Unmanned aerial vehicle laser inertial navigation equipment auxiliary defense guide deception method

By connecting satellite information into the drone laser inertial navigation equipment for effectiveness and fraud judgment, switching navigation mode and using Kalman filtering technology, the problem of satellite navigation equipment being susceptible to interference is solved, and the navigation accuracy of the drone is improved Anti-interference ability.

CN119064956APending Publication Date: 2024-12-03WUHAN HUAZHONG TIANYI INTELLIGENT TECH CO LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202411235344.0
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-09-04
Publication Date
2024-12-03

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The satellite navigation equipment of existing drones is susceptible to deceptive interference, resulting in a decrease in navigation accuracy. Especially in the military field, it will be captured by the enemy field. It is urgent to design a drone laser inertial navigation equipment to assist in the defensive guide.

Method used

By connecting satellite information to the laser inertial navigation device, validity judgment and deception judgment are made, and the position and speed error thresholds are used to determine whether the navigation guide has been deceived. If it is deceived, switch to the pure inertial navigation mode. If it is not deceived, proceed Combined navigation, using Kalman filtering technology for error compensation and correction.

Benefits of technology

Effectively improve the drone's anti-sanitation guide's ability to deceive and interfere, ensure navigation accuracy and safe flight, and improve battlefield survival performance.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The invention discloses an unmanned aerial vehicle laser inertial navigation equipment assisted defense guide deception method. The method comprises the following steps: S1, accessing satellite information to laser inertial navigation equipment; and S2, carrying out validity judgment on the satellite information, and judging the validity of the satellite information according to four serial logic conditions: judging an effective mark of original data, judging a Pdop value, judging a satellite navigation solution state and roughly judging satellite navigation validity. The defense guide cheating method has the beneficial effects that after the defense guide information is accessed to the laser inertial navigation equipment, effectiveness judgment is carried out on defense guide information through effective mark judgment, Pdop value judgment, defense guide solution state judgment and defense guide effectiveness rough judgment; and the satellite navigation deception judgment is judged through two conditions of position error judgment and speed error judgment, whether the error value of satellite navigation and inertial navigation is within a threshold range or not is judged according to an inertial navigation error divergence rule, and whether the satellite navigation is deception or not is judged.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of unmanned aerial vehicles, and in particular to a method for assisting unmanned aerial vehicle laser inertial navigation equipment in defending against deception. Background Art

[0002] Drones can perform tasks such as reconnaissance, alert, surveillance, search, intelligence, communication relay, strike and air support, and are the terminator robots of future air combat. Navigation and positioning are common requirements of all types of drones, and are the basic prerequisites for drones to perform various missions. At present, all types of drones use inertial + satellite technology to provide navigation services, especially for medium and large drones with military purposes. They have long ranges, large payloads, complex mechanical environments such as cabin temperature and vibration, and high navigation accuracy requirements. Laser technology-based inertial navigation equipment is generally selected as the main inertial navigation, and satellite positioning equipment is also equipped to work in combination with laser inertial navigation.

[0003] Inertial navigation equipment has the advantages of full autonomy, full parameters, and high-frequency signal output, but the navigation accuracy will diverge over time; satellite navigation uses satellite navigation receivers to receive electromagnetic wave signals sent by multiple satellites in space to solve and locate, which can achieve real-time and high-precision positioning around the clock and in all weather conditions.

[0004] For example, a strapdown laser inertial navigation device for an unmanned aerial vehicle and an unmanned aerial vehicle with application number CN 115790586A and announcement date 2023.03.14 include multiple laser gyroscopes, accelerometers, gyroscope circuit components, navigation computer circuit components, a main body component and a box component; the laser gyroscope is used to collect angle information, and multiple laser gyroscopes share the gyroscope circuit component and the navigation computer circuit component; the accelerometer is used to collect speed information; the gyroscope circuit component is used to realize the state control of the laser gyroscope; the navigation computer circuit component is used to perform navigation calculations and attitude calculations based on the angle information and speed information; the main body component is used to rigidly strapdown the laser gyroscope and the accelerometer; the box component is used to install the gyroscope circuit component and the navigation computer circuit component.

[0005] Satellite navigation equipment is susceptible to interference, especially deceptive interference. When the interference source generates a deceptive signal that is highly similar to the real satellite navigation signal, the receiver will capture and track the deceptive signal as a real satellite navigation signal, causing the receiver to output incorrect information. Deceptive interference is extremely destructive and concealed, especially in the military field, which will directly lead the drone into the enemy's territory and be captured by the enemy. Therefore, it is urgent to design a method for drone laser inertial navigation equipment to assist in anti-satellite navigation deception to solve the above problems. Summary of the invention

[0006] The purpose of the present invention is to provide a method for assisting the defense against guided missile deception by laser inertial navigation equipment of unmanned aerial vehicles, so as to solve the above-mentioned deficiencies in the prior art.

[0007] In order to achieve the above object, the present invention provides the following technical solutions:

[0008] A method for assisting unmanned aerial vehicle laser inertial navigation equipment to prevent deception of guided missiles, comprising the following steps:

[0009] S1. Satellite information access to laser inertial navigation equipment;

[0010] S2. First determine the validity of satellite information

[0011] The validity of satellite information is judged according to four serial logic conditions: raw data validity flag judgment, Pdop value judgment, satellite navigation solution state judgment and satellite navigation validity rough judgment;

[0012] S3. Deception of satellite information

[0013] The satellite information is deceptively judged based on two serial logics: the position information output by the satellite navigation system is judged against the position information output by the laser inertial navigation system, and the speed information output by the satellite navigation system is judged against the speed information output by the laser inertial navigation system;

[0014] S4. Determine whether the satellite navigation is deceived according to the position information error threshold and the speed error threshold in S3:

[0015] If any of the position and velocity errors exceed the limit, it can be considered that the satellite navigation is deceived and the information is invalid and unusable.

[0016] S5. If the satellite navigation is not deceived, the laser inertial navigation works in the combined navigation mode, with the laser inertial navigation device as the core, and the reference information such as speed and position provided by the satellite navigation is monitored. Based on the Kalman filtering technology, the navigation error of the device is estimated, compensated and corrected.

[0017] Furthermore, the pure inertial positioning accuracy of the airborne laser inertial navigation device is ≤1 nautical mile / hour, and the airborne laser inertial navigation device includes two working modes: pure inertial navigation and combined navigation.

[0018] Furthermore, in S2, the process of judging the effectiveness of the health guide is as follows:

[0019] Each time a new frame of satellite data is received, a satellite navigation validity judgment is performed, mainly to judge whether the valid flag in the satellite navigation message is "valid", whether the Pdop value is <4, whether the satellite navigation solution state is >0, and the satellite navigation position / speed information is roughly judged (whether the speed and position information of two consecutive frames of satellite navigation exceeds the threshold. After the above judgments, it can be determined whether the received satellite navigation information is valid.

[0020] Furthermore, in S3, the satellite navigation anti-fraud judgment process is as follows: the satellite navigation information that is judged to be valid enters the satellite navigation fraud judgment module,

[0021] a. First, the satellite navigation position information is judged. If the difference between the satellite navigation position and the inertial navigation position is greater than the threshold, it is considered that the satellite navigation is deceived, and the device exits the integrated navigation state; if the difference between the satellite navigation position and the inertial navigation position is less than the threshold, it is considered that the satellite navigation position information is not deceived, and the next judgment can be entered;

[0022] b. When it is determined that the satellite navigation position information has not been deceived, the satellite navigation speed information is judged. If the difference between the satellite navigation speed and the inertial navigation speed is greater than the threshold, the satellite navigation is considered to be deceived and the device exits the combined navigation state; if the difference between the satellite navigation position and the inertial navigation position is less than the threshold, the satellite navigation speed information is considered to be not deceived; when both the satellite navigation position and speed information are not deceived, the satellite navigation data is considered to be valid and can be used for combined navigation.

[0023] Furthermore, in S3, the threshold of the position error in the defense guidance deception logic design is designed as follows:

[0024] Δ=80+0.001t 2 , 0≤t≤600

[0025] Δ=180+0.00066t 2 , 600 <t≤2400

[0026] Δ=4000,2400 <t≤3600

[0027] Δ=4000+5x(t-3600), t>3600;

[0028] The threshold of speed error is designed as follows:

[0029] Δ=0.5+0.003t,0≤t≤900

[0030] Δ=4,900 <t≤3600

[0031] Δ=4+2x(t-3600) / 3600, t>3600;

[0032] Where t is the pure inertial navigation time after judging the entry into deception, Δ is the deception judgment threshold, which is set by combining the error divergence law of the laser inertial navigation equipment and the boundary requirements of the safe flight of the UAV. The position threshold and speed threshold are designed in sections to ensure that the aircraft can work normally during long-term continuous flight.

[0033] Furthermore, in S3, if the difference between the position and velocity output by the satellite and the position and velocity output by the inertial navigation is within a threshold range, it is determined that the satellite is not deceived; if it is outside the threshold range, it is determined that the satellite navigation is deceived; if any error of the position and velocity exceeds the threshold, it is determined that the satellite navigation is deceived.

[0034] Furthermore, in S4, if the satellite navigation information is deceived, the satellite navigation information is invalid, the laser inertial navigation operates in a pure inertial navigation mode, and sends a flag message indicating that the satellite navigation is deceived to the flight control.

[0035] Furthermore, in S4, if the satellite navigation is not deceived, the satellite navigation information is valid, and the laser inertial navigation is combined with the position and speed information of the satellite navigation, and the laser inertial navigation works in the combined navigation mode.

[0036] Furthermore, the selection basis of the threshold values ​​of the position error and the velocity error is based on the error divergence law of the laser inertial navigation device and the flight data accumulated during the actual flight law. In a short period of time, the pure inertial position divergence law of the laser inertial navigation device can be approximated by the horizontal second term of time, and the pure inertial velocity divergence law can be approximated by the first term of time and time.

[0037] Furthermore, in the judgment of entering the deception stage, a deception constant is set, and the inherent fluctuations of the satellite navigation position and speed information are around ±20m and ±0.2m / s, and the inherent fluctuation values ​​are increased by 2 to 4 times as the deception judgment constant; after judging that the satellite navigation has entered the deception state, based on the pure inertial position and speed error divergence characteristics, the error curve envelope value including static and dynamic tests is amplified by 1.5 to 2 times as the judgment threshold. After the continuous deception time is greater than 1 hour, the position and speed error divergence accelerates, and the setting threshold increases with time and the speed increases accordingly.

[0038] In the above technical solution, the present invention provides a method for assisting the UAV laser inertial navigation device to prevent the deception of the guided missile.

[0039] 1. After the satellite navigation information is connected to the laser inertial navigation device, the anti-satellite navigation deception method first judges the effectiveness of the satellite navigation confidence through effective flag judgment, Pdop value judgment, satellite navigation solution state judgment and satellite navigation effectiveness rough judgment. When the four logics are all judged to be passed, the satellite navigation deception judgment is judged by the two conditions of position error judgment and speed error judgment. According to the divergence law of inertial navigation error, it is judged whether the error value of satellite navigation and inertial navigation is within the threshold range, and whether the satellite navigation is deceived. If any of the position and speed error judgments exceeds the limit, it can be considered that the satellite navigation is deceived and the information is unavailable. The status information is given, which can effectively improve the drone's resistance to satellite navigation deception interference and improve the drone's battlefield survivability. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0040] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present application or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings required for use in the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments recorded in the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can also be obtained based on these drawings.

[0041] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of the logical structure provided for an embodiment of a method for assisting defense against guided missile deception using laser inertial navigation equipment of an unmanned aerial vehicle of the present invention.

[0042] Figure 2 A schematic structural diagram of a satellite navigation effectiveness judgment process provided in an embodiment of a method for assisted defense against satellite navigation deception using laser inertial navigation equipment of an unmanned aerial vehicle of the present invention.

[0043] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of the satellite navigation anti-spoofing process structure is provided for an embodiment of the UAV laser inertial navigation device assisted anti-satellite navigation spoofing method of the present invention.

[0044] Figure 4 A schematic diagram of the structure of the laser inertial navigation device inertial navigation satellite combined navigation process provided in an embodiment of the unmanned aerial vehicle laser inertial navigation device assisted defense guidance spoofing method of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0045] In order to enable those skilled in the art to better understand the technical solution of the present invention, the present invention will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0046] like Figure 1-4 As shown, an embodiment of the present invention provides a method for assisting the UAV laser inertial navigation device to prevent guidance deception, comprising the following steps:

[0047] S1. Satellite information access to laser inertial navigation equipment;

[0048] S2. First determine the validity of satellite information

[0049] The validity of satellite information is judged according to four serial logic conditions: raw data validity flag judgment, Pdop value judgment, satellite navigation solution status judgment and satellite navigation validity rough judgment, such as Figure 2 As shown,

[0050] The effectiveness judgment process of the medical guide is as follows:

[0051] Each time a new frame of satellite data is received, a satellite navigation validity judgment is performed, mainly to judge whether the valid flag in the satellite navigation message is "valid", whether the Pdop value is <4, whether the satellite navigation solution state solution is >0, and the satellite navigation position / speed information is roughly judged (whether the speed and position information of two consecutive frames of satellite navigation exceeds the threshold. After the above judgment, it can be determined whether the received satellite navigation information is valid;

[0052] S3. Deception of satellite information

[0053] The satellite information is deceptively judged based on two serial logics: the position information output by the satellite navigation system is judged against the position information output by the laser inertial navigation system, and the speed information output by the satellite navigation system is judged against the speed information output by the laser inertial navigation system. Figure 3As shown,

[0054] The satellite navigation anti-fraud judgment process is as follows: the satellite navigation information that is judged to be valid enters the satellite navigation fraud judgment module.

[0055] a. First, the satellite navigation position information is judged. If the difference between the satellite navigation position and the inertial navigation position is greater than the threshold, it is considered that the satellite navigation is deceived, and the device exits the integrated navigation state; if the difference between the satellite navigation position and the inertial navigation position is less than the threshold, it is considered that the satellite navigation position information is not deceived, and the next judgment can be entered;

[0056] b. When it is determined that the satellite navigation position information is not deceived, the satellite navigation speed information is judged. If the difference between the satellite navigation speed and the inertial navigation speed is greater than the threshold, the satellite navigation is considered to be deceived, and the device exits the integrated navigation state; if the difference between the satellite navigation position and the inertial navigation position is less than the threshold, the satellite navigation speed information is considered to be not deceived; when both the satellite navigation position and speed information are not deceived, the satellite navigation data is considered to be valid and can be used for integrated navigation.

[0057] The threshold of position error in the defense guidance deception logic design is designed as follows:

[0058] Δ=80+0.001t 2 , 0≤t≤600

[0059] Δ=180+0.00066t 2 , 600 <t≤2400

[0060] Δ=4000,2400 <t≤3600

[0061] Δ=4000+5x(t-3600), t>3600;

[0062] The threshold of speed error is designed as follows:

[0063] Δ=0.5+0.003t,0≤t≤900

[0064] Δ=4,900 <t≤3600

[0065] Δ=4+2x(t-3600) / 3600, t>3600;

[0066] Where t is the pure inertial navigation time after judging the entry into deception, Δ is the deception judgment threshold, which is set by combining the error divergence law of the laser inertial navigation equipment and the boundary requirements of the safe flight of the UAV. The position threshold and speed threshold are designed in sections to ensure that the aircraft can work normally during long-term continuous flight.

[0067] The difference between the position and velocity output by the satellite and the position and velocity output by the inertial navigation system is within the threshold range, and the satellite is judged to be not deceived; if it is outside the threshold range, the satellite navigation is judged to be deceived; if any error of the position and velocity exceeds the threshold, the satellite navigation is judged to be deceived;

[0068] S4. Determine whether the satellite navigation is deceived according to the position information error threshold and the speed error threshold in S3:

[0069] If any of the position and velocity errors are judged to be out of bounds, it can be considered that the satellite navigation is deceived, and the information is invalid and unusable. The laser inertial navigation works in the pure inertial navigation mode and sends a sign message indicating that the satellite navigation is deceived to the flight control. If the satellite navigation is not deceived, the satellite navigation information is valid, and the laser inertial navigation combines the position and velocity information of the satellite navigation, and the laser inertial navigation works in the combined navigation mode;

[0070] S5. If the satellite navigation is not deceived, the laser inertial navigation works in the combined navigation mode, with the laser inertial navigation device as the core, and the reference information such as speed and position provided by the satellite navigation is monitored. Based on the Kalman filter technology, the navigation error of the device is estimated, compensated and corrected, such as Figure 4 As shown,

[0071] Kalman filtering technology is the core key technology of integrated navigation, which mainly includes four steps: linear model solution, discrete model solution, time update, and state update:

[0072] Step 1: Solving the linear model

[0073] The attitude error, velocity error, position error, gyro bias, accelerometer bias, DVL scale factor error and installation error of the inertial navigation device are taken as state variables, and Kalman filter state observation is established to estimate and compensate for various errors.

[0074] a. System variable status:

[0075]

[0076] in: represents attitude angle error; δv represents velocity error; δλ, δL, δh represent latitude error, longitude error and altitude error respectively; ε bx Indicates the gyro constant zero bias; It indicates the addition of the constant zero bias;

[0077] Observed variables:

[0078] Z=[δL δλ] T

[0079] b. Calculate the A matrix

[0080]

[0081] Attitude Error Equation

[0082]

[0083] Where:

[0084]

[0085]

[0086] Speed ​​Error Equation

[0087]

[0088]

[0089] Position Error Equation

[0090]

[0091] Where:

[0092]

[0093] c. Calculate the G matrix

[0094]

[0095] d. Calculate the H matrix

[0096]

[0097] Step 2: Discrete model solution

[0098] a. Discretization of A

[0099]

[0100] Among them: F k is equal to the value of matrix A at time t, T is the discretization period; b, G discretization

[0101]

[0102] Where: G k Equal to the value of the G matrix at time t, T is the discretization period; Step 3, time update

[0103]

[0104]

[0105] Step 4: Measurement Update

[0106]

[0107]

[0108] P k =(IK k H k ) k / k-1 .

[0109] In one embodiment provided by the present invention, the pure inertial positioning accuracy of the airborne laser inertial navigation device is ≤1 nautical mile / hour, and the airborne laser inertial navigation device includes two working modes: pure inertial navigation and combined navigation.

[0110] In another embodiment provided by the present invention, the threshold values ​​of position error and velocity error are selected based on the error divergence law of the laser inertial navigation device and the flight data accumulated during the actual flight law. In a short period of time, the pure inertial position divergence law of the laser inertial navigation device can be approximated by the horizontal second term of time, and the pure inertial velocity divergence law can be approximated by the linear term of time and time.

[0111] In another embodiment provided by the present invention, a deception constant is set when judging entering the deception stage. The self-fluctuation of the satellite navigation position and speed information is about ±20m and ±0.2m / s, and the self-fluctuation value is increased by 2 to 4 times as the deception judgment constant. After judging that the satellite navigation enters the deception state, based on the pure inertial position and speed error divergence characteristics, the error curve envelope value including static and dynamic tests is amplified by 1.5 to 2 times as the judgment threshold. After the continuous deception time is greater than 1 hour, the position and speed error divergence accelerates, and the setting threshold increases with time and the speed increases accordingly.

[0112] Working principle: satellite information is connected to the laser inertial navigation device, and the validity of the satellite navigation insulation information is first judged, mainly judging whether the valid mark in the satellite navigation message is "valid", whether the Pdop value is <4, whether the satellite navigation solution state is >0, and the satellite navigation position / speed information is roughly judged (whether the speed and position information of two consecutive frames of satellite navigation exceeds the threshold. After the above judgment, it can be determined whether the received satellite navigation information is valid. If the satellite navigation is invalid, the laser inertial navigation device performs pure inertial navigation solution. If the satellite navigation is valid, the position and speed information in the satellite navigation information are unpacked and subtracted from the position and speed information output by the inertial navigation device. The deviation information enters the inertial auxiliary deception threshold detection module. If the deviation is within the set threshold range, it is determined that the satellite navigation is not deceived, and the laser inertial navigation can use this information for combined navigation; if the deviation is outside the set threshold range, it is determined that the satellite navigation is deceived, and the inertial navigation device continues to perform pure inertial navigation solution deviation.

[0113] The above description is only by way of illustration of certain exemplary embodiments of the present invention. It is undoubted that those skilled in the art can modify the described embodiments in various ways without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention. Therefore, the above drawings and descriptions are illustrative in nature and should not be construed as limiting the scope of protection of the claims of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for assisted defense against guided deception by laser inertial navigation equipment of unmanned aerial vehicles, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: S1. Satellite information access to laser inertial navigation equipment; S2. First determine the validity of satellite information The validity of satellite information is judged according to four serial logic conditions: raw data validity flag judgment, Pdop value judgment, satellite navigation solution state judgment and satellite navigation validity rough judgment; S3. Deception of satellite information The satellite information is deceptively judged based on two serial logics: the position information output by the satellite navigation system is judged against the position information output by the laser inertial navigation system, and the speed information output by the satellite navigation system is judged against the speed information output by the laser inertial navigation system; S4. Determine whether the satellite navigation is deceived according to the position information error threshold and the speed error threshold in S3: If any of the position and velocity errors exceed the limit, it can be considered that the satellite navigation is deceived and the information is invalid and unusable. S5. If the satellite navigation is not deceived, the laser inertial navigation works in the combined navigation mode, with the laser inertial navigation device as the core, and the reference information such as speed and position provided by the satellite navigation is monitored. Based on the Kalman filtering technology, the navigation error of the device is estimated, compensated and corrected.

2. The method for preventing deception of unmanned aerial vehicle laser inertial navigation equipment according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The pure inertial positioning accuracy of the airborne laser inertial navigation device is ≤1 nautical mile / hour, and the airborne laser inertial navigation device includes two working modes: pure inertial navigation and combined navigation.

3. The method for defending against deception of unmanned aerial vehicle laser inertial navigation equipment according to claim 1 is characterized in that: In S2, the process of judging the effectiveness of the satellite guide is as follows: Each time a new frame of satellite data is received, a satellite navigation validity judgment is performed, mainly to judge whether the valid flag in the satellite navigation message is "valid", whether the Pdop value is <4, whether the satellite navigation solution state is >0, and the satellite navigation position / speed information is roughly judged (whether the speed and position information of two consecutive frames of satellite navigation exceeds the threshold. After the above judgments, it can be determined whether the received satellite navigation information is valid.

4. The method for preventing deception of unmanned aerial vehicle laser inertial navigation equipment according to claim 1 is characterized in that: In S3, the satellite navigation anti-fraud judgment process is as follows: the satellite navigation information that is judged to be valid enters the satellite navigation fraud judgment module, a. First, the satellite navigation position information is judged. If the difference between the satellite navigation position and the inertial navigation position is greater than the threshold, it is considered that the satellite navigation is deceived, and the device exits the integrated navigation state; if the difference between the satellite navigation position and the inertial navigation position is less than the threshold, it is considered that the satellite navigation position information is not deceived, and the next judgment can be entered; b. When it is determined that the satellite navigation position information has not been deceived, the satellite navigation speed information is judged. If the difference between the satellite navigation speed and the inertial navigation speed is greater than the threshold, the satellite navigation is considered to be deceived and the device exits the combined navigation state; if the difference between the satellite navigation position and the inertial navigation position is less than the threshold, the satellite navigation speed information is considered to be not deceived; when both the satellite navigation position and speed information are not deceived, the satellite navigation data is considered to be valid and can be used for combined navigation.

5. The method for preventing deception of unmanned aerial vehicle laser inertial navigation equipment according to claim 1 is characterized in that: In S3, the threshold of the position error in the defense guidance deception logic design is designed as follows: The threshold of speed error is designed as follows: Where t is the pure inertial navigation time after judging the entry into deception, Δ is the deception judgment threshold, which is set by combining the error divergence law of the laser inertial navigation equipment and the boundary requirements of the safe flight of the UAV. The position threshold and speed threshold are designed in sections to ensure that the aircraft can work normally during long-term continuous flight.

6. The method for preventing deception of unmanned aerial vehicle laser inertial navigation equipment according to claim 1 is characterized in that: In S3, the difference between the position and velocity output by the satellite and the position and velocity output by the inertial navigation is made. If they are within the threshold range, it is determined that the satellite is not deceived; if they are outside the threshold range, it is determined that the satellite navigation is deceived; if any error of the position and velocity exceeds the threshold, it is determined that the satellite navigation is deceived.

7. The method for preventing deception of unmanned aerial vehicle laser inertial navigation equipment according to claim 1 is characterized in that: In S4, if the satellite navigation information is deceived, the satellite navigation information is invalid, the laser inertial navigation operates in a pure inertial navigation mode, and sends a flag message indicating that the satellite navigation is deceived to the flight control.

8. The method for preventing deception of unmanned aerial vehicle laser inertial navigation equipment according to claim 1 is characterized in that: In S4, if the satellite navigation is not deceived, the satellite navigation information is valid, and the laser inertial navigation is combined with the position and speed information of the satellite navigation, and the laser inertial navigation works in the combined navigation mode.

9. The method for preventing deception of unmanned aerial vehicle laser inertial navigation equipment according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The selection basis of the threshold values ​​of the position error and the velocity error is based on the error divergence law of the laser inertial navigation device and the flight data accumulated during the actual flight law. In a short period of time, the pure inertial position divergence law of the laser inertial navigation device can be approximated by the horizontal second term of time, and the pure inertial velocity divergence law can be approximated by the first term of time and time.

10. The method for preventing deception of unmanned aerial vehicle laser inertial navigation equipment according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The deception stage is judged by setting a deception constant. The self-fluctuation of the satellite navigation position and speed information is about ±20m and ±0.2m / s. The self-fluctuation value is increased by 2 to 4 times as the deception judgment constant. After judging that the satellite navigation has entered the deception state, according to the pure inertial position and speed error divergence characteristics, the error curve envelope value including static and dynamic tests is amplified by 1.5 to 2 times as the judgment threshold. After the continuous deception time is greater than 1 hour, the position and speed error divergence accelerates, and the setting threshold increases with time and the speed increases accordingly.

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