Hardware failure mode influence analysis method and device and computer storage medium

Abstract

The invention provides a hardware failure mode influence analysis method, a hardware failure mode influence analysis device and a computer storage medium. The method comprises the steps that an analysis request of an analysis object is responded, functions borne by the analysis object are analyzed, and function analysis types comprise basic functions, a detection mechanism and / or system response; failure analysis is carried out on the analysis objects according to the function analysis results of the different function analysis types; judging whether the analysis object violates the safety target or not based on the failure analysis result of each function analysis type; if not, scoring each failure model in the failure analysis result of the analysis object; and performing optimization processing on the analysis object based on the scoring result, and generating an analysis file of the analysis object. According to the hardware failure mode influence analysis method, the failure modes of a detection mechanism and system response are comprehensively considered, the comprehensiveness of hardware failure mode influence analysis of the analysis object is improved, and the analysis accuracy is improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the technical field of quality management, and in particular to a hardware failure mode impact analysis method, a hardware failure mode impact analysis device, and a computer storage medium. Background Art

[0002] As the penetration rate of new energy vehicles increases year by year, the complexity of motor controllers gradually increases, and their functions gradually improve, the number of hardware components contained in them is also increasing. In order to prevent unexpected safety accidents caused by factors such as systematic failures and random hardware failures, functional safety requirements have emerged. With the continuous improvement of the functional safety development process, FMEA (Failure Mode and Effects Analysis) has developed more and more detailed analysis methods as an important analysis method and development process delivery document.

[0003] However, the current FMEA analysis method has great limitations and cannot perform comprehensive qualitative analysis, resulting in low analysis accuracy. Summary of the invention

[0004] In order to solve the above technical problems, the present application proposes a hardware failure mode impact analysis method, a hardware failure mode impact analysis device and a computer storage medium.

[0005] In order to solve the above technical problems, the present application proposes a hardware failure mode impact analysis method, which includes:

[0006] In response to an analysis request of an analysis object, analyzing the functions undertaken by the analysis object, where the types of function analysis include basic functions, detection mechanisms, and / or system responses;

[0007] According to the functional analysis results of different functional analysis types, failure analysis is performed on the analysis objects respectively;

[0008] Determining whether the analysis object violates the safety goal based on the failure analysis results of each functional analysis type;

[0009] If not, scoring each failure model in the failure analysis result of the analysis object;

[0010] The analysis object is optimized based on the scoring result to generate an analysis file of the analysis object.

[0011] Wherein, the hardware failure mode impact analysis method further includes:

[0012] In response to the analysis object violating the security goal, determining whether the analysis object has a security mechanism;

[0013] If yes, score each failure model in the failure analysis result of the analysis object, and use the safety mechanism to reduce the score of the scoring result;

[0014] If not, based on the functional analysis type that violates the safety goal and does not have a safety mechanism, a safety mechanism is added to the analysis object.

[0015] Wherein, judging whether the analysis object violates the safety goal based on the failure analysis results of each functional analysis type includes:

[0016] Based on the failure analysis results of the detection mechanism, it is judged whether the analysis object violates the safety goal from two directions: individual failure and combined failure of basic functions.

[0017] The analysis objects include system objects, structural modules constituting the system, and physical components constituting the structural modules;

[0018] Before analyzing the function of the analysis object, the hardware failure mode impact analysis method further includes:

[0019] Performing structural analysis on the analysis object to obtain technical security requirements and technical security concepts at the system level of the analysis object;

[0020] The technical safety requirements and technical safety concepts at the system level are assigned to the random failure analysis results of each physical component and are assigned to each structural module and marked.

[0021] After the random failure analysis results of assigning the technical safety requirements and technical safety concepts at the system level to each physical component are assigned to each structural module, the hardware failure mode impact analysis method further includes:

[0022] The failure rate of the structural modules is calculated based on the random failure analysis results of the structural modules.

[0023] Wherein, the hardware failure mode impact analysis method further includes:

[0024] In response to the analysis object violating the safety goal and having a safety mechanism, calculating a residual failure parameter based on the structural module failure rate;

[0025] Based on the residual failure parameters calculated from the functional analysis results of each functional analysis type, the random failure analysis results of the analysis object at the system level are calculated.

[0026] Wherein, the hardware failure mode impact analysis method further includes:

[0027] In response to a single point failure of the analysis object not violating a safety goal, determining whether a combination of multiple point failures of the analysis object violates a safety goal;

[0028] If so, determining whether the combination of multiple failure points of the analysis object has a safety mechanism;

[0029] If not, add a safety mechanism for the multi-point failure combined with the multi-point failure;

[0030] If so, calculating a latent failure parameter based on the failure rate of the structural module;

[0031] Based on the latent failure parameters calculated from the functional analysis results of each functional analysis type, the random failure analysis results of the analysis object at the system level are calculated.

[0032] Wherein, the hardware failure mode impact analysis method further includes:

[0033] Based on the failure analysis results of the detection mechanism, in response to the individual failure of the analysis object violating the safety goal and having a safety mechanism, calculating the residual failure parameter based on the failure rate of the structural module;

[0034] Based on the failure analysis results of the detection mechanism, in response to the combined basic function of the analysis object failing in violation of the safety goal and having a safety mechanism, calculating a latent failure parameter based on the failure rate of the structural module;

[0035] Based on the residual failure parameters and latent failure parameters calculated from the functional analysis results of the detection mechanism, the random failure analysis results of the analysis object at the system level are calculated.

[0036] In order to solve the above technical problems, the present application also proposes a hardware failure mode impact analysis device, which includes a memory and a processor coupled to the memory; wherein the memory is used to store program data, and the processor is used to execute the program data to implement the hardware failure mode impact analysis method as described above.

[0037] In order to solve the above technical problems, the present application also proposes a computer storage medium, which is used to store program data. When the program data is executed by a computer, it is used to implement the above hardware failure mode impact analysis method.

[0038] Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of the present application are as follows: the hardware failure mode impact analysis device responds to the analysis request of the analysis object and analyzes the functions undertaken by the analysis object, and the functional analysis types include basic functions, detection mechanisms, and / or system responses; the analysis object is subjected to failure analysis respectively for the functional analysis results of different functional analysis types; based on the failure analysis results of each functional analysis type, it is judged whether the analysis object violates the safety goal; if not, each failure model in the failure analysis results of the analysis object is scored; based on the scoring results, the analysis object is optimized and an analysis file of the analysis object is generated. Through the above-mentioned hardware failure mode impact analysis method, the failure modes of the detection mechanism and the system response are fully considered, the comprehensiveness of the hardware failure mode impact analysis of the analysis object is improved, and the accuracy of the analysis is provided. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0039] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application, the drawings required for use in the description of the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present application. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying any creative work.

[0040] in:

[0041] Figure 1 This is the basic flow chart of the traditional FMEA analysis provided by this application;

[0042] Figure 2 It is a flowchart of an embodiment of a hardware failure mode impact analysis method provided by the present application;

[0043] Figure 3 It is a schematic diagram of the process of the hardware SFMEA-MSR qualitative analysis method based on FMEA-MSR provided in this application;

[0044] Figure 4 It is a flowchart of another embodiment of the hardware failure mode impact analysis method provided by the present application;

[0045] Figure 5 It is a schematic diagram of the process of the hardware SFMEA-MSR quantitative analysis method based on FMEA-MSR provided in this application;

[0046] Figure 6 It is a flowchart of another embodiment of the hardware failure mode impact analysis method provided by the present application;

[0047] Figure 7 It is a structural schematic diagram of an embodiment of a hardware failure mode impact analysis device provided by the present application;

[0048] Figure 8 It is a structural diagram of an embodiment of a computer storage medium provided by the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0049] The following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of the present application to clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present application, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of this application.

[0050] The terms "first", "second", "third", "fourth", etc. (if any) in the specification and claims of the present application and the above-mentioned drawings are used to distinguish similar objects, and are not necessarily used to describe a specific order or sequence. It should be understood that the data used in this way can be interchangeable where appropriate, so that the embodiments of the present application described herein can, for example, be implemented in an order other than those illustrated or described herein. In addition, the terms "including" and "having" and any of their variations are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusions, for example, a process, method, system, product or device that includes a series of steps or units is not necessarily limited to those steps or units that are clearly listed, but may include other steps or units that are not clearly listed or inherent to these processes, methods, products or devices.

[0051] FMEA (Failure Mode and Effects Analysis), failure mode and consequences analysis. As the most basic analysis method in the FMEA analysis family, its main purpose is to analyze the various subsystems and components that constitute the product and the procedures of the product service process one by one during the product design stage, find out the potential failure mode, analyze the possible consequences, and assess the risk, so as to take measures in advance to reduce the severity of the failure mode. After a long period of engineering development practice, the main body of the FMEA analysis method can now be carried out according to the seven-step method, namely: (1) Planning and preparation, this step determines the project, establishes a team, selects tools, etc.; (2) Structural analysis, this step divides the structure of the analyzed product and system; (3) Functional analysis, this step identifies the function of each structure divided in the previous step; (4) Failure analysis, this step identifies the failure mode of each function analyzed in the previous step and forms a failure chain; (5) Risk analysis, this step evaluates the severity, occurrence and detection of each failure mode in the previous step; (6) Optimization, this step optimizes the high-risk failure modes according to the results of the risk analysis in the previous step; (7) Documentation of results, the above six-step analysis process is delivered as an FMEA document.

[0052] FMEA analysis method, as the most basic analysis method in the FMEA analysis family, although it has a complete analysis process and is the basis of other FMEA family analysis methods, its own analysis involves relatively few contents. As a qualitative analysis method, it cannot give a characterization of the overall failure rate of the analyzed system. During the analysis process, it only analyzes the basic functions of each component of the system, without considering the various detection methods, safety mechanisms and fault responses set up by the system. In the functional safety development process, it is also impossible to analyze whether the failure violates the safety goal, and whether the failure mode that violates safety is covered by the corresponding safety mechanism.

[0053] FMEA-MSR (FMEA for Monitoring and System Response) analysis method: FMEA-MSR, a supplementary FMEA for monitoring and system response. The main process of this analysis method is based on the seven-step analysis method of FMEA, namely planning and preparation, structural analysis, failure analysis, risk analysis, optimization, and result documentation. Unlike the FMEA analysis method, the system studied by FMEA-MSR needs to include at least one sensor, one control unit, and one actuator. Compared with the FMEA analysis method, it adds structural, functional, and failure analysis related to sensor monitoring and system response. Furthermore, FMEA-MSR replaces the occurrence (O) and detection (D) in FMEA with the frequency of occurrence (F) and the degree of detection (M). FMEA-MSR focuses more on the evaluation of the probability of related failures of products and systems during user use, and the probability of being detected after the failure occurs.

[0054] FMEA-MSR is a supplementary FMEA for monitoring and system response developed based on the FMEA analysis method. Compared with the traditional FMEA analysis method, this analysis method takes into account various monitoring, detection methods and system responses to failures in system design, and supplements some missing analysis links in the FMEA analysis method. However, this analysis method does not analyze whether functional failures, detection method failures, and system response failures violate safety goals in the functional safety development process, and whether there are corresponding safety mechanism coverage.

[0055] SFMEA has multiple definitions, and can refer to System FMEA, Software FMEA, and in the functional safety development process, SFMEA specifically refers to Safety FMEA. The SFMEA mentioned later in this article also specifically refers to Safety FMEA.

[0056] SFMEA, as a newly proposed FMEA family analysis method in the functional safety development process, supplements the missing analysis link of the FMEA analysis method in the functional safety development process. It takes into account whether the failure of each function will violate the safety goal and whether there is a corresponding safety mechanism coverage. However, it does not focus on the monitoring and detection methods of the system settings and the system response, and lacks analysis of the failure of the safety mechanism and fault response itself.

[0057] The above three FMEA analysis methods all inherit the analysis method of basic FMEA, and also have the same limitations as basic FMEA, that is, they generally do not consider the failure mode of double-point failure and cannot perform basic quantitative analysis.

[0058] This application proposes a hardware SFMEA-MSR analysis method based on FMEA, FMEA-MSR, and SFMEA in the functional safety development process.

[0059] Please refer to Figure 1 , Figure 1 This is the basic flow chart of the traditional FMEA analysis provided by this application. As mentioned above, the traditional FMEA analysis method usually adopts the seven-step method for analysis. Since the seven-step method is the basis of each analysis method in the FMEA family, it is explained in detail below:

[0060] 1. Planning and preparation: In this step, the scope, purpose, objectives and document writing specifications of FMEA need to be clarified; the personnel arrangement, roles and responsibilities of FMEA analysis work need to be determined.

[0061] 2. Structural analysis: In this step, you need to understand the system structure defined in the FMEA scope and disassemble the system structure. Usually, the system structure can be disassembled into systems, subsystems, and components. After the system structure is disassembled, you need to use tools to visualize the disassembly results, usually in the form of tables, structure diagrams, and structure trees.

[0062] 3. Functional analysis: Based on the structural analysis in the second step, analyze the functions of the system, subsystems and components. In this step, it is necessary to clarify the correctness and accuracy of the functional description.

[0063] 4. Failure analysis: Based on the functional analysis in the third step, the possible failure modes of the system, subsystem and component functions are analyzed. In this step, the correctness and accuracy of the failure mode description must be clarified.

[0064] 5. Risk analysis: Based on functional analysis and failure analysis, evaluate the risk of failure consequences that may be caused by each failure mode, and clarify the existing preventive measures and detection measures. According to the degree of perfection of the existing preventive measures and detection measures, each failure mode is scored with S (severity), O (occurrence), and D (detection), so as to obtain the RPN (Risk Priority Number) and AP (Action Priority) values ​​of each failure mode.

[0065] 6. Optimization: Based on the risk analysis in the fifth step, optimization is required for failure modes with large RPN and AP values. Usually, the O (occurrence) and D (detection) scores can be reduced by adding preventive measures and detection measures, thereby reducing the RPN and AP values ​​of the failure mode.

[0066] 7. Documentation of results: The analysis results of the above six steps are compiled into delivery documents that meet standards and corporate specifications.

[0067] The basic process of FMEA-MSR and SFMEA is similar to the FMEA analysis process and will not be repeated here.

[0068] In order to solve the problems of the above three analysis processes, this application provides a hardware SFMEA-MSR analysis method based on FMEA-MSR. For details, please refer to Figure 2 and Figure 3 . Figure 2 is a flow chart of an embodiment of a hardware failure mode impact analysis method provided by the present application, Figure 3 It is a schematic diagram of the process of the hardware SFMEA-MSR qualitative analysis method based on FMEA-MSR provided in this application.

[0069] The hardware failure mode impact analysis method of the present application is applied to a hardware failure mode impact analysis device, wherein the hardware failure mode impact analysis device of the present application can be a server, a terminal device, or a system composed of a server and a terminal device. Accordingly, the various parts included in the hardware failure mode impact analysis device, such as various units, sub-units, modules, and sub-modules, can all be set in the server, can all be set in the terminal device, or can be set in the server and the terminal device respectively.

[0070] Furthermore, the above-mentioned server can be hardware or software. When the server is hardware, it can be implemented as a distributed server cluster consisting of multiple servers, or it can be implemented as a single server. When the server is software, it can be implemented as multiple software or software modules, such as software or software modules used to provide distributed servers, or it can be implemented as a single software or software module, which is not specifically limited here.

[0071] like Figure 2 As shown, the specific steps are as follows:

[0072] Step S11: In response to an analysis request of the analysis object, analyze the functions undertaken by the analysis object, where the functional analysis types include basic functions, detection mechanisms, and / or system responses.

[0073] In the embodiments of the present application, the analysis object includes one or more of a system, a single component, and a modular circuit structure. The system includes various structural modules, and the structural module is composed of various hardware components. It can be understood that the single component in the hardware component is specifically the smallest structural element constituting the circuit structure, such as components such as resistors, inductors, capacitors, diodes, and transistors. The modular circuit structure in the structural module is a circuit structure composed of multiple components, with a specific connection structure between components, achieving a specific circuit effect, and can be integrated into a general module or a general chip, such as a power module, a filter module, a controller, and other circuit structures. All of the above can be used as analysis objects for hardware failure mode impact analysis in this embodiment, and can be set according to actual working conditions and requirements, and are not limited here.

[0074] In the embodiments of the present application, Figure 3 As shown in the figure, the main analysis process framework of the SFMEA-MSR analysis method is based on the seven-step FMEA method. In the functional analysis and failure analysis steps, there will be more detailed and complete analysis than FMEA.

[0075] Specifically, in the functional analysis step, this application classifies the basic functions, detection mechanisms, and system responses into the considerations of SFMEA-MSR according to the responsibilities of different functions of each module, pending subsequent failure analysis. In this step, it should be noted that the descriptions of the basic functions, detection mechanism functions, and system response functions should be consistent and correct.

[0076] Step S12: performing failure analysis on the analysis objects respectively according to the functional analysis results of different functional analysis types.

[0077] In the embodiment of the present application, in the failure analysis step, the present application analyzes the possible failure modes of the basic functions, the detection mechanism, and the system response in turn.

[0078] For failure analysis of basic functions, referring to IEC 61882, the function + keyword method is usually used. The keywords for basic functions are usually: lost, too large, too small, too late, too early, etc.

[0079] For the failure analysis of the detection mechanism, it is necessary to consider that the detection mechanism usually appears in pairs with the basic function. First, it is necessary to analyze the independent failure of the detection mechanism, and then analyze the consequences of the simultaneous failure of the basic function it detects. Keywords for the failure mode of the detection mechanism can usually be loss and unexpected triggering.

[0080] For failure analysis of system response, the main analysis ideas are the same as the basic functions, and the commonly used keywords are loss and unexpected triggering.

[0081] Step S13: judging whether the analysis object violates the safety goal based on the failure analysis results of each functional analysis type.

[0082] In the embodiment of the present application, in the existing FMEA, each failure mode can be scored S, O, D after failure analysis, and then the RPN and AP values ​​of each failure mode can be obtained.

[0083] And as Figure 3 As shown, before scoring, in addition to analyzing the cause of failure, existing measures, and failure risks, this application needs to analyze whether each failure mode violates the safety goals defined by the system. If it violates the safety goals defined by the system, it is necessary to point out the safety mechanisms defined by the system, software, and hardware, and list them in the existing measures to reduce the D (detection) score. If the failure violates the safety and there is no corresponding safety mechanism coverage, it can be judged at the architectural level that there is a single point of failure, and the architectural design needs to be optimized.

[0084] It should be noted that the failure analysis of detection mechanisms and system responses is similar, and it is necessary to evaluate whether the safety goals and response safety mechanisms are violated.

[0085] Please refer to Figure 3 Before scoring, this application needs to judge whether the basic function of the analysis object violates the safety goal based on the failure analysis results of the basic function. If not, it directly enters the scoring stage, that is, step S14.

[0086] It should be noted that, taking the functional analysis type of the detection mechanism as an example, the present application can judge whether the analysis object violates the security goal from two directions: individual failure and combined failure of basic functions, and the judgment of whether the security goal is violated and the subsequent processing are consistent.

[0087] Step S14: scoring each failure model in the failure analysis result of the analysis object.

[0088] Step S15: Optimize the analysis object based on the scoring result and generate an analysis file of the analysis object.

[0089] In the embodiment of the present application, like the existing FMEA analysis method, the present application can calculate the RPN value and AP value of each failure mode. For failure modes with large RPN and AP values, optimization processing is required. Usually, the O (occurrence degree) and D (detection degree) scores can be reduced by adding preventive measures and detection measures, thereby reducing the RPN and AP values ​​of the failure mode.

[0090] Furthermore, if Figure 3 As shown in Figure 1, when the analysis object of the failure mode violates the safety goal, it is necessary to continue to determine whether the analysis object has a safety mechanism. If the failure mode does not have a safety mechanism, a corresponding safety mechanism is added.

[0091] If the failure mode has a safety mechanism, the failure model can be scored, and then the existing safety mechanism can be used as an existing measure to reduce the detection score.

[0092] In the present application, the hardware failure mode impact analysis device responds to the analysis request of the analysis object, analyzes the functions undertaken by the analysis object, and the functional analysis types include basic functions, detection mechanisms, and / or system responses; performs failure analysis on the analysis object respectively according to the functional analysis results of different functional analysis types; judges whether the analysis object violates the safety goal based on the failure analysis results of each functional analysis type; if not, scores each failure model in the failure analysis results of the analysis object; optimizes the analysis object based on the scoring results, and generates an analysis file for the analysis object. Through the above-mentioned hardware failure mode impact analysis method, the failure modes of the detection mechanism and the system response are fully considered, the comprehensiveness of the hardware failure mode impact analysis of the analysis object is improved, and the accuracy of the analysis is provided.

[0093] In the hardware development process of functional safety projects, the SFMEA-MSR analysis method provided in this application can not only comprehensively consider the basic functions, detection mechanisms, failure modes of system responses, risk analysis, whether safety goals will be violated, and whether there are corresponding safety mechanisms, but also conduct quantitative analysis to verify the calculation results of hardware SPFM, LFM, and FMEDA.

[0094] Please refer to Figure 4 and Figure 5 , Figure 4 is a flow chart of another embodiment of the hardware failure mode impact analysis method provided by the present application, Figure 5 It is a schematic diagram of the process of the hardware SFMEA-MSR quantitative analysis method based on FMEA-MSR provided in this application.

[0095] like Figure 4 As shown, the specific steps are as follows:

[0096] Step S21: Perform structural analysis on the analysis object to obtain the technical security requirements and technical security concepts of the analysis object at the system level.

[0097] Step S22: Assign the technical safety requirements and technical safety concepts at the system level to the random failure analysis results of each physical component and assign them to each structural module, and mark them.

[0098] In an embodiment of the present application, in the structural analysis step of the hardware SFMEA-MSR quantitative analysis method based on FMEA-MSR, the present application further allocates the PMHF (Probabilistic Model for Hardware Failures) assigned to each physical component in the system TSR (Technical Safety Requirements) and TSC (Technical Safety Concept) analysis to each structural module and labels them.

[0099] Step S23: Calculating the failure rate of the structural modules based on the random failure analysis results of each structural module.

[0100] In the embodiments of the present application, Figure 5 As shown in the figure, the failure rate refers to the probability of a product that has not failed until a certain time and will fail per unit time after that time. It is usually recorded as λ and is a function of time t, called the failure rate function. The calculation of failure rate helps to evaluate the reliability of products, especially in the field of electronics, such as power modules and electronic circuit module units, where the calculation of failure rate is crucial for predicting and evaluating the life of products.

[0101] The calculation of the failure rate used in this application can be performed by the following two methods:

[0102] Calculation method based on empirical data: This method is suitable for situations where there is a large amount of similar equipment operation data available for analysis. The calculation formula is failure rate = number of failures / (total operating time*number of devices). Among them, the number of failures refers to the number of faults or failed devices that occurred in a specific time period, the total operating time refers to the cumulative operating time of all devices, and the number of devices refers to the number of devices in the system.

[0103] Calculation method based on physical model: This method is suitable for situations where sufficient empirical data cannot be obtained or reliability assessment of new devices is required. Common physical models include reliability homogenization model, accelerated life model and fault tree analysis. This method predicts device failure rate by analyzing factors such as device structure, materials and working conditions, and using reliability theory and mathematical models.

[0104] Please continue to combine Figure 5 For the failure analysis steps shown in Figure 6 , Figure 6 It is a flow chart of another embodiment of the hardware failure mode impact analysis method provided by the present application.

[0105] like Figure 6 As shown, the specific steps are as follows:

[0106] Step S31: In response to the analysis object violating the safety goal and having a safety mechanism, a residual failure parameter is calculated based on the failure rate of the structural module.

[0107] In the embodiment of the present application, in the failure analysis step, the failure rate data calculated by FMEDA or the preparation stage is annotated in the attributes related to each failure mode. If the failure is covered by a safety mechanism, if so, the residual failure parameter is obtained by calculating (1-DC1)*failure rate data.

[0108] Step S32: Calculate the random failure analysis result of the analysis object at the system level based on the residual failure parameters calculated from the functional analysis results of each functional analysis type.

[0109] In the embodiment of the present application, in the failure analysis step, if the failure does not violate the safety goal, further analysis is performed to determine whether it is combined with other failures to violate the safety goal. If there is no combination, it is a safety failure and the next step of analysis is performed normally. If the safety goal is violated, an assessment is made as to whether there is coverage by a safety mechanism. By calculating (1-DC2)*failure rate data, the latent failure parameter is obtained, and the part covered by the safety mechanism is regarded as a detectable dual-point fault.

[0110] This application conducts the above process for basic functions, detection mechanisms, and system responses respectively. After the analysis is completed, the residual failure parameters and latent failure parameters of the system can be obtained. It is necessary to pay special attention to the fact that when performing failure analysis of the detection mechanism, its combined failure with the basic function is already a double-point failure. At this time, it is only necessary to consider whether there is a safety mechanism. If there is a safety mechanism, its latent failure parameters are evaluated, and the part covered by the safety mechanism is regarded as a detectable double-point failure.

[0111] Finally, after obtaining the residual failure parameters and latent failure parameters, the present application can estimate the PMHF through the formula in ISO 26262-Part5, that is, residual failure parameters + detectable double-point failure * latent failure parameters * operating life.

[0112] The SFMEA-MSR analysis method designed in this application is different from the FMEA analysis method. It independently considers the failure modes of the detection mechanism and system response, and whether the failure of the detection mechanism and system response itself will violate the safety goal and whether there is a corresponding safety mechanism.

[0113] Compared with the traditional FMEA analysis method which only considers single-point failure, the SFMEA-MSR analysis method designed in this application innovatively considers and analyzes the impact of the simultaneous failure of functional failure and its corresponding detection mechanism on the system, as well as whether the safety goals are violated and whether there is a corresponding safety mechanism.

[0114] Compared with the traditional FMEA analysis method which only performs qualitative analysis, the SFMEA-MSR analysis method designed in this application can perform quantitative analysis. When the system performs TSR and TSC analysis, the PMHF assigned to the hardware components is synchronously assigned to the structural analysis level of SFMEA-MSR. When judging failure, the failure rate of each structural analysis module is first brought in. When judging whether there is a safety mechanism in the next step, the diagnostic coverage of the corresponding safety mechanism is brought in. The PMHF of different structural analysis modules and hardware systems can be obtained, which can be used as one of the verification methods for FMEDA calculation results.

[0115] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that, in the above method of specific implementation, the order in which the steps are written does not imply a strict execution order and does not constitute any limitation on the implementation process. The specific execution order of the steps should be determined by their functions and possible internal logic.

[0116] In order to implement the above hardware failure mode impact analysis method, this application also proposes a hardware failure mode impact analysis device, please refer to Figure 7 , Figure 7 It is a structural diagram of an embodiment of a hardware failure mode impact analysis device provided in the present application.

[0117] The hardware failure mode impact analysis device 400 of this embodiment includes a processor 41 , a memory 42 , an input / output device 43 , and a bus 44 .

[0118] The processor 41 , the memory 42 , and the input / output device 43 are respectively connected to the bus 44 . The memory 42 stores program data. The processor 41 is used to execute the program data to implement the hardware failure mode impact analysis method described in the above embodiment.

[0119] In the embodiment of the present application, the processor 41 may also be referred to as a CPU (Central Processing Unit). The processor 41 may be an integrated circuit chip having the ability to process signals. The processor 41 may also be a general-purpose processor, a digital signal processor (DSP), an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a field programmable gate array (FPGA), or other programmable logic devices, discrete gates or transistor logic devices, or discrete hardware components. A general-purpose processor may be a microprocessor or the processor 41 may also be any conventional processor, etc.

[0120] This application also provides a computer storage medium, please continue to refer to Figure 8 , Figure 8 It is a structural diagram of an embodiment of a computer storage medium provided in the present application. The computer storage medium 600 stores a computer program 61. When the computer program 61 is executed by a processor, it is used to implement the hardware failure mode impact analysis method of the above embodiment.

[0121] When the embodiments of the present application are implemented in the form of software functional units and sold or used as independent products, they can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present application is essentially or the part that contributes to the prior art or all or part of the technical solution can be embodied in the form of a software product, and the computer software product is stored in a storage medium, including several instructions to enable a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) or a processor (processor) to perform all or part of the steps of the method described in each embodiment of the present application. The aforementioned storage medium includes: various media that can store program codes, such as a USB flash drive, a mobile hard disk, a read-only memory (ROM, Read-Only Memory), a random access memory (RAM, Random Access Memory), a disk or an optical disk.

[0122] The above description is only an implementation method of the present application, and does not limit the patent scope of the present application. Any equivalent structure or equivalent process transformation made using the contents of the present application specification and drawings, or directly or indirectly used in other related technical fields, are also included in the patent protection scope of the present application.

Claims

1. A hardware failure mode impact analysis method, characterized in that: The hardware failure mode impact analysis method includes: In response to an analysis request of an analysis object, analyzing the functions undertaken by the analysis object, where the types of functional analysis include basic functions, detection mechanisms, and / or system responses; Based on the functional analysis results of different functional analysis types, failure analysis is performed on the analysis objects respectively; Determining whether the analysis object violates the safety goal based on the failure analysis results of each functional analysis type; If not, scoring each failure model in the failure analysis result of the analysis object; The analysis object is optimized based on the scoring result to generate an analysis file of the analysis object.

2. The hardware failure mode impact analysis method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The hardware failure mode impact analysis method further includes: In response to the analysis object violating a security goal, determining whether the analysis object has a security mechanism; If so, scoring each failure model in the failure analysis result of the analysis object, and reducing the score of the scoring result by using the safety mechanism; If not, a safety mechanism is added to the analysis object based on the functional analysis type that violates the safety goal and does not have a safety mechanism.

3. The hardware failure mode impact analysis method according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that: The determining whether the analysis object violates the safety goal based on the failure analysis results of each functional analysis type includes: Based on the failure analysis results of the detection mechanism, it is judged whether the analysis object violates the safety goal from two perspectives: individual failure and combined failure of basic functions.

4. The hardware failure mode impact analysis method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The analysis objects include system objects, structural modules constituting the system, and physical components constituting the structural modules; Before analyzing the function of the analysis object, the hardware failure mode impact analysis method further includes: Performing structural analysis on the analysis object to obtain technical security requirements and technical security concepts at the system level of the analysis object; The technical safety requirements and technical safety concepts at the system level are assigned to the random failure analysis results of each physical component and are assigned to each structural module and marked.

5. The hardware failure mode impact analysis method according to claim 4, characterized in that: After assigning the system-level technical safety requirements and technical safety concepts to the random failure analysis results of each physical component and assigning them to each structural module, the hardware failure mode impact analysis method further includes: The failure rate of the structural modules is calculated based on the random failure analysis results of the structural modules.

6. The hardware failure mode impact analysis method according to claim 5, characterized in that: The hardware failure mode impact analysis method further includes: In response to the analysis object violating a safety goal and having a safety mechanism, calculating a residual failure parameter based on the structural module failure rate; Based on the residual failure parameters calculated from the functional analysis results of each functional analysis type, a random failure analysis result of the analysis object at the system level is calculated.

7. The hardware failure mode impact analysis method according to claim 6, characterized in that: The hardware failure mode impact analysis method further includes: In response to a single point failure of the analysis object not violating a safety goal, determining whether a combination of multiple point failures of the analysis object violates the safety goal; If so, determining whether the multi-point failure combination of the analysis object has a safety mechanism; If not, add a safety mechanism for the multi-point failure combined with the multi-point failure; If so, calculating a latent failure parameter based on the failure rate of the structural module; Based on the latent failure parameters calculated from the functional analysis results of each functional analysis type, a random failure analysis result of the analysis object at the system level is calculated.

8. The hardware failure mode impact analysis method according to claim 6, characterized in that: The hardware failure mode impact analysis method further includes: Based on the failure analysis results of the detection mechanism, in response to a single failure of the analysis object violating a safety goal and having a safety mechanism, calculating a residual failure parameter based on the failure rate of the structural module; Based on the failure analysis results of the detection mechanism, in response to a common failure of a combined basic function of the analysis object violating a safety goal and having a safety mechanism, calculating a latent failure parameter based on the failure rate of the structural module; Based on the residual failure parameters and latent failure parameters calculated from the functional analysis results of the detection mechanism, a random failure analysis result of the analysis object at the system level is calculated.

9. A hardware failure mode impact analysis device, characterized in that: The hardware failure mode impact analysis device includes a memory and a processor coupled to the memory; The memory is used to store program data, and the processor is used to execute the program data to implement the hardware failure mode effect analysis method according to any one of claims 1 to 8.

10. A computer storage medium, characterized in that The computer storage medium is used to store program data, and when the program data is executed by a computer, it is used to implement the hardware failure mode effect analysis method according to any one of claims 1 to 8.

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