} * , send the length l to the data owner.
[0043] Step 1.2: The data owner uses the cuckoo hash method to calculate the hash value of the authorized search keyword of the user end, and uses the simple hash method to calculate the hash value of the required search keyword in the user end. The number of hash functions in the hash function set is 3 and the hash function set is recorded as H = {h1, h2, h3}. The data owner and the user end have the same hash function set. In the cuckoo hash method, when a hash conflict occurs in the data, it is executed in the order of h1 to h3 and the data is placed in the hash bucket. In the simple hash method, h1 to h33 hash functions are executed for each data item, and more than one data item can be placed in each hash bucket.
[0044] Step 1.3: The search keyword permission list authorized by the data owner to the user is set to G, whose length is m, G = (g1, g2, g3..., g m ), g i ∈{0,1} * , and generate the matrix T 0 , T 0 The elements in are randomly generated, and T 0 The size is m×l, T 0 Elements in is the matrix T 0 The row vector of the vth row in is the matrix T 0 The column vector of the u-th column in .
[0045] Step 1.4: The data owner uses the matrix T 0 , the hash function value of the search keyword permission list G data authorized by the user is used as the basis to calculate the matrix T 1 The calculation process is is the matrix T 1 The row vector of the vth row in is the matrix T 1 The column vector of the uth column uses a symmetric encryption algorithm. The data owner and a user end have the same key C, and different user ends have different keys. Use the key C to calculate the encrypted permission data C(g v ), and by C(g v ) and t 0 The corresponding row vector takes the XOR operation result to get t 1 Row vector, that is where g v The vth element in the search keyword permission list G authorized by the data owner to the user.
[0046] Step 1.5: The user and the data owner perform an inadvertent transfer. As the selected vector, the user end selects the vector S as the selection vector, and each time after the oblivious transmission, the user end obtains a vector with a length of m.
[0047] Step 1.6: The user end receives l vectors of length m through the process of step 1.5, and uses the obtained vectors as column vectors to form a new matrix, which is denoted as Q, where the vth column vector of Q is denoted as q v , the uth row vector is denoted as q u It can be seen that And can be launched
[0048] Step 1.7: The user side calculates
[0049] Step 1.8: When querying the vth keyword w in the keyword list W v =g v When If F(w v ) value is 1, the client has the keyword w v Otherwise, there is no search permission for this keyword.
[0050] Step 2 includes the following steps:
[0051] Step 2.1: The data owner publishes a list of document counts Cnt of all searchable keywords. The list contains keywords and the number of documents containing the keywords, which form a key-value pair storage structure.
[0052] Step 2.2: The data owner generates the key K T , K X , K Y , K Z , where the key K is generated according to the security parameter λ T ∈(0,1) λ , K X , K Y , K Z for The random number selected above.
[0053] Step 2.2: The user requests the data owner to retrieve the key K X , K Z .
[0054] Step 2.3: The user sets the keyword with the lowest number of associated documents as w1, and sets w i The number of associated documents for each search keyword using the search key K X , K Z Generate an encrypted query token And send all encrypted query tokens to the server, where F p is the encryption function.
[0055] Step 3 includes the following steps:
[0056] Step 3.1, after receiving the query token, the server queries the index address and blinding factor according to the index in the encrypted database TSet, where the encrypted database TSet stores the encrypted index information consisting of the encrypted document identifier and the encrypted query keyword. After the data owner uploads the index information of the file to be retrieved to the server, the server processes it and stores it in the encrypted database TSet.
[0057] Step 3.2: The server compares xtoken with the encrypted index xtag stored in the encrypted database TSet. If they are exactly the same, it is determined that the search keyword required by the user for query permission is in the index stored in the server.
[0058] Step 4 includes the following steps:
[0059] Step 4.1: An asymmetric encryption method is used between the server and the client. The server uses the public key to encrypt the file index after the data owner uploads the index information of the file to be retrieved. The server sends the retrieved encrypted file index back to the client.
[0060] Step 4.2: The client uses the private key between it and the server to decrypt the index and request the relevant document from the data owner.
[0061] Although the specific embodiments of the present invention are disclosed for the purpose of illustration, the purpose is to help understand the content of the present invention and implement it accordingly, those skilled in the art will understand that various substitutions, changes and modifications are possible without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention and the appended claims. Therefore, the present invention should not be limited to the content disclosed in the best embodiment, and the scope of the present invention is subject to the scope defined in the claims.
Claims
1. An encrypted search method for privacy protection of authorized information, the steps of which are include: 1) The user terminal and the data owner use the oblivious transfer method to find the intersection of the user's required query keyword list W and the authorized searchable keyword list G, so that the data owner and the user terminal can simultaneously obtain the keyword set that the user terminal needs to query and has been authorized; 2) The user terminal requests a key from the data owner and sends it to the server by constructing an encrypted query token. The server queries the corresponding encrypted document identifier set from the encrypted data storage database through the search keyword in the encrypted query token; the encrypted data storage database stores an encrypted index formed by the encrypted document identifier and the encrypted query keyword; 3) The server sends the retrieved encrypted document identifier set to the client.
2. The method according to claim 1, It is characterized in that The method for synchronizing the user's search keyword list and the authorized searchable keyword list between the user and the data owner using the oblivious transfer method is as follows: 11) The query keyword list required by the user end calculation W = (w 1 ,w 2 ,...,w l )’s hash value, generates a vector S with a length of l and sends the length l to the data owner; where w i is the i-th query keyword, and the i-th component in vector S is s i ,s i ∈{0,1} * , i = 1 ~ 1; 12) The data owner sets the authorized search keyword for the client and calculates its hash value; 13) The data owner generates a search keyword permission list G of the user terminal according to the authorized search keywords of the user terminal. 1 ,g 2 ,g 3 ...,g m ), g i ∈{0,1} * , and generate a matrix T of size m×l 0 , the matrix T 0 The elements in are all randomly generated; is the matrix T 0 The row vector of the vth row in is the matrix T 0 The column vector of the uth column in g i Authorizes the data owner to retrieve the i-th keyword in the keyword list, g i =1 means that the data owner authorizes the client to retrieve the i-th keyword in the keyword list, g i =0 means that the i-th keyword in the authorized retrieval keyword list of the data owner is not authorized to the client; 14) The data owner uses the matrix T 0 , based on the hash value of the search keyword permission list G authorized by the user Calculate the matrix T 1 Among them, record is the matrix T 1 The row vector of the vth row in is the matrix T 1 The column vector of the uth column, key C is the symmetric encryption key shared by the data owner and the user, and key C is used to encrypt g v After encryption, the authority data C(g v ); 15) The user and the data owner perform 1 inadvertent transmissions; in each inadvertent transmission, the data owner As the selected vector, the user end selects vector S as the selection vector, and each time after an oblivious transmission, the user end obtains a vector of length m; 16) The user terminal forms a matrix Q based on the received l vectors of length m, where the vth column vector of the matrix Q is denoted as q v , the uth row vector is denoted as q u ; 17) The user side calculates in, g j To retrieve the jth element in the keyword authority list G, w j is the jth keyword in the query keyword list W; 18) When querying the vth keyword w in the keyword list W v =g v When If F(w v ) value is 1, the client has the keyword w v Otherwise, there is no search permission for this keyword. v To retrieve the vth element in the keyword authority list G; 19) According to the calculation result of step 18), a set of keywords that the user needs to query and has been authorized is obtained.
3. The method according to claim 2, It is characterized in that The data owner uses the cuckoo hash method to calculate the hash value of the authorized search keyword of the user end, and the user end uses the simple hash method to calculate the required query keyword list W=(w 1 ,w 2 ,...,w l )'s hash value; the data owner and the user terminal have the same hash function set H.
4. The method according to claim 3, It is characterized in that In the cuckoo hashing method, when a hash conflict occurs in the data, the hash functions in the hash function set H are executed sequentially; in the simple hashing method, each hash function in the hash function set H is executed for each data.
5. The method according to claim 1, It is characterized in that The method to construct an encrypted query token is: 21) The data owner publishes a document count list Cnt of all searchable keywords; the document count list Cnt includes multiple key-value pairs, where the keyword is the key and the number of documents containing the keyword is the key value; 22) The data owner generates the key K T , K X , K Y , K Z ; Among them, the key K is generated according to the security parameter λ T ∈(0,1) λ , K X , K Y , K Z for The random number selected above; 23) The user requests the data owner to retrieve the key K X , K Z ; 24) The user terminal sets the keyword with the lowest number of associated documents to w 1 , and w i The number of associated documents for each search keyword using the search key K X , K Z Generates an encrypted query token.
6. The method according to claim 1, It is characterized in that An asymmetric encryption method is used between the server and the client. The server uses the public key to encrypt the file index after the data owner uploads the index information of the file to be retrieved. The server sends the retrieved encrypted file index back to the client; the client uses the private key between it and the server to decrypt the index and request relevant documents from the data owner.
Citation Information
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