Multiplying triple generation method under asynchronous Byzantine model

By combining asynchronous fully secret sharing protocol and multi-valued Byzantine protocol to generate random shares and multiplicative triples, the problem of high communication overhead under asynchronous Byzantine model is solved, and the communication cost of secure multi-party computation system is reduced.

CN119030710APending Publication Date: 2024-11-26XI AN JIAOTONG UNIV
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202411141511.5
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-08-20
Publication Date
2024-11-26

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Under the asynchronous Byzantine model, existing technologies have high communication overhead for generating random shares and multiplicative triples, resulting in high communication costs for secure multi-party computation systems.

Method used

A method combining asynchronous fully secret sharing protocol and multi-valued Byzantine protocol is adopted to generate the first random share and multiplicative triples, including step S1 to generate the first random share and step S2 to generate multiplicative triples. Through processes such as calculating the Vandermonde matrix and evidence sharing, communication overhead is reduced.

Benefits of technology

The asynchronous Byzantine model reduces the communication overhead for generating random shares and multiplicative triples, thereby reducing the communication cost of the secure multi-party computation system.

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Abstract

The invention discloses a multiplication triple generation method under an asynchronous Byzantine model, and the method comprises the following steps: generating a first random share, obtaining the first share by a participant through calling an asynchronous complete secret sharing protocol and a multi-valued Byzantine protocol during the period, and further obtaining the first random share; and generating a multiplication triple, and during the period, obtaining a second share by the participant by calling an asynchronous complete secret sharing protocol and a multi-valued Byzantine protocol so as to obtain the multiplication triple. According to the method, the asynchronous complete secret sharing protocol and the multi-valued Byzantine protocol are combined in the first random share generation stage and the multiplication triple generation stage, so that the random share and the multiplication triple are generated with relatively low communication overhead under the asynchronous Byzantine model, and the communication cost of the secure multi-party computing system is reduced.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of secure multi-party computing technology, and in particular to a method for generating multiplication triples under an asynchronous Byzantine model. Background Art

[0002] In secure multi-party computation systems, the robust asynchronous offline phase is the most challenging component because it must efficiently preprocess random shares and multiplication triplets and guarantee the delivery of outputs regardless of whether they are affected by an adversary. The online phase can utilize these multiplication triplets to efficiently evaluate multiplication gates, while random shares require the online phase to efficiently evaluate randomized gates, and clients can also use these shares to mask their private inputs. Therefore, it is necessary to study the method of generating multiplication triplets under the asynchronous Byzantine model.

[0003] In the prior art, when in an asynchronous Byzantine model, generating random shares and multiplication triplets generally requires high communication overhead. For example, in the paper Design and analysis of a distributed ECDSA signing service, a new protocol service for providing distributed ECDSA signatures is proposed and analyzed. The prior art is based on Ω(κn 2 ) communication overhead to generate random shares, with Ω(κn 3 ) to generate multiplication triplets with the communication overhead of

[0004] In a secure multi-party computing system, higher communication overhead means higher cost. The communication overhead of generating random shares and multiplication triplets in the above-mentioned prior art is high, so the communication cost of the secure multi-party computing system is high. Summary of the invention

[0005] The present application provides a method for generating multiplication triples under an asynchronous Byzantine model, which is used to solve the problems in the prior art of high communication overhead for generating random shares and multiplication triples and high communication cost of a secure multi-party computing system.

[0006] On the one hand, the present application provides a method for generating multiplication triples under an asynchronous Byzantine model, comprising the following steps:

[0007] Step S1, generating a first random share.

[0008] Step S1 includes the following steps.

[0009] Step S11, under the asynchronous Byzantine model, each participant calls an asynchronous complete secret sharing protocol to share a preset number of random secrets.

[0010] In step S12, each participant obtains the same preset number of asynchronous complete secret sharing protocols as other participants by calling a multi-valued Byzantine protocol, and obtains a first share in these asynchronous complete secret sharing protocols.

[0011] Step S13: Each participant calculates the Vandermonde matrix.

[0012] In step S14, each participant calculates a first random share, a commitment and evidence of the first random share based on the first share and the Vandermonde matrix.

[0013] Step S15: Each participant obtains a first random share.

[0014] Step S2, generating a multiplication triplet.

[0015] Step S2 includes the following steps:

[0016] Step S21, each participant calculates a secret based on the first random share.

[0017] Step S22, setting evidence of the participants according to the secret.

[0018] Step S23, under the asynchronous Byzantine model, each participant calls an asynchronous complete secret sharing protocol to share the secret and broadcasts the evidence to all participants.

[0019] In step S24, each participant obtains the same preset number of asynchronous complete secret sharing protocols as other participants by calling a multi-valued Byzantine protocol, and obtains a second share in these asynchronous complete secret sharing protocols.

[0020] Step S25: Each participant calculates a second random share based on the second share.

[0021] Step S26: Each participant obtains a multiplication triplet based on the second random share.

[0022] In one possible implementation, in step S12, when each participant receives a secret share corresponding to a random secret in a preset number of different asynchronous complete secret sharing protocols, each participant calls a multi-valued Byzantine protocol and takes the index of the completed asynchronous complete secret sharing protocol as input. When the multi-valued Byzantine protocol terminates, each participant obtains the same preset number of asynchronous complete secret sharing protocols and obtains the first share in these asynchronous complete secret sharing protocols.

[0023] In a possible implementation, step S12 includes the following steps:

[0024] Step S121, setting a first index set, and setting the first index set to an empty set.

[0025] Step S122: When a participant receives a secret share corresponding to a random secret in an asynchronous perfect secret sharing protocol, the index of the asynchronous perfect secret sharing protocol is added to the first index set.

[0026] Step S123, when the first index set contains a preset number of elements, each participant calls a multi-valued Byzantine protocol and uses the first index set as input.

[0027] Step S124, when the multi-valued Byzantine agreement is terminated, each participant obtains an identical first index set containing a preset number of elements and obtains the first share.

[0028] In a possible implementation, step S14 includes the following steps:

[0029] Step S141: Each participant calculates a first random share based on the first share and the Vandermonde matrix.

[0030] Step S142: Each participant calculates the commitment and evidence of the first random share based on the first share and the Vandermonde matrix.

[0031] In a possible implementation, step S21 includes the following steps:

[0032] In step S211, each participant divides the first random shares into two equal groups, and calculates a secret based on the two groups of first random shares.

[0033] Step S212, calculating zero-point evidence.

[0034] Step S213, calculate and generate meta-evidence.

[0035] Step S214, calculate the product proof using the product proof protocol.

[0036] In a possible implementation, step S22 includes the following steps:

[0037] The evidence of the participants is set according to the secret, the zero-point evidence, the generator evidence and the product evidence.

[0038] In one possible implementation, in step S24, when each participant receives a secret share corresponding to a secret in a preset number of different asynchronous complete secret sharing protocols, each participant calls a multi-valued Byzantine protocol and takes the index of the completed asynchronous complete secret sharing protocol as input. When the multi-valued Byzantine protocol terminates, each participant obtains the same preset number of asynchronous complete secret sharing protocols and obtains a second share in these asynchronous complete secret sharing protocols.

[0039] In a possible implementation, step S24 includes the following steps:

[0040] Step S241, setting a second index set, and setting the second index set to an empty set.

[0041] Step S242: When each participant receives a secret share corresponding to a secret in an asynchronous perfect secret sharing protocol, the index of the asynchronous perfect secret sharing protocol is added to the second index set.

[0042] Step S243, when the second index set contains a preset number of elements, each participant calls a multi-valued Byzantine protocol and uses the second index set as input.

[0043] Step S244, when the multi-valued Byzantine agreement is terminated, each participant obtains an identical second index set containing a preset number of elements and obtains the second share.

[0044] The method for generating multiplication triples under the asynchronous Byzantine model in this application has the following advantages:

[0045] By combining the asynchronous complete secret sharing protocol and the multi-valued Byzantine protocol in both the first random share generation stage and the multiplication triple generation stage, random shares and multiplication triples can be generated with lower communication overhead under the asynchronous Byzantine model, thereby reducing the communication cost of the secure multi-party computing system. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0046] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present application or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings required for use in the embodiments or the description of the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present application. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative work.

[0047] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of a flow chart of a method for generating multiplication triples under an asynchronous Byzantine model provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0048] Figure 2A flow chart of step S1 of a method for generating multiplication triples under an asynchronous Byzantine model provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0049] Figure 3 A flowchart of step S2 of the method for generating multiplication triples under the asynchronous Byzantine model provided in an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0050] The following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of the present application to clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present application, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of this application.

[0051] like Figures 1 to 3 As shown, the embodiment of the present application provides a method for generating multiplication triples under an asynchronous Byzantine model, comprising the following steps:

[0052] Step S1, generating a first random share.

[0053] Step S1 includes the following steps.

[0054] Step S11, under the asynchronous Byzantine model, each participant calls an asynchronous complete secret sharing protocol to share a preset number of random secrets.

[0055] In step S12, each participant obtains the same preset number of asynchronous complete secret sharing protocols as other participants by calling a multi-valued Byzantine protocol, and obtains a first share in these asynchronous complete secret sharing protocols.

[0056] Step S13: Each participant calculates the Vandermonde matrix.

[0057] In step S14, each participant calculates a first random share, a commitment and evidence of the first random share based on the first share and the Vandermonde matrix.

[0058] Step S15: Each participant obtains a first random share.

[0059] Step S2, generating a multiplication triplet.

[0060] Step S2 includes the following steps:

[0061] Step S21, each participant calculates a secret based on the first random share.

[0062] Step S22, setting evidence of the participants according to the secret.

[0063] Step S23, under the asynchronous Byzantine model, each participant calls an asynchronous complete secret sharing protocol to share the secret and broadcasts the evidence to all participants.

[0064] In step S24, each participant obtains the same preset number of asynchronous complete secret sharing protocols as other participants by calling a multi-valued Byzantine protocol, and obtains a second share in these asynchronous complete secret sharing protocols.

[0065] Step S25: Each participant calculates a second random share based on the second share.

[0066] Step S26: Each participant obtains a multiplication triplet based on the second random share.

[0067] Specifically, multiplication triplets are used in secure multi-party computation to securely calculate the product of two secret shared values, which is extremely important in the privacy computing process. First, based on a pre-generated set of multiplication triplets, each participant calculates some intermediate values ​​by subtracting their own data from these random numbers. Then, each participant exchanges these intermediate values ​​so that they can jointly calculate the final product. In this process, due to the use of random multiplication triplets, the participants cannot infer the original data from the intermediate values, ensuring the privacy of the data. At the same time, because most of the calculations have been completed in advance, this method also reduces the complexity of real-time computing and communication.

[0068] Specifically, in this embodiment, before step S1, the asynchronous Byzantine model is first initialized as follows: This model includes n=3t+1 participants, of which there are at most t malicious participants, and each participant randomly selects a random number and publicly, among which is a finite field of order q.

[0069] In this embodiment, step S11 includes: in the asynchronous Byzantine model, each participant P i Call an asynchronous perfect secret sharing protocol to share N random secrets s i1 ,s i2 ,…,s iN ,in B is the number of multiplication triplets. In the asynchronous complete secret sharing protocol, for other participants P j (j∈{1,…,n}), P i Send Share To the participant P j , where C ik Represents the participant P i The kth polynomial commitment of ik ] j , Indicates to send to P j Participants P i Secrets ik The t-order Shamir secret share, Indicates to send to P j About Shamir's Secret Share[s ik ] j , evidence.

[0070] Exemplarily, in step S12, when each participant receives a secret share corresponding to a random secret in a preset number of different asynchronous complete secret sharing protocols, each participant calls a multi-valued Byzantine protocol and takes the index of the completed asynchronous complete secret sharing protocol as input. When the multi-valued Byzantine protocol terminates, each participant obtains the same preset number of asynchronous complete secret sharing protocols and obtains the first share in these asynchronous complete secret sharing protocols.

[0071] Specifically, in the asynchronous Byzantine model, no participant can expect to wait for all n asynchronous complete secret sharing protocols to end. i In nt different asynchronous complete secret sharing protocols, the participant P receives the secret share corresponding to the random secret. i Call a multi-valued Byzantine agreement and take the index of these completed asynchronous complete secret sharing protocols as input. When the multi-valued Byzantine agreement terminates, each participant will obtain the same nt asynchronous complete secret sharing protocols and get its own share in these nt asynchronous complete secret sharing protocols, that is, the first share.

[0072] Exemplarily, step S12 includes the following steps:

[0073] Step S121, setting a first index set, and setting the first index set to an empty set.

[0074] Step S122: When a participant receives a secret share corresponding to a random secret in an asynchronous perfect secret sharing protocol, the index of the asynchronous perfect secret sharing protocol is added to the first index set.

[0075] Step S123, when the first index set contains a preset number of elements, each participant calls a multi-valued Byzantine protocol and uses the first index set as input.

[0076] Step S124, when the multi-valued Byzantine agreement is terminated, each participant obtains an identical first index set containing a preset number of elements and obtains the first share.

[0077] Specifically, in this embodiment, step S121 includes: setting a first index set and will Set to an empty set, that is

[0078] Step S122 includes: when the participant P i On the participant P j At the end of the asynchronous complete secret sharing protocol, the participant P i You will receive a secret share corresponding to the random secret And set

[0079] Step S123 includes: when the first index set When there are 2t+1 elements in When the participant P i by As input, call the multi-valued Byzantine agreement. Multi-valued Byzantine agreement is that each participant inputs a different first index set Finally, all participants reach a consensus on the first index set, that is, each participant obtains the same first index set

[0080] Step S124 includes: when the multi-valued Byzantine agreement is terminated, each participant P i will get the same first index set containing 2t+1 elements And received the participants Share That is the first share.

[0081] Specifically, in this embodiment, step S13 includes: the participant P i Compute the Vandermonde matrix The jth row of the Vandermonde matrix M in

[0082] Exemplarily, step S14 includes the following steps:

[0083] Step S141: Each participant calculates a first random share based on the first share and the Vandermonde matrix.

[0084] Step S142: Each participant calculates the commitment and evidence of the first random share based on the first share and the Vandermonde matrix.

[0085] Specifically, in this embodiment, step S141 includes: based on the first share For k = 1, 2, ..., N, the participant P i Calculate the first random share ([r1k ] i ,…,[r (t+1)k ] i )←M([s 1k ] i ,…,[s (2t+1)k ] i ) T and

[0086] Step S142 includes: calculating the commitment of the first random share and evidence Where l=1,2,…,t+1.

[0087] In this embodiment, step S15 includes: the participant P i Get N(t+1) first random shares

[0088] Specifically, in a possible embodiment, the asymptotic complexity analysis of the first random share generated in step S1 is performed as follows: In the protocol for generating the first random share, a total of Θ(n) instances of the asynchronous complete secret sharing protocol need to be called. In each asynchronous complete secret sharing protocol, the batch size is Ω(nlogn), and the communication cost of n asynchronous complete secret sharing protocols is Ω(κn 3 logn), where κ is the security strength. In addition, a multi-valued Byzantine protocol needs to be called in the first random share generation protocol, and the communication cost of the protocol is Ω(κn 2 ). Therefore, the first random share protocol can be generated with a total communication cost Ω(κn 3 logn) batches to generate N(t+1) first random shares, which is equivalent to the amortized communication cost of each first random share being Ω(κn). Compared with the prior art which uses Ω(κn 2 ) generates random shares with the communication overhead. The multiplication triple generation method under the asynchronous Byzantine model of the present application reduces the communication overhead of generating random shares.

[0089] Exemplarily, step S21 includes the following steps:

[0090] In step S211, each participant divides the first random shares into two equal groups, and calculates a secret based on the two groups of first random shares.

[0091] Step S212, calculating zero-point evidence.

[0092] Step S213, calculate and generate meta-evidence.

[0093] Step S214, calculate the product proof using the product proof protocol.

[0094] Specifically, in this embodiment, step S211 includes: the participant P i Set the first B first random shares of the 2B first random shares to The next B first random shares are set to For each k∈[1,2,…,B], the participant P i Computing Secrets Randomly select secret And choose the t-order polynomial and Used to share secrets and in and

[0095] Step S212 includes: based on the polynomial and Calculating Zero-Point Evidence

[0096] Step S213 includes: calculating and generating meta-evidence and where g and h are cyclic groups of order q The generator of .

[0097] Step S214 includes: calculating the product evidence π using the following product proof protocol i k :

[0098] calculate and in Computational Challenges in is a collision-resistant hash function; calculate z1=e1+x[a k ] i , z3=e3+x[b k ] i , and Setting up product evidence

[0099] Exemplarily, step S22 includes the following steps:

[0100] The evidence of the participants is set according to the secret, the zero-point evidence, the generator evidence and the product evidence.

[0101] Specifically, in this embodiment, step S22 includes: setting the participant P i The evidence is

[0102] Specifically, in this embodiment, step S23 includes: the participant P i Call the asynchronous perfect secret sharing protocol to share the secret And proof i Broadcast to all participants P j (j∈{1,…,n}). Specifically, each participant P i Call an asynchronous perfect secret sharing protocol to share B secrets In the asynchronous complete secret sharing protocol, for other participants P j (j∈{1,…,n}), P i Send Share and proof i To the participant P j , where C ik Represents the participant P i The kth polynomial commitment of Indicates to send to P j Participants P i The Secret The t-order Shamir secret share, Indicates to send to P j About Shamir's Secret Share[s ik ] j , evidence.

[0103] Exemplarily, in step S24, when each participant receives a secret share corresponding to a secret in a preset number of different asynchronous complete secret sharing protocols, each participant calls a multi-valued Byzantine protocol and takes the index of the completed asynchronous complete secret sharing protocol as input. When the multi-valued Byzantine protocol terminates, each participant obtains the same preset number of asynchronous complete secret sharing protocols and obtains a second share in these asynchronous complete secret sharing protocols.

[0104] Specifically, in the asynchronous Byzantine model, no participant can expect to wait for all n asynchronous complete secret sharing protocols to end. i In nt different asynchronous complete secret sharing protocols, the participant P receives the secret share corresponding to the secret. i Call a multi-valued Byzantine agreement and take the index of these completed asynchronous complete secret sharing protocols as input. When the multi-valued Byzantine agreement terminates, each participant will obtain the same nt asynchronous complete secret sharing protocols and get its own share in these nt asynchronous complete secret sharing protocols, that is, the second share.

[0105] Exemplarily, step S24 includes the following steps:

[0106] Step S241, setting a second index set, and setting the second index set to an empty set.

[0107] Step S242: When each participant receives a secret share corresponding to a secret in an asynchronous perfect secret sharing protocol, the index of the asynchronous perfect secret sharing protocol is added to the second index set.

[0108] Step S243, when the second index set contains a preset number of elements, each participant calls a multi-valued Byzantine protocol and uses the second index set as input.

[0109] Step S244, when the multi-valued Byzantine agreement is terminated, each participant obtains an identical second index set containing a preset number of elements and obtains the second share.

[0110] Specifically, in this embodiment, step S241 includes: setting the second index set γ i , and γ i Set to an empty set, that is

[0111] Step S242 includes: when the participant P i On the participant P j The asynchronous complete secret sharing protocol receives the secret share corresponding to the secret and proof i , participant P i Verify the received proof i If the proof i Correct, Party P i Save Share And set γ i ←Υ i ∪{j}.

[0112] Step S243 includes: when the second index set γ i When there are 2t+1 elements in |γ i |=2t+1, the participant P i γ i As input, call the multi-valued Byzantine agreement. The multi-valued Byzantine agreement is that each participant inputs a different second index set γ i , and finally all participants reach a consensus on the second index set, that is, each participant obtains the same second index set γ.

[0113] Step S244 includes: when the multi-valued Byzantine agreement terminates, each participant P iwill get the same second index set γ containing 2t+1 elements, and receive the participant P j The share of (j∈γ) The second share.

[0114] Specifically, in this embodiment, step S25 includes: based on the second share For k = 1, 2, ..., B, the participant P i Calculate the second random share where λ j is the value of the jth Lagrange interpolation polynomial at zero, that is

[0115] Specifically, in this embodiment, step S26 includes: each participant P i Get B multiplication triplets

[0116] Specifically, in a possible embodiment, the asymptotic complexity analysis of the multiplication triples generated in step S2 is as follows: In the protocol for generating multiplication triples, a total of Θ(n) times of generating the first random share protocol are required. In each generating the first random share protocol, the batch size is Set N = Ω(nlogn). In the protocol for generating multiplication triplets, it is necessary to call Θ(n) times to generate the asynchronous complete secret sharing protocol, and the batch size is B = Ω(n 2 logn), the communication cost of n asynchronous complete secret sharing protocols is Ω(κn 4 logn), where κ is the security strength. In addition, a multi-valued Byzantine protocol needs to be called in the protocol for generating multiplication triples, and the communication cost of the protocol is Ω(κn 2 ). Therefore, the protocol for generating multiplication triplets can be implemented with a total communication cost of Ω(κn 4 logn) batch generation B = Ω(n 2 logn)B multiplication triplets, which is equivalent to an amortized communication cost of Ω(κn 2 ). Compared with the prior art method of using Ω(κn 3 ) generates multiplication triples with the communication overhead, and the multiplication triples generation method under the asynchronous Byzantine model of the present application reduces the communication overhead of generating multiplication triples.

[0117] The embodiment of the present application combines the asynchronous complete secret sharing protocol and the multi-valued Byzantine protocol in both the first random share generation stage and the multiplication triple generation stage, so that random shares and multiplication triples are generated with lower communication overhead under the asynchronous Byzantine model, thereby reducing the communication cost of the secure multi-party computing system.

[0118] Although the preferred embodiments of the present application have been described, those skilled in the art may make other changes and modifications to these embodiments once they have learned the basic creative concept. Therefore, the appended claims are intended to be interpreted as including the preferred embodiments and all changes and modifications falling within the scope of the present application.

[0119] Obviously, those skilled in the art can make various changes and modifications to the present application without departing from the spirit and scope of the present application. Thus, if these modifications and variations of the present application fall within the scope of the claims of the present application and their equivalents, the present application is also intended to include these modifications and variations.

Claims

1. Multiplication triple generation method under asynchronous Byzantine model, It is characterized in that The following steps are involved: Step S1, generating a first random share; Step S1 includes the following steps: Step S11, under the asynchronous Byzantine model, each participant calls an asynchronous complete secret sharing protocol to share a preset number of random secrets; Step S12, each participant obtains the same preset number of asynchronous complete secret sharing protocols as other participants by calling a multi-valued Byzantine protocol, and obtains a first share in these asynchronous complete secret sharing protocols; Step S13, each participant calculates the Vandermonde matrix; Step S14, each participant calculates a first random share, a commitment and a proof of the first random share based on the first share and the Vandermonde matrix; Step S15, each participant obtains a first random share; Step S2, generating a multiplication triplet; Step S2 includes the following steps: Step S21, each participant calculates a secret based on the first random share; Step S22, setting the evidence of the participants according to the secret; Step S23, under the asynchronous Byzantine model, each participant calls an asynchronous complete secret sharing protocol to share the secret, and broadcasts the evidence to all participants; Step S24, each participant obtains the same preset number of asynchronous complete secret sharing protocols as other participants by calling a multi-valued Byzantine protocol, and obtains a second share in these asynchronous complete secret sharing protocols; Step S25, each participant calculates a second random share based on the second share; Step S26: Each participant obtains a multiplication triplet based on the second random share.

2. The method for generating multiplication triples under the asynchronous Byzantine model according to claim 1, It is characterized in that In step S12, when each participant receives a secret share corresponding to a random secret in a preset number of different asynchronous complete secret sharing protocols, each participant calls a multi-valued Byzantine protocol and takes the index of the completed asynchronous complete secret sharing protocol as input. When the multi-valued Byzantine protocol terminates, each participant obtains the same preset number of asynchronous complete secret sharing protocols and obtains the first share in these asynchronous complete secret sharing protocols.

3. The method for generating multiplication triples under the asynchronous Byzantine model according to claim 2, It is characterized in that Step S12 includes the following steps: Step S121, setting a first index set, and setting the first index set to an empty set; Step S122, when a participant receives a secret share corresponding to a random secret in an asynchronous perfect secret sharing protocol, the index of the asynchronous perfect secret sharing protocol is added to the first index set; Step S123, when the first index set contains a preset number of elements, each participant calls a multi-valued Byzantine protocol and uses the first index set as input; Step S124, when the multi-valued Byzantine agreement is terminated, each participant obtains an identical first index set containing a preset number of elements and obtains the first share.

4. The method for generating multiplication triples under the asynchronous Byzantine model according to claim 1, It is characterized in that Step S14 includes the following steps: Step S141, each participant calculates a first random share based on the first share and the Vandermonde matrix; Step S142, each participant calculates the commitment and evidence of the first random share based on the first share and the Vandermonde matrix.

5. The method for generating multiplication triples under the asynchronous Byzantine model according to claim 1, It is characterized in that Step S21 includes the following steps: Step S211, each participant divides the first random shares into two groups, and calculates a secret based on the two groups of first random shares; Step S212, calculating zero-point evidence; Step S213, calculating and generating meta-evidence; Step S214, calculate the product proof using the product proof protocol.

6. The method for generating multiplication triples under the asynchronous Byzantine model according to claim 5, It is characterized in that Step S22 includes the following steps: The evidence of the participants is set according to the secret, the zero-point evidence, the generator evidence and the product evidence.

7. The method for generating multiplication triples under the asynchronous Byzantine model according to claim 1, It is characterized in that In step S24, when each participant receives a secret share corresponding to the secret in a preset number of different asynchronous complete secret sharing protocols, each participant calls a multi-valued Byzantine protocol and takes the index of the completed asynchronous complete secret sharing protocol as input. When the multi-valued Byzantine protocol terminates, each participant obtains the same preset number of asynchronous complete secret sharing protocols and obtains a second share in these asynchronous complete secret sharing protocols.

8. The method for generating multiplication triples under the asynchronous Byzantine model according to claim 7, It is characterized in that Step S24 includes the following steps: Step S241, setting a second index set, and setting the second index set to an empty set; Step S242, when each participant receives a secret share corresponding to a secret in an asynchronous perfect secret sharing protocol, an index of the asynchronous perfect secret sharing protocol is added to the second index set; Step S243, when the second index set contains a preset number of elements, each participant calls a multi-valued Byzantine protocol and uses the second index set as input; Step S244, when the multi-valued Byzantine agreement is terminated, each participant obtains an identical second index set containing a preset number of elements and obtains the second share.