Anonymous traceable intelligent security network management and control method
Through anonymous authentication protocol and elliptic curve public key encryption technology, the problem of user privacy protection in smart security network management is solved, and anonymity and traceability is achieved, ensuring that the behavior of legitimate users is not affected, and flexible anonymity protection is provided. and efficient security.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202411146693.5
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-08-21
- Publication Date
- 2024-12-03
AI Technical Summary
The existing anonymous or traceable password technology is not suitable for smart security network control, and it is difficult to achieve effective network control while protecting user privacy, especially the normal behavior of legitimate users should not be affected.
Using anonymous authentication protocol, the secure conversion and session encryption of stream authentication is performed through three entities: user (U), remote terminal (TM) and semi-trusted agent (DK). Key generation ensures user anonymity and traceability. Specific steps include initialization, key generation, pseudo-identity authentication, mutual authentication and session key establishment to ensure that external enemies cannot obtain real identity and crack session keys.
It realizes user anonymity and privacy protection, ensures that the behavior of legitimate users is not affected, and provides flexible and open degree of anonymity protection, meets the requirements of software-defined networks, and ensures security and forward security through theoretical proof.
Smart Images

Figure CN119071055A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of security network, and in particular to an anonymous and traceable intelligent security network management and control method. Background Art
[0002] Smart security is a series of systems that use modern information technology means such as artificial intelligence, cloud computing, and big data to conduct all-round monitoring, early warning, prevention, control, and disposal of security precautions, making people's lives safer, more convenient, and more comfortable. The network control of smart security can be said to be a "double-edged sword". On the one hand, it can effectively monitor the network status and ensure network security; but on the other hand, it will also infringe on some legitimate rights and interests and privacy of legitimate users, affecting the normal behavior of users. With the increasingly obvious trend of network real-name registration and information transparency, in fact, the behavior of most users is reasonable and legal. It is obviously unreasonable to infringe on the privacy of most users in order to control a small number of network criminals or network illegal behaviors. Therefore, how to achieve effective network control under the premise of protecting user privacy, that is, how to conduct anonymous traceability, is the core of network control for smart security.
[0003] However, the existing anonymous or traceable cryptographic technologies are not suitable for the characteristics of smart security network management and control. Since user privacy is more important, an anonymous authentication protocol needs to be designed. In addition, it is necessary for the stream authentication to be securely converted, that is, a semi-trusted agent can securely convert the stream authentication corresponding to data source A into the stream authentication corresponding to data source B. To this end, three entities are required in this protocol: user (U), remote terminal (TM) and a semi-trusted agent (DK). Summary of the invention
[0004] The purpose of the present invention is to provide an anonymous and traceable intelligent security network management and control method. The specific steps of the anonymous and traceable intelligent security network management and control method are as follows:
[0005] Step 1: Initialize first, DK randomly selects Generate the system public key Ppub = sP and define the hash function: DK publishes public parameters {E / F p , F p ,G,P,P pub ,h,h 1 ,h 2 ,h 3};
[0006] Step 2: Then generate the private key. The key generation of the user U: U randomly selects calculate Then Sent to DK via secure channel;
[0007] Step 3: After receiving the message, the DK calculates the partial pseudo-identity Then the pseudo-identity of U Then randomly select Calculate A u =a u P,s u =a u +s·h 1 (A u , PID u , Ppub), {PID u , A u ,s u}Return to U;
[0008] Step 4: After receiving U, first calculate h 1 (A u , PID, Ppub), verification u P=A u +h 1 (A u , PID u , Ppub)·Ppub is established, if it is established, then accept s u As a partial private key, the final random selection of U Calculate F u =f u P, U's private key is {s u , f u}, U's public key is {A u , F u};
[0009] Step 5: Terminal TM key generation: TM random selection Calculate F TM =f TM P, then {ID TM , F TM}Sent to DK via secure channel;
[0010] Step 6: After receiving the message, DK randomly selects Calculate Z TM =z TM P,s TM =z TM +s·h 1 (Z TM , ID TM , Ppub), {Z TM ,s TM}Return to TM;
[0011] Step 7: After receiving the TM, first calculate h1 (Z TM , ID TM , Ppub), and then verify s TM P=Z TM +h 1 (Z TM , ID TM , Ppub)·Ppub is established, if it is established, then accept s TM is a partial private key, and the private key of TM is {s TM , f TM}, U's public key is {F TM , Z TM};
[0012] Step 8: Then verify, U randomly selects Calculate X = xP, X′ = xF TM , Then U will {E u , X} is sent to TM through the common channel;
[0013] Step 9: TM receives {E u , X}, first calculate X′=f TM X, decrypt E u Get e u and PID u , then verify e u P=X+h 2 (X,F u , A u )·F u +A u +h 1 (A u , PID u , Ppub)·Ppub is established, if it is established, the verification is successful, otherwise the authentication fails;
[0014] Step 10: After successful authentication, TM randomly selects Calculate Y = yP, Y' = yX, generate session key sk = h 3 (Y, Y′, X), MAC sk (Y), and then send {MAC,Y} to U;
[0015] Step 11: After receiving U, first calculate Y′=xY,sk=h 3 (Y, Y′, X), finally verify MAC sk (Y) the validity of;
[0016] Step 12: Finally, the analysis proves that the protocol meets the following security requirements. The first is user anonymity. U’s real identity is included in the pseudo-identity. In the process, if an external enemy wants to obtain the user's real identity, he needs to obtain the private key of DK, and the private key is private to DK, which ensures anonymity.
[0017] Preferably, in step eight, mutual authentication is performed in the protocol via U and ATM to complete the authentication message {E u , X} and the response message {MAC, Y} are sent, and the authentication can be completed by verifying the validity of the authentication message and the response message.
[0018] Preferably, in step nine, due to {E u , X} uses random numbers, even if an external enemy obtains two pieces of information {E u1 , X 1} and {E u2 , X 2}, and it is impossible to determine whether the two pieces of information come from the same U, which ensures the unlinkability of the information.
[0019] Preferably, in step ten, a session key is established. After U and TM perform mutual authentication, a session key sk=h(Y, Y′, X) needs to be established to ensure subsequent communications. In the session key, Y and X are public parameters. An external enemy needs to calculate Y′ if he wants to obtain the session key, which means that the CDH problem needs to be solved to meet the security of the session key.
[0020] Preferably, in step 11, after authentication, U and TM generate a session key sk=h(Y, Y′, X). Even if the long-term private key of TM is leaked, an external enemy cannot calculate Y′, thus ensuring forward security.
[0021] Preferably, in step 12, when U's identity or behavior is abnormal, TM decrypts E u Get U's pseudo identity PID u Then submit it to DK, DK calculates To reveal U's identity and achieve traceability.
[0022] Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of the present invention are: network management and control based on mutual authentication can theoretically prove that as long as users conduct reasonable and legal activities in the network, their privacy will be greatly protected. It has great flexibility and openness, and the degree of anonymity protection can be modified according to specific needs to meet the requirements of software-defined networks. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0023] Figure 1 It is a flow chart of the present invention;
[0024] Figure 2 This is a flow chart of the prior art. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0025] In order to make the purpose, technical solution and advantages of the present invention more clearly understood, the present invention is further described in detail below in conjunction with specific embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are only used to explain the present invention and are not used to limit the present invention.
[0026] Example 1
[0027] An anonymous and traceable intelligent security network management and control method, the anonymous and traceable intelligent security network management and control method has the following specific steps:
[0028] Step 1: Initialize first, DK randomly selects Generate the system public key Ppub = sP and define the h automatic function: DK publishes public parameters {E / F p , F p ,G,P,P pub ,h,h 1 ,h 2 ,h 3};
[0029] Step 2: Then generate the private key. The key generation of the user U: U randomly selects calculate Then Sent to DK via secure channel;
[0030] Step 3: After receiving the message, the DK calculates the partial pseudo-identity Then the pseudo-identity of U Then randomly select Calculate A u =a u P,s u =a u +s·h 1 (A u , PID u , Ppub), {PID u , A u ,s u}Return to U;
[0031] Step 4: After receiving U, first calculate h 1 (A u , PID, Ppub), verification u P=A u +h 1 (A u , PID u , Ppub)·Ppub is established, if it is established, then accept s u As a partial private key, the final random selection of U Calculate Fu =f u P, U's private key is {s u , f u}, U's public key is {A u , F u};
[0032] Step 5: Terminal TM key generation: TM random selection Calculate F TM =f TM P, then {ID TM , F TM}Sent to DK via secure channel;
[0033] Step 6: After receiving the message, DK randomly selects Calculate Z TM =z TM P,s TM =z TM +s·h 1 (Z TM , ID TM , Ppub), {Z TM ,s TM}Return to TM;
[0034] Step 7: After receiving the TM, first calculate h 1 (Z TM , ID TM , Ppub), and then verify s TM P=Z TM +h 1 (Z TM , ID TM , Ppub)·Ppub is established, if it is established, then accept s TM is a partial private key, and the private key of TM is {s TM , f TM}, U's public key is {F TM , Z TM};
[0035] Step 8: Then verify, U randomly selects Calculate X = xP, X′ = xF TM , Then U will {E u , X} is sent to TM through the public channel; mutual authentication is completed in the protocol through U and ATM. u , X} and the response message {MAC, Y} are sent, and the authentication can be completed by verifying the validity of the authentication message and the response message;
[0036] Step 9: TM receives {Eu , X}, first calculate X′=f TM X, decrypt E u Get e u and PID u , then verify e u P=X+h 2 (X,F u , A u )·F u +A u +h 1 (A u , PID u , Ppub)·Ppub is established, if it is established, the verification is successful, otherwise the authentication fails; due to {E u , X} uses random numbers, even if an external enemy obtains two pieces of information {E u1 , X 1} and {E u2 , X 2}, it is also impossible to determine whether the two pieces of information come from the same U, ensuring the unlinkability of the information;
[0037] Step 10: After successful authentication, TM randomly selects Calculate Y = yP, Y' = yX, generate session key sk = h 3 (Y, Y′, X), MAC sk (Y), and then {MAC, Y} is sent to U; Session key establishment, after U and TM authenticate each other, it is necessary to establish a session key sk = h (Y, Y', X) to ensure subsequent communication. In the session key, Y and X are public parameters. If an external enemy wants to obtain the session key, it needs to calculate Y', that is, it is necessary to solve the CDH problem to meet the security of the session key;
[0038] Step 11: After receiving U, first calculate Y′=xY,sk=h 3 (Y, Y′, X), finally verify MAC sk (Y) validity; after authentication, U and TM generate a session key sk = h(Y, Y′, X). Even if TM’s long-term private key is leaked, an external enemy cannot calculate Y′, thus ensuring forward security;
[0039] Step 12: Finally, the analysis proves that the protocol meets the following security requirements. The first is user anonymity. U’s real identity is included in the pseudo-identity. In the example, if an external enemy wants to obtain the real identity of a user, he needs to obtain the private key of DK, which is private to DK, thus ensuring anonymity. u Get U's pseudo identity PID u Then submit it to DK, DK calculates To reveal U's identity and achieve traceability.
[0040] In the smart security network system, terminals will communicate with third parties and users and exchange keys to ensure the security of communications and prevent attackers from stealing information.
[0041] 1. Before the user connects, the third party will generate a system public key and then disclose some parameters. The corresponding user end needs to generate a key and send some parameters to the third party through a secure channel.
[0042] 2. After receiving the information, the third party calculates the pseudo-identity of the user and returns it to the user. The user generates a private key and a public key.
[0043] 3. The terminal also needs to generate a key. After generating a series of parameters, it is sent to a third party through a secure channel. The third party will then calculate the private key and public key of the terminal. Finally, mutual authentication will be performed.
[0044] The above description is only a preferred specific implementation manner of the present invention, but the protection scope of the present invention is not limited thereto. Any technician familiar with the technical field can make equivalent replacements or changes according to the technical scheme and inventive concept of the present invention within the technical scope disclosed by the present invention, which should be covered by the protection scope of the present invention.
Claims
1. An anonymous and traceable intelligent security network management and control method. Features: The specific steps of the anonymous and traceable smart security network control method are as follows: Step 1: Initialize first, DK randomly selects Generate the system public key Ppub = sP and define the hash function: h 3 :G 3 →{0,1} * , DK publishes public parameters {E / F p ,F p ,G,P,P pub ,h,h 1 ,h 2 ,h 3 }; Step 2: Then generate the private key. The key generation of the user U: U randomly selects calculate Then Sent to DK via secure channel; Step 3: After receiving the message, the DK calculates the partial pseudo-identity Then the pseudo-identity of U Then randomly select Calculate A u =a u P,s u =a u +s·h 1 (A u ,PID u ,Ppub), {PID u ,A u ,s u }Return to U; Step 4: After receiving U, first calculate h 1 (A u ,PID,Ppub), verification u P=A u +h 1 (A u ,PID u ,Ppub)·Ppub is established, if it is established, accept s u As a partial private key, the final random selection of U Calculate F u =f u P, U's private key is {s u ,f u }, U's public key is {A u ,F u }; Step 5: Terminal TM key generation: TM random selection Calculate F TM =f TM P, then {ID TM ,F TM }Sent to DK via secure channel; Step 6: After receiving the message, DK randomly selects Calculate Z TM =z TM P,s TM =z TM +s·h 1 (Z TM ,ID TM ,Ppub), will {Z TM ,s TM }Return to TM; Step 7: After receiving the TM, first calculate h 1 (Z TM ,ID TM ,Ppub), and then verify s TM P=Z TM +h 1 (Z TM ,ID TM ,Ppub)·Ppub is established, if it is established, accept s TM is a partial private key, TM's private key is {s TM ,f TM }, U's public key is {F TM ,Z TM }; Step 8: Then verify, U randomly selects Calculate X = xP, X' = xF TM ,e u =x+f u ·h 2 (X,F u ,A u )+s u , Then U will {E u ,X} is sent to TM through the public channel; Step 9: TM receives {E u ,X}, first calculate X'=f TM X, decrypt E u Get e u and PID u , then verify e u P=X+h 2 (X,F u ,A u )·F u +A u +h 1 (A u ,PID u ,Ppub)·Whether Ppub is established, if it is established, the verification is successful, otherwise the authentication fails; Step 10: After successful authentication, TM randomly selects Calculate Y = yP, Y' = yX, generate session key sk = h 3 (Y,Y',X),MAC sk (Y), and then send {MAC,Y} to U; Step 11: After receiving U, first calculate Y'=xY,sk=h 3 (Y,Y',X), finally verify MAC sk (Y) the validity of; Step 12: Finally, the analysis proves that the protocol meets the following security requirements. The first is user anonymity. U’s real identity is included in the pseudo-identity. In the process, if an external enemy wants to obtain the user's real identity, he needs to obtain the private key of DK, and the private key is private to DK, which ensures anonymity.
2. According to the anonymous and traceable intelligent security network management and control method of claim 1, Features: In step 8, mutual authentication is completed in the protocol through U and ATM. u ,X} and the response message {MAC,Y} are sent, and the authentication can be completed by verifying the validity of the authentication message and the response message.
3. According to the anonymous and traceable intelligent security network management and control method of claim 1, Features: In step nine, due to {E u ,X} uses random numbers, even if an external enemy obtains two pieces of information {E u1 ,X 1 } and {E u2 ,X 2 }, and it is impossible to determine whether the two pieces of information come from the same U, which ensures the unlinkability of the information.
4. According to claim 1, an anonymous and traceable intelligent security network management and control method, Features: In step 10, the session key is established. After U and TM authenticate each other, a session key sk=h(Y,Y',X) needs to be established to ensure subsequent communication. In the session key, Y and X are public parameters. If an external enemy wants to obtain the session key, he needs to calculate Y', which means that the CDH problem needs to be solved to ensure the security of the session key.
5. According to claim 1, an anonymous and traceable intelligent security network management and control method, Features: In step 11, after authentication, U and TM generate a session key sk = h(Y, Y', X). Even if TM's long-term private key is leaked, an external enemy cannot calculate Y', thus ensuring forward security.
6. According to claim 1, an anonymous and traceable intelligent security network management and control method, Features: In step 12, when U's identity or behavior is abnormal, TM decrypts E u Get U's pseudo identity PID u Then submit it to DK, DK calculates To reveal U's identity and achieve traceability.
